EN BANC

[G.R. No. 230642. September 10, 2019.]

OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. COMAFAY, JR., RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R.

SANDOVAL, VICTORIA B. LOANZON, ELGIN MICHAEL C. PEREZ, ARNOLD E.
CACHO, AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, LEIGHTON R.
SIAZON, ARIANNE C. ARTUGUE, CLARABEL ANNE R. LACSINA, KRISTINE JANE R.
LIU, ALYANNA MARI C. BUENVIAJE, IANA PATRICIA DULA T. NICOLAS, IRENE A.
TOLENTINO and AUREA I. GRUYAL, petitioners, vs. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, as
represented by its Chairperson, HON. EMERSON B. AQUENDE, and LEB Member
HON. ZENAIDA N. ELEPAÑO, respondents,

ATTYS. ANTHONY D. BENGZON, FERDINAND M. NEGRE, MICHAEL Z. UNTALAN,

JONATHAN Q. PEREZ, SAMANTHA WESLEY K. ROSALES, ERIKA M. ALFONSO,
KRYS VALEN O. MARTINEZ, RYAN CEAZAR P. ROMANO, and KENNETH C. VARONA,
respondents-in-intervention,

APRIL D. CABALLERO, JEREY C. CASTARDO, MC WELLROE P. BRINGAS, RHUFFY

D. FEDERE, CONRAD THEODORE A. MATUTINO and numerous others similarly
situated, ST. THOMAS MORE SCHOOL OF LAW AND BUSINESS, INC., represented by
its President RODOLFO C. RAPISTA, for himself and as Founder, Dean and Professor,
of the College of Law, JUDY MARIE RAPISTA-TAN, LYNNART WALFORD A. TAN, IAN
M. ENTERINA, NEIL JOHN VILLARICO as law professors and as concerned citizens,
petitioners-intervenors.

[G.R. No. 242954. September 10, 2019.]

FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L. ABAYATA, GRETCHEN M. VASQUEZ, SHEENAH S.

ILUSTRISMO, RALPH LOUIE SALAÑO, AIREEN MONICA B. GUZMAN, DELFINO
ODIAS, DARYL DELA CRUZ, CLAIRE SUICO, AIVIE S. PESCADERO, NIÑA CHRISTINE
[*]
DELA PAZ, SHEMARK K. QUENIAHAN, AL JAY T. MEJOS, ROCELLYN L. DAÑO,
MICHAEL ADOLFO, RONALD A. ATIG, LYNNETTE C. LUMAYAG, MARY CHRIS
LAGERA, TIMOTHY B. FRANCISCO, SHEILA MARIE C. DANDAN, MADELINE C. DELA
PEÑA, DARLIN R. VILLAMOR, LORENZANA L. LLORICO, and JAN IVAN M.
SANTAMARIA, petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, Executive Secretary,
and LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, herein represented by its Chairperson, EMERSON
B. AQUENDE, respondents.

DECISION
J.C. REYES, JR., J : p

On the principal grounds of encroachment upon the rule-making power of the Court concerning
the practice of law, violation of institutional academic freedom and violation of a law school aspirant's
right to education, these consolidated Petitions for Prohibition (G.R. No. 230642) and Certiorari and
Prohibition (G.R. No. 242954) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assail as unconstitutional Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7662, [1] or the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993, which created the Legal Education
Board (LEB). On the same principal grounds, these petitions also particularly seek to declare as
unconstitutional the LEB issuances establishing and implementing the nationwide law school aptitude
test known as the Philippine Law School Admission Test or the PhiLSAT.

The Antecedents

Prompted by clamors for the improvement of the system of legal education on account of the
poor performance of law students and law schools in the bar examinations, [2] the Congress, on
December 23, 1993, passed into law R.A. No. 7662 with the following policy statement:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State

to uplift the standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy,
counselling, problem-solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the ethics of the
legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal
profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of
justice and to develop social competence.

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal
education system, require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law
schools, and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
R.A. No. 7662 identifies the general and specific objectives of legal education in this manner:

SEC. 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. —

(a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following
objectives:
(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;
(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs
of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
(3) to train persons for leadership;
(4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice and the
improvement of its administration, the legal system and legal institutions in
the light of the historical and contemporary development of law in the
Philippines and in other countries.

(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific objectives:
(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its various fields
and of legal institutions;
(2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to analyze, articulate
and apply the law effectively, as well as to allow them to have a holistic
approach to legal problems and issues;
 (3) to prepare law students for advocacy, [counseling], problem-solving and
decision-making, and to develop their ability to deal with recognized legal
problems of the present and the future;
(4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for gainful
employment or sufficient as a foundation for future training beyond the basic
professional degree, and to develop in them the desire and capacity for
continuing study and self-improvement;
(5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal profession;
and
(6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals of their
profession and to fully adhere to its ethical norms.

For these purposes, R.A. No. 7662 created the LEB, an executive agency which was made
separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), but attached thereto solely for
[3]
budgetary purposes and administrative support. The Chairman and regular members of the LEB are
to be appointed by the President for a term of five years, without reappointment, from a list of at least
three nominees prepared, with prior authorization from the Court, by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
[4]

Section 7 of R.A. No. 7662 enumerates the powers and functions of the LEB as follows:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. — For the purpose of achieving the objectives
of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner

consistent with the provisions of this Act;

(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and
functions as herein enumerated;

(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account,
among others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the
library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions
of higher learning;

(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum
qualifications and compensation to faculty members;

(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the
requirements for admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such
other courses of study as may be prescribed by the law schools and colleges under the
different levels of accreditation status;

(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar
which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or
firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the
Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the
Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the
 specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of
the Bar[;]
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the
Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses
and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary; and

(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations
necessary for the attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.

On the matter of accreditation of law schools, R.A. No. 7662 further elaborates:
SEC. 8. Accreditation of Law Schools. — Educational institutions may not
operate a law school unless accredited by the Board. Accreditation of law schools may be
granted only to educational institutions recognized by the Government.

SEC. 9. Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. — The [LEB] may

withdraw or downgrade the accreditation status of a law school if it fails to maintain the
standards set for its accreditation status.

SEC. 10. Effectivity of Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. — The

withdrawal or downgrading of accreditation status shall be effective after the lapse of the
semester or trimester following the receipt by the school of the notice of withdrawal or
downgrading unless, in the meantime, the school meets and/or upgrades the standards or
corrects the deficiencies upon which the withdrawal or downgrading of the accreditation
status is based.
Bar Matter No. 979-B
Re: Legal Education

In July 2001, the Court's Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM), through its
Chairperson, Justice Jose C. Vitug, noted several objectionable provisions of R.A. No. 7662 which "go
beyond the ambit of education of aspiring lawyers and into the sphere of education of persons duly
licensed to practice the law profession." [5]
In particular, the CLEBM observed:

x x x [U]nder the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662], the State
"shall x x x require apprenticeship and continuing legal education." The concept of
continuing legal education encompasses education not only of law students but also of
members of the legal profession. [This] implies that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction over
the education of persons who have finished the law course and are already licensed to
practice law[, in violation of the Supreme Court's power over the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines].

x x x Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education increasing

"awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived
and oppressed sectors of the society." Such objective should not find a place in the law
that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of law as they perform the task of
educating aspiring lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution also
provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules on "legal
assistance to the underprivileged" and hence, implementation of [R.A. No. 7662] might
give rise to infringement of a constitutionally mandated power.
 x x x [Section 7(e) giving the LEB the power to prescribe minimum standards for
law admission and Section 7(h) giving the LEB the power to adopt a system of continuing
legal education and for this purpose, the LEB may provide for the mandatory attendance
of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB may deem
necessary] encroach upon the Supreme Court's powers under Section 5, paragraph 5 of
Article VIII of the Constitution. Aside from its power over the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Supreme Court is constitutionally mandated to promulgate rules
concerning admission to the practice of law. [6]

While the CLEBM saw the need for the LEB to oversee the system of legal education, it
cautioned that the law's objectionable provisions, for reasons above-cited, must be removed. [7]

Relative to the foregoing observations, the CLEBM proposed the following amendments to R.A.
No. 7662:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State

to uplift the standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy,
counseling, problem-solving, and decision-making; to infuse in them the ethics of the legal
profession; to impress upon them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal
profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of
justice; and, to develop socially-committed lawyers with integrity and competence.
Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal
education system, require proper selection of law students, provide for legal
apprenticeship, and maintain quality among law schools.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 3. General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education. — x x x

xxx xxx xxx

2.) to increase awareness among law students of the needs of the poor,
deprived and oppressed sectors of society;

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 7. Power and functions. — x x x

(a) to regulate the legal education system in accordance with its powers and
functions herein enumerated;

(b) to establish standards of accreditation for law schools, consistent with

academic freedom and pursuant to the declaration of policy set forth in Section 2 hereof;

(c) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

(d) to prescribe minimum standards for admission to law schools including a

system of law aptitude examination;

(e) to provide for minimum qualifications for faculty members of law schools;

(f) to prescribe guidelines for law practice internship which the law schools
may establish as part of the curriculum; and

(g) to perform such other administrative functions as may be necessary for the
attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act." [8] (Underscoring supplied)
 xxx xxx xxx

In a Resolution [9] dated September 4, 2001, the Court approved the CLEBM's explanatory note
and draft amendments to R.A. No. 7662. The Senate and the House of Representatives were formally
furnished with a copy of said Resolution. This, notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7662 remained unaltered.

LEB Issuances

In 2003, the Court issued a resolution authorizing the JBC to commence the nomination process
for the members of the LEB. In 2009, the LEB was constituted with the appointment of Retired Court of
Appeals Justice Hilarion L. Aquino as the first Chairperson and followed by the appointment of LEB
members, namely, Dean Eulogia M. Cueva, Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Dean Venicio S. Flores and
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Director Felizardo Y. Francisco. Despite the passage of the
enabling law in 1993, the LEB became fully operational only in June 2010.

Acting pursuant to its authority to prescribe the minimum standards for law schools, the LEB
issued Memorandum Order No. 1, Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-2011) providing for the Policies and
Standards of Legal Education and Manual of Regulation for Law Schools.
Since then, the LEB had issued several orders, circulars, resolutions, and other issuances which
are made available through their website:
A. Orders

Number Title/Subject

LEBMO No. 2 Additional Rules in the Operation of the Law Program

LEBMO No. 3-2016 Policies, Standards and Guidelines for the Accreditation of
Law Schools to Offer and Operate Refresher Courses

LEBMO No. 4-2016 Supplemental to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016

LEBMO No. 5-2016 Guidelines for the [Prerequisite] Subjects in the Basic Law
Courses

LEBMO No. 6-2016 Reportorial Requirements for Law Schools

LEBMO No. 7-2016 Policies and Regulations for the Administration of a

Nationwide Uniform Law School Admission Test for
Applicants to the Basic Law Courses in All Law Schools in
the Country

LEBMO No. 8-2016 Policies, Guidelines and Procedures Governing Increases

in Tuition and Other School Fees, and Introduction of New
Fees by Higher Education Institutions for the Law Program

LEBMO No. 9-2017 Policies and Guidelines on the Conferment of Honorary

Doctor of Laws Degrees

LEBMO No. 10-2017 Guidelines on the Adoption of Academic/School Calendar

 LEBMO No. 11-2017 Additional Transition Provisions to [LEBMO] No. 7, Series
of 2016, on PhiLSAT

LEBMO No. 12-2018 LEB Service/Transaction Fees

LEBMO No. 13-2018 Guidelines in the Conduct of Summer Classes

LEBMO No. 14-2018 Policy and Regulations in Offering Elective Subjects

LEBMO No. 15-2018 Validation of the Licenses of, and the Law
Curriculum/Curricula for the Basic Law Courses in use by
Law Schools and Graduate Schools of Law

LEBMO No. 16-2018 Policies, Standards and Guidelines for the Academic Law
Libraries of Law Schools

LEBMO No. 17-2018 Supplemental Regulations on the Minimum Academic

Requirement of Master of Laws Degree for Deans and
Law Professors/Lecturers/Instructors in Law Schools

LEBMO No. 18-2018 Guidelines on Cancellation or Suspension of Classes in All

Law Schools

LEBMO No. 19-2018 Migration of the Basic Law Course to Juris Doctor

LEBMO No. 20-2019 Discretionary Admission in the AY 2019-2020 of

Examinees Who Rated Below the Cut-off/Passing Score
but Not Less than 45% in the Philippine Law School
Admission Test Administered on April 7, 2019

B. Memorandum Circulars

Number Title/Subject

LEBMC No. 1 New Regulatory Issuances

LEBMC No. 2 Submission of Schedule of Tuition and Other School Fees

LEBMC No. 3 Submission of Law School Information Report

LEBMC No. 4 Reminder to Submit Duly Accomplished LSIR Form

LEBMC No. 5 Offering of the Refresher Course for AY 2017-2018

LEBMC No. 6 Applications for LEB Certification Numbers

LEBMC No. 7 Application of Transitory Provisions under [LEBMO] No. 7,

Series of 2017 and [LEBMO] No. 11, Series of 2017 in the
 Admission of Freshmen Law Students in Basic Law
Courses in Academic Year 2017-2018

LEBMC No. 8 Guidelines for Compliance with the Reportorial

Requirements under [LEBMO] No. 7, Series of 2016 for
Purposes of the Academic Year 2017-2018

LEBMC No. 9 Observance of Law Day and Philippine National Law

Week

LEBMC No. 10 September 21, 2017 Suspension of Classes

LEBMC No. 11 Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in

the Academic Year 2016-2017

LEBMC No. 12 Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in

the Academic Year 2017-2018

LEBMC No. 13 Legal Research Seminar of the Philippine Group of Law

Librarians on April 4-6, 2018

LEBMC No. 14 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. 2016

LEBMC No. 15 Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in

the Academic Year 2018-2019

LEBMC No. 16 Clarification to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016

LEBMC No. 17 Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer the

Refresher Course in the Academic Year 2018-2019

LEBMC No. 18 PHILSAT Eligibility Requirement for Freshmen in the

Academic Year 2018-2019

LEBMC No. 19 Guidelines for the Limited Conditional

Admission/Enrollment in the 1st Semester of the Academic
Year 2018-2019 Allowed for Those Who Have Not Taken
the PhiLSAT

LEBMC No. 20 Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer the

Refresher Course in the Academic Year 2018-2019

LEBMC No. 21 Adjustments/Corrections to the Requirements for Law

Schools to be Qualified to Conditionally Admit/Enroll
Freshmen Law Students in AY 2018-2019

LEBMC No. 22 Advisory on who should take the September 23, 2018
PhiLSAT
 LEBMC No. 23 Collection of the PhiLSAT Certificate of
Eligibility/Exemption by Law Schools from Applicants for
Admission

LEBMC No. 24 Observance of the Philippine National Law Week

LEBMC No. 25 Competition Law

LEBMC No. 26 Scholarship Opportunity for Graduate Studies for Law

Deans, Faculty Members and Law Graduates with the
2020-2021 Philippine Fulbright Graduate Student Program

LEBMC No. 27 Advisory on April 7, 2019 PhiLSAT and Conditional

[Enrollment] for Incoming Freshmen/1st Year Law
Students

LEBMC No. 28 April 25-26, 2019 Competition Law Training Program

LEBMC No. 29 Detailed Guidelines for Conditional Enrollment Permit

Application

LEBMC No. 30 Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course in AY

2019-2020

LEBMC No. 31 Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course in AY

2019-2020

LEBMC No. 40 Reminders concerning Conditionally Enrolled Freshmen

Law Students in AY 2019-2020

C. Resolutions and Other Issuances

Number Title/Subject

Resolution No. 16 Reportorial Requirement for Law Schools with Small

Students Population

Resolution No. 7, Declaring a 3-Year Moratorium in the Opening of New Law

Series of 2010 Schools

Resolution No. 8, Administrative Sanctions

Series of 2010

Resolution No. 2011- A Resolution Providing for Supplementary Rules to the

21 Provisions of LEBMO No. 1 in regard to Curriculum and
Degrees Ad Eundem
 Resolution No. 2012- A Resolution Eliminating the Requirement of Special
02 Orders for Graduates of the Basic Law Degrees and
Graduate Law Degrees and Replacing them with a Per
Law School Certification Approved by the Legal Education
Board

Resolution No. 2013- Ethical Standards of Conduct for Law Professors

01

Resolution No. 2014- Prescribing Rules on the Ll.M. Staggered Compliance

02 Schedule and the Exemption from the Ll.M. Requirement

Resolution No. 2015- Prescribing the Policy and Rules in the Establishment of a
08 Legal Aid Clinic in Law Schools

Order Annual Law Publication Requirements

Chairman Restorative Justice to be Added as Elective Subject

Memorandum

The PhiLSAT under LEBMO No.

7-2016, LEBMO No. 11-2017,
LEBMC No. 18-2018, and related
issuances
As above-enumerated, among the orders issued by the LEB was Memorandum Order No. 7,
Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7-2016) pursuant to its power to "prescribe the minimum standards for law
admission" under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662.

The policy and rationale of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is to improve the quality of legal education by
requiring all those seeking admission to the basic law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform law
school admission test, known as the PhiLSAT. [10]
The PhiLSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee's communications and
language proficiency, critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning. [11] It was designed to measure
the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law. [12] Exempted from the PhiLSAT
requirement were honor graduates who were granted professional civil service eligibility and who are
enrolling within two years from their college graduation. [13]

Synthesizing, the key provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016 are as follows:

(1) The policy and rationale of requiring PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of
legal education. The PhiLSAT shall be administered under the control and supervision of
the LEB; [14]

(2) The PhiLSAT is an aptitude test that measures the academic potential of
the examinee to pursue the study of law; [15]

(3) A qualified examinee is either a graduate of a four-year bachelor's degree;

expecting to graduate with a four-year bachelor's degree at the end of the academic year
 when the PhiLSAT was administered; or a graduate from foreign higher education
institutions with a degree equivalent to a four-year bachelor's degree. There is no limit as
to the number of times a qualified examinee may take the PhiLSAT; [16]

(4) The LEB may designate an independent third-party testing administrator;

[17]

(5) The PhiLSAT shall be administered at least once a year, on or before April
16, in testing centers; [18]

(6) The testing fee shall not exceed the amount of P1,500.00 per examination;
[19]

(7) The cut-off or passing score shall be 55% correct answers, or such
percentile score as may be prescribed by the LEB; [20]

(8) Those who passed shall be issued a Certificate of Eligibility while those
who failed shall be issued a Certificate of Grade; [21]

(9) Passing the PhiLSAT is required for admission to any law school. No
applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law course
leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he has passed the
PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of the study; [22]

(10) Honor graduates granted professional civil service eligibility who are
enrolling within two years from college graduation are exempted from taking and passing
the PhiLSAT for purposes of admission to the basic law course; [23]
(11) Law schools, in the exercise of academic freedom, can prescribe
additional requirements for admission; [24]

(12) Law schools shall submit to LEB reports of first year students admitted
and enrolled, and their PhiLSAT scores, as well as the subjects enrolled and the final
grades received by every first year student; [25]

(13) Beginning academic year 2018-2019, the general average requirement

(not less than 80% or 2.5) for admission to basic law course under Section 23 of LEBMO
No. 1-2011 is removed; [26]
(14) In academic year 2017-2018, the PhiLSAT passing score shall not be
enforced and the law schools shall have the discretion to admit in the basic law course,
applicants who scored less than 55% in the PhiLSAT, provided that the law dean shall
submit a justification for the admission and the required report; [27] and

(15) Law schools, in violation of LEBMO No. 7-2016, shall be administratively

[28] [29]
sanctioned as prescribed in Section 32 of LEBMO No. 2-2013 and/or fined up to
P10,000.00. [30]

Effective for the academic year 2017 to 2018, no applicant to law school was allowed admission
without having taken and passed the PhiLSAT. The first PhiLSAT examination was held on April 16, 2017
in seven pilot sites: Baguio City, Metro Manila, Legazpi City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City, and
Cagayan de Oro. A total of 6,575 out of 8,074 examinees passed the first-ever PhiLSAT. For the first
PhiLSAT, the passing grade was adjusted by the LEB from 55% to 45% by way of consideration.
 Since the PhiLSAT was implemented for the first time and considering further that there were
applicants who failed to take the PhiLSAT because of the inclement weather last April 16, 2017, the LEB
issued Memorandum Order No. 11, Series of 2017 (LEBMO No. 11-2017).

Under LEBMO No. 11-2017, those who failed to take the first PhiLSAT were allowed to be
admitted to law schools for the first semester of academic year 2017 to 2018 for justifiable or meritorious
reasons and conditioned under the following terms:
2. Conditions. — x x x

a. The student shall take the next scheduled PhiLSAT;

b. If the student fails to take the next scheduled PhiLSAT for any reason,
his/her conditional admission in the law school shall be automatically revoked and barred
from enrolling in the following semester;

c. If the student takes the next scheduled PhiLSAT but scores below the
passing or cut-off score, his/her conditional admission shall also be revoked and barred
from enrolling in the following semester, unless the law school expressly admits him/her in
the exercise of the discretion given under Section/Paragraph 14 of LEBMO No. 7, Series
of 2016, subject to the requirements of the same provision;
d. The student whose conditional admission and enrol[l]ment is subsequently
revoked shall not be entitled to the reversal of the school fees assessed and/or refund of
the school fees paid; and

e. The student shall execute under oath, and file with his/her application for a
Permit for Conditional Admission/Enrol[l]ment, an UNDERTAKING expressly agreeing to
the foregoing conditions. [31]
The conditional admission and enrollment under LEBMO No. 11-2017 and the transitory provision
provided in LEBMO No. 7-2016 were subsequently clarified by the LEB through its Memorandum
Circular No. 7, Series of 2017 (LEBMC No. 7-2017).

On September 24, 2017 and April 8, 2018, the second and third PhiLSATs were respectively held.
On October 26, 2017, the LEB issued a Memorandum reminding law schools, law students, and
other interested persons that the passing of the PhiLSAT is required to be eligible for
admission/enrollment in the basic law course for academic year 2017 to 2018. It was also therein
clarified that the discretion given to law schools to admit those who failed the PhiLSAT during the initial
year of implementation is only up to the second semester of academic year 2017-2018.

Because of the confusion as to whether conditional admission for academic year 2018 to 2019
may still be allowed, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 18, Series of 2018 (LEBMC No. 18-
2018). Under LEBMC No. 18-2018, it was clarified that the conditional admission was permitted only in
academic year 2017 to 2018 as part of the transition adjustments in the initial year of the PhiLSAT
implementation. As such, by virtue of LEBMC No. 18-2018, the conditional admission of students
previously allowed under LEBMO No. 11-2017 was discontinued.

Nevertheless, on July 25, 2018, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 2018
(LEBMC No. 19-2018) allowing limited conditional admission/enrollment in the first semester of
academic year 2018 to 2019 for those applicants who have never previously taken the PhiLSAT. Those
who have taken the PhiLSAT and scored below the cut-off score were disqualified. In addition, only
those law schools with a passing rate of not less than 25%, are updated in the reportorial requirement
and signified its intention to conditionally admit applicants were allowed to do so. The limited enrollment
was subject to the condition that the admitted student shall take and pass the next PhiLSAT on
September 23, 2018, otherwise the conditional enrollment shall be nullified. Non-compliance with said
circular was considered a violation of the minimum standards for the law program for which law schools
may be administratively penalized.

The fourth PhiLSAT then pushed through on September 23, 2018.

The Petitions

Days before the scheduled conduct of the first-ever PhiLSAT on April 16, 2017, petitioners Oscar
B. Pimentel (Pimentel), Errol B. Comafay (Comafay), Rene B. Gorospe (Gorospe), Edwin R. Sandoval
(Sandoval), Victoria B. Loanzon (Loanzon), Elgin Michael C. Perez (Perez), Arnold E. Cacho (Cacho), Al
Conrad B. Espaldon (Espaldon) and Ed Vincent S. Albano (Albano) [as citizens, lawyers, taxpayers and
law professors], with their co-petitioners Leighton R. Siazon (Siazon), Arianne C. Artugue (Artugue),
Clarabel Anne R. Lacsina (Lacsina) and Kristine Jane R. Liu (Liu) [as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers],
Alyanna Mari C. Buenviaje (Buenviaje) and lana Patricia Dula T. Nicolas (Nicolas) [as citizens intending
to take up law] and Irene A. Tolentino (Tolentino) and Aurea I. Gruyal (Gruyal) [as citizens and taxpayers]
filed their Petition for Prohibition, [32] docketed as G.R. No. 230642, principally seeking that R.A. No.
7662 be declared unconstitutional and that the creation of the LEB be invalidated together with all its
issuances, most especially the PhiLSAT, for encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Court
concerning admissions to the practice of law. [33] They prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) to prevent the LEB from conducting the PhiLSAT.
Respondents-in-intervention Attys. Anthony D. Bengzon (Bengzon), Ferdinand M. Negre (Negre),
Michael Z. Untalan (Untalan), Jonathan Q. Perez (Perez), Samantha Wesley K. Rosales (Rosales),
Erika M. Alfonso (Alfonso), Krys Valen O. Martinez (Martinez), Ryan Ceazar P. Romano (Romano), and
Kenneth C. Varona (Varona) [as citizens and lawyers] moved to intervene and prayed for the dismissal of
the Petition for Prohibition. [34]

On February 12, 2018, petitioners-in-intervention April D. Caballero (Caballero), Jerey C.

Castardo (Castardo), MC Wellroe P. Bringas (Bringas), Rhuffy D. Federe (Federe) and Conrad Theodore
A. Matutino (Matutino) [as graduates of four-year college course and applicants as first year law
students], St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc., [as an educational stock corporation] and
Rodolfo C. Rapista (Rapista), Judy Marie Rapista-Tan (Rapista-Tan), Lynnart Walford A. Tan (Tan), Ian
M. Enterina (Enterina) and Neil John Villarico (Villarico) [as citizens and law professors] intervened and
joined the Petition for Prohibition of Pimentel, et al., seeking to declare R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT
as unconstitutional. [35]

Thereafter, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 242954, was filed by
petitioners Francis Jose Lean L. Abayata (Abayata), Gretchen M. Vasquez (Vasquez), Sheenah S.
Ilustrismo (Ilustrismo), Ralph Louie Salaño (Salaño), Aireen Monica B. Guzman (Guzman) and Delfino
Odias (Odias) [as law students who failed to pass the PhiLSAT], Daryl Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), Claire
Suico (Suico), Aivie S. Pescadero (Pescadero), Niña Christine Dela Paz (Dela Paz), Shemark K.
Queniahan (Queniahan), Al Jay T. Mejos (Mejos), Rocellyn L. Daño (Daño), Michael Adolfo (Adolfo),
Ronald A. Atig (Atig), Lynette C. Lumayag (Lumayag), Mary Chris Lagera (Lagera), Timothy B. Francisco
(Francisco), Sheila Marie C. Dandan (Dandan), Madeline C. Dela Peña (Dela Peña), Darlin R. Villamor
(Villamor), Lorenzana Llorico (Llorico) and Jan Ivan M. Santamaria (Santamaria) [as current law
students who failed to take the PhiLSAT] seeking to invalidate R.A. No. 7662 or, in the alternative, to
declare as unconstitutional the PhiLSAT. They also sought the issuance of a TRO to defer the holding of
the aptitude test. [36]

These Petitions were later on consolidated by the Court and oral arguments thereon were held
on March 5, 2019.

Temporary Restraining Order

On March 12, 2019, the Court issued a TRO [37] enjoining the LEB from implementing LEBMC
No. 18-2018 and, thus, allowing those who have not taken the PhiLSAT prior to the academic year 2018
to 2019, or who have taken the PhiLSAT, but did not pass, or who are honor graduates in college with no
PhiLSAT Exemption Certificate, or honor graduates with expired PhiLSAT Exemption Certificates to
conditionally enroll as incoming freshmen law students for the academic year 2019 to 2020 under the
same terms as LEBMO No. 11-2017.

Subsequently, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 2019 (LEBMC No. 27-
2019) stating that the PhiLSAT scheduled on April 7, 2019 will proceed and reiterated the requirements
that must be complied with for the conditional enrollment for the academic year 2019 to 2020.
The Parties' Arguments

In G.R. No. 230642

Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT are offensive to the
Court's power to regulate and supervise the legal profession pursuant to Section 5 (5), Article VIII [38] of
the Constitution and that the Congress cannot create an administrative office that exercises the Court's
power over the practice of law. They also argue that R.A. No. 7662 gives the JBC additional functions to
vet nominees for the LEB in violation of Section 8 (5), Article VIII [39] of the Constitution.

In their Memorandum, petitioners also question the constitutionality of the LEB's powers under
Section 7 (c) [40] and 7 (e) [41] to prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty members and
Section 7 (h) [42] on the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education as being repugnant
to the Court's rule-making power concerning the practice of law. They also argue that the PhiLSAT
violates the academic freedom of law schools and the right to education.
Petitioners-in-intervention meanwhile contend that the PhiLSAT violates the right to liberty and
pursuit of happiness of the student-applicants. They posit that the PhiLSAT violates the equal protection
clause as it is an arbitrary form of classification not based on substantial distinctions. They also argue
that the PhiLSAT violates the right of all citizens to quality and accessible education, violates academic
freedom, and is an unfair academic requirement. It is also their position that the PhiLSAT violates due
process as it interferes with the right of every person to select a profession or course of study. They also
argue that R.A. No. 7662 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers.

In G.R. No. 242954

Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 argue that certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies either
under the expanded or traditional jurisdiction of the Court. They also invoke the doctrine of
transcendental importance.

Substantively, they contend that R.A. No. 7662, specifically Section 3 (a) (2) [43] on the objective
of legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal profession, Section 7 (e) on law
admission, 7 (g) [44] on law practice internship, and 7 (h) on adopting a system of continuing legal
education, and the declaration of policy on continuing legal education [45] infringe upon the power of the
Court to regulate admission to the practice of law. They profess that they are not against the conduct of
law school admission test per se, only that the LEB cannot impose the PhiLSAT as the power to do so
allegedly belongs to the Court. [46]

It is also their contention that the PhiLSAT violates academic freedom as it interferes with the law
school's exercise of freedom to choose who to admit. According to them, the LEB cannot issue penal
regulations, and the consequent forfeiture of school fees and the ban on enrollment for those who failed
to pass the PhiLSAT violate due process.

The Comments
Procedurally, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the LEB, argues that
certiorari and prohibition are not proper to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7662 either under the
traditional or expanded concept of judicial power. For the OSG, R.A. No. 7662 was enacted pursuant to
the State's power to regulate all educational institutions, and as such, there could be no grave abuse of
discretion. It also claims that the Congress is an indispensable party to the petitions.

Substantively, the OSG contends that the Court's power to regulate admission to the practice of
law does not include regulation of legal education. It also defends Section 7 (e) on the LEB's power to
prescribe minimum standards for law admission as referring to admission to law schools; Section 7 (g)
on the LEB's power to establish a law practice internship as pertaining to the law school curriculum
which is within the power of the LEB to regulate; and 7 (h) on the LEB's power to adopt a system of
[47]
continuing legal education as being limited to the training of lawyer-professors. Anent the argument
that R.A. No. 7662 gives the JBC additional functions not assigned to it by the Court, the OSG points out
that the Court had actually authorized the JBC to process the applications for membership to the LEB
making this a non-issue.
In defending the validity of the PhiLSAT, the OSG advances the argument that the PhiLSAT is the
minimum standard for entrance to law schools prescribed by the LEB pursuant to the State's power to
regulate education. The OSG urges that the PhiLSAT is no different from the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) which the Court already upheld as a valid exercise of police power in the seminal case of
Tablarin v. Gutierrez. [48]

It is also the position of the OSG that neither the PhiLSAT nor the provisions of R.A. No. 7662
violate academic freedom because the standards for entrance to law school, the standards for
accreditation, the prescribed qualifications of faculty members, and the prescribed basic curricula are
fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.

For their part, respondents-in-intervention contend that R.A. No. 7662 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality and that the study of law is different from the practice of law.

In its Comment to the Petition-in-Intervention, the OSG dismisses as speculative the argument
that the PhiLSAT is anti-poor, and adds that the Court has no competence to rule on whether the
PhiLSAT is an unfair or unreasonable requirement, it being a question of policy.
Respondents-in-intervention, for their part, argue that the right of the citizens to accessible
education means that the State shall make quality education accessible only to those qualified enough,
as determined by fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. They dispute
the claimed intrusion on academic freedom as law schools are not prevented from selecting who to
admit among applicants who have passed the PhiLSAT. They stress that the right to education is not
absolute and may be regulated by the State, citing Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas. [49]
 By way of Reply, petitioners-in-intervention emphasize that the doctrine in Tablarin [50] is
inapplicable as medical schools are not the same as law schools. They further aver that the decline in
enrollment as a result of the implementation of the PhiLSAT is not speculative. [51]

The Issues

After a careful consideration of the issues raised by the parties in their pleadings and refined
during the oral arguments, the issues for resolution are synthesized as follows:
I. Procedural Issues:

A. Remedies of certiorari and prohibition; and

B. Requisites of judicial review and the scope of the Court's review in the instant
petitions.
II. Substantive Issues:

A. Jurisdiction over legal education;

B. Supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power;

1. Reasonable supervision and regulation

2. Institutional academic freedom
3. Right to education
C. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-à-vis the Court's jurisdiction over the
practice of law; and
D. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-à-vis the academic freedom of law schools
and the right to education.
The Rulings of the Court

I.
Procedural Issues

A.
Remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition

The propriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition is assailed on the ground that R.A. No.
7662 is a legislative act and not a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function. In any case, respondents
argue that the issues herein presented involve purely political questions beyond the ambit of judicial
review.

The Court finds that petitioners availed of the proper remedies.

The 1935 [52] and 1973 [53] Constitutions mention, but did not define, "judicial power." In contrast,
the 1987 Constitution lettered what judicial power is and even "expanded" its scope.

As constitutionally defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, [54] judicial power
is no longer limited to the Court's duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, or the power of adjudication, but also includes, the duty to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. This innovation under the 1987 Constitution
later on became known as the Court's traditional jurisdiction and expanded jurisdiction, respectively. [55]
 The expanded scope of judicial review mentions "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" to harbinger the exercise of judicial review; while petitions for certiorari [56] and
prohibition [57] speak of "lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction." Petitions for certiorari and prohibition as it is understood under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court are traditionally regarded as supervisory writs used as a means by superior or appellate
courts, in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction, to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of
their jurisdictions. As such, writs of certiorari and prohibition correct only errors of jurisdiction of judicial
and quasi-judicial bodies. [58]
However, considering the commonality of the ground of "grave abuse of discretion," a Rule 65
petition, as a procedural vehicle to invoke the Court's expanded jurisdiction, has been allowed. [59] After
all, there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence, or is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will, or personal
[60] [61]
bias. In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., the Court emphasized that certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues.
That it is a legislative act which is being assailed is likewise not a ground to deny the present
petitions.

For one, the 1987 Constitution enumerates under Section 5 (2) (a), Article VIII, [62] the Court's
irreducible powers which expressly include the power of judicial review, or the power to pass upon the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation.
For another, the Court's expanded jurisdiction, when invoked, permits a review of acts not only by
a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. "Any branch or instrumentality of the Government"
necessarily includes the Legislative and the Executive, even if they are not exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions. [63] As such, the Court may review and/or prohibit or nullify, when proper,
acts of legislative and executive officials, there being no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. [64]

The power of judicial review over congressional action, in particular, was affirmed in Francisco, Jr.
v. The House of Representatives, [65] wherein the Court held:

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of
judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court
ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether
the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse
of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tañada v. Angara,
where petitioners sought to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raised a justiciable controversy and
that when an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have seriously infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, [this Court] declared null and void a resolution of
the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of
a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether
the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
 representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the
House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tañada v. Cuenco, it held that although
under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this
does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of
acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it exercised its power of judicial
review to determine which between the Electoral Commission and the National Assembly
had jurisdiction over an electoral dispute concerning members of the latter. (Internal
citations omitted; emphases supplied)

This was reiterated in Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, [66] as follows:

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board
or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to

raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials. (Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied)

Consistently, in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City, [67] the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition were regarded as proper vehicles to assail the constitutionality of
curfew ordinances, and in Agcaoili v. Fariñas, [68] to question the contempt powers of the Congress in
the exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of legislation.
The consistency in the Court's rulings as to the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to correct,
undo, or restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the legislative and the executive,
propels the Court to treat the instant petitions in the same manner.

B.
Requisites for Judicial Review

The power of judicial review is tritely defined as the power to review the constitutionality of the
actions of the other branches of the government. [69] For a proper exercise of its power of review in
constitutional litigation, certain requisites must be satisfied: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. [70]

These requisites are effective limitations on the Court's exercise of its power of review because
judicial review in constitutional cases is quintessentially deferential, owing to the great respect that each
co-equal branch of the Government affords to the other.
 Of these four requisites, the first two, being the most essential, [71] deserve an extended
discussion in the instant case.
1. Actual Case or Controversy

Fundamental in the exercise of judicial power, whether under the traditional or expanded setting,
is the presence of an actual case or controversy. [72] An actual case or controversy is one which involves
a conflict of legal rights and an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. The
case must not be moot or academic, or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice.
To be justiciable, the controversy must be definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. It must be shown from the pleadings that there is an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other. There must be
an actual and substantial controversy and not merely a theoretical question or issue. Further, the actual
and substantial controversy must admit specific relief through a conclusive decree and must not merely
generate an advisory opinion based on hypothetical or conjectural state of facts. [73]
Closely associated with the requirement of an actual or justiciable case or controversy is the
ripening seeds for adjudication. Ripeness for adjudication has a two-fold aspect: first, the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court
consideration. The first aspect requires that the issue must be purely legal and that the regulation
subject of the case is a "final agency action." The second aspect requires that the effects of the
regulation must have been felt by the challenging parties in a concrete way. [74]
To stress, a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the challenged governmental act
has a direct and existing adverse effect on the individual challenging it. [75] While a reasonable certainty
of the occurrence of a perceived threat to a constitutional interest may provide basis for a constitutional
challenge, it is nevertheless still required that there are sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently
adjudicate the issues. [76]

In this regard, the Court's pronouncement in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities
(PACU) v. Secretary of Education [77] deserves reiteration:

It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant

to consider petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, [e]specially
where, as respondents assert, petitioners suffered no wrong — nor allege any —
from the enforcement of the criticized statute.

It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative

enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of human
judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can
conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility. x x x
When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important
rights have become dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider
an attack on its validity. x x x

As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on

only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a
 justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the
parties concerned. x x x
xxx xxx xxx

It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual

immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that
action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general [interest] to
invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative
action he must show that he has sustained or [has an] interest common to
all members of the public. x x x

Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. x x x

The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only

when the interests of litigants require the use of that judicial authority for
their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being
insufficient. x x x

Bona fide suit. — Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual

cases and controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is
incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the
Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the
Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as
necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy
between litigants. x x x
xxx xxx xxx

An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual
and positive relief. x x x Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem may be.
This is [e]specially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then
there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional
issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." x x x (Internal citations omitted;
emphases supplied)
Ultimately, whether an actual case is present or not is determinative of whether the Court's hand
should be stayed when there is no adversarial setting and when the prerogatives of the co-equal
branches of the Government should instead be respected.

As ruled in Republic v. Roque: [78]

A perusal of private respondents' petition for declaratory relief would show that
they have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to
sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA
9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private
respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which
the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would
remain untrammelled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents' fear of
prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were
 addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show how these remarks
tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the
implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular,
real or imminent threat to any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas
for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then
again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where
both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated
reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial
review for lack of ripeness.

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not

avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely
imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of
any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be
anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. (Internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

Concededly, the Court had exercised the power of judicial review by the mere enactment of a law
or approval of a challenged action when such is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution. In
Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre: [79]
First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet
occurred and the challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency
charged with administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and
constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves
too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function."

This is a rather novel theory — that people should await the implementing evil to
befall on them before they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it
remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are
contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts
implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Tañada v. Angara, this Court held that
when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere
enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other
overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
 constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x, it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.

xxx xxx xxx

As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases,

it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to
uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion
brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency,
instrumentality or department of the government.

In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of
Energy:

x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The courts, as
guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine
whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed
by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not
only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act
unconstitutional and void.
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme
is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the
laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility
of the courts. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)

In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, [80] the Court took cognizance of the petitions despite posing a
facial challenge against the entire law as the petitions seriously alleged that fundamental rights have
been violated by the assailed legislation:

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists
and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law
and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures
to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

xxx xxx xxx

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject
petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a
speech regulating measure.

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning
 not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are
but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which
one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope
to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is
simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously

alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation,
the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to
determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would
diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people. (Internal
citations omitted; emphases supplied) [81]

Likewise in Belgica v. Ochoa, [82] the Court held that the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is satisfied by the antagonistic positions taken by the parties:

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic

positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the
questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds
and the provisions allowing for their utilization — such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD
910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential
Social Fund — are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public
funds.

1 (a). Scope of Judicial Review

To determine whether petitioners presented an actual case or controversy, or have seriously

alleged that R.A. No. 7662 suffers from constitutional infirmities to trigger the Court's power of judicial
review, resort must necessarily be had to the pleadings filed.
 Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 allege that R.A. No. 7662 and the LEB issuances relative to the
admission and practice of law encroach upon the powers of the Court. [83] It is their position that the
[84]
powers given to the LEB are directly related to the Court's powers. In particular, they argue that the
LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education under Section 7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662 falls
within the authority of the Court. [85] In their Memorandum, they additionally argue that the LEB's powers
to prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty members under Section 7 (c) and 7 (e) of
R.A. No. 7662, Sections 50-51 of LEBMO No. 1, and Resolution No. 2014-02 intrude into the Court's
rule-making power relative to the practice of law. [86] They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the
academic freedom of law schools and the right to education. [87] It is their contention that the LEB is
without power to impose sanctions. [88] They also question the authority of the LEB Chairperson and
Members to act in a hold-over capacity. [89]

For their part, petitioners-in-intervention allege that the PhiLSAT requirement resulted to a
reduced number of law student enrollees for St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc. and
constrained said law school to admit only students who passed the PhiLSAT which is against their policy
of admitting students based on values. [90] Their co-petitioners are students who either applied for law
school, failed to pass the PhiLSAT, or were conditionally enrolled. Thus, they argue that Section 7 (e) of
R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT violate the law school's academic freedom.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 allege that they are current law students who failed to pass and/or
take the PhiLSAT, and who are therefore threatened with the revocation of their conditional enrollment
and stands to be barred from enrolling. Twelve of the 23 petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 were not allowed
to enroll for failure to pass and/or take the PhiLSAT.

It is their argument that the LEB's power under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe
minimum standards for law admission, Section 7 (g) to establish a law practice internship, Section 7 (h)
to adopt a system of continuing legal education, and Section 3 (a) (2) on the stated objective of legal
education to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
deprived and oppressed sectors of society usurp the Court's rule-making powers concerning admission
to the practice of law. [91] In addition, they argue that the PhiLSAT issuances violate academic freedom,
and that the LEB is not authorized to revoke conditional enrollment nor is it authorized to forfeit school
fees and impose a ban enrollment which are penal sanctions violative of the due process clause. They
also argue that the classification of students to those who have passed or failed the PhiLSAT for
purposes of admission to law school is repugnant to the equal protection clause.

The petitions therefore raise an actual controversy insofar as they allege that R.A. No. 7662,
specifically Section 2, paragraph 2, Section 3 (a) (2), Section 7 (c), (e), (g), and (h) of R.A. No. 7662
infringe upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and upon institutional
academic freedom and the right to quality education. Necessarily, a review of the LEB issuances when
pertinent to these assailed provisions of R.A. No. 7662 shall also be undertaken.

2. Legal Standing

Inextricably linked with the actual case or controversy requirement is that the party presenting the
justiciable issue must have the standing to mount a challenge to the governmental act.

By jurisprudence, standing requires a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
petitioner has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the violation of its rights, [92] thus:
 Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question." To possess legal standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that [they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged." The requirement of direct injury
guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy and, in effect, assures "that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions." [93] (Emphasis supplied)

The rule on standing admits of recognized exceptions: the over breadth doctrine, taxpayer suits,
third-party standing and the doctrine of transcendental importance. [94]

Petitioners-in-intervention Caballero, Castardo, Bringas, Federe and Matutino, being graduates of

a four-year college course and applicants as first year law students, as well as petitioners Abayata,
Vasquez, Ilustrismo, Salaño, Guzman and Odias, as law students who failed to pass the PhiLSAT and
were denied admission to law school for the academic year 2018 to 2019, and petitioners Dela Cruz,
Suico, Pescadero, Dela Paz, Queniahan, Mejos, Daño, Adolfo, Atig, Lumayag, Lagera, Francisco,
Dandan, Dela Peña, Villamor, Llorico and Santamaria, being law students who were conditionally
enrolled, possess the requisite standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 7 (e) of R.A. No.
7662 and the implementing LEB issuances, as they were, in fact, required to take the PhiLSAT, or to
comply with the terms of the conditional enrollment and failing which, were denied admission as regular
students to law school.
Petitioner-in-intervention St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc., likewise sufficiently
alleges injury that it has sustained in the form of reduced number of enrollees due to the PhiLSAT
requirement and the curtailment of its discretion on who to admit in its law school. Under the specific and
concrete facts available in this case, these petitioners have demonstrated that they were, or tend to be
directly and substantially, injured.

Meanwhile, petitioners Pimentel, Comafay, Gorospe, Sandoval, Loanzon, Perez, Cacho,

Espaldon, Albano, Siazon, Artugue, Lacsina, Liu, Buenviaje, Nicolas, Tolentino, and Gruyal; and
petitioners-in intervention Rapista, Rapista-Tan, Tan, Enterina and Villarico commonly anchor their
standing to challenge R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT as citizens.

Standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft an
issue of transcendental importance or when paramount public interest is involved. [95]

Legal standing may be extended to petitioners for having raised a "constitutional issue of critical
significance." [96] Without a doubt, the delineation of the Court's rule-making power vis-à-vis the
supervision and regulation of legal education and the determination of the reach of the State's
supervisory and regulatory power in the context of the guarantees of academic freedom and the right to
education are novel issues with far-reaching implications that deserve the Court's immediate attention. In
taking cognizance of the instant petitions, the Court is merely exercising its power to promulgate rules
towards the end that constitutional rights are protected and enforced. [97]
Now, to the core substantive issues.

II.
Substantive Issues

A.
 Jurisdiction Over Legal Education

Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law necessarily includes the power to do things related to the practice of law,
including the power to prescribe the requirements for admission to the study of law. In support, they point
to Sections 6 [98] and 16, [99] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. They contend that the Congress cannot
create an administrative body, like the LEB, that exercises this rule-making power of the Court. They
emphasize that the LEB belongs to the Executive department, and, as such, is not linked or accountable
to the Court nor placed under the Court's regulation and supervision.
For their part, petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 maintain that the Court exercises authority over the
legal profession which includes the admission to the practice of law, to the continuing requirements for
and discipline of lawyers. [100] According to them, the rule-making power of the Court is plenary in all
cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law. They argue that the Court's
power to admit members to the practice of law extends to admission to legal education because the
latter is a preparatory process to the application for admission to the legal profession, which "residual
power" of the Court can be inferred from Sections 5 [101] and 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. They
also emphasize that under Sections 1 [102] and 2 [103] of Rule 138-A, non-lawyers are allowed to have
limited practice of law and are held to answer by the Court under the same rules on privileged
communication and standard of conduct pursuant to Sections 3 [104] and 4 [105] of Rule 138-A. [106]
Contrary to petitioner's claims, the Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over legal
education. Neither the history of the Philippine legal education nor the Rules of Court invoked by
petitioners support their argument. The supervision and regulation of legal education is an Executive
function.
1. Regulation and supervision of
legal education had been
historically and consistently
exercised by the political
departments

Legal education in the Philippines was institutionalized in 1734, with the establishment of the
Faculty of Civil Law in the University of Santo Tomas with Spanish as the medium of instruction. Its
curriculum was identical to that adopted during the time in the universities in Europe [107] and included
subjects on Civil Law, Canon Law, ecclesiastical discipline and elements of Natural Law. [108]

In 1901, Act No. 74 was passed centralizing the public school system and establishing the
Department of Public Instruction headed by the General Superintendent. [109] The archipelago was then
divided into school divisions and districts for effective management of the school system. It was through
Act No. 74 that a Trade School [110] and a Normal School [111] in Manila and a School of Agriculture in
Negros were established. [112]

In 1908, the legislature approved Act No. 1870 which created the University of the Philippines
(UP). However, English law courses were not offered until 1910 when the Educational Department
Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), through the efforts of Justice George
Malcolm, offered law courses in the English language. In 1911, UP adopted these classes by formally
establishing its College of Law, [113] with its first graduates being students who studied at YMCA. [114]
The curriculum adopted by the UP College of Law became the model of the legal education curriculum
of the other law schools in the country. [115]

Private schools were formally regulated in 1917 with the passage of Act No. 2706 [116] which
made obligatory the recognition and inspection of private schools and colleges by the Secretary of Public
Instruction, so as to maintain a standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges [117] in the
country. As such, the Secretary of Public Instruction was authorized to inspect schools and colleges to
determine efficiency of instruction and to make necessary regulations. Likewise, under Act No. 2706, the
Secretary of Public Instruction was specifically authorized to prepare and publish, from time to time, in
pamphlet form, the minimum standards required of law schools and other schools giving instruction of a
technical or professional character. [118]

In 1924, a survey of the Philippine education and of all educational institutions, facilities and
agencies was conducted through Act No. 3162, which created the Board of Educational Survey. Among
the factual findings of the survey was that schools at that time were allowed to operate with almost no
supervision at all. This led to the conclusion that a great majority of schools from primary grade to the
university are money-making devices of persons who organize and administer them. Thus, it was
recommended that some board of control be organized under legislative control to supervise their
administration. [119] It was further recommended that legislation be enacted to prohibit the opening of
any school without the permission of the Secretary of Public Instruction. The grant of the permission
was, in turn, predicated upon a showing that the school is compliant with the proper standards as to the
physical structure, library and laboratory facilities, ratio of student to teacher and the qualifications of the
teachers. [120]

Consistent with these statutory precursors, the 1935 Constitution expressed in no uncertain
terms that "[a]ll educational institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation by the
State." [121]

This was followed by several other statutes such as the Commonwealth Act No. 578 [122] which
vests upon teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly-recognized
private schools, colleges and universities the status of "persons in authority" and Republic Act No. 139
[123]which created the Board of Textbooks, mandating all public schools to use only the books approved
by the Board and allowing all private schools to use textbooks of their choice, provided it is not against
the law or public policy or offensive to dignity. [124]

In 1947, the Department of Instruction was changed to the Department of Education. [125] During
this period, the regulation and supervision of public and private schools belonged to the Bureau of Public
and Private Schools. The regulation of law schools in particular was undertaken by the Bureau of Private
Schools through a special consultant who acted as a supervisor of the law schools and as a national
coordinator of the law deans. [126]

The Department of Education, through its Bureau of Private Schools, issued a Manual of
Instructions for Private Schools which contained the rules and regulations pertaining to the qualifications
of the faculty and deans, faculty load and library holdings of private learning institutions. [127] Meantime,
a Board of National Education was created [128] with the task of formulating, implementing and enforcing
general educational policies and coordinating the offerings and functions of all educational institutions.
The Board of National Education was later renamed as the National Board of Education. [129] In 1972,
 [130]
the Department of Education became the Department of Education and Culture, and was later on
renamed as the Ministry of Education and Culture in 1978. [131]

Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution remained consistent in mandating that all educational
institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State. [132]

With the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang 232 [133] (B.P. Blg. 232) or the Education Act of
1982, the regulatory rules on both formal and non-formal systems in public and private schools in all
levels of the entire educational system were codified. The National Board of Education was abolished,
and instead, a Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) was organized to supervise and
regulate educational institutions. Part and parcel of the MECS' authority to supervise and regulate
educational institutions is its authority to recognize or accredit educational institutions of all levels. [134]

Accordingly, the MECS was given the authority over public and private institutions of higher
education, as well as degree-granting programs, in all post-secondary public and private educational
[135] [136]
institutions. In particular, a Board of Higher Education was established as an advisory body to
the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports with the functions of making policy recommendations on
the planning and management of the integrated system of higher education and recommending steps to
improve the governance of the higher education system. Apart from the Board of Higher Education, a
Bureau of Higher Education was also established to formulate and evaluate programs and educational
standards for higher education [137] and to assist the Board of Higher Education. Law schools were
placed under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Higher Education. [138]

The MECS later became the DECS in 1987 under Executive Order No. 117 [139] (E.O. No. 117).
Nevertheless, the power of the MECS to supervise all educational institutions remained unchanged. [140]

The Administrative Code [141] also states that it shall be the State that shall protect and promote
the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such
education accessible to all; and that the DECS shall be primarily responsible for the formulation,
planning, implementation, and coordination of the policies, plans, programs and projects in the areas of
formal and non-formal education. The Administrative Code also empowered the Board of Higher
Education to create technical panels of experts in the various disciplines including law, to undertake
curricula development. [142] As will be discussed hereunder, the 1987 Constitution crystallized the power
of the State to supervise and regulate all educational institutions. [143]

2. DECS Order No. 27-1989 was

the precursor of R.A. No. 7662

Pursuant to its mandate under B.P. Blg. 232, the DECS promulgated DECS Order No. 27, Series
of 1989 (DECS Order No. 27-1989), [144] in close coordination with the Philippine Association of Law
Schools, the Philippine Association of Law Professors and the Bureau of Higher Education. DECS Order
No. 27-1989 specifically outlined the policies and standards for legal education, and superseded all
existing policies and standards related to legal education. These policies were made applicable
beginning school year 1989 to 1990.

"Legal education" was defined in DECS Order No. 27-1989 as an educational program including
a clinical program appropriate and essential in the understanding and application of law and the
administration of justice. It is professional education after completion of a required pre-legal education at
the college level. For state colleges and universities, the operation of their law schools was to depend on
their respective charters, and for private colleges and universities, by the rules and regulations issued by
the DECS. Nevertheless, it was made clear under DECS Order No. 27-1989 that the administration of a
law school shall be governed primarily by the law school's own policies and the provisions thereof apply
only suppletorily. [145]

Likewise, in generally permissive terms, DECS Order No. 27-1989 prescribed the preferred
qualifications and functions of a law dean, as well as the preferred qualifications, conditions of
employment and teaching load of law faculty members. It also prescribed the general inclusions to the
law curriculum, but gave the law schools the prerogative to design its own curriculum. The DECS also
drew a model law curriculum, thus, revising the 122-unit curriculum prescribed in 1946 by the Office of
Private Education, as well as the 134-unit curriculum prescribed in 1963. The law schools were also
given the option to maintain a legal aid clinic as part of its law curriculum. It also prescribed the need for
law schools to have relevant library resources. Applicants for a law course are required to comply with
the specific requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education and the Court.

Such was the state of the regulation of legal education until the enactment of R.A. No. 7662 in
[146]
1993. In 1994, R.A. No. 7722 was passed creating the Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
tasked to supervise tertiary degree programs. Except for the regulation and supervision of law schools
which was to be undertaken by the LEB under R.A. No. 7662, the structure of DECS as embodied in
E.O. No. 117 remained practically unchanged.
Due to the fact that R.A. No. 7662 was yet to be implemented with the organization of the LEB,
the CHED, meanwhile, assumed the function of supervising and regulating law schools. For this
purpose, the CHED constituted a Technical Panel for Legal Education which came up with a Revised
Policies and Standards for Legal Education, which, however, was unpublished.
3. Legal education is a mere
composite of the educational
system

As recounted, the historical development of statutes on education unerringly reflects the

consistent exercise by the political departments of the power to supervise and regulate all levels and
areas of education, including legal education.
Legal education is but a composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps unique
because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is not reason in itself to demarcate
legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and supervisory powers of the political branches.

Notwithstanding, petitioners maintain that legal education, owing to its specialized "legal" nature
and being preparatory to the practice of law, should fall within the regulation and supervision of the Court
itself. Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 went as far as professing that they are not against the creation of
an administrative body that will supervise and regulate law schools, only that such body should be
placed under the Court's supervision and control.
Two principal reasons militate against such proposition:

First, it assumes that the Court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal
education as a necessary consequence of its power to regulate the admission to the practice of law. This
assumption, apart from being manifestly contrary to the above-recounted history of legal education in the
Philippines, is likewise devoid of legal anchorage.
 Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon
itself a power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. For the Court to void R.A. No. 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that regulates
legal education and place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners suggest, is to
demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial activism.

4. Court's exclusive rule-making

power covers the practice of
law and not the study of law
The Constitution lays down the powers which the Court can exercise. Among these is the power
to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law.
The rule-making power of the Supreme Court had been uniformly granted under the 1935, the
1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. The complexion of the rule-making power, however, changes with the
promulgation of these organic laws.

Under the 1935 Constitution, existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure were repealed
and were instead converted as the Rules of Court which the Court can alter and modify. The Congress,
on the other hand, was given the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules on pleading, practice
and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law promulgated by the Court. [147]

This power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and admission to
the practice of law is in fact zealously guarded by the Court.

Thus, in Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, [148] the Court asserted its "exclusive" and
constitutional power with respect to the admission to the practice of law and when the act falls within the
term "practice of law," the Rules of Court govern. [149]

In In Re: Petition of A.E. Garcia, [150] the Court withheld from the executive the power to modify
the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law as the prerogative to promulgate
rules for admission to the practice of law belongs to the Court and the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement such rules is reserved only to the Congress.
Even then, the character of the power of the Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law under the 1935
Constitution was held not to be absolute and that any law passed by the Congress on the matter is
merely permissive, being that the power concerning admission to the practice of law is primarily a judicial
function.

The 1973 Constitution is no less certain in reiterating the Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts and the admission to the practice of law. As
observed in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, [151] the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by giving it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the
integration of the Bar. [152]
The ultimate power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure, the admission to
the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar remains to be with the Court under the 1973
Constitution even when the power of the Batasang Pambansa to pass laws of permissive and corrective
character repealing, altering, or supplementing such rules was retained.
 The 1987 Constitution departed from the 1935 and the 1973 organic laws in the sense that it took
away from the Congress the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar and
therefore vests exclusively and beyond doubt, the power to promulgate such rules to the Court, thereby
supporting a "stronger and more independent judiciary." [153]

While the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions "textualized a power-sharing scheme" between the
legislature and the Court in the enactment of judicial rules, [154] the 1987 Constitution "textually altered
the power-sharing scheme" by deleting the Congress' subsidiary and corrective power. [155]

Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted as vesting
upon the Court the authority to define the practice of law, [156] to determine who will be admitted to the
practice of law, [157] to hold in contempt any person found to be engaged in unauthorized practice of law,
[158] and to exercise corollary disciplinary authority over members of the Bar. [159]

The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating lawyers in the practice of law is a
judicial function because it requires "(1) previously established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles." [160]

Petitioners readily acknowledge that legal education or the study of law is not the practice of law,
the former being merely preparatory to the latter. In fact, the practice of law has a settled jurisprudential
meaning:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment
and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting
of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court.
It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involved appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
 customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill,
of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to
clients which rests upon all attorneys. [161] (Internal citations omitted)

The definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover
the study of law.

5. The Court exercises judicial

power only

Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he Members of the
Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions." The Court exercises judicial power only and should not
assume any duty alien to its judicial functions, the basic postulate being the separation of powers. As
early as Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., [162] the Court already stressed:
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions
of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is
exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and
its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform
any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administering of judicial functions. (Emphases supplied)

Neither may the regulation and supervision of legal education be justified as an exercise of the
Court's "residual" power. A power is residual if it does not belong to either of the two co-equal branches
and which the remaining branch can, thus, exercise consistent with its functions. Regulation and
supervision of legal education is primarily exercised by the Legislative and implemented by the
Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the judiciary.

It is with studied restraint that the Court abstains from exercising a power that is not strictly
judicial, or that which is not expressly granted to it by the Constitution. [163] This judicial abstention is
neither avoidance nor dereliction — there is simply no basis for the Court to supervise and regulate legal
education.

Court supervision over legal education is nevertheless urged [164] to the same extent as the
Court administers, supervises and controls the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA). [165] The
parallelism is mislaid because the PHILJA is intended for judicial education. [166] It particularly serves as
the "training school for justices, judges, court personnel, lawyers and aspirants to judicial posts." [167]
Court supervision over judicial education is but consistent with the Court's power of supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof. [168]

Still, petitioners insist that the Court actually regulated legal education through Sections 5, 6, and
16 of Rule 138 and Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Rule 138-A of the 1997 Rules of Court. On the contrary, the
Rules of Court do not intend nor provide for direct and actual Court regulation over legal education. At
most, the Rules of Court are reflective of the inevitable relationship between legal education and the
admissions to the bar.
6. The Rules of Court do not
support the argument that the
Court directly and actually
regulates legal education

While the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law
exists under the 1935 Constitution and reiterated under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the Court has
not promulgated any rule that directly and actually regulates legal education.

