2022 BAR EXAMINATIONS

CIVIL LAW (PART II)

November 16, 2022 2:00 P.M. to 5:00 P.M.

INSTRUCTIONS

This is a 3-hour examination consisting of 17 problems. The first fifteen problems are
worth 6 points each while the last two questions are worth 5 points each.

All the problems will first require a “Yes” or “No” answer, followed by a concise legal
explanation. You are highly encouraged to read the question in the problem first before reading
the entire problem.

Allocate your time efficiently. Feel free to first answer questions you find relatively easier
than the others. You may return to the more difficult questions initially left unanswered.

Do not leave distinguishing marks in any of your answers. Do not write a mantra, motto,
prayer to deities or saints, special plea addressed to the examiner or the Bar Chairperson, or any
other such extraneous text. Leaving any distinguishing mark is classified as cheating and can
disqualify you from the whole Bar Examinations.

You have until 5:00 p.m. to finish the exam. Make sure you have answered everything and
reviewed your answers.

Always keep in mind your obligations under the Honor Code.

When you hurdle the Bar Examinations, do not forget to serve the people.

Always remember: honor and excellence.

We wish you all the best!

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1. Rufino borrowed money from Conrado. In their Contract of Loan, the parties agreed
that the loan is payable within six (6) months from the execution of their loan contract.
In the Security Agreement attached to the Contract of Loan, Rufino used his personal
property, i.e., a house erected on a lot owned by Vicente, as collateral for the loan
because Rufino leases the land of Vicente. The Contract of Loan with Security
Agreement was registered in accordance with Republic Act No. 11057 (RA 11057), or
the Personal Property Security Act. When Rufino failed to pay despite demand,
Conrado notified Rufino of the intended public disposition of the house. Rufino
opposed on the ground that the security agreement is void since it covers a building
which by its nature may not be subject of a security agreement under RA 11057.

Is Rufino correct?
No. Where a house stands on a rented land belonging to another person, it may be the
subject-matter of a chattel mortgage as personal or movable property if so stipulated in the
document of mortgage, and in an action by the mortgagee for foreclosure, the validity of
the chattel mortgage cannot be assailed by one of the parties to the contract of mortgage.
(Navarro v. Pineda, G.R. No. L-18456, November 30, 1963, En Banc, J. Paredes) Thus,
nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the
principle of estoppel. (Tsai v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120098, October 2, 2001)

In the present case, the house in question was treated as personal or movable property by
the parties to the contract themselves. In the Contract of Loan, Rufino conveyed by way of
“Security Agreement” his personal property, a residential house on a lot owned by Vicente.
Therefore, the Security Agreement is valid because it covers a personal property.

2. Conrado and Marilyn (Sps. Erola) are married. They own a lot covered by TCT No.
T-26108. Cecilia is the sister of Conrado. Being close relatives, Sps. Erola allowed
Cecilia, her husband Julian, and her husband’s relatives (petitioners), to possess the
lot on the condition that they would vacate the same upon demand. Years later, Sps.
Erola sent a letter to the petitioners requiring them to vacate the property but they
refused. Sps. Erola filed an ejectment suit against petitioners.

On her part, Cecilia argued that the lot was originally owned by Rosario, the mother
of Conrado and Cecilia. However, Conrado was able to have the lot registered in his
name. Believing that an implied trust was created in her favor covering the other half
of the property, Cecilia claims that they (petitioners) possessed and cultivated the lot
in the concept of an owner for over 34 years, believing in good faith that they were
co-owners of the subject lot.

Are the petitioners builders in good faith?

Yes. Petitioners are not builders in good faith because they were aware that their tolerated
possession could be terminated at any time. Sps. Erola likewise acted in bad faith because
they tolerated petitioners’ possession for over 34 years. Since both parties are in bad faith,

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 their rights and obligations shall be the same as though both acted in good faith under
Article 453 of the Civil Code. (Spouses Belvis v. Spouses Erola, G.R. No. 239727, July 24,
2019, J. Caguioa)

[NOTE: This case involved the expanded concept of a builder in good faith because of
possession by the petitioners with the knowledge of Sps. Erola, the landowner, who are in
bad faith due to knowledge of builders’ possession for over 34 years. However, instead of
applying the rules applicable to a situation where the landowner is in bad faith and the
builder is in good faith, the Court held that both Sps. Erola and petitioners are in bad faith.
Therefore, the rights and obligations of the parties shall be the same as though both acted
in good faith. Following its findings, it was ruled that Sps. Erola have the following
options: (a) they may appropriate the improvements, after payment of indemnity
representing the value of the improvements introduced and the necessary, useful and
luxurious expenses defrayed on the subject lots; or (b) they may oblige petitioners to pay
the price of the land, if the value is not considerably more than that of the improvements
and buildings. Should Sps. Erola opt to appropriate the improvements made, however,
petitioners may retain the subject lot until reimbursement for the necessary and useful
expenses have been made.]

