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Risk Assessment Handbook

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RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK
2

Bibliographic Reference:
Rovins, J.E.; Wilson, T.M.; Hayes, J.; Jensen, S. J.; Dohaney, J., Mitchell, J.;
Johnston, D.M.; Davies, A. 2015. Risk Assessment Handbook. GNS Science
Miscellaneous Series, 84. 71p.

ISSN Print: 1177-2441; ISSN Online: 1172-2886

ISBN Print: 978-0-908349-35-7; ISBN Online 978-0-908349-36-4
 3

Contents
GLOSSARY..................................................i CHAPTER 3: RISK ASSESSMENT
METHODS................................................34
LIST OF TABLES....................................... iv
Qualitative Risk Analysis...........................34
LIST OF FIGURES..................................... iv
Quantitative Risk Analysis.........................35
CHAPTER 1: UNDERSTANDING RISK
ASSESSMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF Risk Analysis.............................................37
DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT..............1
Mapping....................................................38
Risk Assessment.........................................5
Mapping Approaches...............................42
Risk Assessment for
Data Sharing Across Communities...........44
Disaster Risk Management.........................8
CHAPTER 4: RISK EVALUATION ...........45
Risk Assessment for
Disaster Mitigation.......................................9 Acceptable Levels of Risk.........................45
Risk Assessment for Societal Risk..............................................46
Disaster Preparedness..............................10
Methods to Determine Acceptable...........47
Risk Assessment for
Disaster Response....................................10 Cost-Benefit Analysis..........................48

Risk Assessment for ALARP.................................................48

Disaster Recovery.....................................10 CHAPTER 5: DECISIONS
Stakeholders and Partners........................10 AND COMMUNICATIONS.......................49

Spatial Scales of Who Decides What is Acceptable?...........49

Disaster Risk Assessment.........................16 Decision-Making Framework.....................49
Global Level........................................16 Decision-Making Styles.............................52
National Level......................................17 Communicating Risk Assessment.............54
Local Level..........................................18 Risk Communication Strategies................54
CHAPTER 2: RISK IDENTIFICATION......19 Purpose and Goals of
Risk Identification Methodologies.............21 Your Communication.................................55

Hazard Assessment..................................22 Practical Considerations...........................56

Exposure Assessment...............................22 Where to Get Help:

Information Sharing Protocols...................56
Vulnerability Assessment..........................24
Forms of Communication..........................57
Physical Vulnerability.................................30
Challenges to Risk Communication..........60
Social Vulnerability....................................31
Success of a Risk Communication............60
Economic Vulnerability..............................32
CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR FUTURE RISK ASSESSMENTS......63
REFERENCES..........................................65
 i

Glossary
The United Nations International Strategy Disaster risk: The potential disaster
for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR, losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods,
2009) provides the following definitions assets and services, which could occur to
to promote a common international a particular community or a society over
understanding within Disaster Risk some specified future time period.
Reduction work.
Disaster risk management: The
Acceptable risk: The level of potential systematic process of using administrative
losses that a society or community directives, organizations, and operational
considers acceptable given existing social, skills and capacities to implement
economic, political, cultural, technical and strategies, policies and improved coping
environmental conditions. capacities in order to lessen the adverse
impacts of hazards and the possibility of
Adaptation: The adjustment in natural
disaster.
or human systems in response to actual
or expected climatic stimuli or their Disaster risk reduction: The concept
effects, which moderates harm or exploits and practice of reducing disaster risks
beneficial opportunities. through systematic efforts to analyse and
manage the causal factors of disasters,
Building code: A set of ordinances or
including through reduced exposure to
regulations and associated standards
hazards, lessened vulnerability of people
intended to control aspects of the design,
and property, wise management of land
construction, materials, alteration and
and the environment, and improved
occupancy of structures that are necessary
preparedness for adverse events.
to ensure human safety and welfare,
including resistance to collapse and Disaster risk reduction plan: A
damage. document prepared by an authority, sector,
organization or enterprise that sets out
Coping capacity: The ability of people,
goals and specific objectives for reducing
organizations and systems, using available
disaster risks together with related actions
skills and resources, to face and manage
to accomplish these objectives.
adverse conditions, emergencies or
disasters. Early warning system: The set
of capacities needed to generate and
Corrective disaster risk
disseminate timely and meaningful
management: Management activities
warning information to enable individuals,
that address and seek to correct or reduce
communities and organizations threatened
disaster risks that are already present.
by a hazard to prepare and to act
Critical facilities: The primary physical appropriately and in sufficient time to
structures, technical facilities and systems reduce the possibility of harm or loss.
which are socially, economically or
Emergency management: The
operationally essential to the functioning
organization and management of
of a society or community, both in routine
resources and responsibilities for
circumstances and in the extreme
addressing all aspects of emergencies,
circumstances of an emergency.
in particular preparedness, response and
Disaster: A serious disruption of the initial recovery steps.
functioning of a community or a society
Exposure: People, property, systems, or
involving widespread human, material,
other elements present in hazard zones
economic or environmental losses and
that are thereby subject to potential losses.
impacts, which exceeds the ability of the
affected community or society to cope
using its own resources.
ii GLOSSARY

Extensive risk: The widespread risk National Platform for Disaster Risk
associated with the exposure of dispersed Reduction: A generic term for national
populations to repeated or persistent mechanisms for coordination and policy
hazard conditions of low or moderate guidance on disaster risk reduction that
intensity, often of a highly localized nature, are multi-sectorial and inter-disciplinary in
which can lead to debilitating cumulative nature, with public, private and civil society
disaster impacts. participation involving all concerned
entities within a country.
Forecast: Definite statement or statistical
estimate of the likely occurrence of a future Natural hazard: Natural process or
event or conditions for a specific area. phenomenon that may cause loss of life,
injury or other health impacts, property
Geological hazard: Geological process damage, loss of livelihoods and services,
or phenomenon that may cause loss of social and economic disruption, or
life, injury or other health impacts, property environmental damage.
damage, loss of livelihoods and services,
social and economic disruption, or Preparedness: The knowledge and
environmental damage. capacities developed by governments,
professional response and recovery
Hazard: A dangerous phenomenon, organizations, communities and individuals
substance, human activity or condition to effectively anticipate, respond to,
that may cause loss of life, injury or other and recover from, the impacts of likely,
health impacts, property damage, loss imminent or current hazard events or
of livelihoods and services, social and conditions.
economic disruption, or environmental
damage. Prevention: The outright avoidance of
adverse impacts of hazards and related
Hydrometeorological hazard: disasters.
Process or phenomenon of atmospheric,
hydrological or oceanographic nature Prospective disaster risk
that may cause loss of life, injury or other management: Management activities
health impacts, property damage, loss that address and seek to avoid the
of livelihoods and services, social and development of new or increased disaster
economic disruption, or environmental risks.
damage.
Public awareness: The extent of
Intensive risk: The risk associated common knowledge about disaster risks,
with the exposure of large concentrations the factors that lead to disasters and the
of people and economic activities to actions that can be taken individually
intense hazard events, which can lead to and collectively to reduce exposure and
potentially catastrophic disaster impacts vulnerability to hazards.
involving high mortality and asset loss.
Recovery: The restoration, and
Land-use planning: The process improvement where appropriate, of
undertaken by public authorities to facilities, livelihoods and living conditions
identify, evaluate and decide on different of disaster-affected communities, including
options for the use of land, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors.
consideration of long term economic,
social and environmental objectives and Residual risk: The risk that remains in
the implications for different communities unmanaged form, even when effective
and interest groups, and the subsequent disaster risk reduction measures are
formulation and promulgation of plans that in place, and for which emergency
describe the permitted or acceptable uses. response and recovery capacities must be
maintained.
Mitigation: The lessening or limitation
of the adverse impacts of hazards and
related disasters.
 iii

Resilience: The ability of a system, Structural measures: Any physical

community or society exposed to hazards construction to reduce or avoid possible
to resist, absorb, accommodate to and impacts of hazards, or application of
recover from the effects of a hazard in engineering techniques to achieve hazard-
a timely and efficient manner, including resistance and resilience in structures or
through the preservation and restoration of systems;
its essential basic structures and functions.
Non-structural measures:
Response: The provision of emergency Any measure not involving physical
services and public assistance during construction that uses knowledge, practice
or immediately after a disaster in order or agreement to reduce risks and impacts,
to save lives, reduce health impacts, in particular through policies and laws,
ensure public safety and meet the basic public awareness raising, training and
subsistence needs of the people affected. education.
Retrofitting: Reinforcement or Sustainable development:
upgrading of existing structures to Development that meets the needs of the
become more resistant and resilient to the present without compromising the ability of
damaging effects of hazards. future generations to meet their own needs.
Risk: The combination of the probability of Technological hazards: A hazard
an event and its negative consequences. originating from technological or industrial
conditions, including accidents, dangerous
Risk assessment: A methodology to procedures, infrastructure failures or
determine the nature and extent of risk by specific human activities, that may
analysing potential hazards and evaluating cause loss of life, injury, illness or other
existing conditions of vulnerability that health impacts, property damage, loss
together could potentially harm exposed of livelihoods and services, social and
people, property, services, livelihoods and economic disruption, or environmental
the environment on which they depend. damage.
Risk management: The systematic Vulnerability: The characteristics and
approach and practice of managing circumstances of a community, system
uncertainty to minimize potential harm and or asset that make it susceptible to the
loss. damaging effects of a hazard.
Risk transfer: The process of formally
or informally shifting the financial
consequences of particular risks from one
party to another whereby a household,
community, enterprise or state authority will
obtain resources from the other party after
a disaster occurs, in exchange for on-
going or compensatory social or financial
benefits provided to that other party.
Socio-natural hazard:
The phenomenon of increased
occurrence of certain geophysical and
hydrometeorological hazard events, such
as landslides, flooding, land subsidence
and drought, that arise from the interaction
of natural hazards with overexploited
or degraded land and environmental
resources.
iv LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

List of Tables
Table 1: Summary of issues commonly experienced for risk assessments in South
East Asia...........................................................................................................2
Table 2: Potential stakeholders and partners for risk assessment...............................11
Table 3: Competencies and professions for risk assessment......................................12
Table 4: Risk participants and functions......................................................................13
Table 5: Data requirements for risk assessment..........................................................20
Table 6: Example of building structural type classification..........................................25
Table 7: Typical observational damage survey methods and their characteristics.....26
Table 8: Building response to earthquake intensity scale............................................27
Table 9: Example of damage state categorisation.......................................................27
Table 10: Fragility and Vulnerability Functions...............................................................28
Table 11: Common social vulnerability metrics..............................................................31
Table 12: Risk matrix for qualitative risk assessment.....................................................34
Table 13: Selected hazard and risk assessment applications
and software packages used in South East Asia...........................................37
Table 14: Fundamental map elements...........................................................................39
Table 15: Decision-making styles...................................................................................53
Table 16: Benefits and limitations of different media platforms
for risk communication....................................................................................57
Table 17: 7Cs: Key features of ‘Best Practice’ science and risk communication ..........59

List of Figures
Figure 1: Risk assessment process.................................................................................7
Figure 2: Disaster risk management schematic...............................................................8
Figure 3: Planning for disaster risks...............................................................................18
Figure 4: General methodology for exposure assessment............................................23
Figure 5: Example of cyclone vulnerability curve for semi-,
and non-engineered buildings........................................................................30
Figure 6: Combining hazard and vulnerability information are critical for risk maps.....41
Figure 7: A deterministic map of a typhoon track and wind speeds.............................42
Figure 8: A probabilistic map of a typhoon track and wind speeds..............................43
Figure 9: Acceptable levels of societal risk...................................................................47
 1

Understanding Risk Assessment in the

Context of Disaster Risk Management
South East Asia is one of the most hazard-prone regions of the world. Typhoons are
regular occurrences between May and November, bringing high winds, flooding and
landslides. Earthquakes are also frequent in the region. Disasters in 2013 caused
USD$128 million in damages and impacted 57 million people (ESCAP, 2015a). Disaster
risk management (DRM) has never been so important.
The foundation for DRM is understanding the hazards, and the exposure and vulnerability
of people and assets to those hazards. By quantifying and understanding the risks and
anticipating the potential impacts of hazards, governments, communities, and individuals
can make informed risk management decisions. Such information can be used to set
priorities for development and adaptation strategies, sector plans, programs, projects,
and budgets (World Bank, 2012).
DRM aims to reduce the consequences of disasters by understanding and addressing
the probability and impacts of disasters, underpinned by a structured methodology of
assessment and treatment of risk. However, a range of challenges and issues conducting,
using, and communicating risk assessments have been experienced in South East Asia
(Table 1).
2 RISK ASSESSMENT

Table 1: Summary of issues commonly experienced for risk assessments in South East Asia
POTENTIAL WAYS TO
ISSUE EXPLANATION
RESOLVE THE ISSUE
Scale of yy Different spatial and temporal scales yy Work with stakeholders to determine
assessment used in risk assessments, means that the appropriate risk assessment
comparison between risk measures scale for their purpose.
used in different risk assessments yy A caveat should be stated within
can be limited and must be the risk assessment about the
communicated with caution. applicability of the risk assessment
yy Often the scale used in a risk scale to respective levels of
assessment is dependent on data application.
availability and/or limitations, rather
than the needs of users of the
assessment.
Availability of Often physical and social vulnerability yy Conduct a vulnerability assessment
locally specific information for a local contexts can for study area in question, if
vulnerability be limited, if available at all. Therefore possible (Rossetto et al., 2014).
information some elements at risk (particularly yy In lieu of no locally specific
critical infrastructure) should be information vulnerability information
included in assessments with a degree may be extrapolated from nearby
of caution based on the reliability of the or comparable regions. Caution
information. needs to be exercised if attempting
this, as vulnerability information
is often site or regional specific.
This judgement needs to be
undertaken by someone who is
sufficiently qualified , informed and
experienced.
yy Seek expert opinion on selection of
comparable vulnerability information
(Rossetto et al., 2014).
Data biases Spatial: Some localities have limited yy Use global model (e.g., UN global
hazard monitoring infrastructure (e.g. assessment of risk – note spatial
rain gauges, seismographs, tidal scale caveats)
gauges, etc.) meaning that inputs to, yy Expert input
outputs from, and calibration of hazard
models is limited. yy Build customised hazard model
(can be expensive)
Temporal: Often historical information
is used within risk assessments. Caution needs to be exercised if
However, historical data of disasters in attempting any of these options, as
South East Asia is limited largely to the data analysis in risk assessments is
last 40 years and so cannot include all often site or regional specific. This
possible manifestations of the hazard judgement needs to be undertaken by
process. Further, historical data of someone who is sufficiently qualified,
disasters in South East Asia is heavily experienced and informed
biased towards the catastrophic
events, and the more common but
less impactful events are largely
unaccounted for.
 3

