OIG 24 42 Aug24 Redacted Jan 6 Report

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
OIG-24-42 July 31, 2024
FINAL REPORT
The Secret Service's Preparation for, and Response to,

the Events of January 6, 2021

WARNING: This document is Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES). Do not distribute or copy this report without the expressed written
consent of the Office of Inspector General.
Law Enforcement Sensitive
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 | www.oig.dhs.gov
July 31, 2024
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ronald L. Rowe, Jr.

Acting Director
United States Secret Service
FROM: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.

Inspector General
JOSEPH V Digitally signed by
JOSEPH V CUFFARI
CUFFARI Date: 2024.07.31 15:42:25

-07'00'
SUBJECT: The Secret Service’s Preparation for, and Response to, the Events of
January 6, 2021 – Law Enforcement Sensitive
Attached for your action is our final report, The Secret Service’s Preparation for, and Response to,
the Events of January 6, 2021. We incorporated the formal comments provided by your office.
The report contains six recommendations aimed at improving the Secret Service’s policies and
processes for planning and responding to similar events. Your office concurred with four
recommendations and did not concur with two recommendations. Based on information
provided in your response to the draft report, we consider recommendations 1, 3, 5, and 6 open
and resolved. We consider recommendations 2 and 4 open and unresolved. Once your office has
fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30
days so that we may close the recommendations. The memorandum should be accompanied by
evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions and of the disposition of any monetary
amounts.
Please send your response or closure request to [email protected].
Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide copies of our
report to congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the
Department of Homeland Security. We will post a redacted version of the report on our website.
Please contact me with any questions, or your staff may contact Thomas Kait, Deputy Inspector
General, at (202) 981-6000.
Attachment
OIG Project No. 21-025-SRE-DHS

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS

The Secret Service’s Preparation for, and Response to,
the Events of January 6, 2021
July 31, 2024 What We Found

The United States Secret Service (Secret Service) planned and
Why We Did This conducted protective operations at several sites on January 6, 2021,
including the Capitol, and took actions to assist the United States
Review Capitol Police (USCP). We initiated this review to evaluate the Secret
Service’s preparation for, and response to, the events of January 6, 2021.
We conducted this review to Our review focused on three sites where the Secret Service conducted
evaluate the Secret Service’s protective operations or assisted the USCP:
preparation for, and
response to, the events of • The Ellipse. The Secret Service coordinated all security for President
January 6, 2021. Trump’s speech at the “Save America” rally on the Ellipse.
What We • The Capitol. The Secret Service provided security for Vice President
Michael Pence’s visit to the Capitol, where he was to preside over the
Recommend certification of the electoral college vote before a joint session of
Congress at 1 p.m. The Secret Service also assisted USCP after
protesters violently overwhelmed USCP officers and forced their way
We made six
into the Capitol at 2:13 p.m.
recommendations to
improve the Secret Service’s
• The Democratic National Committee building. The Secret Service
policies and processes for
provided security for Vice President-elect Kamala Harris’ visit to the
planning and responding to
Democratic National Committee building. During her visit, USCP
similar events.
discovered a pipe bomb at 1:05 p.m. while conducting a search following
the discovery of a similar device at the Republican National Committee
building. The Vice President-elect was subsequently evacuated at
For Further Information:

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at
Secret Service Response
(202) 981-6000, or email us at:
DHS- Secret Service officials concurred with four of six recommendations.
[email protected]. Recommendations 2 and 4 are considered unresolved and open, and
recommendations 1, 3, 5, and 6 are considered resolved and open.
www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-24-42

Table of Contents
Background .......................................................................................................................................... 1
Relevant Secret Service Divisions for January 6 Events ....................................................... 12
Results of Review ............................................................................................................................... 13
USSS/PID’s Assessments About January 6 Did Not Convey a High Potential for Violence. 15
The Secret Service Coordinated Typical Security Planning at the Ellipse but Quickly
Encountered Indicators of Potential for Violence Outside of the Secure Area ................... 20
The Secret Service Denied the President’s Request to Go to the Capitol ........................... 29
The Secret Service Secured the Vice President after the Capitol Breach but Narrowly
Avoided Encounters with Rioters .......................................................................................... 31
The Secret Service Sent Civil Disturbance Units to the Capitol After Violence Erupted ..... 38
The Secret Service Did Not Locate the Pipe Bomb at the DNC Building but Promptly
Evacuated the Vice President-Elect After the Pipe Bomb was Detected by the US Capitol
Police ...................................................................................................................................... 46
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 56
Recommendations ............................................................................................................................. 57
Management Comments and OIG Analysis ....................................................................................... 57
Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology ............................................................................. 63
DHS OIG’s Access to DHS Information................................................................................... 63
Appendix B: Secret Service Comments on the Draft Report ............................................................ 66
Appendix C: Office of Inspections and Evaluations Major Contributors to this Report .................. 75
Appendix D: Report Distribution ....................................................................................................... 76
Abbreviations
CAT Counter Assault Team

CDU Civil Disturbance Unit
DNC Democratic National Committee
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis
MPD Washington, DC Metropolitan Police Department
OPO Office of Protective Operations

PID Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division

TSD Technical Security Division
UPE Unusual Protective Event
USCP U.S. Capitol Police
USSS U.S. Secret Service

Background
On January 6, 2021, thousands of individuals gathered in Washington, DC, to protest a joint
session of Congress to certify the results of the 2020 electoral college vote. Approximately 28,000
people attended the “Save America” rally on the White House Ellipse, where President Donald
Trump and others spoke. Crowds from the Ellipse then marched to the U.S. Capitol, where they
joined other demonstrators. There, rioters attacked law enforcement, breached barricades, and
broke into the Capitol building. During the attack, several thousand people breached the
Capitol, threatening the security of Members of Congress and the Vice President.
Over the course of several hours, the attack on the Capitol resulted in assaults on approximately
140 police officers and nearly $3 million in damage. In addition, one rioter was fatally shot by a
U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) officer and three USCP officers died following the attack. 1 Meanwhile,
a few blocks from the Capitol, the USCP discovered viable pipe bombs placed near the exterior of
the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Republican National Committee buildings. 2
The United States Secret Service (Secret Service/USSS) planned and conducted protective
operations at several sites on January 6, 2021, including the Capitol, and took actions to assist
USCP. We initiated this review to evaluate the Secret Service’s preparation for, and response to,
the events of January 6, 2021. 3 Our review focused on three sites where the Secret Service
conducted protective operations or assisted the USCP. 4
• The Ellipse. The Secret Service coordinated all security for President Trump’s
speech at the “Save America” rally on the Ellipse.
• The Capitol. The Secret Service provided security for Vice President Michael
Pence’s visit to the Capitol, where he was to preside over the certification of the
electoral college vote before a joint session of Congress at 1 p.m. The Secret
Service also assisted USCP after protesters violently overwhelmed USCP officers
and forced their way into the Capitol at 2:13 p.m.
1
One USCP officer died on the day after the attack and two USCP officers died by suicide in subsequent days.
2
Our review addressed the device at the DNC building because of the Secret Service’s role protecting the Vice
President-elect during her visit to the DNC.
3
This review is one of three initiated by the DHS OIG related to January 6 events. The two other reviews pertain to
(1) Office of Intelligence and Analysis activities to gather and share intelligence (see I&A Identified Threats prior to
January 6, 2021, but Did Not Issue Any Intelligence Products before the U.S. Capitol Breach, OIG-22-29, Mar. 4, 2022);
and (2) DHS law enforcement agencies’ planning and response efforts, which is not completed. OIGs for the
Departments of Defense, Interior, and Justice also have initiated reviews of their respective agencies’ activities
relating to January 6 events. In addition, the USCP OIG initiated its own reviews of the USCP’s activities related to
the events of January 6 and issued several internal reports.
4
In addition to the three sites included in the scope of this report, Secret Service is responsible for planning and
carrying out daily protective operations at numerous locations in the National Capitol Region such as the White
House and the Vice President’s Residence, as well as at sites across the country and abroad.
www.oig.dhs.gov 1 OIG-24-42

• The DNC building. The Secret Service provided security for Vice President-elect
Kamala Harris’ visit to the DNC building. During her visit, USCP discovered a pipe
bomb at 1:05 p.m. while conducting a search following the discovery of a similar
device at the Republican National Committee building. The Vice President-elect
was subsequently evacuated at
Figure 1 shows the locations of these three sites, where the Secret Service was responsible for
protective operations for the President, Vice President, and Vice President-elect on January 6.
Figure 1. Locations of Three Sites Where the Secret Service Conducted

Protective Operations on January 6
Source: Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General generated: map data © 2023
Google
As part of this review, we developed a detailed timeline (see Figure 2) of major events and actions
related to Secret Service’s protective operations on January 6. The timeline includes information
relevant to five areas covered in this report: Secret Service intelligence leading up to January 6,
the rally at the Ellipse, protecting the Vice President at the Capitol, assisting USCP, and
protecting the Vice President-elect at the DNC.

Figure 2. Timeline of Events Related to Secret Service’s Protective Operations on

January 6, 2021









Source: DHS OIG generated based on Secret Service documents and other information sources
Relevant Secret Service Divisions for January 6 Events

The Secret Service protects the President, Vice President, and other protectees and ensures the
safety and security of key locations and events of national significance. 5 Several divisions within
the Secret Service were integral in planning for and conducting protective operations on January
6 and responding to the day’s events—namely, the Office of Protective Operations (USSS/OPO),
the Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division (USSS/PID), and the Technical Security
Division (USSS/TSD).
Office of Protective Operations
USSS/OPO has more than 1,000 special agents and more than 1,500 Uniformed Division officers
to carry out its mission. Within USSS/OPO, protective activities are organized into several
divisions:
• Presidential Protective Division–Protects the President and members of the First Family.
• Vice Presidential Protective Division–Protects the Vice President and members of the
Second Family. 6
• Dignitary Protection Division–Protects foreign heads of state visiting the United States
and protects major Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates, as well as the
President-elect and Vice President-elect and their families.
5
In addition to its protective mission, the Secret Service also safeguards the Nation’s financial infrastructure and
payment systems. See generally, 18 U.S.C. § 3056.
6
This division also protects the Secretary of Treasury and the Secretary of Homeland Security.