3. Isagani ordered law books from Rex Bookstore. Isagani only paid P300 out of P1,500.
The balance to be paid on installment. Isagani then sold the law books to Velasco, a
store owner. On the next day, Kim bought in full price the law books from Velasco’s
store. When Rex Bookstore learned this transaction, it filed an action to recover the
law books from Kim.

May Rex Bookstore recover the law books from Kim by reimbursing the price?
No. Article 1505(3) of the Civil Code provides that the ownership of the buyer who bought
the thing from a merchant’s store and he bought it in good faith is absolute in character.
Article 559 of the Civil Code does not apply because Rex Bookstore was not unlawfully
deprived of the law books and the law books were neither lost. Here, Kim bought the law
books from a store of Velasco. Since there is no proof of bad faith, Kim is presumed to be
in good faith. Thus, Rex Bookstore cannot acquire ownership because Kim acquired
ownership over the law books even if it reimburses the price paid by Kim to Velasco. (Sun
Brothers Appliances, Inc. v. Perez, G.R. No. L-17527, April 30, 1963, En Banc)

4. Sps. Santos owned Lots 1 and 2. In October 1998, Sps. Garcia bought Lot 2 from Sps.
Santos. Adjoining the property is Lot 1. At the time of the sale, Lot 2 already had a
one-storey residential house erected thereon while Lot 1 was still idle without any
improvements. On January 24, 2009, Sps. Santos started to construct a two-storey
residential house on Lot 1.

Since the two-storey house in Lot 1 is taller than the one-storey house in Lot 2, Sps.
Garcia filed a complaint before the RTC and alleged that the house in Lot 1

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 obstructed their right to light, air, and view, rendering their house dark such that
they are unable to do their normal undertakings in the bedroom, living room and
other areas of the house without switching on their lights.

Does Sps. Garcia acquire an easement of light and view with respect to Lot 1 owned
by Sps. Santos?
Yes, Sps. Garcia acquired such easement by title.

Article 624 of the Civil Code finds application in situations wherein two or more estates
were previously owned by a singular owner, or even a single estate but with two or more
portions being owned by a singular owner. Subsequently, one estate or a portion of the
estate is alienated in favor of another person, wherein, in that estate or portion of the estate,
an apparent visible sign of an easement exists. According to Article 624, there arises a title
to an easement of light and view, even in the absence of any formal act undertaken by the
owner of the dominant estate, if this apparent visible sign, such as the existence of a door
and windows, continues to remain and subsist even after the transfer of the property to the
new owner, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, (a) the contrary
should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or (b) the sign aforesaid
should be removed before the execution of the deed.

In this case, prior to the purchase of the subject property by the Sps. Garcia in 1998, the
subject property and its adjoining lot, i.e., Lot 1, were both owned by singular owners, i.e.,
the Sps. Santos. On the subject property, a one-storey house laden with several windows
and openings was built and the windows and openings remained open. Then in October
1998, the subject property, together with the one-storey structure, was alienated in favor of
the Sps. Garcia, while the Sps. Santos retained the adjoining Lot 1. The windows and other
openings on the one-storey house subsisted and remained open. There was no agreement
made by the parties whatsoever to the effect that the windows and openings of the Sps.
Garcia's house should be closed or removed. Hence, in accordance with Article 624 of the
Civil Code, from the time the Sps. Santos transferred the subject property to the Sps.
Garcia, there arose by title an easement of light and view, placing a burden on the servient
estate, i.e., Lot 1, to allow the Sps. Garcia's residence unobstructed access to light and view,
subject to certain limitations. (Spouses Garcia v. Santos, G.R. No. 228334, June 17, 2019,
J. Caguioa)

5. Torre de Manila is a 30-storey low-cost condominium building located along Taft

Avenue, Manila, just a few blocks from the Rizal Shrine in Luneta Park. In 2012, it
was constructed after obtaining all the necessary permits, licenses, clearances, and
certificates for its construction. The building has also been granted various
government permits and clearances for health and safety standards. The developer
of Torre de Manila also secured the right to build granted by the City Council of
Manila.

