Abundo vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, 925 SCRA 560, G.R. No. 222348 November 20, 2019

Abundo vs.
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, 925 SCRA 560, November 20, 2019
Case Title: JHEROME G. ABUNDO, petitioner, vs. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION,

GRAND CELEBRATION LDA and/ or MARLON ROÑO, respondents.
Docket Number: G.R. No. 222348
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Attorney’s Fees ;
Division: SECOND DIVISION
Ponente: INTING, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 10, 2015 and Resolution dated
January 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 136759 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Respondents are ordered to jointly and severally pay petitioner Jherome G. Abundo
the amount of US$60,000 or its equivalent amount in Philippine currency at the time of payment,
representing total and permanent disability benefits, plus US$1,000, or its equivalent in Philippine
currency, as attorney’s fees.
G.R. No. 222348. November 20, 2019.*
JHEROME G. ABUNDO, petitioner, vs. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, GRAND CELEBRATION LDA
and/ or MARLON ROÑO,** respondents.
Labor Law; Findings of Fact; The factual findings of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
affirming those of the Labor Arbiter (LA), who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within
their jurisdiction, when sufficiently supported by evidence on record, are accorded respect if not finality,
and are considered binding on the Supreme Court (SC).—There is no question that as general rule, findings
of fact of an administrative agency (like the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC), which has acquired expertise in
the particular field of its endeavor, are accorded great weight on appeal. This Court is consistent in ruling
that the factual findings and conclusions of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great weight and
respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court a long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency
of the evidence upon which its labor officials’ findings rest. The factual findings of the NLRC affirming
those of the Labor Arbiter, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction,
when sufficiently supported by evidence on record, are accorded respect if not finality, and are considered
binding on this Court. However, the rule, is not absolute and admits of certain well-recognized exceptions.
Thus, when the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are not supported by substantial
evidence or their judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts, the appellate court may make an
independent evaluation of the facts of the case, which procedure the CA adopted in this case.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; The Rules of Court requires that
only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45.—The Rules of Court requires that
only questions of law should be raised in peti-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
** “RONO” in some parts of the Rollo.
561
VOL. 925, NOVEMBER 20, 2019
561
Abundo vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation
tions filed under Rule 45. As a rule, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below. Petitions for review on certiorari should cover only
questions of law as this Court is not a trier of facts. However, the rules do admit exceptions such as when
the CA’s judgment is based on misapprehension of facts and that it overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although the Court of Appeals (CA) was correct in highlighting that referral to
a third doctor is mandatory, it however, overlooked the fact that there was no final and categorical
assessment and conclusion made by the company-designated physicians.—Although the CA was correct
in highlighting that referral to a third doctor is mandatory, it however, overlooked the fact that there was
no final and categorical assessment and conclusion made by the company-designated physicians. It
likewise misapprehended the fact that the company doctors’ assessment is not yet a final conclusion as
to the petitioner’s disability, and that, there is no need to consult a third doctor in order to settle the
issue. With the foregoing, this Court is compelled to revisit the factual circumstances of the instant case.
In other words, the Court will reevaluate the factual findings of the labor officials and the CA. It is crystal
clear that the exception, rather than the general rule, applies in the present case.
Labor Law; Third Doctor Doctrine; There is no question that the referral to a third doctor as provided in
Section 20(A)(3) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Em- ployment Contract
(POEA-SEC) is mandatory in case there are disagreements made by the company-designated physician
and the seafarer’s chosen physician as to the seafarer’s medical condition.— There is no question that the
referral to a third doctor as provided in Section 20(A)(3) of the POEA-SEC is mandatory in case there are
disagreements made by the company-designated physician and the seafarer’s chosen physician as to the
seafarer’s medical condition. This Court in the recent cases of Murillo v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers,
Inc., 877 SCRA 558 (2018), and Dionio v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc., 886 SCRA 47 (2018),
reiterated the settled rule that the referral to a third doctor is mandatory, and that the seafarer’s failure
to abide thereby is a breach of the POEA-SEC
562
562
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