• Uniformed Division–Performs day-to-day security operations at the White House,

Treasury Building, Vice President’s residence, foreign diplomatic missions in the
Washington, DC region, and other protected sites.
Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division
USSS/PID supports protective operations by analyzing information, investigating threats,

assessing risk, and disseminating protective intelligence information. USSS/PID guides and
coordinates protective intelligence investigations when the Secret Service is alerted to
individuals who may pose a threat to protectees or protective sites. The division analyzes,
evaluates, disseminates, and maintains incoming information about individuals, groups, and
activities, both foreign and domestic, that pose a potential threat to protectees or key locations,
such as the White House. USSS/PID also develops briefings, assessments, and trainings about
vulnerabilities, trends, and tactics seen at events that may inform future protective operations.
USSS/PID has collaborative relationships with partners like the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) to support protective operations. According to senior officials, USSS/PID will share
intelligence and information with law enforcement partners as needed. USSS/PID also runs a 24-
hour Protective Intelligence Operations Center to continuously monitor incoming threats.
Technical Security Division
USSS/TSD is responsible for all aspects of technical security in advance of travel by the President
and Vice President and for other protectees when authorized. Technical security includes, for
example, chemical, biological, radiological, and explosive countermeasures. This division
supports canine explosive detection operations by directing the location of canine sweeps and
facilitating other support for canine teams.
Results of Review
The Secret Service planned for routine protective operations at the White House Ellipse, the U.S.
Capitol, and the DNC building on January 6, 2021. Although Secret Service did not anticipate or
plan for the level of violence that ultimately occurred that day, the Secret Service took actions to
respond to and mitigate the threats it encountered, avoid any harm to its protectees, and assist
USCP.
Leading up to January 6, the Secret Service prepared two threat assessments that did not convey
a high potential for violence on January 6. The Secret Service anticipated that the planned
Ellipse rally would be like previous pro-Trump rallies that took place in November and December
2020. At those events there was some violence, but those events mainly involved opposing
demonstration groups and did not have a high potential to impact protective operations.

However, at the White House Ellipse rally, Secret Service personnel observed indicators of
potential for violence outside of the secure area. This included numerous individuals wearing
body armor, communicating via radios, climbing trees, and avoiding entry to the secure area,
where they would have had to pass through magnetometers. When the President requested to
go to the Capitol following his speech at the rally, the President’s detail leader said that going to
the Capitol was infeasible and the motorcade had to return to the White House.
At the Capitol, the Secret Service treated the Vice President’s visit as a standard visit, which
included
. Even so, the Secret Service secured the Vice President during the
breach of the Capitol, but there were some near encounters with rioters. The Secret Service
considered evacuating the Vice President to his residence, but he did not want to leave, and the
protective detail eventually considered their location on the Capitol grounds secure.
After violence erupted at the Capitol, the Secret Service Uniformed Division Chief offered to assist
USCP and sent officers to assist. The process of identifying White House personnel available
for deployment, while maintaining security at the White House, resulted in an 80-minute delay
before personnel were deployed. These officers provided security for Members of Congress and
staffers sheltering in the Dirksen Senate Office building.
Meanwhile, at the DNC building, the Secret Service evacuated the Vice President-elect after the
USCP discovered a pipe bomb. The pipe bomb had been placed near the building the night
before, but Secret Service personnel did not identify it during their security sweep on the
morning of January 6. The Vice President-elect, traveling in an armored vehicle with her
motorcade, entered the building via a ramp within 20 feet of the pipe bomb, and was in the
building for approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes before the pipe bomb was discovered and she
was subsequently evacuated. The Secret Service did not discover the pipe-bomb; instead, a pair
of USCP officers discovered it while conducting a patrol after a similar pipe bomb was found at
the Republican National Committee building a few blocks away. The Secret Service had not
employed all its explosive detection tactics and measures for the security sweep, instead
providing only canine teams at the DNC building that day. Afterward, the Secret Service did not
report the building’s evacuation as an unusual protective event, as required by its policies. 7 More
than a year later, the Secret Service initiated and completed an update to its policy to address
gaps identified in its processes that may have contributed to the failure to discover the pipe
bomb. 8
During our review, we interviewed more than 100 Secret Service personnel involved in the
preparation for and response to the events of January 6. In addition, we obtained more than
7
Secret Service, Unusual Protective Events and Incident Reporting Protocols, OPO-19, Nov. 25, 2015.
8
Secret Service, Protective Operations Manual, OPO-06, Apr. 7, 2022.

183,000 emails and attachments from select Secret Service personnel and conducted analytical
searches of those emails. We also reviewed Secret Service video from the Ellipse and USCP video
from the Capitol complex and cameras located near the DNC building.
USSS/PID’s Assessments About January 6 Did Not Convey a High Potential for
Violence
The Secret Service’s protective mission relies heavily on maintaining awareness of intelligence
and information. In advance of January 6, USSS/PID prepared two reports that contained
assessments about the likelihood of violence occurring on January 6, but neither identified a
high potential for the level of violence that occurred ultimately. These assessments did not
include some information available to USSS/PID related to potential threats of violence, in part
because the information . Finally,
leading up to January 6, shared some information about
the U.S. Capitol, but the Secret Service
.
USSS/PID Produced Two Documents in Preparation for January 6 that Did Not Anticipate the
Level of Violence that Occurred that Day
Prior to January 6, USSS/PID staff developed two relevant documents about organized protests
scheduled to occur between January 4 and 7, 2021, against the certification of the 2020 election
results. 9 Neither of the products conveyed a high potential for violence that would impact the
Secret Service’s protective mission on January 6.
Research specialists and special agents in USSS/PID produce threat assessment or briefing
documents to inform protective operations. Staff responsible for monitoring
review and analyze
.
Per departmental rules of behavior, intelligence staff
9
As discussed later in this section, the two documents are: 1) the March for Trump protective intelligence brief
issued on December 31, 2020, and reissued on January 4, 2021, with additional information regarding road closures;
and 2) the Notable Trends and Tactics for Consideration Ahead of Potential Civil Unrest in the National Capital
Region, issued on January 5, 2021. Aside from these two products, USSS/PID also develops protective intelligence
briefs focused on threats toward its protectees. According to a USSS/PID official, protective intelligence briefs for
the President and Vice President .

. 10 USSS/PID staff share information with Secret Service leadership and

protective operations personnel for planning and situational awareness and incorporate
information into USSS/PID’s briefings or assessments when the information
. 11
On December 31, 2020, 12 USSS/PID published the March for Trump protective intelligence brief.
According to USSS/PID officials, the brief was developed to assist Uniformed Division and
protective detail personnel with their planning operations related to January 6 protective events
and protectee movements. 13 The brief focused on information
along with related
to upcoming January 6 demonstrations at the Ellipse and Capitol.
For each of the almost 60 demonstrations identified in the brief, intelligence staff reported the
event showed “no indication of civil disobedience.” USSS/PID personnel told us intelligence staff
Rather, according to USSS/PID personnel,
USSS/PID personnel included information about

in the March for Trump protective intelligence brief. The briefing document
. Rather, the
USSS/PID briefing document conveyed statements
10
For departmental guidance regarding monitoring and collecting information on social media, see DHS
Management Directive No. 110-01, Privacy Policy for Operational Use of Social Media, June 8, 2012.
11
While USSS/PID guidance does not constrain it from activities related to other types of threats, guidance indicates
that USSS/PID’s mission focuses on PID-01,
Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division Functions, May 08, 2015, states: “[USSS/PID] analyzes, evaluates,
disseminates, and maintains information about
.”
12
USSS PID issued an updated version of the March for Trump brief on January 4, 2021, with additional information
regarding road closures .
13
USSS/PID’s Open-Source Intelligence Branch primarily authored the March for Trump brief, with input and
subsequent review by PID staff from other sub-offices. The Open-Source Intelligence Branch monitors
, and disseminates intelligence and information related to the security
.
14
Being of record with the Secret Service refers to individuals or groups with a case and/or record (such as arrests)
documented in the Secret Service’s Protective Threat Management System.

.
Figure 3 shows an excerpt from the March for Trump protective intelligence brief.
Figure 3. Excerpt from the March for Trump Protective Intelligence Brief
Source: The March for Trump protective intelligence brief
The March for Trump protective intelligence brief concludes with an assessment that the risk of
violence would be like prior demonstrations in November and December 2020:
Many of the groups planning to engage in demonstration activities on January 6,

2021,
. Verbal and physical altercations ensued
between pro-Trump and anti-Trump supporters during both events. As a result of
the
, PID assesses
.

On January 5, 2021, USSS/PID issued another document, titled Notable Trends and Tactics for
Consideration Ahead of Potential Civil Unrest in the National Capital Region. 15 USSS/PID
personnel authored the document to describe potential activity that might take place around
and on January 6 with an estimated 28,000 demonstrators attending various events. Analysts
based the
. According to the report,
The report concludes with this assessment of the

threat of violence:
[USSS/] PID assesses there is a continued threat of low to mid-level violence

instigated by . It is also assessed
that
Further
demonstration activity related to the 2020 presidential election and upcoming
January 20 inauguration ceremony is anticipated with the possibility of individuals
or groups engaging in civil disorder.
The group within USSS/PID that developed this report is responsible for
. According to the official responsible for developing this report, personnel based
the low-to-mid-level violence
USSS/PID Received Some Information Indicating a High Potential for Violence Leading Up to
January 6, but USSS/PID Did Not Incorporate Such Information in the Final USSS/PID
Assessments
Although the USSS/PID staff received additional information about threats of violence to law
enforcement and other Government officials, in the days preceding January 6, this information
was not included in the final USSS/PID assessments. For example, USSS/PID staff received a tip
from the
USSS/PID staff conducted
and determined there was . Further,
USSS/PID was . In another example,
15
PID’s Critical Protective Analysis Group developed this report. The Critical Protective Analysis Group
.

USSS/PID received an anonymous tip

initially obtained by
17
. The individual
who provided the information in the tip
warned
. Although this tip
was alarming,
.
Some USSS/PID staff also received alerts from a system that

Leading up to January 6, there were alerts mentioning
various threats such as
A USSS/PID supervisor
responsible for the branch that reviews open-source information said the branch struggled to
review the large amount of .
Some USSS/PID staff received reports from a DHS component and another partner conveying a
high level of concern about potential violence and civil unrest to occur that day. On December
23, 2020, the shared its threat assessment, titled
with USSS/PID staff and the Protective Intelligence Operations Center. 19 The
generated this report in anticipation of the
taking place on January 6. The report included information regarding
.
On January 5, shared
its report about events scheduled on January 6 with USSS/PID staff. The report described
17
is a right-wing group founded in
group was involved in two prior instances of violence
.
19
Make America Great Again (MAGA) was a political slogan of the Trump Presidential campaign.

