THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION

PROCESSES ON THE POST-WAR

RECOVERY OF UKRAINE AND
THE MIGRATION POLICIES OF
THE EU AND EAP COUNTRIES
THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION
PROCESSES ON THE POST-WAR
RECOVERY OF UKRAINE AND
THE MIGRATION POLICIES OF
THE EU AND EAP COUNTRIES

The present study focuses on the current processes of forced

emigration, with respect to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) as an initiative
aimed at developing civilised migration processes with the EU countries.
Russia’s full-scale aggression has created new challenges and threats
for Ukraine itself, for the EU countries as providers of temporary asylum
to Ukrainians fleeing the war, and for other countries hosting Ukrainian
refugees. The latter include the EaP countries — Moldova, Georgia,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus.
The most important challenge facing Ukraine today is emigration,
a huge flow of forced migrants to the EU. The ongoing war may
provoke further relocation of Ukrainians abroad, although its intensity
and direction will depend on many factors. The intensification of
migration processes in Europe is a geopolitical challenge for
both member states and the European Union as a whole.
Effective management of migration flows is in the common interest of
all individual participants and the EU as a union. Migration regulation
has become one of the most dynamic and controversial areas of the
EU’s home affairs and justice.
Therefore, this study is an interdisciplinary one, aimed at addressing
complex problems, the relevance of which is due to a number of
interrelated issues. The study consists of four sections and appendices.
The present study focuses on the current processes of forced
emigration, with respect to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) as an initiative
aimed at developing civilised migration processes with the EU countries.
Russia’s full-scale aggression has created new challenges and threats
for Ukraine itself, for the EU countries as providers of temporary asylum
to Ukrainians fleeing the war, and for other countries hosting Ukrainian
refugees. The latter include the EaP countries — Moldova, Georgia,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus.

2
SUMMARY

Section 1 presents the general overview of migration and mobility in

the EaP format and EU-Ukraine cooperation in the field of migration,
highlighting the main areas of the EU migration policy and the tasks of
Ukraine and the EU in the national security sector, of which migration is
one of components.

New external and internal challenges and threats have emerged with
the outbreak of a large-scale war in Ukraine, evoking the crisis in the Eastern
Partnership and uncertainty about its future prospects. The migration issue
has led to a revision of the approaches underlying the EaP initiative and the
European Neighbourhood Policy. The emigration crisis has further revealed
a number of limitations for the initiative’s development, achievement of its
main goals and adaptation to new challenges in politics, economy, security and

migration. In these settings, the EU also needs to actively seek new strategies
and new approaches to cooperation.

Despite the EaP’s achievements, there are still limitations to the further
development of the initiative, achievement of its main goals and adaptation.
As of today, the EU’s eastern policy has several problematic aspects, namely:

  The European Union still has no consolidated position on the develop-

ment of relations with the Eastern European region;

  The European Union lacks effective instruments for implementing its

eastern policy; Eastern European countries do not have a common vision
for implementing foreign policy and conducting domestic reforms.

  Most importantly, the programme did not eliminate any of the security
problems of the six countries located on the EU’s eastern borders and
did not contribute to the resolution of their territorial disputes.

The weakest segments of the EaP initiative are security and the lack
of consensus within the EU on the ultimate goal of building relations with
neighbouring countries. The EaP’s declared goal of strengthening the
resilience of the institutions and societies of the six participating countries
has been put on hold. For the EU, this situation raises the issue of developing
effective tools for implementing its eastern policy in line with current realities,
and, accordingly, a flexible and differentiated approach to the Eastern
Partnership.

In terms of migration and mobility, the EaP initiative was mainly related
to the EU’s security, focusing on the prevention and fight against illegal

3
 THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION PROCESSES ON THE POST-WAR RECOVERY...

migration, readmission, visas, border management and labour migration.

The EU’s external cooperation in the field of migration has been developing
mainly in Eastern Europe.

The basic principles of EU-Ukraine cooperation in the field of migration

are set forth in Title III of the Association Agreement, but they only define
general areas and principles of cooperation. Meanwhile, partner countries
would like to see a greater emphasis on their own specific interests and
needs, such as access to additional legal migration opportunities or additional
migration and development initiatives. However, so far, the stated goals
have not been fully achieved. One of the reasons is that the relations
between the EU and third countries within migration regulation can be
described as asymmetric interdependence, where the EU holds a stronger
position. In most cases, the EU offered financial contributions rather than
opportunities for labour migration and mobility, which was the main interest
of partner countries. At the same time, Ukraine’s national security objectives
have not been fully achieved in the framework of EU-Ukraine cooperation
in the field of migration.