Data management The information required for risk Develop quality relationships and data
practices and assessment often comes from a range sharing practices with data hosts and
data availability of sources with variable data collection within your own organisation
and management practices, quality and Use existing and freely available
sharing policies. For example: national and global data sets (e.g.,
yy Reluctance to share exposure data EM-DAT, Desinventar)
from the census and tax records Judgement is required on the part of
yy Disclosure restrictions due to the risk analyst (and sometimes the
defence/military reasons stakeholders) to determine how much
yy Transboundary data can be difficult effort should be put into acquiring
to access data.
yy Discouragement due to lengthy or
complex procedures to access data
This means that considerable time
and effort may be required for data
collection and data processing to
compile or format data required for a
risk assessment.
Underutilisation of yy The information required for risk Participatory approaches to risk
local knowledge assessment often comes from a assessment are very important,
and culture, and range of sources with variable particularly involving locals as active
stakeholders data collection and management partners in the risk assessment
practices, quality and sharing process (The World Bank, 2012)
policies. For example: The nature of community engagement
yy Reluctance to share exposure data is dependent on the scale of the
from the census and tax records assessment being conducted. The
yy Disclosure restrictions due to more local community input though the
defence/military reasons more rich and relevant the assessment
will be.
yy Transboundary data can be difficult
to access Need to tailor messages to
the respective audiences (see
yy Discouragement due to lengthy or Communicating Risk Assessment
complex procedures to access data section of this handbook).
yy This means that considerable time Engaging audiences in the risk
and effort may be required for data assessment itself assists in identifying
collection and data processing to and overcoming communication
compile or format data required for a barriers.
risk assessment.
Communication of yy Lack of understanding and Need to tailor messages to
risk assessment communication of risk statements the respective audiences (see
information and information from and to decision Communicating Risk Assessment
makers. section of this handbook).
yy Misperception on the sensitivity of Engaging audiences in the risk
risk assessment results leading to assessment itself assists in identifying
poor communication efforts being and overcoming communication
undertaken. barriers.
4 RISK ASSESSMENT

Utilisation of risk yy There are limited and undefined yy One of the first aspects of risk
assessments channels available for disseminating management is understanding
risk assessment results. the context. It is at this stage that
yy Poor utilization of using risk channels for disseminating risk
information in planning for assessment results should be
development. identified.
yy Lack of guidelines on how risk yy Take a holistic approach to risk
assessment outcomes can be used assessment (not just the analysis)
to understand the context of why
the risk assessment is being
undertaken and how it could be
used.
yy Continued education and well
communicated risk assessments.
Celebrate successes and use
best-practice examples.
yy A range of global reports are
useful guides on how risk
assessment outcomes can be
used (e.g., The World Bank, 2012;
GFDRR, 2014; UNDP, 2010a;
UNISDR, 2015)
 5

Risk Assessment
In its most simple form, disaster risk is a function of three components (World Bank, 2014):

yy Hazard: refers to the likelihood and intensity of a potentially destructive natural

phenomenon, such as ground shaking induced by an earthquake or wind speed
associated with a tropical cyclone.
yy Exposure: refers to the location, attributes, and value of assets that are
important to the various communities, such as people, buildings, factories,
farmland, and infrastructure, and that are exposed to the hazard.
yy Vulnerability: is the reaction of the assets when exposed to the spatially variable
forces produced by a hazard event. For example, a building’s vulnerability to
earthquake increases with the intensity of ground shaking and decreases with
improved conformity to seismic design standards. Similarly, socioeconomic
conditions can make responding to a hazard event easier or more difficult.

Risk assessment is a process to determine the nature and extent of risk, and is critical
for laying the foundations for developing effective policies and strategies for disaster
risk management. The process of undertaking risk assessment allows for identification,
estimation and ranking of risks. This includes potential losses of exposed population,
property, services, livelihoods and environment, and assessment of their potential impacts
on society. Generally, the client, regulator or an elected/government representative will
then use this assessment to decide upon the course of action to be taken. The concept
behind risk assessment is that it is a structured, transparent, scientific process that is
independent of politics. This allows it to be repeated, added to, and reused when political
priorities change.
Purely technical assessment of risk, however sophisticated and cutting-edge, is by itself
unlikely to trigger actions that reduce risk. Successful risk assessments produce information
that is targeted, authoritative, understandable, and usable (World Bank, 2014). Thus, the
first steps in a risk assessment include understanding why the assessment is needed and
wanted, defining the information gaps that currently inhibit DRM actions, and identifying
the end-users of the information (World Bank, 2014). The first steps can be completed
only if the process of generating and using risk information is integrated with institutional
processes, and if there is communication and trust among all involved parties: scientists,
engineers, decision makers, governmental authorities, community representatives and
communities themselves. A risk assessment designed along these lines will enable the
development of information useful for risk mitigation (World Bank, 2014).
The role of risk assessment is to undertake the analysis, estimate the risk and anticipate
how it will change under various courses of action and provide guidance in the way of
precedents, benchmarks, comparisons and lateral solutions. These can then be further
developed and communicated with stakeholders and interested parties (e.g. government
and local communities).
6 RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk information provides a critical foundation for managing disaster risk (as identified by
the World Bank, 2012; 2014):
1. Risk identification: Understanding, communicating, and raising awareness of disaster
risk.
2. Risk reduction: Informing policies, investments, and structural and non-structural
measures intended to reduce risk.
3. Preparedness: Informing early warning systems and emergency measures and
supporting preparedness and contingency planning at various levels.
4. Financial protection: Developing financial applications to manage and/or transfer risk
including insurance
5. Resilient reconstruction: Informing early and rapid estimates of damage and providing
critical information for reconstruction or relocation.

Key information required for a risk assessment are:

yy The context and objectives of the risk assessment;
yy The extent and type of risks that are tolerable, and how unacceptable risks are to be
treated;
yy How the risk assessment fits into disaster risk management processes;
yy Methods and techniques to be used for risk assessment, and their contribution to the
risk management process;
yy Accountability, responsibility and authority for undertaking risk assessment;
yy Resources available to carry out risk assessment;
yy How the risk assessment will be reported and reviewed.

In order to meet these information requirements it is useful to follow a standardised

methodology so that outputs are comparable and transparent for the decision making
process. The International Organization for Standardization published an International
Standard on risk management (AS/NZS, 2009), of which risk assessment is a key
component (Figure 1).
 7

Establishing the Context

Risk Assessment

Risk Identification

Communication Monitoring and

and Consultation Risk Analysis Review

Risk Evaluation

Risk Treatment

Figure 1: Risk assessment process (AS/NZS, 2009)

The standardised methodology for undertaking a risk assessment involves three steps
(AS/NZS, 2009, UNDP, 2010):

1. Risk identification: Identifying risks that need to be assessed.

yy Understanding of the current situation, needs and gaps: assess what already
exists, avoid duplication of efforts, and build on existing information and
capacities. This is done through systematic inventory and evaluation of existing
risk assessment studies, available data and information, and current institutional
framework and capabilities;
yy Hazard assessment: identify the nature, location, intensity, and likelihood of major
hazards prevailing in a community of society;
yy Exposure assessment: identify population and assets (elements) at risk and
delineate disaster prone areas;
yy Vulnerability assessment: determine the capacity of elements at risk to withstand
the given hazards.

2. Risk analysis: Determine an understanding of the risks.

yy Loss/Impact analysis: estimate potential losses of exposed population, property,
services, livelihoods and environment, and assess their potential impacts on
society.
8 RISK ASSESSMENT

3. Risk evaluation: Evaluating risks so that decisions can be made based on the risk
assessment outcomes.
yy Risk profiling and evaluation: identify cost-effective risk reduction options in terms
of the socio-economic concerns of a society and its capacity for risk reduction;
yy Formulation or revision of disaster risk reduction strategies and action plans:
setting priorities, allocating resources (financial or human) and initiating disaster
risk reduction programmes.

Risk Assessment for Disaster Risk Management

Disaster risk management encompasses disaster risk reduction and emergency
management (Figure 2):

Disaster risk reduction (DRR): ‘The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks
through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters,
including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and
property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for
adverse events’ (UNISDR, 2009, p.10-11)

Emergency management (EM): ‘The organization and management of resources and

responsibilities for addressing all aspects of emergencies, in particular preparedness,
response and initial recovery steps’ (UNISDR, 2009, p.13).

DRM

DRR EM
PREVENTION PREPAREDNESS
MITIGATION RESPONSE

RECOVERY

Figure 2: Disaster risk management schematic

 9

Risk information is the critical basis for managing disaster risk. In a complex, dynamic
world, disaster risk can easily be overlooked by governments, communities, and individuals
– especially as impacts from historic or future disasters are often not known. Appropriate
communication of robust risk information at the right time can raise awareness and trigger
action. Hazard and risk information may be used to inform a broad range of activities to
reduce risk, from improving building codes and designing risk reduction measures (such as
flood and storm surge protection), to carrying out macro-level assessments of the risks to
different types of buildings (e.g. for prioritizing investment in reconstruction and retrofitting)
(World Bank, 2014). Preparedness activities can be enhanced by understanding
geographic areas at risk and estimating the impact (e.g. potential number of damaged
buildings, fatalities and injuries, secondary hazards, etc.). This informs planning evacuation
routes, creating shelters, and development of detailed and realistic plans for better
response to disasters. Disaster risk analysis (a part of risk assessment) can be used to
help governments manage their sovereign financial risk or support programs that manage
individual financial risks (e.g., micro-insurance or household earthquake insurance). But to
be effective, they must be informed and updated with risk information (World Bank, 2012).
Finally, risk assessment can model the likely impact before an event strikes (e.g. in the days
leading up to a typhoon), or it can provide initial and rapid estimates of human, physical,
and economic loss in an event’s immediate aftermath. This can be critical for resilient
reconstruction to inform resilient design and land-use plans (World Bank, 2014).

The four main basic components of disaster risk management are mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery. Different countries, books, and documents
may use different but similar terms; for example, ‘readiness’ is sometimes used
instead of ‘preparedness’. Risk assessments provide valuable inputs into each
component of disaster risk management.

Risk Assessment for Disaster Mitigation

Mitigation lessens the likelihood of a disaster and disaster impacts by implementing
sustained actions to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people,property, and the
environment. This can be done by reducing the exposure (e.g. land use restrictions) or
vulnerability (e.g. seismic retrofitting), which demonstrates why risk assessments are an
important input for disaster mitigation. Mitigation includes structural and non-structural
measures, and overlaps with recovery, preparedness and response. Non-structural
mitigation includes any measure not involving physical construction that uses knowledge,
practice or agreement to reduce risks and impacts (e.g. building codes, land-use
planning laws, research, public awareness programmes). Structural mitigation includes
improved construction practice, flood protection levees, evacuation shelters and elevation
of structures in flood plains, for example.
10 RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk Assessment for Disaster Preparedness

Preparedness lessens the severity of disasters by preparing people for disaster, developing
plans to ensure an effective response and recovery and training communities and
organizations to implement plans when a disaster occurs. Establishing and maintaining
early warning alerting and communications processes is a key aspect of preparedness.

Prediction and warning for different disasters is essential to preparedness. It helps to give
people time to evacuate and get to a safe place, as well as helping emergency managers to
plan. Risk assessment is fundamental to establishing appropriate warning systems as there
needs to be an understanding of all components of risk to determine likely lead times and
safe areas to evacuate

Risk Assessment for Disaster Response

Response involves the measures and actions taken during and immediately after an
event to be ready for, and to provide efficient medical, rescue, emergency supplies, and
equipment to those in need. Examples of response include mobilisation, rescue and
evacuation, emergency assistance such as medical care, food and water distribution, and
shelter.

Risk assessment is useful for disaster response because it is important to know what
resources will be required in a disaster. In order to determine resource requirements it
is important to understand the potential impacts to the affected society (e.g. how many
people affected, number of buildings damaged).

Risk Assessment for Disaster Recovery

Risk assessment is a fundamental aspect of recovery because it is important that
redevelopment is conducted in a sustainable way, with an understanding of the potential
risks to avoid the disaster repeating or increasing exposure to other risks and hazards.
Recovery actions involve rehabilitation, reconstruction, psychological counselling, and
long-term assistance to rebuild the community. Recovery is the implementation of actions
to promote sustainable redevelopment following a disaster. This includes new or revised
building code standards and land use planning controls.

Stakeholders and Partners

Stakeholders have an interest in and will be affected by the project, but they are not
necessarily involved in the project. Partners can actively participate in the planning and
implementation of the project, and can also be a good source of data. Many organisations
are both stakeholders and technical partners. Some example stakeholders and partners
are listed in Table 2.
 11

Table 2: Potential stakeholders and partners for risk assessment

STAKEHOLDERS
Government agencies
Academia, researchers and scientists
International Non-Governmental Organisations
(INGOs and UN Agencies)
Domestic Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)
Communities
Relevant private sector bodies
Media

Identifying and involving stakeholders throughout the disaster risk assessment process is
essential. Consistent with evolving concepts of governance, communities are expecting
an increasing voice in decisions that will impact their lives, and with a good understanding
of the context, stakeholders can be identified and approached for input in the decision-
making process (see Chapter 5: Decisions and Communications). This involvement
can take a variety of forms and levels of commitment. Stakeholder participation in a risk
assessment exercise, especially when setting the context and identifying risks, has many
advantages, such as access to local knowledge and expertise, and building trust. Getting
the right level of involvement from the community can result in a much more robust
outcome.

In addition to engaging with relevant stakeholders, the experts charged with conducting
the risk assessment will also need to collaborate beyond professional boundaries. This
is because the competencies required to complete a risk assessment will depend on the
hazards being investigated and targeted sectors for vulnerability analysis (Table 3). It then
becomes apparent that risk assessments require a collaborative effort between experts
and stakeholders.
12 RISK ASSESSMENT

Table 3: Competencies and professions for risk assessment

TYPE COMPETENCIES TYPICAL PROFESSIONALS

HAZARD
Seismic hazard analysis; fault
Earthquake Seismologist,Geologist, Engineer
identification;
Atmospheric modelling; storm surge Meteorologist, Coastal Hydrologist,
Cyclone
modelling Land-use Planner, Engineer
Flooding Flood modelling Hydrologist
Geomorphic mapping; land stability Geomorphologist, Engineering
Landslides
analysis; aerial photo interpretation Geologist, Geotechnical engineer
Meteorologist, Climatologist,
Drought Hydrological modelling,
Hydrologist, Agronomist
EXPOSURE GIS proficient Geospatial Analyst
VULNERABILITY
Building damage estimation, structural Engineer; Structural Vulnerability
Physical
engineering Scientist
Socio-economic modelling, social
Social Social and/or Political Scientist
surveys and interviews
Knowledge of local infrastructure
Infrastructure Engineer; Land-use Planner
capabilities and vulnerabilities
Understanding of economic factors
Economist, Political Scientist,
Economic for the scale (e.g. regional, national) of
Lawyer
assessment
Risk assessment process and broad
Risk Scientist, Hazard Analyst,
RISK ANALYSIS knowledge of hazard, exposure, and
Emergency Manager
vulnerability factors

Successful risk assessment and application of the outputs from risk assessment processes
requires the involvement of a wide range of individuals and organisations (World Bank,
2014). Risk assessment, other than remote analysis of data, cannot be achieved without a
collaborative approach being applied. “…understanding risk is more than just modelling
risk” (World Bank. p 19). The range of participants varies from community-based risk
assessments, to broader local and regional assessment, and to at state, provincial or
national levels of assessment and application.
The range of participants in successful risk assessment includes the communities or
stakeholders, or their representatives, at the respective levels within the geographical
area being assessed. Participation includes those most suited to lead and deliver the
risk assessment process, those best suited to collect, analyse and communicate the
inputs to the assessment, as well as those who will manage, apply, and communicate the
assessment outputs.
Risk assessment roles include leadership, delivery, support, participation and governance.
Some participants in risk assessment processes may best be suited to carry out several
roles within various risk assessment functions. Table 4 represents some of the risk
assessment roles relevant at each level or scale of assessment, and identifies some of the
key roles and responsibilities of participants at each level. The table simplifies the roles
considerably, but is useful in communicating the reality that affective risk assessment is
highly collaborative.
Table 4: Risk Participants and Functions