Instead, the 1964 Rules of Court concerned only the practice of law, admission to the bar,
admission to the bar examination, bar examinations, and the duties, rights and conduct of attorneys. The
1997 Rules of Court is no different as it contained only the rules on attorneys and admission to the bar
under Rule 138, the law student practice rule under Rule 138-A, the integrated bar in Rule 139-A and
disbarment and discipline of attorneys in Rule 139-B. [169]

In the exercise of its power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law,
the Court has prescribed the subjects covered by, as well as the qualifications of candidates to the bar
examinations. Only those bar examination candidates who are found to have obtained a passing grade
are admitted to the bar and licensed to practice law. [170] The regulation of the admission to the practice
of law goes hand in hand with the commitment of the Court and the members of the Philippine Bar to
maintain a high standard for the legal profession. To ensure that the legal profession is maintained at a
high standard, only those who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show
proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by the Court by passing the bar
examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner are admitted to the practice of law. [171]

Thus, under the 1997 Rules of Court, admission to the bar requires: (1) furnishing satisfactory
proof of educational, moral, and other qualifications; (2) passing the bar examinations; [172] and (3)
taking the lawyer's oath, [173] signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court a
certificate of the license to practice. [174] An applicant for admission to the bar must have these
qualifications: (1) must be a citizen of the Philippines; (2) must at least be 21 years of age; (3) must be of
good moral character; (4) must be a resident of the Philippines; (5) must produce satisfactory evidence
of good moral character; and (6) no charges against the applicant, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. [175] It is beyond argument that these are the
requisites and qualifications for admission to the practice of law and not for admission to the study of
law.

In turn, to be admitted to the bar examinations, an applicant must first meet the core academic
qualifications prescribed under the Rules of Court.

6 (a). Sections 5, 6, and 16, Rule 138

Section 5 provides that the applicant should have studied law for four years and have
successfully completed all the prescribed courses. This section was amended by Bar Matter No. 1153,
[176] to require applicants to "successfully [complete] all the prescribed courses for the degree of
Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent, in a law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine
Government, or by the proper authority in foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted." Bar
Matter No. 1153 further provides that a Filipino citizen who is a graduate of a foreign law school shall be
allowed to take the bar examinations only upon the submission to the Court of the required certifications.
 In addition to the core courses of civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and
private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation, and
legal ethics, Section 5 was further amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC or the Revised Law Student
Practice Rule dated June 25, 2019 to include Clinical Legal Education as a core course that must be
completed by an applicant to the bar examinations.

Notably, Section 5, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is not directed to law schools,
but to those who would like to take the bar examinations and enumerates the academic competencies
required of them. The Court does not impose upon law schools what courses to teach, or the degree to
grant, but prescribes only the core academic courses which it finds essential for an applicant to be
admitted to the bar. Law schools enjoy the autonomy to teach or not to teach these courses. In fact, the
Court even extends recognition to a degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent obtained abroad or that
granted by a foreign law school for purposes of qualifying to take the Philippine Bar Examinations,
subject only to the submission of the required certifications. Section 5 could not therefore be interpreted
as an exercise of the Court's regulatory or supervisory power over legal education since, for obvious
reasons, its reach could not have possibly be extended to legal education in foreign jurisdictions.

In similar fashion, Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that an applicant to the bar
examinations must have completed a four-year high school course and a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences. Again, this requirement is imposed upon the applicant to the bar examinations and not to law
schools. These requirements are merely consistent with the nature of a law degree granted in the
Philippines which is a professional, as well as a post-baccalaureate degree.

It is a reality that the Rules of Court, in prescribing the qualifications in order to take the bar
examinations, had placed a considerable constraint on the courses offered by law schools. Adjustments
in the curriculum, for instance, is a compromise which law schools apparently are willing to take in order
to elevate its chances of graduating future bar examinees. It is in this regard that the relationship
between legal education and admissions to the bar becomes unmistakable. This, however, does not
mean that the Court has or exercises jurisdiction over legal education. Compliance by law schools with
the prescribed core courses is but a recognition of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction over admissions to
the practice of law — that no person shall be allowed to take the bar examinations and thereafter, be
admitted to the Philippine Bar without having taken and completed the required core courses.

Section 16, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, provides that those who fail the
bar examinations for three or more times must take a refresher course. Similarly, this is a requirement
imposed upon the applicant. The Court does not impose that a law school should absolutely include in
its curriculum a refresher course.

6 (b). Revised Law Student Practice Rule

Neither does Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC on law
student practice manifest the Court's exercise of supervision or regulation over legal education. The
three-fold rationale of the law student practice rule is as follows:

1. [T]o ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence

or inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional
competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act [as] counsels on their own;
2. [T]o provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to
protect itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their
law students; and
 3. [T]o ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to
practice a particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a
license, as required by law. [177]

Consistently, the Revised Law Student Practice Rule is primordially intended to ensure access to
justice of the marginalized sectors and to regulate the law student practitioner's limited practice of law
pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.

In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law student practitioner, what the
Court regulates and supervises is not legal education, but the appearance and conduct of a law student
before any trial court, tribunal, board, or officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal clinic — an
activity rightfully falling under the definition of practice of law. Inasmuch as the law student is permitted to
act for the legal clinic and thereby to practice law, it is but proper that the Court exercise regulation and
supervision over the law student practitioner. Necessarily, the Court has the power to allow their
appearance and plead their case, and thereafter, to regulate their actions.

In all, the Rules of Court do not support petitioners' argument that the Court regulates and
supervises legal education. To reiterate, the Rules of Court are directed not towards legal education or
law schools, but towards applicants for admission to the bar and applicants for admission to the bar
examinations — consistent with the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the
practice of law, the same being fundamentally a judicial function.

Having, thus, established that the regulation and supervision of legal education do not fall within
the competence of the Court and is, instead, a power exercised by the political departments, the Court
now proceeds to determine the extent of such police power in relation to legal education.
B.

Reasonable Supervision and Regulation of Legal

Education as an Exercise of Police Power

The term police power was first used [178] in jurisprudence in 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden [179]
where the U.S. Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, held that the regulation of navigation by
steamboat operators for purpose of interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the
Congress, thus, negating state laws interfering with the exercise of the power. Likewise often cited is
Commonwealth v. Alger [180] which defined police power as "the power vested in legislature by the
[C]onstitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes,
and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the [C]onstitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."

Closer to home, early Philippine jurisprudence pertain to police power as the power to promote
the general welfare and public interest; [181] to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as
may promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare of each inhabitant; [182]
to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state and to establish for the intercourse of
[citizens] those rules of good manners and good neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict of rights.
[183]

In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel [Operators] Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, [184] the
nature and scope of police power was reaffirmed as embracing the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. It is
negatively defined as the authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare [185] and the State's inherent power to prohibit all that is hurtful to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society, [186] and flows from the recognition that salus populi est
suprema lex. [187] It is described as the most essential, insistent and illimitable [188] of the powers of the
State. It is co-existent with the concept of the State and is the very foundation and one of its
cornerstones, [189] and therefore even precedes the written Constitution.
1. Enactment of education laws
is an exercise of police power
[190]
The State has a "high responsibility for [the] education of its citizens" and has an interest in
prescribing regulations to promote the education, and consequently, the general welfare of the people.
[191] The regulation or administration of educational institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is
invested with public interest. [192] Thus, the enactment of education laws, implementing rules and
regulations and issuances of government agencies is an exercise of the State's police power. [193]

As a professional educational program, legal education properly falls within the supervisory and
regulatory competency of the State. The legislative history of the Philippine legal educational system
earlier recounted evinces that the State, through statutes enacted by the Congress and administrative
regulations issued by the Executive, consistently exercises police power over legal education.

The exercise of such police power, however, is not absolute.

2. Supervisory and regulatory

exercise, not control

The 1935 [194] and 1973 [195] Constitutions plainly provide that all educational institutions shall be
under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State. These reflect in express terms the police
power already inherently possessed by the State. Making express an already inherent power is not a
superfluous exercise, but is rather consequential in case of conflict between express powers. As
elucidated in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities: [196]

In this connection we do not share the belief that [now Article XIV, Section 4(1)] has added
new power to what the State inherently possesses by virtue of the police power. An
express power is necessarily more extensive than a mere implied power. For instance, if
there is conflict between an express individual right and the express power to control
private education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must yield to the former —
conflict of two express powers. But if the power to control education is merely implied from
the police power, it is feasible to uphold the express individual right[.] x x x
The 1987 Constitution under Section 4 (1), Article XIV, even when expressly recognizing the
complementary roles played by the public and private schools in education, reiterated that these
educational institutions are subject to State supervision and regulation, thus:

SEC. 4 (1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and
private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable
supervision and regulation of all educational institutions. (Emphasis supplied)
As much as possible, the words of the Constitution are understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. [197]

As worded, the Constitution recognizes that the role of public and private schools in education is
complementary in relation to each other, and primordial in relation to the State as the latter is only
empowered to supervise and regulate. The exercise of police power in relation to education must be
compliant with the normative content of Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. [198] The
exercise of police power over education must merely be supervisory and regulatory.

The State's supervisory and regulatory power is an auxiliary power in relation to educational
institutions, be it a basic, secondary or higher education. This must necessarily be so since the right and
duty to educate, being part and parcel of youth-rearing, do not inure to the State at the first instance.
Rather, it belongs essentially and naturally to the parents, [199] which right and duty they surrender by
delegation to the educational institutions. As held in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)
v. Quezon City, [200] the right and duty of parents to rear their children being a natural and primary right
connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the upbringing of their children. The responsibility
to educate lies with the parents and guardians as an inherent right, [201] over which the State assumes a
supportive role. [202] Withholding from the State the unqualified power to control education also serves a
practical purpose — it allows for a degree of flexibility and diversity essential to the very reason of
education to rear socially responsible and morally upright youth and to enable them, also, to come in
contact with challenging ideas.

In this sense, when the Constitution gives the State supervisory power, it is understood that what
[203]
it enjoys is a supportive power, that is, the power of oversight over all educational institutions. It
includes the authority to check, but not to interfere.

In addition to supervision, educational institutions are likewise made subject to State regulation.
Dispensing a regulatory function means imposing requirements, setting conditions, prescribing
restrictions, and ensuring compliance. In this regard, the political departments are vested with ample
authority to set minimum standards to be met by all educational institutions. [204]

Starkly withheld from the State is the power to control educational institutions. Consequently, in
no way should supervision and regulation be equated to State control. It is interesting to note that even
when a suggestion had been made during the drafting of the 1935 Constitution that educational
institutions should be made "subject to the laws of the State," the proponent of the amendment had no
totalitarian intentions, [205] and the proposal was not meant to curtail the liberty of teaching, [206] thus:

I think it only insures the efficient functioning of educational work and does not limit
liberty of administrators of schools. The gentleman will notice that my amendment does
not tend to curtail which he used in asking the question [sic]. I want the power of the
State to be supervisory as supervision in educational parlance should be of the
constructive type in the matter of help rather than obstruction. [207] (Emphasis
supplied)

3. Reasonable exercise
To be valid, the supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power must
be reasonable and not repugnant to the Constitution. [208]
 As held in Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., [209] the exercise of police power, in order to be
valid, must be compliant with substantive due process:
[T]he State, x x x may be considered as having properly exercised [its] police power only if
the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise[;] and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method. (Emphases supplied)

In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, [210] the Court held that:

Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own
limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is
exercised, that is, to advance the public good. (Emphasis supplied)

Obviating any inference that the power to regulate means the power to control, the 1987
Constitution added the word "reasonable" before the phrase supervision and regulation.

The import of the word "reasonable" was elaborated in Council of Teachers, [211] as follows:

x x x Section 4(1) was a provision added by the Framers to crystallize the State's
recognition of the importance of the role that the private sector plays in the quality of the
Philippine education system. Despite this recognition, the Framers added the second
portion of Section 4[1] to emphasize that the State, in the exercise of its police power, still
possesses the power of supervision over private schools. The Framers were explicit,
however, that this supervision refers to external governance, as opposed to internal
governance which was reserved to the respective school boards, thus:

Madam President, Section 2(b) introduces four changes: one, the

addition of the word "reasonable" before the phrase "supervision and
regulation"; two, the addition of the word "quality" before the word
"education"; three, the change of the wordings in the 1973 Constitution
referring to a system of education, requiring the same to be relevant to the
goals of national development, to the present expression of "relevant to the
needs of the people and society"; and four, the explanation of the meaning
of the expression "integrated system of education" by defining the same as
the recognition and strengthening of the complementary roles of public and
private educational institutions as separate but integral parts of the total
Philippine educational system.

When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to

the external governance of educational institutions, particularly private
educational institutions as distinguished from the internal governance by
their respective boards of directors or trustees and their administrative
officials. Even without a provision on external governance, the State would
still have the inherent right to regulate educational institutions through the
exercise of its police power. We have thought it advisable to restate the
supervisory and regulatory functions of the State provided in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions with the addition of the word "reasonable." We found it
 necessary to add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of our
Supreme Court in a decision in the case of Philippine Association of
Colleges and Universities vs. The Secretary of Education and the Board of
Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court said, and I quote:

It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think

the Constitution provides for control of education by the State.

The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the

power to regulate means power to control, and quotes from the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State
control of private education was intended by organic law.

The addition, therefore, of the word 'reasonable' is meant to

underscore the sense of the committee, that when the Constitution
speaks of State supervision and regulation, it does not in any way
mean control. We refer only to the power of the State to provide
regulations and to see to it that these regulations are duly followed
and implemented. It does not include the right to manage, dictate, overrule
and prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the right to dominate.
(Emphases in the original; underscoring supplied)
The addition of the word "reasonable" did not change the texture of police power that the State
exercises over education. It merely emphasized that State supervision and regulation of legal education
cannot amount to control.

4. Academic freedom
Fundamental in constitutional construction is that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole,
and that all provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the purposes of the Constitution. [212]

Accordingly, the reasonable supervision and regulation clause is not a stand-alone provision, but
must be read in conjunction with the other Constitutional provisions relating to education which include,
in particular, the clause on academic freedom.
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, provides:

(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar provision was found in the 1973
Constitution providing that: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." [213] Both
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions provide for a broader scope of academic freedom compared to the
1935 Constitution which limits the guarantee of academic freedom only to universities of higher learning
established by the State. [214]

In fact, academic freedom is not a novel concept. This can be traced to the freedom of intellectual
inquiry championed by Socrates, lost and replaced by thought control during the time of Inquisition, until
the movement back to intellectual liberty beginning the 16th century, most particularly flourishing in
German universities. [215]

Academic freedom has traditionally been associated as a narrow aspect of the broader area of
freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press. It has been identified with the individual
autonomy of educators to "investigate, pursue, [and] discuss free from internal and external interference
or pressure." [216] Thus, academic freedom of faculty members, professors, researchers, or
administrators is defended based on the freedom of speech and press. [217]

Academic freedom is enjoyed not only by members of the faculty, but also by the students
themselves, as affirmed in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong: [218]

x x x. After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was
none too different from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as
found in Article XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether and what
aspects of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S.
Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand
the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts
to develop further the parameters of academic freedom."

More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we
speak of the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher
learning,' do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?"
Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes x x x" Gascon finished off the broken
thought, — "the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."

Jurisprudence has so far understood academic freedom of the students as the latter's right to
enjoy in school the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. For instance, in Villar v. Technological Institute of the
Philippines [219] and in Non v. Dames II, [220] it was held that academic standards cannot be used to
discriminate against students who exercise their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, in
Malabanan v. Ramento, [221] it was ruled that the punishment must be commensurate with the offense,
and in Guzman v. National University, [222] which affirmed the student's right to due process.

Apart from the academic freedom of teachers and students, the academic freedom of the
institution itself is recognized and constitutionally guaranteed.

The landmark case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology
[223]
elucidates how academic freedom is enjoyed by institutions of higher learning:
[I]t is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the
recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of
such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them.
It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly
extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed
in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose,
nullify its intent. Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in
his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of
academic freedom to the university as an institution as distinguished from the academic
freedom of a university professor." He cited the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard,
Rector of the University of Dijon, France, President of the conference of rectors and vice-
chancellors of European universities: "It is a well-established fact, and yet one which
sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that the
collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the
 individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessarily
connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish,
therefore, between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom
of the individual university teacher." Also: "To clarify further the distinction between the
freedom of the university and that of the individual scholar, he says: "The personal aspect
of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher — recognized and effectively
guaranteed by society — to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in
his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual
university teacher is at least as important, in considering academic freedom, as the status
of the institutions to which they belong and through which they disseminate their learning.
(Internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

Garcia also enumerated the internal conditions for institutional academic freedom, that is, the
academic staff should have de facto control over: (a) the admission and examination of students; (b) the
curricula for courses of study; (c) the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (d) the
allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure. [224]

Reference was also made to the influential language of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, [225] describing it as the "business of the university" to provide a conducive
atmosphere for speculation, experimentation, and creation where the four essential freedoms of the
university prevail: the right of the university to determine for itself on academic grounds (a) who may
teach; (b) what may be taught; (c) how it shall be taught; and (d) who may be admitted to study.
4 (a). State's supervisory and
regulatory power over legal
education in relation to
academic freedom
The rule is that institutions of higher learning enjoy ample discretion to decide for itself who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who to admit, being part of their academic
freedom. The State, in the exercise of its reasonable supervision and regulation over education, can only
impose minimum regulations.

At its most elementary, the power to supervise and regulate shall not be construed as stifling
academic freedom in institutions of higher learning. This must necessarily be so since institutions of
higher learning are not mere walls within which to teach; rather, it is a place where research, experiment,
critical thinking, and exchanges are secured. Any form of State control, even at its most benign and
disguised as regulatory, cannot therefore derogate the academic freedom guaranteed to higher
educational institutions. In fact, this non-intrusive relation between the State and higher educational
institutions is maintained even when the Constitution itself prescribes certain educational "thrusts" or
directions. [226]

This attitude of non-interference is not lost in jurisprudence. To cite an example, due regard for
institutional academic freedom versus State interference was recognized in Lupangco v. Court of
Appeals, [227] the commendable purpose of the Philippine Regulation Commission of ensuring the
integrity of the examination notwithstanding:

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the

academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere
with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best
 enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full-
[f]ledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly
found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and
centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, in University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission, [228] the Court upheld the
university's academic freedom to choose who should teach and held that the Civil Service Commission
had no authority to dictate to the university the outright dismissal of its personnel. Nothing short of
marked arbitrariness, [229] or grave abuse of discretion [230] on the part of the schools, or overriding
public welfare [231] can therefore justify State interference with the academic judgment of higher
educational institutions. As held in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, [232] "[a]s corporate
entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their
policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure."
5. Right to education

Apart from the perspective of academic freedom, the reasonable supervision and regulation
clause is also to be viewed together with the right to education. The 1987 Constitution speaks quite
elaborately on the right to education. Section 1, Article XIV provides:
SEC. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible
to all.

The normative elements of the general right to education under Section 1, Article XIV, are (1) to
protect and promote quality education; and (2) to take appropriate steps towards making such quality
education accessible.
"Quality" education is statutorily defined as the appropriateness, relevance and excellence of the
education given to meet the needs and aspirations of the individual and society. [233]
In order to protect and promote quality education, the political departments are vested with the
ample authority to set minimum standards to be met by all educational institutions. This authority should
be exercised within the parameters of reasonable supervision and regulation. As elucidated in Council of
Teachers: [234]
While the Constitution indeed mandates the State to provide quality education, the
determination of what constitutes quality education is best left with the political
departments who have the necessary knowledge, expertise, and resources to
determine the same. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission again are very
instructive:

Now, Madam President, we have added the word "quality" before

"education" to send appropriate signals to the government that, in the
exercise of its supervisory and regulatory powers, it should first set
satisfactory minimum requirements in all areas: curriculum, faculty,
internal administration, library, laboratory class and other facilities, et
cetera, and it should see to it that satisfactory minimum requirements
are met by all educational institutions, both public and private.
When we speak of quality education we have in mind such
matters, among others, as curriculum development, development of
 learning resources and instructional materials, upgrading of library
and laboratory facilities, innovations in educational technology and
teaching methodologies, improvement of research quality, and others.
Here and in many other provisions on education, the principal focus of
attention and concern is the students. I would like to say that in my view
there is a slogan when we speak of quality of education that I feel we
should be aware of, which is, "Better than ever is not enough." In other
words, even if the quality of education is good now, we should attempt to
keep on improving it. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On the other hand, "accessible" education means equal opportunities to education regardless of
social and economic differences. The phrase "shall take appropriate steps" signifies that the State may
adopt varied approaches in the delivery of education that are relevant and responsive to the needs of the
people and the society. This is why, towards this end, the State shall:

(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of
education relevant to the needs of the people and society;

(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and
high school levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children,
elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age;

(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs,
subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in
both public and private schools, especially to the underprivileged;

(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as

self-learning, independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those
that respond to community needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in
civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills. [235] (Emphases supplied)

The deliberations of the framers in this regard are instructive:

MR. GASCON: When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to

emphasize is that education should be equally accessible to all regardless of social
and economic differences. So we go into the issue of providing opportunities to
such an education, recognizing that there are limitations imposed on those who come
from the poorer social classes because of their inability to continue education. [236] xxx
(Emphasis supplied)

And further, as follows:

This is why when we speak of education as a right, it means very clearly that
education should be accessible to all, regardless of social and economic
differences, meaning, educational opportunities should be provided through a
system of free education, at least, up to the secondary level. And recognizing the
limits of our financial resources, tertiary education should still be afforded and
provided availability to those who are poor and deserving. That is why when we say
that education is a right, it imposes a correlative duty on the part of the State to provide it
to the citizens. Making it a right shows that education is recognized as an important
 function of the State. Education is not merely a social service to be provided by the State.
The proposed provision recognizes that a right to education is a right to acquire a decent
standard of living, and that, therefore, the State cannot deprive anyone of this right in the
same manner that the right to life, the right to liberty and property cannot be taken away
without due process of law. [237] (Emphasis supplied)

The element of accessibility under the Constitution, thus, pertains to both the elimination of
discrimination especially against disadvantaged groups and to the financial duty of the State for, after all,
the right to education is part and parcel of social justice. The objective is to make quality education
accessible by appropriate means.

Apart from the Constitution, the right to education is also recognized in international human rights
law under various instruments to which the Philippines is a state signatory and to which it is
concomitantly bound.

For instance, Article 13 (2) [238] of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) recognizes the right to receive an education with the following interrelated and
essential features: (a) availability; (b) accessibility; (c) acceptability; and (d) adaptability. [239]

In particular, accessibility is understood as giving everyone, without discrimination, access to

educational institutions and programs. Accessibility has three overlapping dimensions:

(1) Non-discrimination — education must be accessible to all, especially the most

vulnerable groups, in law and fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited
grounds x x x;

(2) Physical accessibility — education has to be within safe physical reach, either by
attendance at some reasonably convenient geographic location ([e.g.] a
neighborhood school) or [via] modern technology ([e.g.] access to a "distance
learning" programme); [and]

(3) Economic accessibility — education has to be affordable to all. This dimension of

accessibility is subject to the differential wording of [A]rticle 13(2) in relation to
primary, secondary and higher education: whereas primary education shall be
available "free to all," States parties are required to progressively introduce free
secondary and higher education[.] [240]

Pertinent to higher education, the elements of quality and accessibility should also be present as
the Constitution provides that these elements should be protected and promoted in all educational
institutions.

Nevertheless, the right to receive higher education is not absolute.

5 (a). Right to education is subject to

fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic
requirements

Article 26 (1) [241] of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[t]echnical and
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally
accessible to all on the basis of merit[,]" while the ICESCR provides that "[h]igher education shall be
made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by
the progressive introduction of free education[.]" [242] Thus, higher education is not to be generally
available, but accessible only on the basis of capacity. [243] The capacity of individuals should be
assessed by reference to all their relevant expertise and experience. [244]

The right to receive higher education must further be read in conjunction with the right of every
citizen to select a profession or course of study guaranteed under the Constitution. In this regard, the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution under Section 5 (3), Article XIV are more exacting:
SEC. 5. x x x. —

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.

There is uniformity in jurisprudence holding that the authority to set the admission and academic
requirements used to assess the merit and capacity of the individual to be admitted and retained in
higher educational institutions lie with the institutions themselves in the exercise of their academic
freedom.

In Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, [245] the Court ruled:

Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the

salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is
discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student
rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to
freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic
institution.

"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for
the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right x x x extends as well to
parents x x x as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually
and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student
discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student
relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the
academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from
the panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right
to education" forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that
is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school. (Citation in the original
omitted; emphases supplied)

In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, [246] the Court similarly held:

xxx xxx xxx

 2. What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social,
economic, and cultural rights is the right to education not only in the elementary and high
school grades but also on the college level. The constitutional provision as to the State
maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in areas where finances
permit, establish and maintain a system of free public education" up to the high school
level does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and universities. It is
only at the most a reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such a duty to be obligatory
in the case of students in the colleges and universities. As far as the right itself is
concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right because of the lack of
funds, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone
has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and
fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education
shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit."
3. It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the
social economic, and cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation
imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used being "generally available"
and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all should be on the basis
of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the
aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency.

4. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes

the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing
grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that
standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against
those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced,
their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. (Emphases supplied)

Likewise, in Calawag: [247]

Lastly, the right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for
issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. In Department of Education, Culture
and Sports v. San Diego, we held that the right to education is not absolute. Section 5(e),
Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to select a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements." The thesis requirement and the compliance with the
procedures leading to it, are part of the reasonable academic requirements a
person desiring to complete a course of study would have to comply with. (Citation
in the original omitted; emphasis supplied)

The deliberations of the framers on the qualifications to the right to education are also
illuminating:

MR. NOLLEDO:

Thank you, Madam President. Before I ask questions directed to the chairman and
members of the committee, I would like to warmly congratulate them for a job well-
done. The committee report to my mind, Madam President, is excellent and I hope it
will not, in the course of amendments, suffer from adulteration. With respect to page
 1, lines 12-13: "Education is the right of every citizen of the Philippines," I agree with
this statement, but when we talk of the right, I understand from the chairman that it is
compellable and from Commissioner Guingona, that it is enforceable in court.
Suppose a student of a private school is not allowed to enroll by reason of
misconduct or that his stay in the school is considered by the administration
of that school to be undesirable, does he have a right to enforce his right to
education under this situation?

MR. GUINGONA:
Madam President, the right to education, like any other right, is not absolute. As
a matter of fact, Article XXVI of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, when it
acknowledges the right to education, also qualifies it when at the end of the
provision, it says "on the basis of merit." Therefore, the student may be subject to
certain reasonable requirements regarding admission and retention and this is
so provided in the draft Constitution. We admit even of discrimination. We have
accepted this in the Philippines, and I suppose in the United States there are
schools that can refuse admission to boys because they are supposed to be
exclusively for girls. And there are schools that may refuse admission to girls
because they are exclusively for boys. There may even be discrimination to
accept a student who has a contagious disease on the ground that it would
affect the welfare of the other students. What I mean is that there could be
reasonable qualifications, limitations or restrictions to this right, Madam President.

MR. GASCON:

May I add, Madam President.

MR. NOLLEDO:
Yes, the Commissioner may.

MR. GASCON:

When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize is that

education should be equally accessible to all regardless of social and economic
differences. So we go into the issue of providing opportunities to such an education,
recognizing that there are limitations imposed on those who come from the poorer
social classes because of their inability to continue education.

However, in the same light, this right to education is subject to the right of
educational institutions to admit students upon certain conditions such as
ability to pay the required entrance examination fee and maintaining a
respectable school record. When we speak of this right of schools as far as
maintaining a certain degree or quality of students, these conditions must be
reasonable and should not be used just to impose certain unfair situations on
the students.

MR. GUINGONA:

Madam President, may I add.

There is already established jurisprudence about this. In the United States, in the
case of [Lesser] v. Board of Education of New York City, 239, NYS 2d 776, the court
 held that the refusal of a school to admit a student who had an average of less than
85 percent which is the requirement for that school was lawful.
In the Philippines, we have the case of Padriguilan [sic] v. Manila Central University
where refusal to retain the student was because of the alleged deficiency in a major
subject and this was upheld by our Supreme Court. There is also the case of Garcia
v. Loyola School of Theology, wherein Garcia, a woman, tried to continue studying in
this school of theology. [248] (Citation in the original omitted; emphases supplied)

Extant from the foregoing is that while there is a right to quality higher education, such right is
principally subject to the broad academic freedom of higher educational institutions to impose fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. Plainly stated, the right to receive
education is not and should not be taken to mean as a right to be admitted to educational institutions.

With the basic postulates that jurisdiction over legal education belongs primarily and directly to
the political departments, and that the exercise of such police power must be in the context of
reasonable supervision and regulation, and must be consistent with academic freedom and the right to
education, the Court now proceeds to address whether the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 7662 and the
corresponding LEB issuances fall within the constitutionally-permissible supervision and regulation of
legal education.

C.
LEB's Powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-à-vis the
Court's Jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section
5 (5) of the Constitution

1. Section 3 (a) (2) on increasing

awareness among members of
the legal profession
One of the general objectives of legal education under Section 3 (a) (2) of R.A. No. 7662 is to
"increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and
oppressed sectors of society[.]" This objective is reiterated by the LEB in LEBMO No. 1-2011, Section 7,
Article II, as follows:
SEC. 7. (Section 3 of the law) General and Specific Objectives of Legal
Education. —
a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following
objectives:
xxx xxx xxx

(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the

needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society[.] (Emphasis supplied)

The plain language of Section 3 (a) (2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7 (2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011
are clear and need no further interpretation. This provision goes beyond the scope of R.A. No. 7662, i.e.,
improvement of the quality of legal education, and, instead delves into the training of those who are
already members of the bar. Likewise, this objective is a direct encroachment on the power of the Court
to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and legal assistance to the underprivileged and
should, thus, be voided on this ground. As aptly observed by the CLEBM and which the Court had
approved:
 In the same vein Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education
increasing "awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
deprived and oppressed sectors of the society." Such objective should not find a place in
the law that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of law as they perform the
task of educating aspiring lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution
also provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules on "legal
assistance to the underprivileged" and hence, implementation of [R.A. No. 7662] might
give rise to infringement of a constitutionally mandated power. [249]

2. Section 2, par. 2 and Section

7 (g) on legal apprenticeship
and law practice internship as
a requirement for taking the
bar

Towards the end of uplifting the standards of legal education, Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662
mandates the State to (1) undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system; (2) require
proper selection of law students; (3) maintain quality among law schools; and (4) require legal
apprenticeship and continuing legal education.

Pursuant to this policy, Section 7 (g) of R.A. No. 7662 grants LEB the power to establish a law
practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar examinations:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. — x x x

xxx xxx xxx

(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the

Bar, which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law
office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period
that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this
purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the
specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of
the Bar.

This power is mirrored in Section 11 (g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011:

SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. — For the purpose of
achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and
functions:

xxx xxx xxx

g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the

Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office
or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that
the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose,
the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the
specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of
the Bar[.]

It is clear from the plain text of Section 7 (g) that another requirement, i.e., completion of a law
internship program, is imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This requirement unduly
interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law
and admissions thereto.

The jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations
belongs to the Court. In fact, under the whereas clauses of the Revised Law Student Practice Rule, the
Court now requires the completion of clinical legal education courses, which may be undertaken either in
a law clinic or through an externship, as a prerequisite to take the bar examinations, thus:

Whereas, to produce practice-ready lawyers, the completion of clinical legal

education courses must be a prerequisite to take the bar examinations as provided in
Section 5 of Rule 138.

Under Section 7 (g), the power of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal
education, but now dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar examinations, and consequently,
admissions to the bar. This is a direct encroachment upon the Court's exclusive authority to promulgate
rules concerning admissions to the bar and should, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional.

Further, and as will be discussed hereunder, the LEB exercised this power in a manner that
forces upon law schools the establishment of a legal apprenticeship program or a legal aid clinic, in
violation of the schools' right to determine for themselves their respective curricula.
3. Section 2, par. 2 and Section
7 (h) on continuing legal
education of practicing
lawyers
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the power given to the LEB to adopt a system of
continuing legal education implies that the LEB exercises jurisdiction not only over the legal education of
those seeking to become lawyers, but also over those who are already lawyers which is a function
exclusively belonging to the Court. [250] Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the LEB's power
to adopt a system of continuing legal education is different from the mandatory continuing legal
education required of all members of the bar. [251] Respondent explains that the continuing legal
education under R.A. No. 7662 is limited to the training of lawyer-professors and not to the practice of
the legal profession. [252]
The questioned power of the LEB to adopt a system of continuing legal education appears in
Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. — x x x

xxx xxx xxx

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal
education system, require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law
schools, and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. — x x x

xxx xxx xxx

(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the
[LEB] may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such
 courses and for such duration as the [LEB] may deem necessary; x x x (Emphases
supplied)
This power is likewise reflected in Section 11 (h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, as follows:

SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. — For the purpose of
achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx

h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the

Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such
courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary[.] x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

By its plain language, the clause "continuing legal education" under Section 2, par. 2, and Section
7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662 unduly give the LEB the power to supervise the legal education of those who are
already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory attendance of
practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB deems necessary, the same
encroaches upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes
the education of "lawyer-professors" as teaching of law is practice of law. The mandatory continuing
legal education of the members of the bar is, in fact, covered by B.M. No. 850 or the Rules on Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) dated August 22, 2000 which requires members of the bar, not
otherwise exempt, from completing, every three years, at least 36 hours of continuing legal education
activities approved by the MCLE Committee directly supervised by the Court.

As noted by the CLEBM:

Thus, under the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662], the State
"shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require the proper
selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools and require apprenticeship
and continuing legal education["]. The concept of continuing legal education encompasses
education not only of law students but also of members of the legal profession. Its
inclusion in the declaration of policies implies that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction over the
education of persons who have finished the law course and are already licensed to
practice law. Viewed in the light of Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution
that vests the Supreme Court with powers over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, said
portion of Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662] risks a declaration of constitutional infirmity. [253]

(Underscoring supplied)

4. Section 7 (e) on minimum

standards for law admission
and the PhiLSAT issuances
Of the several powers of the LEB under R.A. No. 7662, its power to prescribe minimum standards
for law admission under Section 7 (e) received the strongest objection from the petitioners. Section 7 (e),
provides:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. — x x x

xxx xxx xxx
 (e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum
qualifications and compensation of faculty members; (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners argue that the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission belongs
to the Court pursuant to its rule-making power concerning the admission to the practice of law. Thus,
Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 which gives the LEB the power to prescribe the minimum standards for
law admission is allegedly unconstitutional as it violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
Necessarily, according to the petitioners, the PhiLSAT which was imposed by the LEB pursuant to
Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 is likewise void.

The Court finds no constitutional conflict between its rule-making power and the power of the
LEB to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662.
Consequently, the PhiLSAT, which intends to regulate admission to law schools, cannot be voided on
this ground.
4 (a). LEB's power to prescribe
minimum standards for "law
admission" pertain to
admission to legal education
and not to the practice of law

Much of the protestation against the LEB's exercise of the power to prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission stems from the interpretation extended to the phrase "law admission." For
petitioners, "law admission" pertains to the practice of law, the power over which belongs exclusively to
the Court.

The statutory context and the intent of the legislators do not permit such interpretation.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, that is, every part must be read together with the other parts, to the end that the
general intent of the law is given primacy. [254] As such, a law's clauses and phrases cannot be
interpreted as isolated expressions nor read in truncated parts, but must be considered to form a
harmonious whole. [255]

Accordingly, the LEB's power under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission should be read with the State policy behind the enactment of R.A. No. 7662
which is fundamentally to uplift the standards of legal education and the law's thrust to undertake
reforms in the legal education system. Construing the LEB's power to prescribe the standards for law
admission together with the LEB's other powers to administer, supervise, and accredit law schools, leads
to the logical interpretation that the law circumscribes the LEB's power to prescribe admission
requirements only to those seeking enrollment to a school or college of law and not to the practice of
law.

Reference may also be made to DECS Order No. 27-1989, as the immediate precursor of R.A.
No. 7662, as to what is sought to be regulated when the law speaks of "law admission" requirements.

Section 1, Article VIII of DECS Order No. 27-1989 is clear that the admission requirement
pertains to enrollment in a law course, or law school, or legal education, thus:

Article VIII
Admission, Residence and Other Requirements
 SEC. 1. No applicant shall be enrolled in the law course unless he
complies with specific requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher
Education and the Supreme Court of the Philippines, for which purpose he must
present to the registrar the necessary credentials before the end of the enrollment period.
(Emphases supplied)

This contemporary interpretation suffice in itself to hold that the phrase "law admission" pertains
to admission to the study of law or to legal education, and not to the practice of law. Further support is
nevertheless offered by the exchanges during the Senate interpellations, wherein it was assumed that
the phrase "minimum standards for law admission" refers to the requirements that the student must fulfill
before being admitted to law school. This assumption was not corrected by the bill's sponsor. [256]
4 (b). Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 is
reasonable supervision and
regulation

Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662, insofar as it gives the LEB the power to prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission is faithful to the reasonable supervision and regulation clause. It merely
authorizes the LEB to prescribe minimum requirements not amounting to control.

Emphatically, the law allows the LEB to prescribe only the minimum standards and it did not, in
any way, impose that the minimum standard for law admission should be by way of an exclusionary and
qualifying exam nor did it prevent law schools from imposing their respective admission requirements.

Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, the minimum standards for admission to law schools as
implemented by the LEB are: (1) completion of a four-year high school course; and (2) completion of a
course for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences. [257] Again, these requirements are but consistent
with the nature of the law course in the Philippines as being both a professional and post-baccalaureate
education.

As the facts disclose, however, the LEB later on introduced the PhiLSAT as an additional
prerequisite for admission to law school.
4 (c). Pursuant to Section 7 (e), LEB
is authorized to administer an
aptitude test as a minimum
standard for law admission
Evident from the Senate deliberations that, in prescribing the minimum standards for law
admission, an aptitude test may be administered by the LEB although such is not made mandatory
under the law. Thus:

Senator Tolentino: x x x
xxx xxx xxx

I will proceed to another point, Mr. President. I have taught law for more than 25
years in private schools and in the University of the Philippines as well. There is one
thing I have noticed in all these years of teaching and that is, many students in the
law school are not prepared or apt by inclination or by ability to become lawyers. I
see that the objectives of the legal education that are provided for in this bill do not
provide for some mechanism of choosing people who should take up the law course.
 As it is now, because of our democratic principles, anybody who wants to become a
lawyer, who can afford the tuition fee, or who has the required preparatory course,
can be admitted into the law school. And yet, while studying law, many of these
students — I would say there are about 30 or 40 percent of students in private
schools — should not be taking up law but some other course because, simply, they
do not have the inclination, they do not have the aptitude or the ability to become
lawyers.

Can that be provided for in this bill, Madam Sponsor? Would it contravene really our
principles of democracy where everybody should be free to take the course that he
wants to take? Or should the State be able to determine who should be able or who
should be allowed to take a particular course, in this case of law?

Senator Shahani:
Mr. President, there are those aptitude tests which are being taken when the
student is in high school to somehow guide the guidance councilors [sic] into
the aptitude of the students. But the talent or the penchant for the legal
profession is not one of those subjects specifically measured. I think what is
measured really is who is, more or less, talented for an academic education as
against a vocational education. But maybe, a new test will have to be designed
to really test the aptitude of those who would like to enter the law school. x x x

Senator Tolentino: x x x
Many parents want to see their children become lawyers. But they do not consider
the aptitude of these children, and they waste money and time in making these
children take up law when they really are not suited to the law course. My real
concern is whether by legislation, we can provide for selection of those who
should be allowed to take up law, and not everybody would be allowed to take
up law. x x x
xxx xxx xxx

Senator Shahani:
Mr. President, of course, the right to education is a constitutional right, and I
think one cannot just categorically deny a student — especially if he is bright
— entrance to a law school. I think I would stand by what I had previously said
that an aptitude examination will have to be specially designed. It is not in
existence yet. x x x [258] (Emphases supplied)

This matter was amplified in second reading:

Senator Angara: x x x

Senator Tolentino asked why there is an omission on the requirements for admission
to law school. I think [Senator Shahani] has already answered that, that the [LEB]
may prescribe an aptitude test for that purpose. Just as in other jurisdictions,
they prescribe a law admission test for prospective students of law. I think the
board may very well decide to prescribe such a test, although it is not
mandatory under this bill. [259] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 The lawmakers, therefore, recognized and intended that the LEB be vested with authority to
administer an aptitude test as a minimum standard for law admission. The presumption is that the
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law and one which operates no further than may
be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. [260] This presumption has not been
successfully challenged by petitioners.

It also bears to note that the introduction of a law aptitude examination was actually supported by
the Court when it approved the CLEBM's proposed amendment to Section 7 (e), as follows:

SEC. 6. Section 7 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 7. Power and Functions. — x x x

xxx xxx xxx

d). to prescribe minimum standards for ADMISSION TO LAW SCHOOLS
INCLUDING A SYSTEM OF LAW APTITUDE EXAMINATION x x x[.]" (Underscoring
supplied)

And further in Bar Matter No. 1161 [261] when the Court referred to the LEB the conduct of a
proposed law entrance examination.

4 (d). PhiLSAT, as an aptitude exam,

is reasonably related to the
improvement of legal
education

Having settled that the LEB has the power to administer an aptitude test, the next issue to be
resolved is whether the exercise of such power, through the PhiLSAT, was reasonable.

Indeed, an administrative regulation is susceptible to attack for unreasonableness. In Lupangco v.

Court of Appeals, [262] the Court held:

It is an [axiom] in administrative law that administrative authorities should

not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be
valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure
the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which
they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. (Emphasis
supplied)

To determine whether the PhiLSAT constitutes a valid exercise of police power, the same test of
reasonableness, i.e., the concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful means, is employed. Petitioners
argue that the PhiLSAT is unreasonable because: it is not a conclusive proof of the student's aptitude;
[263] it entails unreasonable examination and travel expenses and burdensome documentary
requirements; [264] applying for PhiLSAT exemption is inconvenient; [265] it is redundant to existing law
school entrance exams; [266] and it is not supported by scientific study. [267]

Unfortunately, these grounds are not only conclusions of fact which beg the presentation of
competent evidence, but also necessarily go into the wisdom of the PhiLSAT which the Court cannot
inquire into. The Court's pronouncement as to the reasonableness of the PhiLSAT based on the grounds
propounded by petitioners would be an excursion into the policy behind the examinations — a function
which is administrative rather than judicial.
 Petitioners also argue that there is no reasonable relation between improving the quality of legal
education and regulating access thereto. The Court does not agree.
The subject of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education. It is indubitable that the
State has an interest in prescribing regulations promoting education and thereby protecting the common
good. Improvement of the quality of legal education, thus, falls squarely within the scope of police power.
The PhiLSAT, as an aptitude test, was the means to protect this interest.
4 (e). Tablarin sustained the conduct
of an admission test as a
legitimate exercise of the
State's regulatory power
Moreover, by case law, the Court already upheld the validity of administering an aptitude test as a
reasonable police power measure in the context of admission standards into institutions of higher
learning.

In Tablarin, the Court upheld not only the constitutionality of Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 2382, or the
Medical Act of 1959, which gave the Board of Medical Education (BME) the power to prescribe
requirements for admission to medical schools, but also MECS Order No. 52, Series of 1985 (MECS
Order No. 52-1985) issued by the BME which prescribed NMAT.

Using the rational basis test, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as follows:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all
its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to
practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations
requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.
Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements — i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school — for admission to the
medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory
authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related;
the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted
earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is
sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among
other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the
aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in
general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known.
 We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like
the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection
of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in,
for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably in other countries with far more developed
educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the
petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation
in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. [268] (Emphases
supplied)

The Court reached its conclusion that NMAT is a valid exercise of police power because the
method employed, i.e., regulation of admissions to medical education is reasonably related to the
subject, i.e., the protection of the public by ensuring that only those qualified are eventually allowed to
practice medicine.

The necessity of State intervention to ensure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by those
unqualified to take care of the life and health of patients was likewise the reason why the Court in
Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego [269] upheld the "three-flunk" rule in NMAT:

We see no reason why the rationale in the [Tablarin] case cannot apply to the case
at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This
may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by
the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in
the regulation of the medical profession.

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat
that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b)
the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to
be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of
a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the
police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that
the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the
purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended
to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the
intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. (Emphases supplied)
Tablarin recognized that State intervention was necessary, and therefore was allowed, because
of the need to meet the goal of promoting public health and safety.
 In similar vein, the avowed purpose of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education by
evaluating and screening applicants to law school. As elucidated, the State has an interest in improving
the quality of legal education for the protection of the community at-large, and requiring an entrance test
is reasonably related to that interest. In other words, the State has the power and the prerogative to
impose a standardized test prior to entering law school, in the same manner and extent that the State
can do so in medical school when it prescribed the NMAT.
In all, the Court finds no constitutional conflict between the Court's rule-making power concerning
admissions to the practice of law and on the LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662.

Further, pursuant to its power under Section 7 (e), the Court affirms the LEB's authority to initiate
and administer an aptitude test, such as the PhiLSAT, as a minimum standard for law admission. Thus,
the PhiLSAT, insofar as it functions as an aptitude exam that measures the academic potential of the
examinee to pursue the study of law to the end that the quality of legal education is improved is not per
se unconstitutional.
However, there are certain provisions of the PhiLSAT that render its operation exclusionary,
restrictive, and qualifying which is contrary to its design as an aptitude exam meant to be used as a tool
that should only help and guide law schools in gauging the aptness of its applicants for the study of law.
These provisions effectively and absolutely exclude applicants who failed to pass the PhiLSAT from
taking up a course in legal education, thereby restricting and qualifying admissions to law schools. As
will be demonstrated, these provisions of the PhiLSAT are unconstitutional for being manifestly violative
of the law schools' exercise of academic freedom, specifically the autonomy to determine for itself who it
shall allow to be admitted to its law program.
D.

LEB's Powers vis-à-vis Institutional Academic

Freedom and the Right to Education

1. PhiLSAT
Paragraphs 7, 9, 11, and 15 of LEBMO No. 7-2016, provide:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Passing Score — The cut-off or passing score for the PhiLSAT shall be
FIFTY-FIVE PERCENT (55%) correct answers, or such percentile score as may be
prescribed by the LEB.

xxx xxx xxx

9. Admission Requirement — All college graduates or graduating students
applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the
PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to any law school in the Philippines. Upon
the effectivity of this memorandum order, no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment
as a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either
Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken
within 2 years before the start of studies for the basic law course and presents a
valid [Certificate of Eligibility] as proof thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
 11. Institutional Admission Requirements — The PhiLSAT shall be without
prejudice to the right of a law school in the exercise of its academic freedom to
prescribe or impose additional requirements for admission, such as but not limited to:

a. A score in the PhiLSAT higher than the cut-off or passing score set by the
LEB;
b. Additional or supplemental admission tests to measure the competencies
and/or personality of the applicant; and
c. Personal interview of the applicant.
xxx xxx xxx

15. Sanctions — Law schools violating this Memorandum Order shall [be]
imposed the administrative sanctions prescribed in Section 32 of LEBMO No. 2, Series
of 2013 and/or fine of up to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for each infraction.
(Emphases supplied)

Without doubt, the above provisions exclude and disqualify those examinees who fail to reach the
prescribed passing score from being admitted to any law school in the Philippines. In mandating that
only applicants who scored at least 55% correct answers shall be admitted to any law school, the
PhiLSAT actually usurps the right and duty of the law school to determine for itself the criteria for the
admission of students and thereafter, to apply such criteria on a case-by-case basis. It also mandates
law schools to absolutely reject applicants with a grade lower than the prescribed cut-off score and those
with expired PhiLSAT eligibility. The token regard for institutional academic freedom comes into play, if at
all, only after the applicants had been "pre-selected" without the school's participation. The right of the
institutions then are constricted only in providing "additional" admission requirements, admitting of the
interpretation that the preference of the school itself is merely secondary or supplemental to that of the
State which is antithetical to the very principle of reasonable supervision and regulation.
The law schools are left with absolutely no discretion to choose its students at the first instance
and in accordance with its own policies, but are dictated to surrender such discretion in favor of a State-
determined pool of applicants, under pain of administrative sanctions and/or payment of fines.
Mandating law schools to reject applicants who failed to reach the prescribed PhiLSAT passing score or
those with expired PhiLSAT eligibility transfers complete control over admission policies from the law
schools to the LEB. As Garcia tritely emphasized: "[c]olleges and universities should [not] be looked
upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or reject. Education, especially
higher education, belongs to a different, and certainly higher category." [270]
1 (a). Comparison of PhiLSAT with
NMAT and LSAT
Respondent urges the Court to treat the PhiLSAT in the same manner that the Court treated the
NMAT in Tablarin. Petitioners oppose on the ground that the PhiLSAT and the NMAT are different
because there is a Constitutional body, i.e., the Court, tasked to regulate the practice of law while there
is none with respect to the practice of medicine.
The Court treats the PhiLSAT differently from the NMAT for the fundamental reason that these
aptitude exams operate differently.
For one, how these exams allow the schools to treat the scores therein obtained is different.
 While both exams seem to prescribe a "cut-off" score, the NMAT score is evaluated by the
medical schools in relation to their own cut-off scores. Unlike the PhiLSAT score, the NMAT score is not
the sole determining factor on whether or not an examinee may be admitted to medical school. The
NMAT score is only meant to be one of the bases for evaluating applicants for admission to a college of
medicine.

Medical schools further enjoy the discretion to determine how much weight should be assigned to
an NMAT score relative to the schools' own admissions policy. Different medical schools may therefore
set varying acceptable NMAT scores. Different medical schools may likewise assign different values to
the NMAT score. This allows medical schools to consider the NMAT score along with the other
credentials of the applicant. The NMAT score does not constrain medical schools to accept pre-selected
applicants; it merely provides for a tool to evaluate all applicants.

Obtaining a low NMAT percentile score will not immediately and absolutely disqualify an applicant
from being admitted to medical school. Obtaining a high NMAT percentile score only increases an
applicant's options for medical schools. Taking the NMAT, thus, expands the applicant's options for
medical schools; it does not limit them.

For another, medical schools are not subjected to sanctions in case they decide to admit an
applicant pursuant to their own admissions policy. In fact, at some point, [271] there was even no
prescribed cut-off percentile score for the NMAT, and instead it was stressed that a student may enroll in
any school, college or university upon meeting the latter's specific requirements and reasonable
regulations. [272] Also, the issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission to a college of medicine had
been transferred to the medical schools, thus, rightfully giving the responsibility for and accountability of
determining eligibility of students for admission to the medical program to the schools concerned. [273]
Similar to the NMAT, the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) is only one of the several criteria for
evaluation for law school admission. It is just one of the methods that law schools may use to
differentiate applicants for law school. The American Bar Association actually allows a law school to use
an admission test other than the LSAT and it does not dictate the particular weight that a law school
should give to the results of the LSAT in deciding whether to admit an applicant. [274]

In contrast, the PhiLSAT score itself determines whether an applicant may be admitted to law
school or not, the PhiLSAT being strictly a pass or fail exam. It excludes those who failed to reach the
prescribed cut-off score from being admitted to any law school. It qualifies admission to law school not
otherwise imposed by the schools themselves. The PhiLSAT, as presently crafted, employs a totalitarian
scheme in terms of student admissions. This leaves the consequent actions of the applicant-student and
the school solely dependent upon the results of the PhiLSAT.

1 (b). Balancing State interest with

institutional academic freedom

Thus far, it is settled that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, is reasonably
related to the State's unimpeachable interest in improving the quality of legal education. This aptitude
test, however, should not be exclusionary, restrictive, or qualifying as to encroach upon institutional
academic freedom. Moreover, in the exercise of their academic freedom to choose who to admit, the law
schools should be left with the discretion to determine for themselves how much weight should the
results of the PhiLSAT carry in relation to their individual admission policies. At all times, it is understood
that the school's exercise of such academic discretion should not be gravely abused, arbitrary,
whimsical, or discriminatory.
 With the conclusion that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, passes the test of
reasonableness, there is no reason to strike down the PhiLSAT in its entirety. Instead, the Court takes a
calibrated approach and partially nullifies LEBMO No. 7-2016 insofar as it absolutely prescribes the
passing of the PhiLSAT and the taking thereof within two years as a prerequisite for admission to any
law school which, on its face, run directly counter to institutional academic freedom. The rest of LEBMO
No. 7-2016, being free from any taint of unconstitutionality, should remain in force and effect, especially
in view of the separability clause [275] therein contained.

1 (c). PhiLSAT and the right to

education

Anent the argument that the PhiLSAT transgresses petitioners' right to education and their right to
select a profession or course of study, suffice to state that the PhiLSAT is a minimum admission
standard that is rationally related to the interest of the State to improve the quality of legal education and,
accordingly, to protect the general community. The constitutionality of the PhiLSAT, therefore, cannot be
voided on the ground that it violates the right to education as stated under Section 1, Article XIV of the
Constitution. The Court's pronouncement in Tablarin [276] again resonates with significance:

Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more,
petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact
clash with that provision. On the contrary, we may note — x x x — that the statute and the
regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at
the level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5(3) of
Article XIV, as one must, one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to
be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps
to make quality education "accessible to all" who might for any number of reasons wish to
enroll in a professional school, but rather merely to make such education accessible to all
who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."

2. Other LEB issuances on law admission

Apart from the PhiLSAT, the LEB also imposed additional requirements for admission to law
schools under LEBMO No. 1-2011, specifically:
Article III

Prerequisites and Program Specification

SEC. 15. Prerequisites to admission to Law School. — x x x

xxx xxx xxx

Where the applicant for admission into a law school is a graduate of a foreign
institution or school following a different course and progression of studies, the matter
shall be referred to the Board that shall determine the eligibility of the candidate for
admission to law school.

SEC. 16. Board Prerequisites for Admission to the Ll.B. or J.D. Program. —
The Board shall apply Section 6 of Rule 138 in the following wise: An applicant for
admission to the Ll.B. or J.D. program of studies must be a graduate of a bachelor's
degree and must have earned at least eighteen (18) units in English, six (6) units in
Mathematics, and eighteen (18) units of social science subjects.
 SEC. 17. Board Prerequisites for Admission to Graduate Programs in Law. —
Without prejudice to other requirements that graduate schools may lay down, no
applicant shall be admitted for the Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent master's
degree in law or juridical science, without an Ll.B. or a J.D. degree. Admission of
non-Members of the Philippine Bar to the master's degree shall be a matter of academic
freedom vested in the graduate school of law. The candidate for the doctorate degree in
juridical science, or doctorate in civil law or equivalent doctorate degree must have
completed a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent degree.
Graduate degree programs in law shall have no bearing on membership or non-
membership in the Philippine Bar. [277] (Emphases supplied)
Further, LEBMO No. 1-2011, Article V, provides:

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 23. No student who has obtained a general average below 2.5 or 80 in
the college course required for admission to legal studies may be admitted to law school.
Exceptions may be made by the Dean in exceptionally meritorious cases, after having
informed the Board. [278]
These provisions similarly encroach upon the law school's freedom to determine for itself its
admission policies. With regard to foreign students, a law school is completely bereft of the right to
determine for itself whether to accept such foreign student or not, as the determination thereof now
belongs to the LEB.
Similarly, the requirement that an applicant obtain a specific number of units in English,
Mathematics, and Social Science subjects affects a law school's admission policies leaving the latter
totally without discretion to admit applicants who are deficient in these subjects or to allow such applicant
to complete these requirements at a later time. This requirement also effectively extends the jurisdiction
of the LEB to the courses and units to be taken by the applicant in his or her pre-law course. Moreover,
such requirement is not to be found under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court as this section
simply requires only the following from an applicant to the bar exams:

SEC. 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall

be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of
Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission
thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed
therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects
as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history
and economics.

Likewise, in imposing that only those with a basic degree in law may be admitted to graduate
programs in law encroaches upon the law school's right to determine who may be admitted. For
instance, this requirement effectively nullifies the option of admitting non-law graduates on the basis of
relevant professional experience that a law school, pursuant to its own admissions policy, may otherwise
have considered.

The required general weighted average in the college course suffers the same infirmity and would
have been struck down had it not been expressly repealed by the LEB because of the PhiLSAT. [279]
3. Section 7 (c) and 7 (e) on the
minimum qualifications of
faculty members

The LEB is also empowered under Section 7 (c) to set the standards of accreditation taking into
account, among others, the "qualifications of the members of the faculty" and under Section 7 (e) of R.A.
No. 7662 to prescribe "minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members[.]"

Relative to the power to prescribe the minimum qualifications of faculty members, LEB prescribes
under LEBMO No. 1-2011 the following:
[PART I]

Article V
Instructional Standards

SEC. 20. The law school shall be headed by a properly qualified dean,
maintain a corps of professors drawn from the ranks of leading and acknowledged
practitioners as well as academics and legal scholars or experts in juridical
science[.] x x x

xxx xxx xxx

PART III

QUALIFICATIONS AND CURRICULUM

Article I

Faculty Qualifications

SEC. 50. The members of the faculty of a law school should, at the very
least, possess a Ll.B. or a J.D. degree and should be members of the Philippine
Bar. In the exercise of academic freedom, the law school may also ask specialists in
various fields of law with other qualifications, provided that they possess relevant doctoral
degrees, to teach specific subjects.

Within a period of five (5) years of the promulgation of the present order,
members of the faculty of schools of law shall commence their studies in graduate
schools of law.

Where a law school offers the J.D. curriculum, a qualified Ll.B. graduate who is a
member of the Philippine Bar may be admitted to teach in the J.D. course and may wish
to consider the privilege granted under Section 56 hereof.

SEC. 51. The dean should have, aside from complying with the
requirements above, at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or a master's degree in
a related field, and should have been a Member of the Bar for at least 5 years prior
to his appointment as dean.

SEC. 52. The dean of a graduate school of law should possess at least a
doctorate degree in law and should be an acknowledged authority in law, as
evidenced by publications and membership in learned societies and organizations;
members of the faculty of a graduate school of law should possess at least a
 Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or the relevant master's or doctor's degrees in related
fields.
Aside from the foregoing, retired justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals may serve as deans of schools
of law, provided that: they have had teaching experience as professors of law and
provided further that, with the approval of the Legal Education Board, a graduate
school of law may accredit their experience in the collegiate appellate courts and the
judgments they have penned towards the degree [ad eundem] of Master of Laws. [280]

(Emphases supplied)

Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, a law faculty member must have an Ll.B or J.D. degree and
must, within a period of five years from the promulgation of LEBMO No. 1-2011, or from June 14, 2011 to
June 14, 2016, commence studies in graduate school of law.
The mandatory character of the requirement of a master's degree is underscored by the LEB in
its Resolution No. 2014-02, a "sequel rule" to Section 50 of LEBMO No. 1-2011, which provides that:
xxx xxx xxx

1. Members of the law faculty are required to be holders of the degree of Master
of Laws. It is the responsibility of the law deans to observe and implement this rule.

2. The law faculty of all law schools shall have the following percentage of holders of
the master of laws degree:

2.1. School Year — 2017-2018 — 20%

2.2. School Year — 2018-2019 — 40%
2.3. School Year — 2019-2020 — 60%
2.4. School Year — 2020-2021 — 80%
In computing the percentage, those who are exempted from the rule shall be included.

3. Exempted from this requirement of a master's degree in law are the following:
The Incumbent or Retired Members of the:

3.1. Supreme Court;

3.2. Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals;
3.3. Secretary of Justice and Under-Secretaries of Justice, Ombudsman,
Deputy Ombudsmen, Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitors General;
3.4. Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission who teach
Labor Laws;
3.5. Regional Trial Court Judges;
3.6. DOJ State and Regional State Prosecutors and Senior Ombudsman
Prosecutors who teach Criminal Law and/or Criminal Procedure;
3.7. Members of Congress who are lawyers who teach Political Law,
Administrative Law, Election Law, Law on Public Officers and other related
subjects;
3.8. Members of Constitutional Commissions who are Lawyers;
 3.9. Heads of bureaus who are lawyers who teach the law subjects which their
respective bureaus are implementing;
3.10. Ambassadors, Ministers and other [D]iplomatic Officers who are lawyers
who teach International Law or related subjects;
3.11. Those who have been teaching their subjects for 10 years or more upon
recommendation of their deans; and
3.12. Other lawyers who are considered by the Board to be experts in any field
of law provided they teach the subjects of their expertise.