The main instruments of EU’s interaction with countries of origin (migration

donors) have traditionally been cooperation in the field of mobility and
circular migration. Moreover, promotion of circular or return migration, that
is, temporary repeated departures with periodic returns to the home country,
was arranged as a separate area of cooperation. This migration movement
model was beneficial for both countries of origin and destination, as the
former did not lose their population, and the latter did not spend efforts and
money on integration of migrants. At the same time, countries of destination
received the labour force they needed, and countries of origin received
remittances earned by their citizens abroad — an important source of foreign
exchange earnings for development. Achieving circularity was intended,
among other things, to prevent damage to developing countries caused by
the brain drain.

In the meantime, the EU is actively developing initiatives aimed at

addressing the shortage of skilled labour in the Union and strengthening
migration cooperation with partner countries through recruiting, including from
Ukraine (Talent Partnerships,1 New Avenues for Legal Labour Migration, etc.)

1
Talent partnerships, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/legal-migration-
and-integration/talent-partnerships_en.

4
SUMMARY

This raises the question of how best to take into account the interests of
partner countries within the migration cooperation mechanism.

Section 2 contains a general analysis of migration processes in the EaP

countries, an overview of the specifics of migration processes in Ukraine,
and the factors affecting migration trends. In addition, it discusses the
changes in the EU’s migration paradigm as a result of russian large-scale
aggression against Ukraine and the measures taken by EU countries to
support forced emigrants from Ukraine.

Ukraine, like most low-income countries with inconsistent reforms, has

experienced significant waves of migration since the late 1990s. Predominantly
it was voluntary labour migration, with heterogeneous migration waves. In
2004-2006, the country was even considered a migrant-receiving country,
but since 2014, the migration situation in Ukraine has been changing
radically. The country has gained the status of one of the largest labour
donors in Europe among the EaP countries and has been included in the list
of leading labour suppliers, especially for neighbouring countries.

Most migrants from the EaP countries are characterised by circular

migration, which involves working in an unskilled cluster as temporary
labour migrants. Migrants from Ukraine differ from their counterparts from
elsewhere in the world by their qualifications. A characteristic feature is
the distribution of migrants from the EaP countries in less skilled sectors
and professions, despite the fact that they are usually younger and better
educated than other migrant groups. A large share of migrants from Ukraine
had technical and engineering degrees, but only a small proportion worked
in high-skilled sectors (financial services in the UK or IT in Poland).

Migration flows from Ukraine to the EU grew rapidly with the outbreak of
hostilities in the Donbas. The dynamics of the number of Ukrainian asylum
applicants showed a sharp increase since 2013, peaking in 2015. Despite
the high rate of residence permits granted from 2014 to 2022, the level of
recognised asylum applications was extremely low. The broad demographic
profile of asylum seekers suggests that citizens from the EaP countries have
in fact used the EU asylum system to improve their socio-economic situation.
The observed mixed flows of forced and voluntary migration from the EaP
countries have actually called into question the effectiveness of the EU
asylum and international protection system.

5
 THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION PROCESSES ON THE POST-WAR RECOVERY...

Starting from 24 February 2022, the emigration of Ukrainian citizens

abroad has changed from labour to forced migration, which is directly related
to the onset of a full-scale war and combat action in Ukraine. The reasons for
migration from Ukraine have changed fundamentally, with the main reasons
for Ukrainians to leave the country being hostilities and security issues.

Naturally, the key factors and decision-making in forced migration are

markedly different from those in voluntary migration. The latter category
travels on its own free will, in an organised manner and preparing for a
short- or long-term search for education, work, or business abroad. In the
meantime, displaced persons and refugees are forced to leave the country as
a result of the use of force, violence, persecution or war.

The scale and speed of response to the migration flow from Ukraine is
one of the features that the European Union perceives as a distinguishing
factor from previous migration waves. Ukrainian war refugees were imme-
diately able to directly benefit from temporary protection status, which
provides protection comparable to refugee status. Currently, Ukrainian
nationals account for 98% of all temporary protection recipients in the EU.
By exercising this right, refugees do not have to apply for asylum until their
temporary protection status is terminated. Therefore, until they formally apply
for international protection, they shall not be considered asylum seekers in
the strict sense of the word. Not only the EU, but also the EaP countries,
including Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, are actively involved in
providing temporary protection.

It is important that, in the context of disagreements on European

migration policy, temporary protection for Ukrainian citizens makes it possible
to establish a balance in terms of equal distribution between states: asylum
seekers will be able to move freely within the EU. Therefore, the Dublin
Convention, which assigns responsibility for processing asylum applications
to the first country of entry of an asylum seeker, is not applied in relation to
migrants from Ukraine.

Nevertheless, refugees are unevenly distributed across the EU. As of the

end of March 2023, the average number of temporary protection recipients
from Ukraine was 8.7 per thousand people, with the highest rates observed
in the Czech Republic (41.1 per 1,000 population), Estonia (41.1), Poland (36.1),
Lithuania (23.2) and Bulgaria (22.5).