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 Since Torre de Manila towers over the Rizal Shrine, every picture of the Rizal
monument taken would show Torre de Manila at the background. Thus, Torre de
Manila was tagged as the “National Photobomber.” The Knights of Rizal, a non-
government organization, stormed into the Manila City Hall and demanded for the
immediate demolition of Torre de Manila. They argue that Torre de Manila is a
nuisance per se because the despoliation of the sight view of the Rizal Monument is a
situation that annoys or offends the senses of every Filipino who honors the memory
of the National Hero Jose Rizal.

May Torre de Manila be demolished without court order?

No, because Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. By definition, a nuisance per se, is
recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct
menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the
undefined law of necessity. Torre de Manila cannot be considered as a “direct menace to
public health or safety.” Not only is a condominium building or project commonplace in
the City of Manila, Torre de Manila has, according to the proper government agencies,
complied with health and safety standards through the permits and clearances issued, as
well as the right to build from the City Council of Manila. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI
Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 18, 2017, En Banc) These licenses and grants prove
that Torre de Manila is not a menace to the public.

6. A road widening project was conducted by the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) along Sucat Road in Parañaque City. The project affected mainly
the lot owners inside the Happy Subdivision which is located at the heart of Sucat
Road. One of the subdivision lot owners is Francis who demanded payment of just
compensation for the taking of his property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 12345 (TCT No. 12345).

The DPWH however denied payment for areas covered by TCT No. 12345 and noted
that these were subdivision road lots, which Francis no longer owned and which
belonged to the community for whom they were made. The Government, through the
DPWH, based its denial of payment on Presidential Decree No. 957 (PD 957). The last
paragraph of Section 31 of the said Decree requires subdivision developers to donate
to the city or municipality with territorial jurisdiction over the subdivision project all
such roads, alleys, sidewalks, and open spaces. It also imposes upon cities and
municipalities the concomitant obligation or compulsion to accept such donations.
Thus, the DPWH insists that the road lots are not compensable since, being part of
the open spaces, they have already been withdrawn from the commerce of man.

Is the donation of the areas covered by TCT No. 12345 valid?

No. Under Article 725 of the Civil Code, a donation is, by definition, an act of liberality;
hence, cannot be forced. In jurisprudence, animus donandi (that is, the intent to do an act
of liberality) is an indispensable element of a valid donation, along with the reduction of

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 the donor's patrimony and the corresponding increase in the donee's patrimony. The law
must maintain the subdivision owner's or developer's freedom to donate or not to donate.

The last paragraph of Section 31 of PD 957 requires the donor to donate and the donee to
accept the donation. This is oxymoronic since one cannot speak of a donation and a
compulsion in the same breath. Thus, Section 31's compulsion to donate, and concomitant
compulsion to accept, cannot be sustained as valid. (White Plains Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128131, October 8, 1998; Republic v.
Spouses Llamas, G.R. No. 194190, January 25, 2017; Gatchalian v. Flores, G.R. No.
225176, January 19, 2018; Casa Milan Homeowners Association, Inc. v. The Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, G.R. No. 220042, September 5, 2018)

7. Andy, an overseas Filipino worker in Saudi Arabia, is the registered owner of Lot 14
in Marikina City. He decided to spend his accumulated one-month rest period in the
Philippines so he returned to the Philippines on March 1, 2020. To his surprise, he
discovered that Lot 14 is already occupied by Spouses Ocampo. Andy sent them a
Notice to Vacate on March 5, 2020.

Because he had to leave for work back in Saudi Arabia, Andy only had the
opportunity to file on August 1, 2022 a complaint for recovery of possession in order
to evict Spouses Ocampo from Lot 14 and to return the property back to the
registered owner. In their defense, Spouses Ocampo countered that the action should
be dismissed on the ground of prescription because the complaint was filed beyond
the one-year period from demand to vacate.

Has the action filed by Andy already prescribed?