COMMUNITY LOCAL/REGIONAL STATE/PROVINCIAL/NATIONAL

RISK PARTICIPANTS

LEADERS
LEADERS
NATIONAL
BUSINESS

/ NATIONAL

/ REGIONAL

COMMUNITY
COMMUNITY
COMMUNITY

BUSINESSES
GOVERNANCE
GOVERNANCE

MANAGEMENT
LOCAL REGIONAL
STATE / NATIONAL
STATE / NATIONAL

LOCAL RESPONSE

GIS SPECIALISTS –
REPRESENTATIVES
LOCAL / REGIONAL
LOCAL / REGIONAL
LOCAL GOVERNANCE
RISK FUNCTIONS
NATIONAL SERVICES /

EMERGENCY SERVICEs
LAND-USE PLANNERS –

COMMUNITY MEMBERS
COMMUNITY RESPONSE
COMMUNITY SERVICES /
RISK ANALYSTS – LOCAL
SERVICES / BUSINESSES
RISK ANALYSTS – STATE /

GIS SPECIALISTS – STATE

DISASTER MANAGEMENT

COMMUNITY RESILIENCE
Risk Identification L SP SP SP L SPG SP S D SP SP SP SPG SP D SP SP SPG
Risk Analysis (Qual’ + Quant’) SP L SP SP SP SG S SP LD SP SP SP SG SP LD SP S SG
Hazard + Risk Mapping L SP SP SP LP SG SP D L SD S S SG D L SP S SG
Hazard Data Collection SP L SP SP SP SG SP D DL SP SP SP SG D DL SP SP SG
Risk Assessment + Advice S L SP SP SP SG S S D D SP SP SG S SP SPL D SG
Risk Communication SP L SP SP SP SG SP S SP DL SP D SPG S S LD D SPG
Community Engagement SP L SP SP SP SPG LP S SDL SP SP SP SPG S SP L DP SPG
Risk Reduction Planning SP L SP SP SP SPG SP S SP L SP SP SPG S SP L DP SPG
Community Resilience Building SP LS SP SP SP SPG SL S SP SP SD SG S S P SG
Physical Reduction Activities P S S SP SP SPG SD S S SL S SD SPG S S SDL LP SG
Preparedness Planning SPD S L LPD SPD SPG LP S S SP LD LP SPG S S LD PD SPG
Preparedness Leadership SP SP L SP SP SPG L S S SP LD LP SPG S S LD SPD SLPG
Preparedness Activities D SP L DP DP SPG PL SP SP SP L PL SPG SP SP LD SP SPG
Response Planning SPD SP L SPD D SPG P SP SP SP L P SPG SP SP LD P SPG
Response Coordination SP S L PD SP SPG SP S S S L P SPG S S L PD SPG
Recovery Planning SPD LS SP SPL SD LPG SP S S S SPL PL SPG S S SLD PD SPG
Recovery Management SP S SP SP SP LPG SPL S S SP SP SPL LPG S S SLD PD SPG
Monitoring and Review S S S S S SPG SP SP SP SP L SP SPG SP SP LD SP SPG

(key: L = Leadership D = Delivery S = Support P = Participate G = Governance)

13
14 RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk assessment roles include leadership, delivery, support, participation and

governance. Some participants in risk assessment processes may best be suited to carry
out several roles within various risk assessment functions.

Participants in risk assessment, outlined in Table 4, include:

yy Community Members yy Land-Use Planners – Local / Regional
yy Community Resilience Leaders yy Local Response Management
yy Community Response Leaders yy Local Regional Services / Businesses
yy Community Emergency Services yy Local Governance
yy Community Services / Businesses yy GIS Specialists – State / National
yy Community Governance yy Risk Analysts – State / National
yy Community Representatives yy State / National Disaster Management
yy GIS Specialists – Local / Regional yy State / National Services / Business
yy Risk Analysts – Local Regional yy State / National Governance

The functions outlined here are similar at each level of analysis, but are sufficiently
separated in scope and scale to list then separately.
Risk assessment functions represented in Table 4 are:
yy Risk Identification - A collaborative yy Hazard Data Collection - The process
process, supported by hazard experts, of acquiring information and knowledge
to identify the hazards and risk relevant from stakeholders and hazard experts to
to a particular location, organization, inform the risk assessment process.
community, region, state, etc. yy Risk Assessment + Advice - The
yy Risk Analysis (Qualitative + Quantitative) process of assimilating the information
- The process by which the nature of the collected an evaluated and provided
potential impacts and estimated return back to stakeholders and decisions
rates or likelihoods of particular hazards makers in the risk assessment process.
are described and analyzed. Risk being Comparing relative hazards and risks to
a function of Hazard = Consequence develop an adequate risk profile for the
X Likelihood. Quantitative risk analysis respective community, organization or
allows comparison of various hazards area.
and measurement of potential and yy Risk Communication - The process
actual risk treatment activities. of communicating concepts of
yy Hazard + Risk Mapping - The process hazard risk to stakeholders and
of developing a visual representation of community members. An collaborative
relevant hazard risk for the organization, conversational or otherwise easily
community or area. May be a physical accessible approach is more effective
representation, such as a sand and than a one-way delivery of risk
figure model, a community developed information.
paper map, an expert generated paper yy Community Engagement - An active
map, or an electronic map developed process of enabling communities to be
within a simple or complex geographic as engaged as reasonably possible in
information system (GIS) understanding, assessing and, where
possible, managing the risks that may
confront them.
 15

yy Risk Reduction Planning - The process yy Preparedness Activities - Preparedness

of identifying opportunities to reduce or includes a wide range of activities,
mitigate the consequences or likelihood including response and recovery
of individual hazards, and securing the planning, acquisition of response
resources necessary to realise reduction resources, training, exercising, and
opportunities and goals. Thereby monitoring and review of preparedness
reducing their risk. Risk reduction/ capabilities.
mitigation may involve social treatments, yy Response Planning - The process of
including changes in behaviour or developing plans for communities,
land-use designed to avoid hazards, or organisations, government entities,
physical risk reduction, including flood emergency response organisations
protection works, enhanced building and others to respond to the range of
codes, removal of at-risk facilities, etc. hazards identified and communicated
yy Community Resilience Building - An on- form risk assessment processes.
going process of enabling communities yy Response Coordination - Coordination
to better withstand the impact of between organisations and community
hazards when they occur. This can groups responding to an emergency
include enhancing community cohesion or disaster situation. Ideally carried
and communication, emergency out within a common, agreed set
preparedness, acquisition of response of processes and organizational
resources, evacuation planning, etc. arrangements. Coordination occurs
yy Physical Reduction Activities - Creation within and between each level of
or new structures or modification to community and geo-political area.
existing structures, including flood yy Recovery Planning - Planning
protection works, enhanced building conducted prior to emergencies or
codes, removal of at-risk facilities, disasters occur, based on the estimated
hardening of critical infrastructure, impacts to communities, infrastructure,
etc., to reduce the consequences or economic activities, and the natural
likelihood of a hazard causing damage. environment, and the organizational
yy Preparedness Planning - Planning arrangements, information requirements,
within and between communities, coordination, leadership, and
commercial entities, response and relief engagement processes necessary
organisations, government agencies, to enable effective regeneration and
etc., in readiness for response activities reconstruction after significant impacts
and transition from response to recovery. occur.
yy Preparedness Leadership - Leading yy Recovery Management - Coordination
the process of establishing, enhancing and leadership of the processes of
or maintaining preparedness for regeneration and reconstruction after
emergencies or disasters. an major emergency or disaster occurs.
(See Recovery Planning)
yy Monitoring and Review - A systematic
process of assessing the effectiveness
and sustainability of risk assessment
and risk management arrangements
and capabilities, with the objective of
on-going improvement.
16 RISK ASSESSMENT

The part that risk assessment plays in all aspects of risk management is reflected in the
range of functions. From risk identification, analysis and communication, to risk reduction
or mitigation planning and resilience-building, to preparedness or readiness, to response
capabilities and effectiveness, recovery planning, capability-building, and delivery, and
monitoring and review.

Several of the functions identified may be provided or supported by local, regional or

more central government agencies, including departments or ministries, as well as
universities and government or private research and consultancy providers, local or
international non-government entities, communities or communities of interest, insurers,
professional associations, and locally relevant businesses or commercial partnerships.
The particular mix of participants will vary considerably depending on local resources,
needs, and cultural and political preferences and influences.

Spatial Scales of Disaster Risk Assessment

Global Level
At the global level, disaster risk management is guided by the Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. This replaced the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA).
The Sendai Framework has four Priority Areas for Action (UNISDR, 2015):
1. Understanding disaster risk;
2. Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk;
3. Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience;
4. Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response, and “Building Back Better” in
recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

There are 7 targets in the Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 2015):

1. Substantially reduce global disaster mortality by 2030, aiming to lower average per
100,000 global mortality between 2020-2030 compared to 2005-2015;
2. Substantially reduce the number of affected people globally by 2030, aiming to lower
the average global figure per 100,000 between 2020-2030 compared to 2005-2015;
3. Reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product
(GDP) by 2030;
4. Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic
services, such as health and educational facilities, through developing their resilience
by 2030;
5. Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk
reduction strategies by 2020;
 17

6. Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries through

adequate and sustainable support to complement their national actions for
implementation of this framework by 2030;
7. Substantially increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning
systems and disaster risk information and assessments to the people by 2030.

Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 is a guiding instrument used
by countries to reduce disaster risk at international, national, and community levels.
Agreements are formed regionally to implement the Framework’s recommendations.
There are several regional agreements in Asia, such as:

yy Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Agreement on Disaster Management

and Emergency Response (AADMER) (ASEAN, 2005). This is a legally binding
agreement;
yy South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Comprehensive
Framework on Disaster Management in South Asia (SAARC, 2006).

National Level
Many countries have national laws that relate to disaster risk management. Risk
assessment is commonly conducted on a national level to determine which geographical
areas are at greatest risk from different hazards. Such assessments are used to assist
with prioritising efforts to reduce disaster risk to the nation, and allow for targeted national
disaster risk reduction policy frameworks to be implemented (Figure 3), such as:

yy Preparedness and emergency response plans;

yy Development plans;
yy Building codes;
yy Resource/land-use/management legislation;
yy DRM legislation and plans
18 RISK ASSESSMENT

Identify Natural National Development

Hazards Risks Plan/Strategies

Incorporate into
Evaluate Risks Sector Plans

Budget
Accept Risk?

Policies

Yes No
Regulations

Programs
Monitor
Identify ways to prevent or
and
manage risks (RMNH options)
Review Projects

Figure 3: Planning for disaster risks (Bettencourt et al., 2006, p.24)

Local Level
Local level hazard assessments are conducted on a smaller scale than national level
hazard assessments. The purpose of assessments at this scale is often to inform land-use
decision-making policies and disaster mitigation approaches, such as:

yy Location plans;
yy Engineered structures or infrastructure plans;
yy Evacuation plans;
yy Local emergency response plans;
yy Community development;
yy Recovery plans (pre- and post-disaster
 19

Risk Identification:
Data Collection
It can be natural to focus risk identification on the perceived risk of hazards that have
occurred within recent memory. However, this misses the possibility of identifying events
that occurred hundreds or thousands of years ago or have never occurred before,
but have the potential to occur in the future. Therefore, it is important to undertaken a
systematic approach to identify all potential risks within the scope of risk assessment. It
is important to review what existing information is available to ensure that duplication of
work is not unnecessarily occurring. Systematic evaluation of existing risk assessment
studies, available data and information, and current institutional framework capabilities
can provide a large amount of data and will highlight gaps where further data collection or
analysis is required.

Different information types are useful for different aspects of risk identification (Table
5). Historical records can be used to identify areas particularly susceptible to a range
of hazard types (e.g. earthquakes, cyclones, floods) and intensities (e.g. flood height
and extent). They can also be used to assess building and infrastructure performance
under a range of hazard types and intensities which is crucial for determining physical
vulnerability characteristics.
20 RISK IDENTIFICATION

Table 5: Data requirements for risk assessment

HAZARD
DATA REQUIREMENTS
Earthquake Cyclone Flooding Landslides Drought

Topological SA A SA SA A

Hydrological NA A SA SA SA

Coastal A SA SA A A

Vegetation NA SA SA SA SA
Natural
environment
Soil SA NA SA SA A

Climatological
and/or NA SA SA A SA
meteorological

Geological SA NA A SA NA

Building stock SA SA SA SA NA
Built
environment Infrastructure
SA SA SA SA A
networks

Land-use SA SA SA SA SA

Economic SA SA SA SA SA
Societal
characteristics Population SA SA SA SA SA

Administrative
SA SA SA SA SA
boundaries

Pre-/historical records SA SA SA SA SA

(key: SA = strongly applicable; A = applicable; NA = not applicable)

 21

Risk Identification Methodologies

A number of methodologies are available to undertake ‘risk identification’. Selection of the
appropriate methodology will depend on the context and scope of the risk assessment. A
list of common methodologies is presented below:
yy Interviewing stakeholders about the potential risk;
yy Brainstorming allows an individual or group to reach a solution creatively in a short
amount of time. It is generally spontaneous;
yy Preliminary Hazard Analysis identifies and ranks all potential hazards based on
severity. Results from such an analysis will yield working estimates of hazard severity
and allow for focus on important concerns that need more detailed analysis. An
example of a preliminary hazard analysis was conducted in Lao PDR (2010) where the
preliminary hazard assessment identified a need for an enhanced seismic monitoring
system, and that more research focus was needed in the northwest of the country;
yy Ethnographic Analysis: Capturing community, particularly long-term indigenous, local
written, or oral histories and analysis for hazards. This may also identify previous DRM
practices.
yy Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is typically undertaken during the design
and engineering of systems (e.g. power plants). HAZOP is undertaken using a
brainstorming approach by a group usually chaired by a HAZOP qualified individual
and consisting of design engineers and operators of the system;
yy Failure Mode and Effects Analysis helps identify potential system failures and the
effects of failure. To undertake a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis a team of people
with knowledge of the system will brainstorm potential modes of failure and the
effects of such a failure. The effects of potential failure modes are ranked by severity,
likelihood of occurrence, and likelihood of detecting a failure on a scale of 1-10. (1 =
insignificant/extremely unlikely/certain to detect, 10 = catastrophic/inevitable/certain
not to detect) and multiplied together to get an overall risk priority number;
yy Structured What-If (SWIFT) is similar to HAZOP, except there is a higher level of
focus and less detail. This allows SWIFT to be a quicker method of identifying risks. It
typically involves a brainstorming group asking ‘what if’ or ‘how could’ questions using
a range of guide words (e.g. utility failure, operating error);
yy Risk logs contain a description of the risk, the potential impact (typically a scale of 1-3,
1 = low impact, 3 = high impact), likelihood of occurrence (typically a scale of 1-3,
1 = unlikely, 3 = inevitable), Risk Score (impact x likelihood), likely response actions,
mitigation actions;
yy Catchment area or site-specific investigations undertaken prior to the site or wider
area development or redevelopment. Useful in identifying previously unknown local
hazards and in mapping variability of hazards across areas.