6
SUMMARY

NUMBER OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES PER THOUSAND INHABITANTS

IN OECD COUNTRIES AS OF MID-SEPTEMBER 2022
Czech Republic 41.1
Estonia 41.1
Poland 36.1
Lithuania 23.2
Bulgaria 22.5
Latvia 20.2
Slovakia 17.2
Germany 12.1
Ireland 9.3
Austria 9,1
Switzerland 7.0
Finland 7.0
Denmark 5.9
Israel 5.9
Norway 4.9
Portugal 4.8
Belgium 4.8
Sweden 4.5
The Netherlands 4.4
Iceland 4.0
Slovenia 3.6
Hungary 3.0
Spain 3.0
Italy 2.7
Canada 2.2
UK 1.9
Greece 1.8
Turkey 1.7
France 1.5
US 0.4

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 THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION PROCESSES ON THE POST-WAR RECOVERY...

FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR A SINGLE UKRAINIAN REFUGEE IN ACCOMMODATION

PER MONTH IN EUROPE AS OF JUNE 2022, BY SELECTED COUNTRY (IN EUROS)
Germany 449.0
Ireland 412.0
Finland 323.21
Denmark 323.0
Belgium 280.0
The Netherlands 260.0
Luxembourg 255.28
Spain 220.0
Sweden 207.0
Czech Republic 205.0
France 204.0
UK 197.71
Estonia 150.0
Italy 150.0
Portugal 147.0
Lithuania 129.0
Slovenia 127.0
Latvia 109.0
Croatia 105.0
Romania 104.0
Norway 90.33
Greece 75.0
Slovakia 69.0
Hungary 60.6
Austria 40.0
Poland 15.09

8
SUMMARY

As of September 2023, Germany hosted the largest number of Ukrainian

migrants, overtaking Poland. Thus, there are about 1.1 million Ukrainians in
Germany and 990,000 in Poland.

CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES

BY COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE, 2022-2023

29%
Poland 42%

26%
Germany 18%
8%
Czech Republic 11% 4%
Italy 5%
34%
Other countries 23%

І wave ІІ wave
In addition to the temporary protection mechanism for Ukrainian citizens, on
27 April 2022, the European Commission proposed to simplify legal migration
to the EU,2 in particular, by allowing application not only from the territory of
an EU member state where a person wants to work, but also from the person’s
country of residence. The initiative includes a pilot project for Ukrainians who
left because of the russian invasion.3

The temporary protection mechanism also includes the possibility of

employment. At the same time, the EU’s attitude towards war refugees from
Ukraine is fundamentally different from that to refugees from other countries.
Probably, one of key reasons for the Europe’s positive attitude treatment of
refugees from Ukraine is the fact that asylum seekers from the Middle East
face more serious obstacles in terms of socio-cultural integration into
European society. In particular, German experts believe that compared
to refugees who arrived in their country in 2015 and whose integration
required enormous government efforts to implement a wide range of training,

2
Legal migration: Attracting skills and talent to the EU. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_2654.
3
Rapid Response by EU+ Countries to Address the Needs of Displaced People from Ukraine. EUAA,
4.03.22. https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2022-03/2022_situational_update_9_Ukraine_
EN_1.pdf.

9
 THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION PROCESSES ON THE POST-WAR RECOVERY...

orientation and professional development measures, Ukrainian citizens are

more likely to be suitable for the local labour market due to higher level of
their education.4

In Europe, there are significant differences in the integration of Ukrainian

refugees in labour markets of various countries, which leads to different
adaptations of Ukrainians. For example, in Germany, 12% to 20% of Ukrainian
refugees are currently employed (according to various estimates),5 while in
Slovenia this figure is only 6%. In Poland and the Czech Republic, around
two-thirds of Ukrainian refugees have jobs.6 In particular, as many as
98,000 out of 339,000 Ukrainians with a temporary residence permit in
the Czech Republic have permanent jobs. In Estonia, about 11,000 out of
35,000 Ukrainians have found work. Similarly, in Lithuania, 17,000 out of
68,000 Ukrainian refugees are officially employed. One of the main reasons
for Ukrainian refugees’ low employment rate in Germany is the relative
generosity of financial aid, which can be several times higher than in poorer
countries (up to €200 in Poland and the Czech Republic vs over €500 in
Germany). Another reason is Germany’s cumbersome bureaucracy.

The current debate on the future of temporary protection for displaced

Ukrainians revolves around the «dual intent» concept, which on the one hand
supports the development of skills that allow an individual to participate in
the host society’s economic life, while enhancing the prospects for successful
return and reintegration at home for Ukraine’s rapid recovery. The search for
such long-term solutions continues in 2023.