4. The following are the sanctions for non-compliance with the foregoing rules:
4.1. If a law school is non-compliant with these rules for the first time beginning
School Year 2017-2018, the Board shall downgrade its Recognition status
to Permit status;
4.2. If a law school under a Permit status should remain non-compliant with
these rules in succeeding school years, the Board shall downgrade the
Permit status to Phase-Out status;
4.3. If a law school which is under Phase-Out status remains non-compliant with
these rules in succeeding school years, the Board shall order its closure to
take effect at the end of the school year.
5. If a law school under sanction shall become compliant, its Recognition status shall
be restored. (Emphases supplied)
xxx xxx xxx

And under LEBMO No. 2:

SEC. 31. Unfitness to Continue Operating a Law Program. — A law school
which is operated below quality standards of a law school is unfit to continue operating
a law program.

xxx xxx xxx

2) A law school is substandard if the result of the inspection and evaluation of
the law school and its facilities by members of the Board or its staff shows that the law
school has serious deficiencies including a weak faculty as indicated, among others, by
the fact that most of the members are neophytes in the teaching of law[.] x x x
xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 32. The imposable administrative sanctions are the following:

a) Termination of the law program (closing the law school);

b) Phase-out of the law program;

c) Provisional cancellation of the Government Recognition and putting the law

program of the substandard law school under Permit Status.
This master of laws degree requirement is reiterated in LEBMO No. 17, Series of 2018
(Supplemental Regulations on the Minimum Academic Requirement of Master of Laws Degree for
Deans and Law Professors/Lecturers/Instructors in Law Schools), as follows:
 xxx xxx xxx

B) For Members of the Law Faculty

SEC. 6. For purposes of determining compliance with the minimum

academic requirement of a Ll.M. degree for the members of the law faculty in law
schools required under Section 50 of LEBMO No. 1, Series of 2011 and Resolution No.
2014-02, the required percentage of holders of Ll.M. shall be computed based on the
aggregate units of all courses/subjects offered during the semester by the law school.

SEC. 7. Within thirty (30) days upon completion the effectivity this of this
memorandum [sic], the President of the HEI and the Dean of each law school shall jointly
submit to the LEB separate certification of the total teaching assignments/load for
the 1st Semester and 2nd Semester of the Academic Year 2017-2018 in the
prescribed matrix form containing the names of every faculty member, his/her
highest academic law degree, qualification for exemption from the Ll.M.
requirement, if applicable, courses/subjects assigned to teach, and academic
weight of each course/subject, and a disclosure whether or not the law school is
compliant with the prescribed percentage of Ll.M. holders for faculty members.
Thereafter, the same certification shall be submitted for every regular semester not later
than 45 days from the start of the semester.
xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 12. Law schools failing to meet the prescribed percentage of its
faculty members required to have Ll.M. degrees shall be imposed the appropriate
administrative sanction specified under Resolution No. 2014-02. (Emphases
supplied)

To be sure, under its supervisory and regulatory power, the LEB can prescribe the minimum
qualifications of faculty members. This much was affirmed by the Court when it approved the CLEBM's
proposal to revise the powers of LEB under R.A. No. 7662, but nevertheless retaining the LEB's power
to "provide for minimum qualifications for faculty members of law schools." As worded, the assailed
clauses of Section 7 (c) and 7 (e) insofar as they give LEB the power to prescribe the minimum
qualifications of faculty members are in tune with the reasonable supervision and regulation clause and
do not infringe upon the academic freedom of law schools.
Moreover, this minimum qualification can be a master of laws degree. In University of the East v.
Pepanio, [281] the Court held that the requirement of a masteral degree, albeit for tertiary education
teachers, is not unreasonable. Thus:

The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not

unreasonable. The operation of educational institutions involves public interest.
The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of
sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such
institutions. Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for
protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from ill-prepared teachers,
who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be
required to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as
prerequisite to employment. (Emphasis supplied)

This was reiterated in Son v. University of Santo Tomas, [282] as follows:

 As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the undergraduate
program professor's field of instruction has been in place, through DECS Order 92 (series
of 1992, August 10, 1992) or the Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.
Article IX, Section 44, paragraph [1(a)] thereof provides that college faculty members must
have a master's degree in their field of instruction as a minimum qualification for teaching
in a private educational institution and acquiring regular status therein.

DECS Order 92, Series of 1992 was promulgated by the DECS in the exercise of
its [rule]-making power as provided for under Section 70 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232,
otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982. As such, it has the force and effect of law.
In University of the East v. Pepanio, the requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary
education teachers was held to be not unreasonable but rather in accord with the public
interest.
xxx xxx xxx

From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of the law:
respondents, for maintaining professors without the mandated masteral degrees, and for
petitioners, agreeing to be employed despite knowledge of their lack of the necessary
qualifications. Petitioners cannot therefore insist to be employed by UST since they still do
not possess the required master's degrees; the fact that UST continues to hire and
maintain professors without the necessary master's degrees is not a ground for claiming
illegal dismissal, or even reinstatement. As far as the law is concerned, respondents are in
violation of the CHED regulations for continuing the practice of hiring unqualified teaching
personnel; but the law cannot come to the aid of petitioners on this sole ground. As
between the parties herein, they are in pari delicto.

xxx xxx xxx

The minimum requirement of a master's degree in the undergraduate teacher's
field of instruction has been cemented in DECS Order 92, Series of 1992. Both petitioners
and respondents have been violating it. The fact that government has not cracked down
on violators, or that it chose not to strictly implement the provision, does not erase the
violations committed by erring educational institutions, including the parties herein; it
simply means that government will not punish these violations for the meantime. The
parties cannot escape its concomitant effects, nonetheless. And if respondents knew the
overwhelming importance of the said provision and the public interest involved — as they
now fiercely advocate to their favor — they should have complied with the same as soon
as it was promulgated.
xxx xxx xxx

In addition, the Court already held in Herrera-Manaois v. St. Scholastica's College

that —

Notwithstanding the existence of the SSC Faculty Manual, Manaois

still cannot legally acquire a permanent status of employment. Private
educational institutions must still supplementarily refer to the prevailing
standards, qualifications, and conditions set by the appropriate government
agencies (presently the Department of Education, the Commission on
Higher Education, and the Technical Education and Skills Development
 Authority). This limitation on the right of private schools, colleges, and
universities to select and determine the employment status of their
academic personnel has been imposed by the state in view of the public
interest nature of educational institutions, so as to ensure the quality and
competency of our schools and educators. (Internal citations omitted)

Thus, the masteral degree required of law faculty members and dean, and the doctoral degree
required of a dean of a graduate school of law are, in fact, minimum reasonable requirements. However,
it is the manner by which the LEB had exercised this power through its various issuances that prove to
be unreasonable.

On this point, the amicus curiae, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, while admitting that the masteral
degree requirement is a "laudable aim" of the LEB, nevertheless adds that the LEB-imposed period of
compliance is unreasonable given the logistical and financial obstacles:
The masteral degree requirement is a laudable aim of LEB, but the possibility of
meeting the LEB period of compliance is unreasonable and unrealistic in the light of
logistical and financial considerations confronting the deans and professors, including the
few law schools offering graduate degrees in law.
To illustrate, to the best of my knowledge there are no more than six (6) graduate
schools of law around the country to service potential applicants. Those who have opted
for graduate studies in law find it very costly to fly to the venue. While one or two
programs may have been delivered outside the provider's home school venue to reach
out to graduate students outside the urban centers, pedagogical standards are often
compromised in the conduct of the modules. This is even aggravated by the fact that very
few applicants can afford to go into full-time graduate studies considering that most deans
and professors of law are in law practice. Perhaps, LEB should work in consultation with
PALS in designing a cost-effective but efficient delivery system of any graduate program in
law, [especially] for deans and law professors. [283]

Further, the mandatory character of the master of laws degree requirement, under pain of
downgrading, phase-out and closure of the law school, is in sharp contrast with the previous requirement
under DECS Order No. 27-1989 which merely prefer faculty members who are holders of a graduate law
degree, or its equivalent. The LEB's authority to review the strength or weakness of the faculty on the
basis of experience or length of time devoted to teaching violates an institution's right to set its own
faculty standards. The LEB also imposed strict reportorial requirements that infringe on the institution's
right to select its teachers which, for instance, may be based on expertise even with little teaching
experience. Moreover, in case a faculty member seeks to be exempted, he or she must prove to the
LEB, and not to the concerned institution, that he or she is an expert in the field, thus, usurping the
freedom of the institution to evaluate the qualifications of its own teachers on an individual basis.
Also, while the LEB requires of faculty members and deans to obtain a master of laws degree
before they are allowed to teach and administer a law school, respectively, it is ironic that the LEB, under
Resolution No. 2019-406, in fact considers the basic law degrees of Ll.B. or J.D. as already equivalent to
a doctorate degree in other non-law academic disciplines for purposes of "appointment/promotion,
ranking, and compensation."

In this connection, the LEB also prescribes who may or may not be considered as full-time
faculty, the classification of the members of their faculty, as well as the faculty load, including the
regulation of work hours, all in violation of the academic freedom of law schools. LEBMO No. 2 provides:
 SEC. 33. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. — There are two general kinds of
faculty members, the full-time and part-time faculty members.
a) A full-time faculty member is one:

1) Who possesses the minimum qualification of a member of the faculty as

prescribed in Sections 50 and 51 of LEBMO No. 1;
2) Who devotes not less than eight (8) hours of work for the law school;
3) Who has no other occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of work,
except when permitted by the higher education institution of which the law
school is a part; and
4) Who is not teaching full-time in any other higher education institution.

b) A part-time faculty member is one who does not meet the qualifications of a full-time
professor as enumerated in the preceding number.

SEC. 34. Faculty Classification and Ranking. — Members of the faculty may
be classified, in the discretion of the higher education institution of which the law school is
a part, according to academic proceeding, training and scholarship into Professor,
Associate Professor, Assistant Professor, and Instructor.

Part-time members of the faculty may be classified as Lecturers, Assistant

Professorial Lecturers, Associate Professorial Lecturers and Professorial Lecturers. The
law schools shall devise their scheme of classification and promotion not
inconsistent with these rules.

SEC. 35. Faculty Load. — Generally, no member of the faculty should

teach more than 3 consecutive hours in any subject nor should he or she be loaded
with subjects requiring more than three preparations or three different subjects (no
matter the number of units per subject) in a day.

However, under exceptionally meritorious circumstances, the law deans may allow
members of the faculty to teach 4 hours a day provided that there is a break of 30 minutes
between the first 2 and the last 2 hours. (Emphases supplied)

The LEB is also allowed to revoke permits or recognitions given to law schools when the LEB
deems that there is gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors or
instructors under Section 41.2 (d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, thus:

SEC. 41.2. Permits or recognitions may be revoked, or recognitions reverted

to permit status for just causes including but not limited to:

a) fraud or deceit committed by the institution in connection with its application to the
Board;

b) the unauthorized operation of a school of law or a branch or an extension of a law

school;

c) mismanagement or gross inefficiency in the operation of a law school;

d) gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors or
instructors;
 e) violation of approved standards governing institutional operations, announcements
and advertisements;

f) transfer of the school of law to a site or location detrimental to the interests of the
students and inimical to the fruitful and promising study of law;
g) repeated failure of discipline on the part of the student body; and

h) other grounds for the closure of schools and academic institutions as provided for
in the rules and regulations of the Commission on Higher Education. [284] (Emphasis
supplied)
In this regard, the LEB is actually assessing the teaching performance of faculty members and
when such is determined by the LEB as constituting gross incompetence, the LEB may mete out
penalties, thus, usurping the law school's right to determine for itself the competence of its faculty
members.
4. Section 2, par. 2 and Section
7 (g) on legal apprenticeship
and legal internship

While the clause "legal apprenticeship" under Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7 (g) on legal
internship, as plainly worded, cannot immediately be interpreted as encroaching upon institutional
academic freedom, the manner by which LEB exercised this power through several of its issuances
undoubtedly show that the LEB controls and dictates upon law schools how such apprenticeship and
internship programs should be undertaken.
Pursuant to its power under Section 7 (g), the LEB passed Resolution No. 2015-08 (Prescribing
the Policy and Rules in the Establishment of a Legal Aid Clinic in Law Schools) wherein it classified legal
aid clinics into three types: (1) a legal aid clinic which is an outreach project of a law school; (2) a legal
aid clinic which entitles the participating student to curricular credits; and (3) a legal aid clinic that entitles
the participating student to avail of the privileges under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.

Pertinent to the third type, the LEB requires the law schools to comply with the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx

b) Implementing Rules
(1) A LAC should be established by the law school.
(2) The law school should formulate its Clinical Legal Education Program
and submit it to the Legal Education board for its assessment and
evaluation.
(3) If Legal Education Board finds the Clinical Legal Education Program to
be proper and in order it shall endorse it to the Supreme Court for its
approval.
(4) Once approved by the Supreme Court, fourth (4th) year law students in that
law school enrolled in it shall be allowed to practice law on a limited manner
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis
supplied).

Further, Section 24 (c), Article IV of LEBMO No. 2 prescribes the activities that should be
included in the law school's apprenticeship program, as follows:
 Article IV

Law School: Administrative Matters and Opening of Branches or

Extension Classes

SEC. 24. Administrative Matters. —

xxx xxx xxx

c) Apprenticeship Program. The apprenticeship program should be closely

supervised by the Dean or a member of the faculty assigned by the Dean to do the task.
The apprenticeship program should at least include any of the following activities:
1) Preparation of legal documents
2) Interviewing clients
3) Courtroom observation and participation
4) Observation and assistance in police investigations, inquests and preliminary
investigations
5) Legal counseling
6) Legal assistance to detention prisoners
7) For working students, participation in the legal work of the legal section or
office of the employer-entity x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Relatedly, Section 59 (d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, provides:

Article IV
Grading System

SEC. 59. Grading System. — The law school, in the exercise of academic
freedom, shall devise its own grading system provided that on the first day of classes, the
students are apprised of the grading system and provided further that the following are
observed:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) When apprenticeship is required and the student does not complete the
mandated number of apprenticeship hours, or the person supervising the apprenticeship
program deems the performance of the student unsatisfactory, the dean shall require of
the student such number of hours more in apprenticeship as will fulfill the purposes of the
apprenticeship program. [285] (Emphasis supplied)

These provisions unduly interfere with the discretion of a law school regarding its curriculum,
particularly its apprenticeship program. Plainly, these issuances are beyond mere supervision and
regulation.
III.

Conclusion

In general, R.A. No. 7662, as a law meant to uplift the quality of legal education, does not
encroach upon the Court's jurisdiction to promulgate rules under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the
Constitution. It is well-within the jurisdiction of the State, as an exercise of its inherent police power, to
lay down laws relative to legal education, the same being imbued with public interest.
 While the Court is undoubtedly an interested stakeholder in legal education, it cannot assume
jurisdiction where it has none. Instead, in judicial humility, the Court affirms that the supervision and
regulation of legal education. is a political exercise, where judges are nevertheless still allowed to
participate not as an independent branch of government, but as part of the sovereign people.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged is settled as belonging
exclusively to the Court, certain provisions and clauses of R.A. No. 7662 which, by its plain language
and meaning, go beyond legal education and intrude upon the Court's exclusive jurisdiction suffer from
patent unconstitutionality and should therefore be struck down.
Moreover, the exercise of the power to supervise and regulate legal education is circumscribed
by the normative contents of the Constitution itself, that is, it must be reasonably exercised. Reasonable
exercise means that it should not amount to control and that it respects the Constitutionally-guaranteed
institutional academic freedom and the citizen's right to quality and accessible education. Transgression
of these limitations renders the power and the exercise thereof unconstitutional.

Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe minimum
standards for law admission. The PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to guide law schools
in measuring the applicants' aptness for legal education along with such other admissions policy that the
law school may consider, is such minimum standard.

However, the PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant's aptitude for law
school. The PhiLSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools who among the examinees are
to be admitted to any law program. When the PhiLSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict
admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the PhiLSAT goes beyond mere supervision
and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable and therefore,
unconstitutional. In striking down these objectionable clauses in the PhiLSAT, the State's inherent power
to protect public interest by improving legal education is neither emasculated nor compromised. Rather,
the institutional academic freedom of law schools to determine for itself who to admit pursuant to their
respective admissions policies is merely protected. In turn, the recognition of academic discretion comes
with the inherent limitation that its exercise should not be whimsical, arbitrary, or gravely abused.

In similar vein, certain LEB issuances which exceed the powers granted under its charter should
be nullified for being ultra vires.

As in all levels and areas of education, the improvement of legal education indeed deserves
serious attention. The parties are at a consensus that legal education should be made relevant and
progressive. Reforms for a more responsive legal education are constantly introduced and are evolving.
The PhiLSAT, for instance, is not a perfect initiative. Through time and a better cooperation between the
LEB and the law schools in the Philippines, a standardized and acceptable law admission examination
may be configured. The flaws which the Court assessed to be unconstitutional are meanwhile removed,
thereby still allowing the PhiLSAT to develop into maturity. It is, thus, strongly urged that
recommendations on how to improve legal education, including tools for screening entrants to law
school, reached possibly through consultative summits, be taken in careful consideration in further
issuances or legislations.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.

The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education is UPHELD.
The Court further declares:

As CONSTITUTIONAL:
1. Section 7 (c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to
set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the
qualifications of the members of the faculty without encroaching upon the academic
freedom of institutions of higher learning; and
2. Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to
prescribe the minimum requirements for admission to legal education and minimum
qualifications of faculty members without encroaching upon the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the Court:

1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes "continuing legal education"
as an aspect of legal education which is made subject to Executive supervision and
control;
2. Section 3 (a) (2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7 (2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the
objective of legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal
profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;

3. Section 7 (g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11 (g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives
the Legal Education Board the power to establish a law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the Bar; and

4. Section 7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11 (h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives
the Legal Education Board the power to adopt a system of mandatory continuing legal
education and to provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such
courses and for such duration as it may deem necessary.

As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:

1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and qualifying
admissions to law schools in violation of the institutional academic freedom on who to
admit, particularly:

a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college graduates or
graduating students applying for admission to the basic law course shall be
required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to any law school in
the Philippines and that no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as a first year
student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or
Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before
the start of studies for the basic law course;

b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT as a

prerequisite for admission to law schools;

Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on March 12, 2019 enjoining
the Legal Education Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is made
PERMANENT. The regular admission of students who were conditionally admitted
and enrolled is left to the discretion of the law schools in the exercise of their
academic freedom; and
 c. Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011.

2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications and
classification of faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law in violation of
institutional academic freedom on who may teach, particularly:
a. Sections 41.2 (d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

b. Resolution No. 2014-02;

c. Sections 31 (2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2;

d. LEBMO No. 17-2018; and

3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on the
establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs in violation of
institutional academic freedom on what to teach, particularly:

a. Resolution No. 2015-08;

b. Section 24 (c) of LEBMO No. 2; and

c. Section 59 (d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Carandang, Inting and Zalameda, JJ., concur.

Bersamin, C.J., I join the separate dissenting and concurring opinion of J. Leonen.

Peralta, [*] J., took no part.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., please see separate concurring opinion.

Leonen, J., see separate dissenting and concurring opinion.

Jardeleza, J., please see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.

Caguioa, J., please see separate concurring.

A.B. Reyes, Jr., J., please see my concurring opinion.

Gesmundo, J., please separate concurring and dissenting opinion.

Hernando, [**] J., is on official business.

Lazaro-Javier, J., please see concurring and dissenting opinion.

Separate Opinions

PERLAS-BERNABE, J., concurring:

I concur in the result, [1] but I tender this opinion to briefly explain my reasons as to why the
provisions of Legal Education Board (LEB) Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016 [2] (LEBMO No. 7-
2016) that mandatorily require the passing of the Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT) as a
pre-requisite for admission to any law school violate institutional academic freedom and hence,
unconstitutional.
 Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that "[a]cademic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." [3] According to case law, "[t]his institutional academic
freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how
best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term 'academic
freedom' encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: (1) [w]ho may teach,
(2) [w]hat may be taught, (3) [h]ow it shall be taught, and (4) [w]ho may be admitted to study." [4] This
fourth freedom of law schools to determine "who may be admitted to study" is at the core of the present
controversy involving the PhiLSAT.

The PhiLSAT is essentially a standardized aptitude test measuring the examinees'

communications and language proficiency, critical thinking skills, and verbal and quantitative reasoning.
[5] It is designed to measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law. [6] One
of the essential provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is paragraph 9, which states that passing the PhiLSAT
is required for admission to any law school in the Philippines, and that no applicant shall be admitted for
enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws
or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two (2) years before the start of the
study. The PhiLSAT has a passing score of 55%. [7] To concretize the mandatory nature of the PhiLSAT,
paragraph 15 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 provides that law schools that violate the issuance shall be
administratively sanctioned and/or fined in the amount of up to P10,000.00 for each infraction. The
administrative sanctions direly encompass: (a) termination of the law program (closing the law school);
(b) phasing out of the law program; and (c) provisional cancellation of the Government Recognition and
putting the law program of the substandard law school under Permit Status. [8] As the PhiLSAT is a
requirement mandatorily imposed by LEBMO No. 7-2016, non-compliance therewith would result into
these potential consequences.
Compliance with the PhiLSAT effectively means a surrender of the law schools' academic
freedom to determine who to admit to their institutions for study. This is because the PhiLSAT operates
as a sifting mechanism that narrows down the pool of potential candidates from which law schools may
then select their future students. With the grave administrative sanctions imposed for non-compliance,
the surrender of this facet of academic freedom is clearly compulsory, because failing to subscribe to the
PhiLSAT requirement is tantamount to the law school risking its complete closure or the phasing out of
its law program. This effectively results in the complete control — not mere supervision — of the
State over a significant aspect of the institutions' academic freedom.

Notably, the core legal basis for the PhiLSAT is derived from Section 7 (e) of Republic Act No.
7662 [9]
which empowers the LEB "to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission x x x." On a
broader scale, Section 7 (b) of the same law empowers the LEB "to supervise the law schools in the
country x x x." This is a specific iteration of Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that "[t]he State x x x shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all
educational institutions." [10] "Reasonable supervision," as the Framers intended, meant only
"external" and not "internal" governance; as such, it is meant to exclude the right to manage,
dictate, overrule, prohibit, and dominate. [11] As elucidated in the fairly recent case of Council of
Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education: [12]

The Framers were explicit, however, that this supervision refers to external
governance, as opposed to internal governance which was reserved to the
respective school boards, thus:
 Madam President, Section 2(b) introduces four changes: one, the
addition of the word "reasonable" before the phrase "supervision and
regulation"; two, the addition of the word "quality" before the word
"education"; three, the change of the wordings in the 1973 Constitution
referring to a system of education, requiring the same to be relevant to the
goals of national development, to the present expression of "relevant to the
needs of the people and society"; and four, the explanation of the meaning
of the expression "integrated system of education" by defining the same as
the recognition and strengthening of the complementary roles of
public and private educational institutions as separate but integral
parts of the total Philippine educational system.

When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to

the external governance of educational institutions, particularly private
educational institutions as distinguished from the internal governance by
their respective boards of directors or trustees and their administrative
officials. Even without a provision on external governance, the State would
still have the inherent right to regulate educational institutions through the
exercise of its police power. We have thought it advisable to restate the
supervisory and regulatory functions of the State provided in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions with the addition of the word "reasonable." We found it
necessary to add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of our
Supreme Court in a decision in the case of Philippine Association of
Colleges and Universities vs. The Secretary of Education and the Board of
Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court said, and I quote:
It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think
the Constitution provides for control of education by the State.
The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the
power to regulate means power to control, and quotes from the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State
control of private education was intended by organic law.
The addition, therefore, of the word "reasonable" is meant to underscore the
sense of the committee, that when the Constitution speaks of State supervision and
regulation, it does not in any way mean control. We refer only to the power of the
State to provide regulations and to see to it that these regulations are duly followed
and implemented. It does not include the right to manage, dictate, overrule and
[13]
prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the right to dominate. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria (Dean Candelaria) in his Amicus Brief, "[w]hen
[the] LEB took over the functions of the [Commission on Higher Education (CHED)] in relation to law
schools, it is safe to presume that the scope of power of [the] LEB should be no more than what [the]
CHED had traditionally exercised over law schools." [14] As to what he insinuates as "reasonable
supervision" over institutions of higher learning, the State may, through the appropriate agency,
determine the: (a) minimum unit requirements for a specific academic program; (b) general education
distribution requirements; and (c) specific professional subjects as may be stipulated by the various
licensing entities. [15] These activities may ostensibly fall under the category of "external governance"
and hence, "reasonable supervision," as compared to a mandatory, exclusively State-crafted aptitude
test which not only operates as a predetermination of the schools' potential candidates for admission but
also brandishes the total closure of the institution or phasing out of the academic program as
punishment for noncompliance. The latter is, to my mind, a form of State-domination that translates to
"internal governance" and hence, the exercise of the State's control over academic freedom. As earlier
intimated, this strays from the intent of the Framers of our Constitution.

While the more intricate contours of "academic freedom" have yet to be charted in our
jurisprudence as compared to other individual liberties, Dean Candelaria, in his Amicus Brief, also
broached the idea that academic freedom is an aspect of the freedom of expression, and hence, any
regulation thereof is subject to strict scrutiny. [16] The tie between academic freedom and freedom of
expression has yet to be definitively settled in our jurisprudence, Nevertheless, there is ostensible merit
in this theory since an institution of higher learning may be treated as the embodiment of the composite
rights of its individual educators, and ultimately, an educational method of instruction is a form of
communication. Learning necessarily connotes an exchange of ideas. The transmission of knowledge
does not happen in a vacuum but within a framework that the school autonomously determines —
subject only to reasonable State regulation — a cognate part of which is who it deems fit for its
instruction. As Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen eloquently stated in his Separate Dissenting and
Concurring Opinion, academic discussions and other forms of scholarship are manifestations and
extensions of an individual's thoughts and beliefs. [17] Academic freedom is anchored on the recognition
that academic institutions perform a social function, and its business is conducted for the common good;
that is, it is a necessary tool for critical inquiry of truth and its free exposition. Thus, the guarantee of
academic freedom is complementary to the freedom of expression and the freedom of the mind. [18]

The theoretical transposition of the concept of freedom of expression/freedom of the mind to

institutional academic freedom would greatly impact the dynamic of how this Court would henceforth
deal with regulations affecting institutions of higher learning because, as mentioned, the test to be
applied would be strict scrutiny. [19] "Strict scrutiny entails that the presumed law or policy must be
justified by a compelling state or government interest, that such law or policy must be narrowly tailored to
achieve that goal or interest, and that the law or policy must be the least restrictive means for achieving
that interest." [20]

In this case, while the policy of the State to "uplift the standards of legal education" [21] may be
characterized as a compelling State interest, the means of achieving this goal, through the PhiLSAT,
together with its mandatory and exclusionary features as above-discussed, do not appear to be narrowly
tailored or the least restrictive means for achieving this interest. There is no concrete showing why the
implementation of a standardized but optional State aptitude exam, which schools may freely adopt in
their discretion as a tool for their own determination of who to admit (such as the National Medical
Aptitude Test for medical schools or the Law School Admission Test in the United States of America),
would be less of a "sifting" measure than a mandatory and exclusively State-determined one (such as
the PhiLSAT). This is especially so since, as conceded by LEB Chairperson Emerson B. Aquende during
the oral arguments in this case, there is no statistical basis [22] to show the propensity of the PhiLSAT to
improve the quality of legal education. Furthermore, no other study or evaluation regarding the viability of
the PhiLSAT was shown to this effect. It is true that in a general sense, the PhiLSAT operates as a basic
aptitude exam which seeks to test skills that have rational connection to the field of law, i.e.,
communications and language proficiency, critical thinking, and verbal and quantitative reasoning.
However, because the test was solely crafted by the LEB, it completely excludes the law schools' input
and participation, and worse, even puts their very existence in jeopardy should there be non-
subservience. Verily, an absolutist approach in any facet of academic freedom would not only result in an
overly restrictive State regulation, it would also be practically counterproductive because law schools,
being at the forefront, are the quintessential stakeholders to the mission of improving legal education.
Again, by constitutional fiat, the State's role is limited to reasonable supervision, not control. For these
reasons, the provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016 on the PhiLSAT clearly transgress institutional academic
freedom.

Accordingly, I concur in the result.

LEONEN, J., dissenting and concurring:

The provisions permitting the imposition of the Philippine Law School Admission Test, as well as
the entire concept of the Legal Education Board, are unconstitutional for intruding on the academic
freedom of law schools and the universities and colleges to which they belong. The State has no
business in deciding and substituting its judgment for the academic institutions. Any government attempt
to dictate upon universities the qualifications of their studentry or interfere with their curriculum
undermines the school's academic freedom.

Institutions of learning perform a vital function in nurturing and sharpening the people's
understanding and intellect. They ensure an educated and thriving citizenry on whom a nation's
civilization and life depend. Education leads to an economically productive populace through learned
skill. More importantly, it gears the people toward thinking more prudently and critically.

Without educational institutions, our country will inevitably approach a shallow and dismal future.
Thus, the State has a paramount interest in guaranteeing that they flourish and function robustly. Part
and parcel of this guarantee is to allow them to freely determine for themselves their "aims and
objectives and how best to attain them." [1]

One (1) of the four (4) essential academic freedoms is the academic institutions' right to
determine who they will admit to study. In ascertaining who to admit in their institutions, law schools
should be given autonomy in establishing their own policies, including the examination that they will
employ.

The Philippine Law School Admission Test is an unwarranted intrusion into this essential
freedom. The government's imposition of a passing score as a bar to admission violates the educational
institutions' academic freedom to determine who to admit to study. The existence of the Legal Education
Board, on the other hand, interferes with the right of academic institutions with respect to how to teach
and who to teach.

I
Academic freedom, as enshrined in our present Constitution, guarantees the fundamental
protection to academic institutions. Article XIV, Section 5 (2) states that "[a]cademic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."

This provision is equivalent to its precursor, Article XV, Section 8 (2) of the 1973 Constitution,
which stated that "[a]ll institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." This, in turn, was an
expansion of its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution which limited the grant of academic freedom to
state-established universities. Article XIII, Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution stated:
 SECTION 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and
subject to regulation by the State. — The Government shall establish and maintain a
complete and adequate system of public education, and shall provide at least free public
primary instruction, and citizenship training to adult citizens. All schools shall aim to
develop moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and vocational efficiency,
and to teach the duties of citizenship. Optional religious instruction shall be maintained in
the public schools as now authorized by law. Universities established by the State shall
enjoy academic freedom. The State shall create scholarships in arts, science, and letters
for specially gifted citizens.

From this, the 1973 Constitution provided a broader protection by giving the same guarantee to
private educational institutions. [2]

The nature and scope of academic freedom was first discussed at length in the 1975 case of
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology. [3] This Court recognized
academic freedom as an institutional facet, and not solely confined to individual academic freedom or
the right of faculty members to pursue their studies without fear of reprisal. In interpreting the import of
the constitutional provision, this Court said:
For it is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the
recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of
such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is
free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to
the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly
manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent.
Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine
Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom
to the university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a
university professor." [4] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Garcia concerned a Petition for Mandamus filed by Epicharis Garcia, a woman, to compel the
Loyola School of Theology to allow her to continue her studies in the seminary. In dismissing the
Petition, this Court upheld the discretion of educational institutions to choose who may be admitted to
study. [5] Garcia referred to the four (4) essential freedoms as the parameters of academic freedom:

Justice Frankfurter, with his extensive background in legal education as a former

Professor of the Harvard Law School, referred to what he called the business of a
university and the four essential freedoms in the following language: "It is the business of
a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential
freedoms' of a university — to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." [6]

(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Justice Claudio Teehankee's concurring opinion in Garcia is also instructive. He recognized that
courts have neither the competence nor the inclination to decide who shall be admitted to an educational
institution. Instead, they will only overturn the judgment of academic institutions after an exhaustion of
administrative remedies and upon showing of arbitrariness on the school's part. He explained:
 Only after exhaustion of administrative remedies and when there is marked
arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the academic judgment of the school faculty and
the proper authorities as to the competence and fitness of an applicant for enrollment or to
continue taking up graduate studies in a graduate school. The courts simply do not have
the competence nor inclination to constitute themselves as Admission Committees of the
universities and institutions of higher learning and to substitute their judgment for that of
the regularly constituted Admission Committees of such educational institutions. Were the
courts to do so, they would conceivably be swamped with petitions for admission from the
thousands refused admission every year, and next the thousands who flunked and were
dropped would also be petitioning the courts for a judicial review of their grades! [7]

Following the ruling in Garcia, this Court in Tangonan v. Paño [8] reiterated that it cannot compel
academic institutions to admit students who fail to meet standard policies and qualifications. To rule
otherwise, it held, would violate the institution's discretion on the admission and enrollment of students
as a major component of academic freedom:

[S]till petitioner would want Us to compel respondent school to enroll her despite her
failure to meet the standard policies and qualifications set by the school. To grant such
relief would be doing violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the respondent school
enshrined under Article XV, Section 8, Par. 2 of our Constitution which mandates "that all
institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." This institutional academic
freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire,
discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence subject
to no control or authority except of rational methods by which truths and conclusions are
sought and established in these disciplines, but also the right of the school or college to
decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them — the grant being to
institutions of higher learning — free from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. [9]
[10]
In San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals, this Court likewise ruled that a student's failure
to comply with academic standards justifies the institution's refusal to admit him or her.
An institution's discretion in determining who to admit extends to its decision on who to dismiss.
In Ateneo De Manila University v. Capulong, [11] this Court upheld the institution's discretion to dismiss
erring students. It reiterated that schools have the right to establish academic and disciplinary standards,
and in failing to comply with these standards, a student can be validly dismissed:
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the
salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon
a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While
under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of
study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,"
such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary
standards laid down by the academic institution.

For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for
the admission, discipline and promotion of students. . . .

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student
 discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student
relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival. [12]

(Citations omitted)

In Licup v. University of San Carlos, [13] the petitioners were students who had been denied
readmission to the university after a chaotic assembly that resulted in violations of the university
handbook rules. They were also found to have academic deficiencies. In upholding the university's
decision, this Court held that the students were not deprived of due process during the investigation, and
that their serious breach of discipline and failure to maintain the academic standard forfeited their
contractual right to continue studying in the university. [14] This Court ruled similarly in Alcuaz v.
Philippine School of Business Administration, [15] Magtibay v. Garcia, [16] University of San Agustin v.
Court of Appeals, [17] and Spouses Go v. Colegio de San Juan de Letran. [18]

In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, [19] this Court further amplified the scope
of academic freedom when it upheld the institution's right to discipline its students. It pronounced:
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher
learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the
school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them
free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic
freedom" encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds:

(1) Who may teach,

(2) What may be taught,
(3) How it shall be taught, and
(4) Who may be admitted to study.

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere
of anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution
requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational
program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules
and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and
property.

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a

necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the
school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds
basis in the freedom "what to teach." [20] (Citations omitted)

An academic institution's right to discipline its students was held applicable even to students'
activities outside campus premises. In Angeles v. Sison, [21] this Court ruled that the school's power over
its students does not absolutely cease when they set foot outside the school premises. Moreover, the
students' conduct, if directly affecting the school's good order and welfare, may be subject to its
discipline:
 A college, or any school for that matter, has a dual responsibility to its students.
One is to provide opportunities for learning and the other is to help them grow and
develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community.
Discipline is one of the means to carry out the second responsibility.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution
requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational
program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules
and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and
property. The power of school officials to investigate, an adjunct of its power to suspend or
expel, is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of such rules and regulations and the
maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning.

xxx xxx xxx

Common sense dictates that the school retains its power to compel its students in
or off-campus to a norm of conduct compatible with their standing as members of the
academic community. Hence, when as in the case at bar, the misconduct complained of
directly affects the suitability of the alleged violators as students, there is no reason why
the school can not impose the same disciplinary action as when the act took place inside
the campus. [22]

In the more recent case of Cudia v. Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, [23] this
Court reiterated that a school's right to discipline its students is part of the third essential freedom. There,
this Court upheld the Philippine Military Academy's enforcement of its internal rules pursuant to its
academic freedom. The petitioner in Cudia was a graduating honor student who was dismissed for
violating the institution's Honor Code. Affirming the dismissal, this Court ruled that the academy enjoys
academic freedom to impose disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit:

The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their

academic freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student
relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival." As a
Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar
as the water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary power assure its right to
survive and continue operating. In this regard, the Court has always recognized the right
of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel,
on students who violate disciplinary rules. [24] (Citations omitted)

Nevertheless, in Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, [25] this Court clarified that the
discretion of educational institutions is not absolute as to impinge on the students' constitutional rights. In
Villar, the petitioners took part in an assembly and were subsequently denied admission by the
university, which claimed that the students flunked. In finding that some of the petitioners did not violate
the school's academic standards, this Court ruled that while the institution can deny admission to
students with academic deficiencies, the academic freedom it enjoys cannot be used to discriminate
against qualified students who exercise their constitutional rights. [26] This Court held:
The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set
academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the
expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed
 meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise
their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there
is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection
clause being disregarded. [27]

Similarly, in Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., [28] this Court ruled against the
university's refusal to admit the petitioner as its student. Explaining that "academic freedom has never
been meant to be an unabridged license[,]" it held that the university cannot hide behind the shroud of
academic freedom to act arbitrarily in dismissing a student. [29] Malabanan v. Ramento, [30] Arreza v.
Gregorio Araneta University, [31] Guzman v. National University, [32] Non v. Dames II [33] were ruled in
the same vein.

An academic institution's discretion applies not only to the admission and dismissal of its
students, but also to its decision to confer academic recognition. In Morales v. Board of Regents, [34] the
petitioner was a University of the Philippines student who questioned the university's decision not to
grant her the academic distinction of cum laude due to a contested grade computation. In upholding this
decision, this Court emphasized that "the wide sphere of autonomy given to universities in the exercise
of academic freedom extends to the right to confer academic honors." It held:
[The] exercise of academic freedom grants the University the exclusive discretion to
determine to whom among its graduates it shall confer academic recognition, based on its
established standards. And the courts may not interfere with such exercise of discretion
unless there is a clear showing that the University has arbitrarily and capriciously
exercised its judgment. Unlike the UP Board of Regents that has the competence and
expertise in granting honors to graduating students of the University, courts do not have
the competence to constitute themselves as an Honor's Committee and substitute their
judgment for that of the University officials. [35]
Nevertheless, this Court has affirmed in the past the State's power to intrude — in very limited
circumstances — into the admission process of schools imbued with public interest. Specifically,
students applying to medical schools have to take and pass a state-sponsored examination as a
condition to their admission.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, [36] the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the National Medical
Admission Test, a uniform admission test required by the Board of Medical Education and administered
by the Center for Educational Measurement. [37] They sought to declare as unconstitutional portions of
Republic Act No. 2382 and Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports Order No. 52-1985, which require
"the taking and passing of the [National Medical Admission Test] as a condition for securing certificates
of eligibility for admission." [38] The order characterizes the test as an aptitude examination that aims to
upgrade "the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and . . . to improve the
quality of medical education in the country." [39]
In denying the Petition, this Court ruled that the requirement of taking and passing the National
Medical Admission Test was a valid exercise of police power. It found the objectives cited in the order to
be valid. It also found a reasonable relation between prescribing the test as a condition for admission to
medical schools and securing the health and safety of the general public. [40]
Tablarin characterized state-sponsored admission tests as an exercise of police power that
advanced legitimate interests.
 This was further elaborated in Department of Education, Culture, and Sports v. San Diego, [41]

the issue of which also revolved around the National Medical Admission Test. In that case, the
petitioners were students who questioned the three-flunk rule, which states that students may only take
the exam thrice, and are barred from taking it again after three (3) successive failures. [42] They argued
that this limitation violates their constitutional right to academic freedom and education.

The trial court first ruled in favor of petitioners, finding that the three-flunk rule was an arbitrary
exercise of police power. [43] However, this Court reversed its decision and, reiterating its
pronouncements in Tablarin, found the National Medical Admission Test to be a valid exercise of police
power:

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police
power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their
lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose
of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not
qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a

constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public
interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The
State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are
not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a
manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense
of satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If
one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised
and adviced (sic). Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand
he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has
demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing,
however appropriate this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute.
The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or
course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements."
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those
better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in
our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like
him, have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not
well-taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical

students and other students who are not subjected to the National Medical Admission Test
 and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the
people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation.
The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does
not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be
similarly treated. [44] (Citation omitted)

Department of Education, Culture, and Sports highlighted the special character of the medical
profession, which justifies the three-flunk rule in the National Medical Admission Test in force at that
time. As the medical profession "directly affects the very lives of the people," [45] this Court found that the
three-flunk rule was valid insofar as it seeks to admit only those who are academically qualified to study
in a medical school.
Tablarin and Department of Education, Culture, and Sports both resolved issues on the right to
quality education and the right to choose a profession vis-à-vis the State's power to regulate admission
to schools through a uniform aptitude test. In both cases, this Court found that administering the National
Medical Admission Test was a reasonable exercise of police power.

However, it should be remembered that the parties in these cases were student-applicants who
asserted their right to the course of study of their own choosing. The issue of institutional academic
freedom in relation to a standardized test imposed by the State was not discussed. The medical schools
covered by the order that institutionalizes the National Medical Admission Test have not asserted their
exclusive right to determine who may be admitted to their institutions pursuant to their academic
freedom.

Reyes v. Court of Appeals [46] comes close. There, students of the University of the Philippines
College of Medicine questioned the National Medical Admission Test's cutoff grade for admission, which
was prescribed by the college faculty but was not approved by the University Council. The faculty, for its
part, asserted institutional academic freedom in arguing that it had the power to determine the admission
requirements of the college. However, this Court found that this power was vested in the University
Council, not the faculty:
Under the UP Charter, the power to fix admission requirements is vested in the University
Council of the autonomous campus which is composed of the President of the University
of the Philippines and of all instructors holding the rank of professor, associate professor
or assistant professor (Section 9, Act 1870). Consequently, the UC alone has the right to
protest against any unauthorized exercise of its power. Petitioners cannot impugn
theseBOR directives on the ground of academic freedom inasmuch as their rights as
university teachers remain unaffected. [47]

Reyes, therefore, resolved an issue that was not so much a question of whether the State
violated institutional academic freedom, but whether it was the proper academic unit that asserted this
freedom.

The crucial question before this Court now is whether the state-sponsored Philippine Law School
Admission Test, in its current configuration, violates institutional academic freedom.
I agree with the majority that it does.

As found by the majority, the Philippine Law School Admission Test, unlike the National Medical
Admission Test, violates institutional academic freedom [48] insofar as it prescribes a passing score that
must be followed by law schools. [49] Failure to reach the passing score will disqualify the examinee from
admission to any Philippine law school. This is because a Certificate of Eligibility is necessary for
enrollment as a first year law student. [50] Respondent Legal Education Board, which administers the
test, only allows law schools to impose additional requirements for admission, but passing the test is still
mandatory. [51] The failure of law schools to abide by these requirements exposes them to administrative
sanctions. [52]

In contrast, failure to achieve a certain score in the National Medical Admission Test no longer
disqualifies an examinee from applying to all medical schools. For one, test scores are reported with a
corresponding percentile rank that ranges from 1 to 99+. It "indicates the percentage of [National
Medical Admission Test] examinees who have [test] scores the same as or lower than the examinee."
[53] This percentile rank is evaluated by the medical schools against the cutoff grade that they
themselves determine. [54] Hence, the percentile rank cutoff is only a "minimum score that qualifies an
examinee as a bonafide applicant for admission into his/her preferred medical school." [55] The test
score only determines the available medical schools where a person may apply; the higher the score,
the more options the applicant has.
Thus, I agree with the majority's characterization that the Philippine Law School Admission Test
employs a "totalitarian scheme" [56] that leaves the actions of law schools entirely dependent on the test
results. [57] It usurps the right of law schools to determine the admission requirements for its would-be
students — ultimately infringing on the institutional academic freedom they possess, as guaranteed by
the Constitution.

II
However, the majority ruled that the Philippine Law School Admission Test is unconstitutional only
insofar as it is a mandatory requirement for the law schools' admissions processes.
I disagree. The Philippine Law School Admission Test — or, for that matter, any national
admission test — even if not made mandatory, still infringes on academic freedom.
Academic freedom as a constitutional right should be interpreted with the understanding that this
guarantee lies within the broader sphere of the Bill of Rights.
Academic discussions and other forms of scholarship are manifestations and extensions of an
individual's thoughts and beliefs. Thus, academic freedom is constitutionally granted to students, faculty,
and academic institutions alike:

Notwithstanding the increasingly broad reach of academic freedom and the current
emphasis on the essentiality of autonomy for academic institutions, the freedom of
individual faculty members against control of thought or utterance from either within or
without the employing institutions remains the core of the matter. If this freedom exists and
reasonably adequate academic administration and methods of faculty selection prevail,
intellectual interchange and pursuit of knowledge are secured. A substantial degree of
institutional autonomy is both a usual prerequisite and a normal consequence of such a
state of affairs. . . . Hence the main concern over developing and maintaining academic
freedom in this country has focused upon encouragement and protection of the freedom
of the faculty member. [58] (Emphasis supplied)

Academic freedom is anchored on the recognition that academic institutions perform a social
function and its business is conducted for the common good; that is, it is a necessary tool for critical
inquiry of truth and its free exposition. The guarantee of academic freedom is complementary to freedom
of expression and of the mind.
Thus, to foster an environment of critical discussion and inquiry, the faculty must be given a
degree of independence from their employers, and universities must have a degree of independence
from the State. [59] This constitutional protection guaranteed for the students, faculty, and institutions is
not merely a job-related concern or an institutional interest; rather, it "promotes First Amendment values
of general concern to all citizens in a democracy." [60]

As eloquently discussed by then Justice Felix Makasiar in his dissenting opinion in Garcia, blows
against academic freedom inevitably strike at the core of freedom of expression:

The cardinal article of faith of our democratic civilization is the preservation and
enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality. It was Mr. Justice
Frankfurter himself who emphasized that man's "inviolate character" should be "protected
to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his
person," so that the individual can fully develop himself and achieve complete fulfillment.
His freedom to seek his own happiness would mean nothing if the same were not given
sanctuary "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the
erosion of small encroachments and the scorn and derision of those who have no
patience with general principles."
. . . This individual freedom and right to happiness should be recognized and
respected not only by the State but also by enterprises authorized by the State to operate;
for as Laski stressed: "Without freedom of the mind . . . a man has no protection in our
social order. He may speak wrongly or foolishly, . . . Yet a denial of his right . . . is a denial
of his happiness. Thereby he becomes an instrument of other people's ends, not himself
an end."
As Justice Holmes pronounced, "the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out."
The human mind is by nature an inquiring mind, whether of the very young or of
the very old or in-between; for freedom of speech in the words of John Milton is the "liberty
to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience above all liberties."

What is involved here is not merely academic freedom of the higher institutions of
learning as guaranteed by Section 8(2) of Article [X]V of the 1973 Constitution. The issue
here strikes at the broader freedom of expression of the individual — the very core of
human liberty.

Even if the term "academic freedom" were to be limited to institutions of higher

learning — which to the mind of Dr. Vicente Sinco, an eminent authority in Constitutional
Law, is the right of the university as an institution, not the academic freedom of the
university professor — the term "institutions of higher learning" contained in the aforecited
provision of our New Constitution comprehends not only the faculty and the college
administrators but also the members of the student body. While it is true that the university
professor may have the initiative and resourcefulness to pursue his own research and
formulate his conclusions concerning the problem of his own science or subject, the
 motivation therefor may be provoked by questions addressed to him by his students. In
this respect, the student — specially a graduate student — must not be restrained from
raising questions or from challenging the validity of dogmas, whether theological or not.
The true scholar never avoids, but on the contrary welcomes and encourages, such
searching questions even if the same will have the tendency to uncover his own
ignorance. It is not the happiness and self-fulfillment of the professor alone that are
guaranteed. The happiness and full development of the curious intellect of the student are
protected by the narrow guarantee of academic freedom and more so by the broader right
of free expression, which includes free speech and press, and academic freedom. [61]

(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Academic freedom is intertwined with intellectual liberty. It is inseparable from one's freedom of
thought, speech, expression, and the press. [62] Thus, the institutions' and individuals' right to pursue
learning must be "free from internal and external interference or pressure." [63]

In American jurisprudence, the protection of academic freedom has been identified as a subset of
the First Amendment. [64] In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, [65] the U.S. Supreme Court tied the First
Amendment values of critical inquiry and search for truth to the autonomy of academic institutions and its
faculty from the State's intrusion:

No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who
guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our
colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so
thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly
is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes.
Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization will stagnate and die. [66]

Freedom of expression is a cognate of academic freedom. Hence, the zealous protection

accorded to freedom of expression must necessarily be reflected in the level of protection that covers
academic freedom. Any form of State intrusion against academic freedom must be treated suspect.
Central to the resolution of this case is the freedom of academic institutions, particularly law
schools, to determine who may be admitted to study. As part of their academic self-government, law
schools are given the discretion to come up with an autonomous decision on their admission policies,
including the examination they will administer. A state-sponsored examination like the Philippine Law
School Admission Test, which tends to control the internal affairs of academic institutions, runs afoul of
that essential freedom.
Moreover, according to the majority, "[t]he subject of the [Philippine Law School Admission Test]
is to improve the quality of legal education." [67] Thus, under the State's police power, the imposition of
the test is justified by the State's interest to improve the quality of legal education. [68]

I view that the thesis that changing the admissions policy will improve the quality of law schools is
non-sequitur.

The standards for choosing who to admit are entirely different from the standards for maintaining
or ensuring the quality of instruction. The process of admitting students is unrelated to the quality of the
law school. Even if it were indeed related, respondent Legal Education Board has done no specific study
to justify the administration of the Philippine Law School Admission Test. Test makers even admit that
admission tests do not measure "smartness." [69] It is not an accurate barometer of merit, but only a
measure of correlation between the exam scores and the students' first-year grades. [70] At best,
respondent Legal Education Board relied on anecdotal evidence, which, in academic circles, is the worst
way to justify policy. The Philippine Law School Admission Test is, therefore, arbitrary.

A closer look shows that the Philippine Law School Admission Test does not merely recommend,
but dictates on law schools who are qualified to be admitted. By prescribing a passing score and
predetermining who may enroll in law schools, the State forces its judgment on the institutions, when it
has no business doing so. Any governmental attempt to dictate upon schools the composition of their
studentry undermines their institutional academic freedom. [71]
Moreover, the final basis of the administration of the Philippine Law School Admission Test,
regardless of whether there have been consultants, will always rest on the government-appointed
members of respondent Legal Education Board. Yet, as this case shows, the Chair of the Board may not
have the postgraduate academic, teaching, or college or university administrator credentials. Being
government appointees, its members are prone to influences by their appointing power, consequently
undermining the academe's most significant roles: to inquire into the truth, to powerfully disseminate this
truth, and to speak this truth to power.

In the United States, admission to law schools is usually preceded by taking a standardized
aptitude examination called the Law School Admission Test. While it may seem similar to our own test,
important distinctions must be made. First, the U.S. Law School Admission Test is not a state-sponsored
exam. It is administered by the Law School Admission Council, a private nonprofit that promotes "quality,
access, and equity in law and education[.]" [72] Hence, the Law School Admission Test is a mere creation
of law schools. [73]

In some cases, an aspiring student may even be accepted to a law school without taking the test.
[74] Thus, unlike in the Philippines, the adherence of U.S. law schools to the Law School Admission Test
is purely voluntary. The test results may be used merely as one (1) of the many criteria for admission,
which a law school may determine for itself. [75] The Law School Admission Test is designed merely as a
tool to help law schools make sound admission decisions. [76]
The Philippine Law School Admission Test, by contrast, undermines the critical function of law
schools to provide pieces of truth that may ripen into critique of government. The State's intrusion,
whatever form it may be, stifles the ability of the academic institution to be critical. This Court should
remain ever so vigilant on any infraction of the Constitution disguised with good intentions.
Law schools are the principal institutions that have the space to analyze, deconstruct, and even
critique our laws and jurisprudence. They not only teach doctrine, but examine its fundamentals.
The kind of freedom of expression contained in academic freedom is different from political
expression. Within political or creative spaces, freedom of expression takes an almost unqualified
immunity. Any thought, whether or not it is hated by the dominant, finds protection without regard to its
slant or falsity. In the sphere of political debate, falsehoods are platforms for testing reason and providing
opportunities to publicly advocate what is true persuasively.

On the other hand, within the academe, falsities in method and content are deliberately rooted
out, exposed, and marginalized so that the public debate is enriched, whether among the institution's
students or the world beyond its walls. Academic freedom is the constitutional canon that protects this
space from politics. It is the freedom that assures academic intellectual debate without fear of any
governmental intervention of any kind, be it coercive or suggestive.
Government-sponsored standardized admission tests infringe on this freedom without reason.

III
Due process is guaranteed under our Constitution. Its Article III, Section 1 states:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due

process of law[.]

The due process clause is commonly referred to as the "right to be let alone" from the State's
interference. [77] The essence of due process is the freedom from arbitrariness. In Morfe v. Mutuc: [78]

"There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a

standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due
process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of
legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase
Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due
process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly
has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting
idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for justice' and judges the act of
officialdom of whatever branch `in the light of reason drawn from considerations of
fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.' It is not a narrow
or 'technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,'
decisions based on such a clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society.' Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases." [79] (Citation omitted)

Due process is the protection of the sphere of individual autonomy. It aims to "prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals." [80] Thus, it imposes a
burden on the government to observe two (2) separate limits: (1) procedural and (2) substantive due
process. In White Light Corporation v. City of Manila: [81]

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two
related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive
due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process
concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes
an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the
level of formality of a hearing.

If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise
absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are
followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due
 process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving
a person of life, liberty, or property.
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has
reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of
fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now
confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality
though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which
it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should
sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has
acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to
determine the proper metes and bounds for its application. [82] (Citations omitted)

Substantive due process answers the question of whether "the government has an adequate
reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property." [83] To pass this test, the State must provide a
sufficient justification for enforcing a governmental regulation. [84]
While the State's intrusion is not absolutely proscribed, due process requires that the intrusion on
an individual's right to life, liberty, and property is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. [85] In Ichong v.
[86]
Hernandez:

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted
in pursuance of the police power, Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public
welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient
foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a
capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the
means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are
the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process
and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power
and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be
said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would
be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and
anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is
due process of law[.] [87]

When governmental action is checked against the due process requirement under the
Constitution — particularly substantive due process — it must be shown that such action was neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable. Respondent failed to show this.
The creation of the Philippine Law School Admission Test was not based on scientific research.
The State has not given any justification for the propriety of conducting the examination, other than it
being copied from the Law School Admission Test administered in the United States. The Chairperson of
respondent Legal Education Board, during the oral arguments, admitted to this:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE LEONEN:
 Okay, next. Was there a study conducted by the LEB prior to imposing the national
test relating to the correlation of passing the test and passing the bar? Because
according to you the declaration of policy states, to improve the quality of the bar. Or
was this anecdotal in nature? And if there is a test, a scientific study, will you be able
to provide the Court? Was there a study done prior to imposing the national exam in
an exclusionary character prior to giving the test?
xxx xxx xxx

DEAN AQUENDE:
We have none, Your Honor, but we relied on the LSAT study, Your Honor, in the
United States.
JUSTICE LEONEN:

Yes, the LSAT study conducted by the United States. We are a different country and
you are saying that you looked at a different culture so what they did in India, in
America, in Canada, maybe even in Japan but not Filipinos, and the Filipinos have
particular needs in our archipelago. Certainly, Tagum is different from Siargao,
different from Baguio City, different from Cebu, so, you are saying that the LEB
imposed this without, isn't this arbitrary, Chair?

DEAN AQUENDE:
We looked at, Your Honor, at the result or the correlation result of the law school
qualifying test administered by the CEM and in that particular study, the correlation is
that the . . . (interrupted)

xxx xxx xxx

JUSTICE LEONEN:

You said that it was correlation, what was the degree of confidence?
DEAN AQUENDE:

I do not have right now.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

Yes, probably you can provide us with a copy.

DEAN AQUENDE:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

Because in order not to be a grave abuse of discretion, it must be reasonable.

DEAN AQUENDE:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

Considering, Chair, that this affects a freedom and a primordial freedom at that,
freedom of expression, academic freedom, the way we teach our, as Justice Andy
Reyes pointed out, the way we teach law to our citizens and therefore, to me, the
 level of scrutiny should not be cursory. The level of scrutiny must be deep and I
would think it would apply strict scrutiny in this regard. Therefore, if there was no
study that supported it, then perhaps, may be stricken down as unreasonable and
therefore, a grave abuse of discretion. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

JUSTICE LEONEN:

. . . . the English proficiency that you mentioned, what are your statistics on that?

DEAN AQUENDE:
The . . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
That law schools are admitting law students that do not have English proficiency . . .
.
DEAN AQUENDE:

That ties up, Your Honor, with the public interest that we are looking at and that is . . .
. (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes, yes, what are your statistics on that?

DEAN AQUENDE:
. . . . and that is the weigh stage . . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
What are your numbers?

DEAN AQUENDE:
Actually, Your Honor, it's the weigh stage of the human capital resulting problem . . . .
(interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:

I'm not asking about the concept.

DEAN AQUENDE:

. . . . in the bar examination, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

What are your numbers?

DEAN AQUENDE:

It's the bar examination, Your Honor, that seventy-five percent (75%) of all the . . . .
(interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:

You see all the examinations?

DEAN AQUENDE:
 Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
You mean to say, those that flunked the exams is because of English?

DEAN AQUENDE:

No, Your Honor, but that is the competency . . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In other words, in looking at the law schools, you made a claim that the English
proficiency of undergraduates going into law schools is deteriorating, correct? And
because you are an academic body, you should have a scientific study to back
yourself up? Can you submit that to the Court? Have you made that study?
DEAN AQUENDE:

Which particular . . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:

You cannot operate to supervise academic institutions deep in science on the basis
of anecdotal references. That would be unreasonable. That is grave abuse of
discretion.
DEAN AQUENDE:

No. Your Honor, please, if the question is . . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:

You said it was English proficiency, logic, correct? That's why you imposed this
exam. By the way, Chair, how many law schools are there?

DEAN AQUENDE:
One hundred twenty-two (122) law schools, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Have you taught in all those environments?

DEAN AQUENDE:
None, not, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, have you taught in more than five law schools?

DEAN AQUENDE:
No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
How many law schools have you taught in?

DEAN AQUENDE:
Just two (2), Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
 Just two (2), and you make a conclusion based on your experience in two (2) law
schools multiplied by the number of experiences of all your members of the Board
with 120? Shouldn't you have done a scientific study on English proficiency of
incoming first year of law schools at the very least before you put in this policy so
that it becomes reasonable for us?

DEAN AQUENDE:

Well, we looked at the LSAT correlation, Your Honor. [88]

Respondent Legal Education Board has not conducted any scientific and empirical study prior to
its decision to impose a national standardized test for the admission of students in law schools. All that it
has as basis is the study for the Law School Admission Test of the United States. There was no showing
of how this foreign experience is applicable, or even relevant, to the Philippine context. For lack of any
substantial basis, the administration of the Philippine Law School Admission Test is arbitrary.

Moreover, the Philippine Law School Admission Test transgresses due process for being
unreasonable. At the core of this test is the enforcement of a written exam that supposedly sifts and sets
apart individuals who are likely to survive law school. The exclusionary result is based on a single
criterion — if the applicants pass the written exam, they are deemed qualified. There is no other basis
used for the evaluation of applicants. Through the Philippine Law School Admission Test, the
government imposes a single determinant to ascertain who can pursue legal education. This is
insufficient to hurdle the requirement of due process. Reasonableness demands that a multi-varying
approach is used in evaluating law school applicants.

American jurisprudence sheds more light on this. In Grutter v. Bollinger, [89] the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School's use of an applicant's race as among the criteria in
its admission policy. It agreed with the use of race as a factor in its admission decisions, as it serves a
"compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body." [90]
In Grutter, the law school's admission policy sought to admit more students from disadvantaged
backgrounds, not to meet a desired quota for diversity, but to enroll a "critical mass" of minority students.
Its concept of critical mass is anchored on the important educational benefits that flow from having a
diverse studentry. The law school used race as one (1) of the criteria in its admission policy to avoid a
monolithic student demographic that is typically admitted by traditional admissions processes.