which makes the assessment of the company-designated physician final and binding. However, our
jurisprudence is replete with cases which pronounce that before a seafarer should be compelled to initiate
referral to a third doctor, there must first be a final an categorical assessment made by the company-
designated physician as to the seafarer’s disability within 120/240-day period. Otherwise, the seafarer
shall be considered permanently disabled by operation flaw.
Attorney’s Fees; Considering that the petitioner was forced to litigate to protect his right and interest, he
is entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees pursuant to Article 2208(8) of the Civil Code.—
Considering that the petitioner was forced to litigate to protect his right and interest, he is entitled to a
reasonable amount of attorney’s fees pursuant to Article 2208(8) of the Civil Code. However, this Court
notes that petitioner failed to prove that the respondents acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing
to satisfy his demands. Records show that the respondents offered to pay the petitioner disability benefits
corresponding to a Grade 10 disability which is obviously way below the amount for permanent/total
disability. Thus, this Court finds the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of US$1,000 as reasonable.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
INTING, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision2 dated June 10, 2015 and Resolution3 dated January 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 136759, which reversed and
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 28-80.

2 Id., at pp. 9-22; penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, with Associate Justices
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Ramon A. Cruz, concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 24-25.
563
563
set aside the Decision4 dated April 23, 2014 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC
LAC No. (OFW M) 01-000051-14 and NLRC NCR Case No. (M) 06- 08397-13.
Antecedents
As culled from the records, the pertinent facts are as follows:

Jherome G. Abundo (petitioner) was formerly employed as Able Seaman onboard the vessel “Grand
Celebration-D/E” (Grand Celebration). On the other hand, Magsaysay Maritime Corporation is a licensed
manning agent of its principal, Grand Celebration LDA (collectively, respondents).5
On April 25, 2012, the petitioner was engaged by the respondents as Able Seaman for eight months. On
May 8, 2012, he departed from the Philippines and embarked the vessel Grand Celebration.6
On December 15, 2012, while the petitioner was securing a lifeboat, a metal block snapped and hit his
right forearm. First aid was immediately administered on the petitioner at the ship’s infirmary. Then, the
petitioner was sent to a hospital in Brazil. In the hospital, a posterior splint was applied on the affected
area to immobilize it and prevent further injury.7
After consultation with the doctor assigned in the vessel, the petitioner was recommended for
repatriation. When he was fit to travel, the petitioner was medically repatriated on January 7, 2013. Upon
arrival, the petitioner was referred to a company-designated physician, who immediately ordered an
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 152-165; penned by Commissioner Isabel G. Panganiban-Ortiguerra, with Presiding