The Secret Service Relies on for Information but Did Not

Receive Intelligence Products about Potential Threats for January 6
Because the Secret Service is not a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the component
primarily relies on collaboration with partners such as
for obtaining verified intelligence and information. Leading up to January 6,
the Secret Service did not receive any issued intelligence products from 20
. On
January 5, 2021, released the situational information report
This report contained some information

indicating a potential threat against the Capitol. Our review of emails and interviews with staff
confirmed the Secret Service did not receive the report.
The Secret Service can receive intelligence and information from the
. Secret Service representatives serve as Task Force
officers assigned to track and share information related to the Secret Service’s protective
mission. Two Task Force officers from the Secret Service said that prior to January 6, there was
general information about various protest groups but nothing out of the ordinary or uncommon.
However, the two Secret Service representatives we spoke to on the Task Force learned after
January 6 that they had not been included on an email distribution list set up to share
information about potential threats in the National Capital Region leading up to the
inauguration. 21 According to the two Task Force officers, information may have been shared
through that distribution list, , that the Secret Service did not receive
via other avenues. 22
The Secret Service Coordinated Typical Security Planning at the Ellipse but
Quickly Encountered Indicators of Potential for Violence Outside of the Secure
Area
Secret Service personnel had limited advance notice from White House staff about the
President’s January 6 speech at the Ellipse and the anticipated crowd size, which affected site
security planning. Coordination meetings and intelligence prior to the event at the Ellipse did
not raise alarms about a high potential for violence, and Secret Service personnel anticipated
nothing extraordinary. During the rally, some Secret Service personnel observed indicators of
I&A did not publish any intelligence products regarding threats leading up to January 6, 2021; see I&A Identified
20
Threats prior to January 6, 2021, but Did Not Issue Any Intelligence Products before the U.S. Capitol Breach, OIG-22-
29, Mar. 4, 2022.
21
The two Task Force officers we spoke to were unsure why they were left off the email distribution list but thought it
may have been an administrative oversight on the part of .
22
We obtained documentation from the that confirmed had been shared on this email
distribution list.

potential for violence outside the secure area. The Secret Service arrested one individual inside
the secure area with concealed wooden
nunchucks. Over the course of the event, officers at the magnetometer checkpoints seized
hundreds of prohibited items, including knives, tasers, and gas masks.
Secret Service personnel also reported seeing numerous individuals wearing body armor,
communicating via radios, climbing trees outside of the secure area, and avoiding entry to the
secure area, where they would have had to pass through magnetometers. Local law
enforcement partners shared reports of possible firearms within the crowd outside of the Secret
Service’s protected area. Because these individuals were observed outside of the protected area,
the Secret Service’s law enforcement partners, including the U.S. Park Police and the MPD had
jurisdiction over these individuals. 23
The Secret Service Had an Abbreviated Timeline to Prepare for the Ellipse Event
The Secret Service has procedures for security preparations prior to a protectee site visit. The
process begins when a protectee’s staff notifies the protective detail of a scheduled trip or
movement. The relevant protective division then notifies an advance team to conduct site
security planning. :
•
;
•
•
23
The MPD has primary law enforcement jurisdiction over the 61 square miles of land in the District of Columbia. In
Washington, DC, the U.S. Park Police primarily provide law enforcement services on the National Mall and the
Ellipse.

Source: DHS OIG generated based on Secret Service documents
In addition to the advance team of agents assigned to do the advance site security preparations,
a protective detail travels with the protectee during movements and site visits.
•
•
•
•
•
Security preparations for the President’s January 6 speech at the Ellipse were abbreviated
because the Secret Service had limited advance notice from White House staff. Agents said
advance teams would typically have more time to complete site advance work for an event the
size of the Ellipse event, with . On January 1, Secret Service
personnel received notification that White House staff had added the rally at the Ellipse as an in-
town visit to the President’s schedule. Secret Service advance personnel began planning the
next day and scheduled the initial walk-through of the site for January 3. Secret Service
personnel assigned to protective operations at the rally at the Ellipse said the late notice of the
President’s planned attendance left them with an abbreviated amount of time to complete
advance work at the site.
The Secret Service also encountered challenges obtaining timely information on the anticipated
crowd size for the rally at the Ellipse. On January 1, White House staff informed Secret Service
advance personnel that they were expecting 30,000 people to attend the rally. At the time of the
first walk-through to begin site security planning on January 3, the permit issued by the U.S. Park

Service was for only 5,000 people. 24 The Department of Interior OIG found that on January 4,
event organizers requested an increase in the number of event participant to 30,000. 25 In a
January 5 email, PID shared open-source information indicating an increase in planned
participants at the Ellipse event to more than 30,000 people.
Coordination Meetings and Intelligence prior to the Ellipse Event Did Not Raise Alarms about
High Potential for Violence
The Secret Service participated in coordination meetings with law enforcement partners and
DHS law enforcement components leading up to January 6. The MPD led a series of coordination
calls to discuss permits filed for various demonstrations on January 6; participants included the
Secret Service, the U.S. Park Police, USCP, and other partners. 26 These calls were intended to
allow the various entities involved to share information on pre-event intelligence, timelines,
locations involved for the various groups, and coordination of efforts, among other topics. On
January 3, 2021, the Secret Service also participated in a coordination call for DHS law
enforcement components led by the DHS Office of Operations Coordination to review and share
information about the posture for potential civil unrest in Washington, DC, and coordinate
security planning to identify any operational gaps. Meeting participants that we interviewed did
not convey that these meetings raised alarms about any extraordinary potential for violence on
the scale of what ultimately occurred on January 6.
Secret Service personnel involved in planning for the Ellipse event did not consider the
intelligence information leading up to the event unusual or alarming. As discussed earlier in this
report, PID’s briefings anticipated the event would be like previous related demonstrations in
November and December 2020 and did not convey a high potential for violence that would
impact the Secret Service’s protective mission. Agents assigned to the advance planning team
for the Ellipse event, including the advance intelligence agent, did not recall receiving negative
intelligence. In addition, a senior agent on the President’s detail characterized the intelligence
leading up to the event as “generic” because civil disobedience is always a possibility at political
events.
24
Within the Department of the Interior, the National Park Service, in cooperation with partners, may issue permits
for lawful demonstrations on national park lands. National Park Service officials and the U.S. Park Police share
information with local law enforcement partners on permitted events, such as the number of attendees and the
location of the events.
25
Review of the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Actions Related to January 6, 2021, Department of the Interior
Office of Inspector General, December 18, 2023.
26
Coordination calls were scheduled on December 22, 2020, December 29, 2020, and January 4, 2021.

On January 6, the Secret Service Immediately Encountered Indicators of Potential for Violence
at the Ellipse
On January 6, the Secret Service encountered indicators of potential for violence within the
crowd at the Ellipse event. As shown in Figure 5, the Secret Service established a secure area
with magnetometer checkpoints to screen anyone wishing to enter the event. Yet Secret Service
officers and law enforcement partners observed weapons and prohibited items among the
crowds outside the boundaries of the protected area, as described below. For the individuals
observed outside of the secure area, the Secret Service’s law enforcement partners, including the
U.S. Park Police and the MPD, had appropriate jurisdiction.

Figure 5. Map of the Ellipse Showing the Secure Area and Magnetometer
Checkpoint
Source: DHS OIG generated based on Secret Service information

On the morning of January 6, the Secret Service tweeted a list of prohibited items for the Ellipse
event, which included body armor, firearms, and weapons of any kind. At 8:07 a.m., agents
assigned to monitor the crowds outside the secure area for threats started reporting seeing
people wearing ballistic helmets and body armor and carrying radio equipment and military-
grade backpacks waiting to go through the main magnetometers.
The Secret Service arrested one individual who brought a weapon through the magnetometer
into the secure area. At 9:40 a.m., a concerned citizen reported an individual removing
nunchucks from his pant leg and placing them inside his jacket. The Secret Service official who
interviewed the individual informed us that by bringing the weapon into the secure area, the
individual could have harmed the protectee or other event attendees. Figure 6 shows the
nunchucks,
.
Later that morning, local law enforcement partners shared reports of possible firearms within
the crowd outside of the Secret Service’s protected area. For example, at 11:23 a.m., the U.S.
Park Police advised over its of possible armed individuals, one with a Glock and
one with a rifle, in the location of 14th and 15th Streets and Constitution Avenue. At 12 p.m., a
separate report was shared over a Secret Service radio channel of individuals located in trees,

one with a pistol on the hip. Secret Service personnel coordinated with partners in the U.S. Park
Police and the MPD regarding these threats. 27
Large crowds remained outside the secure area and did not seek entry through the
magnetometer checkpoints. A Secret Service officer assigned to the magnetometers at the
Ellipse said that people attempted to enter with motorcycle suits, ballistic vests, and gas masks,
which the Secret Service seized. The officer also told us that a lot of people chose not to enter
the secure area. Once they realized there were checkpoints with magnetometers, they would
turn away to watch the speech from the street. Another Secret Service officer who worked at the
magnetometer checkpoint said there were large crowds covering the hill by the Washington
Monument, but no one was trying to forcefully enter the event.
During the rally at the Ellipse, the Secret Service seized numerous items at the magnetometer
checkpoints from individuals wishing to enter the secure area that were on the prohibited items
list, such as motorcycle suits and ballistic vests, as shown in Figures 7 through 11. A Secret
Service officer told us it was the first time in his 12-year career that he had confiscated a
motorcycle suit. 28
27
According to a senior Secret Service official, whenever there are major events affecting the White House, the Secret
Service
such as the U.S. Park Police and the MPD.
28
The officer explained that motorcycle suits are like Secret Service riot gear and wearing a motorcycle suit would
provide protection from the tools officers use to diffuse a riot.

Figures 7–11. Prohibited Items Confiscated by Secret Service Officials at the

Magnetometer Checkpoint at the Ellipse
Source: Secret Service photos from a report on magnetometer operations at the Ellipse event
By the conclusion of the Ellipse event, the Secret Service officers working the magnetometers
had processed 28,000 individuals and seized a total of 605 prohibited items. Table 1 shows the
number of seizures of various types of prohibited items. A Secret Service official told us he had
never seen the number of ballistic vests and gas masks that he saw on January 6.