A wide range of data can be collected for risk identification. Hazard and exposure need to
be identified and assessed for risk analysis and evaluation. There are three main steps for
risk identification discussed in this chapter – hazard assessment, exposure assessment
and vulnerability assessment (AS/NZS, 2009).
22 RISK IDENTIFICATION

Hazard Assessment
Hazard assessment involves gathering and analysing information and observational
data on meteorological, hydrological, geological and/or technological hazards. Hazard
assessment is characterised by degree of severity, duration, extent of the impact area,
and their relationship. The comprehensiveness of hazard assessment depends on the
following factors (ADPC, 2012):
yy Availability of disaster event data and geological, geomorphological, demographic
data;
yy Availability of time and resources;
yy Type and characteristics of hazards; and
yy Application of hazard assessment to the end users.

Measureable characteristics of hazards, useful for risk identification, include:

yy Magnitude/Intensity;
yy Frequency;
yy Temporal spacing (seasonal/periodic/random);
yy Duration;
yy Areal extent;
yy Speed of onset (timeline of development);
yy Spatial dispersion/distribution.

Intensities are generally variables that quantify how hazards are measured and
represented. For example:
yy Cyclone/typhoon: wind speed.
yy Flood: flood height, flow velocity, annual flood, volume and annual flood peak.
yy Drought: non-rainy days, precipitation, soil moisture content.

Exposure Assessment
Exposure assessment involves mapping what societal elements (e.g. people, land-uses,
infrastructures, economic resources, and natural resources) may be affected by a hazard,
often with the hazard intensity information attached. For example, an exposure assessment
can detail how many houses will be exposed to what velocity of wind during a typhoon.

An exposure assessment requires two conceptual pieces of information, the hazard layer
(spatial representation of hazard extent and intensity) and the exposure inventory (societal
elements) (Figure 4). Exposure assessments may be based on maximum hazard zones,
scenario-based zones, and comparisons of multiple hazard scenarios. Statistical analysis
may be used to identify variations in demographic sensitivity across a community to
natural hazards.
 23

Figure 4: General methodology for exposure assessment (National Committee for Disaster
Management, 2014, p.70)

Exposure assessments can be undertaken through time, to analyse current and future
socio-economic, land use and other trends. For example, a technical report found some
Sri Lankan villages that suffered a high degree of impact due to the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami are still located in dangerous areas and are there for still highly exposed to
tsunami hazards (ADPC, 2015). Accounting for changes in exposure is important as
efforts to reduce vulnerability could be negated by increases in exposure.
24 RISK IDENTIFICATION

Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability assessment is a systematic and evidence based examination of susceptibility
of different societal elements, including buildings, critical infrastructure or facilities,
population groups or components of the economy to the effects of hazards. Most
commonly in risk assessments in the recent past the concept of vulnerability is only
discussed for physical vulnerability and existing elements. For example, the physical
damage sustained to a building or person. However, the definition of vulnerability
encompasses a much wider range of factors. Vulnerability factors include (Government of
Lao PDR National Disaster Management Committee and UNDP Lao DPR, 2010):
yy Physical vulnerability: the potential for physical impact on the built environment and
population. The degree of loss to a given element at risk or set of elements at risk
resulting from the occurrence of natural phenomenon of a given magnitude and
usually expressed on a scale ranging from no damage to total damage.
yy Human/Social vulnerability: the potential impact of hazards on groups of people such
as the poor, single parent households, pregnant or lactating women, children and the
elderly;
yy Economic vulnerability: the potential impacts of hazards on economic assets and
processes;
yy Environmental vulnerability: the potential impacts of hazards on the environment.
Properties of a particular element can make it more vulnerable to certain types of hazard
than to other hazards. For example, buildings constructed with low-strength materials
(e.g., unreinforced masonry) will be more vulnerable to flood, cyclone, or seismic hazards
than that to drought.

Vulnerability can be estimated for individual structures, for specific sectors or for
selected geographic areas, e.g. areas with the greatest development potential or already
developed areas in hazardous zones. Characterising the vulnerability of various assets
can be very time and resource intensive, requiring extensive technical and scientific
inputs (Table 1).

Although significant work has been carried out internationally in the past regarding
how to characterise vulnerability, limited work has been carried out in the Southeast
Asian context. There is little literature available to quantitatively assess vulnerability (i.e.
vulnerability functions – see below) for earthquake, floods and landslides in South East
Asia (Table 1). Consequently, the literature that is available for similar geographical
and cultural locations must be applied when determining vulnerability. Assessment of
vulnerability can also be drawn from experts and field based judgment.

Physical Vulnerability
Physical vulnerability is related to buildings and structures at risk and how these buildings
and structures are damaged by a particular hazard, due to physical forces exerted by
water (floods), wind (storms), fire, ground motion (earthquakes), ballistics (volcanic
eruptions) and droughts.
 25

To assess vulnerability of existing building stock, basic attribute information may include
(Table 6):
yy Building structural type;
yy Number of building stories;
yy Building occupancy class; and
yy Number of occupants during the day and night.

Table 6: Example of building structural type classification (Government of Lao PDR National Disaster
Management Committee and UNDP Lao PDR, 2010, p.28)

TYPE OF HOUSE CHARACTERISTICS ATC-13 ARYA ET AL.'S

NO RADIUS CLASS
AS PER WALLS OF HOUSING CLASS CLASS
Wall are made up
FC No
1 Brick / RCC of brick and RCC Res-4 Type C
78
roofing
Either walls or roof
2 Wood FC No 1 Res-4 Type C
are made with wood
Both wall and roof
3 Bamboo are made with N/A Res-1 N/A
bamboo
Light-weight
4 Plywood material for walls FC 1 Res-1 N/A
and roof
Light-weight
5 Grass material for walls N/A Res-1 N/A
and roof

It is rare to find existing building vulnerability databases specific to the South East Asia
region, which has often led to studies conducting their own building surveys. There are
a range of different survey methods for creating empirically defined building vulnerability
databases (Table 6). Comprehensive building surveys may be required to obtain
missing information, but these will usually be impossible to survey every building in a
city, particularly under budget and time constraints of risk assessments. However, well-
designed, comprehensive building surveys carried out at a number of sample buildings or
areas can be used to obtain a good approximation of the missing information.
26 RISK IDENTIFICATION

Table 7: Typical observational damage survey methods and their characteristics (adapted from
Rossetto et al., 2014)

SAMPLE
TYPE METHOD RELIABILITY TYPICAL ISSUES
SIZE
Safety, not damage
evaluations
Rapid survey Large Low
Misclassification errors
Detailed Large to
High Unrepresentative samples
engineering survey small
Damage Reconnaissance
Very small High Unrepresentative samples
team survey
Only collapse or very heavy
damage states may be
Remotely sense Very large Low reliable

Misclassification errors
May include data on
Tax assessor data Very large High
Economic damaged buildings only
loss Concentrates on damaged
Claims data Very large High
and/or insured buildings only
Government Possibly unrepresentative
Very large Low
Survey samples
Unlikely association with
Casualties NGO surveys Varies Low building damage and cause
of injuries
Detailed casualty
Very small High
surveys

Damage ratios and damage curves are common measures of physical vulnerability:

yy A damage ratio quantifies damage by describing the percentage of damage to

the infrastructure based on a hazard intensity (e.g. flow depth of flood, ground
acceleration of earthquake, wind speed of typhoon).
yy A damage state qualifies damage by describing the typical characteristics of damage
based on a hazard intensity (Table 7).
 27

Table 8: Building response to earthquake intensity scale (APDC &Norwegian Geotechnical Institute
Centre for International Studies and Cooperation, 2010, p.97) MMI Scale used

BUILDING TYPE INTENSITY VII INTENSITY VIII INTENSITY IX INTENSITY X

Mud and Most have large Most suffer partial

Most suffer Most suffer
Adobe houses, deep cracks collapse complete complete
random stone collapse, Few collapse, Few
construction Few suffer partial Few suffer partial collapse, partial collapse,
collapse complete collapse remaining deep remaining deep
cracks cracks
Ordinary brick Many walls have Most have large Many show partial Most suffer
buildings or small cracks in and deep cracks collapse complete
large blocks and walls collapse, Few
prefab type, poor Few partial Few completely partial collapse,
half timbered collapse collapse remaining deep
houses cracks
Few minor cracks
Reinforced Many have fine Most may have Many may have Most suffer
buildings, well plaster cracks small cracks in large and deep complete
build wooden walls cracks collapse, Few
buildings Partial collapse,
Few may have Few may have remaining deep
large deep cracks partial collapse cracks

Table 9: Example of damage state categorisation (Government of Lao PDR National Disaster
Management Committee and UNDP Lao PDR, 2010, p.28) MMI Scale used

BUILDING TYPE INTENSITY VI INTENSITY VII

Few have fine cracks in walls

Brick/RCC type of buildings Negligible fine cracks
Many have wide cracks in walls
Many have fine plaster cracks
Well-built wooden buildings No damage
Few have wide cracks
Bamboo/grass/plywood/other
Few/Small cracks in the wall Most of the walls will collapse
type of light houses

Quantitative analysis and assessment are a desirable components of effective

risk assessment (see above sections). A key method used within quantitative risk
assessments is the utilisation of numerical fragility and/or vulnerability functions – which
quantify vulnerability. Fragility functions describe the likelihood that assets (e.g., buildings,
infrastructure, and/or people) will sustain a level of damage dependent on the hazard
parameter (e.g., earthquake ground motion). Vulnerability functions differ from fragility
functions as they express the likelihood that assets will obtain varying levels of loss or
damage over a range of given hazard parameters.
28 RISK IDENTIFICATION

A fundamental requirement for qualitative fragility and vulnerability functions is that they
are built from reliable fragility and vulnerability information that is specific to the region
in question (Rossetto et al., 2014). This is because vulnerability can vary significantly
from region to region (e.g. building practises and standards). Therefore, fragility and
vulnerability functions are strongly limited by what knowledge is available, and the
resource and time constraints available for the risk assessment work. This presents a
significant challenge and major barrier to both the selection and development of effective
fragility and vulnerability functions for quantitative risk assessment.

Selecting appropriate fragility and vulnerability functions is an essential aspect of risk

assessment as poor selection can cause unsound decision making and unintentionally
increase risk (GFDRR, 2014). The selection of appropriate functions is often limited by
the availability of functions for the type of risk assessment being conducted. It is highly
recommended that expert opinion and review is sought when selecting fragility and
vulnerability functions, but some factors that must be considered when selecting fragility
and vulnerability functions are presented in Table 10).

Table 10: Fragility and Vulnerability Functions

FACTOR TO CONSIDER EXPLANATION EXAMPLE

Fragility and vulnerability of Different vulnerability functions

Type of hazard considered in societal elements to hazards are used for flooding and
risk assessment will differ depending on the earthquake damage (see ADPC,
type of hazard. 2013)
Building materials and design The risk to different building
characteristics can vary classifications based on building
greatly between assets, as materials and construction
Exposed societal elements such fragility and vulnerability type is assessed using a
functions specifically different unique corresponding
developed for that asset type vulnerability function for flooding
should be used. (see APDC, 2013)
ADPC (2013) considers
vulnerability of buildings
at a national scale. The
Some fragility and vulnerability
vulnerability function for this
functions are only appropriate
Spatial scale of risk considers replacement cost
for use at large scales. Others
assessment of the building. If this study
might be too detailed for use
was conducted at a finer scale
at a national scale.
vulnerability might consider the
replacement cost of the building
as well as loss of contents.
 29

A risk assessment which

considers only one hazard type
(e.g. flooding) means that only
that risk for only that hazard
type has been considered
for the exposed societal
elements. If other hazards
are present, then they need
to be considered separately. A study to compile a
For these to be comparable, comprehensive risk profile for
care needs to be taken that Timor-Leste considered flood,
the hazard models and the tropical cyclone, drought, forest
vulnerability/fragility functions fire, earthquake risk separately
assess the same measures. and then aggregated for an
Singular hazard or multi- Also, different hazards will overall risk score (ADPC, 2013).
hazard risk assessment often occur simultaneous This would not be a true multi-
or in a cascading manner, hazard risk assessment, as the
such as land sliding following cumulative vulnerability of a
an earthquake. Assessing building exposed to more than
the cumulative impact is one hazard at the same time
challenging and can be (e.g., flooding and strong winds)
complex. is not captured.
True multi-hazard risk
assessments are rare due to
the complexity of considering
the cumulative impact of
multiple and variable hazards
on a given asset (e.g., ground
motion and flooding).

Generally, fragility and vulnerability functions are developed by experts with specific
training and knowledge the asset type at risk, ideally in collaboration with other relevant
experts (see Table 3). For example, most seismic fragility functions for buildings will
be developed by experts skilled in earthquake engineering. Using experts to develop
and review vulnerability and risk assessments greatly reduces potential errors that can
occur (Rossetto et al., 2014). Broadly speaking, there are two methodologies for the
development of fragility and vulnerability functions (empirical and theoretical).

yy Empirical derivation of functions requires (1) a damaging event to occur, (2)

information to be gathered from this event; and (3) models to be developed which
describe the observations from the damaging event. The process for empirical
derivation of fragility and vulnerability functions described here is based on guidelines
from the Global Earthquake Model (Rossetto et al., 2014). The first step is to gather
information based on observations using a range of survey techniques (Table 6). The
next step requires selection of appropriate hazard intensity measures and statistical
models to represent the information (further details about this process are available
in Rossetto et al., 2014). A range of different intensity measures should be tested
to select of the most optimum function. The model must then be validated either by
comparing results with independent observations or, if no new information is available,
cross-validation methodologies can be performed. A major limitation of empirically
deriving functions is the requirement of a relevant damaging event to occur. Damaging
events can have long return periods, particularly high impact ones.
30 RISK IDENTIFICATION

yy In the absence of appropriate empirical data to derive fragility and vulnerability

functions, theoretical derivation may occur. Theoretical development of functions is
often done using computational simulations and requires a high level of understanding
of the performance of asset components under the forces exerted by different hazard
types at various hazard intensities.

100

80

60
Loss (%)

40

20

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Vf(m/s)

NE1 NE2 NE3

SE1 SE2 SE3

Figure 5: Example of cyclone vulnerability curve for semi-, and non-engineered buildings (based on
Goyal et al., 2012). This shows that as velocity (Vf) increases the percentage loss (usually of total
building value) of the building increases, but slightly differently for each building class.

Physical Infrastructure Vulnerability

A physical infrastructure vulnerability assessment will assess the ability of specified
infrastructure to absorb damage and reductions in functionality. Vulnerability analysis often
needs to be assessed for the individual infrastructure systems being considered due to
unique designs and operational environments. Reductions in functionality of infrastructure
such as transport, electricity, or water can lead to knock-on impacts, which impact other
infrastructure sectors. For example, waste water infrastructure often require power supply
at treatment centres. Therefore, it could be important to consider interdependencies
between infrastructure types. However, this type of analysis is very data intensive and
often requires very sophisticated models.
 31

Social Vulnerability
Social, or human, vulnerability is impacted by a wide range of factors. These affect the ability
of the people or social groups to endure a disaster, and it is important to note the factors are
not mutually exclusive. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific (UNESCAP, 2015) outlines a number of factors being worked on by policymakers to
reduce social vulnerability; for example, more accessible health and education services can
build resilience. Common metrics used to assess social vulnerability are given in Table 8, but
which and how many of these metrics are used will be community specific.