Commissioners Joseph Gerard E. Mabilog and Nieves E. Vivar-De Castro, concurring.
5 Id., at p. 29.
6 Id., at p. 153.
7 Id.
564
564
X-ray. The X-ray revealed an overriding fracture, fragment at the distal 3rd shaft of the right radius.8
Subsequently, the petitioner underwent a treatment procedure for open reduction and internal fixation
with plate replacement and screws of the fractured right distal radius. After his discharge from the
hospital, the petitioner was then made to undergo physiotherapy to improve the function of his right
arm.9
On April 22, 2013, the company-designated physician noted: 1) weak grip, right; 2) paresthesia on the
right thumb; and 3) left wrist pain upon extreme movements. The petitioner was advised to continue the
rehabilitation. Dr. Esther G. Go (Dr. Go), the company-designated doctor, issued an interim assessment of
Grade 10 disability which was noted by the company medical coordinator, Dr. Robert D. Lim (Dr. Lim),
thus:
xxxx
Patient complained of left wrist pain upon extreme movements.
There is weak grip, right.
There is also paresthesia on the right thumb.
He was advised to continue his rehabilitation.
His interim assessment is Grade 10 – ankylosis of the left wrist in normal position.10
Further, on April 26, 2013, Dr. Ramon Lao (Dr. Lao), a company surgeon, suggested a Grade 10 disability
due to ankylosed wrist.11
Meanwhile, the petitioner sought an independent doctor, Dr. Rogelio P. Catapang (Dr. Catapang), an
orthopaedic sur-
_______________
8 Rollo, pp. 11, 397.
9 Id., at pp. 154, 436.
10 Id., at p. 438.
11 Id., at p. 439.
565
565
gery and traumatic flight surgeon who made the following findings:
Mr. Abundo continues to have weakness and pain of the right extremity despite continuous
physiotherapy. Range of motion is restricted particularly in supination. Because his grip is weak, he is
unable to lift heavy objects, the kind of work seaman are expected to perform. He has lost his pre-injury
capacity and is UNFIT to work back at his previous occupation.
xxxx
In addition, excessive forces associated with throwing and swinging activities may aggravate the present
condition, the patient sustained his injury following a direct trauma to his arm; although he has received
first aid the first definitive treatment was immediately done. The signs and symptoms associated with
these injuries are directly related to the degree of severity. There may or may not be any visible or
palpable deformity. Point tenderness is normally present at the site of injury, and may remain. The patient
has demonstrated a limited range of motion, weakness of the hand in the affected side and an increase
in pain at the involved site with attempted movements.
Mr. Abundo’s pre-injury job requires that he operates some machines and lift heavy objects. He may also
be required to use tools to adjust nuts, bolts and screws on some occasions. Mr. Abundo claimed that he
can no longer perform these functions because he no longer has the strength in his right hand.
Mr. Abundo, with his present condition, he will not be able to perform his pre-injury work because of the
physical demands it en-
566
566
tails. Some [restriction] must be placed on his work activities. This is in order to prevent the impending
late sequelae of his current condition. He presently does not have the physical capacity to return to the
type of work he was performing at the time of the injury. He is therefore, UNFIT in any capacity for further
strenuous duties.12
With these findings, the petitioner demanded from the respondents the maximum benefit under the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) and claimed
to be suffering from permanent disability. Instead of granting permanent disability benefits, the
respondents offered US$10,075.00, an amount equivalent to a Grade 10 disability. As a result, the
petitioner filed a labor complaint against the respondents seeking the payment of sickness allowance,
permanent and total disability benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
For their part, the respondents argued: (1) that the petitioner failed to prove that he is suffering from
total and permanent disability; (2) that he failed to observe the conflict-resolution procedure in the POEA-
SEC which is to refer to a third doctor to settle the conflicting findings between the company-designated
physician and that of the petitioner’s chosen physician; and (3) that the petitioner is not entitled to his
claims including moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
_______________
12 Id., at p. 415.
567
567
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
In the Decision13 dated October 30, 2013, Labor Arbiter Virginia T. Luyas-Azarraga (Labor Arbiter) ruled
in favor of the petitioner. The Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner’s disability is permanent and total
based on the pieces of evidence presented. She explained that even after the company- designated
physician gave an interim assessment of the petitioner’s medical condition under Grade 10 disability, the
petitioner was still undergoing rehabilitation.14 The Labor Arbiter opined that total disability does not
mean absolute helplessness. Thus, she concluded that in disability compensation, it is not the injury which
is compensated but rather the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.15
For these reasons, the Labor Arbiter deemed it wise to award to the petitioner US$60,000.00 representing
the maximum coverage for disability benefit under the POEA-SEC. The Labor Arbiter, likewise, awarded
10% attorney’s fees to the petitioner. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is rendered ordering respondents, jointly and severally
to pay complainant Sixty Thousand U.S. Dollars (U.S. $60,000.00) or its peso equivalent at the time of
payment, plus 10% of the total award as attorney’s fees.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Undaunted, the respondents appealed to the NLRC.
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13 Id., at pp. 105-111; penned by Labor Arbiter Virginia T. Luyas-Azarraga.
14 Id., at p. 110.
15 Id., at p. 111.
568
568
The Ruling of the NLRC
On April 23, 2014, the NLRC promulgated a Decision16 affirming the Labor Arbiter’s ratiocination. The
NLRC echoed the Labor Arbiter’s findings that the petitioner was not restored to his pre-injury condition
and his injury made him unable to perform his customary work as a seafarer. Moreover, the NLRC ruled
that while it has been held that failure to resort to a third doctor will render the company doctor’s
diagnosis controlling, it is not the automatic consequence. The NLRC explained that resort to a third doctor
is merely directory and not mandatory.17 It disposed the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision affirmed.
SO ORDERED.18
Subsequently, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC.
Aggrieved, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On June 10, 2015, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision19 granting the petition and reversing the
NLRC’s ruling, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED such that the assailed
decision and resolution
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 152-165.