Table 1. Prohibited Items Confiscated at Magnetometer

Checkpoints at the Ellipse Rally on January 6
Prohibited Item Number Confiscated

Knives/blades 269
Pepper spray 242
Miscellaneous 94
Total 605
Source: Secret Service report on magnetometer operations at the Ellipse event
The Secret Service Denied the President’s Request to Go to the Capitol

As discussed above, whenever a protectee has a scheduled trip or movement, his or her staff
notifies the protective detail so that Secret Service can plan accordingly. Sometimes a protectee
may request an off-the-record movement,
.
According to the President’s detail leader, during a meeting several days prior to the rally at the
Ellipse, a White House staff member mentioned the idea of the President going to the U.S.
Capitol after the rally on January 6, 2021. The President’s detail leader said he advised against
this movement, saying it was not a good idea,
especially because of the
ongoing transition. Following that discussion, White House staff did not make a formal request
and the Secret Service did not plan for a movement to the Capitol on January 6.
On January 5, 2021, at 5:37 p.m., a Secret Service agent assigned to the President’s motorcade
emailed the other assigned drivers that there was an unconfirmed rumor of a possible
Presidential move to the Capitol following the event at the Ellipse. The email indicated that the
visit to the Capitol would be an off-the-record movement if it happened. The Secret Service
official who sent the email informed us that he did not think an off-the-record movement to the
Capitol was likely on January 6, because a
.
On January 6, 2021, at 11:58 a.m., President Trump arrived on stage at the Ellipse event. During
his speech, he announced that he would go with protestors to the Capitol. A Secret Service
official who was backstage said that a military aide told him the President had announced he
would go with the protestors to the Capitol and asked whether the Secret Service had a way to
get the President to the Capitol. The Secret Service official informed the military aide that the

typical motorcade route was not possible because of the attendees marching to the Capitol.
Exercising due diligence, the Secret Service agent then contacted an MPD point of contact to
plan potential logistics in case the movement did happen. According to the Secret Service agent,
the MPD point of contact began to determine a potential route to the Capitol for that scenario.
At 1:16 p.m., after concluding his speech, the President entered his limousine. There were
Secret Service agents in the limousine with the President—
— and no one else. According to the agents, once the motorcade was en
route to the White House, the President requested to go to the Capitol. The detail leader
informed the President that going to the Capitol was infeasible and the motorcade had to return
to the White House. 29
By 1:19 p.m., the President had reached the White House and was inside the West Wing. The
detail leader asked the limousine driver to hold while he received clarity on whether a movement
to the Capitol was still being considered. At about the same time—1:19 p.m.—a senior Secret
Service official from OPO sent an email to the President’s detail leader informing him that USCP
was having serious challenges securing the Capitol. The email advised against an off-the-record
movement to or near the Capitol. After 15 to 20 minutes, the detail leader released the
motorcade after he determined that the President would not be going to the Capitol.
Specifically, the detail leader said there was no further discussion about going to the Capitol
once they returned to the White House because of the ongoing violence at the Capitol. At 1:55
p.m., the detail lead replied to the email from the senior OPO official that there would be no off-
the-record movement to the Capitol.
29
During the June 28, 2022, hearing of the U.S. House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
U.S. Capitol, a witness testified that the White House Deputy Chief of Staff told her that the President attempted to
grab the steering wheel of the limousine and lunged toward the Secret Service detail lead when his request to go to
the Capitol was denied. The OIG did not interview this witness—who was not a DHS employee—because transcripts
of her Committee testimony and Committee staff interview are publicly available at www.govinfo.gov. We
attempted to interview the Deputy Chief of Staff; however, after encountering 4 months of delays in response to our
efforts to schedule and conduct the interview, we provided questions for written response. In response to our
question about this incident, we received the following message: “I do not recall being made aware of any details
about the President’s return trip to the White House and, as such, I do not recall speaking with anyone about it.” We
also interviewed Secret Service agents in the limousine with the President. The limousine driver said that
the President was angry when his request to go to the Capitol was denied, whereas the President’s detail lead, who
was seated in front of the President, said he did not recall if the President was angry. We asked agents whether
the President reached for the steering wheel of the limousine or lunged toward the detail lead when his request to
go to the Capitol was denied, and witnesses said those actions did not occur.

The Secret Service Secured the Vice President after the Capitol Breach but
Narrowly Avoided Encounters with Rioters
Because the U.S. Capitol is considered a secure site and is managed by USCP,
The Secret
Service treated the Vice President’s January 6 visit to the Capitol as a standard visit without any
special precautions or heightened security. This included following USCP’s practice that
. Despite limited
contingency planning and communication challenges, the Secret Service secured the Vice
President during the breach of the Capitol, but there were some near encounters with rioters.
The Secret Service considered evacuating the Vice President to his residence, but he did not want
to leave, and the protective detail eventually considered their location secure. After the Capitol
was cleared of protestors, the Secret Service escorted the Vice President back to chambers to
resume election certification proceedings.
The Secret Service Followed its Standard Process for Routine Visits to the Capitol, including
On January 6, 2021, the Vice President was expected to serve as the President of the Senate. The
Secret Service planned for the visit to the Capitol to be a standard visit without any special
precautions or heightened security. This included
. 30
Secret Service protective detail members regularly visit the Capitol due to protectees’ roles in
Congress. The Capitol is a unique site, with its own police presence and security measures in
place. Specifically, the complex has cameras and guarded entry gates, as well as magnetometers
inside the buildings. Secret Service personnel told us that for these reasons, they
As a routine matter, USCP

Secret Service staff told us, and our policy review confirmed, that there are no
known documented procedures or agreements noting this limitation, but it is a general
understanding.
30
According to Secret Service,
.
31
Protective surveys, typically generated in conjunction with an “advance,” identify vulnerabilities and document
site logistics and emergency plans.

To facilitate coordination for protectee visits to the Capitol, the Secret Service’s Liaison Division
has assistants permanently assigned to the complex. According to Liaison Division
staff, they coordinate between the Secret Service, the Sergeant-at-Arms Office for the Senate and
House of Representatives, and USCP. Liaison Division staff said they also conduct
by Secret Service protective staff. According to Liaison Division staff, they also
manage the sharing of logistical information between USCP and the Secret Service and serve as
escorts for protectees while onsite.
On December 30, 2020, Secret Service protective staff received confirmation that the Vice
President would attend the electoral college certification at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. The
Secret Service assigned a lead agent to begin planning for the site visit. The Secret Service also
confirmed the Vice President’s visit and his itinerary with USCP on January 5.
On January 6, the site agent arrived at the Capitol several hours before the Vice President for a
walk-through. The site agent, the Vice President’s staff members, and the assigned Liaison
Division staff conducted the walk-through of expected movements around
10:45 a.m. After the walk-through concluded, the site agent contacted the Vice President’s
supervisory detail members to brief them about the security and emergency action plan. The
site agent also contacted the transportation agent to provide an update that protestors were
beginning to gather around the complex, but ultimately gave clearance for the Vice President’s
arrival.
The Vice President, the Second Lady, and their daughter, along with their protective details,
arrived on the Senate side of the Capitol around 12:37 p.m. The Vice President was first escorted
to his office, then eventually to the Senate and House chambers for the certification, while his
family was escorted by their detail staff and a Liaison Division supervisor to another floor.

Due to Communication Challenges and Limited Contingency Planning, the Secret Service
Protective Detail Only Narrowly Avoided Rioters
According to the transportation agent, after the Vice President and his family entered the Capitol,
the motorcade was directed to move to the plaza above the Capitol Visitor Center. Video footage
reflects that about 100 protestors had surrounded the plaza. USCP officers guarded bike racks
set up as a barricade to keep protestors back
. Figure 13 shows the location where the Vice President’s
motorcade was parked and the surrounding protestors. After being parked for about 30 minutes,
the transportation agent started noticing the protestors getting closer and fighting with USCP to
move the bike rack barricade. At the same time, the motorcade’s MPD counterpart heard
through the radio that things were “getting crazy” on another side of the Capitol grounds, with
USCP officers clashing with protestors.

Figure 13. Location of the Vice President’s Motorcade and Surrounding Protestors
At 1:43 p.m., about an hour after the motorcade parked, the protestors who were initially
barricaded behind the bike racks began attempting to remove the bike racks, while USCP officers
tried to keep them in place. Initially, USCP officers were able to control the situation and keep
protestors from breaching the barricade. In response to the escalation of events, the
transportation agent said he told anyone who had exited their motorcade vehicles to get back in
them. The agent told us he was concerned that protestors would overtake the area and vehicles,
block any exit routes, and cause injuries.
The transportation agent told us that once all staff were back inside the vehicles, he had to come
up with a plan to relocate in case the area became unsecured.

, protestors stormed through the plaza, breaching the

barricades at 1:59 p.m. The transportation agent said some protestors moved toward the
motorcade and attempted to block some of the vehicles. Those vehicles were ultimately able to
get around the protestors and rejoin the rest of the motorcade.
. The transportation agent said making that quick decision
to move the motorcade was the “hardest call I’ve had to make.”
Just as the Capitol was breached at 2:13 p.m., the site agent returned to the chamber area
and heard glass breaking and a rush of people entering the Capitol lobby on the
floor below. The site agent said that she immediately ran from the chamber area down the
stairwell to monitor the situation. The site agent informed the detail supervisor, who was
coming down the stairs, of the situation so he could relay the information to staff still located
upstairs and determine a plan of action. Due to security concerns, the Secret Service had moved
the Vice President from the Senate Chambers to the Vice President’s office just prior to the
breach, at 2:12 p.m. According to the site agent, the protesters had two paths out of the area
they had entered, one of which was directly toward the site agent and the Vice President’s office.
USCP officers directed protestors away from the direction of the stairwell leading to the Vice
President’s office toward the other path. The rioters reached the second floor at 2:15 p.m.,

where a USCP officer led them away from the direction of the Vice President’s office toward a line
of USCP officers.
If USCP had been unsuccessful in directing the protestors, they could have moved into the office
and chamber area while the Vice President and his family were still there. The site agent told us
the situation kept quickly changing—the evacuation path was clear of protestors one moment,
then not clear the next. At 2:25 p.m., the detail used a moment when the path was clear to
relocate the Vice President from his office . Figure 14 shows
the proximity of the Vice President to rioters on January 6, 2021.
Figure 14. Proximity of Vice President Pence to Rioters in the Capitol’s Senate Wing on
January 6, 2021
Source: DHS OIG generated based on Secret Service documents and public information
The site agent told us that the

created manpower challenges that day.

The site agent also told us that additional personnel would have been helpful while moving the
Vice President,
.
The Secret Service Decided Not to Evacuate the Capitol Grounds
At , the Vice President’s detail safely moved the Vice President from his office
without incident. During this time, the detail leader said that he and the Vice
President discussed relocating from the Capitol. According to notifications from the Secret
Service’s operations center, there were initial plans to evacuate the Capitol and go to the Vice
President’s residence. The Vice President did not want to leave the Capitol grounds. Detail staff
said they were not aware of the developments outside the building, including protestors erecting
a gallows and noose and yelling, “Hang Mike Pence.”
Once the Vice President was moved , the detail leader worked to determine a
plan of action and whether to leave the Capitol grounds. The detail leader said he was
monitoring motorcade routes in case an evacuation was needed. The detail leader also told us
he took the Vice President’s desire not to leave Capitol grounds into consideration. Ultimately,
the detail leader determined there was no reason to leave the secure location. At 2:49 p.m., the
detail notified the Secret Service operations center of the decision to remain holding
. After deciding to hold, the detail leader directed staff to gauge the threat level

According to some agents, they were

32
not receiving communications from various entities such as the Protective Intelligence
Operations Center. According to Secret Service agents, the USCP and MPD officers in the area
could use their radios to maintain necessary communications with their counterparts
. Ultimately, everyone
remained safe for the duration of the hold.
The Vice President Returned to Chambers from the Secure Location
USCP declared the Capitol clear of protestors at 6 p.m. Following the declaration, Secret Service
canine teams began assisting USCP with sweeps inside the Capitol. Between 6:30 p.m. and 6:45
p.m., the site agent, Liaison Division staff assistant, and USSS/CAT agents started conducting
walk-throughs to ensure the walking paths from to the chambers were clear. At
around 7:00 p.m., the site agent, detail supervisors, Liaison Division staff assistant, and
USSS/CAT agents escorted the Vice President back inside the Capitol. Various staff members
were relieved of duty and replaced by other staff at different times throughout the evening. At
7:30 p.m., Senators began returning to the chambers and the Vice President-elect arrived at the
Capitol.
By 8:05 p.m., the Vice President returned to the chambers to resume proceedings. Prior to
proceedings ending in the early morning hours of January 7, 2021, the transportation agent ran
the motorcade route with the MPD from the Capitol to the Vice President’s residence to ensure a
clear path. Once the route was deemed clear, minutes before 4 a.m., the Vice President, his
family, and any remaining Secret Service staff onsite finally departed the Capitol without
incident.
The Secret Service Sent Civil Disturbance Units to the Capitol After Violence
Erupted
After violence erupted at the Capitol, the Secret Service Uniformed Division Chief offered to assist
the USCP, and Secret Service sent Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) teams to the Capitol. The process
of identifying White House personnel available for deployment, while maintaining security at the
White House, resulted in an 80-minute delay before personnel were deployed. Ultimately, the
number of personnel deployed were fewer than Secret Service leadership anticipated. The
CDU officers who responded provided security for Members of Congress and staffers sheltering in
the Dirksen Senate Office building. The Secret Service did not conduct any formal after-action
review of support provided to USCP.
32
Although we requested text messages from select Secret Service personnel to ensure our reconstruction of events
and evaluation of Secret Service’s response was comprehensive, Secret Service notified OIG that it did not maintain
text messages when it implemented a system update despite our ongoing review and other investigations.
Appendix A includes additional information about our request for Secret Service text messages.