No. In an accion reivindicatoria, the cause of action of the plaintiff is to recover possession
by virtue of his ownership of the land subject of the dispute. A registered owner has a right
to eject any person illegally occupying his property. This right is imprescriptible and can
never be barred by laches. In turn, the imprescriptible right to evict ostensibly proceeds
from paragraph 2 of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Section 47 of PD 1529
which states that “[n]o title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.” (Catindig v. Vda. de
Meneses, G.R. No. 165851, February 2, 2011; Heirs of Cullado v. Gutierrez, G.R. No.
212938, July 30, 2019, En Banc, J. Caguioa)

Thus, the recovery action filed by Andy has not prescribed because the action that he filed
is actually an accion reivindicatoria to recover possession based on ownership as a
registered owner of Lot 14.

8. Donna used as a security a set of diamond ring and earrings to Jane for P200,000.00.
She was made to sign an agreement that if she cannot pay her debt within six months,
Jane could immediately appropriate the jewelry for herself. After six months, Donna

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 failed to pay. Jane then displayed the earrings and ring set in her jewelry shop located
in a mall. A buyer, Juana, bought the jewelry set for P300,000.00.

Was the agreement which Donna signed with Jane valid?

Yes. The rule on pactum commissorium under Article 2088 of the Civil Code was expressly
repealed by the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA). (Sec. 66[b], RA 11057) Under the
PPSA, pursuant to the right of a secured creditor to dispose of collateral, “after default, a
secured creditor may sell or otherwise dispose of the collateral, publicly or privately, in its
present condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing.”
(Sec. 49[a], supra.) (2015 Bar)

9. Virginia borrowed from Luisa P500,000.00 payable within one year. To secure the
loan, Virginia executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12345, together with all the buildings and
improvements existing thereon, in favor of Luisa. On the loan's maturity, Virginia
failed to pay her loan despite demand. Luisa filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (RTC Manila) a complaint against Virginia, praying for the payment of the
loan or, in default of such payment, the foreclosure of the property subject of a real
estate mortgage.

The RTC Manila ordered Virginia to pay Luisa the loaned amount of P500,000 and,
in default of payment, the mortgaged property, together with all the buildings and
improvements existing thereon, shall be foreclosed and sold and the proceeds of their
sale shall be applied to the payment of the amounts due to Luisa.

Can the property be foreclosed in case Virginia failed to pay Luisa?

No. The settled rule is that these remedies of collection of sum of money and foreclosure
of real estate mortgage are mutually exclusive. The invocation or grant of one remedy
precludes the other because the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor
consisting of recovery of the credit with execution of the security. Consequently, the
plaintiff cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the
debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. (Pineda v. De Vega,
G.R. No. 233774, April 10, 2019, J. Caguioa, citing Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Icarañgal,
G.R. No. 45350, May 29, 1939)

10. On February 28, 1998, Arthur filed an application for registration of title of a lot in
Ternate, Cavite before the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite under Section 48(b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141) for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Section 48(b) of CA 141 requires possession counted from June 12, 1945. Arthur
presented testimonial and documentary evidence that his possession and that of his
predecessors-in-interest started in 1936. The lot was declared alienable and
disposable (A and D) in 1993 based on a PENRO certification and a certified true
copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary. The government

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opposed the application on the ground that the lot was certified A and D only in 1993
while the application was instituted only in 1998. According to the government,
Arthur's possession of five (5) years from the date of declaration does not comply with
the 30-year period required under CA 141.

Is the government correct?

No. Arthur’s possession should be reckoned from the date of his actual possession, by
himself and his predecessors-in-interest, since 1936. Under Section 48(b) of CA 141, as
amended by PD 1973, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession
for “thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application” to possession
“since June 12, 1945 or earlier”. But possession is different from classification. It is only
necessary that the land be already classified as A and D “at the time the application for
registration is filed” to make public the release of the property for alienation or disposition.
Thus, the possession of Arthur even prior to the classification of the as A and D shall be
counted in determining the period of possession. To rule otherwise absurdly limits the
application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands
actually declared alienable and disposable prior to June 12, 1945, even if the current
possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date. (Republic v. Naguit, G.R. No. 144057,
January 17, 2005; Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009
and September 3, 2013, En Banc; AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System v.
Republic, G.R. No.180086, July 2, 2014) (Bar 2016)