17 Id., at p. 161.
18 Id., at p. 164.
19 Id., at pp. 9-22.
569
569
dated 23 April 2014 and 16 June 2014 respectively, both rendered by the National Labor Relations
Commission Sixth Division are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Jherome G. Abundo
is awarded US$10,075.00 or its Philippine Peso equivalent as his disability benefit. Lastly, the prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction is DENIED for being moot.
SO ORDERED.20
The CA held that referral to a third doctor is mandatory.21 It ruled that it is the obligation of the seafarer
to notify the concerned employer of his intention to settle the issue through the appointment of a third
doctor.22 The CA upheld the assessment of Dr. Go, the company-designated physician, stating that the
petitioner suffers from Grade 10 disability.23
Likewise, the CA clarified that the 120/240-day period could no longer be made as basis for the assessment
of the disability grade but the actual disability grade given by the company-designated physician or the
third independent physician pursuant to Section 20(A)(6) of the POEA-SEC. Applying Section 20(A)(6) of
the POEA-SEC, the CA stated that the disability shall be based on the disability grading provided under
Section 32 of the POEA-SEC which grants a disability award of US$10,075.00.24
Finally, the CA denied the petitioner’s prayer for attorney’s fees. It declared that the respondents are well
within their rights to deny the petitioner’s claim for permanent an total disability benefit.25
_______________
20 Id., at p. 21.
21 Id., at p. 17.
22 Id., at p. 18.
23 Id., at p. 19.
24 Id., at pp. 19-21.
25 Id., at p. 21.
570
570
The petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied by the CA in its assailed Resolution26 dated
January 14, 2016.
Undeterred, the petitioner comes before this Court raising the following grounds, to wit:
A. The Court of Appeals was in error when it reversed the NLRC’s Decision as the NLRC did not act with
grave abuse of discretion since its decision is based on substantial evidence.
B. The Court of Appeals committed a serious mistake when it failed to uphold the evaluation made by the
NLRC.
C. The Court of Appeals was in error in its application of the POEA-SEC conflict-resolution procedure
regarding the third physician referral.
D. The Court of Appeals seriously erred when they failed to uphold that it is by operation of law that the
petitioner is considered a totally and permanently disabled, and as such, the “third physician referral rule”
finds no application in the instant case.27
The basic contention of the petitioner is that he was permanently disabled as a result of the injuries he
suffered while working as a seafarer. He maintains that disability should be based on one’s incapacity to
work. The petitioner asserts that since he was unable to engage in a gainful employment even after the
statutory 120/240-day period, he is entitled to permanent disability benefits.28
The petitioner also contends that the third-doctor-referral provision is not applicable because it was by
operation of law
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26 Id., at pp. 24-25.
27 Id., at pp. 35-36.
28 Id., at pp. 57-61.
571
571
that he became permanently disabled. He avers that the assessment of the company-designated physician
is merely an interim one, and not a final and categorical evaluation as to his disability. He insists that the
failure of the company-designated physician to submit a final and categorical disability assessment within
the 120/240-day period conclusively presumes that he is permanently disabled. Lastly, the petitioner
argues that the temporary disability assessment of the company-designated physician is not controlling
in awarding disability benefits.
In their Comment29 dated June 30, 2016, the respondents emphasize that the absence of findings coming
from a third doctor makes the certification of the company-designated physician controlling in
determining the disability grading of the petitioner’s injury. Accordingly, the findings of the company-
designated physician should prevail.
Moreover, the respondents submit that the mere lapse of 120/240-day period does not automatically
vest an award of permanent disability benefits upon the petitioner. They argue that the degree of
disability must still be determined by a competent and reliable physician.
Lastly, the respondents claim that there is absolutely no basis for this Court to award attorney’s fees in
the absence of bad faith on their part in denying the petitioner’s demand for permanent disability
benefits.
Our Ruling
This Court grants the petition.
In a nutshell, the main issue in this case is whether the petitioner is entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits. The parties’ disagreement lies on the degree of disability and the amount of benefits
that the petitioner is entitled.
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29 Id., at pp. 659-691.