In upholding the policy, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the law school's educational judgment
that diversity is essential to its educational mission must be respected, and that universities must be
given a degree of deference when it comes to academic decisions:
In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a compelling state interest, Justice
Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First
Amendment, of educational autonomy: "The freedom of a university to make its own
judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body." From this premise,
Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming "the right to select those students who will
contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas,'" a university "seek[s] to achieve a
goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission." Our conclusion that
the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by our
view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper
institutional mission, and that "good faith" on the part of a university is "presumed" absent
"a showing to the contrary." [91] (Citations omitted)
 In Grutter, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a holistic evaluation of an applicant by considering
several factors such as academic ability, talents, experiences, including other information through a
personal statement, letters of recommendation, together with the applicant's undergraduate grade point
average, Law School Admission Test score, and other "soft variables," including the applicant's racial
and ethnic status. In effect, the law school affords an individualized consideration to all applicants
regardless of race. There is no policy of automatic acceptance or rejection based on a single variable.
In this case, by enforcing an arbitrary and unreasonable measure in the law schools' admission
process, the government violates the applicants' right to due process.
The choice of pursuing an education is within the ambit of one's right to life and liberty. Liberty
includes the "right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude." [92] It embraces
the right of individuals to enjoy the faculties they are endowed with such as the right to live, right to be
married, right to choose a profession, and the right to pursue an education. [93] In City of Manila v.
Laguio, Jr.: [94]

While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . .
guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be
no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed. [95]

In my concurring opinion in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City: [96]

Speaking of life and its protection does not merely entail ensuring biological
subsistence. It is not just a proscription against killing. Likewise, speaking of liberty and its
protection does not merely involve a lack of physical restraint. The objects of the
constitutional protection of due process are better understood dynamically and from a
frame of consummate human dignity. They are likewise better understood integrally,
operating in a synergistic frame that serves to secure a person's integrity.
"Life, liberty and property" is akin to the United Nations' formulation of "life, liberty,
and security of person" and the American formulation of "life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness." As the American Declaration of Independence postulates, they are
"unalienable rights" for which "[g]overnments are instituted among men" in order that they
may be secured. Securing them denotes pursuing and obtaining them, as much as it
denotes preserving them. The formulation is, thus, an aspirational declaration, not merely
operating on factual givens but enabling the pursuit of ideals.

"Life," then, is more appropriately understood as the fullness of human potential:

not merely organic, physiological existence, but consummate self-actualization, enabled
and effected not only by freedom from bodily restraint but by facilitating an empowering
existence. "Life and liberty," placed in the context of a constitutional aspiration, it then
becomes the duty of the government to facilitate this empowering existence. This is not an
inventively novel understanding but one that has been at the bedrock of our social and
political conceptions. [97] (Citations omitted)
 Ultimately, the right to life is intertwined with the right to pursue an education. Right to life, after
all, is not merely the right to exist, but the right to achieve the "fullness of human potential[.]" [98] This is
real in attaining a degree of one's own choice. Education does not only enhance and sharpen intellect,
but also opens up better opportunities. It improves the quality of life. When a person obtains a degree,
there is economic and social mobility. Thus, when the State interferes and prevents an individual from
accessing education, it impliedly infringes on the right to life and liberty.

In the same vein, imposing an arbitrary and unreasonable government-sponsored standardized

test violates the right to property. Applicants, forced to take the mandatory examination, are likewise
required to pay testing fees. This means additional financial cost that acts as another unnecessary
obstacle to aspiring law students.
Yet, more than the financial barrier, going through the bureaucracy of studying for, applying for,
and actually taking the test also entails opportunity cost. This includes, among others, the foregone time,
prospects, and other possibilities that could have been realized. [99] These additional costs only serve as
exclusionary measures that unreasonably weed out those who simply cannot afford them.
Thus, the Philippine Law School Admission Test must be struck down for infringing on the rights
to life, liberty, and property without due process of law.
IV

Moreover, standardized tests as a measure of merit should be taken with a grain of salt. A
meritocratic method based on these tests does not necessarily mean that the most qualified students are
admitted. [100] For one, meritocracy was originally a term of abuse, used to describe a "ludicrously
unequal state." [101] Rather than measure fairness, it disproportionately benefits those who are well-off.
[102] For another, entrance tests have historically been skewed in favor of elite applicants who have
significant advantage and access to better education, resources, and wealth. [103]

As Stanford Law professor Richard Banks concluded:

Differential access to achievement-related resources may occur at the level of a child's
family, school, or neighborhood.

The relative achievement formulation of socioeconomic status would encompass

family characteristics such as parental income, education, occupation, and wealth. A
variety of studies have demonstrated positive relationships between early academic
achievement and parental income, education, and occupation. [104] (Citations omitted)

Merit is a manifestation of elitism. Meritocracy opposes democratization and opportunity for all.
[105]

Even if national standardized tests were non-exclusionary, and were designed only to guide law
schools, harm still persists in their mandatory character. Obviously, they entail both financial and
opportunity cost for the applicant. An admission exam like the Philippine Law School Admission Test
presents another financial barrier for an applicant.
This Court cannot ignore the greater disparity that prevails among income classes, ethnicities,
and even geographical differences. The cost of taking the Philippine Law School Admission Test creates
an additional burden and prevents applicants from the middle to low-income strata from pursuing legal
education. The test morphs into a selective mechanism that unduly favors the wealthy. Even if the results
of the exams are non-exclusionary, the costs virtually make the exam itself exclusionary.
 Moreover, students with low scores in the national test, which was created without the
participation of true academics who understand test metrics, will consider themselves inferior. Because
the results are ranked, the test creates a stigma on those who received low scores and excludes them. A
national standardized exam, even as a non-exclusionary list, when state-sponsored, creates an
unnecessary hierarchy.

Besides, that a law school is producing good lawyers does not automatically mean that it is a
good law school. On the contrary, having a standardized national admission exam hides the defects and
inadequacies of a law school. Students who ranked high in the Philippine Law School Admission Test,
but went on to study in a school that may not exactly have good standards of education, may still likely
pass the bar examinations. This is because students who topped the Philippine Law School Admission
Test are not a random sample. Right at the start, they have already enjoyed a good foundation of
education and a conducive environment to excel, equipped with the advantage of financial resources.
[106]

Thus, the Philippine Law School Admission Test effectively screens applicants not on the basis of
merit alone, but on the resources they possess. Through it, law schools are encouraged to work with
better-equipped students. They are incentivized in catering to the elite in our society.
Ironically, we incentivize sloth among law schools.

Justice Clarence Thomas' (Justice Thomas) dissent in Grutter is likewise illuminating. Proposing
that law schools must end their reliance on the Law School Admission Test, he suggested adopting
different methods of admission "such as accepting all students who meet minimum qualifications," [107]

instead of betting on the highest scores.

Justice Thomas questioned whether standardized admission tests are reliable in predicting the
success of applicants in law school. He does not believe that the test serves any real educational
significance, but is only used to admit high scorers. The test, he notes, translates to selectivity — a
marker of elitism:

[T]here is much to be said for the view that the use of tests and other measures to
"predict" academic performance is a poor substitute for a system that gives every
applicant a chance to prove he can succeed in the study of law. The rallying cry that in the
absence of racial discrimination in admissions there would be a true meritocracy ignores
the fact that the entire process is poisoned by numerous exceptions to "merit." [108]
Here in the Philippines, our education system's obsession with examination-based meritocracy
must be tempered, not further celebrated. Legal education must not be an exclusive good for the elite.
There must be a conscious move to eliminate the socioeconomic barriers that cement this elitism. The
Philippine Law School Admission Test does the exact opposite by reinforcing a faulty method that does
not necessarily admit the most qualified students, but only favors the economically privileged.

National standardized admission tests reward this blind and corrosive meritocracy. Crudely
rewarding merit without understanding its context undermines the constitutional goal of achieving social
justice. Rewarding merit alone or privileging it results in more inequality.
There has never been a level playing field in basic, secondary, and tertiary education. In the first
place, not all poor and rural students who enter basic education make it to college. Fewer still are those
that finish their college degrees. Most of the poor rural students will not rank high in a national
standardized test due to limited access to resources in their communities. This does not mean, however,
that they are so mentally deficient that they will not make it in law school. Rather, the national
standardized test will most likely exclude them because they will be put in the proverbial back of the line.
Those from privileged families, by contrast, are more likely to grow up in an environment that
nurtures cognitive development. [109] They have likely received social and cultural capital that propel
them to do better in school. [110] Chances are they attended good schools staffed with competent
teachers and professionals, learning with other privileged students. [111]
The inevitably low ranking of poor students adds to their burden. In the meantime, rich, privileged
students will, as usual, get better chances. This situation only perpetuates the status quo, ultimately
putting meritocracy as a barrier to the principle of equality. [112]

On its surface, the contemporary idea of meritocracy is appealing because "it carries with it the
idea of moving beyond where you start in life, of creative flourishing and fairness." [113] But this
understanding is a myth, as our system rewards through wealth and it increases inequality. [114]
Financially privileged students are way ahead of those who have much less, and any merit-based
system will only serve to further highlight this privilege:
In this intergenerational relay race, children born to wealthy parents start at or near
the finish line, while children born into poverty start behind everyone else. Those who are
born close to the finish line do not need any merit to get ahead. They already are ahead.
The poorest of the poor, however, need to traverse the entire distance to get to the finish
line on the basis of merit alone. In this sense, meritocracy strictly applies only to the
poorest of the poor; everyone else has at least some advantage of inheritance that places
them ahead at the start of the race.

In comparing the effects of inheritance and individual merit on life outcomes, the
effects of inheritance come first, then the effects of individual merit follow — not the other
way around. [115]

An educational system that rewards on the basis of loosely defined merits assumes an equality of
educational opportunity. [116] It fails to recognize that the most privileged in society are provided with
much greater opportunities to succeed and fewer chances to fail compared with those from less
privileged backgrounds. [117]
All these privileges that are attached to a person simply by the circumstances of his or her birth
snowball within an educational system that hides behind the sanitized concept of meritocracy. In truth,
such concept only widens the existing economic, social, and cultural inequality.

It is, thus, inaccurate to use the results of a standardized test as proxies for measuring the
capability of students to do well in law school. The competitive and individualistic meritocracy that
standardized tests espouse rests on the neoliberal assumption that hard work and effort alone will result
in success. It is, however, almost deliberately blind to the reality that the starting line for success is
unequal, and the path toward it more challenging for those disfavored by the system. In reality, a national
standardized test only rewards crude meritocracy. Meritocracy, then, disguises prejudice.

V
In this case, the majority declared unconstitutional several provisions of the Legal Education
Reform Act and Memorandum Orders of respondent Legal Education Board. However, it essentially
retained the Philippine Law School Admission Test. It ruled that Section 7 (e) of the Legal Education
Reform Act [118] is faithful to the reasonable supervision and regulation clause under the Constitution. It
found that the provision only empowers respondent Legal Education Board to prescribe minimum
requirements, which does not equate to control. [119]

Section 7 (e) of the Legal Education Reform Act states:

SECTION 7. Powers and Functions. — For the purpose of achieving the
objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx

(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum

qualifications and compensation of faculty members[.]

The majority concludes that while the State may administer the Philippine Law School Admission
Test, it should not be imposed on law schools as a mandatory part of their admission process. [120]

Relying on Tablarin, it sustained admission tests as a legitimate exercise of the State's regulatory power.
[121]

I find that the majority's pronouncements readily allow unwarranted State incursion on academic
freedom.

An educational institution's right to determine who to admit as its students is an integral part of its
institutional academic freedom. It is absolute. Any form of State intrusion into an educational institution's
admission policies, no matter how benign, should be rejected.

In this regard, I view that Tablarin and Department of Education, Culture, and Sports [122] should
be overturned. Just like the Philippine Law School Admission Test, the National Medical Admission Test,
and any kind of government-sponsored standardized admission test — mandatory or not — should be
rejected for infringing on academic freedom.

The State cannot sponsor an admission exam under the guise of prescribing minimum
qualifications when, right from the start, it already excludes those who cannot pay to take the test.
Ultimately, the results of the Philippine Law School Admission Test will affect the schools'
admission decisions. To recapitulate, its mandatory character means that if an applicant fails, he or she
is disqualified from enrolling in any law school, even when a law school determines that the unsuccessful
examinee should be admitted as its student. Removing its mandatory character, but retaining the test
nonetheless, perpetuates the stigma that attaches to an applicant who passes but scores low relative to
other examinees. Thus, the power of respondent Legal Education Board to implement the Philippine Law
School Admission Test, even as a minimum requirement for admission, is already a demonstration of
State control over the law schools.
The academic institutions' right to determine who they will admit to study remains among their
four (4) essential freedoms. In ascertaining who to admit, law schools must have autonomy in
establishing their own policies, including the examination that they will employ.

The Philippine Law School Admission Test presents an unwarranted intrusion into this essential
freedom. The government's imposition of a passing score as a bar to admission is a violation of the
institutions' academic freedom.
The rationale of this decision in relation to the significance of academic freedom in our jurisdiction
also applies to the entire concept of the Legal Education Board.
 The teaching of law as an academic degree is protected by Article XIV, Section 5 (2) [123] of the
Constitution, which also relates to Article III, Section 4 [124] under the Bill of Rights. On the other hand,
the requirements for a license to practice law is broadly covered by Article XIV, Section 5 (3) [125] of the
Constitution, and more specifically as a power granted to this Court under Article VIII, Section 5 (5). [126]
The regulation on the teaching of law as an academic degree is different from the regulation on
the practice of law as a profession. The former is an aspect of higher education leading to a degree,
while the latter may require a degree, yet the degree alone does not qualify one to practice law.

Quality legal education should be guaranteed by the faculty and administration of a law school. A
law school, on the other hand, may be part of a university or college. Thus, the law school is accountable
to its academic councils for its approaches to teaching, qualifications and promotion of its professors, as
well as the full contents of its curriculum.

The broad and ambiguous rubric of police power should not be an excuse to provide government
oversight on purely academic matters, or even academic matters that appear to be administrative
issues. Academic supervision cannot be done by a statutorily appointed Legal Education Board
restricting the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning which offer what amounts to a
postgraduate degree. Legal education cannot be supervised in the way institutions offering pre-school or
basic elementary education are supervised. The entire concept of the Legal Education Board —
appointed public officials interfering with law schools' academic freedoms as if the appointment from an
elective official gives them the academic expertise — is precisely what Article XIV, Section 5 (2) of the
Constitution proscribes.
The entire Legal Education Reform Act clearly violates the Constitution. It is, therefore, surprising
that the majority is unwilling to strike it down. It is likewise astounding that the majority seems to put its
trust on the evolution of law as an academic discipline to political appointees.

There are better ways to ensure the quality of legal education, none of which involves a super
body similar to the Legal Education Board. While it appears to be a mere guidance for law schools, the
State's infringement on academic freedom through the Philippine Law School Admission Test has far-
reaching implications.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petitions. The entire Republic Act No. 7662, or the Legal
Education Reform Act, is unconstitutional.

LAZARO-JAVIER, J., concurring and dissenting:

We all have different competencies. Some of us are
intellectually gifted, some of us athletically gifted, some of us
are great listeners. Everyone has a different level of what they
can do. [1]
Don't take on things you don't believe in and that you yourself
are not good at. Learn to say no. Effective leaders match the
objective needs of their company with the subjective
competencies. As a result, they get an enormous amount of
things done fast. [2]

PREFATORY
 The pursuit of excellence has never been a bad thing. From our ranks, we shower accolades to
the best, brightest, most efficient, most innovative — the cut above the rest. Soon, the Court will again
be recognizing excellence of execution among our judges and clerks of court, conferring on them the
judicial excellence awards. These awards do not come cheap. They are laden with perks and
advantages that are sorely denied others. Yet this is not discrimination. The differential treatment is not
based on something like the color of one's skin or the circumstances regarding one's birth — the
differential treatment arises not from an unchanging and unchangeable characteristics and traits, but
from circumstances largely within the awardees' control and efforts. Exclusion necessarily comes with
quality.

To strive for excellence and to require others to also trail this path in matters of privilege is not
usurping that other's role in this regard. This is the case where the requirer of excellence shares the
same goal of excellence as the required. More in point to the present cases, who would not want
something more from a law student whose answer to the following question is as follows —

Teacher:
Q What are fruits as they relate to our study of Obligations & Contracts?

Student
"The Obligations and contracts is very beneficial to our life. The fruit I relate is
Banana. This fruit have a vitamins and it gave the beneficial like became taller." [3]
Each of us has distinct competencies. Some run quicker than others. A few love to ruminate.
There are fifteen (15) Justices in the Court, and in a room full of lawyers and judges, this is as exclusive
as it can get. Of the several hundreds who take the Bar, not everyone gets over the hurdle. In any World
Cup, there are only a number of aspirants. The top-tier law schools cannot accommodate a slew of the
applicants. It is not society's fault that not every Army officer comes from the Philippine Military Academy,
or a lawyer can claim blue, maroon, red, yellow, or green as the color of his or her scholastic pedigree.
The right of each citizen to select a course of study is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements.
If we are agreed that quality and excellence and their resulting exclusionary effect are valid
objectives in any institution of higher learning like law schools, we next ask, who decides whom to
accept in such institutions, like law schools? We should also be concerned with things like curriculum,
faculty; internal administration, library, laboratory class and other facilities. [4] This is because when we
speak of quality education we have in mind such matters, among others, as curriculum development,
development of learning resources and instructional materials, upgrading of library and laboratory
facilities, innovations in educational technology and teaching methodologies, improvement of research
quality, and others. [5] Who speaks for these requisites?
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

To resolve the cases her, it is important to understand the relationship of the intersecting
constitutional rights and interests as visually reflected below:
 Not one of these rights and interests is superior to any of the others. Each has an impact on
any of the others in terms of meaning and application. It is the Court's duty to weigh and balance these
rights and interests according to the circumstances of each case.
In the exercise of the State's power to reasonably supervise and regulate all educational
institutions, the State is mandated to protect and promote not just any access to education but access
to quality education. So the State is expected to initiate, innovate, and implement measures to achieve
this objective.
It is established that "the duty of providing quality education entails the duty of screening
those who seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is required in order to merit quality
education goes up as one goes higher in the educational ladder of progression. . . . As already
seen, however, there is also recognition of the right of the school to impose admission standards. The
State itself may also set admission standards." [6]

Which of the State agencies is responsible for this task? The Court has already recognized that
—

. . . . the Constitution indeed mandates the State to provide quality education,

the determination of what constitutes quality education is best left with the political
departments who have the necessary knowledge, expertise, and resources to
determine the same. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission again are very
instructive:
Now, Madam President, we have added the word "quality" before "education"
to send appropriate signals to the government that, in the exercise of its
supervisory and regulatory powers, it should first set satisfactory minimum
requirements in all areas: curriculum, faculty, internal administration, library,
laboratory class and other facilities, et cetera, and it should see to it that
satisfactory minimum requirements are met by all educational institutions, both
public and private. When we speak of quality education we have in mind such matters,
among others, as curriculum development, development of learning resources and
 instructional materials, upgrading of library and laboratory facilities, innovations in
educational technology and teaching methodologies, improvement of research quality,
and others.

Here and in many other provisions on education, the principal focus of attention
and concern is the students. I would like to say that in my view there is a slogan when we
speak of quality of education that I feel we should be aware of, which is, "Better than ever
is not enough." In other words, even if the quality of education is good now, we should
attempt to keep on improving it. [7] (emphasis added)

A citizen — not any individual but a citizen — has the right to select a profession or a
course of study leading to that chosen profession; however, the citizen is not guaranteed
admission to the profession or to the course of study and school of his or her choosing. The right
given to every citizen is to select — a profession or course of study. BUT this right does not
necessarily give rise to and guarantee a right to pursue, and engage in, the chosen profession of the
citizen or a right to be admitted to the course of study and school of the citizen's choosing. The citizen
must have to consider the State's duty to regulate and supervise reasonably educational
institutions, which would have to include measures to assure the citizen's access to quality education,
as well as the express limitation inherent in every citizen's right to select a profession or course of
study, i.e., — fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
As the intersecting rights and interests show, the State has a stake in the determination and
imposition of the fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements through the
duty of the political departments of the State to reasonably regulate and supervise educational
institutions towards, among others, assuring the citizen of access to quality education.
In addition, the Constitution also recognizes the important role that academic freedom plays in
providing quality education. Institutions of higher learning including law schools enjoy academic
freedom in the highest legal order possible. Written in jurisprudence are the substance and
parameters of this constitutional privilege and duty which entitles its holders to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study. Subsumed under this entitlement is the capacity of institutions of higher learning to
determine and impose fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.

Both the State through its political departments and the institutions of higher learning have
roles to play in providing our citizens access to quality education. It is our duty to balance the
academic freedom of institutions of higher learning and the State's exercise of reasonable
supervision and regulation. Academic freedom is not absolute.

The foregoing rights and interests of the State, the citizen, and the institutions of higher learning
interplay in the present cases. These rights and interests very strongly suggest that these cases are not
and have never been about a willy-nilly and free-wheeling intellectual inquiry of individuals on the
nature of the law or its relevance to everyday life and its application to real life situations, or about those
individuals whose only interest in obtaining legal education is to get qualified for some higher civil service
postings.

Individuals are not forbidden from learning the law for whatever motives or purposes they may
each have. Every individual has the freedom of intellectual and non-intellectual inquiry, a cognate of
each one's freedom of thought, expression, and speech that is not in any way restricted by the
discussion and ruling which follows.
 It is important that we see through the distinction between intellectual inquiry within the narrow
confines of educational institutions like law schools and a citizen's political right of free expression. In this
light, academic freedom and the State's power of reasonable supervision and regulation of all
educational institutions bear upon the context of the narrower academic community. [8] This is
different from an individual's freedom of expression which encompasses his or her freedom of
intellectual inquiry for whatever purposes it may serve him or her.
For clarity and emphasis, what we are dealing with here is different from merely wanting to study
law for its own sake or for immediate career advancement which a law degree carries in the civil service.
Our endeavour here is a distinct proposition that has a life of its own. In the words of the Court in Garcia
v. Faculty Admissions Committee, [9] [i]t is equally difficult to yield conformity to the approach taken
that colleges and universities should be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion
as to whom to admit or reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs to a different, and
certainly, higher category."

Here, the issues are defined by the education of and learning by citizens within the confines
of an educational institution whose existence and operation are imbued with public concern, to
pursue a course of study subject to reasonable regulation and supervision by both the State and
the law school, as to access, quality and admission, and academic requirements, where the citizen
if successful gets entitled to qualify for and engage in a profession that we all admit to be noble and
suffused with public interest.

I understand that some eager students would have their dreams of becoming law students
scuttled. To this situation, I have only to stress the advice reflected in my chosen epigraphs above —

We all have different competencies. Some of us are intellectually gifted, some of us

athletically gifted, some of us are great listeners. Everyone has a different level of what
they can do.

Don't take on things you don't believe in and that you yourself are not good at. Learn to
say no. Effective leaders match the objective needs of their company with the subjective
competencies. As a result, they get an enormous amount of things done fast.

In the context of the Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT), whose validity as a
screening mechanism I stand by as my resolution to this Opinion's second issue. Indeed, nothing can be
more liberating than taking the epigraphs to heart and to bear on one's aspirations in life.
Our task is to consider carefully, weigh and balance the rights and interests of these
stakeholders. Each is equally important, compelling, and relevant as the next right and interest. Not one
is superior to another, though one may qualify the other. When considered, weighed, and balanced
properly, these rights and interests will form the tapestry against which we will be able to judge the
validity of the assailed statutory provisions and the relevant founding regulation. I now endeavour to do
this and more.
THOUGHTFUL RUMINATIONS

First. I have been confronted with the idea that as regards education in institutions of higher
learning, the State's supervisory and regulatory power is only an auxiliary power in relation to
educational institutions, be it basic, secondary, or higher education. It has been said that this must be
necessarily so because the right and duty to educate, being part and parcel of youth-rearing, does not
inure to the State at the first instance. Rather, it belongs essentially and naturally to the parents who
surrender it by delegation to the educational institutions.
 I beg to differ. It is well-taken if this idea were referring only to pre-school or elementary school
students. But the cases here are not about the education of young and impressionable children. They
are about the education which molds an individual into a legal professional, the one whom another would
meet to seek help about his or her life, liberty, or property. Nor are the cases here about nurturing
generally socially acceptable values.

They are about piecing together building blocks to develop focused core values essential to
professions, including the legal profession. With respect to the latter, regardless of how a potential
student of law has been reared by his or her or its natural or surrogate parents, he or she must learn
focused core values that the confluence of private and public communities relevant to the legal
profession has judged to be important. In fact, some of these focused core values may be
different from the basic values which the potential student of law may have been taught at home.

For example:

Home Values Lawyer's Values

1. Be Honest 1. Duty of Confidentiality

2. Defend Only the Good Ones 2. Right to Counsel and Duty of Loyalty to Client

3.& Love and Defend Your 3.Avoid Conflict of Interest in the Performance of
Family Lawyer's Duties

To stress, "the duty of providing quality education entails the duty of screening those who
seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is required in order to merit quality education goes
up as one goes higher in the educational ladder of progression. . . ." [10]
The State's supervisory and regulatory power in relation to prescribing the minimum
admission requirements has been said to be a component of police power, which as explained in
Tablarin v. Gutierrez, [11] "is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to
secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the
general community." Hence, the State's supervisory and regulatory power over institutions of higher
learning cannot be characterized as a mere auxiliary power in the ordinary sense of being just a spare,
substitute, or supplementary power.

Second. There are three (3) issues to be resolved here:

1. Which State agent — the Supreme Court or the Legal Education Board or both — is
responsible for exercising reasonable regulation and supervision of all educational
institutions? In this regard, is the reasonable regulation and supervision of legal education
within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court? If it is, what is the exact jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court over the reasonable regulation and supervision of legal education? May
this jurisdiction be assigned or delegated to or shared with the Legal Education Board
created under RA 7662?

2. Do Subsection 7 (e) of RA 7662 [12] and Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No.
7, series of 2016, (LEBMO No. 7) fall within the constitutionally-permissible supervision
 and regulation?

3. Are Subsections 7 (g) and (h) of RA 7662 [13] ultra vires for encroaching into the
constitutional powers of the Supreme Court.

Let me address these issues sequentially.

1. Which State agent — the Supreme Court or Congress and the Legal Education
Board or both — is responsible for exercising reasonable regulation and
supervision of all educational institutions? In this regard, is the reasonable
regulation and supervision of legal education within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court? If it is, what is the exact jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the
reasonable regulation and supervision of legal education? May this jurisdiction be
assigned or delegated to or shared with Congress and the Legal Education Board
created under RA 7662?
I accept the Decision's ruling that Congress and the Legal Education Board have primary
and direct jurisdiction to exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of legal education and the law
schools providing them. The Supreme Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over legal
education and law schools.
The Supreme Court, however, is not entirely irrelevant when it comes to legal education.
Although the primary and direct responsibility rests with Congress and the Legal Education Board to
reasonably supervise and regulate legal education and law schools, the Supreme Court can and will
intervene when a justiciable controversy hounds the discharge of the Legal Education Board's duties.
The Supreme Court will also have to intervene when its power to administer admission to the Bar
is infringed. Admission to law school is far different from admission to the Bar. As the Decision has
aptly discussed, historically, textually, practicably, and legally, there has been no demonstrable
assignment of the function to supervise and regulate legal education to the Supreme Court.
Textual. The confusion regarding the Supreme Court's supervisory and regulatory role stems
from Subsection 5 (5) of Article VIII of the Constitution which enunciates the power of the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law.

Admission to the practice of law, however, is not the same as law school admission, which is
part and parcel of legal education regulation and supervision. The former presupposes the completion of
a law degree and the submission of an application for the Bar examinations, among others. In terms of
proximity to membership in the Bar, admission to the practice of law is already far deep into the
process, the outcome of legal education plus compliance with so many more criteria. [14] On the
other hand, law admission signals only the start of the long and arduous process of legal
education. It is therefore speculative and somehow presumptuous to consider an applicant for law
admission as already a candidate for admission to the practice of law.

Clearly, Subsection 5 (5) of Article VIII cannot be the source of power of the Supreme Court
to exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of legal education and law schools as a primary and
direct jurisdiction.
Historical. The Supreme Court has not played a primary and direct role in regulating and
supervising legal education and law schools. Legal education and law schools have been consistently
placed for supervision and regulation under the jurisdiction of the legislature, and in turn, the country's
education departments.
 For instance, it was the University of the Philippines College of Law which pioneered the legal
education curriculum in the Philippines. On the basis of statutory authority, the Bureau of Private
Schools acted as supervisor of law schools and national coordinator of law deans. Thereafter, the
Bureau of Higher Education regulated law schools. Still further later, DECS Order No. 27-1989, series of
1989 outlined the policies and standards for legal education, qualifications, and functions of a law dean,
and qualifications, compensation and conditions of employment of law faculty, formulated a law
curriculum, and imposed law admission standards.

Impracticable. The Supreme Court has no office and staff dedicated to the task of supervising
and regulating legal education and law schools. It also has no expertise as educators of these tertiary
students. It has no budget item for this purpose.

Legal. Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution [15] prohibits members of the Supreme
Court from being designated to any agency (which includes functions) performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions. The spirit of this prohibition precludes the Court from exercising reasonable
supervision and regulation of legal education and law schools. The reason is that this task involves
administrative functions — "those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs
of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the
policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence." [16]

Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co. [17] has emphasized that the Supreme Court
should only exercise judicial power and should not assume any duty which does not pertain to
the administering of judicial functions. In that case, a petition was filed requesting the members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms and the compensation to be paid to
Manila Electric Company for the use of right of way. The Court held that it would be improper and illegal
for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, whose decision shall be final, to
act on the petition of Manila Electric Company. The Court explained:

We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting
as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or as members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions.
The first case would appear not to fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court.
Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute
before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction
and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would then have
the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the
Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its
members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the functions performed by
the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered
as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the performance of
duties which the members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it upon
themselves to perform. The present petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another
anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members of
the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at all.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions
of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is
 exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of
the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the
powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme
Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to
perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administering of judicial functions. (emphasis added)

Imposing regulatory and supervisory functions upon the members of the Court
constitutes judicial overreach by usurping and performing executive functions. In resolving the
first issue, we are duty bound not to overstep the Court's boundaries by taking over the functions of an
administrative agency. We should abstain from exercising any function which is not strictly judicial in
character and is not clearly conferred on the Court by the Constitution. [18] To stress, "the Supreme
Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to
perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial
functions." [19]

2. Do Subsection 7 (e) of RA 7662 and Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No.
7, series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7) fall within the constitutionally-permissible
supervision and regulation?
I submit that both Subsection 7 (e) of RA 7662 and LEBMO No. 7, series of 2016, as a minimum
standard for admission to a law school, fall within the constitutionally-permissible reasonable supervision
and regulation by the State over all educational institutions.

Subsection 7 (e) of RA 7662 states "[f]or the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the
Board shall have the following powers and functions. . . (e) to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members. . . ."
On the other hand, LEBMO No. 7 imposes as an admission requirement to a law school passing
(defined as obtaining a 55% cut-off score) [20] the "one-day aptitude test that can measure the academic
potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law [by testing] communications and language
proficiency, critical thinking skills, and verbal and quantitative reasoning." [21] This one-day test is the
Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT).

PhiLSAT is offered at least once a year, [22] recently, twice a year, and an applicant can take
PhiLSAT as many times as one would want if unsuccessful in the attempt. [23] A law school may
prescribe admission requirements, but these must be in addition to passing the PhiLSAT. [24]
There is no doubt that Subsection 7 (e) of RA 7662 and LEBMO No. 7 are measures to regulate
and supervise law schools. The issue: are these measures reasonable?
I appreciate the Decision's ruling that the State can conduct the PhiLSAT. But I do not agree with
its ruling that passing the PhiLSAT cannot be a minimum requirement for admission to a law school.
This is a ruling that takes with its left hand, what it gives with the right. After stating that PhiLSAT is
within the State's reasonable supervisory and regulatory power to design and provide or conduct as
a minimum standard for admission to a law school, the Decision then disempowers the State of such
power and authority, when it gave discretion to the law schools to ignore PhiLSAT completely.

The Decision accepts that PhiLSAT is a minimum standard for law school admission and is
therefore valid under the State's power to regulate and supervise education in a reasonable manner.
Since PhiLSAT is valid, though it may infringe a portion of a law school's academic freedom, then it
cannot be set aside. It is a contradiction in terms to say that PhiLSAT is a valid regulation but that it
can be ignored.

Reasonableness is the standard endorsed by the Constitution. Reasonableness requires

deference. It is the stark opposite of the search for the correct measure of regulation and supervision,
which means there can only be one proper means of regulating and supervising educational
institutions. Where the power, however, refers to the exercise of reasonable regulation or supervision, a
reviewing court cannot substitute its own appreciation of the appropriate solution; rather it must
determine if the outcome falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law. [25]
Where the standard is reasonableness, there could be more than one solution, so long as
each of them is reasonable. If the process and the solution fit comfortably with the principles of
justification (i.e., existence of a rational basis for the action), transparency, and intelligibility (i.e., the
adequacy of the explanation of that rational basis), it is not open to a reviewing court to substitute its
own view of the preferable solution.

Conversely, where a regulation or supervision is determined to be unreasonable, it means that

while there could have been many appropriate measures to regulate or supervise, the particular
regulation or supervision which was adopted is not reasonable.
The existence of justification or whether there exists a rational basis to support the regulation,
lies at the core of the definition of reasonableness. The test of justification is a test of
proportionality. [26] Accordingly:

First, the objective of the regulation must be pressing and substantial in order to justify a
limit on a right. This is a threshold requirement, which is analyzed without yet considering the scope of
the infringement made by the regulation, the means employed, or the effects of the measure. The
integrity of the justification analysis requires that the objective of the regulation be properly stated.
The relevant objective is the very objective of the infringing measure, not the objective of the
broader provision upon which the regulation hinges.

Second, the means by which the objective is furthered must be proportionate. The
proportionality inquiry comprises three (3) components: (i) rational connection to the objective, (ii)
minimal impairment of the right, and (iii) proportionality between the effects of the measure (a
balancing of its salutary and deleterious effects) and the stated objective of the regulation. The
proportionality inquiry is both normative and contextual, and requires that a court balances the interests
of society with the interests of individuals and groups.

The question at the first step of the proportionality inquiry is whether the measure that has
been adopted is rationally connected to this objective. This can be proved by evidence of the harm
that the regulation is meant to address. In cases where such a causal connection is not scientifically
measurable, the rational connection can be made out on the basis of reason or logic.

The second component of the proportionality test requires evidence that the regulation at
issue impairs the right as little as reasonably possible. This can be shown by what the regulation
seeks to achieve, what the effects of the regulation could be (i.e., if they are overinclusive or
underinclusive) or how the regulation is tailored to respond to a specific problem.

At the final stage of the proportionality analysis, it must be asked whether there is
proportionality between the overall effects of the infringing regulation and the objective. This
involves weighing the salutary effects of the objectives and the deleterious effects of the
regulation. Are the benefits of the impugned regulation illusory and speculative? Or are these benefits
real? Is it clear how the objectives are enhanced by the regulation? Are the deleterious effects on
affected rights holders serious? What are these deleterious effects? What is the harm inflicted on these
rights holders?

Let me deal first with Subsection 7 (e) of RA 7662.

Existence of Justification. Subsection 7 (e) of RA 7662 states:

(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications
and compensation of faculty members. . . .

The State objectives in the enactment of Subsection 7 (e) of RA 7662 are found in Sections 2
and 3 of the same statute:

Section 2. Declaration of Policies. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to

uplift the standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy,
counselling, problem-solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the ethics of
the legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility and dignity of the
legal profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the
administration of justice and to develop social competence.

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education
system, require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools,
and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
Section 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. — (a) Legal education
in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:
(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;

(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs
of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;

(3) to train persons for leadership;

(4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice and the
improvement of its administration, the legal system and legal institutions in the light
of the historical and contemporary development of law in the Philippines and in other
countries.
(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific objectives:

(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its various
fields and of legal institutions;

(2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to analyze, articulate
and apply the law effectively, as well as to allow them to have a holistic approach to legal
problems and issues;
(3) to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-solving and
decision-making, and to develop their ability to deal with recognized legal problems
of the present and the future;
 (4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for gainful
employment or sufficient as a foundation for future training beyond the basic professional
degree, and to develop in them the desire and capacity for continuing study and
self-improvement;

(5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal profession;
and
(6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals of their
profession and to fully adhere to its ethical norms. (emphasis added)
The objectives of Subsection 7 (e) of RA 7662 are pressing and substantial. This is because
they arise from, or at least relate to, the objective of achieving quality of education (including of
course legal education), which the Constitution has seen proper to elevate as a normative obligation.

The foregoing objectives justify a limitation on a citizen's right to select a profession and course
of study because they fall under the express limit to this right, "subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements." As well, the overarching power of the State to exercise
reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions justifies this qualification. The
objectives also justify a limitation on the academic freedom of every law school as an institution of
higher learning because quality legal education is a constitutional obligation of the State to protect
and promote.
In real terms, why would we not want law students who have the basic abilities to
communicate clearly and concisely, analyze fact situations and the legal rules that apply to them, and
understand the texts assigned to them for reading and discussion? Why should we be content with just
legal education when the Constitution no less and our practical wisdom demand that we conjoin
education with quality?

As the assailed measures prescribe mere minimum standards for law admission and
minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members, Subsection 7 (e) of RA 7662 and
LEBMO No. 7 are proportionate to the foregoing objectives.
Minimum law admission and minimum faculty competence and compensation requirements are
rationally connected to quality legal education and to each of the objectives mentioned in sections 2
and 3 above-quoted. This rational connection is intuitive, logical, and common-sensical. Prescribing
these minimum standards can lead to and accomplish the objectives of Subsection 7 (e) as they
favorably affect the quality of students that a law school admits as well as the quality of law faculty
who in turn mentors the students whose aptitude for law studies has been tested. In the words of
Professor Bernas, paraphrasing the Constitutional Commission:

. . . . the duty of providing quality education entails the duty of screening

those who seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is required in order to
merit quality education goes up as one goes higher in the educational ladder of
progression. . . . However, as already seen, there is also recognition of the right of school
to impose admission standards. The state itself may also set admission standards. [27]
Subsection 7 (e) impairs the right of a citizen to select a profession and a course of study and
the academic freedom of every law school only as little as reasonably possible. For Subsection 7 (e)
prescribes only minimum standards of law admission and faculty competence and compensation.
 This provision is not overinclusive or underinclusive as the minimum standards do not
impact on aspects of a citizen's right to select a profession or course of study or the academic freedom
of a law school other than the admission of students into a law degree program of a law school.

Subsection 7 (e) is tailor-fit to the objective of fostering law student success in law school and
ensuring competent law faculty to teach these students.

It is reasonable to assume that every self-respecting law school would see Subsection 7 (e)'s
requirements of minimum standards for law admission and faculty compensation and competence as
necessary ingredients of quality legal education, and that these minimum requisites would coincide
with each law school's good practices in administering legal education.

At the final stage of the proportionality analysis, there is proportionality between the overall
salutary effects of the objectives of Subsection 7 (e) and the deleterious impact of prescribing
minimum standards for admission of students in law schools and minimum qualifications and
compensation for the law faculty.

The benefits obtained from achieving the objectives are obvious. No one can argue against
students who are academically competent and have a personality ready for the rigors of legal
education. It will spare both the law student and the law school of the waste of time, expense, and
trauma of not being able to fit in and succeed. Minimum standards for law admission and law faculty
competence and compensation are base-line predictors of success in law school and quality of the
legal education it offers. Professor Bernas and the Constitutional Commission, as quoted above,
shared this observation. [28]
On the other hand, the deleterious effect of the imposition of such minimum standards is
speculative.
In the first place, petitioners offered no evidence of the oppressive or discriminatory nature
and other evils that could be attributed to the prescription of such minimum standards. In fact, the
converse is true — easily more than half of the applicants passed the first versions of PhiLSAT.

YEAR, MONTH PASSING RATE

2017, April 81.43%

2017, September 57.76%

2018, April 61.39%

2018, September 56.78%

2019, April Unreleased [29]

Accepting that quality legal education is a pressing and substantial objective, the screening of
law students and the provision of minimum levels of competency and compensation standards
for law faculty are logical necessary steps towards achieving this objective.
 Existence of Transparency and Intelligibility. It cannot be denied that Subsection 7 (e) of RA
7662 was adopted by Congress after deliberations. These deliberations articulate the reasons
behind the enactment of Subsection 7 (e). The policy declaration and the list of objectives mentioned in
RA 7662 also adequately explain the basis for Subsection 7 (e).
Action as being within a range of possible, acceptable, and defensible outcomes. The
Congress enacted Subsection 7 (e) as one of several measures to achieve the constitutional objective
of quality education, which includes quality legal education. Prescribing minimum enforceable
standards upon the admission of law students and the compensation and qualifications of law faculty is
one of these courses of action. Actually, it is difficult to imagine how the narrative of quality legal
education could not lead to the imposition of standards referred to in Subsection 7 (e). This intuitive
justification for these measures was not lost on the Constitutional Commission who believed that
the duty to provide and promote quality education demanded the screening of students for base-line
competencies:

[T]he duty of providing quality education entails the duty of screening those who
seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is required in order to merit quality
education goes up as one goes higher in the educational ladder of progression. . . .
However, as already seen, there is also recognition of the right of school to impose
admission standards. The state itself may also set admission standards. [30]
I now apply the proportionality test to determine the reasonableness of LEBMO No. 7.

LEBMO No. 7, series of 2016, governs not only the mechanics but also the regulatory and
supervisory aspects of PhiLSAT.

Like Subsection 7 (e) of RA 7662, the general objective of PhiLSAT is to improve the quality
of legal education. LEBMO No. 7's particular objective is to measure the academic potential of an
examinee to pursue the study of law.
The means to these objectives is PhiLSAT's one-day testing of communications and language
proficiency, critical thinking skills, and verbal and quantitative reasoning.

To enforce compliance, admission to a law degree program and a law school requires or is
dependent upon obtaining the cut-off score of 55% correct answers in PhiLSAT.

As stated, PhiLSAT is offered at least once a year, [31] recently, twice a year, and an applicant
can take PhiLSAT as many times as one would want if unsuccessful in any of the attempts. [32]
There is also a penalty for non-compliance by a law school, that is, if it admits students
flunking the PhiLSAT. [33]
Law schools may impose other admission requirements such as but not limited to a score
higher than 55% from an examinee.
I have already established above that protecting and promoting quality legal education
(including legal education) as an objective is pressing and substantial.
Part and parcel of the objective of quality legal education is the objective of being able to
screen students for the purpose of ascertaining their academic competencies and personal readiness
to pursue legal education. As quoted above:

[T]he duty of providing quality education entails the duty of screening those who
seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is required in order to merit quality
 education goes up as one goes higher in the educational ladder of progression. . . .
However, as already seen, there is also recognition of the right of school to impose
admission standards. The state itself may also set admission standards. [34]

PhiLSAT as devised is proportionate to PhiLSAT's objectives. The following proportionality

inquiry proves this conclusion.

PhiLSAT is rationally connected to quality legal education and the measurement of one's
academic potential to pursue the study of law. To repeat, "the duty of providing quality education
entails the duty of screening those who seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is required
in order to merit quality education goes up as one goes higher in the educational ladder of
progression. . . . However, as already seen, there is also recognition of the right of school to impose
admission standards. The state itself may also set admission standards." [35]

PhiLSAT helps determine if an examinee has the basic skills to be able to complete successfully
the law school coursework.

It is true that PhiLSAT limits both the right of a citizen to select a profession and a course of
study and the academic freedom of every institution of higher learning. But it does so only as little as
reasonably possible.
In the first place, the right of a citizen to select a profession and a course of study has an
internal limitation. The Constitution expressly limits this right subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission and academic requirements. This right therefore is not absolute, and PhiLSAT
as an admission requirement falls within the limitation to this right.
In fact, as it measures only the basic competencies necessary to survive the coursework in
a law school, PhiLSAT enhances a law school applicant's sense of dignity and self-worth as it prevents
potential unmet expectations and wastage of time, resources and efforts.

If an applicant does not obtain a score of at least 55% in this test involving the most basic of
skills required in a law school, despite the unlimited chances to write PhiLSAT, then the applicant's
aptitude must lie somewhere else.
Secondly, it is inconceivable to think of a university program without any admission criteria
whatsoever. A self-respecting law school — a law school that abhors being referred to as a diploma mill
— subscribes to some means to measure the academic and personal readiness of its students, and as a
badge of honor and pride, to distinguish its students from the rest. And, if a law school can impose
standards, the State can also do in accordance with its powers and duties under the Constitution.

The impact of PhiLSAT on the right of law schools as an institution of higher learning to select
their respective students must be reconciled with the State's power to protect and promote quality
education and to exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.
Verily, the impact of PhiLSAT on academic freedom is for sure, minimal.

The analysis takes us first to Nos. 1 and 2 of LEBMO No. 7, which state the "Policy and
Rationale" of the "administration of a nationwide uniform law school admission test for applicants to the
basic law courses in all law schools in the country." Thus:
1. Policy and Rationale — To improve the quality of legal education, all those
seeking admission to the basic law courses leading to either a Bachelor of Laws or Juris
Doctor degree shall be required to take the Philippine Law School Admission Test
 (PhiLSAT), a nationwide uniform admission test to be administered under the control and
supervision of the [Legal Education Board].
2. Test Design. — The PhiLSAT shall be designed as a one-day aptitude test that
can measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law. It
shall test communications and language proficiency, critical thinking skills, and
verbal and quantitative reasoning. (emphasis added)
No. 1 of LEBMO No. 7 states the animating purpose, to improve the quality of legal
education, for requiring the taking of the PhiLSAT by applicants for admission to a law school.

No. 2 of LEBMO No. 7 provides the mechanism for achieving No. 1.

Nos. 7 and 9 of LEBMO No. 7 further clarify how PhiLSAT would be used to measure the
academic potential of an applicant to a law school:

7. Passing Score — The cut off or passing score for the PhilSAT shall be
FIFTY FIVE PERCENT (55%) correct answers, or such percentile score as may be
prescribed by the LEB.
8. Test Results — Every examinee who passed the PhilSAT shall be issued by
the testing administrator a CERTIFICATE OF LEGIBILITY (COE), which shall contains the
examinees test score/rating and general average to the bachelor's degree completed.
Examinees who fail to meet the cut-off or passing score shall by issued a Certificate of
Grade containing his/her test score/rating. The COE shall be valid for two (2) years and
shall be submitted to the admitting law school by the applicant.
9. Admission Requirement — All college graduates or graduating students
applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the PhilSAT
as a requirement for admission to any law School in the Philippines. Upon the
affectivity of this memorandum order, no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as a
first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws
or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhilSAT taken within 2 years before the start
of studies for the basic law course and presents a valid COE as proof thereof. (emphasis
added)
This stage of the analysis requires us to refer to Nos. 10 and 11 of LEBMO No. 7:

10. Exemption. — Honor graduates granted professional civil service

professional eligibility pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 907 who are enrolling within
two (2) years from their college graduation are exempted from taking and passing the
PhiLSAT from for purposes of admission to the basic law course.

11. Institutional Admission Requirements. — The PhiLSAT shall be without

prejudice to the right of a law school in the exercise of its academic freedom to prescribe
or impose additional requirements for admission, such as but not limited to:
a. A score in the PhiLSAT higher than the cut-off or passing score set by the
LEB;
b. Additional or supplemental admission tests to measure the competencies
and/or personality of the applicant; and

c. Personal interview of the applicant. (emphasis added)

 No. 11 of LEBMO No. 7 itself expressly recognizes the right of law schools to impose
screening measures in addition to the taking or writing of PhiLSAT, such as but not limited to a
PhiLSAT score of higher than 55%, additional admission tests, and personal interview of the
applicant.
The law school may also opt to rely solely on the result of the PhiLSAT in accepting students.

The additional requirements that a law school may impose would have to be of the same
kind as a PhiLSAT score of higher than 55%, additional admission tests, or a personal interview
of the applicant — the defining characteristic of the specie in the enumeration is the ability to
measure the competencies and/or personality of the applicant relevant to and indicative of an
applicant's success in law school — an applicant's communications or language proficiency, critical
thinking skills, and verbal and quantitative reasoning, and personality fit for success in law school. So
any screening module that makes such measurements could be imposed as an additional
measure.

On the other hand, No. 10 of LEBMO No. 7 provides for an exemption from both writing and
passing PhiLSAT. This, however, does not exempt an applicant from the other admission
requirements of a law school if one has been imposed.
Thus, the scheme under LEBMO No. 7 can be summarized as follows:

1. Objective: to measure the academic potential of an applicant to a law school to pursue a

law degree in terms of baseline competencies in communications or language
proficiency, critical thinking skills, and verbal and quantitative reasoning.
2. Means: (a) writing the one-day aptitude test on communications or language proficiency,
critical thinking skills, and verbal and quantitative reasoning, and passing this test with a
score of 55% of correct answers; (b) non-admission of applicants who score less than
55% in PhiLSAT and imposition of administrative fine against law schools admitting law
students who did not write or pass PhiLSAT; and (c) law school admission
requirements in addition to writing and passing PhiLSAT, if any.
3. Exemption: as stated in No. 10 of LEBMO No. 7.

PhiLSAT as an admission requirement is reasonable because it is minimally impairing of

academic freedom.

The scope of the area measured by PhiLSAT is limited to academic potential —

communications or language proficiency, critical thinking skills, and verbal and quantitative reasoning —
and does not extend to an applicant's personality or emotional quotient.
PhiLSAT competencies are the most basic of skills needed to survive as and gain
something from being, a law student. There is nothing fancy, whimsical or arbitrary about these
competencies. PhiLSAT does not intrude into a law school's decision to prescribe other admission
requirements covering other sets of skills.

Further, PhiLSAT's passing score is minimal — 55%. If an applicant cannot even obtain a
score of at least 55% in this test involving the most basic of skills required in a law school, then the
applicant's aptitude must lie somewhere else.

A snapshot or sample of PhiLSAT questions bears this out:

Section 2. Sentence Completion. —
 Directions: Choose the word or phrase that, when inserted in the sentence, best fits the meaning
of the sentence as a whole.
23. Cecilia's mother __________ from Switzerland 30 years ago, and she found a haven in
the Philippines.

(A) emigrated

(B) immigrated
(C) has emigrated

(D) has immigrated

24. After seeing the movie, Andrea took her eyeglasses off and put them ___________ her
lap.
(A) to

(B) on
(C) in

(D) at

25. Contemporary Manila, with its images of urbanization and poverty, is _________ from
Old Manila, once romantically described as the Queen City of the Pacific.
(A) a far cry

(B) a grain of salt

(C) the last straw

(D) the wrong tree

26. __________ the presenter had rehearsed the part she thought the most difficult, the
participants did not appreciate her effort and went home unhappy.
(A) Since

(B) Because
(C) If only

(D) Even though

27. Yosef presented to the team ___________ than what the company purchased three
years ago.
(A) a powerfuller device

(B) the powerfuller device

(C) a more powerful device

(D) the more powerful device

28. She was answering her assignment on historical background of a short story
___________ she discovered she was in the wrong page.
(A) after

(B) but
 (C) and

(D) when

29. After a tight and exhausting schedule yesterday, Ramon _______ in bed since early this
morning.
(A) lay

(B) lying
(C) has lain

(D) had lied

30. The passengers are informed that they have the next four hours ___________ leisure,
and can go wherever they wish.

(A) at

(B) by
(C) on

(D) as
31. Because the problem is rather insoluble, even those who initially wanted to take it up
have now dropped it like a __________.
(A) penny for your thoughts

(B) piece of cake

(C) spilt milk

(D) hot potato

32. We are expected to ___________ our outputs on or before Thursday next week.

(A) turn to
(B) turn off

(C) turn in
(D) turn into

33. She was (the) __________ among the researchers in this institution, despite her
formidable credentials.

(A) humbler
(B) humblest

(C) more humble

(D) most humble

LEBMO No. 7 also respects the academic freedom of law schools to impose additional
admission measures as they see fit. It is only this minimal requirement of writing and passing
PhiLSAT at the very reasonable score of 55% on multiple choice questions that reflects an applicant's
capacity for reading, writing, computing and analyzing individual questions and fact scenarios, which
the State demands of every law school to factor in as an admission requirement.
 More, a law school may admit as students those who have not written and passed PhiLSAT but
have obtained professional civil service eligibility within two years from the date of their graduation in
college.

In addition, a law school desirous of proving the propriety of another exemption from taking and
passing PhiLSAT can very well petition the Legal Education Board for this purpose.

To repeat, While LEBMO No. 7 impacts on a law school's academic freedom, the
impairment is minimal and based on rational considerations.

As regards individual applicants to law school, the demand and effect of PhiLSAT upon them
thoughtfully account for their dignity as individuals. This is because PhiLSAT relieves an applicant
of the potential pain and agony of unmet expectations and wastage of time, resources and efforts.
Unsuccessful PhiLSAT examinees may have their aptitude in something else.

In any event, the scheme under LEBMO No. 7 is also very accommodating of applicants who
fail the test. PhiLSAT is now offered twice a year, and an applicant can write it as many times as he
or she is willing to take.

To stress anew, PhiLSAT as envisioned in LEBMO No. 7 minimally impairs the limited right of a
citizen to select a profession or a course of study and a law school's academic freedom, is consistent
with the State's power of reasonable regulation and supervision of all educational institutions, and is
therefore reasonable.
I conclude, therefore, that there is proportionality between the overall salutary effects of the
objectives of PhiLSAT and the deleterious effect of passing PhiLSAT as an admission requirement.
As in the case for Subsection 7 (e), the benefits obtained from achieving the objectives are
obvious — no one can argue against students who have been measured to have the necessary skills in
communications and language, critical thinking, and verbal and quantitative reasoning. On the other
hand, the deleterious effect of the imposition of PhiLSAT to stress anew is speculative. There is in
fact no evidence of the evils that could be attributed to this minimal admission requirement. It has not
been shown that PhiLSAT questions are arbitrary, the test results are oppressive to the examinees (in
fact, as shown above, easily more than half of the applicants have passed the first versions of
PhiLSAT), or the scope of PhiLSAT has occupied the entire field of admission standards and has left
nothing for law schools to prescribe. These allegations have not been proven to be true.

Existence of Transparency and Intelligibility. PhiLSAT has had a long history of validation
and re-validation that both the Decision and the Memorandum of the Office of the Solicitor General
have been able to recount succinctly. The bases for which PhiLSAT was conceived and required for
applicants to law school have thus been made transparent and intelligible. One can therefore concede
that PhiLSAT was not the result of an arbitrary and capricious exercise of wisdom by its authors.
Action as being within a range of possible, acceptable and defensible outcomes. It is open
to the Legal Education Board to impose PhiLSAT as one of several measures to achieve the
constitutional objective of quality education. In fact, a mandatory law school admission test was one
of the reform agenda to improve the quality of the instruction given by law schools as
recommended by the Court's Special Study group on Bar Examination Reforms, and later, by the
Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters and the Court's Bar Matter No. 1161.
To reiterate, both Subsection 7 (e) of RA 7662 and LEBMO Order No. 7 on PhiLSAT are
reasonable forms of State regulation and supervision of law schools.
 I also reflect on some of the Decision's ratio.

I refer to the presumption that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just
law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose
of the law. In a word, Subsection 7 (e) and LEBMO No. 7 are presumed to be reasonable.
As reasonableness is a fact-heavy determination, absent evidence of unreasonableness from
petitioners, it would be speculative to jump to the conclusion that PhiLSAT is in fact unreasonable.
Petitioners need to prove facts to disprove the presumption. [36]

I agree that the subject of PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education, which falls
squarely within the scope of police power.

But I do not agree that PhiLSAT is irrelevant to such purpose and that it is further arbitrary and
oppressive. In the first place, I do not share the view that there is an apparent discord between the
purpose of improving legal education and prescribing a qualifying and restrictive examination because
the design of the PhiLSAT itself appears to be disconnected with the aptitude for law that it seeks to
measure. The discussions above should prove that PhiLSAT is not only relevant to the objectives set
out by the Constitution and RA 7662 but is also proportionate as a means to these objectives.

Notably, petitioners presented no evidence on these factual issues. Hence, it cannot be said
that the ratio in the Decision is based on facts and circumstances. There is not even a discussion in the
Decision on the structure and contents of the PhiLSAT tests that have been administered thus far. To be
sure, the absence of an evidentiary record makes the Decision's conclusions at best speculative.

An evidentiary record is important because the Decision itself recognizes the presumption that
the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than
may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Yet, although petitioners adduced no
contrary evidence, the Decision goes on to conclude that the presumption of validity has been rebutted.

If there is any evidence on record here, it is to the effect that LEBMO No. 7's PhiLSAT
actually measures a potential law student's aptitude for law. As the Decision itself acknowledges,
the PhiLSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee's communications and language
proficiency, critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning, and that it was designed to measure the
academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law.
There is no denying that the ability to read a large volume of material in English and write,
think and argue in English are important indicators of one's ability to complete a law degree.
While PhiLSAT is not an exact predictor of success in law school, it is its undeniable role in
measuring a student's strong potentials for success that must be taken into account.
Further, as the Decision itself notes, the Court, through Resolution dated September 4, 2001,
approved the recommendations of our own Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, including
"d) to prescribe minimum standards for admission to law schools including a system of law aptitude
examination[.]" The Court could not have recommended a measure that would have been an
unreasonable imposition on potential students of law or on academic freedom.

Some law schools are already imposing strict admission standards. That is true. But this fact
does not automatically render PhiLSAT irrelevant or unreasonable.

PhiLSAT would not have come into being had there been no legitimate concerns about
improving the state of our legal education. The top law schools are precisely top law schools
because of strict admission standards they have in place.
 These law schools, however, are not the only law schools in the Philippines. They do not have
the monopoly of law students in the country. In fact, they are only a minority. There are so many
more law schools and law students out there, whose state of competencies LEBMO No. 7 seeks to
capture.
It is also a contradiction in terms that we laud the best admission standards and practices of
some law schools, yet reject the passing of PhiLSAT as a requirement for law school admission.
Their standards and practices indubitably prove a reasonable connection between the regulation
of admissions to legal education and in ensuring that those allowed to study law and eventually allowed
to practice law are competent, knowledgeable or morally upright.

But these law schools are not the reason why we are debating about how to improve legal
education standards. If every law school has exercised responsibly their role in ensuring that admission
standards and practices are up to par with quality legal education, we would not be talking about
requiring PhiLSAT anymore.

The indubitable social and legislative facts prove that a screening mechanism like PhiLSAT is
necessary. If we are again going the way of making such screening mechanism an optional device for
law school admission, as the Decision does, then the Court is not just overhauling the undeniable
social and legislative facts upon which Subsection 7 (e) of RA 7662 was based, the Decision is
also turning its back to the problems that have long beset our legal education.
Common sense dictates that the absence of filters would clog sooner than later the pipeline of
knowledge. PhiLSAT acts as that filter which removes students whose capacity, values, forbearance
and aptitude may not be for the study of law. This is true for aspiring law students (there must be a
State-imposed method to determine an entry level student's aptitude, capacity, forbearance and values
for law study) as it is true for those who want to be appointed to the Bench (where the battery of
tests administered by the JBC presumably makes not only for a fair selection process but also for a pool
of competent aspirants).

I do not agree that the imposition of the PhiLSAT cut off score was made without the benefit of a
prior scientific study, thereby making it arbitrary. To my mind, this is a reversal of the onus of who
proves what. Since the Decision admits the existence of the presumption that the legislature intended
to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary
to effectuate the specific purpose of the law, it is up to the petitioners to establish that Congress
— both the House and the Senate — and the Legal Education Board acted arbitrarily. Petitioners did
not adduce evidence to this effect.
On the contrary, the other Branches of Government have tests validating PhiLSAT. It is not for
these Branches of Government to explain the relevance and validity of these studies if, on their
face, these studies appear to be relevant. The actions of these Branches of Government are entitled
to deference not only because of the presumption above-mentioned but also due to their status as
agents of sovereignty. Again, the burden is on petitioners to prove by evidence their claim that
PhiLSAT is arbitrary for having been imposed without prior scientific study, or that petitioners' own
studies disprove the presumption.

I also do not think that it is arbitrary and harsh to impose penalties upon law schools that do not
make PhiLSAT a requirement for law school admission.

Again, petitioners have not adduced evidence that unduly oppressiveness will be the case. In
any event, there is nothing oppressive about penalizing an entity that does not comply with
regulations. This set-up of regulatory and even criminal penalties has been done so often to deter
violations and enforce obedience. This is especially true where the regulation involved is intended
towards a socially positive and uplifting goal, but compliance is not assured.

In addition, whether to attach a penalty to a measure is a policy and not a legal decision.
The decision to impose a penalty speaks to the utility and wisdom or desirability of the manner by
which breach of the regulation is deterred, and compliance, maximized.
There is, too, further nothing abusive about the scoring methodology in LEBMO No. 7. It is
common among law schools that examinations are graded based on a minimum percentage of
correct answers and not on a percentile score. The Supreme Court's Bar examinations are scored
on the basis of correct and wrong answers, and passers are those who reach the minimum
required scores.