[NOTE: The UPLC had two suggested answers but the second suggested answer is based
on an abandoned ruling in Zarate v. Director of Lands (G.R. No. 131501, July 14, 2004).
Thus, the suggested answer in this question is based on the correct suggested answer in the
original 2016 Bar question. Also, observe that in this question, the application of Arthur
was filed before the effectivity of RA 11573 which now requires only a period of
possession of 20 years instead of June 12, 1945 or earlier. Thus, the rulings prior to the
effectivity of RA 11573 remain true. Nonetheless, it is believed that principle in the above-
cited cases of Naguit, Malabanan, and AFP Retirement is still applicable considering that
the only objectives of RA 11573 are (1) to address the difficulties encountered in proving
ownership since 1945 and the strict standards set by the Supreme Court in a judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles; and (2) to remove the fixed term set on December 31, 2020
as stated under Republic Act No. 9176 for the filing of application of agricultural free
patents and confirmation of imperfect title under Sections 44 and 48. Clearly, it was not
the intention of Congress to change the rule in Naguit, Malabanan and AFP Retirement
when the legislature passed RA 11573 as the law was crafted precisely to address the
stringent requirements in proving that the land is alienable and disposable brought about
by the cases of Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. (G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008) and
Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corp. (G.R. No. 172102, July 2, 2010) which
were affirmed in Dumo v. Republic (G.R. No. 218269, June 6, 2018). In effect, RA 11573

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 supersedes the requirements in T.A.N. Properties and Hanover. (Republic v. Pasig Rizal
Co., Inc., G.R. No. 213207, February 15, 2022, En Banc, J. Caguioa)]

11. In June 2010, spouses Joel and Michelle purchased a parcel of land, Lot No. 143,
Cadastral Survey No. 38-D, with an area of 600 square meters for their residence in
Cainta, Rizal, from Cecille who by herself and her predecessor-in-interest had been
in open, public, peaceful, continuous and exclusive possession of the property under
a bona fide claim of ownership since 1980.

In February 2022, the spouses filed an application for registration of their title before
the proper court under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended by
Republic Act No. 11573, which shortened the possessory requirement for judicial
legalization from June 12, 1945 to only 20 years. The government, through the
Solicitor General, opposed their application for judicial registration alleging that
unclassified lands are presumed to be public lands under the Regalian doctrine;
hence, they pertain to the State. In their Reply, spouses Joel and Michelle argued that
their and their predecessor-in-interest’s open, public, peaceful, continuous and
exclusive possession of the land for 20 years under a bona fide claim of ownership has
made the land alienable and disposable; hence, converted the land from public to
private by operation of law.

Should the petition of spouses Joel and Michelle be granted?

No. The two most basic requirements for land registration under the Public Land Act and
the Property Registration Decree are possession and classification. While RA 11573
shortened the period of possession for judicial legalization and administrative legalization,
the amendatory law retained the classification requirement of the land, that is, alienable
and disposable agricultural land. Thus, the law maintained the basic elements of land
classification and possession. The conversion by operation of law necessitates proof of
possession and land classification of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain. (see Basilio v. Callo, G.R. No. 223763, November 23, 2020)

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. In the absence of such proof,
unclassified lands are considered forestland under Presidential Decree No. 705, or the
Revised Forestry Code; hence, presumed owned by the State. (Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, G.R. No. 167707, October 8, 2008, En
Banc) Being an unclassified land, Lot No. 143, Cadastral Survey No. 38-D is therefore
presumed as land belonging to the State.

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12. Alberto mortgaged an unused parcel of registered land to Bonito, as security for a
PhP1,000,000 loan that Bonito extended to Alberto. The mortgage was not registered,
but Alberto delivered the original certificate of title to Bonito. In the meantime,
Alberto went to Canada to get vaccinated against COVID19. Without Alberto’s
knowledge, Bonito forged a deed of sale of the said parcel of land in his favor and
subsequently obtained a transfer certificate of title in his name. Bonito then sold the
parcel of land to Carita, who subsequently obtained a transfer certificate of title in
her name. Carita did not inspect the lot before the purchase. Alberto subsequently
returned to the Philippines, fully paid Bonito’s loan, and asked Bonito to give back
the OCT to the parcel of land. Bonito, however, admitted that he had already sold the
parcel of land to Carita.

May Alberto recover the parcel of land from Carita?

No. It is well-settled that even if the procurement of a certificate of title was tainted with
fraud, such defective title may be the source of a completely legal and valid title in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value. (Cabuhat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122425,
September 28, 2001; Clemente v. Razo, G.R. No. 151245, March 4, 2005; Leong v. See,
G.R. No. 194077, December 3, 2014; Republic v. Limbonhai and Sons, G.R. No. 217956,
November 16, 2016) A landowner may no longer recover his property from the hands of a
buyer in good faith. Section 53 of P.D. 1529 provides that in all cases of registration
procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the
parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for
value of a certificate of title.