The European Commission is currently proposing to extend temporary

protection for Ukrainians who have left for the EU due to russian aggression
from 4 March 2024 through 3 March 2025. Moreover, the European Parliament
plans to consider a Directive amending and establishing common rules for
obtaining permanent residence status in the EU for third-country nationals «to

4
«Refugees from Ukraine face considerable uncertainty about their future». — IAB Forum, https://www.
iab-forum.de/en/refugees-from-ukraine-face-considerable-uncertainty-about-their-future/.
5
80% of Ukrainian refugees in Germany jobless — Die Welt, https://www.azerbaycan24.com/en/80-of-
ukrainian-refugees-in-germany-jobless-die-welt/.
6
Ibid.

10
SUMMARY

boost their integration».7 However, the conditions for extending the protection
status are at the discretion of each country. Such steps may indicate the EU’s
intention to compensate for its depopulation at the expense of Ukrainians,
especially since millions are already in Europe and are socialising, learning the
language, and educating their children.

On the other hand, there are already signs of weakening resilience of

the countries hosting displaced persons from Ukraine. Due to budgetary
constraints, Eastern European countries are cutting funding on assistance
programmes for Ukrainian refugees. In particular, Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Slovakia have already taken such measures. Specifically, they will reduce
expenditures on emergency housing and cancel the «solidarity contributions»
for homeowners who have taken in Ukrainians. This is also due to the fact that
a significant number of Ukrainian refugees have found jobs, and the need to
support them has decreased.

Section 3 reviews the impact of migration on the economic develop-

ment of countries that receive and supply migrants. In particular, it
analyses the structural changes in the European economy that are forcing
most EU countries to significantly liberalise migration legislation and
introduce new instruments for attracting labour from other regions. The
section also analyses the impact of emigration on Ukraine’s recovery, in
particular the role of human capital as the most important factor in the
country’s socio-economic revival.

Depopulation trends are mounting in Ukraine, which is a serious threat to

the country that needs to be addressed immediately. In order to accelerate
economic growth and restore the country, it is necessary to significantly
increase its population, including economically active part. It is the increase
in the population, especially the working age population, that plays a key
role in economic growth. After all, the consumer component accounts for
about 70% of the GDP structure.

According to the Ministry of Economy, Ukraine needs to attract 3.1 to

4.5 million people to the labour force by 2032 in order to grow at a rate of
7% per annum, and this is only «as of now». While many Ukrainian refugees

7
Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL concerning the
status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents (recast) OM/2022/650 final, https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022PC0650.

11
 THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION PROCESSES ON THE POST-WAR RECOVERY...

are still working remotely for their Ukrainian employers, some are returning.
But once these ties are severed, the staff shortage could increase signi-
ficantly. According to preliminary estimates, Ukraine’s post-war recovery
will require at least USD 411 billion,8 which is about 2.5 times higher than the
country’s pre-war GDP.

Therefore, emigration from Ukraine has a direct impact on national

security, especially its economic and social components, as it raises the
question of «who will rebuild the country after the war». This requires
addressing the issue of returning Ukrainian citizens who fled the war,
especially given that the emigration of Ukrainians provides for adequate social
protection and legal support that guarantees the right to settle, work, and
study in the EU. The right to employment is readily enjoyed by many Ukrainian
migrants, as most of them are women of working age.

On the other hand, migration is becoming an instrument for EU’s long-

term growth. Despite the significant costs of receiving migrants, it offers
impressive economic benefits to host countries, which, amidst the growing
shortage of skilled labour, becomes one of the main factors for attracting
migrants, especially young and skilled ones.

Section 4 analyses emigration challenges, in particular, the motives and

factors of return/non-return of Ukrainian emigrants, including economic
ones. Also, the section proposes approaches and ways to influence
migration behaviour.

So, bringing its citizens back home is the main task of Ukraine recovery
policy. Unfortunately, it is still difficult to tell what the return of Ukrainians
will look like, and one should be very careful even in making predictions. The
decision of individuals and families on whether to return to the country they
fled or stay in the host country is the result of a complex combination of
factors and unique situations of every refugee.

8
Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction needs seen reaching $411 bln — World Bank,
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-recovery-reconstruction-needs-seen-113001550.html?
guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cucmJjLnVhLw&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAADNw71j03xws_
Rc0R4V5YEqe0NL9yFN-R_O7U2jp8Z6C6oB_tcCobu4gE-A5dtkUCNCV16rAh04kF38eReNAWIJzB8o_
V9vZ0Lcm5xGjzkksjSfPHyCBouCVMPey42U2cg5DuhVYWJLB9QgF6stFGCkrCOt6h5tfExVt.