The ruling in Tablarin [37] is relevant. This case law focused on the validity of the National Medical
Admissions Test (NMAT) as a valid and reasonable police power measure as an admission standard into
medical schools. Tablarin held that NMAT is an educational regulatory tool related to one of the
legitimate objectives of police power — public order, specifically, securing of the health and physical
safety and wellbeing of the population. Tablarin also recognized that though NMAT is at the most initial
and lowest rung of the requisites to attain this police power objective, NMAT is nonetheless an essential
part of the police power objective. Tablarin confirmed that NMAT serves as a gate-keeping measure to
weed out misfits in the sense of those whose aptitude and inclinations are not for the field of medicine.
The fact that NMAT was described by the Court as a factor in becoming better doctors (or medical
practitioners) does not detract from the ruling in Tablarin that NMAT is first and foremost a legitimate
screening device for those wishing to be admitted to medical schools.
Hence, NMAT serves the same function as that of PhiLSAT. Because PhiLSAT is the NMAT
equivalent in essential respects, the ruling in Tablarin justifying NMAT as a legitimate police power
exercise should also apply to the cases-at-bar about PhiLSAT.

PhiLSAT serves an equivalent function as the LSAT. LSAT is a standardised test designed to
identify individuals who are likely to succeed in first year law school. Unlike in PhiLSAT which is a
State-sponsored measure, all law schools in North America require applicants to take LSAT. LSAT is
administered by a non-profit corporation located in the United States.

LSAT, like PhiLSAT, is a screening device for entry into the great learning of the law. The
theory behind both LSAT and PhiLSAT is that law schools seek students who have substantial
promise for success in law school, and as a result, a strong likelihood of succeeding in the
practice of law as shown by their preliminary aptitude for law.

To be sure, we cannot distance or segregate law school experience from the practice of law
because the former should ideally segue to the latter. Law schools do not exist exclusively just to
teach law students; law schools are also there to transform their students into lawyers. It is
unrealistic to say otherwise.

If law schools were to simply exist to teach without regard to whether their students become
lawyers, law school education would lose both its clientele and its relevance in the real world —
this is the common sensical and obvious context of the educative process. Despite the division of
authority as between legal education and practice of law and the obvious difference between them, in
reality, one bridges to the other as one cannot be dissociated from the other.
 The difference between LSAT and PhiLSAT is not conceptual but operational — that is, how
much weight is to be given by institutions of higher learning — the law schools — to the scores obtained
by an examinee. They also differ in the scoring system — LSAT is percentile-based while PhiLSAT as
now envisioned is raw score-based.
Most law schools in common law countries have several streams about how an applicant is to
be admitted as a law student. The most common if not the only stream is through high LSAT scores
and grade point averages. So it is a common goal for those aspiring to enter law schools in those
countries to take LSAT and aim for high LSAT percentiles and GPAs.
Among these law schools, there may be other streams of admission — those who have achieved
extensive relevant experiences abroad or in-country and those who would bring interesting diversity to
the law school student population. But the number of these students vis-à-vis the entire population
of law students in a law school is miniscule. The students admitted through these other streams
constitute a very small minority of the entire population of law students.

The majority are still required to show competence through LSAT scores. The lower
scores an applicant has, the lower the chance the applicant can get to enrol in a law school — IF
THEY HAVE ANY CHANCE AT ALL.
In any event, LSAT is not anchored on a State sponsored measure. Why the countries under
LSAT regimes do not require State supervision and regulation could be attributed to their perception that
their law societies (the equivalent of our Integrated Bar) and law schools are mature enough to self-
regulate.
If we had no concerns about law schools which have no proportionate standards to the nobility of
legal education, then perhaps we can adopt as liberal a policy as the countries utilizing LSAT and having
different admission streams. But obviously, our experiences are not the same as their experiences; our
situation is not similar to their situations.
In any case, PhiLSAT tries to mirror the admission practices where LSAT is the screening
device. If LSAT can be waived in exceptional circumstances, this exceptional stream where LSAT is
waived is akin, in the case of PhiLSAT, to recall from above, to the exemption under No. 10 of
LEBMO No. 7 for honor graduates.
PhiLSAT as embodied in LEBMO No. 7 is not objectionable for being unreasonable. Having been
imposed by a law that carries the presumption of validity and reasonableness that has not been
disproven by contrary evidence from petitioners' end, PhiLSAT cannot be ignored or set aside as this
has been imposed by the State through an administrative regulation — LEBMO No. 7 — which finds its
basis in RA 7662.

I agree with the Decision that the reasonable supervision and regulation clause is not a stand-
alone provision but must be read in conjunction with the other constitutional provisions which include, in
particular, the clause on academic freedom. I agree as well that institutions of higher learning has a wide
sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students.

Yet, this sphere of autonomy is not absolute or limitless. Autonomy cannot result in arbitrary
or discriminatory admission policies. If autonomy were to have such a result, restrictive police power can
curb such actuality or tendency. Autonomy too cannot disregard the constitutional power of the
State to exercise reasonable regulation and supervision of all educational institutions. Thus, I
agree with the Decision that affirmative police power can be legitimately exercised in the regulation and
supervision of institutions of higher learning. The Decision aptly ruled that institutions of higher learning
enjoy ample discretion to decide for itself who to admit, being part of their academic freedom, but the
State, in the exercise of its reasonable supervision and regulation over education, can impose minimum
regulations. This is what RA 7662 and LEBMO No. 7 have done.

The issue is not whether the State can intervene in the admission requirements of law schools
or any other institution of higher learning — the rule of law has already said the State can. The issue
is whether the degree and breadth of the intervention that the State can legally do is reasonable
supervision and regulation.

In this light, I do not agree that the PhiLSAT cut off score is a direct intrusion into the law school's
essential freedom to choose who may be admitted to study. I maintain that PhiLSAT plays a viable and
vital role in determining an entry law student's aptitude for law. The ability to read a large volume of
materials in English and write in English are important indicators of the ability to complete a law degree.
Again, while the PhiLSAT is not an exact predictor of success in law school, it is a factor that must be
taken into account.

For the reasons I have stated, I disagree with the Decision that in mandating that only students
who scored at least 55% correct answers shall be admitted to any law school, PhiLSAT usurps the right
and duty of the law school to determine for itself the criteria for the admission of students and thereafter,
to apply such criteria on a case to case basis. There is a way to read reason into LEBMO Order No. 7
that is neither strained nor unwarranted. I have shown this in the foregoing disquisition.
Another. I disagree with the Decision that the law schools are left with absolutely no discretion
to choose its students in accordance with its own policies, but are dictated to surrender such discretion
in favor of a State-determined pool of applicants. This is a hyperbole that finds no basis in fact and
law. It is highly speculative that the complexion of the student body and the number of students a
law school admits will be different just because PhiLSAT was put in place. There is no evidence of
that in the records. In any case, the State is also a stakeholder in our educational institutions. The State
cannot lightly be disregarded when it comes to reasonable minimal regulation and supervision.

I therefore do not concur with the ruling that the requirement of passing the PhiLSAT insofar as
admission to law school is concerned should be struck down not only for being unreasonable but also for
encroaching upon the law school's exercise of discretion as to who to admit in its law program.
In practical terms, PhiLSAT is the default means by which one could become a law student.
Hence, one desirous of becoming a law student would want to take and pass PhiLSAT. If he or she fails
the first time, he or she can try again and again and again. Then perhaps if one still fails PhiLSAT, legal
education is not for his or her aptitude. It is not of course the end of the world. It is the door that opens to
other fitting opportunities for self-improvement if not self-aggrandizement.

Accordingly, I vote to affirm the constitutionality in full of Subsection 7 (e) and LEBMO Order No.
7, series of 2016.

3. Are Subsections 7 (g) and (h) of RA 7662 ultra vires for encroaching into the
constitutional powers of the Supreme Court.

These provisions read:

(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar
which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or
firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the
Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the
Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the
 specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of
the Bar.
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the
Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses
and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary.

We can opt to read these provisions niggardly or reasonably, the first resulting in an obvious
conflict with the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the practice or procedure before our courts and other
decision-making bodies and over members of the Bar, while the second seeks a middle way that does
not strain the wording of these provisions. [38] I opt to read these provisions with respect and
deference to the legislative intent not to violate the constitutional powers of the Supreme Court.
This is consistent with enshrined principles of statutory construction.

A rule of statutory construction long cherished by the Court is that law should not be construed as
to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, and that a statute should be construed whenever
possible in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution. [39]
Each part or section of a rule should be construed in connection with every other part or section
as to produce a harmonious whole. [40]

More, the "meaning of a word or a phrase used in a statute is qualified by the purpose which
induced the legislature to enact the statute. In construing a word or phrase, the court should adopt that
interpretation that accords best with the manifest purpose of the statute or promotes or realizes its
object." [41]

A "statute must always be construed as a whole, and the particular meaning to be attached to
any word or phrase is usually to be ascertained from the context, the nature of the subject treated and
the purpose or intention of the body which enacted or framed the statute." [42] In other words, the rule's
purpose or context must be the controlling guide in interpreting every provision thereof. [43]
Accordingly, I read Subsections 7 (g) and (h) with the caveat that the Legal Education Board's
exercise of power over these matters is neither final, direct, primary nor exclusive for the simple reason
that the subject-matters of Subsections 7 (g) and (h) are no longer about promoting the quality of
legal education.

Law practice internship or articling as it is called elsewhere already involves the practice of law. It
calls for putting one's legal education to apply to real life situations. Continuing legal education covers
lawyers, not law students. It is part and parcel of ensuring a lawyer's competence, not a law student's
aptitude for legal education. Clearly, the Legal Education Board cannot decide on these matters
primarily, directly, and much less, exclusively.

Subsections 7 (g) and (h) so as not to render them unconstitutional or illegal, must be read
consistent with the objective of RA 7662: is to focus on enhancing the quality of legal education,
and these provisions cannot be given effect beyond that objective.

Here, the Legal Education Board may establish a law practice internship or adopt a continuing
legal education program for lawyers, as any service provider can, but these programs must be
consistent with the rules already promulgated and vetted by the Court.

In other words, the law practice internship would have to be vetted and sanctioned by the
Supreme Court — nothing of this sort moves without the imprimatur of the Court. This
requirement of Supreme Court regulation and control is deemed written into Subsection 7 (g). This
arises from the rule that statutes and regulations are inferior to the Constitution, and that statutes
and regulations are presumed to have been intended to be valid and thus must be read in a way
that upholds the Constitution.
Continuing legal education may also be provided by the Legal Education Board as a
service provider. It may innovate means to serve the Supreme Court's mandatory continuing legal
education program. But like the law practice internship, the continuing legal education program the
Legal Education Board will have to be vetted and sanctioned by the Court. As in the case of
Subsection 7 (g), the requirement of vetting and sanctioning by the Court is deemed written into
Subsection 7 (h) of RA 7662.
As a result, I vote to affirm the constitutionality of Subsections 7 (g) and (h) of RA 7662.

CONCLUSION
With due respect to the majority, the dispositive portion of the Decision is quite ambivalent, and if
I may so, engages in circular reasoning. It reads in part:
The Court further declares:

As CONSTITUTIONAL:
1. Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board
the power to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into
account, among others, the qualifications of the members of the faculty
without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher
learning; and
2. Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board
the power to prescribe the minimum requirements for admission to legal
education and minimum qualifications of faculty members without
encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.
Pray tell, what can the LEB do now without encroaching on the academic freedom of law schools
— if it is unconstitutional for LEB to require a qualifying examination such as PhiLSAT, when LEB can
only recommend but not impose? Where does the exercise of regulation and supervision in this kind of
ruling come in? Truly, the Decision takes with its left hand what it gives with its right. We are back to
square one.

GESMUNDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

Before this Court are two consolidated petitions: in G.R. No. 230642, it seeks to nullify Republic
Act No. 7662 and abolish the Legal Education Board (LEB); and in G.R. No. 242954, to annul and set
aside LEB Memorandum Order Nos. 7-2016 and 11-2017, dated December 29, 2016 and April 20, 2017,
respectively, and LEB Memorandum Circular No. 18-2018, dated October 5, 2018.
I vote to partly grant the consolidated petitions.

There is a stereotype that the study of law is a precursor for the practice of law. However, the
study of law is not that simple. There may be instances when a person studies law for its philosophy,
wisdom, and concepts; and choose not to take the bar examinations as he or she is not interested in
becoming a lawyer. Thus, the study of law does not always result into the practice of law. Nonetheless,
even after hurdling the bar, lawyers and judges are still mandated to continue the study of law. It is a
well-settled rule that the study of law is a never-ending and ceaseless process. [1]

The study of the law is not an exact science with definite fields of black and white and unbending
rules and rigid dogmas. The beauty of this discipline in the words of Justice Holmes, is the "penumbra
shading gradually from one extreme to another," that gives rise to those honest differences of opinion
among the brotherhood as to its correct interpretation. Honest differences are allowed and, indeed,
inevitable, but we certainly must frown on stilted readings to suit one's motives, especially if they are less
than noble. The law does not permit this, and much less, for that matter, does equity. [2]
Academic Freedom of Institutions
of Higher Learning
It is clear that the study of law is within the domain of academic freedom. In Ateneo de Manila
University v. Judge Capulong, [3] the Court stated that the term "academic freedom," which has evolved
to describe the emerging rights related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with
freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words, it has been identified with the
right of individuals in universities, such as professors, researchers and administrators, to investigate,
pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may lead,"
free from internal and external interference or pressure. Obviously, its optimum impact is best realized
where this freedom is exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into unbridled license. Early cases
on this individual aspect of academic freedom have stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a
measure of independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure. [4]
Academic freedom has long been recognized by our organic laws. Section 5, Article XIV, of the
1935 Constitution states that universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom.
Likewise, Section 8, Article XV, of the 1973 Constitution states that all institutions of higher learning shall
enjoy academic freedom. Under the present Constitution, Section 5, Article XIV, states that academic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. Verily, institutions of higher learning, such
as schools, colleges, and universities offering a degree program in law, all have constitutionally
enshrined academic freedom.

Academic freedom of institutions of higher learning have the following essential freedoms: (1)
who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to
study. [5] This was first discussed in the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) case of Sweezy
v. New Hampshire. [6] In that case, Paul Sweezy, who was an economist and lecturer in the University of
New Hampshire, was subpoenaed by the State Attorney General to answer several questions, which
included inquiries regarding his lectures on Socialism at the university. Paul Sweezy refused to answer
particular questions and was declared in contempt of court. The SCOTUS reversed the contempt charge
on the basis of violation of academic freedom and stated that:

The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost

self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by
those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of
education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be
made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
 evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization will stagnate
and die. [7]
In the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter, he explained the importance of academic
freedom in a university, viz.:
"In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end. A university
ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of Church or State or any
sectional interest. A university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, its ideal being
the ideal of Socrates — 'to follow the argument where it leads.' This implies the right to
examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and hypothesis
are incompatible, and the concept of an immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of a
university. The concern of its scholars is not merely to add and revise facts in relation to
an accepted framework, but to be ever examining and modifying the framework itself.
xxx xxx xxx

"Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and
experiment are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific knowledge. A
sense of freedom is also necessary for creative work in the arts which, equally with
scientific research, is the concern of the university.

xxx xxx xxx

". . . It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive
to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the
four essential freedoms' of a university — to determine for itself on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study." [8] (emphasis supplied)

In the subsequent case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents, [9] the SCOTUS held that a law cannot
force teachers to sign an oath stating they are not members of certain communist parties pursuant to
their academic freedom and because the law is overbreadth, to wit:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us, and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast
a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms
is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools." The classroom is
peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."

On the other hand, in University of California Regents v. Bakke, [10] the SCOTUS tackled the
legality of the university policy which requires a particular number of minorities for admission. It
grounded its analysis on academic freedom and stated that "the university's use of race in its admission
may use for the attainment of a diverse student body. Nothing less than the nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this United
States. In seeking the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the 'robust
exchange of ideas,' a university seeks to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the
fulfillment of its mission. Both tradition and experience lend support to the view that the contribution of
diversity is substantial." [11] Nevertheless, while race may be considered as one of the several factors for
admission, the SCOTUS ruled that the specific or fixed number of minorities for university admission is
too unreasonable. The ruling in University of California Regents v. Bakke was affirmed in Grutter v.
Bollinger, [12] regarding admission in the University of Michigan Law School, Gratz v. Bollinger, [13]
regarding the point system admission policy of the University of Michigan, and Fisher v. University of
Texas. [14]
Academic Freedom in
Philippine Jurisdiction
The four essential freedoms constituting academic freedom have also been discussed by our
jurisprudence. In University of the Phils. v. Civil Service Commission, [15] the Court discussed institutions
of higher learning's freedom to determine "who may teach." In that case, a professor was on leave of
absence without pay for four (4) years. Nevertheless, the university therein still accepted the professor
back to work even though the Civil Service Commission had terminated his services. The Court ruled
that the university has the academic freedom to determine who shall teach. This freedom encompasses
the autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls
of professors and other academic personnel. [16] It was also stated therein that "since academic freedom
is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we
shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom." [17]
Jurisprudence has also recognized that institutions of higher learning have the enshrined
freedom to determine "who may be admitted to study." In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee,
Loyola School of Theology, [18] it involved a student who wanted to compel the Loyola School of
Theology to accept her in their Master of Arts in Theology program. The respondent therein invoked its
academic freedom to admit students in its program. The Court denied the petition and held that the
respondent indeed had the academic freedom to determine who would be admitted to their school. It
was highlighted that colleges and universities should not be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any
discretion as to whom to admit or reject Education, especially higher education, belongs to a different,
and certainly higher category. [19]

In Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, [20] the law students involved in the hazing
incident argued that the school imposed arbitrary rules and penalties regarding its admission policy. The
Court held that the law school, which is an institute of higher learning, had the academic freedom to
determine who may be admitted, including the power to promulgate rules concerning student discipline.
The establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution,
but to its very survival. [21]

In Licup v. University of San Carlos, [22] the students involved committed demonstrations in the
university that were far from peaceful and the school administration imposed the penalty of non-
admission. The Court affirmed the penalty imposed by the school. While it is true that students are
entitled to the right to pursue their education, the school is likewise entitled to academic freedom and
has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized. The Court underscored that an
institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the
course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to
maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits that contractual right; and the Court should not
review the discretion of university authorities. [23]
 However, academic freedom of institutions of higher learning is not absolute; rather, it is subject
to the limitation of reasonability and that it should not be arbitrarily exercised. In Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual
Help College of Rizal, Inc., [24] the student therein, who questioned the tuition fee hike of the school, was
expelled because he allegedly had Citizen's Military Training (CMT) deficiencies. The Court held that the
school cannot invoke academic freedom to immediately expel its student based on mere deficiencies in
the CMT. The Court held that "[w]hile we ordinarily would not delve into the exercise of sound judgment,
we will not, however, hesitate to act when we perceive taints of arbitrariness in the process. The
punishment of expulsion appears to us rather disproportionate to his having had some unit deficiencies
in his CMT course. Indeed, the DECS itself is conceding to the grant of the instant petition. The
circumstances lend truth to the petitioner's claim that the private respondent has strongly been
influenced by his active participation in questioning PHCR's application for tuition fee increase." [25]

On the other hand, in Morales v. The Board of Regents of the University of the Phils., [26] the
Court emphasized that the discretion of schools of learning to formulate rules and guidelines in the
granting of honors for purposes of graduation forms part of academic freedom. And such discretion may
not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts, unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its
exercise. [27]
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that institutions of higher learning are granted academic
freedom by the Constitution, which includes that freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.
The academic freedom of these institutions, however, are not unbridled and subject to the test of
reasonableness.

LEB Memorandum Orders and Circular

unreasonably restrict academic freedom
LEB Memorandum Order No. 7-2016 instituted the PhilSAT, which is an aptitude test that
measures the academic potential of an examinee. Only those who pass with a 55% score on the
examination shall be allowed admission in law schools. LEB Memorandum Order No. 11-2017, states
that those who failed the first PhilSAT may be conditionally admitted to law schools in the first semester
of school year 2017 to 2018 provided they take the next scheduled PhilSAT. On the other hand, LEB
Memorandum Circular No. 18-2018 discontinued the conditional admission of students. Thus, the LEB
requires the mandatory taking of the PhilSAT before being admitted to any law school; and, a student
shall not be admitted if he or she fails the said examination. In other words, PhilSAT is exclusionary and
those that do not pass the said test shall not be admitted in the study of law. The respondents argue that
LEB's institution of the PhilSAT is within the State's power to regulate all educational institutions.
I concur with the ponencia that the LEB Memorandum Orders and Circular, requiring the PhilSAT
as mandatory and exclusionary, are unconstitutional.
Institutes of higher learning have academic freedom, under the Constitution, and this includes the
freedom to determine who may be admitted to study. Such freedom may only be limited by the State
based on the test of reasonability. In this case, however, the assailed LEB Memorandum Orders fail to
provide a reasonable justification for restraining the admission of students to law schools based on the
following reasons:

First, by making the PhilSAT mandatory and exclusionary, the LEB significantly restricts the
freedom of law schools to determine who shall be admitted as law students. Only those who pass the
said examination shall be considered for admission to these institutions of higher learning.
Consequently, the LEB, through the PhilSAT, first chooses the potential law students, and only
afterwards, shall the law schools be allowed to choose their students from the limited pool of student-
passers. The said institutes of higher learning are barred from considering those students who failed the
examinations, regardless of their previous academic grades and achievements.

Second, the LEB does not give any justification for the required passing score of 55% and the
format of the examinations. The studies cited by the LEB were conducted by different organizations, for
different professions, and for foreign jurisdictions. Indeed, no concrete study conducted in the Philippines
for the legal profession was provided to substantiate the passing score and the test format. It is not even
clear whether the consensus of the law schools in the country was secured before the LEB imposed the
PhilSAT. Without any concrete basis for the conduct of the examination, it would be unreasonable. to
impose the same mandatorily and without exemption to the institutes of higher learning.
Third, law schools are given no option other than to follow the LEB Memorandum Orders and
Circular. Failure to comply with these shall result in administrative sanctions, ranging from closure of the
law school, phase-out of the law program, provision cancellation of its recognition and/or liability to pay a
fine of P10,000.00 for each infraction. Even without a valid reason for the imposition of the PhilSAT
requirement, the LEB completely restricts the law schools from accepting students who did not pass the
said examination. The schools' exercise of academic freedom to choose their students is restricted by
the threat of administrative and pecuniary sanctions.

Assuming arguendo that the LEB Memorandum Orders and Circular were issued under the
exercise of police power of the State to regulate the rights of certain institutions, it does not justify the
unreasonable restriction on the academic freedom of institutes of higher learning. Notwithstanding its
extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it
may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for
which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private
interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power. [28]
Here, the LEB failed to establish the reasonable means to limit the academic freedom of the
institutes of higher learning. Again, there is no valid explanation provided on the mandatory and
exclusionary requirement of the PhilSAT, its passing grade, and format of examinations. Manifestly, to
impose a penalty on law schools based on an unreasonable policy that restricts academic freedom
would be an invalid exercise of police power.

PhilSAT is different from the

NMAT and LSAT

One of the arguments of the LEB is that the PhilSAT is comparable to the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT), which was upheld by the Court in Tablarin v. Judge Gutierrez, [29] and the Law
School Admission Test (LSAT) in the United States.
I disagree.

There are too many differences between the PhilSAT and the NMAT that they cannot be treated
in the same vein. One of the most notable differences is that in the NMAT, there is actually no passing or
failing grade; rather, the examinees are merely given a percentile score. Medical schools have the
discretion to determine the acceptable percentile score of their potential students. Thus, even with the
NMAT, medical schools have full freedom and control of students they intend to admit. They have the
sole discretion to impose the required percentile score in the NMAT, whether high or low, as a
requirement for admission. In fact, some medical schools are even allowed to conditionally accept
students who have not yet taken their NMAT.
 Unlike the NMAT, the PhilSAT provides for a strict passing score of 55%. This passing score was
provided by the LEB and not decided by the law schools themselves. These law schools have no option
in adjusting the passing score and they can only accept students who pass the said test. Stated
differently, law schools have no discretion to determine which students they will admit insofar as the
PhilSAT requirement is concerned.

On the other hand, the LSAT is a nationwide admission test for law schools in the United States.
The said test is administered by the Law School Admission Council (LSAC), which is a non-profit
corporation comprised of more than 200 law schools in the United States and Canada. The institutes of
higher learning themselves participate, prepare, and conduct the LSAT, and not their government. [30]

Nonetheless, even if there is the LSAT in the United States, the said examination is not an absolute
requirement for law school admission. The American Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure
merely require each student-applicant to take a valid and reliable admission test and it is not only
confined to the LSAT. [31] Thus, law schools in the United States are allowed to require other admission
tests provided that these are valid and reliable. Indeed, the LSAT requirement in the United States does
not unreasonably restrict the academic freedom of the law schools therein.

With the PhilSAT, however, the examination is mandatory and exclusionary, and local law schools
have no discretion to choose a different admission test. The law schools are only confined to choosing
those students who pass the PhilSAT, which does not provide any valid justification for restricting
academic freedom.

Evidently, both the NMAT and the LSAT are different from the PhilSAT. The former respect and
consider the academic freedom of institutes of higher learning in their liberty of choosing their students;
while with the latter, law schools are unreasonably constrained in determining the students it may accept
for enrollment.

Uniform Admission Examination

instituted by Foreign Law Schools

I firmly believe that PhilSAT should be set aside; instead, the law schools in the
Philippines, through the Philippine Association of Law Schools (PALS), and under the mere
supervision of LEB, should establish a unified, standardized, and acceptable law admission
examination. Said examination must be unrestrictive of academic freedom, cost-efficient, accessible,
and an effective tool in assessing incoming law students. At the onset, I will discuss the constitutional
viability of a unified law admission examination, spearheaded by the law schools, pursuant to their right
to academic freedom.
There was a time when law schools could follow the advice of Wigmore, who believed that "the
way to find out whether a boy [or girl] has the makings of a competent lawyer is to see what he [or she]
can do in a first year of law studies." [32] In those days there were enough spaces to admit every
applicant who met minimal credentials, and they all could be given the opportunity to prove themselves
in law school. But by the 1920's many law schools found that they could not admit all minimally qualified
applicants, and a selection process began. The pressure to use some kind of admissions test mounted,
and a number of schools instituted them. [33]

In the United States, the LSAT was formulated by the LSAC. The idea of LSAT began on May 17,
1945, when Frank Bowles, Admission Director at Columbia Law School, wrote to the President of
College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB) suggesting the creation of a law capacity test to be used in
admission decisions. It was discussed that the validity of the LSAT would be linked to its correlation with
grades in the first year of law study. Consequently, correlation with success in taking the bar examination
was rejected because candidates often take the bar exam several times and everybody passes them
sooner or later. It was also highlighted that the more law schools participating in the LSAT, the greater
the numbers for testing validity and the more widely the costs would be spread. [34]
On August 15, 1947, representatives of Columbia, Yale and Harvard law schools met with the
representatives of the CEEB. The representative of Harvard opined that the LSAT would help make
decisions on "those borderline on college record and those from unknown colleges." [35] It was also
agreed upon to invite more law schools to participate and that the creation of the test would also
create a new organization of law schools. As of 2000, the LSAC now consists of a total 198 law
schools. [36]
On November 10, 1947, the initial LSAT was discussed and the law schools from Rutgers,
Northwestern, Syracuse, Stanford, Cornell, the University of Southern California, New York University,
[37]
the University of Pennsylvania, Yale, and Harvard also participated. The founders of the test were
adamant that it could not and must not be the only criterion for admission.
Further, the LSAT has played an important role in opening the legal profession at all levels to men
and women whose ancestors had been the object of merciless prejudice and overt discrimination. This
does not mean that the test is a foolproof gauge of merit. It is merely what it was designed to be — a tool
to aid in the admissions decision. It was not designed as a pass or fail grading system. [38] The entire
rationale for the test was the need to supplement the information supplied by the undergraduate record.
The scores on the test were to be used along with pre[-]law grades, recommendations, and other
information as an aid in admissions. [39]

In his Dissenting Opinion in DeFunis v. Odegaard, [40] Justice Douglas of the SCOTUS opined
that when the Law School Admission Committees consider the LSAT, undergraduate grades, and prior
achievement of the applicants, it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, to wit:
The Equal Protection Clause did not enact a requirement that law schools
employ as the sole criterion for admissions a formula based upon the LSAT and
undergraduate grades, nor does it prohibit law schools from evaluating an
applicant's prior achievements in light of the barriers that he had to overcome. A
black applicant who pulled himself out of the ghetto into a junior college may thereby
demonstrate a level of motivation, perseverance, and ability that would lead a fairminded
admissions committee to conclude that he shows more promise for law study than the son
of a rich alumnus who achieved better grades at Harvard. That applicant would be offered
admission not because he is black, but because as an individual he has shown he has the
potential, while the Harvard man may have taken less advantage of the vastly superior
opportunities offered him. Because of the weight of the prior handicaps, that black
applicant may not realize his full potential in the first year of law school, or even in the full
three years, but in the long pull of a legal career his achievements may far outstrip those
of his classmates whose earlier records appeared superior by conventional criteria. There
is currently no test available to the Admissions Committee that can predict such
possibilities with assurance, but the Committee may nevertheless seek to gauge it as best
it can, and weigh this factor in its decisions. Such a policy would not be limited to
blacks, or Chicanos or Filipinos, or American Indians, although undoubtedly
groups such as these may in practice be the principal beneficiaries of it. But a poor
 Appalachian white, or a second generation Chinese in San Francisco, or some other
American whose lineage is so diverse as to defy ethnic labels, may demonstrate similar
potential and thus be accorded favorable consideration by the Committee. [41] (emphases
supplied)
On the other hand, in the United Kingdom (UK), there is a National Admissions Test for Law
(LNAT), which was adopted in 2004. [42] It is the only aptitude test currently used in the UK for the
selection of people to the legal profession. [43] It was established by a consortium of Universities,
comprised of the following: University of Bristol, Durham University, University of Nottingham and
University of Oxford, King's College London, LSE London School of Economics and Political Science,
and University College London. [44] The LNAT consists of a multiple choice test and a written essay and
is designed to measure the following verbal reasoning skills: comprehension, interpretation, analysis,
synthesis, induction, and deduction. The test is used by participating UK law schools to aid in the
selection of law students. [45]

Similar to the LSAT in the US, the LNAT is not a substitute for undergraduate grades, [46]
applications, personal statements or interviews but is used by each university in the way that best suits
its own admissions policy. Different universities place different emphasis on the multiple choice score
and the essay question. [47]

Likewise, in India, there is also a centralized law admission test for National Law Schools, called
the Common Law Admission Test (CLAT). Before CLAT, each university running Bachelor of Laws
courses conducted its own admission test. As a result, students aspiring for good legal education had to
write a number of admission tests; and this multiplicity of admission tests caused tremendous hardship,
both physically and financially, to candidates. In 2006, this issue was raised in a Writ Petition filed by
Varun Bhagat against the Union of India and the various National Law Schools in the Supreme Court of
India. In the course of hearing, the Chief Justice of India directed the Union of India to consult with the
National Law Schools with a view to evolving a scheme for a common admission test. [48]

The common admission test required the consensus of all National Law Schools. The University
Grants Commission of India brought all seven National Law Schools, namely: National Law School of
India University, National Academy of Legal Studies and Research, National Law Institute University,
National University of Juridical Sciences, National Law University, Hidayatullah National Law University,
and Gujarat National Law University and they finalized the guidelines for the CLAT. It is expected that
other national law schools will join in due course. [49] As of 2015, sixteen (16) national law universities in
India participate in the CLAT. [50]

Law Admission Test administered

by law schools in the Philippines
Accordingly, I dissent with the ponencia that it should still be the LEB who shall lead, control, and
regulate the unified admission examinations for law schools.
While a standardized admission test for law schools is constitutionally and legally viable, it must
not be the LEB spearheading the admission test. Instead, it must be initiated and organized by the law
schools themselves, pursuant to their constitutionally enshrined academic freedom.

Currently, there is an organization of law schools in the country. The PALS, established in 1967,
is a non-stock corporation composed of 112 law schools nationwide. It seeks to be a primary driving
force in uplifting the standards of legal education in the Philippines to both meeting global standards of
excellence and at the same time serve as catalyst for both the economic and human development in
Philippine Society. [51]

As there is an available avenue, law schools in this jurisdiction could certainly organize a
standardized admission test pursuant to their academic freedom to determine whom they will admit as
their students. As discussed earlier, a unified admission test for law schools proves to be one of the
effective mechanisms in determining who among the applicants are mostly likely to succeed in the first
year of law study. And, more importantly, this unified admission examination is conducted and organized
by the law schools themselves through their academic freedom. Manifestly, this system of unified law
admission examination, conducted by the law schools themselves, has been observed and successfully
implemented in the United States, U.K. and India.
The flaws in the LEB Memoranda and Orders will not be followed if the law schools will organize
this unified admission test. A standardized admission examination must not be the sole measure in
determining whether an applicant will be accepted in law school. The answers a student can give in an
admission examination is limited by the creativity and intelligence of the test-maker. A student with a
better or more original understanding of the problem than the test-maker may realize that none of the
alternative answers are any good, but there is no way for that student to demonstrate his or her
understanding. If a student is strong-minded, nonconformist, unusual, original, or creative, that student
must stifle his or her impulses and conform to the norms that the test-maker established. The more
profoundly gifted the candidate is, the more his or her resentment will rise against the mental strait jacket
into which the testers would force his or her mind. [52] Stated differently, the unified admission test
should not be exclusionary.

Accordingly, the law admission test should not be the sole basis for admission in law schools. As
discussed earlier, there are other relevant factors, such as undergraduate achievements, motivation, or
cultural backgrounds that the admission test cannot measure. Besides the admission test, the law school
must still be given discretion to determine on its own, based on its academic freedom, the decision of
whom to admit as students. Thus, the proposed standardized admission test should only be one of many
criteria for admission to any law school. It would be the decision of each law school whether to accept or
deny admission of a potential law student under their academic freedom which would not be curtailed by
the unified law entrance examination since it would only be one of several factors for admission.

At the end of the day, the decision of creating a standardized admission test for law schools rests
upon the law schools in the country. These institutions of higher learning may come together, through the
PALS, and initiate for the creation and implementation of a standardized admission test. It would be the
culmination of the collective effort of law schools in their exercise of academic freedom.

In the event that the law schools pursue drafting, creating and organizing a standardized
admission test for legal studies in the Philippines, the LEB would not be entirely set aside in this
endeavor. Under R.A. No. 7662, one of the powers of the LEB is to supervise the law schools in the
country. [53]

The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower
officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is distinguished from the power of control or
the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter. [54] An officer in
control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order
the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does
not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed,
but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them.
If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the
prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on
this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. [55]

Consequently, the LEB may only supervise the proposed standardized admission test of the law
schools. It cannot substitute its own judgment with respect to said test organized by the law
schools; otherwise, it would violate the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning. The
LEB may only oversee whether the policies set forth by the law schools in the admission test are
reasonable and just. It cannot, however, ultimately override the collective decisions of the law schools in
the admission test for law students. In that manner, the LEB serves its purpose in the supervision of
legal education and, at the same time, the academic freedom of law schools is respected.
Further, to ensure the success of the law admission test initiated by the law schools in the
Philippines and supervised by the LEB, concrete studies on the effectiveness of this test must be
conducted. There must be an effective monitoring system for the examination. It must be determined,
before and after the admission test, whether said examination actually predicts and helps the success of
law students, at the very least, in their first year of legal study. The admission examination should not be
conducted for the sake of merely having one. It must have some tangible and definite benefit for the law
schools and potential law students. To achieve this quality-control mechanism, the law schools, through
PALS, and the LEB must thoroughly coordinate with each other to determine the most effective manner
in conducting the admission examinations. It is only through constant cooperation and consultation with
the stakeholders that the success of any admission examination will be guaranteed.
While the State has the power to regulate the education of its citizens, the 1987 Constitution
expressly grants academic freedom in all institutions of higher learning, including law schools. Thus, the
right to determine whom shall be admitted to law school should rest solely in these institutions. The State
cannot absolutely control this important pillar of academic freedom of institutes of higher learning. I
genuinely believe that it is only through the combined efforts of the law schools in the country that the
envisioned unified admission test for law schools can achieve fruition based on the Constitution, the
laws, and its practical implementation. Again, the LEB should only supervise the said unified admission
examination conducted by the law schools.
Existing problems of the PhilSAT

If the law schools in the Philippines ultimately decide to conduct a unified and standardized law
admission examination, as supervised by the LEB, then it must address the existing problems created by
the PhilSAT. The problems were created precisely because the admission examination was solely
conducted by the LEB, through its regulatory power. The law schools had no concrete voice in the
formulation of the PhilSAT and their academic freedom is disrespected. Thus, it created several
problems, particularly, financial burden and accessibility.

Under the PhilSAT, the LEB initially imposed a testing fee of P1,500.00 per examination, which
was subsequently lowered to P1,000.00; [56] and there are only seven (7) testing centers across the
entire country — Baguio City, Metro Manila, Legazpi City, Iloilo City, Cebu City, Davao City and Cagayan
de Oro City. [57] Also, the LEB failed to explain why it had to impose said fee for a mere written
examination. The sum collected by the LEB for the examination could amount to millions of pesos
considering that there are thousands of students taking the PhilSAT. Glaringly, the LEB did not give any
sufficient basis to justify the imposition of a P1,000.00 fee for an entrance examination.
 Further, the LEB also failed to consider the transportation and logistical expenses that would be
incurred by an examinee coming from the far-flung areas to take the examination in the limited seven (7)
testing centers. A student from the province explained the immense difficulty of taking the PhilSAT, viz.:

6. Q: What personal experience do you have with the PhilSAT exam?

A: I first took the PhilSAT exam last April 2018.

7. Q: Where did you take the exam?

A: Cebu City.

8. Q: Are you a permanent resident of Cebu?

A: No.

9. Q: Where is your permanent residence?

A: I am from Maasin City, Leyte.

10. Q: If you are from Leyte, why did you take the exam in Cebu City?
A: The LEB offers the exam in only seven (7) testing centers across the country, Cebu
being one of them.
11. Q: What effect did this limited number of available testing centers have on your
PhilSAT experience?
A: Since the exam would not be conducted in our area, I was compelled to travel from
Leyte to Cebu City. We had to travel the day after my graduation in order for me to
arrive in Cebu on time to take the exam. During the registration period, we also had
to travel to another town around five (5) hours away just to deposit the testing fee
since the bank in our locality did not accept checkbook as a mode of payment. [58]

Thus, the unified admission test in the future, spearheaded by the law schools, must impose only
reasonable fees to the examinees. It should not be a money-making venture. The fees of the
examination should only be for the exact expense in conducting the admission test; nothing more,
nothing less. There should be no additional and unnecessary financial burden imposed on the
examinees.
Likewise, the admission test should be accessible to all aspiring law students, especially those
from the distant regions. The unified admission test should be conducted in numerous and strategic
testing sites spread throughout the country. The law schools must avoid the situation where only those
privileged students living in the capital cities will have access to the said unified examination. Moreover,
considering that the examination shall now be conducted by the law schools in the Philippines, then
they may consider conducting the said test in their own school at a unified time and date with the
rest of the law schools in the country to guarantee the examination's accessibility.

It must be underscored that the study of law should not be hindered by financial and geographical
hardships; rather, it must be reasonable and accessible to the examinees. Otherwise, it would defeat the
purpose of a unified admission examination — to ensure that those intellectually capable to become law
students, regardless of social status, shall be admitted to the study of law.

The Supreme Court and

the study of law
 The ponencia states that the Court's rule-making power covers only the practice of law and
cannot be unduly widened to cover the study of law. Nonetheless, it declares that the State, though
statutes enacted by Congress and administrative regulations issued by the executive, consistently
exercise police power over legal education. Hence, admissions, being an area of legal education,
necessarily fall within the scope of the State's police power.

I dissent.
It is impossible to completely separate the interests of the Supreme Court and the law schools
and the other branches of government with respect to legal education. There are several reasons that
the study of law is affected, one way or another, by the Court's rule-making power.

First, the Court has the exclusive power to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law.
Thus, the Court prescribe specific subjects that a law school must offer before its students can be
admitted for the bar examinations. Section 5 of Rule 138 states:

Sec. 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for

admission other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being
admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have successfully completed all
the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in a
law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine Government or by the
proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.
No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be
admitted to the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the
following course in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law,
commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political
law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation, legal ethics, and clinical
legal education program.
A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the
bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a)
completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent
degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and (c)
completion of all fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law
school duly recognized by the Philippine Government. [59]
Section 5 provides several requirements for the admission to the bar. Nevertheless, these
requirements also affect the curriculum offered by law school. In effect, for a law school to successfully
field bar examinees, it must offer all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its
equivalent degree. Thus, it cannot simply offer a two (2)-year short course on law.
More importantly, Section 5 provides for the specific courses that must be completed in a law
school before a student may be allowed to take the bar examinations, to wit: civil law, commercial law,
remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation,
medical jurisprudence, taxation, legal ethics, and clinical legal education program. Pursuant to this
provision, a law school is mandated to offer these courses; otherwise, it will not be able to produce law
graduates qualified to take the bar examinations. Stated simply, Section 5 provides for the minimum
courses that a law school must offer to its law students. This is one of the direct provisions of the Rules
of Court: that the Court itself participate in the legal education of law students.
 Second, even before a student begins his study of law, the Supreme Court already provides the
requirements for his or her pre-law studies. Section 6 of Rule 138 states:

Sec. 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall

be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of
Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission
thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed
therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as
major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and
economics.
The above-quoted provision provides that any potential law student must have a four-year high
school course and a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences. If a law school admits students without these
completed courses, then it will not be able to produce bar examinees. Verily, this rule affects the
admission policy of the institutes of higher learning with respect to law students.
Third, the precursor of Republic Act No. 7662, which is DECS Order No. 27, also recognizes that
the Supreme Court contributes to the requirements for admission in law courses, to wit:
Article VIII

Admission, Residence and Other Requirements

Section 1. No applicant shall be enrolled in the law course unless he complies

with specific requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education and the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, for which purpose he must present to the registrar
the necessary credentials before the end of the enrolment period.
Lastly, even after earning a law degree, the Supreme Court continues to participate in the study
of law. Bar Matter No. 850, which was adopted by the Court on August 22, 2000, provides for the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education requirement for members of the Bar. Continuing legal education
is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their
career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance
the standards of the practice of law. [60]
Similarly, the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA), initially created by the Supreme Court on
March 12, 1996 through the issuance of Administrative Order No. 35-96, is a separate but component
unit of the Supreme Court. It is an all-important factor in the promotion of judicial education in the
Philippines. It receives full patronage and support from the Court which guarantees the participation of
judges and court personnel in its programs and activities. PHILJA was institutionalized as a training
school for justices, judges, court personnel, lawyers, and aspirants to judicial posts. [61]
Coordination and cooperation
with the various stakeholders
in legal education

The Supreme Court, either directly or indirectly, affects the legal education administered by the
law schools as institutes of higher learning. The Court's authority over legal education is primarily
observed in the bar examinations. Nevertheless, such authority or influence of the Court over legal
education should be viewed in a coordinated and cooperative manner; and not as a limitation or
restriction.
 For more than a century, the bar examinations conducted by the Court have been the centerpiece
of every law student's plight. The preparation, success and defeat of bar examinees are annual
recurrences. The low passing percentage of the bar examinations proves it as one of the most difficult
tests in the country. There are on-going initiatives to remedy this predicament and improve the legal
education.

However, it must be stressed that the bar examination is not the sole and penultimate goal of the
study of law. There is no clear evidence that grades and other evaluators of law school performance,
and even the bar examination, are particularly good predictors of competence or success as a lawyer.
[62] The legal education is a wide spectrum of discipline, ranging from the traditional subjects of political,
civil, and remedial laws, to the liberal and innovative subjects of media, sports, and competition laws. It
is not confined to litigation practice, court hearings, and drafting pleadings and other legal documents.
The study of law is a dynamic concept that seeks to analyze, comprehend and apply the effects and
interrelationships of the Constitution, laws, rules and regulations, in view of a just and humane society.

Thus, instead of restricting the study of law only to the bar examinations, the Court must
endeavor to promote its liberalization. The bar-centric mindset of law schools must be amended. It must
be emphasized that legal education should not confine law students to the syllabi for bar examinations.
Instead, law schools must encourage their students to freely take elective subjects that spark their
interests; participate in legal aid clinics to render free legal service; experience debate and moot court
competitions; and publish law journal articles for their respective schools. These liberalization of legal
education must be accomplished for the enrichment of the law students' knowledge. In order to
implement these innovative measures, various stakeholders in the entire country must be consulted and
conferred with to ensure active, wide, and effective participation.

Notably, the Court has recently issued A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC, [63] otherwise known as the
Revised Law Student Practice Rule, which liberalizes the Law Student Practice. It was issued to ensure
access to justice for the marginalized sectors, to enhance learning opportunities of law students, to instill
among them the value of legal professional social responsibility, and to prepare them for the practice of
law. Further, the completion of clinical legal education courses was made a prerequisite of the bar
examinations to produce practice-ready lawyers. Thus, the Court recognizes that, aside from the written
bar examination, the practical aspect of legal education is an essential component in the formation of
competent and able lawyers.
Again, while the Supreme Court has some authority over the legal education, this should be
channeled in cooperation and coordination with different law schools of the country and even with the
legislative and executive branch of the government, through the LEB. At best, the Court should only
provide the minimum course requirements for the purpose of the bar examinations and should not be
considered as a hindrance in the study of law. Beyond that, law schools are directed to promote the
innovative measures in legal education in furtherance of their academic freedom. Through a
comprehensive and novel approach, the goal of improving the legal education is definitely within reach.

Constitutionality of R.A. No. 7662

One of the issues raised by the parties is that R.A. No. 7662 is unconstitutional because it
infringes on the power of the Court to supervise the bar examination and legal education.
With respect to that issue, the Court must emphasize the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
The doctrine states that this Court may choose to ignore or side-step a constitutional question if there is
some other ground upon which the case can be disposed of. [64] To remain true to its democratic
moorings, judicial involvement must remain guided by a framework or deference and constitutional
avoidance. This same principle underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing
advisory opinions. Specifically as regards this Court, only constitutional issues that are narrowly framed,
sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be entertained. [65] In other words, if the determination of the
constitutionality of a particular statute can be avoided based on some other ground, then the Court will
not touch upon the issue of unconstitutionality.
Here, the powers of the LEB enumerated under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7662 are assailed because
they contradict the judicial power of the Court. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: —

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Some of the powers of the LEB under R.A. No. 7662 can be harmonized with the Constitution.
For instance, Section 7 (c) of R.A. No. 7662 states:

Section 7. Powers and Functions. — For the purpose of achieving the objectives of
this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among
others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library
and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions
of higher learning[.] (emphasis supplied)
Said provision states that the LEB has the power to set the standards of accreditation for law
schools. However, it also provides for a reasonable limitation on the exercise of such power: it should not
encroach the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning. With this, the law schools are
safeguarded that the LEB will not arbitrarily exercise its power to set the standards of accreditation
because of the reasonable limitation of academic freedom. This reasonable limitation should also be
read together with the other powers provided by R.A. No. 7662 so that the LEB will not encroach upon
the constitutional rights of law schools. Pursuant to this interpretation, majority of the powers of the LEB
listed under the law will conform to the organic law and the Court will not be required to pass upon the
constitutionality of these statutory provisions.

However, under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7662, there is a provision that is inescapably
unconstitutional. No amount of judicial interpretation can evade the inevitable conclusion that this
provision violates the Constitution. Section 7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662 states:
Section 7. Powers and Functions. — For the purpose of achieving the objectives of
this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
 (h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may
provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such
duration as the Board may deem necessary[.] (emphasis supplied)

The provision clearly covers the continuing legal education of practicing lawyers. However,
Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the Constitution states that the Supreme Court has the exclusive judicial
power to: "[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the under-privileged." Accordingly, only the Court has the power to prescribe
rules with respect to the continuing practice of lawyers.

Pursuant to this judicial power, the Court issued Bar Matter No. 850 dated August 22, 2000,
adopting the rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education for members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Continuing legal education is required of members of the IBP to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law. [66]
Here, Section 7 (h) covers the continuing legal education of practicing lawyers. Evidently, this
encroaches upon the power of the Court to promulgate rules on the practice of lawyers. The objective of
R.A. No. 7662 is only to effect reforms in the Philippine legal education, not in the legal profession. In his
Explanatory Note in B.M. No. 979-B, Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug stated that the concept of
continuing legal education encompasses not only law students but also the members of the legal
profession. The inclusion of the continuing legal education under R.A. No. 7662 implies that the LEB has
jurisdiction over the education of persons who have finished the law course and are already licensed to
practice law. In other words, this particular power, directly involves members of the legal profession,
which is outside the realm of R.A. No. 7662. Undeniably, Section 7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662 is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the Constitution.
Fate of the Legal Education Board

The ponencia states that LEB Memorandum Orders and Circular regarding the PhilSAT are
unconstitutional because these do not meet the fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. Nevertheless, it states that Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 is constitutional insofar as it
gives the LEB, an agency of the executive branch, the power to prescribe the minimum requisites for
admission to legal education.
I concur.

Although PhilSAT is declared unconstitutional for employing unreasonable means for the
admission of students to law schools, the LEB still has numerous powers and responsibilities under its
charter. As stated above, one of its vital functions is its power to accredit and set the standards of
accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications
of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities. [67] If a law school is underperforming, the
LEB may withdraw or downgrade the accreditation status of such law school, especially if it fails to
maintain the required standards. This is an important role in ensuring that law schools keep an
adequate, satisfactory, and respectable curriculum program for its law students.

Likewise, I agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that the powers and functions of the LEB
should be read in accordance with its mandate to guide law students and law schools. [68] R.A. No. 7662
should not be interpreted to include matters that are already within the exclusive jurisdiction of Court,
such as the bar examinations, law student practice, and the practice of law.
 In addition, the powers and functions of the LEB should always be interpreted in light of the
institutes of higher learning's academic freedom. Thus, the LEB should consider the academic freedom
of law schools when it issues orders, circulars, and regulations under its power of supervision. The
Constitution bestows institutes of higher learning academic freedom, which is further compromised of
several freedoms. These freedoms may only be subjected to reasonable limitations. Anything beyond
reasonable, or arbitrary, shall be considered an infringement of such freedoms.
The importance of LEB's role in improving the legal education in our country cannot be
overemphasized. It can bridge the gap between the different law schools from the capital cities to the far-
flung areas in the provinces. It can conduct studies and give recommendations on how to improve the
state of legal education. It can also promote the innovative approaches in the holistic study of law. This
can be achieved if the LEB is open and willing to coordinate, through consultations and meetings, with
the various stakeholders, law schools, government agencies, and the Supreme Court.
However, the LEB should be strictly warned that it should not gravely abuse its discretion.
Otherwise, the Court will not think twice in striking down any arbitrary exercise of power, including those
that violate the fundamental rights of institutions of higher learning under their academic freedom.

Conclusion
I sincerely believe that it is now high time to develop, innovate, modernize, and improve the legal
education system in our country. The petitions at bench are valuable opportunities for the esteemed
members of the Court to discuss and examine the current and future state of legal education in the
country. The different stakeholders must assess and recommend innovations and improvements in the
country's state of legal education in view of the changes brought about by the developments in law, the
needs of the people, and technological innovations. Verily, the stakeholders should be concerned in
remodeling legal education because it is an indisputable fact that legal education is the very foundation
upon which the exercise of the law profession rests.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest, and
that a lawyer owes substantial duties, not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to
the courts, and to the public, and takes part in the administration of justice, one of the most important
functions of the State, as an officer of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain, not only a
high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. [69]

This goal of remodeling legal education will be realized through a multi-sectoral approach of
cooperation, initiative, and the promotion of free-thinking. The outdated, obsolete, and unproductive
aspects in legal education that cause disadvantageous effects to the study of law should definitely be set
aside. It must be underscored that the purpose of the study of law is not only to successfully hurdle the
bar examinations, but also to produce competent and noble lawyers who shall represent and stand up
for justice, truth, and equity for the benefit and welfare of the Filipino people.

I vote to PARTLY GRANT the consolidated petitions. The PhilSAT should be SET ASIDE. It must
be the law schools of the Philippines, through the Philippine Association of Law Schools, under the
supervision of the Legal Education Board, which should formulate the unified and standardized law
admission examination, carrying only reasonable fees and accessible to all aspiring law students.

A.B. REYES, JR., J., concurring:

The question in the instant case is simple — may the State, under the guise of improving
the quality of legal education forbid its own citizens from pursuing a course in law?
 In the instant consolidated Petitions for Prohibition, and Certiorari and Prohibition, under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, the petitioners seek to declare as unconstitutional RA No. 7662, or the Legal
Education Reform Act of 1993. They principally target Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No. 7,
Series of 2016 ("LEBMO NO. 7"), which established the Philippine Law School Admission Test
("PhilSAT"), and the subsequent Legal Education Board Memorandum Orders and Circulars issued in
relation thereto, particularly Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No. 11, Series of 2017
("LEBMO No. 11") which supplies transitional provisions for LEBMO No. 7 and Legal Education Board
Memorandum Circular No. 18 ("LEBMC No. 18"), which enumerates the PhilSAT eligibility requirements
for freshmen law students for academic year 2018-2019. [1]

The ponencia focused its scrutiny on LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016, LEBMO No. 11, Series of
2017, and LEBMC No. 18, which were all declared to be unconstitutional. This examination was based
on the assumption that the objection against the PhilSAT lies at the core of all the Petitions. [2]
I agree with the ponencia in striking as unconstitutional LEB Mo. No. 7, and all its adjunct
orders. I further concede that they must be struck down on the basis of police power, and for being
violative of the institutions' and students' academic freedom. In addition, I wish to highlight certain
important matters that were not mentioned in the ponencia.
The Importance of Education in the
Philippine Setting

Education is a continuing concern that is impressed with public interest. The importance of
education in our country is apparent from the numerous Constitutional provisions highlighting the
obligation of the State to nurture and protect our educational systems, viz.:

"ARTICLE II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES

Article II, Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology,
arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress,
and promote total human liberation and development.

ARTICLE XIV. EDUCATION

Article XIV, Section 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all.

Article XIV, Section 2. The State shall:

1. Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of
education relevant to the needs of the people and society;
2. Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary and
high school levels. Without limiting the natural rights of parents to rear their children,
elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age;

3. Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs,

subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both
public and private schools, especially to the underprivileged;
4. Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self-
learning, independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those that respond to
community needs; and
 5. Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics,
vocational efficiency, and other skills.
Article XIV, Section 4. The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private
institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and
regulation of all educational institutions."

The common thread that runs through these Constitutional provisions is the State's priority
towards education. This stems from the reality that "education and total human development [are] the
gateway not only to intellectual and moral development but also to economic advancement and the
cultivation of the yearning for freedom and justice." [3] It leads to the promotion of "total human liberation
and development." [4]
In view of the importance of education, the State is bound to protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education, and to undertake steps to make it accessible and affordable for all. [5]

Added to this, all systems of education must be relevant to the needs of the people and the society. [6]

Pursuant thereto, on December 23, 1999, Congress passed Republic Act No. 7662 or the Legal
Education Reform Act of 1993. The law was created to fulfill the State's policy to uplift the standards of
legal education to prepare law students for advocacy, counseling, problem-solving, and decision-making;
to infuse in them the ethics of the legal profession and impress on them the importance and dignity of
the legal profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench. [7] To achieve these ends, the
lawmakers created a Legal Education Board ("LEB"), to pursue the following objectives, to wit:

(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent
with the provisions of this Act;

(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and
functions as herein enumerated;

(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among
others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library
and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning;

(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum

qualifications and compensation of faculty members;
(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements
for admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses
of study as may be prescribed by the law schools and colleges under the different levels
of accreditation status;
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a
law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or
legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board
may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board
shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of
such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar.
 (h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may
provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such
duration as the Board may deem necessary; and

(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations
necessary for the attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)

Latching on to its power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission, on December 29,
2016, the LEB released LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016, which provides for the implementation of a
nationwide uniform law school admission test — the PhilSAT. It is an aptitude exam that is designed to
"measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law," through a series of
questions that gauge his/her proficiencies in communications, language, critical thinking, and verbal and
quantitative reasoning." [8]

Under LEBMO No. 7, the PhilSAT shall be administered once a year on or before April 16 in
Metro Manila, Baguio City, Legazpi City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City, and Cagayan de Oro City. A
prospective test taker must pay a testing fee of Php1,500.00 (later reduced to Php1,000). [9]
Basically, the PhilSAT intends to predict the capacity of the test taker to survive in a challenging
legal education program. It is surmised that if the examinee obtains a grade of 55 and above, then
he/she can surely endure the rigors of law school.

In addition, it is assumed that those who graduated with honors and have been granted a
professional civil service eligibility possess the basic competencies to thrive in law school. As such, they
are exempt from the requirement of taking the PhilSAT, provided that they enroll in a law school within
two years from their college graduation, and obtain a Certificate of Exemption from the LEB.

On the part of the law schools, they are strictly enjoined from admitting an applicant who failed to
obtain the minimum required score, or an honor graduate who neglected to submit the Certificate of
Exemption. Any law school who violates this rule shall be subjected to administrative sanctions, ranging
from the termination or phasing-out of its law program; provisional cancellation of its government
recognition and placing of its law program under Permit Status, and/or paying a fine of not less than
Php10,000.00. [10]

Meanwhile, the LEB issued LEBMO No. 11, which provided for transitional provisions to LEBMO
No. 7, allowing conditional admission and enrollment to those who failed to take the PhilSAT last April
16, 2017. The test takers' conditional enrollment was premised on an undertaking that they will take the
next scheduled PhilSAT, and obtain the required minimum score, otherwise, their conditional admission
shall be revoked. In addition, they must file a notarized application with the Chairman of the LEB, and
pay an application fee of Php300.00.

Thereafter, on June 8, 2018, LEB Chairperson Aquende issued LEBMC No. 18, putting an end to
the conditional admission of students who failed to present a Certificate of Eligibility.

For sure, the LEB was properly vested with the power to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission. However, this right is not unbridled, and is limited by the Constitutional admonition that said
right must be exercised in a reasonable manner. [11] This means that the extent of State supervision and
regulation may not transgress the cherished freedoms granted under the Constitution.

The PhilSAT is Violative of the Law

Schools' Academic Freedom
 Inasmuch as the State possesses the right to supervise and regulate educational institutions, the
Constitution craftily ensures that the exercise thereof will not spiral into tyranny. To avoid any form of
despotism in the regulation of institutions, the Constitution adds a layer of protection in favor of the
academic institutions by ensuring that notwithstanding the possibility of state interference in their affairs,
"[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." [12] Law schools, as
institutions of higher education, are the recipients of this boon. [13]
This institutional autonomy granted unto universities has been in existence as early as the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions. [14] Despite being strongly entrenched in our fundamental law, surprisingly, the
body of jurisprudence on the matter of academic freedom is scarce. Noted Constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, SJ theorizes that the scarcity stems from either a positive aspect — where occasions for
litigation and controversy surrounding the matter are rare due to the unhampered freedom enjoyed by
the academic world, or, in a negative aspect — due to a general ignorance or naivety regarding its
meaning, purpose, and utility. [15] The instant case is one of the rare occasions where the issue of
academic freedom comes to fore, and thus, presents an opportunity for the Court to further elucidate its
meaning.

Interestingly, academic freedom is an amorphous concept that eludes exact definition. The
framers of the Constitution intended it to remain as expansive and dynamic, in a desire to give the courts
a wide latitude to develop its meaning further, viz.:
In anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are
included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic
freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in
education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of
academic freedom."

More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we
speak of the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher
learning,' do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?"
Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes . . . ." Gascon finished off the broken
thought, — "the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes." [16]

In Philippine jurisprudence, one of the earliest definitions of this term emerged from the case of
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology where the Court held that
"the internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academic staff should have de
facto control of the following functions: (i) admission and examination of students; (ii) the curricula for
courses of study; (iii) the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (iv) the allocation of
income among the different categories of expenditure." [17]
In the cases that followed, the parameters of academic freedom were simplified to pertain to a
general liberty to decide (i) who may teach; (ii) who may be taught; (iii) how lessons shall be taught; and
(iv) who may be admitted to study. [18] Certainly, "[i]t is the business of a university to provide that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation; x x x an atmosphere in
which there prevail the 'four essential freedoms' of a university." [19]

Accordingly, insofar as the academic institution is concerned, it possesses the general right to
determine not only the subject matter, or manner of teaching, but likewise has a free reign to select its
own students. This liberty was described in Garcia [20] as "a wide sphere of autonomy." [21] Thus, the
school has the right to decide its admission criteria for itself, in accordance with "its aims and objectives,
and how best to attain them — free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint." [22] Moreover, the Court nips in the bud any attempts
to curtail or limit this freedom, warning that "[t]his constitutional provision [academic freedom] is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purposes and
nullify its intent." [23]

Similarly, in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, [24] the Court went further by
characterizing the right of the schools to choose their own students as "inherent," explaining that,
"educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to
establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or
pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall be
taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study." [25]
Indeed, institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their own
policies — academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. This includes the
creation of their own distinct policies, standards or criteria in the selection of their students, in
accordance with their vision-mission and objectives. Remarkably, this prerogative is essential to their
very functioning and identity. For sure, the schools' body politic serves as a representation of their
standards, an embodiment of their vision, and a reflection of their ideals.