572
572
At the outset, this Court must address the petitioner’s argument that the CA went beyond its jurisdiction
when it re-evaluated the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
There is no question that as general rule, findings of fact of an administrative agency (like the Labor
Arbiters and the NLRC), which has acquired expertise in the particular field of its endeavor, are accorded
great weight on appeal. This Court is consistent in ruling that the factual findings and conclusions of the
NLRC are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed
binding on this Court a long as they are supported by substantial evidence.30 Judicial review of labor
cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which its labor officials’
findings rest.31 The factual findings of the NLRC affirming those of the Labor Arbiter, who are deemed to
have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, when sufficiently supported by evidence on
record, are accorded respect if not finality, and are considered binding on this Court.32
However, the rule, is not absolute and admits of certain well-recognized exceptions. Thus, when the
findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are not supported by substantial evidence or their
judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts, the appellate court may make an independ-
_______________
30 Peckson v. Robinson Supermarket Corporation, 713 Phil. 471, 479; 700 SCRA 668, 685 (2013), citing
Acebedo Optical v. National Labor Relations Commission, 554 Phil. 524, 541; 527 SCRA 655, 672 (2007).
31 Id., at p. 486; p. 672.

32 Dela Rosa v. Michaelmar Philippines, Inc., 66 Phil. 154, 165; 648 SCRA 721, 731 (2011), citing Bolinao
Security and Investigation Service, Inc. v. Toston, 466 Phil. 153, 160-161; 421 SCRA 406, 412 (2004).
573
573
ent evaluation of the facts of the case, which procedure the CA adopted in this case.33
In the instant case, the CA was acting within its jurisdiction when, on certiorari, it did not merely adopt
the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, but reversed the latter’s ruling that the third doctor-
referral rule is merely directory and not a mandatory procedure. The NLRC’s ruling is clearly erroneous
considering the plethora of doctrinal jurisprudence stating that the third-doctor-referral provision is
mandatory. Thus, the CA acted within its jurisdiction when a petition for certiorari was filed before it.
The Rules of Court requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45.34
As a rule, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered
in the proceedings below.35
Petitions for review on certiorari should cover only questions of law as this Court is not a trier of facts.36
However, the rules do admit exceptions37 such as when the CA’s judgment
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33 AMA Computer College-East Rizal v. Ignacio, 608 Phil. 436, 453; 590 SCRA 633, 649 (2009), citing San
Miguel Corporation v. Aballa, G.R. No. 149011, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 392, 415.
34 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Section 1.
35 Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No. 187448, January 9, 2017, 814 SCRA 10, 18.
36 See Heirs of Jose Mariano and Helen S. Mariano v. City of Naga, G.R. No. 197743, March 12, 2018, 858
SCRA 179.
37 As provided in Twin Towers Condominium Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 280, 310; 398
SCRA 203, 223 (2003), the following are the exceptions: (a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b)
when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was
based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g)
574
574
is based on misapprehension of facts and that it overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
Although the CA was correct in highlighting that referral to a third doctor is mandatory, it however,
overlooked the fact that there was no final and categorical assessment and conclusion made by the
company-designated physicians. It likewise misapprehended the fact that the company doctors’
assessment is not yet a final conclusion as to the petitioner’s disability, and that, there is no need to
consult a third doctor in order to settle the issue. With the foregoing, this Court is compelled to revisit the
factual circumstances of the instant case. In other words, the Court will reevaluate the factual findings of
the labor officials and the CA. It is crystal clear that the exception, rather than the general rule, applies in
the present case.
To arrive at a judicious resolution of the present controversy, this Court deemed it proper to apply: a)