The Secret Service Offered Assistance to USCP but Struggled to Identify Available Officers
Secret Service had authority to assist USCP at the Capitol on January 6. First, its statutory law
enforcement authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3056A provides the Secret Service Uniformed Division
with powers equivalent to those of the MPD. Second, Secret Service officials asserted that a
protective nexus existed at the Capitol because of the Vice President’s presence on the complex
and the Vice President-elect’s planned appearance later that evening.
The Secret Service Uniformed Division Chief offered to assist the USCP Chief via text message at
1:01 p.m. 33 The Uniformed Division Chief estimated that the USCP Chief responded within 5
minutes, indicating that he would take whatever assistance the Secret Service could provide.
This text exchange is shown in Figure 15. The Uniformed Division Chief then reached out to the
Secret Service Assistant Director and Deputy Director for approval to assist. The Uniformed
Division Chief estimated the process of consulting with his superiors took about 10 to 15 minutes.
The Secret Service Director said that he also independently reached out to the USCP Chief via
phone and left a voicemail before learning that the Secret Service Uniformed Division Chief had
already established contact and had begun to act.
33
During field work, this text message exchange was the only material Secret Service provided in response to our
request for text messages.

Figure 15. Excerpt of Text Exchange between the

Secret Service Uniformed Division Chief
and the USCP Chief
Source: Secret Service image of text message exchange
34
34
According to a USSS official responsible for CDU training, USSS/CDU officers are trained and equipped for crowd
control. The mission of the USSS/CDU officers was to protect the White House from any form of civil disturbance and
to assist with the event on the Ellipse, if needed. A senior USSS White House Branch official said that, as a result of
protests during the summer of 2020, the Secret Service decided to have USSS/CDU presence for any large rallies or
protests near the White House.

According to the Uniformed Division Chief, he delegated further responsibility for arranging
assistance to the Capitol to the Assistant Chief and proceeded to meet with other high-level
officials in the Director’s Crisis Center. The Uniformed Division Chief said he was not involved in
further coordination while in the Director’s Crisis Center because it was a secure facility where he
did not have his cell phone. The Assistant Chief recalled the Chief at first telling him to assist with
sending support to the USCP, but then redirected him to go to the White House instead to
oversee the security posture. The Assistant Chief said he thought the Chief requested another
USSS official to assist with sending support to the USCP but did not know who. Through our
interviews of other Uniformed Division officials, we could not determine what official, if any, took

any further action at that time to facilitate the Uniformed Division Chief’s initial plan to assist.
The plan to have Washington Field Office agents provide backfill at the White House before
providing assistance had still not occurred hours after the initial 1:01 pm text regarding
assistance. In an email from 3:10 p.m., a White House Branch official wrote: “[Washington Field
Office] is sending an additional agents to [White House Branch] to relieve of our Officers to
respond to the Capitol.”
Meanwhile, the USSS/CDU personnel assigned to the Ellipse event had returned to the White
House, where they were on standby to provide civil disturbance response, if needed. Multiple
USSS/CDU officers assigned to the Ellipse explained that once the event concluded, they
returned to the south lawn of the White House to assume a standby status.
At 1:55 p.m., USCP issued a call for assistance to all agencies via the Police Mutual Aid Radio
System. 35 The Secret Service Uniformed Division Chief had convened a virtual chat with the
Uniformed Division Assistant and Deputy Chiefs at 1:49 p.m. According to a Deputy Chief whose
branch subsequently provided assistance to the Capitol, shortly after the USCP transmission, the
Uniformed Division leadership on the chat determined the support Secret Service would deploy
to the Capitol. Secret Service deployed USSS/CDU teams totaling personnel
They were supplemental to the White House Branch personnel

and considered not essential to the complex security. Before USSS/CDU teams could deploy
they needed instruction for an arrival location, which the Secret Service Uniformed Division Chief
requested and received from the USCP Chief via text message. At 2:12 p.m. the Secret Service
Uniformed Division Chief emailed the arrival location information to the Uniformed Division
Chiefs.
At 2:27 p.m. the USSS/CDU officers departed the White House and arrived at the Capitol at
2:38 p.m. Ultimately, it took 86 minutes from the initial text sent by the Uniformed Division Chief
offering assistance at 1:01 p.m. until the deployment of USSS/CDU teams to assist at 2:27 p.m.
Upon their arrival, USCP directed the USSS/CDU officers to secure the Dirksen Senate Office
Building, where Members of Congress and were sheltering in place according to USSS/CDU
personnel.
Independent of this initial deployment, a of Uniformed Division officers

arrived at the Capitol at 2:35 p.m. The official who led this team said
the team had been initially mobilized and staged for the day as the
“mass arrest team,” intended for potential disturbances at the Ellipse event. According to this
official, the team was sent to assist with the Vice President’s evacuation, but the Vice President
35
The Metropolitan Washington Area Police Mutual Aid Radio System is a regional law enforcement system designed
to give law enforcement communications/emergency operations centers, including that of the Secret Service, the
ability to communicate with one or more other participating agencies.

did not evacuate the complex, and the team proceeded to join the officers at the Dirksen
building. Figure 16 shows USSS/CDU personnel moving within the Dirksen building.
Figure 16. USSS/CDU Personnel in the Dirksen Senate Office Building
Source: Photo by Rod Lamkey/Consolidated News Photos, used with permission
The Secret Service’s provision of personnel to assist USCP may not have been the magnitude
of assistance leadership anticipated. An email from the head of PID to the Secret Service Director
at 3:47 p.m. indicated that, “the Secret Service has already deployed approximately 100 [law
enforcement] Officers to the Capitol and [will deploy] approximately ANOTHER 100 within the
next hour.” When we asked Secret Service leadership about this email, they provided
inconsistent recollections on where these estimated numbers originated and whether they
reflected the Secret Service’s intended response. During an operations meeting with other DHS
components on the afternoon of January 6, the head of PID informed them that Secret Service
had provided approximately 100 law enforcement officers to support USCP, significantly over-
reporting the Secret Service’s true magnitude of response.
The Secret Service also sent a Uniformed Division Official and USSS/OPO officials to USCP’s
Command Center. According to those officials their role at the Command Center included
coordinating the agency’s CDU response, monitoring the Vice President’s movements, and
maintaining direct communication between the Secret Service and USCP. These officials arrived
at the USCP Command Center at approximately 3:45 p.m.

At the Dirksen building, the USSS/CDU teams assumed defensive positions at stairwells and
internal doorways surrounding the large room occupied by Members of Congress and staff.
These teams served as the last line of defense for the building and, according to one Uniformed
Division Chief, freed up USCP officers to clear the main Capitol building. At approximately 3:35
p.m. the USSS/CDU officers defending the Dirksen building were joined by several FBI agents.
USSS/CDU officers held the Dirksen building without incident or engagement from the rioters
until the main Capitol building had been cleared and declared safe for the Members of Congress’
return. At around 7 p.m., some USSS/CDU officers assisted with escorting the Members back to
the main Capitol building. Those USSS/CDU officers ultimately regrouped with the remaining
CDU officers at the Dirksen building and then departed for the White House or their place of duty
at around 8 p.m.
At around 6:30 p.m., the Secret Service deployed canine teams to assist USCP with sweeps
across the Capitol complex until discontinuing at 9:47 p.m. After the situation at the Capitol had
subsided, the Secret Service assisted with arranging installation of anti-scale fencing around the
Capitol complex. Table 3 provides a breakdown of the assistance the Secret Service provided to
the Capitol.
Secret Service Did Not Conduct a Formal After-Action Review of Assistance Provided to the
Capitol
Some of the Secret Service personnel who participated in the component’s response to the
Capitol said they participated in after-action discussions but not in any formal documented
reviews. While some personnel said that Secret Service’s assistance to USCP did not encounter
challenges, others identified potential lessons learned. For example, two responding officers felt
that given their training level and equipment, they could have been better used to directly
engage rioters rather than secure the static position of the Dirksen building. Specifically,
according to the leader of the team, the USSS/CDU officers from the Rowley Training Center were
trained at a high level, and they had a that they

were trained to use or could have provided to USCP. Additionally, three officers expressed
concerns with the lack of coordination with USCP.
During our review, we encountered inconsistent information about some aspects of Secret
Service’s assistance to the Capitol across documents we reviewed and interviews with officials.
For example, the number of officers provided in the email from the head of PID to the Secret
Service Director (discussed previously indicating that Secret Service had deployed 100 officers to
the Capitol) far exceeded the actual number of officers that we could verify as present on the
scene. Further, Secret Service leadership provided inconsistent recollections of where these
estimated numbers originated and whether they reflected the Secret Service’s intended
response. In addition, some Secret Service officials stated that the component provided
additional personnel to support USCP with security through the night of January 6 and into the
following week. In response to our request for confirmation of these activities, the Uniformed
Division Chief provided information about Secret Service Officers assisting USCP with security at
the Capitol on January 14, 2021, but not on any other day following January 6. A formal after-
action review by the Secret Service would have been invaluable not only for the component’s
own institutional knowledge but also to help external reviewers determine the true happenings
of the day.
The Secret Service Did Not Locate the Pipe Bomb at the DNC Building but
Promptly Evacuated the Vice President-Elect After the Pipe Bomb was Detected
by the US Capitol Police
Secret Service canine teams conducting sweeps of the DNC building in preparation for the Vice
President-elect’s visit on January 6 did not discover a pipe bomb that had been placed outside
the building the night before. The Vice President-elect, traveling in an armored vehicle with her
motorcade, entered the DNC building via a ramp within 20 feet of the pipe bomb.
. Secret Service personnel

provided differing interpretations of canine search requirements and procedures. In addition,
the Secret Service had not employed all its explosive detection tactics and measures for the
security sweep, in part because it did not have adequate policies and procedures for requesting
these capabilities for “elect” protectees. Two USCP plainclothes agents who were searching the
DNC building after a similar device was discovered at the Republican National Committee
building ultimately discovered the pipe bomb 1 hour and 40 minutes after the Vice President-
elect’s arrival. The two USCP agents notified the Secret Service, who then evacuated the Vice
President-elect from the DNC building. The Secret Service did not report the DNC building’s
evacuation as an Unusual Protective Event (UPE), as required by its policies. More than a year
later, the Secret Service initiated and finalized an update to its explosive detection coordination
policy to include explosive coordination efforts for “elect” protectee visits.