Table 11: Common social vulnerability metrics (adapted from Cutter, Boruff & Shirley, 2003)

COMMON
CONCEPT DESCRIPTION VULNERABILITY
METRIC
Socio-economic Ability to absorb impacts from hazards. Wealth usually Low socio-economic
status enhances ability to recover from losses more quickly. status
Women are often impacted more than men in disasters due to
Gender lower wages, family care responsibilities, and sector specific Female
employment.
Language and cultural barriers can be imposed which affect Different
Ethnicity access to post-disaster assistance culture/race
Both old and young are generally more vulnerable to disaster Elderly
Age due to mobility to move out of harm’s way. Children
Rural residents are often more dependent on locally based High density urban
Rural/urban resources (e.g. agriculture). High density urban areas are
complex to evacuate Rural
Often lack sufficient shelter options, especially when lodging
Renters Renters
becomes too expensive to afford
Production sector
Occupations involving the production and service sector are employment
Occupation often disproportionately affected by disasters.
Service sector
High birth rate
Single parent households or families with a high number of Large family
Family structure dependents often have limited means to care for dependents.
Single-parent
household
It is more difficult to communicate risk to a population with low
levels of education, and so the capacity for hazard mitigation Low/
Education is reduced. Additionally, education levels are linked to social no education
mobility and wealth.
The demand for quality housing and social services often Rapid population
Population growth exceeds supply when a community experiences rapid growth
population growth
Low density of
Medical services Medical facilities are often in high demand during disaster. medical facilities
and/or professionals
Social People with a high dependence on social services will require High social service
dependence more assistance and support during and post-disaster. dependence
Special needs populations (e.g., institutionalised, homeless) Large special needs
Special needs are often disproportionately affected during disasters, and
populations population
are often ignored during recovery
32 RISK IDENTIFICATION

Economic Vulnerability

Fiscal Vulnerability
Disaster risk has the potential to cause significant economic and development
consequences. As a result of natural disasters, the area affected experiences direct and
indirect tax revenue decreases, investment decreases and long term economic growth
decreases through negative effects on a country’s credit rating and an increase in interest
rates for external borrowing. Natural disasters can be a setback for development in the
short- to medium-term. In turn, poor development status of communities and countries
increases the vulnerability to disasters.

Disasters can exert significant costs to national governments due to the role they need
to assume in dealing with disaster losses and risks. Generally, governments assume
responsibility for replacing damaged public infrastructure, providing relief post-event
and ensuring rapid recovery of the economy overall. From an economic perspective,
governments are exposed to natural disaster risk and potential damages due to their
two main functions: the allocation of goods and services (security, education, clean
environment and the distribution of income). According to Stern (2007), in many cases,
market forces are unlikely to generate an adequate adaptation to disaster risks, broadly
because of the following three reasons: 1) uncertainty and imperfect information; 2)
missing and misaligned markets; and 3) financial constraints. In case of a disaster event,
consequently, there may be substantial contingent liabilities.

Production Sector Vulnerability

The production sector (e.g. rice paddy fields, forestry, fishing/marine farming, and mining)
is one of the most important components of the economies of South-East Asian countries,
and often serves as an important source of local employment and resources. If aspects of
the production sector are unable to produce the required resources, economic impacts,
as well as malnutrition, and other knock-on impacts can result. Therefore, the production
sector must be considered within vulnerability assessments to determine potential losses
due to disaster.

Developing robust vulnerability estimates for the wide range of production sectors can be
a challenge, as there are often limited impact records to analyse and production systems
may be highly context dependent. This aspect of a risk assessment can be very time
consuming and expensive, but if not carried out then it can often be the greatest source of
uncertainty.

It is also important to have a clear understanding of the context and purpose of the risk
assessment being undertaken. If the risk assessment is for assessing national level risk,
it might be appropriate to determine how many farms are at risk of all different hazards.
However, if the risk assessment is at a local level, it might be useful to determine how
vulnerable specific farms are to different hazards (ADPC, Norwegian Geotechnical
Institute, Centre for International Studies and Cooperation, 2010).
 33

Socio-Economic Vulnerability
Socio-economic vulnerability assessment influences the ability of a society to absorb
losses and enhance resilience to hazard impacts. Wealth generally enables communities
to absorb and recover losses more quickly due to insurance, social safety nets, and
entitlement programs. Additionally, the value, quantity and density of commercial and
industrial buildings are indicators of the economic health of a community, potential losses
in the business community and longer-term recovery issues (Cutter et al., 2003).
34 RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk Assessment Methods

Qualitative Risk Analysis
Qualitative risk analysis describes risk using defined descriptive terms. Non-numerical
labels are given for input parameters, which often represent a numerical range. For
example, flood risk at “House A” may be described as:
yy Likelihood: ‘LIKELY’ (Annual Probability of Flood = 0.1-0.01)
yy Consequence: ‘EXTREME’ (Repair cost as percentage of house value = 80-100%)
yy Risk = Likelihood x Consequence: ‘EXTREME’

Qualitative risk analysis has the benefit of being less time consuming than quantitative
analysis. Due to the descriptive nature of qualitative risk analyses, they are often based
on expert opinion to determine which risks are most important. This makes comparisons
between analyses undertaken by different groups important as there could be
disagreements on the relative importance of risks.

A common method of qualitative risk assessment is to estimate risk based on a risk matrix
(Table 10). This involves estimating the likelihood of a hazardous event occurring and
the potential consequence if it were to occur. Factors, or measures of consequence, to
include that will influence the decision are injuries, deaths, economic, and environmental
impacts

Table 12: Risk matrix for qualitative risk assessment. In this example, the risk is likely to occur with
extreme consequences, which makes the risk rating ‘extreme’

CONSEQUENCE
LIKELIHOOD
INSIGNIFICANT MINOR MODERATE MAJOR EXTREME
Almost Moderate High High Extreme Extreme
certain
Likely Moderate Moderate High High Extreme
Possible Low Moderate Moderate High High
Unlikely Low Low Moderate Moderate High
Rare Low Low Low Moderate Moderate

Possible uses of qualitative risk assessment include:

yy Preliminary identification of priority areas for risk assessment;
yy Communication to non-experts about risk;
yy Training and plans for emergency response;
yy Plans for post-disaster recovery.
 35

Quantitative Risk Analysis

Quantitative risk analysis calculates risk numerically. Numerical values are assigned to
input parameters, often with a measure of uncertainty. For example, flood risk at “House
A” may be described as:
yy Likelihood: Annual Probability of Flood = 0.05 ±0.01
yy Consequence: Repair cost as integer of house value = 0.83 ±0.2
yy Risk = Likelihood x Consequence: (0.05 ±0.01) x (0.83 ±0.2) = 0.04 ± 0.02

As quantitative risk analysis calculates risk numerically, it has the benefit of appearing to a
more objective analysis and so has the following advantages:
yy Risks assessed for different hazards can be made more directly comparable;
yy Uncertainties can be quantified;
yy Case-by-case decisions can be avoided in the absence of consistent,
objective risk criteria;
yy Results can be used for quantitative planning and development, making the planning
process simpler and more effective for managing risk.

There are two quantitative risk analysis approaches: deterministic (scenario based) and
probabilistic (statistical). There are pros and cons to using deterministic or probabilistic
risk analysis, and the decision to use either will depend on the context of the risk
assessment process (Kirchsteiger, 1999). For example:
yy If the purpose of risk management is to determine appropriate seismic design levels, a
probabilistic approach will be required because of uncertainty involved in the analysis;
yy If the purpose of risk assessment is to create plans for an emergency response to a
disaster, then using a deterministic risk analysis would be more appropriate.

Deterministic Risk Analysis

Deterministic risk analysis assesses risk based on a single scenario. Risks are defined
and handled as static entities and outputs have fixed values (i.e. cost, duration, etc.);
for example, the likelihood and consequences of Super Typhoon Haiyan impacting on
Southeast Asian countries during the next 6 hours. This means that deterministic risk
analysis only has a single and specific outcome based on the scenario being assessed.
Using a scenario-based approach can be extremely useful for communicating risk
assessment results to non-experts.

Deterministic risk assessments may be used for different objectives. For example, the
scenario selected may be a ‘worst-case scenario’ ‘maximum-credible scenario’, ‘most
likely scenario’, a ‘recent scenario event’ (i.e. based on a historical event) or even a ‘best-
case scenario’. It depends on what the purpose and application of the risk assessment is
for. Historic events are a useful guide for assessing the viability of scenarios because we
can deduce exactly how they will affect a community and we know for certain that these
events can happen. However, there may not have been an historic event, and if there
has been, the likelihood of the same scenario occurring again in the future is uncertain
(Kirchsteiger, 1999). On a cautionary note, compounding conservative estimates,
which may be used in worst-case or maximum-credible scenarios, can result in overly-
36 RISK ASSESSMENT

conservative results. It is important for the risk assessor to understand and communicate
such aspects.

WORST-CASE SCENARIO
The worst-case scenario is one of the most widely used methods of qualitative and
quantitative risk assessment. It assumes that everything that can conceivably go
wrong will go wrong. As a consequence, the outputs of a worst-case scenario are often
considered to be a (ultra)conservative estimate of the actual risk (Kirchsteiger, 1999).

A considerable limitation of using worst-case scenarios is that it assumes those assessing

risk can identify what the worst-case scenario is. This assumption has been shown to
be incorrect in a number of cases, such as the 2004 Indonesian and 2011 East Japan
tsunamis, during which the hazard events both exceeded the estimated worst-case
scenarios (Central Disaster Management Council, 2011). In the case of the 2011 East
Japan tsunami, this meant that tsunami walls had not been designed to withstand the size
of the waves which were generated and were overtopped. However, depending on the
scenario, the likelihood of the worst-case scenario occurring can be judged to be so low
that risk analysis outputs may become meaningless to potential users.

MAXIMUM-CREDIBLE SCENARIO
The maximum-credible scenario is the worst event that is credibly likely to occur. These
scenarios attempt to determine how large a future event could realistically be, rather than
simply determining the ‘worst-case scenario’. Determining the criteria for what is a likely
event tends to still be subjective and will depend on the risk identification (Kirchsteiger,
1999). These scenarios suffer the same limitations as ‘worse-case scenarios’, but are
often more accepted by risk scientists as their probability tends to be higher (Central
Disaster Management Council, 2011).

Probabilistic Risk Analysis

A probabilistic risk analysis differs from a deterministic risk analysis because it considers
all possible instances of the hazards over an extended timeframe instead of one specific
scenario. For example, instead of assessing likelihood and consequence of a M8.0
earthquake on the Sagaing Fault in Myanmar, an assessment of seismic risk to Myanmar
from all potential sources of earthquakes would be conducted. This means that:
yy Risk is based on the combination of all possible instances of the hazards. This
is particularly useful where there are too many possible scenarios to consider
individually;
yy Consideration of the complete range of instances of the respective hazards allows
estimates of occurrence in space and time;
yy Likelihood and consequence are expressed as a probability distribution (as the
likelihood decreases, the potential consequences increase). This can be used to
prioritise mitigation costs.
yy Uncertainty can be included in estimates of likelihood and consequence, which can
be represented and incorporated into the estimate of risk;
yy Factors are drawn from a probability distribution (i.e. mean, standard deviation);
yy Risks have probabilistic outcomes for outputs (e.g. cost, time schedule, etc.);
 37

Because probabilistic risk analysis provides an estimated likelihood of a location being

affected by a hazard they are useful for:
yy The insurance industry to project annual losses based on the likelihood of having to
make payments to customers;
yy Developing buildings codes;

However, probabilistic risk assessments can be difficult to understand because it is

not always obvious what the consequences from a particular event might be. Using a
combination of probabilistic and deterministic methods in a complimentary manner is a
favourable approach, if resources permit.

Risk Analysis
Risk assessment requires a combination of risk identification, analysis and evaluation.
Risk analysis can be broadly split into two categories: qualitative and quantitative risk
analysis. A range of tools are available and have been used within South East Asia for risk
analysis (Table 11).

Most risk assessments from South East Asia have elected to use their own risk
assessment methodologies, usually to cater for data availability limitations. For this
reason, adaptable software platforms (e.g. ArcGIS, QGIS) have been more widely applied
for risk analysis.

Table 13: Selected hazard and risk assessment applications and software packages used in South
East Asia

MODEL/
SOFTWARE APPLICATION CAPABILITY LIMITATIONS
NAME
Requires manual
Utilised widely Allows for variable techniques of risk development of
for mapping and
ArcGIS assessment (e.g. qualitative and risk assessment
aggregating risk quantitative). methodology and data
information input.
Developed for a Central
America context.
National and Provincial Open source platform for Requires extensive data
CAPRA Risk Assessment, probabilistic hazard and risk input relating to locally
Cambodia 2014 assessment specific hazard and
risk.
Risk-based economic framework for
assessing economic impact from
disasters and the cost and benefit
National and Provincial of measure to reduce impacts. Computationally
CATSIM Risk Assessment, More info see Hochrainer et al. complex and data
Cambodia 2014 2013 (available here: http://www. intensive
preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/
gar/2013/en/bgdocs/Hochrainer%20
et%20al.%202013.pdf)
Stochastic event set for 150,000
Typhoon/cyclone model events. Detailed vulnerability
EQECAT for Philippines, Thailand, functions for individual buildings. A Black box software
and Malaysia basin wide model which can capture
impacts in multiple countries
38 RISK ASSESSMENT

Web-based platform for sharing

geospatial information on hazards, Limited data
GeoNode Risk Atlas, Cambodia exposure and risk within Cambodia. manipulation
Allows consistent data management capabilities
procedures and quality control.
Developed for United
Publicly available multi-hazard risk States context.
National and Provincial assessment for earthquake, flood, Requires extensive data
HAZUS-MH Risk Assessment, and hurricane losses. More info
available here: http://www.fema.gov/ input relating to locally
Cambodia 2014 specific hazard and
HAZUS risk.
Freely available one dimensional Cannot be applied in
National and Provincial flood flow and sediment transport highly complex river
HEC-RAS Risk Assessment, modelling. More info available here:environments requiring
Cambodia 2014 http://www.hec.usace.army.mil/ multi-dimensional
software/hec-ras/ modelling.
Earthquake hazard and Web-based application which allows Relies on open source
data which can be of
risk in Greater Manila hazard and risk calculations based
OpenQuake Area. More info in Allen et on the Global Earthquake Model inadequate quality in
the South East Asia
al (2014) data sets. region.
A freely available and open source Requires manual
Utilised widely software. Allows for variable development of
for mapping and
QGIS techniques of geospatial risk risk assessment
aggregating risk assessment (e.g. qualitative and methodology and data
information quantitative). input.
Dam related flooding in Use in South East Asia
Riskscape Vietnam. More info here: Create hazard, asset, and currently limited to
https://riskscape.niwa. aggregation modules Vietnam
co.nz/vietnam

Mapping
Maps are a useful method of risk assessment as they allow for a visual depiction of the
situation. A map is a two-dimensional symbolic depiction of three-dimensional (3D) space.
It is a geographical image of the environment and shows the relationships between
elements of a space, such as objects and regions. Maps can be a representation of the
spatial distribution of a phenomenon or process, people, their lives, and health. They can
be prepared on various themes such as climatic, topographic or natural hazards. Humans
can see the real world in 3D, but when a 3D view is put on paper, we tend to lose the
depth, and visualize in two-dimensions.

The real world is dynamic with varying rates of change. To some extent, dynamics can be
addressed in mapping by using a series of maps that each indicates one static condition.
In the digital mapping environments, we can reduce the size of interval generating
graphics more closely reflecting reality even including 3D.