Section 20(A)(3) of the POEA-SEC; b) Article 198 [192](c)(1), Chapter VI, Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code;
and c) the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation (AREC) implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor
Code.
Section 20(A)(3) of the POE-SEC provides:
Section 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS.—
_______________
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (h) where the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of
specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent or
where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.
575
575
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS —
3. x x x x
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly
between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both
parties.
The POEA-SEC should never be read in isolation with other laws such as the provisions of the Labor Code
on disability and the AREC. Otherwise, the disability rating of the seafarer will be completely at the mercy
of the company-designated physician, without redress, should the latter fail or refuse to give one.38 It
must be emphasized that the POEA SEC is not the only contract between the parties that governs the
determination of the disability compensation due the seafarer.39 The POEA-SEC should be read hand in
hand with the Labor Code and the AREC in resolving disability compensation cases.
Article 198[192](c)(1), Chapter VI, Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code instructs, thus:
Art. 198[192]. Permanent and total disability.—
xxxx
(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as
otherwise provided for in the Rules[.]
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38 Carcedo v. Maine Marine Philippines, Inc., 758 Phil. 166, 184; 755 SCRA 543, 560 (2015).
39 Id.
576
576
In addition, Section 2(b) of Rule VII of the AREC defines disability as follows:
Sec. 2. Disability.—x x x.
(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to
perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided
for in Rule X of these Rules.
Likewise, Section 2, Rule X of the AREC reads:
Sec. 2. Period of entitlement.—(a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such
disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except
where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240
days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However,
the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous
temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or
mental functions as determined by the System.
There is no question that the referral to a third doctor as provided in Section 20(A)(3) of the POEA-SEC is
mandatory in case there are disagreements made by the company-designated physician and the seafarer’s
chosen physician as to the seafarer’s medical condition. This Court in the recent cases of Murillo v.
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.40
_______________
40 G.R. No. 221199, August 15, 2018, 877 SCRA 558.
577
577
and Dionio v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc.,41 reiterated the settled rule that the referral to a third
doctor is mandatory, and that the seafarer’s failure to abide thereby is a breach of the POEA-SEC which
makes the assessment of the company-designated physician final and binding.
However, our jurisprudence is replete with cases which pronounce that before a seafarer should be
compelled to initiate referral to a third doctor, there must first be a final an categorical assessment made
by the company-designated physician as to the seafarer’s disability within 120/240-day period. Otherwise,
the seafarer shall be considered permanently disabled by operation flaw.
In Sunit v. OSM Maritime Services, Inc., et al. (Sunit),42 this Court, citing Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc., et al.
v. Munar,43 ruled that the assessment of the company-designated physician of the seafarer’s fitness to
work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days must be definite for it to be controlling
in determining the medical condition of the seafarer, to wit:
We point to our discussion in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, 15 underscoring that the assessment of
the company-designated physician of the seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability within the
period of 120 or 240 days must be definite, viz.:
Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the

seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail
to do so and the seafarer’s medical condition remains un-
_______________
41 G.R. No. 217362, November 19, 2018, 886 SCRA 47.
42 806 Phil. 505; 818 SCRA 663 (2017).
43 702 Phil. 717; 689 SCRA 795 (2013).