The Secret Service Canine Teams Did Not Sweep the Bushes Where the Pipe Bomb Was
Located
Advance security sweeps by the Secret Service at the DNC building did not include the outside
area where a pipe bomb had been placed.
personnel gave us differing interpretations of whether the pipe bomb’s location should have
been included in a sweep.
On the evening of January 5, an unidentified individual placed a pipe bomb in bushes near a
bench in front of the DNC building. The pipe bomb was approximately 9 feet from the building’s
exterior wall and 20 feet from the center of the driveway to the garage entrance where the Vice
President-elect, traveling in an armored vehicle with her motorcade, entered the building on
January 6. Figure 17 shows the location of the pipe bomb. According to the FBI, the pipe bomb
was “viable” and “could have detonated, causing innocent bystanders to be seriously injured or
killed.” 36
36
Statement of the Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI Washington Field Office accompanying the release of video
and additional information regarding the pipe bomb investigation on September 8, 2021. During a June 7, 2023,
transcribed interview with members of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, the same FBI
official (retired prior to the June interview) indicated that he did not think the timer on the device could have
detonated the pipe bomb because its 1-hour duration had elapsed.

Figure 17. Location of the Pipe Bomb at the DNC Building
Source: DHS OIG photo
Note: The pipe bomb was placed in the bushes near a bench (as shown in Figure 19). Both the bushes and bench
have since been removed and do not appear in this photo.
On the morning of January 6, between 8:30 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., two Secret Service canine
teams 37 conducted a sweep of the DNC building in preparation for the Vice President-elect’s
arrival at 11:25 a.m. After completing a walk-through of the site, the site agent for the DNC visit
instructed the canine teams to sweep the Vice President-elect’s walking path within the building.
The site agent did not instruct the canine teams to sweep any part of the exterior of the building.
Nevertheless, the two canine teams divided the search areas, with one team sweeping the
interior of the building and the other team taking responsibility for sweeping certain exterior
areas. The officer responsible for sweeping exterior areas said that the exterior sweep included
the garage entrance ramp and some other areas near the garage entrance, including a storm
drain, but did not include the bushes where the pipe bomb was located. 38
37
A canine team consists of one dog and one handler.
38
We reviewed security camera footage of the garage entrance ramp. The video footage did not cover the area
adjacent to the entrance ramp that included the bushes where the pipe bomb was located.

39
Other Secret Service officials, including a canine team supervisor and a subject matter expert in
TSD, said that the area where the pipe bomb was located should have been swept given its
proximity to the garage driveway ramp.
The Vice President-Elect’s Motorcade Passed Near the Still Undiscovered Pipe Bomb
The Vice President-elect, along with members of her staff, arrived at the DNC building at 11:25
a.m. The motorcade entered the DNC building via the garage driveway ramp, passing near the
still undiscovered pipe bomb, as shown in Figure 18.
39
The Technical Security Division’s Protective Advance Procedures Manual (undated) states, “In order to protect
sweep methodology and minimize risk to personnel in case of an explosive functioning during the sweep, the areas
to be checked must be vacated of non-essential personnel and secured (posted) prior to the start of the EOD/K9
sweeps at each site.”

Figure 18. Proximity of Vice President-elect’s Motorcade to Still Undiscovered Pipe Bomb
Source: DHS OIG generated: map data ©2023 Google
Two USCP plainclothes agents discovered the pipe bomb at 1:05 p.m. The two USCP agents were
conducting a patrol of the area in response to the discovery of a pipe bomb at 12:44 p.m. at the
Republican National Committee building. Figure 19 is a picture of the pipe bomb outside the
DNC building taken by the USCP plainclothes agents when they discovered it.

Figure 19. Photo of Pipe Bomb Taken

by USCP Agent
Source: USCP plainclothes agent
Immediately after identifying the pipe bomb, the USCP agents notified Secret Service agents who
were assigned to wait in the MPD vehicle that served as the lead car in the motorcade outside the
DNC building, close to where the device was discovered. The Secret Service agents exited their
car to visually confirm the pipe bomb and then notified the rest of the Vice President-elect’s
protective detail within the building. The detail leader decided to evacuate the building
immediately. At p.m., Vice President-elect Harris exited the DNC building
.
Before the discovery of the pipe bomb, the Vice President-elect had initially planned to return to
the U.S. Capitol at 3:30 p.m. According to Secret Service officials, the plan was still to return to
the Capitol after evacuating the DNC building. However, the MPD officer assigned to drive the
lead car for the motorcade began to hear radio traffic about the escalation of violence at the
Capitol. Ultimately, the Vice President-elect’s detail decided to take the Vice President-elect to
her residence, where she arrived at

The Vice President-elect was ultimately evacuated safely. The motorcade including the Vice
President-elect came within less than 20 feet of the pipe bomb, and the Vice President-elect
spent approximately 1 hour and 50 minutes at the DNC building before evacuating. Further, a
Secret Service agent assigned to the garage entrance spent a total of 5 hours at his post, which
was in proximity to the pipe bomb.
The Secret Service Did Not Employ Key Explosive Detection Capabilities for the Security Sweep
We found that Secret Service did not use two key explosive detection capabilities for the security
sweep. First, a specialized site coordinator from USSS/TSD, who is responsible for planning and
managing the installation of technical assets and countermeasures to ensure a safe
environment, was not present at the DNC building for the Vice President-elect’s visit. Without a
USSS/TSD site coordinator, the canine team did not receive guidance on where to sweep on the
exterior of the building. Second, there was no Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team present
to support the canine teams during the advance work. 41
•
42
According to the same guidance, USSS/TSD is routinely included in advance security planning for
sites visited by the President and Vice President and is available upon request and authorization
for all other protectees. USSS/TSD guidance does not state a specific timeframe for requesting
support, nor is there any guidance specifically about requests for an “elect” protectee, such as
the Vice President-elect on January 6. Secret Service advance security personnel did not request
a USSS/TSD site coordinator for the Vice President-elect’s visit to the DNC building on January 6.
Secret Service personnel said that it was
To verify this claim,
we requested all USSS/TSD assignments to site visits for the Vice President-elect between August
12, 2020, when she was selected as the Vice-Presidential candidate, and January 20, 2021, the
day of the Presidential Inauguration. Based on our review of 29 site visits, which included visits
in and outside of the National Capital Region,
. The locations for
these visits were . In addition, USSS/TSD did not
42
Technical Security Division, Protective Advance Procedures Manual.

have records of any , indicating

.
In the absence of a USSS/TSD site coordinator, a USSS/TSD senior official and a canine
supervisor said the site agent was responsible for providing sweep instructions to the canine
teams. The site agent provided guidance on
. A
USSS/TSD senior official said that
In an email for another visit to the
DNC building a few days prior to January 6, a Secret Service official told the site agent, “[n]o
[USSS/] TSD support because it’s short notice but show K9 the path and they’ll know what to
do.” This email shows that in at least one other instance a Secret Service official responsible for
site logistics provided guidance to a site agent to relying on canine teams to determine the
sweep for themselves, rather than following the practice the USSS/TSD senior official said should
be followed. The USSS/TSD senior told us he was unaware of any training or guidance for site
agents to help determine what areas should be swept or not swept at a site.
We also found that there was no EOD team present to support the canine team.
For the DNC visit on January 6, the Vice-

Presidential Protective Division’s Operations Section—a unit that provides logistical support to
protective operations within the division—submitted the canine support request. The canine
support request that the Operations Unit submitted did not include a request for any EOD teams
to support the canine teams.
According to USSS/TSD personnel, its policy is not a requirement that other

agents must follow when conducting sweeps without USSS/TSD present.
On the morning of January 6, the two Secret Service canine teams assigned to sweep the DNC
building were surprised to learn that an EOD team was not onsite to assist them with the sweep
of the building. The site agent was also surprised. He said that he called the Operations Unit to
confirm whether an EOD team would be present, and the Operations Unit informed him that an
EOD team would not be present for the sweep of the DNC building.

The Operations Unit agent said that the reason for requesting canine support but not an EOD
team was that the Department of Defense requires 72-hour advance notice to provide an EOD
team. The Operations Unit agent submitted the canine request form on January 4, less than 72
hours before the site visit on January 6. 44 However, the 72-hour advance notice requirement was
not documented in any guidance or on the request form. A TSD senior official was unaware of a
72-hour timeframe for submitting an EOD request.
Our review of additional canine and EOD requests also did not show evidence of a 72-hour
advance notice requirement. We reviewed 36 approved canine and EOD request forms for the
Vice President-elect between August 12, 2020, when she was a Vice-Presidential candidate, and
January 20, 2021, the day of the Presidential Inauguration. Based on our review of 36 approved
request forms, we determined that on seven occasions EOD support was requested and
approved for visits within the National Capital Region when the request was submitted less than
72 hours prior to the protectee’s visit.
The locations in which EOD support was requested and approved varied,
to the Vice President-elect’s residence in Washington, DC. Additionally, all seven
requests for EOD support within the National Capital Region were submitted by the Secret
Service Washington, DC, Field Office, not the Operations Unit within the Vice-Presidential
Protection Division. We identified one instance of an EOD request being denied for a visit to the
DNC building on December 14, 2020, when the request was submitted at 10:50 a.m. for a site visit
at 5 p.m. the same day. During our interview, a canine supervisor said at least 24 hours’ advance
notice for an EOD request would be needed because EOD teams typically come from local
military bases.
The Secret Service Did Not Take Required Steps to Designate the Evacuation as an Unusual
Protective Event
The Secret Service defines an Unusual Protective Event as “any occurrence, episode, or incident
that interrupts the normal protective activities of the Secret Service.” 45 These events have
unusual significance, such as failed or mitigated security incidents or an attempted or successful
assassination, kidnapping, or assault. 46
44
The Secret Service uses a single form that allows the requester to indicate how many canine and EOD teams are
needed.
45
Secret Service, Unusual Protective Events and Incident Reporting Protocols, OPO-19, Nov. 25, 2015. Secret Service
updated OPO-19 on Aug. 16, 2021. The update to OPO-19 did not change the information referenced in this section
of our report.
46
Reporting requirements instruct staff to characterize a UPE as fitting one of five categories: nominal incidents,
mitigated incidents, security failure incidents, attempted assassination/kidnapping/assault, and successful
assassination/kidnapping/assault.