Equally important, in University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, [26] the Court stressed
that concomitant to the right of the schools to pursue their academic freedom, are the duties to ensure
that this freedom is not jeopardized, [27] and to staunchly avert any possible encroachments thereto.
They must zealously guard their liberty against the State. Correlatively, on the part of the State, it should
only interfere in instances where the public welfare necessitates its intrusion.

This idea was likewise evinced by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
MR. GASCON:

When we speak of state regulation and supervision, that does not mean dictation,
because we have already defined what education is. Hence, in the pursuit of
knowledge in schools we should provide the educational institution as much
academic freedom it needs. When we speak of regulation, we speak of guidelines
and others. We do not believe that the State has any right to impose its ideas on the
educational institution because that would already be a violation of their
constitutional rights.
There is no conflict between our perspectives. When we speak of regulations, we
speak of providing guidelines and cooperation in as far as defining curricular et
cetera, but that does not give any mandate to the State to impose its ideas on the
educational institution. That is what academic freedom is all about. [28]
In fact, even the legislative and executive branches of government protect this liberty. Particularly,
under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, as amended, the State affirms the objective of establishing and
maintaining a complete, adequate and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national
development. [29] Further, Section 13 (2) of B.P. Blg. 232 recognizes that to achieve this goal, the
determination of admission standards should be left to the schools, and not to the State, viz.:
 Sec. 13. Rights of Schools. — In addition to their rights provided for by law, school
shall enjoy the following:
1. The right of their governing boards or lawful authorities to provide for the proper
governance of the school and to adopt and enforce administrative or management
systems.

2. The right for institutions of higher learning to determine on academic grounds who
shall be admitted to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of the study
and research. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, this is not to relegate the State to being an impotent commander or a mere passive
guardian. The State may set minimum admission requirements, provided that these are reasonable and
equitable in their application, both for the school and the applicant. [30] Said standards must never
transgress upon Constitutional rights.
Judged against these parameters, it becomes all too apparent that LEBMO No. 7, insofar as it
imposes the PhilSAT, is a constricting regulation that binds the hands of the schools from choosing who
to admit in their law program. The LEB thrusts upon the law schools a pre-selected roster of applicants,
and effectively deprives them of the right to select their own students on the basis of factors and criteria
of their own choosing. Consequently, the law schools are left with no choice but to elect from this limited
pool. Worse, they are forbidden from admitting those who failed to comply with the LEB's requirements,
under pain of administrative sanctions.

Undoubtedly, the imposition of the PhilSAT is an oppressive and arbitrary measure. The LEB is
bereft of power to substitute its own judgment for that of the universities'. Rather, the universities should
be free to consider other criteria (aside from the PhilSAT) in determining their prospective students'
aptitude and ability to survive in law school. In fact, during the Oral Arguments held on March 5, 2019,
amicus curiae Dean Sedfrey Candelaria revealed that passing the law entrance exam is not a guarantee
that the student will survive through law school:

JUSTICE A. REYES:
All right. But then you would always state that it is not a guarantee that a student will
pass law school because he passed the law entrance exam?
DEAN CANDELARIA:

I agree, Your Honor, in fact in my conversations with Father Bernas who has a longer
stay with me in the law school, I think he has even said that any students catch up,
let [sic] say, people who may have studied in other regions, they easily catch up
once they go to Manila, at least in the Ateneo when he was Dean and I've observed
this also during my tenure that there are people who have caught up with the rest
come second year. . ." [31]

Concededly, although the PhilSAT measures a person's aptitude or ability to cope with the rigors
of law school, this is but a one-sided assessment. It fails to consider the person's diligence, drive or zeal
— which are equally important in successfully obtaining a degree in law. Surely, one who may not be as
proficient in language or reasoning, but is filled with a passion and a desire to learn, may perform as well
as another who is innately intelligent, but who is apathetic and indifferent. There are certainly other
extraneous factors, traits or characteristics that make a good student, which the law school must be
allowed to consider, should it so desire.
The PhilSAT is Violative of the
Students' Academic Freedom and
Right to Acquire Knowledge

Article XIV, Section 5 (3) of the 1987 Constitution declares that "[e]very citizen has a right to
select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements."
Certainly, the right to pursue a course of higher learning is supported, no less by the State. It
must endeavor to ensure a becoming respect for every citizen's right to select his/her course of study. To
expand one's knowledge, to obtain a degree, or to advance one's professional growth are liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution. Although these rights are not absolute, they may only be curbed by
standards that are "fair, reasonable, and equitable." [32]

Although the Constitution fails to specifically mention that academic freedom is equally enjoyed
by students, this lacuna was supplied by the Court in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong,
[33] where for the first time, the Court affirmed that academic freedom is equally enjoyed by the students.
[34]

Interestingly, the modern concept of academic freedom as it applies to students has its immediate
origin from a nineteenth century German term known as "lernfreiheit." [35] This term meant that students
were "'free to roam from place to place, sampling academic wares,' 'free to determine the choice and
sequence of course,' 'responsible to no one for regular attendance,' and 'exempted from all tests save
the final examinations.'" [36] In a sense, it is an untrammeled freedom to satiate one's thirst for
knowledge. Albeit a radical sense of freedom, in our jurisdiction, this so-called thirst may be curbed by
reasonable standards.
Remarkably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution supported the idea of academic freedom as a
"spirit of free inquiry," [37] which includes the pursuit of truth and advocacy. [38] Moreover, they believed
that academic freedom is essential to create an environment that will "encourage creative and critical
thinking." [39] In turn, this free flow of ideas will promote the full and wholistic development of the
students. Also, more than the promotion of the students' welfare, the framers even went further by saying
that this freedom of thought may even lead to the country's improvement — "so far as this [academic
freedom] is allowed full play in the academic institutions or in the institutions of higher learning, I think we
will end up the better as people." [40]
Consequently, the framers stressed the need to protect this cherished freedom. They
emphasized that the right to learn and discover, "should be protected as long as the activities fall within
the canons of scholarship, and subjected as it were to the forces of the market place of ideas." [41] They
believed that if the State encourages critical and creative thinking, it will naturally protect it." [42]
In addition, the law affirms the right of students to select their own course of study. This is evident
from Section 9 (2) of B.P. Blg. 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982, as amended:
SEC. 9. Rights of Students in School. — In addition to other rights, and subject to
the limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall
enjoy the following rights:

1. The right to receive, primarily through competent instruction, relevant qualify

education in line with national goals and conducive to their full development as person
with human dignity.
 2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and
to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations. [43] (Emphasis supplied)

More so, as adverted to by the ponencia, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that
"[e]veryone has a right to education. Technical and professional education shall be made generally
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit." [44]

Significantly, the Constitution, the law, and international conventions are one in affirming the
students' right to apply to a school of their own choosing, and correspondingly, select their own course of
study. Although said right of the students is subject to their compliance with the criteria dictated by the
school, it must be stressed however that the student and the school are free to negotiate between
themselves, without the interference of the State. This scenario should be likened to a free marketplace
where the school showcases its product — its curricula, professors, environment, while a student, in
turn, flaunts his/her own capabilities, skills, and talents. The parties should be left to freely decide for
themselves whether they are a fit for each other. The State should not meddle, unless absolutely
necessary for the public's safety and welfare. Should it decide to intervene, its power is in no way
almighty, but must be circumscribed within the bounds of reasonableness.
The Right to Study law is an Adjunct
of One's Fundamental Right to
Acquire Knowledge. In the Same
Vein, the Manner Through Which
the Law School Decides to Teach the
Law is an Exercise of its Freedom of
Expression

This concept was broached during the deliberations for the 1973 Constitution. Delegate Vicente
G. Sinco intimated that the freedom of the teacher and of the student may be anchored on the basic
Constitutional guarantees of freedom, in addition to the specific guarantee of academic freedom: [45]
by expressly guaranteeing academic freedom the new provision implicitly distinguishes
academic freedom from a citizen's political right of free expression. Litigation on this new
freedom, therefore will force the courts to search for standards of adjudication, standards
not necessarily identical with those that have already been established for the general
freedom of expression. Academic freedom is freedom not just in the context of a
political freedom but also in the context of a narrower academic community. The
implication of this distinction must be explored. The search for standards for academic
freedom must take into consideration not just the general theory of freedom of expression
but also the functions of a university. [46]

More so, beyond the Philippine laws and Constitution, the right to knowledge is a universal
human right, protected no less by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICPR").

Specifically, Article 19 of the ICPR, affirms that:

Article 19

1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
 regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.

3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but
these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (order public), or of public
health or morals." [47]
Indeed, freedom of expression, which includes the right to receive information and ideas of all
kinds, is a civil and political right. It is an inalienable right that stems from a person's inherent dignity. It is
likewise the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. [48] As such, this essential guarantee
may only be restricted insofar as it violates the rights and reputation of others, or if absolutely necessary
to protect national security and public order. [49]

Moreover, knowledge cannot be passed without a medium. Thus, the right of the law school to
teach, the information it shares, and its manner of teaching are representations of its freedom of
expression. The State should only step in, should it find that "the means or methods of instruction are
clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption." [50]

Furthermore, I wish to underscore that a distinction exists between the right to study law and the
privilege to practice it. Although these two activities may be related, they are not one and the same. The
study of law does not ipso facto lead to the practice thereof. This was a point that I stressed during the
Oral Arguments on March 5, 2019:

"JUSTICE A. REYES: But you are not in the pursuit of the study of law not in the pursuit
of being a lawyer. Is there a need for an entrance exam if he just wants to study the law
itself as a person?
xxx xxx xxx

He doesn't want to become a lawyer, he just wants to be a student of the law. He has a lot
of time on his hands, he has all the money. He just wants to study law, is there anything
wrong with that?" [51]
Lest it be forgotten, the law is not only a profession, but it is first and foremost, a field of study. It
is an interesting and practical science, that proves useful for everyday life, and for one's personal growth
and career. For instance, the Law on Obligations and Contracts is practical for one engaged in business;
Constitutional Law piques the interest of one desirous to learn about the workings of the government and
the citizen's fundamental rights; and Criminal Law, inflames one curious about society's penal laws and
systems. For others, obtaining a Bachelor's Degree or a Juris Doctor in Law serves as a gateway to
promotion. These are but a few examples of a myriad of realities pertaining to the law's importance as an
academic field.
Certainly, the State has no legitimate interest in preventing such individuals who want to learn
about the law, who have free time on their hands, and who possess resources to fund a legal education.
Neither does it have the right to prevent a law school that is willing and capable of teaching such
persons from admitting them in their program. [52]
 This concern was likewise echoed by the eminent magistrate, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, when he
said:
Preventing anyone from going to law school who can afford to go to school pay for
his own tuition fees, that's unreasonable. Even if he scores only one percent (1%), if the
school is willing to accept him, he is willing to pay, you cannot stop him. [53]

Also, as eloquently articulated by Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen,

Considering, Chair, that this affects a freedom and a primordial freedom at that,
freedom of expression, academic freedom, the way we teach our, as Justice Andy Reyes
pointed out, the way we teach law to our citizens and therefore, to me, the level of scrutiny
should not be cursory. The level of scrutiny must be deep and I would think it would apply
strict scrutiny in this regard. Therefore, if there was no study that supported it, then
perhaps, it may be stricken down as unreasonable, and therefore, grave abuse of
discretion. x x x [54]

It is therefore apparent that an individual's right to knowledge and the manner by which such
knowledge is pursued, are entitled to a high degree of protection by the State and its agencies. Our
State is in no way autocratic. It is not repressive, and should not prevent its citizens from gaining
knowledge that will promote their personal growth. [55] These are simple realities that cannot be ignored.
To deprive a person of his right to knowledge, which is an adjunct of one's freedom of expression, may
not be done under flimsy and vague pretexts. This Constitutional protection to freedom of expression
enjoys an exalted place in the spectrum of rights, and is certainly entitled to the highest level of scrutiny.
A Legitimate Objective Will not in
Itself Justify State Intrusion if the
Means Employed Pursuant Thereto
are Unreasonable and Oppressive
There is no doubt that the ultimate goal of attaining quality legal education is a legitimate and
lofty objective. For sure, no country would negligently allow degenerate institutions that fail to properly
educate students to persist to the detriment of the community. However, the issue is not as simple. It
must be noted that the test for a valid exercise of police power is two-pronged. The presence of a
legitimate State objective must be balanced alongside a reasonable means for achieving such goal. One
cannot exist without the other.

Remarkably, in Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, [56] the Court struck down the regulation issued by
the Professional Regulatory Commission which prohibited those taking the accountancy licensure
examinations from attending review classes, conferences and receiving hand-outs, review materials, or
tips three days immediately preceding the examination day. The Court stressed that although the
measure was backed by a noble objective, this will not serve as a justification to violate constitutional
freedoms, to wit:
Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable
purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations."
However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its
face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend
any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material,
or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any
 reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions." [57] (Emphasis in the original)
Indeed, the level of supervision and regulation granted unto the State must be reasonable. This
"reasonableness" in no way grants a warrant for the State to exercise oppressive control over the
schools. In the case of the PhilSAT, in addition to being arbitrary and oppressive, the LEB likewise failed
to establish that the means employed will serve its purpose of improving the quality of legal education.
In fact, during the oral arguments, Chairperson Aquende admitted that the LEB issuances
imposing the PhilSAT were bereft of statistical basis. [58] This presents an even greater challenge
against the PhilSAT. It appears that the LEB merely operates on the hunch that the PhilSAT will improve
the quality of legal education. Although I agree with the point made by Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa
that the schools (or the LEB) are not required to conduct statistical research regarding the effectiveness
of the PhilSAT. This is only to underscore the absence of any factual basis proving the LEB's contention.

Worse, the PhilSAT renders nugatory the Constitutional provision mandating that education
should be made accessible to all by limiting a legal degree to an elite few. Students who desire to obtain
a degree in law are immediately barred from this pursuit, simply on their purported inanity, as determined
by the PhilSAT. In effect, the State punishes the students instead of encouraging them to learn, thereby
making the law a restrictive subject that is only available to an exclusive few who possess the required
aptitude and wealth.
All told, this case is riddled with paradoxes. The LEB, in its desire to achieve quality legal
education, bullheadedly pursued such end and trampled upon the right to accessible education. It must
be stressed that quality education may not be accomplished by excluding a segment of the population
from learning. Access to education should never be sacrificed to achieve this end. Rather, these two
goals should go hand-in-hand. Barring the citizens from pursuing further studies and learning more
about the law, lead to stripping them of their fundamental right to knowledge. There is nothing more
stifling to our democracy than repressing our own citizens' pursuit for personal growth. For sure, there
are other Constitutionally permissible ways of achieving this end.
As a final note, the law is personified by Lady Justice, whose eyes are covered with a blindfold as
an assurance that she will always dispense justice objectively to her suitors, regardless of their wealth
and power; her scales of justice are perfectly balanced, for she delicately weighs all circumstances
before her; her sword is scathing, proving that her justice is swift and firm — this is the symbol of law
and justice. Ironically, however, with the PhilSAT, entry to the study of law (a field that will train one to
imbibe justice and fairness) is far from objective and just. In this oppressive scenario, Lady Justice's
eyes are opened wide as she peremptorily judges prospective students, barring the inane from learning
the law; her scales are tilted in favor of an elite few; and her sword is sharp and piercing against those
who failed to reach her criteria. This is not the law, and it should never be. Thus, I vote to declare as
unconstitutional LEBMO No. 7, and all its adjunct orders.
CAGUIOA, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia. I write this opinion only to further expand on the points raised therein,
with emphasis on the primordial issue of academic freedom.

The Scope of the Court's Review

The ponencia declares as constitutional the power of the Legal Education Board (LEB) to set the
standards of accreditation for law schools, minimum qualifications of law school faculty members, and
the minimum requirements for admission to legal education, granted under Section 7 (c) and 7 (e) of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7662. [1]
In turn, the ponencia declares as unconstitutional for encroaching upon the Court's rule-making
powers the powers of the LEB to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar
examinations, [2] and to adopt a system of continuing legal education for lawyers. [3] The ponencia also
declares as unconstitutional for being ultra vires a number of resolutions, memoranda, and circulars
issued by the LEB for violating the law schools' academic freedom.

I agree with the scope and extent of the Court's disposition in the instant case, as indeed, the
Court is not limited only to the issue of the requirement of Philippine Law School Admission Test
(PhiLSAT). Apart from the reasons already stated in the ponencia, I note that the petitioners, particularly
those in G.R. No. 230642, questioned the entire law, not just the provision empowering the LEB to
impose standards for admission into law schools. Moreover, the substantive issues in this case had been
expanded in the Advisory for the oral arguments, to cover the following:

3. Whether or not R.A. No. 7662 violates the academic freedom of law schools,
specifically:

a. Section 7(c) which empowers the LEB to set the standards of

accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size of
enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and
other facilities[;]

b. Section 7(e) which empowers the LEB to prescribe minimum

standards for law admission;

c. Section 7(e) which empowers the LEB to prescribe minimum

qualifications and compensation of faculty members[;]

d. Section 7(f) which empowers the LEB to prescribe the basic

curricula for the course of study; and

4. Whether or not R.A. No. 7662 is a valid police power measure. [4]
Clearly, the issues now before the Court go beyond the PhiLSAT. As there are other pressing
concerns about the operations of the LEB — vis-à-vis academic freedom, the ponencia was correct in
looking into the LEB's issuances and rulings beyond those covering the PhiLSAT. Stated otherwise, the
Court is called upon to look at the entirety of R.A. 7662, as well as the issuances of the LEB, and to test
their validity on the basis of the primordial issue of whether they violate the academic freedom of law
schools: an exercise the Court is actually called upon to do given that there are no factual issues
involved.

While it is true that, on the surface, the issue on the validity of the PhiLSAT is the centerpiece of
the instant petitions, a deeper understanding of the issues raised herein, as well as the discussions that
arose from the oral arguments, readily reveals that at the heart of the instant controversy is the
constitutionality of the LEB's powers under R.A. 7662 and the reasonableness of the exercise of such
powers, as measured through the yardstick of academic freedom.
It must not be lost on the Court that the exercise by the LEB of its powers under the aforesaid
law, including its exercise of control over the law schools' operations, the qualifications of the deans and
professors, and especially the curriculum, are even more intrusive and invasive than the PhiLSAT, which
only deals with admission to law school. Therefore, it would be a wasted opportunity for the Court to
adopt a short-sighted approach and shirk away from delving into the constitutionality of the other powers
and acts of the LEB, especially considering that, as extensively shown herein, the LEB's exercise of
these powers is punctuated by blatant violations of academic freedom. The Court's ruling in Pimentel Jr.
v. Hon. Aguirre [5] teaches:
x x x By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even
without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty. x x x
xxx xxx xxx

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme
is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the
laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility
of the courts. [6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

I submit that the Court not only has the opportunity but, in fact, the duty to settle the disputes
given the serious allegations of infringement of the Constitution. The Court should thus not foster
lingering or recurring litigation as this case already presents the opportune time to rule on the
constitutionality of the LEB's statutory powers and how the LEB exercises the same. Hence, I maintain
that the Court's disposition of the instant case should not be unduly restricted to only the question of the
PhiLSAT's constitutionality.

For ease of reference, quoted below are the functions and powers of the LEB under R.A. 7662:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. — For the purpose of achieving the objectives
of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:

a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner

consistent with the provisions of this Act[;]
b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and
functions as herein enumerated;
c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account,
among others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the
library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions
of higher learning;

d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum

qualifications and compensation of faculty members;

f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the
requirements for admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such
other courses of study as may be prescribed by the law schools and colleges under the
different levels of accreditation status;

g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar

which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or
firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the
Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the
 Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the
specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of
the Bar;

h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board
may provide for the mandatory attendance of practising lawyers in such courses and for
such duration as the Board may deem necessary; and
i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations
necessary for the attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.
Much like the ponencia, I have undertaken the same exercise of evaluating, through the lens of
academic freedom, the powers of the LEB and how the same are and have been exercised. As a
result, I have identified several other LEB issuances beyond those identified by the ponencia which are
arbitrary and unreasonable, and thus null and void.
A. Issues on Academic Freedom

The guarantee of academic freedom is enshrined in Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution,
which states that: "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." This
institutional academic freedom includes "the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when
the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint." [7] The essential freedoms subsumed in the term
"academic freedom" are: 1) who may teach; 2) what may be taught; 3) how it shall be taught; and 4) who
may be admitted to study. [8]
Nevertheless, the Constitution also recognizes the State's power to regulate educational
institutions. Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that: "[t]he State recognizes the
complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise
reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions." As gleaned from the quoted
provision, the State's power to regulate is subject to the requirement of reasonableness.

The limitation on the State's power to regulate was introduced in the 1987 Constitution. Under the
1973 Constitution, it only states that "[a]ll educational institutions shall be under the supervision of, and
subject to regulation by, the State." [9] The framers of the current Constitution saw the need to add the
word "reasonable" before the phrase "supervision and regulation" in order to qualify the State's power
over educational institutions. This is extant from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on
August 29, 1986:

MR. GUINGONA. x x x
xxx xxx xxx

When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to the external

governance of educational institutions, particularly private educational institutions
as distinguished from the internal governance by their respective boards of
directors or trustees and their administrative officials. Even without a provision on
external governance, the State would still have the inherent right to regulate educational
institutions through the exercise of its police power. We have thought it advisable to
restate the supervisory and regulatory functions of the State provided in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions with the addition of the word "reasonable." We found it
necessary to add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of our Supreme
Court in a decision in the case of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs.
The Secretary of Education and the Board of Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court
said, and I quote:

It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the
Constitution provides for control of education by the State.

The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power
to regulate means power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention to prove that State control of private education
was intended by organic law.

The addition, therefore, of the word "reasonable" is meant to underscore the

sense of the committee, that when the Constitution speaks of State supervision and
regulation, it does not in any way mean control. We refer only to the power of the
State to provide regulations and to see to it that these regulations are duly followed
and implemented. It does not include the right to manage, dictate, overrule and
prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the right to dominate.

xxx xxx xxx

Delegate Clemente, chairman of the 1973 Constitutional Convention's Committee

on Education, has this to say about supervision and regulation, and I quote:
While we are agreed that we need some kind of supervision and
regulation by the State, there seems to be a prevailing notion among some
sectors in education that there is too much interference of the State in the
management of private education. If that is true, we need some kind of re-
examination of this function of the State to supervise and regulate
education because we are all agreed that there must be some kind of
diversity, as well as flexibility, in the management of private education.
(Minutes of the November 27, 1971 meeting of the Committee on Education
of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, pages 10 and 11.) [10] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Further, the Constitutional Commission deliberations on September 9, 1986 also discuss:

MR. MAAMBONG. What I am trying to say is that we have bogged down in this
discussion because we do not see how we can reconcile a concept of state regulation and
supervision with the concept of academic freedom.
MR. GASCON. When we speak of state regulation and supervision, that does
not mean dictation, because we have already defined what education is. Hence, in the
pursuit of knowledge in schools we should provide the educational institution as much
academic freedom as it needs. When we speak of regulation, we speak of guidelines
and others. We do not believe that the State has any right to impose its ideas on the
educational institution because that would already be a violation of their
constitutional rights.

There is no conflict between our perspectives. When we speak of

regulations, we speak of providing guidelines and cooperation in as far as defining
curricula, et cetera, but that does not give any mandate to the State to impose its
 ideas on the educational institution. That is what academic freedom is all about. [11]

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In sum, "reasonable supervision and regulation" by the State over educational institutions
does not include the power to control, manage, dictate, overrule, prohibit, and dominate.
As applied to the instant case, in order to determine whether the LEB's functions violate the
academic freedom of law schools, it must be ascertained whether the LEB's discharge of its functions is
reasonable.

However, a review of the issuances of the LEB (i.e., memorandum orders, memorandum circulars
and resolutions), of which this Court can take judicial notice, [12] and in which there are no factual
questions, reveals that the LEB has gone beyond its powers of reasonable supervision and regulation of
the law schools. Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria (Dean Candelaria), as amicus curiae for this case,
expressed a similar view in his Amicus Brief: "[i]t is my considered view that a number of LEB issuances
may have overstepped the limits of its jurisdiction, powers and functions. The problem areas have been
on the power to prescribe minimum standards for (a) law admission; (b) qualification and compensation
of faculty members; and, (c) basic curriculum." [13]

I accordingly discuss these LEB issuances in relation to the essential freedoms inherent in
academic freedom:

i. Who may teach

As already explained, the Constitution protects the right of institutions of higher learning to
academic freedom, [14] the first aspect of which is the right to determine "who may teach" [15] and to fix
"the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff." [16] This aspect protects an institution's right to
select and to assemble a roster of faculty members that best suits its academic aims, objectives and
standards, subject only to minimal state interference when some overwhelming public interest calls for
the exercise of reasonable supervision and never repressive or dictatorial control. [17] The power to
select educators is not some esoteric concept, but involves an institution's freedom to: determine the
eligibility of faculty members and other academic staff; categorize their positions and ranks; evaluate
their performance; establish quality and retention standards; determine work load and work hours;
determine, subject to applicable labor laws, the appropriate compensation and benefits to be given; and
choose the facilities that will be made available for their use.

R.A. 7662 purportedly empowers the LEB to prescribe minimum qualifications and compensation
of faculty members, to wit:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. — For the purpose of achieving the objectives
of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account,
among others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the
library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions
of higher learning;
xxx xxx xxx

e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum

qualifications and compensation of faculty members[.] (Underscoring supplied)
 In the exercise of this power, however, the LEB has grossly violated the academic freedom of law
schools by going beyond reasonable supervision and regulation in their issuances. To illustrate:

First. In the guise of accreditation, the LEB has gravely abused its minimal supervisorial authority
by requiring as part of an institution's application for a permit [18] to operate: a) "a copy of the roster of its
administrative officials, including the members of the Board of Trustees or Directors," [19] b) "a roster of
its faculty members for the proposed law school, x x x [including] the academic credentials and personal
data sheets of the dean and of the faculty members," [20] c) "the present library holdings for law as well
as the name and qualifications of the law librarian" [21] and, quite ridiculously, d) "pictures of [, among
others, the] dean's office, and faculty lounge of the law school." [22] Under LEB Memorandum Order No.
1, Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-2011), the application for a permit to operate may be denied upon
evaluation and ocular inspection, [23] if the LEB finds that the law program is "substandard in the quality
of its operation[,] x x x when surrounding circumstances make it very difficult for it to form a suitable
faculty or for any valid and weighty reasons, the proposed law school could not possibly deliver quality
legal education." [24]

The foregoing grounds for denial of an application to operate under LEBMO No. 1-2011 are not
only vague and arbitrary but worse, blatantly violative of an institution's academic freedom. By insisting
that it can review 1) the "suitability" of the faculty and personnel through the submission of their
academic credentials and personal data sheets, and 2) the "quality" of a school's operations through an
evaluation of an institution's library holdings and faculty facilities, the LEB has unreasonably interfered
with an institution's right to select its faculty and staff and to determine the facilities and benefits
that will be made available for their use.

Second. Again in the guise of accreditation, the LEB overreached its mandate anew by
authorizing itself to interview [25] the dean and faculty members of schools applying for recognition
status [26] in order for it to determine whether "its students are prepared for the last year of the law
curriculum, and that the professors who are to teach review subjects are prepared for the last year of the
law course." [27] This requirement is so unreasonable that if an institution undergoing accreditation is
found deficient, recognition may be denied and the law school may be closed. [28]

LEB Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 2013 (LEBMO No. 2-2013) likewise provides that law
schools that have a "weak faculty," [29] "inadequate library research facilities," [30] "no faculty syllabus,"
[31] "no moot court room," [32] and "no faculty lounge," [33] as determined by the LEB, shall be
considered "substandard," [34] and shall be "unfit to continue operating a law program." [35]

The LEB's supposed authority to review 1) an individual faculty member's ability to teach and 2)
the strength or weakness of the faculty as a whole, is not only presumptuous but is a gross violation of
an institution's right to set academic standards and procedures for evaluating the qualifications and
performance of its own educators.

Third. In gross violation of an institution's right to select "who may teach," the LEB has also
imposed the requirement that the members of the faculty, in addition to their respective law degrees and
Bar memberships, must likewise possess Masters of Law degrees (LLM). LEBMO No. 1-2011 pertinently
provides:

Section 50. The members of the faculty of a law school should, at the very
least, possess a Ll.B. or a J.D. degree and should be members of the Philippine Bar. In
the exercise of academic freedom, the law school may also ask specialists in various
 fields of law with other qualifications, provided that they possess relevant doctoral
degrees, to teach specific subjects.
Within a period of five (5) years of the promulgation of the present order, members
of the faculty of schools of law shall commence their studies in graduate schools of law.
Where a law school offers the J.D. curriculum, a qualified Ll.B. graduate who is a
member of the Philippine Bar may be admitted to teach in the J.D. course and may wish
to consider the privilege granted under Section 56 hereof. (Underscoring supplied)

LEB Resolution No. 2014-02 and LEB Memorandum Order No. 17, Series of 2018 (LEBMO No.
17-2018), which implement the foregoing provision, mandate that law schools comply with the following
percentages and schedules, under pain of downgrading, phase-out, and eventual closure. LEB
Resolution No. 2014-02 provides:

2. The law faculty of all law schools shall have the following percentage of holders of
the master of laws degree:
2.1. School Year — 2017-2018 — 20%
2.2. School Year — 2018-2019 — 40%
2.3. School Year — 2019-2020 — 60%
2.4. School Year — 2020-2021 — 80%
In computing the percentage, those who are exempted from the rule shall be
included.
3. Exempted from this requirement of a master's degree in law are the following:

The Incumbent or Retired Members of the:

3.1 Supreme Court;
3.2 Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals;
3.3 Secretary of Justice and Under-Secretaries of Justice, Ombudsman, Deputy
Ombudsmen, Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitors General;
3.4 Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission who teach
Labor Laws;
3.5 Regional Trial Court Judges;

3.6 DOJ State and Regional State Prosecutors and Senior Ombudsman
Prosecutors who teach Criminal Law and/or Criminal Procedure;
3.7 Members of Congress who are lawyers who teach Political Law,
Administrative Law, Election Law, Law on Public Officers and other related
subjects;
3.8 Members of Constitutional Commissions who are Lawyers;
3.9 Heads of bureaus who are lawyers who teach the law subjects which their
respective bureaus are implementing;
3.10 Ambassadors, Ministers and other diplomatic Officers who are lawyers who
teach International Law or related subjects;
 3.11 Those who have been teaching their subjects for 10 years or more upon
recommendation of their deans; and
3.12 Other lawyers who are considered by the Board to be experts in any field
of law provided they teach the subjects of their expertise. (Underscoring
supplied)
To ensure compliance with the foregoing, LEBMO No. 17-2018 imposes strict reportorial
requirements, including the regular submission of various certifications and even the faculty members'
LLM diplomas. [36]

The foregoing requirements impose unreasonable burdens on incumbent and potential faculty
members and unduly infringe on an institution's right to select the legal experts and practitioners that will
educate its students and further its academic aspirations. More importantly, the requirement is arbitrary
and miserably fails to take into account the distinct nature of the legal profession, i.e., that legal expertise
is not necessarily developed or acquired only through further studies but also (or more so) through
constant and continuous law practice in various specialized fields.

Under the foregoing rule, a seasoned law practitioner with 10 or 20 years of experience from an
established law firm will not be qualified to teach in a law school without an LLM, unless he or she is able
to prove to the LEB (not to the institution) that he or she is an expert in the subject he or she seeks to
teach. This does not only prejudice the institution, but more so the law student who is, by LEB fiat,
senselessly deprived of the opportunity to learn from the wisdom of experience. The significance of
actual law practice vis-à-vis law study is highlighted by the fact that a minimum number of years in the
former is required as a qualification for appointment as a judge. [37] In contrast, an LLM degree is not
even required for members of the Court.

The LEB also failed to consider that 1) LLM programs impose onerous financial/time constraints
and opportunity costs on incumbent or potential faculty members, 2) few schools in the Philippines offer
LLM programs, and 3) LLM programs abroad teaching foreign laws do not necessarily augment legal
expertise, knowledge, and experience in Philippine law. As Dean Candelaria accurately noted in his
Amicus Brief, "[t]he mandatory requirement of graduate degrees in law for deans and faculty members
under LEB policies, while laudable and ideal, may not be easily realizable in light of the practical
difficulties in accessing and maintaining enrollment in graduate programs." [38] Upon being asked during
the oral arguments to expound on this matter, Dean Candelaria elucidated as follows:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CAGUIOA:

Okay, on page seven (7) of your Brief, you mentioned that the master's requirement
while laudable, may not be easily realizable in light of the practical difficulties in
accessing and maintaining enrollment in graduate programs. Can you inform the
Court exactly what [these] practical difficulties are?
DEAN CANDELARIA:

Your Honor, I teach at least in two (2) schools where there is graduate degree being
offered, the Ateneo and San Beda Graduate School of Law with the consortium with
the academy, and I have seen the difficulties in particular, for instance, for sitting
deans or faculty members, to appropriate the time to actually access the centers for
learning, because we don't have as much presence, perhaps, in the Visayas or
Mindan[a]o. And of course, we have to ad[a]pt now, because some schools now are
going out there, like Ateneo De Naga, has actually requested on-site the offerings.
 So, difficulties really abound insofar as remote areas are concerned. Manila is not so
much problematic, for those who teach in Manila. But for those who would have to
fly, from Samar, I know I have a student from Samar, from Mindanao, who would
tranche a weekend curriculum, let's say at San Beda. . .
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CAGUIOA:

So, in other words, Dean, what you are saying is that, as an example, the physical
location or the topography of the area is such that, insisting on this requirement
would be a grave prejudice to these other law schools because they cannot, in fact,
access further higher learning to comply with the requirements of [the] LEB.

DEAN CANDELARIA:
At this stage, Your Honor, as the lack of institutions is really evident, I think we may
have to work on this progressively in the near future. With the cooperation of the
Bench, the Bar, the Association of Law Schools, and also the Philippine Association
of Law Professors, to be able to achieve that goal. [39]
Undoubtedly, the LEB overreaches its authority in requiring an LLM as a "minimum qualification."
In imposing the foregoing requirement, the LEB arbitrarily usurped an institution's academic
authority to gauge and to evaluate the qualifications of its educators on an individual basis, and
hastily reduced the pool of expertise available for selection — to the detriment of the institution,
the faculty, the students, and the profession as a whole.

Fourth. The same observations may be made about the qualifications imposed on deans of law
schools and graduate law schools, who are required to possess a Master's or Doctorate Degree,
respectively. LEBMO No. 1-2011 states:
Section 51. The dean should have, aside from complying with the
requirements above, at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or a master's degree in a
related field, and should have been a Member of the Bar for at least 5 years prior to his
appointment as dean.
Section 52. The dean of a graduate school of law should possess at least a
doctorate degree in law and should be an acknowledged authority in law, as evidenced by
publications and membership in learned societies and organizations; members of the
faculty of a graduate school of law should possess at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.)
degree or the relevant master's or doctor's degrees in related fields.

Aside from the foregoing, retired justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals may serve as deans of schools
of law, provided that: they have had teaching experience as professors of law and
provided further that, with the approval of the Legal Education Board, a graduate school of
law may accredit their experience in the collegiate appellate courts and the judgments
they have penned towards the degree ad eundem of Master of Laws. (Underscoring
supplied)
The unreasonableness of the foregoing provisions is exemplified by the fact that deans are
primarily "school administrators." While certainly, many legal luminaries have occupied, and currently
occupy, the position of dean, there is no justifiable reason to absolutely require (rather than encourage or
recommend) an LLM (for law deans) and Doctorate Degree (for graduate law deans), when the same
would not necessarily improve the management or administration of a law institution. On the other
hand, if legal scholarship and authority were to be made the standard, it is peculiar that even a
retired Member of the Court would prove unfit, unless otherwise approved by the members of the
LEB.
Notably, the members of the LEB — while seeing it fit to impose arbitrary requirements to gauge
the suitability of faculty members, and to evaluate the strength or weakness of the faculty as a whole —
are themselves not subjected to the same educational qualifications. As pointed out by Justice Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen during the oral arguments:
JUSTICE LEONEN:

Excuse me, for a moment, you are requiring from all Deans, which you supervise,
[and] law professors that they have an advanced degree, yet the LEB does not have
an advanced degree, how do you explain this?
[MR.] AQUENDE:

Your Honor, the justification or the rationale that was prepared by the previous Board
because it was not approved during our term, the previous Board looked into the
function of the LEB and which is not academic in nature, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx

JUSTICE LEONEN:
And in LEB, maybe, even perhaps, you should take care first that the LEB members
are all, at minimum, have masteral degrees from reputable law schools here or
abroad or a doctoral degree for that matter before you apply it to your constituents,
but my point is, isn't that unreasonable x x x

xxx xxx xxx

x x x that you require deans to take an advance[d] degree x x x

xxx xxx xxx

In other words, you imposed an educational requirement on law schools and

certainly according to our jurisprudence, who to teach is an academic matter? It is a
mission of a school and it is protected by academic freedom on the basis of your
LLB or JD degrees?

[MR.] AQUENDE:
Yes, Your Honor. The point, Your Honor, is that the fact that the members of the LEB
[do] not have x x x higher degrees [is] because the law does not require it. However,
that does not mean that we could not x x x

xxx xxx xxx

JUSTICE LEONEN:

If the law does not require it, it doesn't mean that anything you do will be reasonable.
You have to actually prove to us because, again, from my point of view, the degree
of judicial scrutiny of any interference on academic freedom x x x the degree of
scrutiny should be very tight. So again, my point is, perhaps you can address the
reasonability of the requirement, etcetera x x x [40]
 Fifth. Finally, the LEB impairs institutional academic freedom by categorizing faculty members
and interfering with faculty load, as follows:

Section 33. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. — There are two general kinds of
faculty members, the full-time and part-time faculty members.
a) A full-time faculty member is one:
1) Who possesses the minimum qualification of a member of the faculty as
prescribed in Sections 50 and 51 of LEBMO NO. 1;
2) Who devotes not less than eight (8) hours of work for the law school;
3) Who has no other occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of work,
except when permitted by the higher education institution of which the law
school is a part; and
4) Who is not teaching full-time in any other higher education institution.
b) A part-time faculty member is one who does not meet the qualifications of a full-time
professor as enumerated in the preceding number.
Section 34. Faculty Classification and Ranking. — Members of the faculty may be
classified, in the discretion of the higher education institution of which the law school is a
part, according to academic proceeding, training and scholarship into Professor, Associate
Professor, Assistant Professor, and Instructor.
Part-time members of the faculty may be classified as Lecturers, Assistant
Professorial Lecturers, Associate Professorial Lecturers and Professorial Lecturers. The
law schools shall devise their scheme of classification and promotion not inconsistent with
these rules.

Section 35. Faculty Load. — Generally, no member of the faculty should teach more
than 3 consecutive hours in any subject nor should he or she be loaded with subjects
requiring more than three preparations or three different subjects (no matter the number of
units per subject) in a day.

However, under exceptionally meritorious circumstances, the law deans may allow
members of the faculty to teach 4 hours a day provided that there is a break of 30 minutes
between the first 2 and the last 2 hours. [41] (Underscoring supplied)

The foregoing provisions unequivocally show that the LEB has not only overreached its authority
to set minimum qualifications for faculty members, it has arbitrarily dabbled in the internal affairs of
law schools, including the grant of faculty positions and titles, the regulation of work hours and
occupations, and the assignment of work load. While presumably imposed for the benefit of the
students and the professor, the imposition of the foregoing is better left to the individual institution which
would be in a better position to determine the needs and capacities of its students and its faculty.

To reiterate, academic institutions are free to select their faculty, to fix their qualifications, to
evaluate their performance, and to determine their ranks, positions, and teaching loads. The LEB's
purported power to prescribe minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members should be
construed to cover only minimal state interference when some important public interest calls for the
exercise of reasonable supervision. It does not include a blanket authority to impose trivial rules as
it sees fit. In the exercise of the LEB's purported power to supervise law schools, it has engaged
in the unreasonable and invalid regulation, control, and micromanagement of law schools. The
LEB has become, for lack of a better word, a tyrant.

ii. What may be taught

The second aspect of academic freedom involves the right of institutions of higher learning to
[42]
determine "what may be taught," i.e., to design the curricula (what courses to offer, when to offer
them, and in what sequence) and to craft the appropriate syllabi (course description, coverage, content,
and requirements).

The importance of this right cannot be overemphasized. An academic institution should be given
the necessary independence to identify, design and establish the courses and subjects that it deems
crucial to a student's personal and professional development and what it believes will best reflect and
inculcate its fundamental academic values. Protecting an institution's right to select various fields of
study and to design the corresponding curricula and syllabi fosters critical thinking, diversity, innovation,
and growth, encourages the free exchange of ideas, and protects the youth from potential
indoctrination by the State.

Similar to the right of an academic institution to determine "who may teach" therefore, the
Constitution likewise safeguards its right to determine what to teach and how to teach, free from undue
interference "except when there is an overriding public welfare which would call for some restraint." [43]

While R.A. 7662 empowers the LEB to prescribe "the basic curricula for the course of study
aligned to the requirements for admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness," [44] it does
not grant the LEB unbridled authority to impose unreasonable requirements in contravention of
an academic institution's fundamental right to determine what to teach and how to go about it.

A review of LEB's various memoranda evinces no other conclusion than that it has grossly
overstepped this authority, as shown below:

LEBMO No. 1-2011 requires institutions 1) to submit its curriculum for evaluation and approval as
[45]
a requirement for accreditation, 2) to comply with the minimum unit requirements for each legal
education course, i.e., Bachelor of Laws (LLB) (152 units), Juris Doctor (JD) (168 units), LLM (36 units)
[46]
and Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD) or Doctor of Civil Law (DCL) (60 units), 3) to follow a specific
and highly inflexible model curricula, [47] and 4) to comply with the course names, prescribed number of
units, number of hours, course descriptions, and prerequisites. [48]

In LEBMO No. 2-2013, the LEB unequivocally stated that "in the exercise of its regulatory
authority, [it may] void the graduation of any law student and/or impose appropriate sanctions on any law
school that has not complied with the curricular requirements, as well as policy and standards required
by the Board." [49]

A perusal of the mandatory model curricula unmistakably shows that the LEB has gone far
beyond the mere prescription of a "basic curricula." For instance, all the following subjects as specifically
described in the course descriptions, in the corresponding number of units, during the semester
indicated. This is illustrated by the mandatory first year courses of a JD degree, as follows:

First Year [50]

 1st SEMESTER 2nd SEMESTER

COURSE UNIT COURSE UNIT

Introduction to Law 1 Obligations and 5

Contracts

Persons and Family 4 Constitutional Law II 3

Relations

Constitutional Law I 3 Criminal Law II 4

Criminal Law I 3 Legal Technique and 2

Logic

Statutory Construction 2 Legal Writing 2

Philosophy of Law 2 Basic Legal Ethics 3

Legal Research and 2

Thesis Writing

Legal Profession 1

TOTAL 18 TOTAL 19

In relation thereto, Section 58.2 of the same issuance particularly describes each course, the
required units and hours per week, and even the manner by which each class should be conducted.
Sample course descriptions of the first year courses of JD degree are shown below:

COURSE NAME/NUMBER OF
UNITS/CONTACT HOURS/ COURSE DESCRIPTION
PREREQUISITES

First Year-First Semester

INTRODUCTION TO LAW A general course given to

freshmen, providing for an
Cases, recitations and lectures;
overview of the various aspects of
1 hour a week; the concept of law, with emphasis
1 unit on the relationship between law,
jurisprudence, equity, courts,
society and public policy,
presented through selected
provisions of law, cases and other
materials depicting settled
 principles and current
developments, both local and
international, including a review of
the evolution of the Philippine
legal system.

PERSONS AND FAMILY A basic course on the law of

RELATIONS persons and the family which first
views the effect and application of
Cases, recitations and lectures;
laws, to examine the legal norms
4 hours a week; affecting civil personality,
4 units marriage, property relations
between husband and wife, legal
separation, the matrimonial
regimes of absolute community,
conjugal partnership of gains, and
complete separation of property;
paternity and filiation, ad[o]ption,
guardianship, support, parental
authority, surnames, absence and
emancipation, including the rules
of procedure relative to the
foregoing.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I A survey and evaluation of basic

principles dealing with the
Cases, recitations and lectures;
structure of the Philippine
3 hours a week; Government.
3 units

CRIMINAL LAW I A detailed examination into the

characteristics of criminal law, the
Cases, recitations and lectures;
nature of felonies, stages of
3 hours a week; execution, circumstances affecting
3 units criminal liability, persons criminally
liable[,] the extent and extinction
of criminal liability as well as the
understanding of penalties in
criminal law, their nature and
theories, classes, crimes, habitual
delinquency, juvenile delinquency,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law
and the Probation Law. The
course covers Articles 1-113 of the
Revised Penal Code and related
laws.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION A course that explores the use
and force of statutes and the
Cases, recitations and lectures;
principles and methods of their
2 hours a week; construction and interpretation.
2 units

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW A study of the historical roots of

law from Roman times, the
2 hours a week;
schools of legal thought that
2 units spurred its growth and
development, and the primordial
purpose of law and legal
education.

LEGAL RESEARCH AND The course will introduce

THESIS WRITING structures to the methodology of
legal research and the preparation
Lectures, reading and practical
of legal opinions, memoranda, or
work;
expository or critical paper on any
2 hours a week; subject approved by the faculty
2 units member teaching it.

LEGAL PROFESSION The history and development of

the legal profession in the
Cases, recitations and lectures;
Philippines, its current problems,
1 hour a week; goals, and role in society. Also
1 unit covered are the methodologies in
the preparation of J.D. thesis

First Year-Second Semester

OBLIGATIONS AND An in-depth study of the nature,

CONTRACTS kinds and effect of obligations and
their extinguishment[,] contracts in
Cases, recitations and lectures;
general, their requisites, form and
5 hours a week; interpretation[,] defective
5 units contracts, quasi contracts, natural
obligations, and estoppel.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II A comprehensive study of the

Constitution, the bill of rights and
Cases, recitations and lectures;
judicial review of the acts affecting
3 hours a week; them.
3 units

CRIMINAL LAW II A comprehensive appraisal of

specific felonies penalized in Book
Cases, recitations and lectures;
 4 hours a week; II of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, their nature, elements
4 units
and corresponding penalties.

LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND A course on the methods of

LOGIC reasoning, syllogisms, arguments
and expositions, deductions, the
Recitations and lectures;
truth table demonstrating invalidity
2 hours a week; and inconsistency of arguments. It
2 units also includes the logical
organization of legal language
and logical testing of judicial
reasoning.

LEGAL WRITING An introduction to legal writing

techniques; it involves applied
Lectures, reading and practical
legal bibliography, case digesting
work;
and reporting analysis, legal
2 hours a week; reasoning and preparation of legal
2 units opinions or memoranda.

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS A course that focuses on the

canons of legal ethics involving
Cases, recitations and lectures;
the duties and responsibilities of
3 hours a week; the lawyer with respect to the
3 units public or society, the bar or legal
profession, the courts and the
client.

The LEB mandate that law schools offer specifically described subjects during a specific
semester is a manifest violation of academic freedom, both individual and institutional. [51] It does not
only deprive the faculty member of his or her academic right to design the coverage of the course and to
conduct classes as he or she sees fit, but also unreasonably usurps the academic institution's right to
decide for itself 1) the subjects law students must take (core subjects) and the subjects law students
may opt to take (non-core subjects/electives); 2) the coverage and content of each subject; and 3) the
sequence by which the subjects should be taken.
The abuse of power does not end there.

The LEB has not only taken it upon itself to require subjects such as Agrarian Law and Social
Legislation, [52] Special Issues in International Law, [53] and Human Rights Law, [54] which are subjects
of special interest or specialization that law schools may have only previously offered as electives, it has
also usurped the institution's right to design and develop its own electives. Significantly, LEBMO No. 1-
2011 provides a list of "suggested" electives, [55] including but not limited to the following:

SUGGESTED ELECTIVES (DESCRIPTION)

xxx xxx xxx

JURIS DOCTOR (J.D.) PROGRAM

ADMIRALTY

The course covers the history or the genesis of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, up to
the advent of the contentious Hague Rules of 1924, Hague Visby Rules of 1968 and
Hamburg Rules of 1978, including aspects of bills of lading, charter parties, collision,
salvage, towage, pilotage, and the Ship Mortgage Act. (2 units)
ADVANCED TAXATION

A seminar designed for students who are seriously considering tax practice. It examines
the procedural requirements of the Internal Revenue Code. This includes a detailed look
at the audit process from the examination of a return, and ending with a consideration of
the questions surrounding the choice of a forum when litigation is appropriate. It also
exposes students to some of the intellectual rigors of a high level tax practice.
(Prerequisites: Taxation I and Taxation II) (2 units)

APPELLATE PRACTICE AND BRIEF MAKING

The course is designed to provide students with the skills necessary to successfully
litigate appeals before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. Emphasis will be placed
on practical training including appellate procedure, oral and written presentation and
methodology. Brief writing and other aspects of modern appellate practice are also
covered. (2 units)

ARBITRATION LAWS
A study of the Philippine laws on Arbitration, the ICC Rules on Arbitration, the Conventions
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the settlement of
investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. (2 units)

BANKING LAW I (GENERAL BANKING)

The course covers the study of the rules and regulations governing banks and non-bank
financial intermediaries, including the New Central Bank Act, the General Banking Law of
2000, and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars, rules and regulations. (2 units)

BANKING LAWS II (INVESTMENT BANKING)

A study of the Finance Company Act, the Investment House Law and the Investment
Company Act, and related Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and Securities and Exchange
Commission regulations. (1 unit)

CHILDREN'S RIGHTS LAW

This elective course aims to introduce the students to the legal framework of protection for
children and the psycho-social dimensions of handling children's rights cases. The
Convention on the Rights of the Child is used to provide the background on an
international level. The course is divided further into specific clusters of rights of children
in relation to Philippine laws, issuances, rules of court and jurisprudence. In each cluster
the legal and psycho-social issues affecting certain groups of children (sexually and
physically abused children in conflict with the law, child laborers, children in situations of
armed conflict, trafficked children, displaced and refugee children, indigenous children,
etc. . .) are discussed in order to understand in a holistic manner the plight of children
 within the legal system. The methods used in teaching the course include lectures,
workshop exercises and mock trial. Students will also be exposed to actual case handling.
(2 units)

CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION I AND II

Supervised student practice under Rule 138-A (Law Student Practice Rule) of the Rules of
Court including conference with clients, preparation of pleadings and motions, appearance
in court, handling of trial, preparation of memorandum. The course will include the use of
video equipment and computers to enhance training in direct and cross-examination
techniques. (4 units)

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS

An introduction to the collective bargaining process, negotiations, mediation, and

arbitration as experienced in both the private and government sectors, with emphasis on
practice. (2 units) [56]

While suggesting electives may be acceptable and even commendable, LEB Memorandum Order
No. 14, Series of 2018 (LEBMO No. 14-2018) has 1) atrociously prohibited law schools from offering
elective subjects not falling within the LEB's "suggested" list of electives, without prior LEB approval [57]
and 2) penalized the same with fines, and threats of downgrading, phase out, and/or eventual closure.
[58] This is grave abuse of the power to prescribe "basic curricula."

Further, and as equally appalling, the LEB now mandates a prescribed sequence, again under
pain of downgrading, phase-out, and eventual closure, [59] by which subjects must be taken. LEBMO
No. 2-2013 provides:

Section 4. Advanced Subjects and Back Subjects. — As a general rule, a student

shall not be permitted to take any advanced subject until he has satisfactorily passed the
prerequisite subject or subjects.

In relation thereto, LEB Memorandum Order No. 5, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 5-2016) dictates
"what subjects need to be taken and passed by students in the basic law courses before being allowed
to take the advanced subjects" [60] as follows:

ADVANCED SUBJECT(S) PRE-REQUISITE SUBJECT(S)

Administrative and Election Constitutional Law I

Laws or Administrative Law, Law
on Public Officers and Election
Law

Agency, Trust and Partnership Obligations and Contracts

Civil Law Review I Persons and Family Relations

Property

Succession
Civil Law Review II Civil Law Review I

Civil Procedure Persons and Family Relations

Obligations and Contracts

Commercial Law Review Agency, Trust and Partnership

Transportation
Credit Transaction

Corporation Law

Negotiable Instruments Law

Insurance

Constitutional Law Review Constitutional Law I

Constitutional Law II

Criminal Law Review Criminal Law I

Criminal Law II

Credit Transaction Obligations and Contracts

Criminal Law II Criminal Law I

Criminal Procedure Criminal Law I

Criminal Law II

Evidence Criminal Procedure

Civil Procedure

Human Rights Law Constitutional Law II

Insurance Obligations and Contracts

Labor Law II Labor Law I

Labor Law Review Labor Law I

Labor Law II

Legal Forms Obligations and Contracts

Property

Sales

Credit Transactions

Negotiable Instruments Law

Agency, Trust and Partnership

 Land Titles and Deeds

Criminal Procedure
Civil Procedure

Legal Counseling and Social Basic Legal Ethics

Responsibility
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

Criminal Procedure
Civil Procedure

Evidence

Legal Medicine Criminal Law II

Obligations and Contracts Persons and Family Relations

Practice Court I Criminal Procedure

Civil Procedure
Evidence

Special Proceedings

Legal Forms

Practice Court II Practice Court I

Problem Areas in Legal Ethics Basic Legal Ethics

Property Obligations and Contracts

Remedial Law Review I Criminal Procedure

Civil Procedure

Evidence

Special Proceedings

Remedial Law Review II Remedial Law Review I

Sales Obligations and Contracts

Special Proceedings Succession

Succession Persons and Family Relations

Property

Taxation I Constitutional Law I

Taxation II Persons and Family Property

Taxation I
 Succession

Torts and Damages Obligations and Contracts

Transportation Obligations and Contracts

The foregoing cannot, in any way, be construed as falling within the LEB's power to prescribe
basic curricula. The basis for delineating "pre-requisites" vis-à-vis "advanced subjects" is not only
arbitrary, it is fundamentally flawed. To illustrate:

1) Persons and Family Relations has been made a pre-requisite for Obligations and
Contracts, while Persons and Family Property and Succession have been made pre-
requisites for Taxation II, [61] even though knowledge of the aforementioned "pre-
requisite" may not necessarily be essential for studying the corresponding "advanced
subject;"
2) Persons and Family Relations, Property, and Succession have been made pre-requisites
to Civil Law Review I and Civil Law Review II, but curiously, Obligations and Contracts
was not made a pre-requisite for either of the Civil Law Review subjects; [62]

3) Agency, Trust and Partnerships has been made a pre-requisite for Commercial Law
Review, [63] even though it has traditionally been treated as a Civil Law subject in the Bar;
and
4) Legal Forms (a mere 2-unit subject) has been arbitrarily assigned 9 pre-requisites while
Practice Court (which is not even a Bar subject) has been assigned 5 pre-requisites. [64]
The inflexibility of the mandate has also, as Dean Candelaria explained, "led to implementation
problems affecting student tenure, faculty assignments, tuition rates, among others." [65] Upon being
asked to elaborate, he further elucidated on this matter during the oral arguments, to wit:

DEAN CANDELARIA:

x x x [O]n student tenure, there had been changes in recent years, whereby they
add or split courses. I'll give you an example concretely. When I took Administrative Law, it
was offered with Public Corporation, I think it was also with Election Law, and Public
Officers. That has been the experience for a long time. In more recent times, there had
been splits by the Legal Education Board, and the problem that students who have taken
it, or who are about to take it for instance, would be displaced in terms of the ladder of
courses that they will take. So, we've had students who have had tenure problems,
because they have to take one which, at that time, was actually not offered so, there is an
administrative problem imputing the number of units, that's one concrete problem. On
faculty for instance, the assignment, there have been changes when it comes to faculty
assignments and I think the problem with many law schools also, is hiring. Faculty
members who may have to teach new courses also that are now being required by the
Legal Education Board. I think for instance, Environmental Law. I know Environmental
Law is booming in this country, there is a roster of lawyers right now who have gone into
Environmental Law. But there are other subjects, of course, that are being introduced that
may really be not, I think, easily taught by incumbent faculty members. And the last one
 is tuition rates. When you start tampering with the number of units, in a law school
operation, and recommending changes, it will affect tuition rates for many law
[66]
schools. At least those who are reliant on private tuition. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

While the Court does not pass upon questions regarding the wisdom of the LEB's
prescribed curriculum, the Court is duty-bound to uphold an educational institution's right to
determine and evaluate the propriety of assigning pre-requisites as an aspect of its right to
determine what to teach and how to do so.

If only to highlight the gross and patent abuse by the LEB of its power to prescribe the basic
curricula, it bears emphasis that the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), which was empowered
to set "(a) minimum unit requirements for specific academic programs; (b) general education distribution
requirements as may be determined by the Commission; and (c) specific professional subjects as may
be stipulated by the various licensing entities," [67] subject to an educational institution's academic right
to "curricular freedom," [68] has only seen fit to recommend sample curricula and sample syllabi to meet
[69]
a minimum set of desired program outcomes. For instance, CHED Memorandum Order No. 041-17,
which prescribes the Standards and Guidelines for Journalism majors, states:
Per Section 13 of RA 7722, the higher education institution shall exercise academic
freedom in its curricular offerings but must comply with the minimum requirements for
specific academic programs, the general education distribution requirements and the
specific professional courses.
Section 3. The Articles that follow set minimum standards and other requirements
and prescriptions that all HEIs must adopt. These standards are expressed as a minimum
set of desired program outcomes, as enumerated under Article IV, Section 6. The CHED
designed the curricula to attain such outcomes. These curricula are shown in Article V,
Section 9 as sample curricula. The numbers of units for these curricula are herein
prescribed as the "minimum unit requirement" pursuant to Section 13 of RA 7722. In
designing the curricula, the CHED employed a curriculum map for each program,
samples of which are shown in Article V, Section 10.

Using an outcomes-based approach, the CHED also determined the appropriate

curriculum delivery methods shown in Article V, Section 11. The sample course syllabus
given in Article V, Section 12 shows some of these methods.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 4. In recognition of the HEIs' vision, mission and contexts under which
they operate, the HEIs may design curricula suited to their own needs. However, the
HEIs must demonstrate that the same leads to the attainment of the required
minimum set of outcomes. In the same vein, they have latitude in terms of
curriculum delivery and in specifying and deploying human and physical resources
as long as they attain the program outcomes and satisfy program educational
objectives. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Similarly worded provisions appear in the Standards and Guidelines for degrees in Computer
[70] [71] [72] [73] [74]
Engineering, Political Science, Communications, Business Administration, Statistics,
Education, [75] among others.
 In contrast with the curricular flexibility provided by the CHED, the LEB did not merely
prescribe minimum unit requirements, desired program outcomes, or a sample curricula. The LEB
gravely abused its authority and violated the law schools' curricular freedom when it imposed the above-
described curriculum, usurped the law schools' right to determine appropriate pre-requisites and
prohibited law schools from designing their own electives.

Clearly, the right to formulate the curriculum belongs to the educational institutions, subject to
reasonable guidelines that may be provided by the State. On the dangers of having the State actually
prescribe what may be taught in educational institutions of higher learning, the Constitutional
Commissioners had this to say:

FR. BERNAS.

What I am concerned about, and I am sure the committee is concerned about

also, is the danger always of the State prescribing subjects. I recall that when
the sponsor was the dean of Arts and Sciences in La Salle, his association of private
school deans was precisely fighting the various prescriptions imposed by the State
— that the schools must teach this, must teach that. Are we opening that up here?

MR. VILLACORTA.
The Commissioner is right in describing these as guidelines. This is not to say that
there will be specific subjects that will embody these principles on a one-to-one
correspondence. In other words, we are not saying that there should be a subject
called nationalism or ecology. That was what we were fighting against in the
Association of Philippine Colleges of Arts and Sciences. The government always
came up with what they called thrusts, and therefore the corresponding subjects
imposed on schools that are supposed to embody these thrusts. So, we had current
issues. It was a course that was required on the tertiary level. Then there was a time
when they required subjects that dealt with green revolution; and then agrarian
reform. Taxation is in fact still a required course. We are not thinking in those terms.
These are merely guidelines.