12
SUMMARY

In particular, decisions will be made based on:

  
the duration of hostilities, both in Ukraine as a whole and in the
regions from which citizens have left, as well as the level of destruction
(the incentives to return weaken with an extended duration and signi-
ficant destruction);

  
the economic dynamics in the government-controlled territories,
including in terms of construction of housing and social infrastructure
(slow recovery with no attention to living standards significantly
reduces the attractiveness of such regions);

  the status of Ukrainians in European countries, rules and regulations

for the employment of migrants (a long stay in a «new» country along
with employment opportunities significantly increase incentives to
stay, provided that there are appropriate legal conditions);

  the state and prospects of socio-economic dynamics in the host country

(sustainable balanced growth, stable employment, satisfactory
purchasing power with low inflation are additional factors that
influence the decision to return to Ukraine).

At present, there are arguments both for and against the return.

The following factors can be attributed to the motives for return:

The emotional difficulty of living in another country and homesickness

are powerful incentives to return.

Also, most returnees are those who have had problems finding jobs
and housing abroad, as well as those who have old relatives back home.

Language barrier is another obstacle that prevents many Ukrainians

from getting skilled jobs in their field of study. In the EU, they mostly offer
unskilled work in the service sector. At the same time, the vast majority of
both women and men from Ukraine have higher education and are reluctant
to accept any job. Those who were motivated as labour migrants had
already found a suitable job before the outbreak of large-scale war.

A truly powerful incentive for return is the fact that the doors to Ukraine
will be wide open. Unlike many refugees in the world today, Ukrainians have
not fled dictatorship or internal conflict.

13
 THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION PROCESSES ON THE POST-WAR RECOVERY...

Public Opinion

IF YOU HAVE RETURNED HOME FROM ABROAD,

WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR YOUR RETURN?9
of respondents

Missing home and emotional difficulty of living in a foreign country 48.8

Lack of own financial resources 18.0
Shelling of your settlement have reduced or stopped 17.1
Difficulties in communication, lack of knowledge of the language abroad 16.7
You returned from abroad for some time and plan to leave again 14.4
Lack of affordable housing 13.8
Difficulties with finding a job that matches your qualification 12.6
Ideological reasons: it is every Ukrainian’s duty to be with his / her Homeland at such times 12.3
Hostilities in or near your settlement have ceased 10.7
An opportunity to find or resume work in Ukraine 10.7
The need to care for parents / children / close relatives 7.2
Social benefits abroad have been cancelled 5.3
Temporary asylum in the host country has expired 4.5
The need to find employment abroad 3.8
Inability to work remotely 3.3
The infrastructure of your permanent place or residence has been restored 1.6
Your settlement has been liberated or de-occupied 0.0
None of the above 0.8
Other 2.8
Hard to say 5.6

9
The face-to-face survey was conducted by the Razumkov centre’s sociological service
on 3-10 August 2023 in Vinnytsya, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpatya, Zaporizhzhya,
Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv,
Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi oblasts and the city of Kyiv (survey in
Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv and Kherson regions was only carried out in government-controlled
areas not subject to hostilities).
A total of 2,016 respondents aged 18+ were interviewed. The theoretical sampling error does not
exceed 2.3%.

14
SUMMARY

WERE THEIR QUALIFICATIONS OR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

IN UKRAINE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN HIRING?
% of respondents

Mostly yes 16.3

Mostly no 53.8

I don’t know 29.9

DID THEY NEED TO KNOW THE LANGUAGE OF THE HOST COUNTRY?

% of respondents

Yes 52.2

No 28.7

I don’t 19.1
know

The sociological study has shown that the factors that will facilitate the
refugees’ return to Ukraine include the creation of employment or pro-
fessional development opportunities (mentioned by 89% of experts).
The opinion that people will return feeling an inner call to participate in
Ukraine’s recovery was significantly less popular (41% of experts agreed
with this, while 37% disagreed).

Reasons (motives) for no return include the following:

Multiple latest studies show that the motivation for further emigration is
not yet decreasing, and as the war continues, the number of refugees not
willing to return to Ukraine may even increase.

The formalisation of the status of Ukrainians in the EU essentially reduces

the likelihood of their return home for permanent residence. Each year,

15
 THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION PROCESSES ON THE POST-WAR RECOVERY...

the prolongation of hostilities10 adjusts the refugees’ life plans towards

«ingrowth» in a new social reality.

Given the qualifications and average age of forced migrants from Ukraine
and better attitude towards them compared to, for example, Syrian migrants,
it is reasonable to assume that EU countries are interested in integrating
migrants after temporary protection ends. The determining factors include
conditions in the country of asylum and the level of integration of refugees.
Simplification of residence permits may be another argument in favour of
staying in Europe even after the war.