Once a UPE is declared, the appropriate Secret Service staff are required to report the incident to
their chain of command who would then brief protective operations leadership. Staff are also
required to complete a UPE Preliminary Information Form (SSF 4386). 47 Following these initial
reporting requirements, staff must complete an after-action memorandum documenting any
additional details surrounding the event, including any threats or changes related to the
protectee. Once they have completed all the information, the documentation is retained in a
case file in the Protective Threat Management System. 48
Following the events of January 6, the Secret Service neither designated nor reported the Vice
President-elect’s evacuation at the DNC as a UPE. However, according to Secret Service policy,
the Vice President-elect’s evacuation due to the discovery of a pipe bomb and relocation to her
residence qualifies as a “security failure.” The Secret Service policy OPO-19 defines security
failure incidents as:
Those protective occurrences where existing security measures, and/or technical

or physical security devices, failed to detect and/or prevent an unauthorized
action or undesirable circumstance that could have been otherwise avoided and
did not result in harm to a protectee. Security failures may also include situations
where there was a substantial disruption of the protected site/event/facility,
substantial change in the protectee’s itinerary, or an increased risk of harm to a
protectee due to a security matter. Generally, such occurrences resulted in formal
evaluations/investigations of what transpired, and substantive changes to
numerous operational policies/procedures were implemented. Security Failure
incidents also typically received significant media attention and extensive
oversight activities by multiple outside entities.
The Vice President-elect’s protective detail did note in its final survey 49 that an explosive device
was discovered “within close proximity to the primary Arrival/Departure exit route for [Vice
President-Nominee] Kamala Harris.” The Secret Service did not complete an SSF 4386, as
required by Secret Service policy. 50 The Secret Service Director at the time told us the Vice
President-elect’s evacuation was “without question” a UPE and that if it was not documented, “it
was not compliant with their policy.”
47
The SSF 4386 is the initial mechanism used to briefly detail the circumstances surrounding the applicable incident.
48
The Protective Threat Management System is a PID-managed case management system to track information
about individuals or incidents that may impact the Secret Service’s protective mission.
49
The final survey contains a summary of events and pertinent documents related to a protectee’s movement. The
final survey is completed by the protective detail’s lead advance agent and approved by the detail’s special agent in
charge.
50
The Secret Service designated and reported the Vice President’s evacuation at the Capitol as a UPE security failure
incident.

The Secret Service Initiated a Policy Update 1 Year Later
In early February 2022, more than a year after the pipe bomb incident, USSS/OPO and other
specialized offices within the Secret Service began discussions to revise their explosives
detection coordination.
The revisions to the Protective Operations Manual (OPO-06), published on April 7, 2022, includes
a new section titled, “Office of Technical Development and Mission Support, Technical Security
Division Explosive Threat Coordination.” 51 The new section states that:
A Secret Service official told us that updates were made to OPO-06 to ensure that what happened
on January 6 at the DNC building does not reoccur. Another Secret Service official told us that
policy changes were made to OPO-06 to
.
Conclusion
On January 6, the Secret Service planned and conducted protective operations for several sites
affected by the day’s events, including the rally at the Ellipse, the U.S. Capitol, and the DNC
building. Although it did not anticipate or plan for the level of violence that ultimately occurred
that day, the Secret Service took actions to respond to and mitigate the threats it encountered
and avoid any harm to its protectees and to assist USCP. The events of January 6 were
unprecedented, and the issues we identified during our review present an opportunity for the
Secret Service to be better prepared in the future.
51
The Secret Service initiated an earlier revision to this policy in May 2021, which it completed in January 2022. This
revision did not address guidance on explosives detection coordination.

Recommendations
Recommendation 1: We recommend the Director of the Secret Service reassess the agreement
with the U.S. Capitol Police
to ensure there is adequate flexibility depending on conditions to determine the
appropriate size of the protective detail and document any updates to the agreement with the
U.S. Capitol Police.
Recommendation 2: We recommend the Director of the Secret Service develop and implement
protocols for providing Civil Disturbance Unit support to law enforcement partners in the event
of an emergency such as occurred on January 6 to ensure appropriate and timely response.
policy and guidance that ensures a consistent approach for requesting Technical Security
Division personnel.
training for site agents on directing canine sweeps if a specialized Technical Security Division
agent is not assigned to a site.
Recommendation 5: We recommend the Director of the Secret Service implement policy and
guidance on requesting explosive ordnance disposal personnel, including specifying the
protective events for which they are available, specifying any required timeframes for requests,
and identifying site personnel responsible for submitting explosive ordnance disposal requests.
Recommendation 6: We recommend the Director of the Secret Service ensure that adequate
procedures are in place and are followed for conducting internal after-action reviews, including
completing required documentation and evaluations for incidents that qualify as unusual
protective events.
Management Comments and OIG Analysis

We have included a copy of Secret Service’s management comments in their entirety in Appendix
B. We also received technical comments from Secret Service on the draft report and made
revisions as appropriate. In response to our draft report, Secret Service expressed concern
regarding how the report characterized Secret Service’s responses to OIG’s requests for
information. Secret Service stated that several OIG requests were wide-ranging in scope and
included requests for access to highly sensitive information that was unrelated to the January 6,
2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. The Secret Service asserted that while fully committed to
cooperating with the OIG, it is appropriate for it to make inquiries to ensure the appropriate
disclosure and safeguarding of sensitive information.

As an example, Secret Service cited the OIG’s June 11, 2021, request for emails, text messages,
and phone communications, stating that because the request was all encompassing and
included senior level Secret Service leadership, there was no doubt these communications
included highly sensitive information unrelated to the OIG’s review. Therefore, the Secret
Service requested the OIG reduce the scope of the request and allow the Secret Service to review
communications before providing them to the OIG.
As stated in our report, consistent with the IG Act, we disagreed with Secret Service’s approach,
and through extensive discussions, including with Department leadership, we ultimately
received emails without the restrictions sought by Secret Service. Our approach to requesting
emails from the Secret Service was consistent with our typical process, which allows us to
conduct analytical searches of all potentially relevant emails to ensure our review is thorough
and independent. We also have a process that allows components to identify sensitive
information in the draft report that the component does not believe should be shared publicly.
Ultimately, Secret Service’s dispute over access resulted in a 7-month delay from our first
request for electronic communications in February 2021 until we obtained requested emails in
October 2021.
The Secret Service also expressed concern that the report omits important context regarding
Secret Service’s deletion of text messages. Secret Service stated it had planned the cell phone
migration that resulted in the deletion of text messages months prior to January 6, 2021, and it
provided Secret Service employees guidance on how to create and save screen recordings of text
message records. The Secret Service states that it advised the OIG on multiple occasions that
any text messages would be unavailable because they were deleted during the cell phone
migration.
As we state in our report, it was not until February 23, 2022, that Secret Service provided needed
clarity to the OIG that it had wiped all phones when it updated software in the January – April
2021 timeframe, did not have backup files, and could not provide the information, not merely
that it was unavailable. We acknowledged in this report that when the dispute over access to
emails began, we subsequently limited the original June 11 request to focus on emails, removing
the requirement for immediate production of text messages on July 27, 2021. On December 3,
2021, we renewed the request for text messages from select Secret Service employees relevant to
our review. This report does not address when Secret Service began planning for the cell phone
migration or what guidance was provided to Secret Service personnel to preserve text messages
because it was not within the scope of this review. However, we note in our report that in
addition to our initial request for information in February 2021, multiple committees of Congress
issued three separate notifications to DHS requesting all electronic communications related to
the events of January 6.

In addition, the Secret Service expressed concern about how the report characterized Secret
Service’s process for providing documents to the OIG. The Secret Service said that to ensure
proper internal coordination and timely responses to inquiries, it has routinely coordinated
most, if not all, OIG and Government Accountability Office requests for information through its
Office of Professional Responsibility, which tracks the requests to ensure timely responses, and
facilitates any clarification needed between auditors and agency personnel, as appropriate. The
Secret Service said in response to two instances when the OIG raised concern about not receiving
documents directly without internal review, it notified its personnel that no such review was
required.
As stated in our report, throughout our review Secret Service personnel indicated they would not
provide documents directly to us without the document first going through an internal review.
While it is typical for components to provide responses to certain types of OIG requests for
information via an audit liaison—as Secret Service described the role of its Office of Professional
Responsibility—we must also be able to receive information directly from agency personnel to
ensure the independence and objectivity of OIG work, as well as to ensure that an employee is
able to exercise his or her statutory right to provide information to OIG on a confidential basis. 52
Secret Service’s practice left unclear when documents were undergoing review, and whether we
ultimately received a complete and accurate response. Secret Service’s review also led to
unnecessary redactions in some instances and delays caused by follow-up to receive documents
without redaction.
In Secret Service’s technical comments on the draft report, it appeared to request that the entire
report be marked law enforcement sensitive, which would preclude us from issuing a public
report.
Secret Service officials concurred with four of six recommendations. Recommendations 2 and 4
are considered unresolved and open, and recommendations 1, 3, 5, and 6 are considered
resolved and open. A summary of Secret Service’s response to each recommendation and our
analysis follows.
Secret Service Response to Recommendation 1: Concur. The Secret Service indicated that its
Office of Intergovernmental and Legislative Affairs and OPO will work with the USCP to reassess
the agreement .
Secret Service estimated this action to be completed by October 31, 2024.
52
See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(13)(B) (an agency may not implement or enforce a policy that prohibits or restricts an
employee from making a whistleblowing disclosure to an OIG); 5 U.S.C. § 407(b) (an OIG may not disclose the
identity of an employee who provides information to an OIG without the employee’s consent).