In this case, Carita is an innocent purchaser for value who was entitled to rely on the
transfer certificate of title in Bonito’s name absent any cloud or vice thereon or on the deed
of sale. Being an innocent purchaser for value of the lot, Carita has acquired title thereto
and Alberto has no cause for recovery against Carita.

13. If a defendant raised ownership as a defense in accion publiciana, is it a collateral

attack on the title of the plaintiff?
No. In accion publiciana, the adjudication of the issue of ownership is provisional. Thus,
the defense of ownership (i.e., that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is the rightful owner)
will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiff's Torrens or certificate of title because
the resolution of the issue of ownership is done only to determine the issue of possession.
(Heirs of Cullado v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019, En Banc, J. Caguioa)

14. In 2020, Ignacio was issued Homestead Patent No. V-67820 for Lot No. H-19731.
During an investigation by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) in 2021, it was discovered that the land covered by Homestead Patent No. V-
67820 fell within the zone of unclassified public forest. Consequently, the Republic of
the Philippines filed a complaint for reversion of land to public dominion in 2022. It
argued that Lot No. H-19731 could not have been validly registered because it fell

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 within the forest or timberland zone. Ignacio argued that the issuance of the
homestead patent is fraught with the presumption of regularity of official functions
when the Undersecretary of the DENR, acting for the President, granted the
homestead patent. According to Ignacio, the President, acting through his alter ego,
would not award a homestead patent over forest land but only over public
agricultural land.

Does the issuance of Homestead Patent No. V-67820 cured the non-registrable
character of Lot No. H-19731?
No. Any person seeking relief under Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act,
admits that the property being applied for is public land. (Republic v. Spouses Noval, G.R.
No. 170316, September 18, 2017) Thus, any application for a homestead settlement
recognizes that the land belongs to the public domain. The mere issuance therefore of a
homestead patent does not automatically remove the land from inalienability and convert
it into alienable agricultural land. Prior to its disposition, the public land has to be classified
first as alienable and disposable through a positive act of the government. The State has
the right to institute an action for the reversion of an inalienable land of the public domain
erroneously awarded by its officials and agents. (Republic v. Heirs of Daquer, G.R. No.
193657, September 4, 2018)

In this case, Ignacio failed to show that a law or official proclamation had been issued
declaring the land covered by Homestead Patent No. V-67820 to be alienable and
disposable. Having failed to overcome the burden of proving that the land covered by
Homestead Patent No. V-67820 is alienable and disposable, the presumption that it is an
inalienable land of the public domain remains.

15. X and Y sold the northern portion of a property covered by OCT No. 1 in favor of Z.
In view of the such sale, Z was able to register the said portion property in his name
with the issuance of TCT No. 2. Not long after, Z died. In the course of settling the
estate of Z, the heirs of Z filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the lost owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 1 alleging that Z acquired the entire property by virtue of the
sale, with TCT No. 2 covering the northern portion of the subject property having
been issued. The heirs also alleged that they could no longer locate OCT No. 1 despite
diligent efforts to look for the same.

Prior to the filing of the petition, the heirs registered the Affidavit of Loss of OCT No.
1 with the Registry of Deeds (RD); hence, the fact of execution of the said notice, thru
the Affidavit of Loss, was entered into the Memorandum of Encumbrances of OCT
No. 1 as Entry No. 12345. Per certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court, the
petition was publicly posted and the necessary documents were furnished to the RD,
the Land Registration Authority (LRA), and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

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 The trial court granted the petition. The decision became final and executory. A
month later, X and Y filed Petition for Annulment of Judgment contending that the
Petition for Reconstitution should have been filed by them as the registered owners.
They argue that they were neither included as petitioners nor notified and this shows
illicit desire of Z’s heirs to appropriate the entire lot.

Should X and Y be notified of the of the Petition for Reconstitution proceedings?

Yes.

Section 109 of PD 1529 also contemplates a situation wherein the petition for reconstitution
is filed by another person having an interest in the property who is not the registered owner.
In other words, when an owner's duplicate certificate of title is lost or destroyed, a person
who is a transferee of the ownership over the property, who is not necessarily the registered
owner, may also file the petition for reconstitution. Similarly, in this situation, the other
persons having interest in the property should be notified of the proceedings. In this
situation, the registered owner must also be duly notified of the proceedings. By his or her
very status as registered owner, the latter is an interested party in the petition for
reconstitution case.