Maps represent large areas that we cannot otherwise easily see all at once. Since maps
represent a large area, they are always scaled down, and for the purpose of different
applications, the clarity of the picture can be increased or decreased, and details added
or removed. Even though some mapped elements are not exactly similar, we group them
into a few categories and represent them with symbols. The elements could be physical
properties such as buildings, roads, water bodies, hazards or processes such as wind
or temperature. More dimensions or details can be presented on maps using techniques
such as colour coding, shading, contours and isoclines. For example, roads can be
 39

categorized in different classes by colour. In the digital mapping environment, there are
tools that enable zooming in and out more effortlessly.

Maps enable us to interpret the spatial relationships of elements, such as houses within a
high flood hazard zone. They also represent processes or phenomena that we cannot see
through the naked eye.

The most common way of assessing risk due to natural hazards is through mapping. All
maps should contain basic map elements, outlined in Table 12.

Table 14: Fundamental Map Elements

The title tells us what is being looked at. It describes the theme or subject.
TITLE It should be descriptive and specific, indicating geographic, layer and
indicator.
LEGEND The legend shows what symbols mean and is subordinate to the title.
The authorship can be attributed to an institute or individual, and should
AUTHORSHIP also note data sources and a disclaimer on usage limitations.
DATE THE MAP WAS The date should be the date created and the date effective.
PRODUCED
Scale indicates distance or area on the ground. A large-scale map covers
a small area and is explained by the scale. Examples include:
SCALE • Verbal: 1 centimetre equals1,000 meters.
• Ratio: 1:100,000 (Units don’t matter).
• Graphic: Bar scale with distances marked in units.
Orientation indicates the directions and positioning of the map. It can be
ORIENTATION North or easting and northing, a coordinate system and projection

Maps can be organised into a variety of categories, by:

yy Hazard: Typhoon, flood, etc.
yy Administrative boundaries:
- National: Cyclone hazard, Sri Lanka;
- Province: Cyclone hazard, Sindh province, Pakistan;
- State: Storm surge hazard, Rakhine State, Myanmar;
- District: Cyclone hazard, Tando Allahyar district, Sindh Province, Pakistan;
- Commune: Tsunami hazard, Kalkudha (Grama Niladari Division), Batticaloa district,
Eastern province, Sri Lanka;
yy Frequency of occurrence/Return period: 5 year RP, 10 year RP, 50 year RP, 100 year
RP, etc.;
yy Ordinal scale: e.g. Rare risk (> 50 year RT), occasional risk (10 – 50), frequent risk (<
10);
yy Other factors, such as seasonal, severity or triggering factors.

Hazard assessment commonly shows zones of different intensity or probability of certain

hazard. Practitioners broadly differentiate between susceptibility, hazard, and risk maps
(BGR and GAI, 2009).
40 RISK ASSESSMENT

Susceptibility maps provide spatial information on whether a certain terrain is prone to

the occurrence of a hazardous event. Susceptibility maps show the spatial distribution
of hazard intensities either by graduated scale, intervals (zones) or isoclines. Hazards
are driven or influenced by geophysical characteristics of the area. Flood hazards are
influenced by river cross-sections, and adjacent elevations, so an elevation map can
explain the behaviour of a flood. The term is particularly common for landslides studies,
where static parameters such as topography/slope, soil condition and average rainfall can
be used to indicate the potential for mass movements.

Hazard maps represent the temporal probability that a hazardous event may occur. For
example, a flood hazard map is commonly based on the return period of river flooding
levels. Hazard maps are created by data layers; there are base layers and hazard
layers. Base layers are the regions or frames that the map is based on. They include
administration boundaries, roads, elevation, slopes and water bodies. Hazard layers
show intensity and the probability or scenario. These are represented by hazard zones or
hazard intensities in graduated colours.

Hazard maps display how a hazard varies over a specified area. This can be
measured as:
yy Magnitude or intensity;
yy Frequency;
yy Temporal variance of hazard (e.g. during different seasons);
yy Duration;
yy Areal extent;
yy Speed of onset;
yy Spatial dispersion (e.g. spreading of diseases).

Hazard levels, as depicted on maps, will direct us to identify the priorities of control
or treatment measures.
Hazard maps can be applied in many ways, including:
yy As a tool to communicate information to the public about threats in their living
environment;
yy For land use, strategic and business planning;
yy As the basis for civil engineers and town planers for safe and sustainable
development;
yy As the basis for developing risk transfer mechanism through insurance and
catastrophic bonds.

One example is to assist engineers to locate or design buildings, bridges, highways, and
utilities that will withstand disasters in the region.

Risk maps differ from a hazard maps because, in addition to including information
about the hazard, they include information regarding the vulnerability and exposure of
assets or people (Figure 6). By overlaying all aspects of risk (i.e. hazard, exposure and
vulnerability), a map indicating areas of different risk scores can be formed. Risk can be
assessed at national and sub-national levels, and can be detailed up to household level.
 41

This is useful because it allows for geographical prioritisation of planning initiatives to

different hazards.

Spatial databases are often developed for use as base maps to assist the vulnerability
and risk assessments of the study area. All important physical features of the city are
usually considered during the database development. Based upon the availability of
existing database and information, an appropriate methodology is then developed
to acquire missing information by conducting a physical feature survey and attribute
information collection.

The baseline data required are:

yy Administrative boundaries;
yy Vulnerability information about the community (e.g. infrastructure, buildings, health,
education, livelihood); and
yy Hazard information (e.g. intensity, likelihood, duration, seasonality, areal extent).

Figure 6: Combining hazard and vulnerability information are critical for risk maps (ADPC, 2011, pp.
37, 92, 121)
42 RISK ASSESSMENT

Mapping Approaches
There are two types of approaches to hazard assessment mapping, which correspond to
the two types of quantitative risk analysis: deterministic and probabilistic.

The deterministic approach looks at:

yy Only the consequences or damages;
yy Worst-case scenario;
yy Physical/Image measurements;
yy Incident or community based;
yy Real incidents;
yy Individual maps.

Examples of deterministic maps include maps prepared by communities by using their

experiences and local knowledge, and model results of a single typhoon track and wind
speeds (Figure 7).

Figure 7: A deterministic map of a typhoon track and wind speeds

 43

The probabilistic approach looks at:

yy Probability and consequences or damage
yy Scenarios with return periods;
yy Historical measurements;
yy Scientific;
yy Modelling;
yy Map series.

Figure 8: A probabilistic map of a typhoon track and wind speeds – Historical tracks are shown in
grey

For example, to create a probabilistic map of typhoon hazard, multiple historical typhoons
generated in the Pacific Ocean have to be considered. The statistical analysis is
performed and the probabilistic intensities for wind speeds at a given location calculated,
as are return periods (Figure 8).
44 RISK ASSESSMENT

Data Sharing Across Communities

Data sharing across communities, regions and from the national to the local level is really
important. Some countries already do this, however some do not. Amongst other things,
this information can be used for risk assessments and warning systems.

i-ASSIST
i-ASSIST is a tool that is being developed in Myanmar and Laos for data sharing. i-ASSIST
is a geospatial web portal, with several sections:
yy i-ASSIST Geospatial web portal: This section provides an overview of the i-Assist
Geospatial Web Portal, and is considered a way to feature or promote some of the key
features of the system;
yy Hazard Profile: This section discusses country hazard profiles, including hazard types,
history and other important information related to each hazard type at country level;
yy Map: This section provides an overview of and location of all projects that have been
done in Myanmar and will automatically link with the information of the project in
“What’s inside” tab;
yy What’s inside: This feature discusses the information related to different projects that
are published on the web portal;
yy Web News and Announcements: This section contains the news from ‘Prevention Web
RSS’ and displays the latest news in the web portal.
 45

Risk Evaluation
The purpose of risk evaluation is to assist with decision-making following the risk
assessment process. To make decisions based on the risk assessment, the level of
risk found in the analysis needs to be compared with a risk criterion, often in the form
of whether the risk is acceptable, unacceptable or tolerable. Deciding on levels of
acceptable/tolerable/unacceptable risk will depend on contextual situation of the risk
assessment.

Acceptable Levels of Risk

Even though calculated risk, as an objective method, is not subject to risk perception,
it cannot tell us the level of calculated risk that is acceptable. Zero risk is impossible. A
total relocation of a community can result in a specific risk of zero; they may think that the
risk to the specific hazard might be zero, but this does not take into account new risks
that emerge because other hazards or opportunities are lost due to relocation. However,
depending on many factors, risk appetite can vary hugely. The disaster risk management
process allows for the determination of the acceptable level of risk, defined as the loss
level that is acceptable without destroying lives, national economy or personal finances.
Once the current and acceptable levels of risk are determined, disaster risk reduction
plans and strategies could be revised or developed so that they have the measurable
goal of reducing the current risk to acceptable levels. There will always be an element of
risk in all decisions that are made, but the level of risk can differ depending on different
decisions. For example, a decision to build flood embankments or levees has a risk that
money could be spent on these structures and a flood still occurs, and a decision to not
build flood levees carries the risk that a flood occurs which could have been prevented by
flood levees. Therefore, before decisions can be made using risk assessments, the level
of risk that is acceptable, tolerable or intolerable needs to be defined.

Risk estimates made by citizens are typically more subjective and socially constructed,
particularly in the face of uncertainty (Slovic, 2000). A number of social and cultural values
can influence perceptions of risk, including:
yy Voluntary vs. involuntary risk: An individual’s perception of risk can change depending
on whether they have agreed to be exposed to the risk;
yy Personal control of risk vs. uncontrolled: Whether someone has control in a situation
or not will influence the perception of risk. An analogy for this is if you imagine you
are the passenger in a car being driven by another person, you will think the risk of
an accident is greater than if you were driving because you do not have control of the
vehicle;
yy Unfamiliarity: Unfamiliarity with a risk can lead an individual to believe that it poses
a higher risk than what it really does. An example of this would be calls to ban the
chemical Dihydrogen Monoixide (for example, water);
yy Dread and fears: When thinking about natural hazards (e.g. earthquakes) people will
often take a pessimistic view on what will happen. This results in a perception of the
risk being higher than it really is;
46 RISK EVALUATION

yy Catastrophic events vs. many small events;

yy Long term vs. short term risks/events: Undertaking activities that take a long time
for consequences to manifest (e.g. smoking) are often underestimated by those
accepting the risk compared to short term risks (e.g. playing contact sport);
yy Benefits associated with risk: If there are benefits associated the risk, this can lead to
risk being assessed as lower than it really is;
yy Trustworthy information about risk: Where information regarding risks is sourced is
important because if the source is viewed as untrustworthy the information will be less
likely to be viewed as truthful;
yy High magnitude low frequency events vs. lower magnitude more frequent events: High
magnitude events are often quite rare, which means that the novelty of them can make
them seem more significant than what it really is.

Risk analysis by experts is mostly based on objective analysis of the likelihood of hazard
activity and its consequences within a specified area or organization, to derive estimates
of actual risk (AS/NZS, 2009).

A seminal study of risk perception by Slovic (1987) noted the difference between actual
risk and perceived risk. The actual risk of activities can be surprising. Slovic (1987)
compared the risk of harm from travelling by plane or as a pedestrian. Both risks are very
low, but the actual risk of harm from air travel is lower, which might be counter-intuitive
because of the factors that influence our perception of risk. For example, a pilot controls
an airplane, whereas we control ourselves when walking. When in control we feel safer,
so the perceived risk is lower. Media reporting on travel accidents can also skew our
perception. People have different perceptions of risk, and often view risk in subjective
ways, based on emotion or personal experiences. This illustrates why it is essential for
stakeholders to be engaged in the risk assessment process.

Societal Risk
Individual risk is the risk posed to any one person. Societal risk is the risk posed to the
society. An important distinction to make is whether fatalities occur in many isolated
events or whether fatalities occur in a single event. In general, society will accept many
fatalities a year if they occur as single deaths in many events rather than mass fatalities
occurring in one isolated event. For example, 3,000 people dying per year in 3,000 road
accidents is more acceptable to society than 3,000 people dying in a single flood event.
This is because:
yy Mass death is unacceptable under any circumstances;
yy It is even more unacceptable when the event is inevitable and foreseen;
yy The consequences to society would be severe;
yy Risks can be unacceptable to society while being acceptable on an individual basis

For example, it might be acceptable to an individual to live in an area at risk to tsunami

inundation, as the social and economic benefits outweigh the potential costs. However, it
is unacceptable to the government that 100,000 people live in that zone and may die if a
tsunami occurs.
 47

So, how do we decide between individual risk and societal risk? As for all risk, this is a
matter of context. Generally in a single event, society will accept (see Figure 9):
yy 1 death every 10,000 years;
yy 10 deaths every 100,000 years;
yy 100 deaths every 1 million years;
yy Never accept >1,000 deaths per event.

Figure 9: Acceptable levels of societal risk (Adapted from AS/NZS, 2009)

Stakeholders have different levels of tolerance of risk. We often hear that statistically you
are more likely to die in an automobile accident than in a plane crash, but many people
would perceive the risk of death as much greater in a plane than in a car. This apparent
contradiction is a function of human behaviour, as we experience risk in many forms in
our daily lives and we create personal values and beliefs based on these experiences.
Ultimately, people have differing understandings of what hazards are, what risks they
pose, and what they should do about them. Scherer and Juanillo (2003) argue that
individual and community concerns and ideas of risk are multidimensional and that the
task of incorporating these varied perspectives is complex.

Methods to Determine Acceptable

The role of the risk assessment expert is to undertake the analysis, estimate the risk
and its possible changes under various courses of action, and provide guidance in the
way of precedents, benchmarks, comparisons and lateral solutions. Comparisons are
a particularly useful way to think about acceptable levels of (additional) risk. There are
several ways to make this decision. Cost-Benefit Analysis and As Low As Reasonably
Possible are two options.
48 RISK EVALUATION

Cost-Benefit Analysis
One possibility is to undertake cost-benefit risk approach to assess what the benefits
of taking an action are against the costs of not taking that action. A common method
of reducing risk is to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. This method involves comparing
the cost of reducing risk with the benefits of a reduced risk. If the costs of reducing risk
outweigh the benefits of a reduced risk then the result of the cost-benefit analysis will be
less than 1. If the costs of reducing risk are less than the benefits of a reduced risk then
the result of the cost-benefit analysis will be greater than 1. Therefore, the cost-benefit
analysis provides an objective approach to evaluating risk. However, not all aspects of a
risk assessment can be quantified in monetary terms (e.g. cost of life, elements of cultural
or religious significance).

As Low As Reasonably Possible (ALARP)

Layfield (1987), proposed the concept of tolerable risk: “Although acceptable risk is often
used in balancing risks and benefits it does not adequately convey the reluctance with
which possibly substantial risks and benefits may be tolerated (p. 58).”

Individuals are prepared to tolerate some risks that would otherwise be unacceptable in
return for specific benefits. Infinite resources could be spent on reducing specific risks,
however this is unlikely to yield the best result for managing risk. Therefore, ALARP is
a principle to reduce risk to As Low As Reasonably Possible (ASNZS, 2009). ALARP
principle suggests that at some point, the cost of reducing a risk is disproportionate to
the additional benefit of reducing the risk. ALARP allows for mapping of various risks on
a scale. It is important to consider whether someone is exposed to a risk involuntarily
(e.g. due to a natural disaster) or exposed to the risk voluntarily (e.g. car crash). In order
to consider this, the threshold for tolerable involuntary risk is 10 times higher than for
tolerable voluntary risk. There are three broad zones when using the ALARP principle:
yy Where risk is intolerable, risk reduction must be undertaken regardless of the cost to
reduce the risk;
yy Where risk is tolerable, it will be necessary to balance the level of risk against the cost
to reduce the risk;
yy Where risk is broadly acceptable, risks are low enough that no additional measures
are necessary to reduce risk.