The extension of temporary protection mechanisms by EU countries can

be seen as an additional argument for Ukrainian refugees to stay in Europe.
After all, the return will depend not only on the security situation in Ukraine,
but also on economic conditions.

Uncertainty and inability of most of those who have left to fulfil them-
selves «plays» against their return. Before the war, Ukraine’s economy had
a complex structure and was characterised by a higher level of division of
labour than it will certainly have immediately after the war. The structure of
the economy and, accordingly, the skills that will be in demand after the
conflict is over are also unknown.

The prospects for return are directly linked to successes of the post-war
recovery. Reduced funding for education and healthcare can hardly give
reasons for optimistic forecasts. The issue of urban amenities, the level of
healthcare and education for children is also of major importance.

Another significant factor is the large-scale destruction, especially in the

east of the country. According to preliminary estimates, at least 140,000
residential buildings have been destroyed, including about 18,000 multi-
storey buildings. Eastern towns and villages with tens of thousands of
residents have been almost completely or totally wiped out. In addition to
the housing stock, the social infrastructure has also suffered critical damage.

10
According to the latest extended medium-term macroeconomic forecast of the
National Bank of Ukraine, active hostilities will continue until mid-2024. See Inflation Report, July 2023 —
NBU, https://bank.gov.ua/ua/news/all/inflyatsiyniy-zvit-lipen-2023-roku.

16
SUMMARY

The breakup of marriages as a result of living apart for a long time is another
important factor. Before the war, as many as 60% of marriages in the country
broke up, but after the onset of the war, this figure further increased in families
where one of the spouses (usually a woman) went abroad. Over the past year,
the service of «remote divorce» has become particularly popular, with the
number of divorces increasing by 33%. And if women no longer want to return
home to restore their families but form the new ones abroad, the chances of
their return to Ukraine are close to zero.

These assumptions are confirmed by the results of the Razumkov Centre’s

sociological studies. In particular, the overwhelming majority of experts (85%)11
believe that the longer the hostilities last, the less likely refugees are to return
to their hometowns. 85% of experts share the opinion that Ukrainians who
received social assistance at home and left Ukraine after 24 February 2022
for countries with higher social protection standards are less likely to return
as long as they receive assistance and benefits in these countries. 83% of
experts agree that people who have worked abroad seasonally or permanently
will have more opportunities to stay in these countries and bring their families
with them.

Other negative factors include the uncertainty of the security situation —

it can change quickly as there is a possibility of intensification or resumption
of hostilities (83% of experts mentioned this factor), and no work (76%
of experts said that not all refugees will be able to immediately find work
upon return). Some vulnerable categories may also face problems with
return: 78% of experts think that people with disabilities and limited mobility
may find it more difficult to return to where they lived before 24 February
2022, and 61% feel that members of discriminated against groups in Ukraine
are likely to stay longer elsewhere, where the level of discrimination is lower
than in Ukraine.

11
The expert survey was conducted by the Razumkov Centre’s sociological service in
August 2023. A total of 54 experts (representatives of state authorities, civil society and volunteer
organisations, academics) were interviewed.

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PLEASE ASSESS THE LIKELIHOOD OF A MASS RETURN

OF MIGRANTS TO UKRAINE AFTER THE END OF HOSTILITIES
% of the experts

Only small proportion

33.8
of our citizens will return

Most of our citizens will return 28.6

Adult refugees will return to Ukraine,

while their children of senior school age 20.5
or university students will remain abroad

Hard to say 17.1

CONCLUSIONS AND POLITICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

It can be generally stated that regional migration in 2023 currently

depends on many factors and has very uncertain prospects of returning to
pre-2022 or pre-pandemic patterns. The war in Ukraine is already evolving
into a protracted conflict that will threaten both the economic situation of
millions of people and the hopes of displaced Ukrainians to return home soon.
It also means that large-scale displacement will remain one of key features of
the region for years to come. In view of this, displaced Ukrainians, their host
countries in Europe and the Ukrainian government alike will have to deal
with the new circumstances, adapting temporary modalities to longer-term
solutions.

Having summarised the various proposals, one can formulate three main
directions of Ukraine’s policy on the return of forced migrants:

  Ensuring analytical work and communication, which should become the

foundation for the process of voluntary return. Ukraine has to cooperate
with other countries and establish effective communication with migrants
in order to realise its own interests in the return of citizens.

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SUMMARY

  Meeting basic needs, which includes restoring housing and social

infrastructure, addressing employment issues and creating jobs with
decent pay.

  Introducing incentives, including for investment and business, and

working with the diaspora.

Political Recommendations for the government of Ukraine

The return of Ukrainian forc ed migrants to their homeland should be

considered solely as a duty (constitutional obligation), rather than a «right»,
«manifestation of goodwill» or «desire» of the Ukrainian state as such.