578
578
resolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.44 (Emphasis and underscoring
omitted)
Moreover, in Sunit, this Court stressed:
A final and definite disability assessment is necessary in order to truly reflect the true extent of the
sickness or injuries of the seafarer and his or her capacity to resume work as such. Otherwise, the
corresponding disability benefits awarded might not be commensurate with the prolonged effects of the
injuries suffered.45
This Court likewise held in Carcedo v. Maine Marine Philippines, Inc. (Carcedo),46 that failure of the
company-designated doctor to issue a final assessment made the disability of the seafarer therein
permanent and total, thus:
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals and the Labor Arbiter that the 24 March 2009 disability
assessment made by Dr. Cruz was definitive. To our mind, the said disability assessment was an interim
one because Carcedo continued to require medical treatments even after 24 March 2009. He was
confined in the hospital from 20 April 2009 to 6 June 2009, where he underwent serial debridements,
curettage, sequestrectomy and even amputation of the right first metatarsal bone. He was certainly still
under total disability, albeit temporary at that time.
_______________
44 Sunit v. OSM Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 42 at p. 517; p. 679.
45 Id., at p. 519; pp. 680-681.
46 758 Phil. 166; 755 SCRA 543 (2015).
579
579
His discharge from the hospital was 137 days from repatriation. Following the Court’s rulings in Vergara
and Kestrel, since Carcedo required further medical treatments beyond the 120 day period, (sic) his total
and temporary disability was extended. The company- designated physician then had until 240 days from
repatriation to give the final assessment.
xxxx
Here, the company-designated physician failed to give a definitive impediment rating of Carcedo’s
disability beyond the extended temporary disability period, after the 120-day period but less than 240
days. By operation of law, therefore, Carcedo’s total and temporary disability lapsed into a total and
permanent disability.47 (Italics supplied)
Furthermore, in Fil-Pride Shipping Co., Inc., et al. v. Balasta,48 this Court instructed that the company-
designated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent
disability within the period of 120 or 240 days, otherwise, the seafarer’s medical condition remains
unresolved and the latter shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. This Court ruled in this wise:
The company-designated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work
or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days, pursuant to Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor
Code and Rule X, Section 2 of the AREC. If he fails to do so and the seafarer’s medical condi-
_______________
47 Id., at pp. 183-184; p. 560.
48 728 Phil. 297; 717 SCRA 624 (2014).
580
580

tion remains unresolved, the latter shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.49
In the case at bench, the disability grading that Dr. Go, the company-designated doctor, issued was merely
an interim assessment and not a final and categorical finding. If it were otherwise, Dr. Go would not have
advised the petitioner to continue his rehabilitation. Also, Dr. Lao’s subsequent medical report cannot be
considered as final assessment as he merely suggested disability grading. Dr. Lao was not the designated
doctor who medically evaluated the petitioner’s condition. His report is merely a suggestion subject for
evaluation by Dr. Lim, the medical coordinator.
This Court pronounced in Belchem Philippines, Inc./United Philippine Lines, et al. v. Zafra, Jr.,50 that a
mere “suggestive” disability grading will not suffice as final and definitive medical assessment, thus:
In this case, petitioner seek the Court’s attention to the “final” assessment, dated April 19, 2010, issued
by the attending physician, which was earlier quoted.
To the petitioners, this assessment forecloses any claim that Zafra’s injury is total or one that incapacitates
the employee to continue performing his work, They treat it as the certification required under Section
20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC as it contained his degree of disability and fitness to resume sea duties.
The statement, however, is clearly de- void of any definitive declaration as to the capacity of Zafra to
return to work or at least a categorical and final degree of disability. As pointed out by the CA, all the
medical certifi-
_______________
49 Id., at p. 312; p. 641.
50 759 Phil. 514; 757 SCRA 560 (2015).