Here is an example of ALARP for flooding risk:

yy Risk of death per year due to flooding = number of people killed in an event divided
by the number of flooding events per year;
yy If a 1 in 10 year flood kills 10 people it has a risk of 1;
yy Acceptable risk is where an event can only kill 1 person per million years (1x10-6).
Suggesting that the risk of death for a 1 in 10 year flood is not acceptable;
yy Tolerable risk is where it can kill 1 person every 1,000 – 10,000 years (1x10-3 – 1x10-
4), depending on social context. Suggesting that the risk is intolerable and mitigation
measures must be taken.
 49

Decisions and Communications

Who Decides What Is Acceptable?
How society makes social choices is often referred to as governance (Renn, 2008).
Governance can also be applied to how any organization runs, how it coordinates with
other organizations, and the frameworks in which decision-making occurs. This broader
view of governance helps us to understand how decisions tend to be made through a
broad range of mechanisms rather than isolated in government.

Generally the client, regulator or an elected/government representative ultimately decides

the level of tolerable risk. There are many factors that influence decisions including;
(1) Stakeholders’ expectations; (2) increasing transparency (3) accountability; and
(4) political influences. As such, risk decision-making is complex and difficult, but
increasingly critical for economic progress and stability of our communities (Renn, 2008,
2015, Jensen et al., 2015).

There are often many competing interests with different priorities involved in the decision
making process. This can lead to:
yy Too much emphasis placed on preventing too much risk;
yy Large events exceeding capacity to recover;
yy Inappropriate consideration of assets with values beyond their monetary value (e.g.
cultural or environmental importance);
yy Difficulty defining the cost of a human life.

Recent disasters have evidenced that it is increasingly difficult to hide bad policy
decisions. We have seen in recent disasters that those responsible may be pursued.
Examples include the Christchurch CTV collapse and the Bangladesh factory building
collapse. Moreover, a country’s reputation suffers when disaster problems are not
managed well. Although risk decision-making is complex and difficult, it is increasingly
critical for economic progress and stability of our communities.
50 DECISIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS

There are many levels of decision-making that influence risk and they interact
simultaneously. In order to assist with decision-making, frameworks are often utilised and
then built on. Frameworks are set up to:
yy Clarify what is to be achieved;
yy Analyse and evaluate the situation objectively to understand the various interactions
and information needs;
yy Develop options which can help achieve the goals based on outputs from the analysis;
yy Evaluate and analyse the shortlisted options;
yy Decide on a solution;
yy Develop a plan to implement the decision;
yy Brief stakeholders on the decision, including the intended outcome, information
considered, and how it will be achieved;
yy Implement the decision and evaluate the outcomes.

Decision-Making Framework
A decision-making framework provides an agreed process that can be followed, acting
as the skeleton to build on to get a better decision. As such, a decision-making process
does not need to be overly burdensome. In an emergency it might take only few minutes
to run through the basic steps, while larger strategic decisions might require much more
deliberation.

The nine step framework presented has been derived from the incident management
system developed for New Zealand (New Zealand Fire Service Commission, 2014). The
framework is an example and a guide, one which is well proven and can guide decision-
making, but does not need to be rigidly followed when a situation indicates otherwise.
Other countries practice similar frameworks.

1. ESTABLISH THE MISSION

The first step in decision-making is to clarify the problem that needs to be addressed,
and it should be noted that often the problem is not what it seems on the surface. This
is also critical for getting a good level of buy-in.

2. EXAMINE THE CONTEXT

Developing a deep understanding of the context is critical in the outset. It is a
continual process as risk tends to be dynamic and shifts as other decisions are made.
Of particular importance is to understand the time frames under which a decision must
be made. Usually there is more time than people expect for making a good decision.
This is not meant to be an excuse for putting off decisions, but simply opening up
proper amount of time for the due diligence that must go into significant decisions.
 51

3. IDENTIFY STAKEHOLDERS
This can include primary and secondary stakeholders. Consistent with evolving
concepts of governance, communities are expecting an increasing voice in decisions
which will impact their lives. With a good understanding of the context, stakeholders
can be identified and approached for input in the decision-making process. Their
involvement can take a variety of forms and levels of commitment. It is important to
emphasize that getting the right level of involvement from the community can result in
a much more robust outcome.

4. EXPLORE ALL OPTIONS

At this point it is vital to get all the options on the table. The best options can be sorted
out later. Remember that even odd ideas prompt discussions that can lead to better
ideas. Have participants discuss possible options. Encourage them to be creative.

There are a variety of options available to us to help make informed decisions. These
include; 1) risk assessments; 2) policy; 3) land use; 4) building standards; 5) non-
structural mitigation; 6) insurance and risk transfer mechanisms; 6) education; and 7)
preparedness.

5. ANALYSE BEST OPTIONS

There are many perspectives to any decision, which can be legal, economic, urban
planning, development, business and others. Decisions can be complicated and may
result in unintended consequences. Analysis attempts to find the right combination of
actions from a wide range of possibilities and create an optimised system to function
harmoniously with other dependent systems, all evolving constructively over time.

Analysis needs to include; 1) finding the right combination of actions from a wide
range of possibilities; 2) getting an optimized system to function harmoniously with
other dependent systems and 3) ensuring that the plan can actually be executed.

Analysis considerations include using information, data, facts and inferences,

analytics, models, and uncertainty.

6. AGREE ON WAY FORWARD

Decision-making can be very complex. There may be multiple stakeholders with a
wide range of valid perspectives on a particular initiative. There might also be multiple
related initiatives. Thus achieving the right combination of initiatives for a given
problem will come down to some level of judgment. With the greater role of judgment
comes a greater possibility of error.
52 DECISIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS

There are also a number of ways the problem can be considered to influence the
decision-making outcome:
yy Simplistic: There is only one answer;
yy Deterministic: There is only one correct answer, but the correct formula must be
used;
yy Random: Different answers are possible, and all can be identified; and
yy Indeterminate: Different answers are possible but all are conjectural, so not all can
be identified.

Decisions must be based on fact. In the end, achieving the right combination of
initiatives for a given problem will come down to some level of judgment. With an
increased inclusion of judgment comes a greater possibility of error.

7. GENERATE A PLAN
This could involve a different set of people and skills than were involved in previous
steps. The people responsible for building the plan ideally should have been
consulted along the way to ensure that the decisions made could be implemented.
During the planning process some key questions to address are: Who might be
involved in building a plan? How do you ensure that the intent of the decisions made
are translated into the plan?

8. COMMUNICATE INTENT
Communications are important throughout the process to ensure communities that risk
is being addressed. However, as directions become clear the communications with the
communities concerned should be stepped up in appropriate ways. Understanding
how people interpret risks and choose actions base is vital to any risk communication.
Research has consistently shown that decision-making under conditions of uncertainty
is inadequately described by traditional models of ’rational choice’ and attention
needs to be paid to how understanding of risk is shaped by their own experience,
personal feelings, values, and cultural beliefs (Eiser et al., 2012).

9. EXECUTE, EVALUATE AND REVISE

Any good program should be continually evaluated and revised when opportunities
for improvements are found. The importance of effective evaluation has been
demonstrated the as a function of good governance (Ehler, 2003; Renn, 2008, 2015;
Saunders et al., 2015)

Decision-Making Styles
In an effort to get the best possible outcomes in complex problems, decision-making
styles have been studied intensively for nearly 80 years since Lewin (1939) identified
three different styles of leadership and decision-making: autocratic, democratic and
delegative. Later work on decision-making was done by Tannenbaum (1958) expanding
on Lewin’s three styles. Governance today requires flexibility in decision-making styles.
It is important to remember that no matter what style is used it should be a good fit with
the community, time frame and situation at hand. Some styles of decision-making are
introduced in Table 13.
 53

Table 15: Decision-making styles (Withanaarachchi & Setunge, 2014, p.179)

AUTOCRATIC
Autocratic is when one decision maker makes all the decisions. With individual
decision-making the leader must make the decision alone and input from others is
limited to collecting relevant information.

CONSULTATION
The leader shares the issues with one or more people seeking ideas, opinions and
suggestions. Once they have completed the consultation they make a decision. The
leader considers the input of other but the final decision is theirs to make. They can
choose to use or not use the ideas presented to them.

DELEGATION
This is when the leader sets the parameters and allows one or more other people to
make the final decision. Although the leader does not make the decision, they support
it.

DEMOCRATIC
This is when everyone gets an opportunity to have input into the decision-making
process.

ANALYTICAL/DIRECTIVE
Decisions are made according to results, empirical analysis and also depends on the
decision maker’s behavioural patterns.

CONSENSUS/GROUP DECISION-MAKING
The leaders work together with others to reach an agreement. All members buy-in to
the final decision and support its implementation.

Different approaches to decision making are required in different situations. Approaches

range from analytical decision making based on weighing up the different options to
naturalistic decision making, a faster intuitive type of judgement that relies on experience
(Flin, 1996; Paton et al., 2009; Doyle et al., 2011). The type of decision making in a crisis
is significantly different from that practiced during non-crisis periods, as the a crisis
operating environment often requires the making of decisions in high risk and low time
contexts that make using the more traditional analytical style less applicable. Many other
decision-making styles have been identified, such as recognition primed decision making,
procedural based decision making, creative decision making, and distributive decision
making (Doyle et al.,2011).

When making decisions related to risk it is important to find the right combination of
actions from a wide range of possibilities. This can be complex. However, as Nightingale
(2008, p.1) states, “we simply decide without thinking much about the decision process”.
A constructive approach requires some forethought and transparency in how decisions
will be made. Styles, approaches and frameworks may evolve over time, but the main
point is that good decisions are made reflecting the best interests of the community.
54 DECISIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Communicating Risk Assessment

Information from risk assessments can be used in a variety of situations, such as raising
community and organisational awareness about hazards, and informing decision-makers
at all levels about risks and potential risk management options. In order for risk to be
effectively communicated, practitioners must develop sound communication strategies
and work with communities to implement them.

Why is risk communication important? In its simplest form, risk communication strategies
should make sure that people are aware of the risks that they face. Communication,
cultural theorists, public relations and disaster researcher communities have explored
the dimensions of risk communication and how differing approaches may influence its
success. In general, these communities have advised that we should move away from
the old, linear, “transmission” form of communication (i.e., source -> receiver) towards
partnering with communities to establish a dialogue which supports diversity in the
needs of the audience and builds trust between these groups. The Sendai Framework
for Disaster Risk Reduction supports this new approach, encouraging the sectors of
society (i.e., public, private and academic sectors) to work together in a ‘people-centred’
approach to DRR (UNISDR, 2015; pg. 10). The complexity of both the information and
intended/affected communities will greatly influence the nature of communication strategy
that the stakeholders should consider taking.

This section outlines the basic principles, theories and best practices for science
and engineering organisations to communicate risk assessments to stakeholders.
Stakeholders can be decision-makers (i.e., emergency managers, businesses),
communities (individuals and family of diverse cultural backgrounds), or organization. We
discuss risk communication as a broader term which may involve the communication of
technical information to diverse stakeholders. The previous knowledge, experience and
ability of the various stakeholders to assimilate technical information needs to be taken
into account in communication design and practice.

Risk Communication Strategies

It is important that information from risk assessments is properly communicated to the
relevant stakeholders. In order to do this, it is important to understand the perceptions and
behaviour of the audience the information is intended for.

Once a risk analysis and assessment is completed, risk communicators can begin
to develop messages and partnerships with the stakeholders through a variety of
approaches. One method is the mental models approach (Fischhoff, 1995; Morgan et
al, 2002). This model ensures that, if people choose to, they can “understand how the
risks they face are created and controlled, how well science understands those risks,
and how great they seem to be” (Morgan et al., 2002, p.14). This approach recognises
the value of what the experts want to communicate with the audience, but also balances
the importance that messages need to respect and address community and stakeholder
concerns. This is just one example and there are many others.
 55

Many organisations communicate in a linear format, which involves the transmission

of information from a reliable ‘source’ to an audience (a.k.a., the ‘receivers’ of the
information). In this situation, information is brainstormed, composed, edited and
delivered. A purely linear approach may actually marginalise those who deserve a major
role in the process, lacking an understanding of the people’s subjective assessment of
the risks that they face. However, new paradigms of risk communication have emerged
which support engagement of the public as a partner. These approaches seek to form a
dialogue with those whose risks are being discussed (Hadden, 1989).

Dialogues and discourse can help hazard specialists and those conducting risk
communication programmes work with stakeholders to develop and establish mutual
goals and relationships, which in turn, breed trust – a crucial component to successful
risk communication. Hadden (1989, p.307) states that “information alone is not adequate;
because of the inevitable gaps and uncertainties about how to evaluate risks, risk
communication depends upon trust among all parties to the communication.” Because
“[s]cientific assessments are neither trivial nor invincible, they must be sustained in
community infrastructures where dialogue privileges various views and concerns” (Heath
and O’Hair, 2009, p.8). It should be noted that institutional and cultural boundaries
may exist between communities and risk communicators. In these cases, participatory
approaches can be more difficult to establish, but where they are all the more important.
Whether your organisation chooses a dialogic or linear model of communication, the
information and delivery of the message must be carefully considered.

Purpose and Goals of your Communication

To begin with, your organisation should know what risks occur, what their probability
is, who they are most likely to affect, under what circumstances are these people to be
most likely affected, and with what positive or negative outcomes given the multitude of
scenarios that could occur. This will allow you to identify the information that is needed to
be communicated and the audience, and their needs.

Next, you should ask yourself two important questions:

1) What is the purpose of the communication?
2) What are the goals (i.e., outcomes) of your communication?

For example the purpose of your communication may be to work with a seaside
community to understand the natural and human-induced processes contributing
to coastal flooding along a seaside esplanade. The goals may be that the seaside
community should: a) be aware of the natural processes at work, b) understand risk
reduction/mitigation measures are available, c) understand the risks and benefits of
available options, and d) contribute to risk management decision-making and action. In
this model, the community members should feel involved in the process and that they
have been informed of and meaningfully engaged in the process. Once clear goals have
been established, Rowan (1994) suggests determining principle obstacles to those goals
and selecting appropriate methods for overcoming or minimising these difficulties and
achieving communication objectives.
56 DECISIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Practical Considerations
This section highlights some important practical considerations when communicating risk.
A wide range of risk information needs to be communicated, including:

yy Risks: What hazards can happen here? When will the hazard happen?
yy Magnitude: How “big” is the event/risk?
yy Duration: How long will it last? When will it stop?
yy Location: Where is it happening?
yy Impacts: Who will be impacted? What facilities will be impacted? How much damage
will there be?
yy Assistance: Where to get help? What types of assistance are available?
yy Preparedness: What is in a preparedness kit? How to be safe in an event?

Where to Get Help: Information Sharing Protocols

A number of organisations and institutions are responsible for helping vulnerable people.
Advice, education and assistance are available for every stage of the disaster risk
management process, though during the hazard, communities are sometimes isolated
from external assistance. Therefore, during the hazard itself, communities must be self-
sufficient. The better prepared a community is for a disaster, the lower the vulnerability.