FR. BERNAS.
In other words, while the State will give the goals and guidelines, as it were,
how these are to be attained is to be determined by the institution by virtue of
its academic freedom.

MR. VILLACORTA.
That is right, Mr. Presiding Officer. I invite, of course, my fellow members in the
committee who might have some reservations on the points I raised.

FR. BERNAS.

But I guess what I am trying to point out is: Are we really serious about academic
freedom?

MR. VILLACORTA.
Definitely, we are. Would the Commissioner have certain misgivings about the way
we defined it?

FR. BERNAS.
 I would, if the committee goes beyond mere guidelines, because if we allow the
State to start dictating what subjects should be taught and how these would
be taught, I think it would be very harmful for the educational system. Usually,
legislation is done by legislators who are not educators and who know very little
about education. Perhaps education should be left largely to educators, with certain
supervision, and so forth.
MR. VILLACORTA.

Excuse me, Mr. Presiding Officer, if I may interject. I am sure the Honorable Bernas,
being very much experienced in education, is aware of the fact that there is this
great need to develop certain priority concerns in the molding of our youths' mind
and behavior. For example, love of country is something that is very lacking in our
society and I wonder if the Honorable Bernas would have any reservation against
giving emphasis to nationalism.

FR. BERNAS.

I have nothing against motherhood concepts, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. VILLACORTA.

But this is always the dilemma of educators. To what extent do we give freedom as
to the subject matter and manner of teaching versus certain imperatives of national
development? In the last dispensation, we found a lopsided importance given to so-
called national development which turned out to be just serving the interest of the
leadership. The other members of the committee are fully aware of the dangers
inherent in the State spelling out the priorities in education, but at the same time, we
cannot overlook the fact that there are certain areas which must be emphasized in a
developing society. Of course, we would wish that we shall not always be a
developing society bereft of economic development as well as national unity. But we
like the advise of the Honorable Bernas, as well as our colleagues in the
Commission, on how we can constitutionalize certain priorities in educational
development as well as curricular development without infringing necessarily on the
goals of academic freedom. Moreover, jurisprudence accords academic freedom
only to institutions of higher learning.

FR. BERNAS.

So, I am quite satisfied that these are guidelines. [76] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In sum, the LEB's authority to prescribe the "basic curricula" is limited by the Constitutional right
of law schools to academic freedom and to the due process standard of reasonableness. When the LEB
(or any branch of government for that matter) interferes with Constitutional rights and freedoms and
overreaches its authority, as it has done in this case, it is the Court's Constitutional duty to make it tow
the line.

iii. How to teach

As regards the aspect of academic freedom on how to teach, several issuances of the LEB
readily reveal that, over the years, the LEB has exercised considerable power in controlling, and not
merely recommending or supervising, the manner by which legal education institutions and law school
professors conduct the teaching of law courses.
To cite a concrete example of how the LEB interferes with the law schools' right to determine the
manner of instruction, the LEB issued LEBMO No. 1-2011, which, as earlier discussed, introduced
policies and standards of legal education and provided for a manual of regulations for law schools. The
said LEBMO is riddled with various rules, regulations, and restrictions that go into the manner by
which law schools teach their students.

For instance, according to Section 18 (a) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, with respect to the LLB
curriculum, the LEB requires law schools to complete the teaching of all subjects in the LLB curriculum
within the entire semester as prescribed by the model curriculum provided in the LEBMO. Law schools
are prohibited from completing the curriculum in modular fashion, i.e., completing the subject by a class
held continuously for a number of days, although satisfying the required number of hours. Evidently, the
manner by which the law schools implement its curriculum is restricted.

The said provision also prohibits distance education, unless otherwise provided for by the LEB.
For instance, if a law school professor wishes to conduct class through a video teleconference when
he/she is temporarily outside of the country, because LEBMO No. 1-2011 prohibits distance education
unless approved by the LEB, the professor cannot do so. Clearly, this illustrates how the LEB interferes
with the professors' prerogative to determine what methods they will employ in teaching their respective
classes.

Further, under Section 18 (c), the LEB imposes the total number of credits that shall be awarded
to a student pursuing his/her LLM, as well as the specific number of units to be credited upon a
successful defense before a Panel of Oral Examiners. The said provision also dictates upon the law
school the specific type of output that a student must submit in a non-thesis master's program. Similarly,
under Section 18 (d), the issuance not only determines the minimum academic credits as regards the
degree of SJD or DCL; even the specific number of pages of a doctoral dissertation is imposed, i.e., 200
pages. In fact, under Section 20 of the same issuance, legal education institutions are mandated to
utilize internet access and to put up a Moot Court room in the process of teaching their students.

With respect to assessing the respective faculties of the law schools, under Section 41.2 of the
issuance, the LEB is allowed to revoke the permits or recognitions given to legal education institutions
when the LEB deems that there is gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of
professors or instructors. Simply stated, under the issuance, the LEB is permitted to assess the teaching
performance of law school faculty members and mete out penalties in line with such assessment. The
evaluation of the performance and competence of faculty members is part and parcel of a law school's
right to determine its own manner of instruction. Worse, the said issuance is silent as to how the LEB
gauges gross incompetence.

As discussed earlier, under Section 58 of LEBMO No. 1-2011, the LEB prescribes course
specifications, wherein the names of the courses, the number of units per course, the number of hours to
be spent per week, and the various methods of instruction that must be utilized are dictated upon the
legal education institution and the law school professors who teach the various courses indicated
therein.
As a glaring example, under Section 58.1 of the aforesaid issuance, on the course of Persons
and Family Relations in the LLB program, the instructor is specifically required to conduct "[c]ases,
recitations and lectures" for 4 hours a week. For Legal Technique and Logic, on the other hand, the
teaching methods prescribed are limited to "[r]ecitations and lectures" only, for 2 hours per week. Does
this mean that professors who teach Persons and Family Relations and Legal Technique and Logic are
discouraged, or worse, prohibited, to require group work or group presentations in their respective
classes, considering that these methods of instruction were not included in the course specifications?
That seems to be the case, based on a reading of the said issuance.
To stress, as clearly illustrated in the foregoing examples, the LEB, through LEBMO No. 1-2011,
dictates with much particularity and, therefore, unduly restricts the method of teaching that may be
adopted by the law school professors. This does not merely encroach on the academic freedom of the
legal education institutions as to how to teach; the academic freedom of the faculty members themselves
is directly infringed.

It must equally be stressed that the imposition of the course specifications provided under
LEBMO No. 1-2011 is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory in nature, considering that under
Section 58 of the issuance, the law schools may provide their own course descriptions only when the
same are not provided under the issuance and if in conformity with the subject titles stated in the model
curricula provided in the issuance.
Astonishingly, under Section 59 of LEBMO No. 1-2011, the LEB even imposes specific rules and
regulations on the manner by which the law schools grade its students. Law schools are even required
to submit their grading system and a complete explanation thereof before the LEB.

To further illustrate how the LEB meddles with the right of the law schools to determine their own
grading system, Section 59 (a) specifies certain factors that must be considered by the law school
professor in determining the student's final grade, i.e., "[p]articipation in class through recitation,
exchange of ideas, presentation of reports, and group discussion."

Under Section 59 (b), law schools are forced to drop students who incur absences totaling 20%
of the total number of contact hours or required hours (units) for the subject. Worse, law schools are
required to inscribe the entry "FA" (Failed due to Absences) in the student's official transcript of records.
Section 59 (d), on the other hand, interferes with the law schools' management of their respective
apprenticeship programs. Under the said provision, when apprenticeship is required by the law school
and the student does not complete the mandated number of apprenticeship hours, or the person
supervising the apprenticeship program deems the performance of the student unsatisfactory, the law
school dean is forced to "require of the student such number of hours more in apprenticeship as will fulfill
the purposes of the apprenticeship program."
Also, under Section 59 (e), when a program requires the submission and defense of a thesis, in a
situation where a student fails to submit or receives a failing grade, the issuance directs law schools to
allow students to "improve, correct or change the thesis and present it anew for the evaluation of the law
school, through its dean or the professor assigned to direct thesis-writing." It is readily apparent that the
very manner by which legal education institutions conduct their thesis program is interfered with.

Beyond LEBMO No. 1-2011, various rules and regulations that interfere in the legal education
institutions' right to determine their manner of teaching are likewise found in LEBMO No. 2-2013.

In the said issuance, the LEB imposes several restrictions as to the allowable load of students in
the law schools. As previously discussed, under Section 4 of LEBMO No. 2-2013, students are not
permitted to take any advanced subject until passing prerequisite subjects. Further, under Section 5, the
LEB sets the maximum number of academic units in excess of the normal load that may be allowed for
graduating students, i.e., six units. Under Sections 6 and 8, the requirements for the cross enrollment
and transfer of students from one law school to another, respectively, are imposed.
 Several impositions are also made even on the most miniscule of details regarding the
request, transfer, and release of school records and transfer credentials. [77] Interestingly, even
the format of the school records is forced upon the law schools, as found in Section 7 [78] of the
issuance. Under Section 12, the rules on denial of final examinations, withholding of grades, and
refusal to re-enroll are likewise dictated upon the legal education institutions.

Under Section 14 of LEBMO No. 2-2013, which mirrors Section 59 (b) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, the
LEB requires that professors fail students who incur absences of more than 20% of the prescribed
number of class hours. This provision is a clear example of how the LEB directly interferes with the law
professors' freedom to manage their respective classes.

LEBMO No. 2-2013 even imposes upon the legal education institutions the manner by which they
should conduct their respective apprenticeship programs, determining the list of specific activities that
should be required for students undergoing the apprenticeship programs. [79]

As regards the law schools' right to determine which of their students are eligible to graduate,
Section 16 of the issuance imposes residency requirements for graduation, establishing the rule that no
student shall be allowed to graduate from any law school where he or she has not established academic
residency for at least the two last semesters of his or her course of study. In fact, to further underscore
the high level of interference and overreach exercised by the LEB, LEBMO No. 2-2013 even imposes
upon the law schools certain rules on determining which students may participate in the commencement
exercise of the law schools. [80]

The interference of the LEB with the manner by which law schools implement their curriculum is
[81]
so pervasive that, under LEBMO No. 2-2013, in order for a law school to open another branch or
hold extension classes, [82] prior approval of the LEB is required. [83]

Aside from the foregoing provisions of the LEBMO, I invite the Court's attention to Article III of the
said issuance, which imposes numerous restrictions on the power of law schools to maintain discipline
and to determine the manner by which they conduct administrative proceedings.

For example, under Section 20, the LEB forces upon law schools certain rules on when and how
they can preventively suspend, suspend, expel, and not readmit their students.

The law school may only preventively suspend a student "when the evidence of guilt is strong
and the Dean is morally convinced that the continued stay of the student pending investigation would
cause sufficient distraction to the normal operations of the law school, or would pose real or imminent
threat or danger to persons and property inside the law school's premises." [84]

If the law school decides to suspend a student, its action is constrained to denying the erring
student from attending classes for a period not exceeding 20% of the prescribed total class days for the
school term. [85]

With respect to the penalty of non-readmission, when meting out the said penalty, the law school
is forced to allow the student to complete the current school term when the resolution for non-
readmission was promulgated. The law school is likewise mandated to issue the transfer credentials of
the erring student upon promulgation. [86]
As regards the penalty of exclusion, the LEB allows the law schools to mete out such penalty "for
acts or offenses such as dishonesty, hazing that involves physical, moral or psychological violence that
does not result in death of a student, carrying deadly weapons, immorality, selling and/or possession of
prohibited drugs, drug dependency, drunkenness, hooliganism, vandalism and other offenses analogous
to the foregoing." [87]
The said issuance also confines the power of law schools to expel a student. Under LEBMO No.
2-2013, the permissible instances when law schools can expel a student are limited to (a) participation of
a student as a principal in a fraternity hazing that results in the death of a law student; (b) unlawful
physical assault of higher education institution officials inside the school campus; and (c) commission of
[88]
an offense with an imposable minimum penalty of more than 12 years. Hence, based on this
provision, if a student participates in a fraternity hazing wherein the death of a non-law student occurs,
absurdly, the law school has no power to expel a student.

Further, in cases wherein the administrative charge filed against a student amounts to a criminal
offense, Section 22 of the LEBMO requires law schools to proceed with the administrative proceedings
until termination even if the criminal case has not yet been decided by the court.

Notably, under Section 19 of LEBMO No. 2-2013, if the law school imposes a sanction of
expulsion against a student, the student may appeal the disciplinary action meted out by the school
before the LEB. The latter is empowered under the LEBMO to reverse and set aside the school's
decision to expel the student. Without a shred of doubt, this is a clear derogation of the law school's
right to discipline its students.

It must be emphasized that the right of the school to discipline its students is an integral aspect of
[89]
the academic freedom of how to teach. Because the schools' power to instill discipline in their
students is subsumed in their academic freedom, the Court has generally adopted a stance of deference
and non-interference, declining to meddle with the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions,
which includes the power to dismiss or expel, students who violate disciplinary rules. [90] In fact, the
power of schools to discipline their students is so established and recognized that, in our jurisprudence,
even the power to impose disciplinary measures has extended to schools even after graduation for any
act done by the student prior thereto. [91]

Hence, the various rules imposed by the LEB that control and unduly restrict the law
schools' determination of the manner by which they discipline their students undoubtedly
amount to a serious breach of their academic freedom to determine how to teach.
Another exemplar of the LEB's unwarranted and undue interference in the law schools'
prerogative to control the manner of instruction is LEB Memorandum Order No. 10, Series of 2017
(LEBMO No. 10-2017), which imposes guidelines on the adoption of the academic/school calendar.
While the said LEBMO allows law schools to establish their own academic/school calendars and set
their own opening dates, it nevertheless restrictively confines the academic/school calendar to no less
than 36 weeks, wherein the total number of days shall not be less than 200 per calendar year. Moreover,
the issuance requires law schools to set the start of their school calendar not earlier than the last week
of May, but not later than the last day of August. The law schools' discretion to determine the amount of
weeks and days in their academic/school calendars, as well as the period of commencement of the
academic year, is clipped.

The aforementioned issuances and their provisions are but examples of how the LEB has
exercised the power of control — not supervision — over the legal education institutions' rights to
determine the manner by which law courses are taught and how such institutions manage their internal
affairs.

iv. Who may be admitted

 With respect to the academic freedom aspect of who may be admitted to the schools, I reiterate
my position that the ponencia is correct in holding that the PhiLSAT is violative of academic freedom.
Mandating legal education institutions to reject examinees who failed to obtain the prescribed passing
score amounts to a complete transfer of control over student admissions from the law schools to the
LEB. To emphasize, the permissible power of the State over institutions of higher learning is limited to
supervision and regulation, not control.
Beyond the PhiLSAT, however, the LEB has imposed other restrictions that similarly interfere with
the law school's right to determine who to admit and teach.

Under LEBMO No. 1-2011, where the applicant for admission into a law school is a graduate of a
foreign institution, instead of allowing the law schools to determine for themselves whether to admit the
student or not, the matter is referred exclusively to the LEB, who shall determine the eligibility of the
candidate for admission to law school. [92] Hence, under the LEBMO, the LEB is given complete control
and discretion as to the admissions of foreign graduates. This is a clear derogation of the right of law
schools to determine who to admit.
Further, under Section 16 of the same LEBMO, the LEB forces law schools to reject applicants
for admission to the LLB or JD program of studies who failed to earn at least 18 units in English, 6 units
in Mathematics, and 18 units of social science subjects. Such requirement has no basis under the
Rules of Court or under any law. The aforesaid requirement is purely the creation of the LEB. The
same may be said with respect to the rules on the prerequisites for admission to graduate programs in
law imposed under Section 17.

B. Other Issues under the LEB Law

i. LEB's power to accredit is too broad and unreasonable

Beyond the four essential aspects of academic freedom, several other issuances of the LEB may
also be classified as unreasonable.
Under R.A. 7662, the LEB is empowered to supervise and regulate law schools or legal
educational institutions through accreditation. [93] Without encroaching upon the schools' academic
freedom, the LEB shall set the standards of accreditation, taking into account, among others, "the size of
[94]
enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities."
Educational institutions may only operate a law school upon accreditation by the LEB. [95] Should the
law school fail to maintain these standards, the LEB may withdraw or downgrade its accreditation. [96] To
implement the provisions of R.A. 7662, the LEB issued LEBMO No. 1-2011 entitled Policies and
Standards of Legal Education and Manual of Regulations for Law Schools.
[97]
Under LEBMO No. 1-2011, accreditation is either mandatory or voluntary. With mandatory
accreditation, a law school is authorized and recognized by the LEB to operate and to endorse its
[98]
graduates for the Bar Examinations. On the other hand, voluntary accreditation "refers to the
processes that may be devised by private accrediting agencies, recognized by [the LEB], that confer
marks of distinction on law schools that surpass the minimum requirements and standards" under
[99]
LEBMO No. 1-2011. Mandatory accreditation consists of two stages: Permit Stage and Recognition
[100]
Stage. A Permit status, which must be obtained before each academic year, allows the law school
to open and offer subjects of the first year of the law curriculum. [101] Meanwhile, a Recognition status
constitutes full mandatory accreditation which allows the law school's students to graduate, to be
conferred degrees and to be endorsed to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the Bar Examinations. [102]
 R.A. 7662 provides that the grant, denial, withdrawal and downgrading of a school's accreditation
must be subject to the standards to be set by the LEB. Under LEBMO No. 1-2011, some of these
[103]
standards are that a law school: (a) shall be headed by a properly qualified dean; (b) shall maintain
a corps of professors drawn from the ranks of leading and acknowledged practitioners as well as
academics and legal scholars or experts in juridical science; [104] (c) shall be properly equipped with the
necessities of legal education, particularly library facilities, including reliable internet access, as well as
suitable classrooms and a Moot Court room; [105] (d) shall have a faculty lounge for the convenience of
members of the faculty; [106] and (e) shall publish a research journal. [107] A private higher education
institution applying for Permit status to open a law school must include in its application, among others,
the present library holdings, as well as the name and qualifications of the law librarian, and pictures of
the classrooms, moot court, library, dean's office, and faculty lounge. [108]

Verily, I find these standards to be unreasonable impositions on law schools, if not a patent
violation of their academic freedom, as previously discussed.

Moreover, some of the provisions in LEBMO No. 1-2011 lack legal basis in R.A. 7662 and can be
classified as arbitrary. Consider the following: (a) the LEB shall assure accessibility of legal education by
seeing to the proportional distribution of law schools throughout the country; [109] (b) in the exercise of
LEB's "sound discretion," it may deny an application to open another law school "if x x x there is/are
existing law school/s which adequately serve/s the legal education needs" in a given area; [110] and (c) it
may also deny an application if it determines based on the records that a law school is "substandard in
the quality of its operation or when surrounding circumstances make it very difficult for it to form a
[111]
suitable faculty, or for any valid and weighty reasons," it could not deliver quality legal education.
Further, in spite of the serious consequences of the denial of recognition, i.e., closure or phase out of the
law school, there is no provision on grounds for such denial. [112]

Lastly, LEBMO No. 1-2011 also provides that the LEB shall take "cognizance of all matters
involving acts or omissions" in relation to R.A. 7662, related laws and issuances and it may impose
administrative sanctions. [113] While these sanctions are not defined in the said issuance, it may be
inferred that it refers to a denial, withdrawal or downgrading of a law school's accreditation.

The above provisions show that the LEB's discretion to grant, deny, withdraw or
downgrade a school's accreditation is too broad and overreaching, contrary to the constitutional
provisions on reasonable supervision and regulation and on academic freedom.

Other issuances of the LEB which are seemingly void for being either unreasonable or issued
ultra vires are as follows:
1. LEB Resolution No. 7, Series of 2010 (LEB Resolution No. 7-2010), Declaring a 3-Year
Moratorium on the Opening of New Law Schools — The Whereas Clauses stated that: (a)
based on LEB's opinion, the 128 law schools as of that time are more than enough; (b)
the proliferation of law schools has been identified as one of the causes of the poor quality
of legal education; and (c) the LEB needs a 3-year period to inspect and monitor the
performances of existing law schools and "to focus on the introduction of reform measures
in our legal education system." Thus, the LEB declared a 3-year moratorium on opening of
new law schools.

This unilateral declaration, which is merely based on the LEB's opinion, seems to have
been undertaken without consultation with stakeholders, specifically the law schools,
 which the LEB plans to inspect and monitor.

2. LEB Resolution No. 16, Series of 2011 (LEB Resolution 16-2011) — The LEB considers a
small student population in a law school as not financially viable and would result in
"substandard legal education," unless subsidized by the management. Thus, a law school
with less than 15 students in the first semester of the first level or with a school population
of less than 60 students is required to explain in writing why it should be allowed to
continue its operations or what remedial measures it shall undertake to address the low
enrollment.
It seems that the LEB has arbitrarily determined that a law school with a school population
of less than 60 students is not financially viable unless subsidized by the management. As
stated in the Whereas Clause, the basis for LEB's conclusion that the cost of legal
education determines its quality is merely stated as "experience, observation and
information." To my mind, the LEB cannot dictate to a law school whether or not it is
financially viable to continue its operation as the latter can, and should, make its own
business decisions.

3. LEB Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2017 (LEBMC No. 2-2017), Submission of
Schedule of Tuition and Other School Fees — All law schools are reminded to follow
section/paragraph 13 of LEB Memorandum Order No. 8, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 8-
2016), i.e., to submit to the LEB the approved schedule of tuition and other school fees for
S.Y. 2015-2016 and S.Y. 2016-2017. This Circular also provides that failure to seasonably
submit the said schedule will bar the non-compliant law school from increasing its tuition
and other school fees in S.Y. 2017-2018.

This Circular's provision on barring a non-compliant law school from increasing its
tuition and other fees has no legal basis and constitutes undue interference with
the law school's management and operations.

4. LEB Memorandum Circular No. 4, Series of 2017 (LEBMC No. 4-2017), Reminder to
Submit Duly Accomplished LSIR Form — The LEB reminded the law schools to submit
the Law School Information Report (LSIR) Form for the second semester of AY 2016-2017
as required under LEB Memorandum Order No. 6, Series of 2016, (LEBMO No. 6-2016).
This Circular also served as a "warning" that "non-compliant law schools shall be subject
to appropriate administrative sanctions, including the imposition of fine up to P10,000."

It is not clear what these "appropriate administrative sanctions" are. Moreover, it is

also unclear what the legal basis is for the said administrative sanctions and for the
imposition of fine up to P10,000.00.

5. LEB Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 2017 (LEBMC No. 6-2017), Applications for
LEB Certification Numbers — This Circular provides that, in lieu of Special Orders issued
by the CHED, legal education institutions are required under LEB Resolution No. 2012-02
to secure LEB Certification Numbers for graduating students of law programs. This
issuance also provides that "LEIs that graduate students without LEB Certification
Numbers due to late submission of applications" shall be imposed the appropriate
sanctions.

Similar to the previous issuances above, it is not clear what these sanctions are. In
addition, the LEBMC unduly interferes with the management of the law schools
 regarding their graduating students.

6. LEB Memorandum Order No. 16, Series of 2018 (LEBMO No. 16-2018), Policies,
Standards, and Guidelines for the Academic Law Libraries of Law Schools — Pursuant to
LEB Resolution No. 2018-207, this issuance contains detailed requirements for the
operation of a law library, such as: (a) its size should "adequately contain the entire law
collection and seat comfortably fifteen percent (15%)" of the entire law school population;
(b) there should be an exclusive reading area for faculty members; (c) the operating hours
shall not be less than 6 hours a day; (d) qualifications and development training of the
librarian; (e) required number of copies and kinds of books, as well as foreign and
online/digital sources; (f) if wireless internet connection is not available to students, the
required number of internet workstations shall be increased to such number equivalent to
the ratio of 1 for every 50 students; (g) transitory provisions which states that non-
compliant law schools shall be given three (3) months to meet this issuance requirements;
and (h) failure to meet any of the requirements shall constitute non-compliance with the
prescribed minimum standards for the law program and shall be subject to the appropriate
administrative sanctions under Nos. 1 and 2 of the said issuance.
While the objectives of providing for a good law library is laudable, the stringent
requirements and its corresponding costs may strain the law school's resources, or
worse, unduly burden the students with increased fees simply to allow the law
school to immediately comply with the provisions of the said issuance.
7. LEB Memorandum Order No. 18, Series of 2018 (LEBMO No. 18-2018), Guidelines on
Cancellation or Suspension of Classes in All Law Schools — Pursuant to LEB Resolution
No. 2018-344, this LEBMO provides that there will be automatic national suspension of
classes upon declaration of the Office of the President or when Signal No. 3 is raised by
Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration. Without
these conditions, the suspension shall depend on Local Government Unit declaration.
Since this issuance merely provides for guidelines on cancellation or suspension of
classes in law schools, it is bemusing that there is a clause therein which states that
failure to comply with any of its provisions shall be subject to appropriate administrative
sanctions under Nos. 1 and 2 of the said issuance.

These issuances by the LEB can evidently be classified as unreasonable and unduly burden
some to the operations of the law schools — which clearly go beyond its mandate. The LEB ought to be
reminded that under administrative law, "administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid." [114]

ii. R.A. 7662's provision on law practice internship

With regard to the provision in R.A. 7662 empowering the LEB to impose an internship
[115]
requirement as a prerequisite to take the Bar examinations, I agree with the ponencia's ruling that
the said provision of law is unconstitutional on its face. Section 7 (g) of R.A. 7662 provides that the LEB
is granted the power:

g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar

which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or
 firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the
Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the
Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the
specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of
the Bar.

To my mind, the ponencia correctly holds that the aforequoted provision encroaches on the
power of the Supreme Court to prescribe the requirement for admission to the Bar as provided under
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every
applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at
least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines;
and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or
are pending in any court in the Philippines.

In his Amicus Brief, Dean Candelaria also noted that some of the provisions of R.A. 7662 are in
apparent conflict with the power of the Court to promulgate rules and that law practice internship and
mandatory continuing legal education are both subjects of Court rules and issuances. [116]

From the foregoing, it is my view that the ponencia was justified in striking down the particular
provision of R.A. 7662 for being unconstitutional.

Conclusion

To end, I reiterate my agreement with the ponencia's conclusions for the reasons I have already
discussed above.
Verily, after a meticulous review of the circulars, memorandum orders and other issuances of the
LEB, it has become apparent that the LEB has committed acts of overreach, clearly going beyond mere
supervision of law schools. A careful analysis of how the LEB exercised and continues to exercise its
powers readily reveals that the LEB is already unduly interfering and meddling with the law schools' right
to determine who may teach, what may be taught, how to teach and who may be admitted to study. As
illustrated above, the exercise of the LEB's powers are evidently beyond reasonable supervision and
regulation by the State.

Perhaps, if the various LEB rules and regulations cited here were merely recommendatory in
nature or were mere guidelines (following the intent of the Constitutional Commissioners), then the
exercise of the LEB's power could possibly pass constitutional muster. However, this is not the case.
As seen from the discussion above, the many issuances of the LEB were imposed on the law schools
under pain of administrative sanctions — which include the closing down of the law school for non-
compliance. The questionable issuances cited here show that the LEB is exercising the power to
control, manage, dictate, overrule, prohibit and dominate the law schools — in absolute
disregard of the Constitutional guarantee of academic freedom. As such, the Court is called upon in
this case to curb the abuse, and to strike down these issuances for being violative of the Constitutional
right of the law schools to exercise academic freedom.

In view of the foregoing, I concur with the ponencia in PARTLY GRANTING the petitions and in
declaring the following:

The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education is UPHELD.
The Court further declares:

As CONSTITUTIONAL:

1. Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board
the power to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into
account, among others, the qualifications of the members of the faculty
without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher
learning; and
2. Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board
the power to prescribe the minimum requirements for admission to legal
education and minimum qualifications of faculty members without
encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the Court:

1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes "continuing

legal education" as an aspect of legal education which is made subject to
State supervision and control;
2. Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on
the objective of legal education to increase awareness among members of
the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors
of society;
3. Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011
insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to establish a law
practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar; and

4. Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011
insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to adopt a system of
mandatory continuing legal education and to provide for the mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as it
may deem necessary.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:

1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting,
and qualifying admissions to law schools in violation of the institutional
academic freedom on who to admit, particularly:
a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college
graduates or graduating students applying for admission to the basic
law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for
admission to any law school in the Philippines and that no applicant
shall be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law
courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor
unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within 2 years before
the start of studies for the basic law course;
b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the taking and passing of the
PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for admission to law schools.
 Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on March 12,
2019 enjoining the Legal Education Board from implementing LEBMC
No. 18-2018 is made PERMANENT. The regular admission of
students who were conditionally admitted and enrolled is left to the
discretion of the law schools in the exercise of their academic
freedom; and
c. Sections 15, 16, 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011[.]
2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the
qualifications and classification of faculty members, dean, and dean of
graduate schools of law in violation of institutional academic freedom on who
may teach, particularly:
a. Sections 41.2(d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

b. Resolution No. 2014-02;

c. Sections 31(2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2; [and]
d. LEBMO No. 17, Series of 2018; and (sic)
3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on
the establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs in
violation of institutional academic freedom on what to teach, particularly:
a. Resolution No. 2015-08;
b. Section 24(c) of LEBMO No. 2; and

c. Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011. [117]

Additionally, after reviewing the various issuances of the LEB beyond those covering the
PhiLSAT, I also vote to declare the following as UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating the institutional
academic freedom of the law schools as well as the individual academic freedom of the law faculty:

1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications and
classification of faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law in violation of
institutional and individual academic freedom on who may teach, particularly:

a. Sections 33.1 (4), 33.1 (5), 34 (d), 35 (1) and 35 (3) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.

2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on the
establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs, as well as its
unreasonable intrusion into the formulation of the law schools' curricula, in violation of
institutional academic freedom on what to teach, particularly:

a. Sections 3 and 4 of LEBMO No. 2-2013;

b. Sections 33 (6), 53, 54, 55 and 58 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

c. LEBMO No. 5-2016; and

d. LEBMO No. 14-2018.

3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the manner by which legal
education institutions and law school professors conduct the teaching of law courses, in
violation of institutional and individual academic freedom on how to teach, particularly:
 a. Sections 18 (a), 18 (c) 18 (d), 20, 41.2, 58 and 59 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

b. Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of LEBMO No.
2-2013; and

c. LEBMO No. 10-2017.

4. Other issuances of the Legal Education Board which are arbitrary, unreasonable, or
issued ultra vires, i.e.:

a. Sections 20, 21, 24, 33.1, 34, 37, 43 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

b. LEBMO No. 23-2019;

c. LEBMO No. 16-2018;

d. LEBMO No. 18-2018;

e. LEB Resolution No. 7-2010;

f. LEB Resolution No. 16-2011;

g. LEBMC No. 2-2017;

h. LEBMC No. 4-2017; and

i. LEBMC No. 6-2017.

JARDELEZA, J., concurring and dissenting:

[1]
Petitioners in the present consolidated cases seek the Court's issuance of a writ of prohibition
and a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to keep the Legal Education Board
(herein after referred to as the "LEB Law") from holding the Nationwide Uniform Law School Admission
Test (PhilSAT) for, among others, its violation of academic freedom. They also ultimately pray that
Republic Act No. 7662, [2] the LEB Law be stricken down as unconstitutional, for its encroachment on
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in promulgating rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law, as provided for in Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution.

I concur with the ponencia insofar as it holds that the Court has no jurisdiction over legal
[3]
education. Both statutory history and legislative intent contemplate a separation between legal
education and the law profession; and the regulation and supervision of legal education, including
admissions thereto, fall within the scope of the State's police power. However, and for reasons I shall
hereinafter set out, I must dissent from the majority's ruling to partially nullify Legal Education Board
Memorandum Order (LEBMO) No. 7-2015 "insofar as it absolutely prescribes the passing of the
PhiLSAT x x x as a pre-requisite for admission to any law school which, on its face, run directly counter
to institutional academic freedom." [4]

With respect, I submit that: (I) the invocation of academic freedom as a ground for the partial
nullification of the challenged LEBMO is misplaced; (II) the provision by the State of a standardized
exclusionary exam for purposes of admission to a law school is a valid exercise of police power; and (III)
the resolution of the challenge against the State regulation's reasonableness involve underlying
questions of fact which cannot be resolved by this Court at the first instance.

My above reservation is heightened by my own research which yields a conclusion different from
the conclusion of fact reached by the ponencia [5] that the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
upheld in Tablarin v. Gutierrez [6] does not have a cut-off or passing score requirement. As I shall also
hereinafter show, the NMAT is no different from the PhiLSAT insofar as it also employs an exclusionary
(or, in the words of the ponencia, "totalitarian") scheme in terms of student admissions. [7] I see no
reason why both tests should merit different treatment.

I
A

My survey of its venerable history and application in Philippine jurisprudence convince me that
the concept of academic freedom has different applications, depending on the character of the party
invoking it as a right. And, in instances when academic freedom has been invoked as a personal right —
that is, one in favor of individuals (whether an educator or a student), the same has been always been
inextricably linked (or discussed in relation) to said individual's broader freedom of expression.
1

The concept of academic freedom began in medieval Europe, where it was used as to protect
universities as a community of scholars against ecclesiastical and political intrusion. It was then carried
over to Latin America, where it was used to create sanctuaries out of universities for people who were
[8]
under political persecution. Academic freedom thereafter developed as a legal right consisting of
three key concepts: (1) the philosophy of intellectual freedom for teachers and scholars; (2) the idea of
autonomy for the university as a community of scholars; and (3) the guarantee of free expression in the
Constitution. [9]
Similarly, the conceptualization of academic freedom in the United States (U.S.) is that it exists to
protect scholarship in higher education from untoward political intrusions, mainly through allowing
universities to enjoy autonomy over policies of education. [10] Furthermore, while it is conceded to
overlap with civic free speech, academic freedom is delineated from the former by limiting it as
professional speech within higher education, rather than the rights of expression granted to citizens
against broader governmental interference. [11]

The first mention of academic freedom in a U.S. Supreme Court case came with the promulgation
of Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York. [12] This case involved a New York State statute
[13]
which required public employees to take loyalty oaths as a condition for their continued employment,
and effectively banned state employees from belonging to "subversive groups" under pains of
termination. Although the statute was upheld by the Court as a valid exercise of police power, [14] Justice
William Douglas, [15] in his key Dissenting Opinion, couched the discourse of academic freedom within
the context of freedom of thought and expression. He opined:

x x x The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression to everyone

in our society. All are entitled to it, and none needs it more than the teacher.

The public school is, in most respects, the cradle of our democracy. The increasing
role of the public school is seized upon by proponents of the type of legislation
represented by New York's Feinberg law as proof of the importance and need for keeping
the school free of "subversive influences." But that is to misconceive the effect of this type
of legislation. Indeed, the impact of this kind of censorship on the public-school system
illustrates the high purpose of the First Amendment in freeing speech and thought from
censorship.

xxx xxx xxx

 The very threat of such a procedure is certain to raise havoc with academic
freedom. Youthful indiscretions, mistaken causes, misguided enthusiasms — all long
forgotten — become the ghosts of a harrowing present. Any organization committed to a
liberal cause, any group organized to revolt against an (sic) hysterical trend, any
committee launched to sponsor an unpopular program, becomes suspect. These are the
organizations into which Communists often infiltrate. Their presence infects the whole,
even though the project was not conceived in sin. A teacher caught in that mesh is
almost certain to stand condemned. Fearing condemnation, she will tend to shrink
from any association that stirs controversy. In that manner, freedom of expression
will be stifled. [16] (Emphasis supplied.)

In the same year, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Wieman v. Updegraff, [17] where it
struck down as unconstitutional a "loyalty oath" statute [18] required of state employees, including the
faculty and staff of Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, which had the effect of excluding
persons from state employment solely on the basis of membership in organizations tagged as
"subversive," regardless of their knowledge of the activities and purposes of said organizations. [19]

Justice Hugo Black, in his Concurring Opinion in Wieman, explained that test oaths were
notorious tools of tyranny that inevitably stifle freedom of expression and freedom of the press, and is
counter to the crucial uncompromising interpretation of the Bill of Rights. [20] In support, Justice Felix
Frankfurter cautioned that statutes that unwarrantedly inhibit the free spirit of teachers will create a
chilling effect on that spirit, which is what teachers "ought to especially cultivate and practice." He added
that such "fundamental principles of liberty" inevitably go into the nature of the role that teachers play in
any given democratic society, and that these freedoms of thought and expression importantly bear on
the teachers' capacity to encourage open-mindedness and critical inquiry in the people. [21]
[22]
Four years after Adler and Wieman, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, [23] gave a landmark pronouncement in its recognition and acceptance of academic freedom
and its grounding in the Constitution. This case involved a New Hampshire statute, pursuant to which
Paul Sweezy (Sweezy), then a professor at the University of New Hampshire, was interrogated by the
New Hampshire Attorney General about his suspected affiliations with communism. Sweezy refused to
answer a number of questions about his lectures in class, on the ground that they were unrelated to the
purpose of the investigation and that the questions infringed upon an area protected by the First
Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Sweezy's favor and, echoing Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Wieman, held that academic inquiries must be left "as unfettered as possible"
where "political power must abstain from intrusion into this activity of freedom." [24]
[25]
Two years after Sweezy, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Barenblatt v. United States,
[26]
a case involving alleged infringement of First Amendment rights, had occasion to qualify the liberal
approach on academic freedom. Speaking through Justice John Marshall Harlan, the Court moderated
the safeguarding of academic freedom, and held that it was not immune to warranted interrogation by
the legislature, to wit:

x x x Of course, broadly viewed, inquiries cannot be made into the teaching that is
pursued in any of our educational institutions. When academic teaching — freedom and
its corollary, learning —, freedom, so essential to the well-being of the Nation, are
claimed, this Court will always be on the alert against intrusion by Congress into this
constitutionally protected domain. But this does not mean that the Congress is precluded
 from interrogating a witness merely because he is a teacher. An educational institution is
not a constitutional sanctuary from inquiry into matters that may otherwise be within the
constitutional legislative domain merely for the reason that inquiry is made of someone
within its walls. [27]

Finally, in the 1967 case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents, [28] the Supreme Court overturned its
decision in Adler, and extended First Amendment protection to academic freedom. Keyishian involved
faculty members and a non-teaching employee of the State University of New York whose employment
contracts were terminated or not renewed when they refused (or failed) to submit a "Feinberg Certificate"
[29]
required under Section 3021 of the New York Education Law. Under such document, the individual
certifies that he is not a Communist and that he has never advocated or been a member of a group
which advocated forceful overthrow of the Government. [30] In striking down the statute as
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court, citing Shelton v. Tucker, [31] held that though the governmental
purpose may have been legitimate and substantial, that purpose could not be undertaken too broadly as
to "stifle fundamental personal liberties." [32]
In the Philippines, the term "academic freedom" first appeared in the 1935 Constitution, under
Article XIV, Section 5, as a liberty to be enjoyed by state universities:

Sec. 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and

subject to regulation by the State. The Government shall establish and maintain a
complete and adequate system of public education, and shall provide at least free public
primary instruction, and citizenship training to adult citizens. All schools shall aim to
develop moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and vocational efficiency,
and to teach the duties of citizenship. Optional religious instruction shall be maintained in
the public schools as now authorized by law. Universities established by the State shall
enjoy academic freedom. The State shall create scholarships in arts, science, and letters
for specially gifted citizens. (Emphasis supplied.)

It was restated in the 1973 Constitution in Article XV, Section 8 (2) and was expanded in
application to cover both private and public institutions of higher learning, to wit:

Sec. 8. x x x. —

xxx xxx xxx

(2) All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The above provision on academic freedom as a constitutional right was further refined and
developed through its amendment in the 1987 Constitution in Article XIV, Section 5 (2):

Sec. 5. x x x. —

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

(Emphasis supplied.)

This amendment in the academic freedom clause was explained as a categorical shift from the
previous conception that academic freedom was solely institutional in nature, to be enjoyed only by the
institutions themselves, to the present belief that said grant is given not only to the institutions
themselves, but to the individual stakeholders (teachers, researchers and students) within said institution
as well. [33]
Among others, the critical import of academic freedom has been seen in the dynamics of
Philippine national life, where it became a necessary tool used by faculty members and students of an
institution to "re-examine existing knowledge and reweigh the prevailing values so dearly cherished by
the majority." [34] During the period of Martial Law, for instance, especially during the rise of student
activism during the First Quarter Storm, universities served as refuge for those who were politically
targeted by the ruling regime, under the protection of the academic freedom that the universities
enjoyed. The nature of academic freedom as a right has been seen as a furtherance of the right to
freedom of expression, that is, faculty members and students, as stakeholders of the institutions of
higher learning, enjoy the freedom of expression even if they are within the university. [35] The general
perception, in fact, appears to be that academic freedom is not only enshrined in the Constitution, but is
part and parcel of one's freedom of expression. [36]
[37]
In the case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, the
Court, in discussing the concept of academic freedom, held:

2. Nor is this all. There is, as previously noted, the recognition in the
Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoying academic freedom. It is more often
identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty
and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that
retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful
or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic
establishments. For the sociologist, Robert McIver it is "a right claimed by the accredited
educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his
conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization
because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or
beyond the institution." As for the educator and philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his
version: "What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally
qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field
of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority except the control or authority
of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought and established in these
disciplines."

3. That is only one aspect though. Such a view does not comprehend fully the
scope of academic freedom recognized by the Constitution. For it is to be noted that the
reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It would
follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself
its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It
has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This
constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a gradging
fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. Former President Vicente
G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of
the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the university as an
institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor." He cited
the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon, France,
 President of the conference of rectors and vice-chancellors of European universities: "'It is
a well-established fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions
of the problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization is by no means
the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of
freedom are not even necessarily connected. In considering the problems of academic
freedom one must distinguish, therefore, between the autonomy of the university, as a
corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university teacher.'" Also: "To clarify
further the distinction between the freedom of the university and that of the individual
scholar, he says: The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university
teacher — recognized and effectively guaranteed by society — to seek and express the
truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private
citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as important, in
considering academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and
through which they disseminate their learning.'" x x x [38] (Underscoring supplied.)
Garcia and subsequent cases would show the Court's attempts to outline the distinction between
[39]
academic freedom as a right enjoyed by the educational institution, or its individual stakeholders
such as the teacher/researcher/educator [40] or student. [41]

B
In this case, and save for petitioner-intervenor St. Thomas More School of Law and Business (St.
Thomas More), all petitioners appear to be individual educators and students. There is no assertion
(much less proof) from any of them that the challenged LEB Law, in general, and the imposition of the
PhiLSAT passing requirement, in particular, infringes on their personal rights to freedom of expression.
This, to my mind, is precisely the reason why the ponencia itself focused on the concept of academic
freedom as enjoyed by an educational institution, specifically, the "freedom of law schools to determine
for itself who may be admitted to legal education x x x." [42]

On this score, I have examined the petition-in-intervention filed by St. Thomas More, which raised
the following causes of action and arguments:

(1) The imposition of the PHILSAT passing requirement would inevitably lead to a
decrease in law student enrollees which will, in turn, "result to an increase in tuition fees x
x x to recover lost revenue x x x" and "in effect puts law schools away from the reach of
the poor students in the provinces;" [43]

(2) The imposition of the PHILSAT passing requirement "arbitrarily encroaches on the
academic freedom of the Dean of St. Thomas More to choose its students" on the basis of
"values, character, sense of honesty, ethics, and sense of service to others and to
society;" [44]

(3) The imposition of the PHILSAT passing requirement is unfair and unreasonable;
[45]

(4) The LEB Law clearly provides that the intent was to improve legal education, not
regulate access thereto; [46]

(5) The ruling of the Court in Tablarin v. Judge Gutierrez [47] sustaining the
constitutionality of the National Medical Admissions Test (NMAT) is inapplicable; [48] and
 (6) The LEB Law is an undue delegation of legislative power. [49]

Of the six foregoing issues, only one (issue No. 2) textually references the concept of academic
freedom. Indeed, the freedom to determine who may be admitted to study is among the "four essential
freedoms" accorded an educational institution. This freedom, however, is by no means absolute; it must
be balanced with important state interests "which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of
[50]
the greater majority." It is beyond cavil that the State has an interest in prescribing regulations to
promote the education and the general welfare of the people. [51]

In this case, the ponencia itself declares that "the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude
test, is reasonably related to the State's unimpeachable interest in improving the quality of legal
education." [52] I find that, in addition to the avowed policy to improve legal education, the provision of
the PhiLSAT Passing Requirement may also serve to discourage the proliferation of the "great evil"
sought to be corrected by the "permit system." [53] As the ponencia cites, Act No. 3162, back in 1924,
created the Board of Educational Survey which made "factual findings" that "a great majority of schools
from primary grade to the university are money-making devices of persons who organize and administer
[54]
them." Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, in his report to the Legal Education Summit on July 31, 2019,
representing the Legal Education Board Charter Cluster, admitted to the continued existence of "non-
performing" law schools. Thus, it is my view that the Court should carefully weigh casting in stone a rule
leaving to a law school the unbridled discretion to determine for itself the PhilSAT passing score for
purposes of admission to legal education. In fact, I would argue that the provision of minimum standards
(such as a minimum PhiLSAT passing score) for admission to law schools is, in principle, no different
[55]
from the provision of standards on matters such as the maximum rates of tuition fee increases, the
location and construction of school buildings, the adequacy of library, laboratory and classroom facilities,
the maximum number of students per teacher, and qualifications of teachers, among others. Such
standards, which are also police power measures instituted in furtherance of the public interest, arguably
have some effect on an educational institution's "essential freedoms."

II

While the ponencia would hold that the PhiLSAT, as an aptitude test, passes the test of
reasonableness, it declares the challenged LEB Law issuance unreasonable to the extent that it is
exclusionary, that is, it provides a cut-off score which effectively forces law schools, under pain of
administrative sanctions, to choose students only from a "[s]tate-determined pool of applicants x x x." [56]
I disagree.

There is nothing constitutionally abhorrent with the provision by the State of a standardized
exclusionary exam. This has long been settled in the case of Tablarin v. Gutierrez. [57] There, the Court
upheld the taking and passing of the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a national prerequisite
for admission to all medical schools in the Philippines since academic year 1986-1987, pursuant to the
Republic Act No. 2382, otherwise known as the "Medical Act of 1959," and under Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Order No. 52 series of 1985:

x x x MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of
admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who
 exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical
practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of
our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like
the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection
of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in,
for instance, medical schools in the United States of America the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably in other countries with far more developed
educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the
petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation
in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, contrary to the ponencia's findings, I do not see any difference in how the NMAT
[58]
and the PhiLSAT are meant to (or even actually) operate. Both are, in fact, exclusionary exams.
Permit me to explain.

Under Department of Education (DepEd) Department Order (DO) No. 52, Series of 1985, the
NMAT, as a uniform admission test, was required to be "successfully hurdled by all college graduates
seeking admission into medical schools in the Philippines, beginning the school year 1986-1987."
Although the same DO provides that the NMAT rating of an applicant will be considered "with other
admission requirements" as basis for the issuance of a Certificate of Eligibility, it also provides that no
such Certificate will be issued without the required NMAT qualification (that is, meeting the cut-off score
— which shall be determined by the Board of Medical Education on a yearly basis). That the NMAT,
similar to the PhiLSAT, was meant to be exclusionary in nature is clear from DepEd DO No. 11,
issued subsequently in 1987, which provides that the cut-off score of 45th percentile shall be
followed for the December 6, 1987 and April 24, 1988 NMAT examinations.

In fact, this exclusionary nature appears to subsist to this day. Memorandum Order No. 18, Series
of 2016 [59] issued by the Commission on Higher Education [60] provides, to wit.

17.3 Minimum Standards for Admission

Applicants seeking admission to the medical education program must have the
following qualifications:
a. Holder of at least a baccalaureate degree;
b. Must have taken the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) not more than two
(2) years from the time of admission, with a percentile score equivalent to or
higher than that currently prescribed by the school or the [CHED], whichever
is higher:
c. The applicant shall submit the following documents to the medical schools:
• xxx
• xxx
 • Certified true copy of NMAT score

17.4 Certificate of Eligibility for Admission to Medical School

a. On the basis of foregoing documents, the medical school is responsible for and
accountable for the issuance of the Certificate of Eligibility for Admission to medical
school.
b. xxx
c. Likewise, it is also the responsibility of the medical school to verify the authenticity
of the NMAT score against the master list provided by the recognized testing
center.

17.5 NMAT Score cut off

a. An NMAT score cut-off of at least 40th percentile will be implemented by all
higher educational institutions offering medical program.
b. Medical schools are hereby required to declare their NMAT cut-off score as part of
their Annual Report (electronic and hard copy) to be submitted to CHED.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Thus, even under the present rule, students who fail to get an NMAT score of 40th percentile (or
the declared cut-off score of their chosen medical school, whichever is higher) will not be issued a
Certificate of Eligibility and therefore cannot be admitted to medical school. Clearly, the NMAT is no
different from the PhiLSAT insofar as it also employs an exclusionary (or, in the words of the ponencia,
[61]
"totalitarian") scheme in terms of student admissions. I therefore see no reason why both tests
should merit different treatment. The principle behind this Court's ruling in Tablarin should be applied
here.

III
A

The other allegations against the LEB Law, in general, and the PhiLSAT passing requirement, in
particular, seem to be challenges against its reasonableness as a police power measure. What is
"reasonable," however, is not subject to exact definition or scientific formulation. There is no all-
[62]
embracing test of reasonableness; its determination rests upon human judgment as applied to the
facts and circumstances of each particular case. [63]
The consolidated petitions all sought direct recourse with this Court. As We have most recently
[64]
reaffirmed in Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications, direct resort to
this Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of law:

x x x Save for the single specific instance provided by the Constitution under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, cases the resolution of which depends on the
determination of questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court
because we are not a trier of facts. We are not equipped, either by structure or rule,
to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these are the primary
functions of the lower courts or regulatory agencies. This is the raison d'être behind
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism
designed to enable this Court to focus on the more fundamental tasks assigned to it by
the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed aside by an
 invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of the
issue or cause raised. [65] (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)
I submit that the Court should refrain from resolving the challenges against the reasonableness of
the LEB Law (and related issuances) at this time. Taking issue at reasonableness, equity or fairness of a
state action, in a vacuum and divorced from the factual circumstances that suffer the same, would mean
that this Court will have to adjudicate (in my view, wrongly) based on conjectures and unsupported
presuppositions. As it appears, this Court will be settling controversies based on unsupported allegations
[66]
or, worse, grounds not even pleaded or raised by the parties. [67] Allegations and counter-allegations
against the constitutionality and/or reasonableness of a challenged state action need to be proven in
evidence, otherwise they may be no more than uncorroborated rhetoric.
Given this fact-based nature of the question of reasonableness of an exercise of police power,
the present questions pertaining to the propriety or validity of the PhiLSAT should be dismissed at this
point and given its turn in a trial, where the equipped lower court may first resolve questions of fact, such
as whether the PhiLSAT as administered by the LEB meets the careful design that our legislators
intended.

Mere invocation of a constitutional right, in this case, academic freedom, does not excuse the
parties so invoking from actually proving their case through evidence. This is chiefly true in a petition that
seeks the invalidation of a law that enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving
one's cause through evidence must rise against the bar that gives the challenged law default
constitutionality. As We held in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v.
City Mayor of Manila, [68] citing O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.: [69]
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the
necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is
void on its [face,] which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better
expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,
where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly
summed up the matter thus:
"The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the
scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground
that the [specific] method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and
hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of
this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute."

No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the

lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of
[facts], the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside. [70] (Emphasis supplied.)
The tall order, therefore, to overturn the constitutional presumption in favor of a law must be
through a conclusive "factual foundation," the absence of which must inevitably result in the upholding of
the constitutionality of the challenged law.
 Until the decisive factual questions are determined in the context of a trial, this Court should
refrain from making an effective pronouncement as to the validity or invalidity of the PhiLSAT. The wide-
ranging consequences of the issues raised in these petitions, when decided, all the more call for
prudence and constitutionally-intended restraint until all the factual components that bear on these
issues are ascertained and definitively settled. The Philippine legal education and the legal profession
are worthy of no less.

Finally, to strike down a legislative act on the basis of unalleged or unestablished factual
conclusions that essentially came nowhere near their burdens of proof is the height of disservice to the
causes these parties before us sought to protect, whether that be a student's right to education, a law
school's institutional academic freedom or the State's duty to supervise and regulate education that is
invested with public interest.

This Court will serve no other and but expediency in insisting to deem ripe the unquestionably
paramount but undoubtedly premature question of whether an examination that fundamentally seeks to
improve the state of the country's legal education is succeeding or failing on its promise.
For all the foregoing reasons, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Footnotes

* Also referred to as "Jocelyn L. Daño" in some parts of the rollo.

* No part.

** On official business.

1. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REFORMS IN LEGAL EDUCATION, CREATING FOR THE PURPOSE,
A LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

2. See In Re: Legal Education, B.M. No. 979-B, September 4, 2001 (Resolution).

3. Republic Act No. 7662, Sec. 4.

4. Id. at Sec. 5.

5. In Re: Legal Education, B.M. No. 979-B, supra note 2.

6. Id.

7. Id.

8. Id.

9. Id.

10. LEBMO No. 7-2016, par. 1.

11. Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. I, p. 216.

12. LEBMO No. 7-2016, supra, par. 2.

13. Id. at par. 10.

14. Id. at par. 1.

15. Id. at par. 2.

16. Id. at par. 3.

17. Id. at par. 4.

18. Id. at par. 5.

19. Id. at par. 6.

20. Id. at par. 7.

21. Id. at par. 8.

22. Id. at par. 9.

23. Id. at par. 10.

24. Id. at par. 11.

25. Id. at par. 12.

26. Id. at par. 13.

27. Id. at par. 14.

28. Sec. 32. The imposable administrative sanctions are the following:

a) Termination of the law program (closing the law school);

b) Phase-out of the law program; and

c) Provisional cancellation of the Government Recognition and putting the law program of the
substandard law school under Permit Status.

29. Additional Rules in the Operation of the Law Program.

30. LEBMO No. 7-2016, par. 15.

31. LEBMO No. 11-2017, par. 2.

32. Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. I, pp. 6-22.

33. Id. at 8-11.

34. Id. at 38-59.

35. Id. at 289-320.

36. Rollo (G.R. No. 242954), Vol. I, pp. 3-39.

37. Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. III, pp. 1309-1311.

38. Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following power:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, and the integration of the Bar which, however, may be repealed, altered, or
supplemental by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

39. Sec. 8. x x x. —

(5) The [Judicial and Bar] Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to
the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to
it.

40. Republic Act No. 7622, Sec. 7. Powers and Functions. — x x x

xxx xxx xxx

(c) [T]o set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the
size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other
facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning[.]
(Emphasis supplied)

41. Sec. 7. (e) [T]o prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and
compensation of faculty members[.] (Emphasis supplied)

42. Sec. 7. (h) [T]o adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may
provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration
as the Board may deem necessary[.] (Emphases supplied)

43. Sec. 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. — (a) Legal education in the
Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) [T]o increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
deprived and oppressed sectors of society[.] (Emphasis supplied)

44. Sec. 7. (g) [T]o establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a
law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal
assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide,
but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the
necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall
include the actual work of a new member of the Bar[.] (Emphasis supplied)

45. Sec. 2. Declaration of Policies. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the
standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-
solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the ethics of the legal profession; to impress on
 them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an equal and indispensable
partner of the Bench in the administration of justice and to develop social competence.

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system,
require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal
apprenticeship and continuing legal education. (Emphasis supplied)

46. Rollo (G.R. No. 242954), Vol. I, p. 29.

47. Id. at 86-87.

48. 236 Phil. 768 (1987).

49. 716 Phil. 208 (2013).

50. Tablarin v. Gutierrez, supra.

51. In support, petitioners-in-intervention attached to their Partial Compliance and Motion,

certifications issued by St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc., St. Mary's College of
Tagum, Inc. College of Law, and Western Leyte College School of Law tending to show a decrease
in the number of enrollees from academic year 2017 to 2018 to academic year 2018 to 2019. They
also attached a Summary of Enrollment (of 44 out of the 126 law schools) furnished by the
Philippine Association of Law Schools which tend to show that 37 out of the 44 law schools
experienced a decrease in enrollment. (Rollo [G.R. No. 242954], Vol. III, pp. 1463-1477).

52. Art. VIII, Sec. 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as may be established by law.

53. Art. X, Sec. 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts
as may be established by law. The Batasang Pambansa shall have the power to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section five hereof.

54. Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

55. See Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 883, 909-910 (2003).

56. RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1, provides:

Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
 annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

57. Id. at Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

58. Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc., 802 Phil. 116, 136 (2016).

59. Id. at 139.

60. Ocampo v. Enriquez, 798 Phil. 227, 294 (2016).

61. 732 Phil. 1, 121 (2014).

62. Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.

63. Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 531 (2014), citing Holy Spirit Homewoners Association, Inc. v.
Defensor, 529 Phil. 573, 587 (2006).

64. Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, supra.

65. Supra note 55, at 891-892.

66. 757 Phil. 534, 544 (2015).

67. G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017, 835 SCRA 350.

68. G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018.

69. Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 73 (2009). See also Angara v. Electoral Commission,
63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936), where the Court held that the Court's duty under the Constitution is "to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them."

70. Garcia v. Executive Secretary, id., citing Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra
note 55, at 892.
71. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 471
(2010).

72. Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc., supra note 58, at 140.

73. Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 499 Phil. 281,
304-305 (2005).

74. De Borja v. Pinalakas na Ugnayan ng Maliliit na Mangingisda ng Luzon, Mindanao at Visayas,

G.R. Nos. 185320 and 185348, April 19, 2017, 823 SCRA 550, 571-572.

75. ABAKADA Guro Partylist v. Purisima, 584 Phil. 246, 266 (2008).

76. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629, 686-687 (2010), citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 113-118 (1976) <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/424/1/> and Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138-148 (1974)
<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/419/102/> (visited May 31, 2019).

77. 97 Phil. 806, 809-811 (1955).

78. 718 Phil. 294, 305-306 (2013).

79. 391 Phil. 84, 106-108 (2000).

80. Supra note 61.

81. Id. at 124-126.

82. 721 Phil. 416, 520 (2013).

83. Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 1, p. 11.

84. Id. at 15.

85. Id. at 17.

86. Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 3, pp. 1370-1371.

87. Id. at 1375-1380.

88. Id. at 1381.

89. Id. at 1382.

90. Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 1, p. 304.

91. Rollo (G.R. No. 242954), Vol. 1, p. 22.

92. BAYAN v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 646 (2000) and Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652, 695-
696 (1995).
93. The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and
Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018.

94. Private Hospitals, Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 234448, November 6,
2018.

95. See Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 634 (2000).

96. Funa v. Villar, 686 Phil. 571, 585 (2012).

97. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5), supra note 38.

98. Sec. 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the
study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school
course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any
of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, [E]nglish,
[S]panish, history and economics.

99. Sec. 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who have failed the bar
examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they
show to the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year
review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.

The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall
certify under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects
under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular
subject.

100. Rollo (G.R. No. 242954), Vol. 1, p. 18.

101. Sec. 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other than
those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the examination,
satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed
all prescribed courses [Bachelor of Laws] in a law school or university, officially approved and
recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a
certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further
evidence may be required by the court.

No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be admitted to the
bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school
or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal
law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical
jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

102. Sec. 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd
year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's
clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
 compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or
officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

103. Sec. 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under
the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to
be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

104. Sec. 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules safeguarding privileged communications

between attorney and client shall apply to similar communications made to or received by the law
student, acting for the legal clinic.

105. Sec. 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The law student shall comply with the
standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide
adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action.

106. Supra note 91.

107. Faculty of Civil Law (1734) <http://www.ust.edu.ph/civil-law/> (visited April 1, 2019).

108. Cortes, Irene R. (1994), ESSAYS ON LEGAL EDUCATION, Quezon City: University of the
Philippines, Law Center.

109. The implementation of this Act created a heavy shortage of teachers so the Philippine
Commission authorized the Secretary of Public Instruction to bring to the Philippines 600 teachers
from the United States known as the "Thomasites."

110. Philippine College of Arts and Trade, now known as the Technological University of the
Philippines.

111. Philippine Normal School, now known as the Philippine Normal University.

112. Act No. 74, Sec. 18.

113. University of the Philippines College of Law <law.upd.edu.ph/about-the-college/> (visited April 1,

2019).

114. ESSAYS ON LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 108.

115. Id.

116. AN ACT MAKING THE INSPECTION AND RECOGNITION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND
COLLEGES OBLIGATORY FOR THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES, March 10, 1917.