With the legal presumption that the registered owner is the owner of the property, thus
affording him preferential right over the owner's duplicate, duly notifying him would
prevent a person who wrongfully purports to be the owner of the property to commit fraud.
It would offer the registered owner sufficient opportunity to contest the supposed interest
of the person filing the petition for reconstitution. The rule on the mandatory notification
of the registered owner in a petition for reconstitution of a lost or destroyed owner's
duplicate certificate filed by another person who is not the registered owner is to ensure an
orderly proceeding and to safeguard the due process rights of the registered owner. It
prevents the commission of fraud.

Therefore, being the registered owners of the subject property, the Sps. Ramirez, whose
rights are now transferred by succession to the petitioners Heirs of the Sps. Ramirez, should
have, at the very least, been given sufficient opportunity to be heard in the Petition for
Reconstitution. (Heirs of Spouses Ramirez v. Abon, G.R. No. 222916, July 24, 2019, J.
Caguioa)

16. CONTRACT OF AGENCY TO SELL PARCEL OF LAND

This AGENCY AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between:

_____________________, of legal age, Filipino, residing at _________________, referred

to as the “PRINCIPAL,”

And

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 ___________________, of legal age, Filipino, residing at _________________, referred
to as the “AGENT,”

WITNESSETH

In consideration of __________________, the PRINCIPAL hereby authorizes the AGENT

to SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, for a price not less than ________________ PESOS
(P____________), to whosoever may buy or purchase the following described real
property, to wit:

(Desription of property)

of which I am the registered owner as evidenced by Transfer (or Original) Certificate of

Title No. ________ of the Registry of Deeds of __________.

The PRINCIPAL is hereby giving and granting unto the AGENT full powers and authority
to do and perform all and every act requisite or necessary to carry into effect the foregoing
authority to sell, as fully to all intents and purposes as the PRINCIPAL might or could
lawfully do if personally present, with full power of substitution and revocation, and hereby
ratifying and confirming all that the AGENT or his substitute shall lawfully do or cause to
be done by virtue hereof.

The AGENT shall not appoint the services of another agent without the prior written
consent of the PRINCIPAL.

This agency agreement contains all the terms, covenants, conditions and agreements
between the parties. Subsequent amendments to the provisions of this agency agreement
must be in writing and signed by both parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agency Agreement is hereby signed this ____ day
of ___________, ___________, in the City (or Municipality) of _______________,
Philippines.

_________________________ _________________________
Principal Agent

17. DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

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 I, ____(vendor)_____, of legal age, Filipino, residing at _________________, for
and in consideration of the sum of ______________________________ PESOS
(P________________), Philippine currency, to me in hand paid by
______(vendee)________, of legal age, Filipino, residing at _________________, do
hereby SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, absolutely and unconditionally, unto the said
______(vendee)________ his/her heirs and assigns, that certain parcel (or parcels) of land,
together with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in
____________________________________, and more particularly described as follows:

(Desription of property)

of which I am the registered owner in fee simple in accordance with the Land Registration
Act, my title thereto being evidenced by Transfer (or Original) Certificate of Title No.
_______________, issued by the Register of Deeds of ____________________.

It is hereby mutually agreed that the vendee shall bear all the expenses for the
execution and registration of this Deed of Absolute Sale.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed this Deed of Absolute Sale, this
____ day of ___________, ___________, in the City (or Municipality) of
_______________, Philippines.

____________________
Vendor

With my consent:

____________________
Vendor’s spouse

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

___________________________ ___________________________

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )

CITY OF MANILA ) S.S.

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BEFORE ME, this 19th day of August 2022 in the City of Manila, personally appeared:

Name Competent evidence of identity Place and date of issue

____(vendor)_____ _______________________ _______________________
____(vendee)_____ _______________________ _______________________

Known to me to be the same person who executed the foregoing instrument, and
acknowledged that the same are their free act and deed.

This instrument, consisting of two (2) pages, including the page on which this
acknowledgment is written, has been signed on the left margin of each and every page
thereof by ____(vendor)_____ and ______(vendee)________ and their witnesses, and
sealed with my notarial seal.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal on
the date and place above written.

Doc No. 123 ATTY. _______________________

Page No. 2 Roll of Attorneys No.____________
Book No. V IBP No. _____________, _________
Series of 2022 PTR No. ____________, _________
MCLE Compliance No. __________

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