People get help from a wide range of stakeholders:

yy Government: Government is responsible for the wellbeing of the population, and can
employ a variety of services to help vulnerable populations, depending upon the
judged severity of the hazard. Government acts to advise, educate, legislate, mitigate
and recover in regard to natural disasters. Examples of government agencies that may
have risk and vulnerability information include ministries or departments of statistics,
housing, transport, and health;
yy Academia, researchers and scientists: Academics have the best understanding of
the hazard. They can work with other organisations and the community throughout the
disaster risk management process;
yy Non-Governmental Organisations: NGOs work to prepare communities for and recover
from natural hazards;
yy Media: The media play a crucial role in communicating hazard forecasts, advice and
official statements;
yy Relevant private sector bodies: It may be in the interest of private sector bodies to
offer (in some cases impartial) advice on the disaster management process. For
example, it is in the interest of a consultancy that is paid by a government to undertake
a flood hazard risk assessment to educate communities about their hazard so that the
government sees a benefit of undertaking the risk assessment and commissions more
in other areas. However, it is important to be aware where private sector bodies are not
impartial;
 57

yy Communities: An individual’s experience with a hazard means they are better able to
make an assessment of the likely consequences and respond appropriately. Pooled
perspectives often result in a better assessment of the danger and so response.
People can act to warn each other of hazards and share experience. Friends and
family are also often the most trusted information source, meaning their advice is
usually acted upon. However, if this advice contradicts official advice the population
may be placed at increased risk. Social media has acted to amplify the effect of this
informal form of communication. People within the vicinity of a disaster will also be the
first to be able to respond and mount rescue and recovery operations.

Forms of Communication
In modern society, communication occurs in a multitude of forms and contexts. Traditional
media transmits statements in print, radio, and television. Dialogic communication (i.e.,
two-way communication) can be done through social media, press conferences, and
panel discussions. Each method of communication has a range of benefits and limitations
(Table 14). In a crisis situation, if information is intended for the whole of society (e.g.,
to advise of an approaching typhoon) it will be necessary to use multiple methods of
communication (e.g., a combination of print, radio, television, social media, internet, SMS
messaging) to ensure that everyone receives the message.

Table 16: Benefits and limitations of different media platforms for risk communication

MEDIA/MEDIUMS BENEFITS LIMITATIONS

yy May be difficult to organise

yy Direct contact with communities
and/or stakeholders yy Particular interests may be over-
Risk represented
yy Interaction between stakeholders
Communication yy Experts input may be overly
Workshops yy Allows for two-way technical
communication – stakeholders
and experts yy Response organisations may
downplay risk

yy May be difficult to organise

yy Community ownership of risks
and assessment process more yy Particular interests may be
likely over- represented or dominate
Community-Led discussions
yy Assessment can occur in context
Risk Meetings yy Experts input may be overly
yy Allows for two-way technical
communication – stakeholders
and experts yy Response organisations may
downplay risk

yy Information accessible to
stakeholders yy One-way communication
Information/ yy Can be seen in hazard risk yy Susceptible to environmental or
Interpretation context deliberate damage
Boards / Signs yy Development, construction and
yy Able to be updated readily
maintenance costs
yy Not time dependent
58 DECISIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS

MEDIA/MEDIUMS BENEFITS LIMITATIONS

yy Receptive audience yy Information needs to be re-cast in

yy Potential to communicate from terms children can engage with
In-School small groups to wider community yy Curriculum and school priorities
Education and
yy Opportunity to school projects may not permit time required
Engagement
yy Encourages inter-generational yy Effective risk communicators in
risk knowledge and action short supply

yy May require multiple languages

yy High credibility yy Limited space
Print yy Available for future reference yy Limited to people who have the
ability to read
yy Can target an audience
yy Brochures and a poster will not
send the message by itself.

yy Can broadcast in local language

/ dialect
yy Covers a large area yy Prior education to inform
community on what radio
yy Allows for repetition of message frequency to listen to
Radio yy Audience can call in yy Limited to people with the ability
yy Can be made available to hear
immediately yy Often commercial pressures to sell
yy Can reach parts of community advertisements
that print cannot (e.g. site
impaired or illiterate)

yy Can broadcast in local language

yy Covers a large area yy Prior education to inform
yy Allows for repetition of message community of which television
yy Audience can call in channel to watch
yy Can be made available yy Deaf and blind cannot be reached
immediately yy Often commercial pressures to sell
yy Can reach parts of community advertisements
Television
that print cannot (e.g. site yy Graphic images can desensitize
impaired or illiterate) viewers, can invite a demand for
yy Visuals can be dramatic action that is limited by the quality
yy Can humanise the message by of the vision – a good visual makes
giving viewers something to relate a good story.
to
yy Works in low literacy areas

yy Builds relationships between

emergency management and
community through increased
interconnectedness, including yy Many different social media
trust platforms
yy Builds preparedness by yy Limited to people with internet and
pointing people towards further social media access
Websites and information, resources and tools yy Difficult to distinguish legitimate
social media yy Helps monitor public opinion sources (may need prior
education to inform community
yy Can share information quickly in which social media channels to
an emergency situation follow).
yy Helps build situational awareness
during event
yy Information can be requested by
the community
 59

Emergency management and supporting agencies should establish guidelines for use of
media. Suggested guidelines for all media (Table 15):

yy No method should be used in isolation;

yy Risk information and data sharing needs to be consistent. To ensure consistency there
should be standard operating procedures. Each type of media should have its own
procedure;
yy There needs to be a standard point of contact for the media. This person will be able
to develop a relationship with the media;

• There should be regular communication with the media to help strengthen this
relationship and build trust. It can also be used to build awareness during no disaster
times.

Table 17: 7Cs Key features of ‘Best Practice’ science and risk communication( adapted and influ-
enced from Weingart, Engels, & Pansegrau, 2000; Miller, 2008; Fisher, 1991; Amberg & Hall, 2010)

7 CS
KEY FEATURES OF ‘BEST PRACTICE’ SCIENCE AND RISK COMMUNICATION
COMPREHENSIBLE: Simple, jargon-free, clear, concise, logical, but not condescending
Acknowledges and reflects diverse, complex sociocultural contexts.
CONTEXTUALISED: Acknowledges different knowledge bases and disciplines
CAPTIVATING: Entertaining, engaging, salient, and relevant to everyday life

CREDIBLE: Believable, open, does not overpromise, and acknowledges uncertainty

Backed by evidence, confirmable, coordinated and collaborated sources
CONSISTENT: of information
COURTEOUS: Compassionate, empathetic, and respectful
ADDRESSES Empowers action and response; Forms a dialogue, Consider it an ongoing
CONCERNS: process
CONCISE: avoids superfluous information

CONFIRMABLE: checkable – links to other information

CONCRETE: linked to solutions and actions

CREDIBLE: transparent, acknowledges uncertainty

60 DECISIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Challenges to Risk Communication

We have to rethink what we know and what we practice about communicating risk
because what we have done historically does not work. This has led to some damaging
misconceptions. What we have learned is:
yy Using fear as a way to motivate people does not work;
yy Consequences alone do not necessarily mean that people will care or do anything
about the risk. There are several examples of where consequences have been
discussed but it has done nothing towards solving the problem, such as with drug
use, smoking, and health: science tells us that smoking is harmful and yet people still
smoke;
yy Some experts are great communicators, and are well-received by audiences; others
are not. They must be seen to be credible and appealing to the audience they are
trying to communicate to. They must be liked.
yy Experts must make sure their information is current as it is important to remember that
over time information changes.

To effectively communicate and address some of these issues, the following list of
recommendations should always be followed:
yy Make an effort to understand your audience this includes the cultural context (i.e.
indigenous populations);
yy Be approachable to the audience. For example, in a community meeting the layout
and setting must be welcoming. Having a group of officials sitting behind a table,
talking down to the audience is not going to engage community relationships;
yy Admit when things go wrong. This happens in the emergency management sector and
it is important to communicate problems sensitively and professionally;
yy Admit when you don’t know the answer. If you do not know the answer to the questions
it is fine to say “I don’t know” but you need to find out the answer as soon as you can
and provide it to them;
yy Return enquiries from the community in a timely manner.

Success of a Risk Communication

Once a communication process has been completed, an organisation may consider the
job is done, with information in the hands of those who need it. But, how do we know
that the information has been received and understood in the manner in which it was
intended? And how can we define “success”?
 61

In 1989, the United States National Research Council (NRC) stated: “We construe risk
communication to be successful to the extent that it raises the level of understanding of
relevant issues or actions for those involved and satisfies them that they are adequately
informed within the limits of available knowledge” (NRC, 2006, p.3). Based on these
parameters, risk communication researchers and public relations would consider a
more educated and satisfied audience, as an indicator of success. However, this view
is limited, as a public may be aware of the scientific principles but fail to act or make
critical decisions, due to their personal beliefs. Organisations should be cautioned
that awareness does not necessarily lead to a successful risk communication strategy.
Therefore, it may be more useful to view the quality of a risk communication could be
gauged by how it connects to the community and their individual needs and concerns.
To determine success of a communication initiative, focus groups (and other appropriate
methods) can be used to measure diverse people’s (i.e., your target audience) mental
models (discussed above) of risk, before and after viewing/reading/engaging with the
intended communication.

Researchers and practitioners of the past have compiled many “recipes” for risk
communication best practice. Heath and O’Hair (2009) describe a common suggestion:
“Get a credible spokesperson who can deliver a knowledgeable message in a clear
manner. Communicate in ways – dress, manner and posture – that encourage audiences
to identify with risk communicators. Be clear to be understood. Be sensitive to audience
members’ outrage and concerns.” This advice focuses primarily on the mechanics of a
singular communication and communicator. It incorporates suggested behaviour and
delivery. Recent work by Vivienne Bryner at
the University of Otago (New Zealand) takes a
more holistic and comprehensive approach to
risk communication best practices.

Following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami,

a report was produced by the Norwegian
Geotechnical Institute (2006) to help the Thai
government develop short and long term plans
for future tsunami risk. The report outlines:
yy The science of the December 26,
2004 tsunami
yy Future earthquake and tsunami risk
in Thailand
yy The risk assessment and its design criteria
yy Recommended risk mitigation measures
yy Case study areas of: Patong City,
Bang Niang, Nam Khem
62 DECISIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS

There are several notable strengths to this

report: The key points to remember when
communicating a risk assessment
yy The authors start the report with the
are:
catastrophic event, which sets a
‘scene’ for why the reader should care yy Use the risk assessment
about tsunami risk in Thailand. This is process to establish credible
important, because as scientists, we scientific knowledge and
may sometimes forget that if people expertise.
have not experienced or researched yy Define the purpose and goals
these phenomena, sometimes people of the communication.
need a reminder of the destruction that yy Know your audience, and their
can be done. Also, the use of narrative information needs. Engage
(i.e., story-telling) is helpful for readers them in a participatory manner
to connect to the scientific information (if possible). Get feedback
presented within. from your audience: Did they
yy Large, colourful, well-labelled, and get it?
simplistic images and maps are used yy Use a respectful and
throughout. Maps and images are very considerate approach to
effective for non-science audiences. develop trust between the
It shows them the information, rather risk communicators and the
than describing it. It situates the reader community.
in the geographic location, and shows
yy Be aware of language use
them the extent of the spatial features.
in your written and oral
Note: Be sure to vet your imagery with
communication; Use technical
non-science audiences. The use of
language when appropriate,
colour, labels, scale, and symbols can
but be sure to explain it
all be sources of confusion and lead
well if you do. Don’t ‘dumb
to misleading interpretations of the
down’ your information. Your
diagrams.
audience is intelligent, but not
yy The report comfortably uses scientific experts in the field you are
terms and concepts. Often risk describing.
communicators may feel that they
should avoid jargon and technical
terms completely, providing audiences
with a ‘dumbed down’ version of
the information. This is an incorrect
assumption. Your audience may
have a range of literacy and scientific
backgrounds. It is best to use the exact
terms, concepts, and numbers which
tell the story of the risk assessment, but
can be modified or explained (using
analogies, stories, and examples)
to help the reader understand the
meaning of these concepts. If a
reader does not understand one of the
concepts, they can refer to other online
resources to learn more.
 63

Recommendations for
Future Risk Assessments
The planning, execution and utilisation of disaster risk assessments is an increasingly
pertinent topic for DRM practitioners. A number of challenges stand in the way of
greater widespread use and application of risk information. So recent publications by
intergovernmental institutions have attempted to. The report ‘Understanding Risk in
an Evolving World’ by the World Bank (2014) offers a useful and up-to-date synthesise
of recommendations for disaster risk assessment users and undertakers for future risk
assessments:

1. Clearly define the purpose of the risk assessment before analysis starts: Where risk
assessments have been commissioned in response to a clear and specific request for
information, they have tended to be effective in reducing fiscal or physical risk.

2. Promote and enable ownership of the risk assessment process and efforts to
mitigate risk: Ownership is critical for ensuring that knowledge created through a risk
assessment is authoritative and therefore acted upon.

3. Cultivate and promote the generation and use of open data: Experience gained in the
last decade strongly speaks to the need to encourage the creation and use of open
data. The analysis of natural hazards and their risks is a highly resource- and data-
intensive process, whereby the return on expended resources (time and money) can
be maximized if the data are created once and used often, and if they are iteratively
improved.

4. Make better communication of risk information an urgent priority: Clear communication

throughout the risk assessment process—from initiation of the assessment to delivery
of results and the development of plans in response—is critical for successfully
mitigating disaster risk.

5. Foster multidisciplinary, multi-institutional, and multi-sectoral collaboration at all

levels, from international to community: To generate a usable risk assessment
product, technical experts and decision makers must consult with one another and
reach agreement on the risk information that is required by the relevant development
program, and more broadly on the purpose and process of the risk assessment.

6. Consider the broader risk context: We know that failure to consider the full hazard
environment can result in maladaptation (heavy concrete structures with a ground-
level soft story for parking can protect against cyclone wind, for example, but can
be deadly in an earthquake), whereas adopting a multi-hazard risk approach leads
to better land-use planning, better response capacity, greater risk awareness, and
increased ability to set priorities for mitigation actions.

7. Keep abreast of evolving risk: Risk assessments need to account for temporal
and spatial changes in hazard, exposure, and vulnerability, particularly in rapidly
urbanizing areas or where climate change impacts will be felt the most.
64 RECOMMENDATIONS

8. Understand, quantify, and communicate the uncertainties and limitations of risk

information: Once risk information is produced, all users must be aware of and
knowledgeable about its limitations and uncertainties, which can arise from
uncertainties in the exposure data, in knowledge of the hazard, and in knowledge
of fragility and vulnerability functions. Failure to consider these can lead to flawed
decision making and inadvertently increase risk.

9. Ensure that risk information is credible and transparent: Risk information must be
scientifically and technically rigorous, open for review, and honest regarding its
limitations and uncertainties, which may arise from uncertainties in the exposure data,
in knowledge of the hazard, and in knowledge of fragility and vulnerability functions.
The best way to demonstrate credibility is to have transparent data, models, and
results open for review by independent, technically competent individuals.

10. Encourage innovations in open source software: In the last 5 to 10 years, immense
progress has been made in creating new open source hazard and risk modelling
software. Yet this innovation has created challenges around assessing “fitness-for-
purpose,” interoperability, transparency, and standards. These need to be addressed
in a way that continues to catalyze innovation and yet also better supports risk model
users
 65

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