The Ukrainian state, primarily in the person of its supreme authorities,

officials and civil servants, is directly responsible for the fact that millions of
Ukrainians became forced emigrants after the onset of russia’s full-scale
military invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, because in the first days/
weeks of invasion, the state was actually not ready to protect its citizens from
aggression, to defend their lives and health, as well as to properly ensure
other human and civil rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution
of Ukraine.

On the other hand, Article 3 of the Constitution clearly states that an

individual, his / her life and health, honour and dignity, inviolability and
security are recognised in Ukraine as the highest social value; human rights
and freedoms and guarantees thereof determine the essence and course of
activities of the state; affirming and ensuring human rights and freedoms is
the main duty of the state. At the same time, the state is answerable to an
individual for its activities. In this regard:

1. Ukraine, as a state, needs to develop and adopt a document that

would regulate the basic issues of proper organisation by the state of the
voluntary return of all forced migrants to Ukraine.

2. By its intrinsic nature and socio-political essence, such a document

should be of a regulatory (generally binding) nature with an appropriate level
of legitimacy. The title (official name) of a document could be the «National
Plan for the Return to the Homeland of Ukrainian Migrants Forced to Leave
by the Russian War in Ukraine» (the National Plan).

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3. The draft National Plan should be prepared by the head of state

(President of Ukraine) in close cooperation with the government (Cabinet
of Ministers of Ukraine) and submitted to the parliament (Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine) for approval. After all, it is the President of Ukraine who is the
guarantor of human and citizen rights and freedoms (part 2, Article 102 of
the Constitution of Ukraine); the Cabinet of Ministers is directly obliged to
«take measures to ensure human and citizen rights and freedoms» (part 2,
Article 116 of the Constitution of Ukraine); and the Verkhovna Rada has the
exclusive right to approve national programmes for economic and social
development of the country (clause 6, part 1, Article 85 of the Constitution
of Ukraine).

4. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine should approve the National Plan

as a separate / special law, since it is «exclusively the laws of Ukraine that
determine», in particular, «human and citizen rights and freedoms, the
guarantees of these rights and freedoms; the main duties of a citizen <....>
the fundamentals of social protection, the forms and types of pension
provision; the principles of the regulation of labour and employment, marriage,
family, the protection of childhood, motherhood, fatherhood; upbringing,
education, culture and health care; ecological safety <….> the principles of
demographic and migration processes regulation» (clauses 1, 6, 10, part 1,
Article 92 of the Constitution of Ukraine).

5. Passing / adoption of the law approving the National Plan by the

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine will mean a) guaranteeing the stability of the
National Plan’s provisions as they can only be amended through the appro-
priate legislative procedure; b) implementing the National Plan as provisions
and prescriptions of an ordinary law by all subjects of state legal relations
across Ukraine; c) ensuring the existence of legally enshrined obligations
of the government, other state executive bodies, as well as local self-
governments and their officials to implement the National Plan.

6. The structure of the National Plan could include (if necessary) several
«national programmes», for example, the National Programme of Housing
for Ukrainian Forced Migrants Who Returned to their Homeland, the
National Programme of Employment for Ukrainian Forced Migrants Who
Returned to their Homeland, the National Programme of Entrepreneurship
for Ukrainian Forced Migrants Who Returned to their Homeland, etc.

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SUMMARY

7. The National Plan should be considered as an integral part of the

implementation of Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic course (part 5 of
the Preamble to the Constitution of Ukraine), part of practical measures
on the path to Ukraine’s full membership in the European Union.

Political Recommendations for the EU

1. The unprecedented migration flows of Ukrainians to the EU countries

require significant adjustments to the European Neighbourhood Policy,
the Eastern Partnership, and the principles of economic, security, and
humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. Ukraine’s cooperation with the EU in
the field of migration should primarily aim at achieving Ukraine’s national
security objectives.

2. The current situation points at the need of developing ideological

foundations and effective tools for implementing the eastern policy in line
with current realities. It is primarily about recognising the new status of
Ukraine as an EU candidate and as an eastern outpost in defending Europe’s
democratic values. That is why the EaP format in EU-Ukraine relations should
be replaced by a policy of accelerated integration along with economic,
infrastructural, and humanitarian modernisation of Ukraine, which will not
only become a tool for deepening humanitarian and sectoral cooperation
with the EU but will also address controversial issues and processes in the
field of migration, including the task of facilitating the return of Ukrainian
migrants and displaced persons to post-war Ukraine.