117. Act No. 2706, Sec. 2. For the purposes of this Act, a private school or college shall be any private
institution for teaching managed by private individuals or corporations, which is not subject to the
authority and regulations of the Bureau of Education, and which offers courses of primary,
intermediate, or secondary instruction, or superior courses in technical, professional, or special
schools, for which diplomas are to be granted or degrees conferred.
118. Id. at Sec. 6. The Secretary of Public Instruction shall from time to time prepare and publish in
pamphlet form the minimum standards required of primary, intermediate, and high schools and
colleges granting the degrees of bachelor of arts, bachelor of science, or any other academic
degrees. He shall also from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimum
standards required of law, medical, dental, pharmaceutical, engineering, and agricultural schools or
colleges and other special schools giving instruction of a technical or professional character.

119. Cited in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, supra note
77, at 812.

120. Id.

121. CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. XIII, Sec. 5, provides:

Sec. 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the
State. The Government shall establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public
education, and shall provide at least free public primary instruction, and citizenship training to adult
citizens. All schools shall aim to develop moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and
vocational efficiency, and to teach the duties of citizenship. Optional religious instruction shall be
maintained in the public schools as now authorized by law. Universities established by the State
shall enjoy academic freedom. The State shall create scholarships in arts, science, and letters for
specially gifted citizens.

122. Enacted on June 8, 1940.

123. Approved on June 14, 1947. Repealed by Republic Act No. 8047 or the BOOK PUBLISHING
INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT ACT.

124. Republic Act No. 139, Sec. 1. Sec. one of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and fifty-seven,
as amended by Acts Numbered Thirty-one hundred and eighty-five, Thirty-four hundred and two,
and Thirty-seven hundred and seventy-two, is further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 1. A board is hereby created which shall be known as the Board on Textbooks and shall have
charge of the selection and approval of textbooks to be used in the public schools. The textbooks
selected and approved shall be used for a period of at least six years from the date of their
adoption.

The textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the Government shall
be submitted to the Board which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks
which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honor of the Government and
people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the general policies of the Government,
or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable.

Decisions of the Board on Textbooks shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of Instruction
upon the recommendation of the National Council of Education.

125. Executive Order No. 94 (1947).

126. Magsalin, M. Jr. (2003), The State of Philippine Legal Education Revisited, Arellano Law and
Policy Review, 4 (1), 38-56 <https://arellanolaw.edu/alpr/v4n1c.pdf> (visited May 31, 2019).
127. Id. at 39.

128. Republic Act No. 1124, AN ACT CREATING A BOARD OF NATIONAL EDUCATION CHARGED
WITH THE DUTY OF FORMULATING GENERAL EDUCATION POLICIES AND DIRECTING THE
EDUCATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE NATION, June 16, 1954. Later on amended by Republic Act
No. 4372 on June 19, 1965.

129. Presidential Decree No. 1 (1972).

130. Under Proclamation No. 1081 (1972).

131. Under Presidential Decree No. 1397 (1978).

132. CONSTITUTION (1973) Art. XV, Sec. 8 (1), provides:

1. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of, and subject to regulation by, the
State. The State shall establish and maintain a complete, adequate, and integrated system of
education relevant to goals of national development.

133. Approved on September 11, 1982.

134. Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, Part III, Chapter 3, Sec. 27, provides:

Sec. 27. Recognition of Schools. — The educational operations of schools shall be subject to their
prior authorization of the government, and shall be affected by recognition. In the case of
government operated schools, whether local, regional, or national, recognition of educational
programs and/or operations shall be deemed granted simultaneously with establishment.

In all other cases the rules and regulations governing recognition shall be prescribed and enforced
by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports defining therein who are qualified to apply,
providing for a permit system, stating the conditions for the grant of recognition and for its
cancellation and withdrawal, and providing for related matters.

135. Id. at Part IV, Chapter 1, Sec. 54. Declaration of Policy. — The administration of the education
system and, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution, the supervision and regulation of
educational institutions are hereby vested in the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, without
prejudice to the provisions of the charter of any state college and university.

136. Id. at Chapter 2, Sec. 59. Declaration of Policy. — Higher education will be granted towards the
provision of better quality education, the development of middle and high-level manpower, and the
intensification of research and extension services. The main thrust of higher education is to achieve
equity, efficiency, and high quality in the institutions of higher learning both public and private, so
that together they will provide a complete set of program offerings that meet both national and
regional development needs.

137. Id. at Sec. 65. Bureau of Higher Education. — The Bureau of Higher Education shall perform the
following functions:

1. Develop, formulate and evaluate programs, projects and educational standards for a higher
education;
 2. Provide staff assistance to the Board of Higher Education in its policy formulation and advisory
functions;

3. Provide technical assistance to encourage institutional development programs and projects;

4. Compile, analyze and evaluate data on higher education; and

5. Perform other functions provided for by law.

138. The State of Philippine Legal Education Revisited, supra note 126.

139. Reorganization of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, Prescribing its Powers and
Functions and for other purposes, Executive Order No. 117 (1987), Sec. 27, provides:

Sec. 27. Change of Nomenclatures. — In the event of the adoption of a new Constitution which
provides for a presidential form of government, the Ministry shall be called Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and the titles Minister, Deputy Minister, and Assistant Minister shall
be changed to Secretary, Undersecretary and Assistant Secretary, respectively.

140. Id. at Sec. 4. Mandate. — The Ministry shall be primarily responsible for the formulation,
planning, implementation and coordination of the policies, plans, programs and projects in the
areas of formal and non-formal education at all levels, supervise all education institutions, both
public and private, and provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete, adequate
and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national development.

141. Book IV, Title VI, Chapter 1, Sec. 1.

142. Id. at Chapter 4, Sec. 10.

143. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. XIV, Sec. 4 (1). The State recognizes the complementary roles of
public and private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision
and regulation of all educational institutions.

144. Approved on March 30, 1989.

145. Art. III. Organization and Administration.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. The administration of a law school shall be governed primarily by its own policies. The
provisions under this Article shall only be suppletory in character.

146. AN ACT CREATING THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION or THE HIGHER

EDUCATION ACT OF 1994.

147. Art. VIII, Sec. 13, provides:

Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and
are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
 same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

148. 105 Phil. 173 (1959).

149. Id. at 176.

150. 112 Phil. 884 (1961).

151. 361 Phil. 73, 88 (1999), as cited in Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017,
837 SCRA 160.

152. Art. X, Sec. 5 (5), provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

153. Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, supra.

154. Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Judge Cabato-Cortes,

627 Phil. 543, 548 (2010).

155. Id. at 549.

156. Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, supra note 148, at 176.

157. In Re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534, 546 (1954).

158. People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 (1958).

159. Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon,
613 Phil. 1, 23 (2009), citing Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 248 Phil. 542, 555 (1988).

160. In Re: Cunanan, supra, at 545.

161. Cayetano v. Monsod, 278 Phil. 235, 242-243 (1991).

162. 57 Phil. 600, 605 (1932).

163. Id.

164. See Amicus Brief of Dean Sedfrey Candelaria, rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 4, pp. 1657-1677.

165. Republic Act No. 8557 or AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY,
DEFINING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
166. Id. at Sec. 3. The PHILJA shall serve as a training school for justices, judges, court personnel,
lawyers and aspirants to judicial posts. For this purpose, it shall provide and implement a
curriculum for judicial education and shall conduct seminars, workshops and other training
programs designed to upgrade their legal knowledge, moral fitness, probity, efficiency, and
capability. It shall perform such other functions and duties as may be necessary in carrying out its
mandate.

167. Id.

168. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 6.

169. As amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated May 20, 1968 and February 13, 1992.

170. In Re: Parazo, 82 Phil. 230, 242 (1948).

171. Id.

172. RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise
provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following
subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law
(Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and
Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercises (in Pleading and Conveyancing).

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take
place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be designated by the
chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First
day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second
day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and
Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises (afternoon).

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 percent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 percent in any subject. In determining the average, the subjects in the
examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 percent; Labor and Social
Legislation, 10 percent; Mercantile Law, 15 percent; Criminal Law, 10 percent; Political and
International Law, 15 percent; Taxation, 10 percent; Remedial Law, 20 percent; Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises, 5 percent.

173. Sec. 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — An applicant who has passed the
required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take
and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.

Sec. 18. Certificate. — The Supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the
bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its
 records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate
shall be his authority to practice.

174. Sec. 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme Court shall keep a roll of all attorneys
admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his
certificate.

175. Sec. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission
as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

176. Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations through
Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March 9, 2010.

177. In Re: Need that Law Student Practicing under Rule 138-A be Actually Supervised during Trial,
Bar Matter No. 730, June 13, 1997 (visited September 3, 2019).

178. Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415, 427 (1968).

179. 22 U.S. 1 (1824) <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/22/1> (visited May 31, 2019).

180. 7 Cush. 53, 85 (1851) <masscases.com/cases/sjc/61/61mass53.html> (visited May 31, 2019).

181. Morfe v. Mutuc, supra note 178, citing United States v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 94 (1910).

182. Id., citing United States v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218, 225 (1915).

183. Id., citing United States v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245, 254 (1915).

184. 127 Phil. 306 (1967).

185. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 246 Phil. 393, 398 (1988).

186. Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919); Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 956, 986 (2000).

187. JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, 93 (1996).

188. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1163 (1957).

189. United States v. Gomez Jesus, supra.

190. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018, citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/406/205/> (visited May 31, 2019).

191. Id.

192. Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education, 408 Phil. 483, 495 (2001).
193. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, supra.

194. Art. XIII, Sec. 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to
regulation by the State.

195. Art. XV, Sec. 8 (1). All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of, and subject to
regulation by, the State. The State shall establish and maintain a complete, adequate, and
integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national development.

196. Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) v. Secretary of Education, supra note
77, at 819.

197. Supra note 195.

198. Sec. 4. (1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the
educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational
institutions.

199. Sec. 12, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of
parents in the rearing of their children:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

200. Supra note 67.

201. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters (268 U.S. 510, 535 [1925]), where the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only."
<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/268/510/> (visited May 30, 2019).

Nevertheless, a shift of responsibility from the parent to the State is observed in the light of the
compulsory education laws. (Brooke Wilkins [2005], Should Public Education be a Federal
Fundamental Right?, Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal, 2005[2], 261-290)
<https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj/vol2005/iss2/8/> (visited May 30, 2019).

202. See Art. 13, Sec. 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which
provides that:

Sec. 3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other than those
established by the public authorities x x x.
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx> (visited May 30, 2019).
203. As a legal concept, supervision is usually understood in relation with the concept of control.
Thus, in Bito-onon v. Yap Fernandez (403 Phil. 693, 702-703 [2011]), the Court held that "
[s]upervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior
body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body. [Officer] in control [lays] down
the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the
act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does
not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely see to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If
the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done to conform to the prescribed
rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act."

204. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, supra note 190.

205. Bernas, Joaquin G. (1958), State "Supervision" and "Regulation" of Private Schools, Philippine
Studies, 6 (3) 295-314 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42719389> (visited May 30, 2019).

206. Id. at 303.

207. Id.

208. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., 557 Phil. 121,
140 (2007).

209. 568 Phil. 658, 702 (2008).

210. 246 Phil. 393, 399 (1988).

211. Supra note 190.

212. Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147, 162 (1991).

213. Article XV, Sec. 8 (2).

214. CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. 13, Sec. 5, provides:

Sec. 5. x x x "Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." x x x

215. Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, 294 Phil. 654, 672 (1993).

216. Id. at 672-673.

217. As notoriously stated in Keyishian v. Board of Regents (385 U.S. 589, 603 [1967]), "academic
freedom x x x is x x x a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."
<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/385/589/> (visited May 31, 2019).

218. Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, supra note 215, at 674.

219. 220 Phil. 379 (1985).

220. 264 Phil. 98 (1990).

221. 214 Phil. 319 (1984).

222. 226 Phil. 596 (1986).

223. 160-A Phil. 929, 943-944 (1975).

224. Id. at 944.

225. 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/354/234/> (visited May

31, 2019).

226. To illustrate, Art. XIV, Sec. 3 (2) of the 1987 Constitution prescribes that all educational
institutions "shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human
rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach
the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character
and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and
technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency." These are understood as mere
guidelines for the State.

227. 243 Phil. 993, 1006 (1988).

228. 408 Phil. 132 (2001).

229. See concurring opinion of Justice Teehankee in Garcia v. The Faculty and Admission Committee,
Loyola School of Theology, supra note 223, at 949.

230. Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas, supra note 49, at 216.

231. Garcia v. The Faculty and Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 223, at
943.

232. Supra note 215, at 661.

233. Republic Act No. 9155 (2001) or the GOVERNANCE OF BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 2001.

234. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, supra note 190.

235. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. XIV, Sec. 2 (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5).

236. IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 58 (August 29, 1986).

237. Id. at 53.

238. Art. 13 (2). The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving
the full realization of this right:

(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all;

(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary
education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and
in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;
 (c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every
appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;

(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons
who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education; [and]

(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate
fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching staff shall be
continuously improved. Supra note 202.

239. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: The Right to
Education (Art. 13). (Twenty-first Session, December 8, 1999)
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838c22.html> (visited May 31, 2019).

240. Id.

241. Art. 26 (1). Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally
accessible to all on the basis of merit. <https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>
(visited May 31, 2019).

242. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 202, at Art. 13 (2)
(c).

243. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: The Right to
Education (Art. 13), supra note 239.

244. Id.

245. Supra note 215, at 675-676.

246. Supra note 219, at 383-384.

247. Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas, supra note 49, at 217.

248. IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 236.

249. B.M. No. 979-B, supra note 2.

250. Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 1, p. 17.

251. Id. at 100.

252. Id. at 101.

253. B.M. No. 979-B, supra note 2.

254. Land Bank of the Philippines v. AMS Farming Corporation, 590 Phil. 170, 203 (2008).

255. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Urgello, 549 Phil. 302, 322 (2007).

256. I RECORD, SENATE 9th CONGRESS 2ND SESSION 458 (August 24, 1993).
 Senator Tolentino: Thank you, Mr. President.

Now, here is one question on which I would like to be enlightened. The Council here may provide for
the minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications to faculty members. I
assume that this law admission means admission to the college of law of the student.

xxx xxx xxx

I assume that minimum standards for law admission here refers [sic] to the requirements that the
student must fulfill before being admitted to the law school. x x x

257. Section 15. Prerequisites to Admission to Law School. — Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court prescribes: "No applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the
study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school
course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any
of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, English, Spanish,
history and economics." (Underscoring supplied)

258. I RECORD, SENATE 9th CONGRESS 2ND SESSION, supra note 256, at 456-457.

259. Id. at 711 (September 22, 1993).

260. Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management,
686 Phil. 357, 372-373 (2012).

261. Re: Proposed Reforms in the Bar Examinations.

262. Supra note 227, at 1005.

263. Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 1, p. 305.

264. Id. at 305 and 1567-1568.

265. Id. at 1564.

266. Id. at 1569.

267. Id. at 1582.

268. Tablarin v. Gutierrez, supra note 48, at 782-784.

269. 259 Phil. 1016, 1021-1022 (1989).

270. Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 223, at 945.

271. See Commission on Higher Education Memorandum Order No. 6 (1996)

<https://ched.gov.ph/cmo-6-s-1996/> (visited May 31, 2019).

272. Id.
273. See CHED Memorandum Order No. 03 (2003) <https://ched.gov.ph/cmo-3-s-2003-2/> (visited
September 3, 2019).

274. The American Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools
2018 to 2019 provide:

Standard 503. ADMISSION TEST

A law school shall require each applicant for admission as a first-year J.D. degree student to take a
valid and reliable admission test to assist the school and the applicant in assessing the applicant's
capability of satisfactorily completing the school's program of legal education. In making
admissions decisions, a law school shall use the test results in a manner that is consistent with the
current guidelines regarding proper use of the test results provided by the agency that developed
the test.

Interpretation 503-1

A law school that uses an admission test other than the Law School Admission Test sponsored by
the Law School Admission Council shall demonstrate that such other test is a valid and reliable test
to assist the school in assessing an applicant's capability to satisfactorily complete the school's
program of legal education.

Interpretation 503-2

This Standard does not prescribe the particular weight that a law school should give to an
applicant's admission test score in deciding whether to admit or deny admission to the applicant.

Interpretation 503-3

(a) It is not a violation of this Standard for a law school to admit no more than 10% of an entering
class without requiring the LSAT from:

(1) Students in an undergraduate program of the same institution as the J.D. program; and/or

(2) Students seeking the J.D. degree in combination with a degree in a different discipline.

(b) Applicants admitted under subsection (a) must meet the following conditions:

(1) Scored at or above the 85th percentile on the ACT or SAT for purposes of subsection (a) (1), or
for purposes of subsection (a) (2), scored at or above the 85th percentile on the GRE or GMAT;
and

(2) Ranked in the top 10% of their undergraduate class through six semesters of academic work, or
achieved a cumulative GPA of 3.5 or above through six semesters of academic work.
<https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2018-
2019ABAStandardsforApprovalofLawSchools/2018-2019-aba-standards-chapter5.pdf> (visited
May 31, 2019).

275. 16. Separability Clause — If any part or provision of this memorandum order is declared invalid
or unconstitutional, all other provisions shall remain valid and effective.
276. Tablarin v. Gutierrez, supra note 48, at 779.

277. Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 1, pp. 119-120.

278. Id. at 123.

279. LEBMO No. 7-2016, provides:

xxx xxx xxx

13. General Average — Beginning in Academic/School Year 2018-2019, the requirement of a

general average of not less than eighty percent (80%) or 2.5 for admission in the basic law course
under Section 23 of [LEBMO No. 1-2011] shall be withdrawn and removed.

280. Supra note 277, at 123 and 136-137.

281. 702 Phil. 191, 201 (2013).

282. G.R. No. 211273, April 18, 2018.

283. Amicus Brief of Dean Sedfrey Candelaria, supra note 164, at 1674.

284. Supra note 277, at 133.

285. Supra note 277, at 191-192.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J., concurring:

1. See fallo of the ponencia, pp. 101-103.

2. "POLICIES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF A NATIONWIDE UNIFORM

LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST FOR APPLICANTS TO THE BASIC LAW COURSES IN ALL
LAW SCHOOLS IN THE COUNTRY," issued on December 29, 2016.

3. Emphases supplied.

4. Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431, 455-456 (2000); emphases and
underscoring supplied.

5. Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. I, p. 216.

6. See LEBMO No. 7-2016, paragraph 2.

7. See LEBMO No. 7-2016, paragraph 14.

8. See LEBMO No. 2-2013, "LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 2:
ADDITIONAL RULES IN THE OPERATION OF THE LAW PROGRAM" (June 1, 2014), Section 32.

9. Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REFORMS IN LEGAL EDUCATION, CREATING FOR THE
PURPOSE A LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as
the "LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM ACT OF 1993," approved on December 23, 1993.

10. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.

11. See Amicus Brief dated March 27, 2019 of Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, p. 5; emphasis and
underscoring supplied.

12. See G.R. Nos. 216930, 217451, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218123 and 218465, October 9, 2018.

13. See id.

14. See Amicus Brief, p. 12.

15. Id. at 7.

16. Id. at 12-13.

17. See Justice Leonen's Separate Dissenting and Concurring Opinion.

18. See id.

19. Strict scrutiny applies to "laws dealing with freedom of the mind." It is also "used today to test the
validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental
rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection." (See White Light Corporation
v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 462-463 [2009].)

20. Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., 602 Phil. 625, 663 (2009); underscoring
supplied.

21. See Republic Act No. 7662, Section 2.

22. See TSN, March 5, 2019, pp. 171-182.

LEONEN, J., dissenting and concurring:

1. Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 160-A Phil. 929, 943 (1975)
[Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

2. J. Makasiar, Dissenting Opinion in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of

Theology, 160-A Phil. 929, 951 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

3. 160-A Phil. 929 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

4. Id. at 943.

5. The institutional academic freedom reflected in Garcia was reiterated in the later case of University
of the Philippines v. Ayson, 257 Phil. 580, 584-585 (1989) [Per J. Bidin, En Banc], where this Court
held that the abolition of the UP College Baguio High School as a decision of the UP Board of
Regents is within its exercise of academic freedom. Thus, as an "institution of higher learning
enjoying academic freedom, the UP cannot be compelled to provide for secondary education."

6. Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 160-A Phil. 929, 944 (1975)
[Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

7. J. Teehankee, Concurring Opinion in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of

Theology, 160-A Phil. 929, 949 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
8. 221 Phil. 601 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas, Second Division].

9. Id. at 611-612.

10. 274 Phil. 414 (1991) [Per J. Medialdea, First Division].

11. 294 Phil. 654 (1993) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].

12. Id. at 675.

13. 258-A Phil. 417 (1989) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division].

14. Id. at 423-424.

15. 244 Phil. 8 (1988) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].

16. 205 Phil. 307 (1983) [Per J. Escolin, Second Division].

17. 300 Phil. 819 (1994) [Per J. Nocon, Second Division].

18. 697 Phil. 31 (2012) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

19. 401 Phil. 431 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].

20. Id. at 455-456.

21. 197 Phil. 713 (1982) [Per J. Fernandez, Second Division].

22. Id. at 724-726.

23. 754 Phil. 590 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

24. Id. at 655-656.

25. 220 Phil. 379 (1985) [Per C.J. Fernando, En Banc].

26. Id. at 384.

27. Id.

28. 298 Phil. 382 (1993) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

29. Id. at 387-388.

30. 214 Phil. 319 (1984) [Per C.J. Fernando, En Banc].

31. 221 Phil. 470 (1985) [Per C.J. Fernando, En Banc].

32. 226 Phil. 596 (1986) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].

33. 264 Phil. 98 (1990) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].

34. 487 Phil. 449 (2004) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].

35. Id. at 474.

36. 236 Phil. 768 (1987) [Per J. Feliciano, En Banc].

37. Id. at 774.

38. Id.

39. Id. at 776-777.

40. Id. at 782.

41. 259 Phil. 1016 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

42. Id. at 1018.

43. Id. at 1019.

44. Id. at 1021-1023.

45. Id. at 1023.

46. 272 Phil. 241 (1991) [Per J. Medialdea, En Banc].

47. Id. at 254.

48. Ponencia, p. 85.

49. Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No. 7 (2016), par. 7.

50. Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No. 7 (2016), par. 9.

51. Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No. 7 (2016), par. 11.

52. Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No. 7 (2016), par. 15.

53. Center for Educational Measurement, Inc., National Medical Admission Test Bulletin of Information
(2019), available at <https://cem-inc.org.ph/nmat/files/upload/BOI_NMAT_Regular2019_web.pdf>
(last accessed on September 9, 2019).

54. Commission on Higher Education Memorandum Order No. 03 (2003) delegates the determination
of the National Medical Admission Test cutoff score to the respective medical schools. Available at
<https://ched.gov.ph/cmo-3-s-2003-2/> (last visited on September 9, 2019).

55. Center for Educational Measurement, Inc., National Medical Admission Test Bulletin of
Information, 6 (2019), available at <https://www.cem-inc.org.ph/National Medical Admission
Test/files/upload/BOI_National Medical Admission Test_Summer_2019.pdf> (last accessed on
September 9, 2019).

56. Ponencia, p. 87.

57. Id.

58. Ralph F. Fuchs, Academic Freedom: Its Basic Philosophy, Function and History, 28 LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 431, 433 (1963), available at
 <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2963&context=lcp> (last visited on
September 9, 2019).

59. David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom
under the First Amendment, 53 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 227, 230 (1990),
available at <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4057&context=lcp> (last
visited on September 9, 2019).

60. Id.

61. J. Makasiar, Dissenting Opinion in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Technology, 160-A Phil. 929, 954-956 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

62. Ateneo De Manila University v. Capulong, 292 Phil. 654, 672-673 [Per J. Romero, En Banc].

63. Id. at 673.

64. See J. Douglas, Dissenting Opinion in Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952), where
the U.S. Supreme Court first mentioned academic freedom as a constitutional right. In Adler,
Justice Douglas stated that "[t]he Constitution guarantees freedom of though and expression to
everyone in our society. All are entitled to it; and none needs it more than the teacher. The public
school is in most respects the cradle of our democracy . . . the impact of this kind of censorship in
the public school system illustrates the high purpose of the First Amendment in freeing speech and
thought from censorship; See also J. Frankfurter, Dissenting Opinion in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952).

65. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).

66. Id. at 251.

67. Ponencia, p. 81.

68. Id.

69. LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MERITOCRACY 17-18 (2016).

70. Id.

71. David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom
under the First Amendment, 53 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 227, 272 (1990),
available at <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4057&context=lcp> (last
visited on September 9, 2019).

72. Law School Admission Council, About the Law School Admission Council, available at
<https://www.lsac.org/about> (last accessed on September 9, 2019).

73. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Destruction of the Holistic Approach to Admissions: The Pernicions
Effects of Rankings, 81 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 322, 323 (2006). Available at
<http://ilj.law.indiana.edu/articles/81/81_1_Johnson.pdf> (last visited on September 9, 2019).
74. The Princeton Review, ABA Accredited Law School, available at
<https://www.princetonreview.com/law-school-advice/law-school-accreditation> (last accessed
August 27, 2019).

75. See Michelle J. Anderson, Legal Education Reform, Diversity, and Access to Justice,
61RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 1014 (2009). Available at
<https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1169&context=cl_pubs> (last visited
on September 9, 2019). Even the Law School Admissions Council, which administers the LSAT,
cautions law schools against over-reliance on LSAT scores in the admissions process.

76. Id.

77. See Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415 (1968) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

78. Id.

79. Id. at 432-433.

80. White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 461 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

81. 596 Phil. 444 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

82. Id. at 461-462.

83. City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 311 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

84. Id.

85. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1166 (1957) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].

86. 101 Phil. 1155 (1957) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].

87. Id. at 1165.

88. TSN dated March 5, 2019, pp. 171-179.

89. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

90. Id. at 329.

91. City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 316 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

92. Id.

93. Id.

94. 495 Phil. 289 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

95. City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 317 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc] citing Roth v. Board
of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).

96. 815 Phil. 1067 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

97. Id. at 1142-1143.

98. Id.

99. Racelis v. Spouses Javier, G.R. No. 189609, January 29, 2018,
<http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63801> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

100. Id.

101. Jo Littler, Meritocracy: the great delusion that ingrains inequality, THE GUARDIAN, March 20,
2017, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/20/meritocracy-
inequality-theresa-may-donald-trump> (last accessed on September 9, 2019).

102. Id.

103. Elise S. Brezis, The Effects of Elite Recruitment on Social Cohesion and Economic Development
3 (2010), available at <https://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/46837524.pdf>. (last visited on September 9,
2019); and R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based
College Admissions, 79 N. C. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2001), available at
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=301300&download=yes> (last visited on
September 9, 2019).

104. R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College
Admissions, 79 N. C. L. REV. 1061 (2001), available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=283711> (last visited on September 9, 2019).

105. Elise S. Brezis, The Effects of Elite Recruitment on Social Cohesion and Economic
Development, 7 (2010), available at <https://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/46837524.pdf> (last visited on
September 9, 2019).

106. Elise S. Brezis, The Effects of Elite Recruitment on Social Cohesion and Economic Development
3 (2010). Available at <https://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/46837524.pdf> (last visited on September 9,
2019); R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based
College Admissions, 79 N. C. L. Rev. 1062 (2001). Available at
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=301300&download=yes> (last visited on
September 9, 2019).

107. J. Thomas, Dissenting Opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 361 (2003).

108. Id. at 367-368.

109. Id. at 107.

110. Id.

111. Id.

112. Hannah Arendt, The Crisis in Education (1954)

<http://www.digitalcounterrevolution.co.uk/2016/hannah-arendt-the-crisis-in-education-full-text/>
(last accessed September 12, 2019).

113. Jo Littler, Meritocracy: the great delusion that ingrains inequality, THE GUARDIAN, March 20,
2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/20/meritocracy-inequality-theresa-
 may-donald-trump> (last accessed on September 9, 2019).

114. Id.

115. STEPHEN MCNAMEE AND ROBERT K. MILLER, JR., THE MERITOCRACY MYTH 49 (2004).

116. Id. at 102.

117. Id.

118. Republic Act No. 7662 (1993).

119. Ponencia, p. 77.

120. Id. at 78.

121. Id. at 81-84.

122. 259 Phil. 1016 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

123. CONST., art. XIV, sec. 5 (2) provides:

SECTION 5. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

124. CONST., art. III, sec. 4 provides:

SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.

125. CONST., art. XIV, sec. 5 (3) provides:

SECTION 5. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission and academic requirements.

126. CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5 (5) provides:

SECTION 5. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
 and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

LAZARO-JAVIER, J., concurring and dissenting:

1. A to Z Quotes at https://www.azquotes.com/quotes/topics/competencies.html (last accessed July

23, 2019), attributed to Michelle Bachmann.

2. A to Z Quotes at https://www.azquotes.com/quotes/topics/competencies.html (last accessed July

23, 2019), attributed to Peter Drucker.

3. Quoted with permission, name of school, teacher, and student purposely withheld.

4. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018.

5. Ibid.

6. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:
A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-260, 414-418.

7. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines, Supra note 4.

8. Id. at 1251-1252.

9. G.R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975.

10. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:
A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, citing IV RECORD 258-260.

11. G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987.

12. The Subsection read: "(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum
qualifications and compensation of faculty members. . . ."

13. The Subsections read: "(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the
Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or
legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may
decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe
the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which
shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar. (h) to adopt a system of continuing legal
education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing
lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary."

14. Rules of Court, Rule 138, Secs. 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 and 19.

15. The provision reads: "The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions."

16. In Re: Designation of Judge Manzano as Member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, 248 Phil. 487 (1988).
17. 57 Phil. 600 (1932).

18. Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., Id.

19. Noblejas v. Teehankee, 131 Phil. 931 (1968).

20. Nos. 7 and 9, LEBMO No. 7.

21. No. 2, LEBMO No. 7.

22. No. 5, LEBMO No. 7.

23. No. 3, LEBMO No. 7.

24. No. 11, LEBMO No. 7.

25. Manila Memorial Park, Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development,
G.R. No. 175356, December 3, 2013: "Because all laws enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality, courts will uphold a law's validity if any set of facts may be conceived to
sustain it. On its face, we find that there are at least two conceivable bases to sustain the
subject regulation's validity absent clear and convincing proof that it is unreasonable, oppressive
or confiscatory. Congress may have legitimately concluded that business establishments
have the capacity to absorb a decrease in profits or income/gross sales due to the 20%
discount without substantially affecting the reasonable rate of return on their investments
considering (1) not all customers of a business establishment are senior citizens and (2) the level
of its profit margins on goods and services offered to the general public. Concurrently, Congress
may have, likewise, legitimately concluded that the establishments, which will be required to
extend the 20% discount, have the capacity to revise their pricing strategy so that whatever
reduction in profits or income/gross sales that they may sustain because of sales to senior
citizens, can be recouped through higher mark-ups or from other products not subject of discounts.
As a result, the discounts resulting from sales to senior citizens will not be confiscatory or
unduly oppressive. (emphasis added).

26. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).

27. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:
A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-260, 414-418.

28. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:
A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-260, 414-418.

29. The list of names of passers for the April 2019 PhiLSAT exam has been released. However, the
passing rate has not been released by either the official PhiLSAT website or any other media
outlet, article, or post.

30. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:
A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-260, 414-418.

31. No. 5, LEBMO No. 7.

32. No. 3, LEBMO No. 7.

33. No. 15, LEBMO No. 7.

34. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:
A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-260, 414-418.

35. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:
A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-260, 414-418.

36. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. [n] v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L-
24693, July 31, 1967: "Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of
any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or
ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of
validity . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. . . ."
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence
to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case
here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman &
Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis
tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: 'The statute here questioned deals with a
subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground
that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of
due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation
of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' No such factual foundation being laid in the
present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of
facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside." (emphasis added)

37. 236 Phil. 768 (1987).

38. Uy Ha v. City Mayor of Manila, 108 Phil. 400 (1960): "A law should not be construed as to allow
the doing of an act which is prohibited by law." Philippine Long Distance Co. v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 90 Phil. 674 (1952): ". . . a statute should be construed whenever possible in a manner
that will avoid conflict with the Constitution."

39. Uy Ha v. City Mayor of Manila, 108 Phil. 400 (1960): "A law should not be construed as to allow
the doing of an act which is prohibited by law;" Philippine Long Distance Co. v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 90 Phil. 674 (1952): ". . . a statute should be construed whenever possible in a manner
that will avoid conflict with the Constitution."

40. Ruben E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1995) 196-197, citing Tamayo v. Gsell, 35 Phil.
953 (1916).

41. Ruben E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1995) 148, Supra note 40, citing Luzon
Stevedoring Co. v. Natividad, 43 Phil. 803 (1922), Molina v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167 (1918).

42. Ruben E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1995) 198, Supra note 40, citing Sotto v.
Sotto, 43 Phil. 688 (1922), Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709 (1956).

43. Ruben E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1995) 198, Supra note 40.
GESMUNDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

1. Heirs of Piedad v. Exec. Judge Estrera, 623 Phil. 178, 188 (2009).

2. Royal Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 227 Phil. 570, 575 (1986).

3. 294 Phil. 654 (1993).

4. Id. at 672-673.

5. Id. at 673.

6. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).

7. Id.

8. Id.

9. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).

10. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

11. Id.

12. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

13. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).

14. 570 U.S. 297 (2013).

15. 408 Phil. 132 (2001).

16. Id. at 145.

17. Id. at 145-146.

18. 160-A Phil. 929 (1975).

19. Id. at 945.

20. Supra note 3.

21. Id. at 675.

22. 258-A Phil. 417 (1989).

23. Id. at 423.

24. 298 Phil. 382 (1993).

25. Id. at 388.

26. 487 Phil. 449 (2004).

27. Id. at 466.

28. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Hon. Drilon, 246 Phil. 393, 399 (1988).

29. 236 Phil. 768 (1987).

30. See Developing and Assembling the Law School Admission Test, Ronald Armstrong, Dmitry Belov,
Alexander Weissman, Interfaces, Vol. 35, No. 2, March-April 2005, p. 141.

31. See Standard 503, Chapter 5, Admission and Student Services, 2017-2018 American Bar
Association Standards and Rules of Procedure.

32. Wigmore, Juristic Psychopoyemetrology — Or, How to Find Out Whether a Boy Has the Makings
of a Lawyer, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 454, 463-464 (1929).

33. Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice William O. Douglas in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974).

34. WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, A History of the Law School Admission Council and the LSAT, Keynote
Address, 1998 LSAC Annual Meeting.

35. Id. at 5-6.

36. Id.

37. Id. at 6 & 8.

38. Id. at 10.

39. Id. at 8.

40. 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The ponencia therein denied the petition questioning the Admission Policy of
University of Washington Law School in treating minorities differently in their admission to law
school. It was essentially denied because the petitioner therein will already complete his law school
studies, hence, the petition was moot.

41. Id.

42. New entry test for law students, BBC News, February 2, 2014,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/3451897.stm [last accessed September 3, 2019].

43. Aptitude Testing and the Legal Profession, Dr. Chris Dewberry, Birkbeck, University of London,
June 6, 2011, p. 61, (2011).

44. WHY JOIN LNAT?, LNAT National Admission Test for Law, https://lnat.ac.uk/why-join-lnat/ [last
accessed September 3, 2019].

45. Supra note 43 at 61-62.

46. In the UK, undergraduate grades are measured through A-Levels and General Certificate of
Secondary Education (GCSE).

47. Supra note 44.

48. The Pearson Guide to the LLB Entrance Examinations, Edgar Thorpe and Showick Thorpe,
Pearson Education India, p. 22, 2008.

49. Id.

50. NLUs enter into new CLAT MoU, ensuring full participation of all 16 NLUs (except NLU Delhi),
Shrivastava, Prachi, Legally India, https://www.legallyindia.com/pre-law/all-16-nlus-can-now-
conduct-clat-unlike-earlier-7-20141103-5262 [last accessed September 3, 2019].

51. PALS reelect UE Dean Valdez, University of the East News, March 16, 2012,
[https://www.ue.edu.ph/news/?p=2786 last accessed August 15, 2019].

52. See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice William O. Douglas in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974), citing B. Hoffmann, The Tyranny of Testing 91-92 (1962).

53. See Section 7 (b) of R.A. No. 7662.

54. Bito-onon v. Hon. Yap Fernandez, 403 Phil. 693, 702 (2001).

55. Hon. Drilon v. Mayor Lim, 305 Phil. 146, 152 (1994).

56. Memorandum of petitioner in G.R. No. 245954, p. 33.

57. Sec. 5, LEB Memorandum Order No. 7, series of 2016.

58. Judicial Affidavit of petitioner Gretchen M. Vasquez, Annex F of Memorandum of Abayata, et al., p.
3.

59. As amended by A.M. 19-03-24-SC, Amendment of Rule 138, Section 5 in relation to the Revision
of Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, July 23, 2019.

60. Section 1, Bar Matter No. 850.

61. History of PHILJA, http://philja.judiciary.gov.ph/history.html [last accessed: June 6, 2019].

62. See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice William O. Douglas in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974); citing Rosen, Equalizing Access to Legal Education: Special Programs for Law
Students Who are Not Admissible by Traditional Criteria, 1970 U. Tol. L. Rev. 321, 332-333.

63. Dated June 25, 2019.

64. See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Del Castillo, Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, 782
Phil. 292, 357-363 (2016).

65. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 795 Phil. 529, 575 (2016).

66. Section 1, Bar Matter No. 850.

67. Section 7 (c) & (d).

68. See Memorandum of the Office of the Solicitor General, pp. 38-39.

69. Atty. Villonco v. Atty. Roxas, A.C. No. 9186, April 11, 2018.
A.B. REYES, JR., J., concurring:

1. Petition, p. 1148.

2. Main Decision, p. 15.

3. Deliberations for the 1987 Constitution, Volume IV, p. 170; Bernas, p. 91.

4. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article II, Sec. 17.

5. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Sec. 2 (3).

6. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Sec. 2 (1).

7. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7662 — An Act Providing for Reforms in the Legal Education, Creating for the
Purpose, A Legal Education Board and for Other Purposes.

8. LEBMO No. 7.

9. Id.

10. LEBMO No. 7; LEBMO No. 2-2013, Section 32.

11. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Section 4 (1).

12. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Section 5 (2).

13. The PTA of St. Mathew Christian Academy, et al. v. The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., 627
Phil. 669, 683 (2010).

14. University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 287, 306-307 (1999).

15. Bernas, p. 1294.

16. Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, 294 Phil. 654, 674 (1993).

17. 160-A Phil. 929, 944 (1975).

18. Mercado, et al. v. AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc., 632 Phil. 228, 251 (2010), citing
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431, 455-456 (2000).

19. The PTA of St. Mathew Christian Academy, et al. v The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co, supra
note 13.

20. Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 17.

21. Id. at 943.

22. Id.

23. University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 300 Phil. 819, 833 (1994).

24. Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, supra note 16.

25. Id. at 673.

26. Supra note 23.

27. Id. at 833 citing Licup, et al. v. University of San Carlos (USC), et al., 258-A Phil. 417, 423-424
(1989).

28. Deliberations for the 1987 Constitution, Volume IV, p. 441.

29. Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, Sec. 3. Declaration of Basic Policy.

30. Bernas, p. 1306.

31. Transcript of Oral Arguments held on March 5, 2019, p. 122.

32. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Section 5 (3).

33. Supra note 16.

34. Id.

35. Bernas, p. 1295.

36. Id.

37. Deliberations for the 1987 Constitution, Volume IV, p. 438.

38. Id. at 439.

39. Id. at 438.

40. Id.

41. Id.

42. Id. at 439.

43. University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23 at 832-833.

44. Article 26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

45. Bernas, pp. 1298-1299.

46. Bernas, p. 1301.

47. Article 19, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

48. Preamble, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

49. Article 12, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

50. Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 243 Phil. 993, 1006 (1988).

51. Transcript of Oral Arguments, March 5, 2019, p. 123.

52. Id.

53. Transcript of Oral Arguments, March 5, 2019, p. 184.

54. Transcript, Oral Arguments, March 5, 2019, p. 173.

55. Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 50 at 1005.

56. Id.

57. Id. at 1004-1005.

58. Transcript of Oral Arguments, March 5, 2019, p. 172.

CAGUIOA, J., concurring:

1. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REFORMS IN LEGAL EDUCATION, CREATING FOR THE PURPOSE
A LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

2. R.A. 7662, Sec. 7, par. (g).

3. Id. at par. (h).

4. Advisory, p. 3.

5. 391 Phil. 84 (2000).

6. Id. at 107-108.

7. Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431, 455-456 (2000).

8. Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 160-A Phil. 929, 944
(1975).

9. Art. XV, Sec. 8, par. (1).

10. IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 56-57.

11. IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 441.

12. RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 1: "Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states,
their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of
the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions." (Underscoring
supplied)

13. Amicus Brief, p. 6.

14. CONSTITUTION, (1987), Art. XIV, Sec. 5, par. (2).

15. Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 8.
16. Id.

17. Id. at 943.

18. LEB Memorandum Order No. 1, Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-2011), Section 31.1. A PERMIT
entitles a law school to open and to offer the subjects of the first year of the law curriculum. A
permit must be obtained before each academic year to enable the law school to operate on the
succeeding academic year.

19. Id. at Sec. 33.1, par. (4). See also Section 20 of the same LEBMO, which states that "The law
school shall be headed by a properly qualified dean, maintain a corps of professors drawn from the
ranks of leading and acknowledged practitioners as well as academics and legal scholars or
experts in juridical science, properly equipped with the necessities of legal education, particularly
library facilities including reliable internet access as well as suitable classrooms and a Moot Court
room. There shall likewise be provided a faculty lounge for the convenience of members of the
faculty."

20. Id. at par. (5); underscoring supplied.

21. Id. at par. (7); underscoring supplied.

22. Id. at par. (8); underscoring supplied.

23. Id. at Sec. 34.

24. Id. at par. (d); underscoring supplied.

25. Id. at Sec. 35, par. (3).

26. Id. at Sec. 31.2. "A RECOGNITION constitutes full mandatory accreditation. It allows the law
school to graduate its students, to confer upon them their degrees and titles and to endorse them
to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the Bar Examinations."

27. Id. at Sec. 35, par. (1).

28. Id. at Sec. 37.

29. Sec. 31, par. (2), which defines that "[a]s indicated, among others, by the fact that most of the
members are neophytes in the teaching of law or their ratings in the students' and deans'
evaluations are below 75% or its equivalent in other scoring system;" underscoring supplied.

30. Id.

31. Id.

32. Id.

33. Id.

34. Id. at par. (1).

35. Id.
36. Sec. 8.

37. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1983), provides:

SEC. 15. Qualifications. — No persons shall be appointed Regional Trial Judge unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five years of age, and, for at least ten years,
has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held a public office in the
Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 26. Qualifications. — No person shall be appointed judge of a Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, at least 30 years of age, and, for at least five years, has been engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines, or has held a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the
practice of law as an indispensable requisite. (Underscoring supplied)

38. Amicus Brief, p. 7.

39. TSN, March 5, 2019, pp. 102-103.

40. Id. at 173-175.

41. LEBMO No. 2-2013, Sec. 33-35. See also LEB Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 2018
(LEBMC No. 14-2018).

42. Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 8.

43. Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, 754 Phil. 590, 655 (2015).

44. R.A. 7662, Sec. 7, par. (f).

45. Secs. 33, par. (6) and 53.

46. Id. at Sec. 54.

47. Id. at Sec. 55.

48. Id. at Sec. 58.

49. Sec. 3.

50. LEBMO No. 1-2011, Sec. 55.2.

51. Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 8.

52. LEBMO No. 1-2011, Secs. 58.1 and 58.2, Second Year, First Semester, 2-unit subject, described
as "A study of Presidential Decree No. 27, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and
related laws and regulations, and the Special Security Act and the Government Service Insurance
Act."

53. Id. at Sec. 58.2, Second Year, Second Semester, 2-unit subject described as "This is an elective
subject that allows for more concentrated study on any of the following possible areas of
 international law: a. International Criminal Law: that should be taken with reference to R.A. 9851; b.
The Law of the Sea: which should be of special interest to the Philippines because we are an
archipelagic state; and c. International Trade Law: particularly the regime of the World Trade
Organization."

54. Id. at Sec. 58, Second Year, Second Semester, 2-unit subject described as "Study focused on the
aspects of protecting, defending and seeking redress for violations of human rights in the
Philippines."

55. Id.

56. Id.

57. Par. (3).

58. Id. at par. (7).

59. LEB Memorandum Order No. 5, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 5-2016), par. (4).

60. Id. at par. (1).

61. Id.

62. Id.

63. Id.

64. Id.

65. Amicus Brief, p. 7.

66. TSN, March 5, 2019, pp. 106-107.

67. R.A. 7722, Sec. 13.

68. Id.

69. POLICIES, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR BACHELOR IN JOURNALISM (B

JOURNALISM) AND BACHELOR OF ARTS IN JOURNALISM (BA JOURNALISM) PROGRAMS,
May 12, 2017.

70. POLICIES, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN

COMPUTER ENGINEERING (BSCPE) EFFECTIVE (AY) 2018-2019, CHED Memorandum Order
No. 087-17, December 4, 2017.

71. POLICIES AND STANDARDS FOR THE BACHELOR OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (BA
POS) PROGRAM, CHED Memorandum Order No. 051-17, May 31, 2017.

72. REVISED POLICIES, STANDARDS, AND GUIDELINES (PSGS) FOR BACHELOR OF ARTS IN
COMMUNICATION (BA COMM) PROGRAM, CHED Memorandum Order No. 035-17, May 11,
2017.
73. REVISED POLICIES, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, CHED Memorandum Order No. 017-17, May 9, 2017.

74. POLICIES, STANDARDS, AND GUIDELINES FOR THE BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN

STATISTICS (BS STAT) PROGRAM, CHED Memorandum Order No. 042-17, May 17, 2017.

75. POLICIES, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR BACHELOR OF SECONDARY EDUCATION

(BSED), CHED Memorandum Order No. 075-17, November 2, 2017.

76. IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 77 (August 29, 1986).

77. LEBMO No. 2-2013, Sec. 7-11.

78. Section 7. School Records of a Student. — The school record of every student shall contain the
final rating in each subject with the corresponding credits, and the action thereon preferably
indicated by "passed" or "failed." No final record may contain any suspensive mark such as "Inc."
The student must either be given a passing or a failing grade in the final record.

79. Sec. 24.

80. Id. at Sec. 15.

81. Id. at Sec. 25.

82. Id. at Sec. 26.

83. Id. at Sec. 27.

84. Id. at Sec. 20, par. (a).

85. Id. at Sec. 20, par. (b) (1).

86. Id. at Sec. 20, par. (b) (2).

87. Id. at Sec. 20, par. (b) (3).

88. Id. at Sec. 20, par. (b) (4).

89. Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 7.

90. Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, supra note 43, at 655-656.

91. Id. at 657-658, citing University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 287,
306-308 (1999).

92. Sec. 15.

93. R.A. 7662, Sec. 7, par. (d).

94. Id. at par. (c).

95. Id. at Sec. 8.

96. Id. at Sec. 9.

97. Sec. 30.

98. Id.

99. Id.

100. Id. at Sec. 31.

101. Id. at Sec. 31.1.

102. Id. at Sec. 31.2.

103. Id. at Sec. 20.

104. Id.

105. Id.

106. Id.

107. Id. at Sec. 24. In LEB Memorandum Order No. 23, Series of 2019 (LEBMO No. 23-2019), the
LEB saw fit, under pain of administrative sanctions, to regulate the establishment of Law
Journals, including the composition, position, and powers of the Editorial Board, the
frequency of publication, and even a Law Journal's format and style.

108. Id. at Sec. 33.1.

109. Id. at Sec. 21.

110. Id. at Sec. 34, par. (d).

111. Id.

112. Id. at Sec. 37.

113. Id. at Sec. 43.

114. Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 243 Phil. 993, 1005 (1988).

115. Ponencia, p. 102.

116. Amicus Brief, p. 4.

117. Ponencia, pp. 101-103.

JARDELEZA, J., concurring and dissenting:

1. Abayata, et al. v. Hon. Salvador Medialdea, et al. (G.R. No. 242954) and Pimentel, et al. v. Legal
Education Board (G.R. No. 230642).

2. Otherwise known as the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993, hereinafter referred to as "LEB Law."

3. Ponencia, pp. 37-53.

4. Id. at 88.

5. Id. at 86.

6. G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 730.

7. Ponencia, p. 87.

8. Pacifico Agabin, Academic Freedom and the Larger Community, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 52,
336, 336 (1977) Phil. L.J. 336, 336 (1977).

9. Enrique M. Fernando, Academic Freedom as a Constitutional Right, Philippine Law Journal, Vol.
52, 289, 290 (1977); citing Fuchs, Academic Freedom — Its basic Philosophy, Function and
History, in BAADE (ed.).

10. J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real about the "Four
Freedoms" of a University, Georgetown University Law Center, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 929-953 (2006).

11. Id. at 930.

12. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).

13. Id. at 498. The Civil Service Law of New York, Section 12 (a) thereof made ineligible for
employment in any public school any member of any organization advocating the overthrow of the
Government by force, violence or any unlawful means.

14. Id. at 493. According to the Court:

A teacher works in a sensitive area in a school room. There he shapes the attitude of young minds
towards the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. It must preserve the
integrity of the schools. That the school authorities have the right and the duty to screen the
officials, teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a
part of ordered society, cannot be doubted. One's associates, past and present, as well as one's
conduct, may properly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty. From time immemorial,
one's reputation has been determined in part by the company he keeps. In the employment of
officials and teachers of the school system, the state may very properly inquire into the company
they keep, and we know of no rule, constitutional or otherwise, that prevents the state, when
determining the fitness and loyalty of such persons, from considering the organizations and
persons with whom they associate.

If, under the procedure set up in the New York law, a person is found to be unfit and is disqualified
from employment in the public school system because of membership in a listed organization, he is
not thereby denied the right of free speech and assembly. His freedom of choice between
membership in the organization and employment in the school system might be limited, but not his
freedom of speech or assembly, except in the remote sense that limitation is inherent in every
choice. Certainly such limitation is not one the state may not make in the exercise of its police
power to protect the schools from pollution and thereby to defend its own existence.

15. As concurred in by Justice Black.

16. Supra note 12 at 508-509 (1952).

17. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).

18. The Oklahoma Stat. Ann, 1950, Tit. 51, Section 37.1-37.9 required each state officer and
employee, as a condition of his employment, to take a "loyalty oath" stating, inter alia, that he is
not, and has not been for the preceding five years, a member of any organization listed by the
Attorney General of the U.S. as "communist front" or "subversive."

19. Wieman v. Upegraff, 344 U.S. 485, 193 (1952); The Court, in the main, found a violation of the
Due Process Clause ("Indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an
assertion of arbitrary power.") and held that the Government's efforts at countering threats of
subversion must not be at the expense of democratic freedoms.

20. Id. Justice Hugo elucidated thus:

Governments need and have ample power to punish treasonable acts. But it does not follow that
they must have a further power to punish thought and speech, as distinguished from acts. Our own
free society should never forget that laws which stigmatize and penalize thought and speech of the
unorthodox have a way of reaching, ensnaring and silencing many more people than at first
intended. We must have freedom of speech for all or we will, in the long run, have it for none but
the cringing and the craven. And I cannot too often repeat my belief that the right to speak on
matters of public concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly lost. (Italics supplied.)

21. Wieman v. Upegraff, supra note 19 at 196; Justice Frankfurter explained:

To regard teachers — in our entire educational system, from the primary grades to the university —
as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to indulge in hyperbole. It is the special task of
teachers to foster those habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for
responsible citizens, who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective public opinion.
Teachers must fulfill their function by precept and practice, by the very atmosphere which they
generate; they must be exemplars of open-mindedness and free inquiry. They cannot carry out
their noble task if the conditions for the practice of a responsible and critical mind are denied to
them. They must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into the meaning
of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history of social and economic dogma. They must
be free to sift evanescent doctrine, qualified by time and circumstance, from that restless, enduring
process of extending the bounds of understanding and wisdom, to assure which the freedoms of
thought, of speech, of inquiry, of worship are guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States
against infraction by national or State government. (Italics supplied.)

22. Supra note 12.

23. 354 U.S. 234, 262 (1957).

24. Id. at 262-263, Justice Frankfurter's opinion further added:

x x x This means the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university. It
matters little whether such intervention occurs avowedly or through action that inevitably tends to
check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars, qualities at once so fragile and so indispensable for
fruitful academic labor. x x x
 To further emphasize the nature and design of a university and the import of its academic freedom
as rooted in freedom of expression and thought, Justice Frankfurter quoted a statement from a
conference of senior scholars from the University of Cape Town and the University of the
Witwatersrand, to wit:

"In a university, knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end. A university ceases to be
true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of Church or State or any sectional interest. A university
is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of Socrates — 'to follow the
argument where it leads.' This implies the right to examine, question, modify or reject traditional
ideas and beliefs. Dogma and hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept of an immutable
doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of a university. The concern of its scholars is not merely to add
and revise facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to be ever examining and modifying the
framework itself.

Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and experiment are the
necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific knowledge. A sense of freedom is also
necessary for creative work in the arts which, equally with scientific research, is the concern of the
university.

It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of
a university — to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. (Emphasis supplied.)"

25. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).

26. Id. at 114-115, 130. Here, petitioner, a former graduate student and teaching fellow at the
University of Michigan, refused to answer questions posed to him in an investigation being
conducted by a Congressional Subcommittee into alleged Communist infiltration into the field of
education. For his refusal, he was fined and sentenced to imprisonment for six months. The Court,
after balancing the competing public and private interests involved, found that petitioner's claim that
the "investigation was aimed not at the revolutionary aspects, but at the theoretical classroom
discussion of communism x x x rests on a too constricted view of the nature of the investigatory
process, and is not supported by a fair assessment of the record x x x."

27. Id. at 113.

28. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).

29. Id. at 595-596; taken from the Feinberg Law which required the measure.

30. Id.

31. Keyishan v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of NY, id. at 602; citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479; United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Sup. 362, 372 (1943).

32. Id. Affirming the significance of academic freedom, and it rationalized:

"x x x The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow
of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the
 constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the
opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of
the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the
security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government." (De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 365 [1937])

Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value
to all of us, and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern
of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom. "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools." The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The
Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of
ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection." (Keyishan v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of NY, supra note 28 at
603. Underscoring supplied.)

33. Delegate Adolf Azcuna's explanation, in sponsoring said amendment, as cited in Pacifico Agabin's
Comparative Developments in the Law of Academic Freedom, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 64, 139-
140 (1989):

MR. AZCUNA: In the 1973 Constitution, this freedom is given to the institution itself. All institutions
of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom. So, with this proposal, we will provide academic
freedom in the institutions — enjoyed by students, by the teachers, by the researchers and we will
not freeze the meaning and the limits of this freedom. Since academic freedom is a dynamic
concept and we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore we will
leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom. We just say that it
shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

34. Supra note 8 at 338.

35. Id. at 339, citing Emerson & Haber, Academic Freedom of the Faculty Member as Citizen, 28 Law
and Contemp. Prob. 525 (1968); Dean Pacifico Agabin posited:

Expression if it is to be free, is not limited to the trivial and the inconsequential. It may strike deep at
our most cherished beliefs or speak up for the most unorthodox doctrines. Expression cannot be
subjected to prior censorship for fear of serious injury or controversy.

xxx xxx xxx

This does not mean that freedom of expression is confined to the four walls of the classroom. This
would be a very parochial view of free speech. The spirit of free inquiry cannot be cut off, like a
water tap, once the student steps out of his classes. It is therefore important that the University
encourage discussion and debate outside the classroom, for "an atmosphere and ferment in the
academic community at large may be more meaningful to the student than freedom of discussions
within the confines of the class.

36. Agabin's Comparative Developments in the Law of Academic Freedom, supra note 1; see also
Onofre D. Corpuz's Academic Freedom and Higher Education: The Philippine Setting, Vol. 52,
1977, at 273.
37. G.R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277. This case involved a mandamus
proceeding where the student prayed that the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School
of Theology be ordered to allow her to continue pursuing her Master of Arts in Theology. The Court,
in the name of academic freedom, would go on to uphold the school's "wide sphere of autonomy
certainly extending to the choice of students."

38. Id. at 283-284.

39. The Court in Garcia, iterated the "four essential freedoms" of a university to determine for itself on
academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4)
who may be admitted to study, and ultimately found that the Faculty Admission Committee had
sufficient grounds to deny the student's admission. Id. at 293.

40. In the case of Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation, G.R. No. L-44251, May 31, 1977, 77
SCRA 321, 327, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, quoted Robert MacIver, and
echoed the Sweezy definition of academic freedom as 'a right claimed by the accredited educator,
as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without
being subjected to any interference, molestation or penalization because these conclusions are
unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution."

41. The Court's holding in Garcia, was subject of a strong dissent from Justice Felix Makasiar who
argued that academic freedom, although at the time textually granted only to the academic
institutions, should be deemed to have been granted to the students themselves as well, as the
students constitute part of the institution itself, without whom the institution can neither exist nor
operate. According to Justice Makasiar:

What is involved here is not merely academic freedom of the higher institutions of learning as
guaranteed by Section 8 (2) of Article [V] of the 1973 Constitution. The issue here strikes at the
broader freedom of expression of the individual — the very core of human liberty.

Even if the term "academic freedom" were to be limited to institutions of higher learning — which to
the mind of Dr. Vicente Sinco, an eminent authority in Constitutional Law, is the right of the
university as an institution, not the academic freedom of the university professor (Sinco, Phil.
Political Law, 1962 ed., 489) — the term "institutions of higher learning" contained in the aforecited
provision of our New Constitution comprehends not only the faculty and the college administrators
but also the members of the student body. While it is true that the university professor may have
the initiative and resourcefulness to pursue his own research and formulate his conclusions
concerning the problem of his own science or subject, the motivation therefor may be provoked by
questions addressed to him by his students. In this respect, the student — specially a graduate
student — must not be restrained from raising questions or from challenging the validity of dogmas
whether theological or not. The true scholar never avoids, but on the contrary welcomes and
encourages, such searching questions even if the same will have the tendency to uncover his own
ignorance. It is not the happiness and self-fulfillment of the professor alone that are guaranteed.
The happiness and full development of the curious intellect of the student are protected by the
narrow guarantee of academic freedom and more so by the broader right of free expression, which
includes free speech and press, and academic freedom. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 37 at 295.
42. Ponencia, pp. 59-64, 71.

43. Rollo, p. 304. G.R. No. 230642 Vol. I.

44. Id. at 304-305.

45. Id. at 305-306.

46. Id. at 307.

47. Supra note 6.

48. Rollo, p. 309. G.R. No. 230642 Vol. I.

49. Id. at 310-313.

50. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000, 343 SCRA 377, 390.

51. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines, et al. v. Secretary of
Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018.

52. Ponencia, p. 88.

53. See Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806,
812-813 (1955), a case involving challenges to Act No. 2706, as amended by Act No. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act No. 180 which provides for a "previous permit system" before a school or any
other educational institution can operate. There, the Court, quoting a report commissioned by the
Philippine Legislature at the time, upheld the challenged Acts as a valid exercise of police power to
correct a "great evil," thus:

x x x An unprejudiced consideration of the fact presented under the caption Private Adventure
Schools leads but to one conclusion, viz.: the great majority of them from primary grade to
university are money-making devices for the profit of those who organize and administer them. The
people whose children and youth attend them are not getting what they pay for. It is obvious that
the system constitutes a great evil. That it should be permitted to exist with almost no supervision is
indefensible. x x x

54. Ponencia, p. 39.

55. For example, Republic Act No. 6139, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate Tuition and Other
School Fees of Private Educational Institution, Providing for the Settlement of Controversies
Thereon and for Other Purposes. See also Lina, Jr. v. Carino, G.R. No. 100127, April 23, 1993, 221
SCRA 515, where this Court sustained the legal authority of respondent DECS Secretary to set
maximum permissible rates or levels of tuition and other school fees and to issue guidelines for the
imposition and collection thereof.

56. Ponencia, p. 85.

57. Supra note 6.

58. Ponencia, p. 86.

59. Also known as the "Policies, Standards and Guidelines for the Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) Program.

60. Which now regulates the study of medicine, among others, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7722,
otherwise known as the Higher Education Act of 1994.

61. Ponencia, p. 87.

62. Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA
318, citing City of Raleigh v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 165 S.E.2d 745 (1969).

63. Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, supra citing Board of Zoning Appeals of
Decatur v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954). Cited in Concurring
and Dissenting Opinion of J. Jardeleza in Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019.

64. G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019.

65. Id.

66. Including, for example, that of PhilSAT being pro-elite and anti-poor, or the converse but equally
unverified arguments that PhiLSAT is sound and properly designed to measure the necessary
aptitude of prospective law students.

67. Including, for example, the power of the LEB to prescribe the qualifications and classifications of
faculty members and deans of graduate schools of law.

68. G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.

69. 282 U.S. 251 (1931).

70. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, supra note 68
at 857.

n Note from the Publisher: Written as "Emita-Malate Motel and Hotel Operators Association, Inc." in
the official document.