581
581
cates found in the record merely recited his medical history and, worse it made no mention as to whether
the seafarer was even capable of resuming work. In fact, it was merely a suggestion coming from the
attending doctor and not from the company-designated physician, as if the letter was written while the
process of evaluation was still being completed. To stress, Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC requires the
declaration of fit to work or the degree of permanent disability by the company-designated physician and
not by anyone else. Here, it was only Dr. Chuasuan, Jr. who signed the suggested assessment, addressing
the letter solely to Dr. Lim, the company-designated physician. Taken in this context, no assessment,
definitive in character, from the company-designated physician’s end was issued to reflect whether Zafra
was fit or unfit to resume duties within the 120/240-day period, as the case may be. Thus, the Court deems
him unfit to resume work onboard a sea vessel.51 (Emphasis supplied; italics supplied)
Records reveal that petitioner remained incapacitated to resume sea duties even after the company-
designated doctor evaluated his medical condition. This means that the petitioner had to still undergo
medical treatment even after being seen by the company-designated physician. Obviously, even after the
lapse of the maximum 240-day period there was still no final assessment made by the company-
designated doctor as to the petitioner’s disability. With Dr. Go’s failure to issue a final and definite
assessment of petitioner’s condition within the 240-day period, petitioner was thus deemed totally and
permanently disabled. It is apparent that petitioner’s disability and incapacity to resume working
continued for more than 240 days.
_______________
51 Id., at pp. 527-528; pp. 572-573.
582
582
Consequently, the absence of a final assessment by the company designated physician makes the rule on
third-doctor-referral inapplicable in the instant case. The failure of the company-designated physician to
issue a final assessment and disability grading within the 240-day period made the petitioner’s disability
total and permanent even without evaluation by a third doctor. Evidently, there is no need for the
petitioner to initiate the referral to a third doctor for him to be entitled to permanent disability benefits.
In Carcedo, this Court decreed that the rule on third doctor referral is not applicable if there is no definitive
disability assessment made by the company-designated physician, thus:
In this case, the third-doctor-referral provision did not find application because of the lack of a definitive
disability assessment by the company-designated physician. x x x52
Considering the absence of definitive disability assessment made by the company-designated physician,
it was by operation of law that the petitioner became permanently disabled.
Viewed in this light, the CA erred in upholding the interim assessment of Dr. Lao over that of Dr. Catapang
on the basis of the petitioner’s failure to seek medical opinion from a third doctor as provided under the
POEA-SEC. It erroneously applied the provisions of the POEA-SEC in isolation with other laws such as the
Labor Code and the AREC. The CA should have widened its spectrum in deciding the case and applied the
Labor Code provisions on disability benefits. Applying the 2010 POEA-SEC, the Labor Code provisions on
permanent disability and the AREC vis-à-vis the several jurisprudence concerning seafarer’s disability
compensation, this Court holds that the petitioner is, by operation of law, permanently disabled to work
as a seafarer.
_______________
52 Supra note 38 at p. 189.
583
583
Lastly, considering that the petitioner was forced to litigate to protect his right and interest, he is entitled
to a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees pursuant to Article 2208(8) of the Civil Code.53 However, this
Court notes that petitioner failed to prove that the respondents acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy his demands. Records show that the respondents offered to pay the petitioner disability
benefits corresponding to a Grade 10 disability which is obviously way below the amount for
permanent/total disability. Thus, this Court finds the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of US$1,000
as reasonable.54
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 10, 2015 and Resolution dated January
14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 136759 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Respondents are ordered to jointly and severally pay petitioner Jherome G. Abundo the amount of
US$60,000 or its equivalent amount in Philippine currency at the time of payment, representing total and
permanent disability benefits, plus US$1,000, or its equivalent in Philippine currency, as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe (Chairperson, Senior Associate Justice), A. Reyes, Jr. and Zalameda,*** JJ., concur.
Hernando, J., On Leave.
_______________
53 Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except:
xxxx
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws.
54 Sunit v. OSM Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 42 at p. 524.
*** Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2724 dated October 25, 2019.
584
584
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—In case of disagreement between the findings of the company-designated physician and the
seafarer’s physician, the parties may agree to jointly refer the matter to a third doctor whose decision
shall be final and binding on them. (Tradephil Shipping Agencies, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz, 818 SCRA 476 [2017])
Based on jurisprudence, the findings of the company-designated physician prevail in cases where the
seafarer did not observe the third doctor referral provision in the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). (C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs.
Castillo, 824 SCRA 14 [2017])
——o0o——

Abundo vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, 925 SCRA 560, G.R. No. 222348 November 20, 2019

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Abundo vs.

Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, 925 SCRA 560, November 20, 2019

Case Title: JHEROME G. ABUNDO, petitioner, vs. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION,

Docket Number: G.R. No. 222348

Syllabi Class: Attorney’s Fees ;

Division: SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 222348. November 20, 2019.*

** “RONO” in some parts of the Rollo.

VOL. 925, NOVEMBER 20, 2019