3. Unlike other migration cases, Ukraine has consistently expressed

interest in returning its citizens after the end of the war, emphasising their
role in recovery and reconstruction. Therefore, integration measures for
Ukrainian recipients of temporary protection should pursue a «dual intent»
and contribute to the development of skills that would allow an individual to
economically participate in host society, while enhancing his/her prospects
for successful return. After all, the available options after exiting temporary
protection include return, another type of international protection, or
transition to other categories of residence. A timely debate on the best ways
for «dual intent» would better inform EU planning, but most importantly,
provide a clearer perspective for the millions of Ukrainians who have been
forced to leave their country or may do so over the next year.

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4. Updated EU initiatives and programmes to support the return of

migrants and Ukraine’s reintegration programmes should build on close
cooperation between state authorities, local governments, and all other
stakeholders, including civil society, both in Ukraine and the EU. In inter-
national practice, such cooperation is considered an imperative to avoid
gaps and duplications of assistance in the countries of origin and host
countries. At the same time, it is advisable to use the best international
practice, introduce common harmonised funding standards, and establish
effective interaction and information exchange between the participants in the
process.

5. It is expedient to actively apply measures of the so-called return

migration policy, aimed at providing a different vector for migration move-
ments and designed to influence potential migrants. The return may be
voluntary or not. In this case, it is about re-emigration, which is carried out
through voluntary repatriation. In international practice, return migration
mechanisms may include indirect incentives. In this case, special state
programmes are either absent or temporary, but replaced by measures to
support return migrants, including certain socio-cultural or professional
groups.

6. Availability of affordable housing, especially in regions destroyed or

damaged by the invader, as well as appropriate social infrastructure are
important factors affecting migrants’ decisions to return to Ukraine. The EU
has considerable experience in accelerated construction of social housing,
and this can be particularly useful for Ukraine. Such construction in Ukraine
will obviously require additional resources, including labour. However,
Europe announcing the intent to involve displaced Ukrainians in erecting
new EU-funded towns, and in fact in building housing for themselves (which
also includes employment in the newly formed service sector), would send
a powerful signal to displaced people to return.

7. A sharp reduction in political and security risks could be achieved by

the EU banking system providing guarantees for bank loans for investment
projects (purchase of equipment, technology, management know-how)
that would allow the integration of Ukrainian businesses into value chains
in European markets after the war. The expansion of investment that would
include insurance guarantees from European banks could increase demand

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SUMMARY

for qualifications in competitive areas that are considered as requiring

special training, including through retraining. It would be appropriate for
the EU to develop and finance retraining courses for Ukrainians in relatively
safe regions of Ukraine. This would contribute to both the adaptability
of workers to return and a better response to the needs of the Ukrainian
economy, and thus to faster practical realisation of recovery projects.

8. The fullest possible opening of the EU labour market to Ukrainians

after the war has a high potential for migrants’ return to Ukraine. By doing
so, Europe would give confidence to Ukrainians who initially left for the EU
due to the war that their later return to the EU will be unimpeded (rather
than linked to the right to temporary residence), and thus increase their
inclination to return (at least temporarily) to Ukraine.

9. The task of maintaining intellectual potential is becoming increasingly

urgent. Many scientists who have left the country have proven their quali-
fications and already joined research and applied programmes and projects.
It is advisable to expand scientific and research programmes, in particular,
based on the experience of the Horizon 2020 — the largest transnational
research and innovation support programme in history with a budget of about
€95.5 billion for 2021-2027.

In the meantime, it should be borne in mind that foreign aid alone cannot
solve the problems of economic underdevelopment, unemployment and
emigration, but it can create conditions for the necessary social changes.
The emigration issue can only be addressed by the country exporting its
population. If such a country fails to take economic measures to restore
a decent standard of living, the effect of aid will be temporary.

The direct effect of foreign investment becomes effective only if it

creates jobs, primarily in domestic companies and sectors. The indirect effect
is achieved through stimulating growth and modernisation of the entire
economy, introducing new technologies, organisational and managerial
know-how, improving the skills of the workforce and facilitating access to
global markets.

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 THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION PROCESSES ON THE POST-WAR RECOVERY...

Public Opinion

DO YOU THINK THE EU COUNTRIES SHOULD INTRODUCE CERTAIN MEASURES

TO RETURN UKRAINIAN CITIZENS HOME?
% of respondents

Yes 64.8

No 13.0

Hard to say 22.2

WHAT MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN BY EU COUNTRIES

TO ENCOURAGE THE RETURN OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS HOME?
of respondents

European governments should launch a legal process of mass return through repatriation
14.8
or deportation mechanisms

EU countries should introduce financial incentives for refugees to return home 46.3

Opportunities should be created for Ukrainians to return to the EU (if they wish), such as
opening the EU labour market, so that Ukrainian refugees do not fear that by leaving for 57.4
Ukraine they will lose the opportunity to return to the EU

Other measures 5.6

EU countries should take no measures in this direction 14.8

Hard to say 3.7

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