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation, which we consider
resolved and open. We will close this recommendation when Secret Service provides evidence of
its coordination with the USCP and documentation of any update to the agreement.
Secret Service Response to Recommendation 2: Non-concur. The Secret Service stated its
primary mission limits its ability to provide emergency support to other law enforcement
partners. It stated that obligations to mutual aid agreements could result in compromising its
foremost responsibility to protect the White House and the President, as well as its other
protected sites and persons in the National Capital Region. Secret Service stated that it is
opposed to developing and implementing protocols for providing CDU assistance to support law
enforcement partners in the National Capital Region, even in the event of emergencies such as
those that occurred during January 6, 2021. The Secret Service requested that the OIG close this
recommendation.
OIG Analysis: We consider this recommendation unresolved and open. We recognize that Secret
Service is not a party to, and its primary mission limits its ability to join, mutual aid agreements
with other law enforcement entities in the National Capital Region. The recommendation does
not assert that Secret Service should enter into an agreement with other law enforcement
partners to provide mutual aid. However, our review found that Secret Service offered and
provided assistance to the USCP on January 6 but did not have protocols in place for this type of
rare emergency. Without such protocols, Secret Service could not identify available officers in a
timely manner. This recommendation will remain open until Secret Service provides evidence
that it has implemented the recommended protocols.
Secret Service Response to Recommendation 3: Concur. Secret Service stated its April 7, 2022,
update to OPO-06 addresses this recommendation in the new section titled, “Office of Technical
Development and Mission Support, Technical Security Division Explosive Threat Coordination.”
Secret Service provided a copy of the revised policy to the OIG on November 22, 2022. The Secret
Service requested that the OIG close this recommendation.
OIG Analysis: OIG recognizes the update to OPO-06, completed in April 2022, as partially
responsive to this recommendation, which we consider resolved and open. The revised OPO-06
appears to indicate that a specialized USSS/TSD advance team member would always be
assigned to sites for certain protectees, including “elect” protectees. However, it does not
explicitly clarify whether TSD personnel must be requested or if there is any limitation on the
timeframe for making such requests, which we identified as issues during our review. The OIG
had not yet shared its findings and recommendations with the Secret Service when the Secret
Service completed its revision of OPO-06. Consequently, Secret Service could not consider
whether the changes it implemented in OPO-06 completely addressed the issues the OIG
identified. We will close this recommendation when Secret Service provides additional

documentation clarifying whether TSD assistance must be requested or if there is any limitation
on the timeframe for making such requests.
Secret Service Response to Recommendation 4: Non-concur. Secret Service stated that the April
7, 2022, update to OPO-06 addresses the intent of this recommendation. Specifically, OPO-06
provides direction to agents on how to proceed when specialized personnel are not available to
assist, thus ensuring the continuity of operations and the protection of Secret Service protectees
negating the need for site agents to be trained on directing canine sweeps. The Secret Service
requested the OIG close this recommendation.
OIG Analysis: We consider this recommendation unresolved and open. OIG recognizes the
update to OPO-06, completed in April 2022, as partially responsive to this recommendation.
Contrary to Secret Service’s statement in its response to recommendation 4 that “OPO-06
provides direction to agents on how to proceed when specialized personnel are not available,”
the guidance appears to indicate that a specialized TSD personnel would always be assigned to
sites for “elect” protectees. During our review, we found that prior to the revision of OPO-06 the
site agent was responsible for providing sweep instructions to the canine teams when a
USSS/TSD coordinator was present, which was the basis for our recommendation to provide
training for site agents. We agree with Secret Service’s assessment that training for site agents
on directing canine sweeps is unnecessary if it has fully implemented its process change to
require TSD personnel to direct the sweep for all relevant sites. We will close this
recommendation when Secret Service provides evidence that it has implemented its revised
process for ensuring that TSD personnel are always assigned to sites for certain protectees,
including “elect” protectee sites.
Secret Service Response to Recommendation 5: Concur. The Secret Service stated the April 7,
2022, update to OPO-06 addresses the intent of this recommendation. Specifically, the Secret
Service indicated that this policy clarifies the guidelines and requirements for explosive threat
coordination. Secret Service stated that TSD site personnel would be responsible for submitting
a request for EOD support through OPO for approval. The Secret Service requested the OIG close
this recommendation.
OIG Analysis: We recognize the update to OPO-06, completed in April 2022, as partially
responsive to this recommendation, which we consider resolved and open. The revised OPO-06
appears to indicate that a specialized USSS/TSD advance team member would always be
assigned to sites for certain protectees, including “elect” protectees. In its response to
recommendation 5, Secret Service states the USSS/TSD advance team member would be
responsible for submitting a request for EOD support through OPO for approval. The revised
OPO-06, however, does not include this specific information. In addition, the revised policy does
not clarify if there is any required timeframe for requesting EOD, which was an area of
uncertainty identified in our report. We had not shared our findings and recommendations with

the Secret Service when it completed its revision of OPO-06. Consequently, Secret Service could
not consider whether the changes it implemented in OPO-06 completely addressed the issues we
identified in our report. We will close this recommendation when Secret Service provides
evidence that it has implemented its revised process for ensuring that TSD personnel are
assigned for all “elect” protectee sites and implements guidance on any required timeframe for
EOD requests.
Secret Service Response to Recommendation 6: Concur. The Secret Service stated that it has
adequate procedures in place for conducting internal after-action reviews. The Secret Service
acknowledged that it did not complete a UPE for the evacuation of the Vice President-elect and
stated it is committed to the UPE process. Secret Service indicated that the incident was
documented in the Protective Threat Management System, which is where UPE information is
typically stored. The Secret Service requested that the OIG close this recommendation.
OIG Analysis: We consider this recommendation resolved and open. During our review we
requested and reviewed the relevant information stored in the Protective Threat Management
System. This information was about the events of January 6, 2021, generally, not specifically the
evacuation of the Vice President-Elect from the DNC. We will close this recommendation when
Secret Service provides evidence that it has implemented controls to ensure that it completes
required documentation and evaluations for incidents that qualify as a UPE.

Appendix A:
Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was established by the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107−296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act
of 1978.
We initiated this review in response to events that transpired on January 6, 2021, including but
not limited to the breach of the U.S. Capitol and multiple site evacuations involving Vice
President Michael Pence and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris. Our objective was to evaluate
the Secret Service’s preparation for and response to the events of January 6, 2021.
To meet our objectives, we interviewed more than 100 Secret Service personnel involved in the
preparation for and response to the events of January 6. We obtained and reviewed policies and
procedures relating to protective operations, as well as intelligence and information developed
relating to the January 6, 2021, events. We also requested emails from select Secret Service
personnel and received more than 183,000 emails and attachments that we reviewed by
conducting analytical searches. We requested Secret Service radio communications and
received more than 4,800 files that we reviewed for relevant information. We also reviewed
Secret Service video from the Ellipse as well as USCP video from the Capitol complex and
cameras located near the DNC building and reviewed available video from the DNC building.
We conducted this review under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended,
and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency.
DHS OIG’s Access to DHS Information

The Secret Service significantly delayed OIG’s access to information, impeding the progress of
our review. For example, we experienced a 7-month delay receiving emails from Secret Service.
Our initial information request to Secret Service in February 2021 included a request for all
electronic communications. 53 In response to our request for emails, Secret Service asked that we
53
In the months following the assault on the Capitol, multiple committees of Congress issued three separate
notifications to DHS requesting all electronic communications related to the events of January 6: 1) On March 25,
2021, Chairwoman Maloney, Chairman Thompson, Chairman Schiff, Chairman Nadler, and three other members
requested documents and communications received, prepared, or sent by DHS employees related to the events of
January 6; 2) On August 11, 2021, a notice issued by Chairman Thompson of the January 6 Select Committee joined
in the March 25, 2021, Congressional request and a January 16, 2021, notice issued by Chairs Adam Schiff, Bennie
Thompson, Carolyn Maloney, and Jerrold Nadler, on behalf of their respective committees, to senior officials of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and the

reduce the scope of the email inquiry and provide search terms. Secret Service also sought to
conduct an internal review of the data prior to submission. Consistent with the IG Act, we
disagreed with this approach and through extensive discussions, including with Department
leadership, we ultimately received emails in October 2021.
Although we requested text messages from select Secret Service personnel, Secret Service did
not provide these records while we conducted our fieldwork. On March 31, 2021, the Secret
Service provided a screenshot of only one text message exchange in response to our February
2021 initial information request—an excerpt this text message exchange is shown in Figure 15 of
this report. In response to our follow-up request for additional content for the text message
exchange provided, the Secret Service indicated on May 4, 2021, that the additional information
requested was unavailable because of a planned Secret Service-wide cell phone migration. On
June 11, 2021, we requested all emails and text messages for 25 Secret Service employees or
distribution accounts relevant for our review. When the dispute over access to emails began, as
discussed above, OIG subsequently limited the original June 11 request to focus on emails,
removing the requirement for immediate production of text messages on July 27, 2021. On
December 3, 2021, the OIG renewed the request for text messages from select Secret Service
employees relevant to our review. On February 23, 2022, the Secret Service informed us that it
had wiped all phones when it updated software in the January to April 2021 timeframe, they did
not have backup files, and they could not provide the information, not merely that it was
unavailable. After our fieldwork was complete, in December 2022, Secret Service provided 13
images of text messages that it identified in response to a Freedom of Information Act Request.
Throughout our inspection, Secret Service personnel indicated they would not provide
documents directly to OIG without the documents first going through an internal review. Secret
Service did not provide the authority supporting the additional level of internal review. This
practice also left unclear whether OIG ultimately received a complete and accurate response. On
three occasions, when documents were finally produced, they contained redactions. Secret
Service did not indicate who approved or applied the redactions or why such redactions were
originally made, thereby requiring OIG to spend time making inquiries to obtain the unredacted
documents, which is required by law. 54 Although OIG’s follow-up eventually yielded unredacted
documents, together these hurdles resulted in significant delay.
Directorate of National Intelligence, that mandated the production of “[a]ll documents or materials that refer or
relate to events that could or ultimately did transpire on January 6, or refer or relate to threats in connection with
the US presidential inauguration;” 3) On August 25, 2021, a letter issued by Chairman Thompson for the January 6
Select Committee requested all documents and communications received or shared relating to events that occurred
on January 6. This notice directed DHS to provide the January 6 Select Committee with all documents DHS
produced to other investigatory bodies, to include the OIG, relating to the January 6 attack.
54
Inspector General Act of 1978, § 6(a).

DHS OIG reported these delays in our Semiannual Report to Congress for the period ending
September 30, 2021, and again in our report for the period ending March 31, 2022. In addition, on
July 13, 2022, the Inspector General sent a letter to members of the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Government Affairs and the House Committee on Homeland Security to
notify them of DHS’s delays and denials of access to information, including Secret Service's
deletion of text messages. On July 15, 2022, the Inspector General, senior staff, and DHS OIG
inspectors briefed the House January 6 Select Committee about Secret Service delays and
denials of access to DHS information.

Appendix B:
Secret Service Comments on the Draft Report









Appendix C:
Office of Inspections and Evaluations Major Contributors to this Report
Steve Staats, Chief Inspector
Erik Gonzalez, Special Agent
Brittany Scott, Senior Inspector
Sean Peck, Senior Inspector
Almas Khan, Inspector
John Lanca, Inspector
Shawn Cosman, Auditor
Attorneys from the General Law Division
Dorie Chang, Communications Analyst
Ryan Nelson, Independent Referencer
Christine Haynes, Independent Referencer

Appendix D:
Report Distribution
Department of Homeland Security
Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
Director, Secret Service
Secret Service Audit Liaison
Office of Management and Budget
Chief, Homeland Security Branch

DHS OIG Budget Examiner
Congress
Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees
Additional Information
To view this and any other DHS OIG reports, Please visit our website: www.oig.dhs.gov
For further information or questions, please contact the DHS OIG Office of Public Affairs via email:
[email protected]
DHS OIG Hotline

To report fraud, waste, abuse, or criminal misconduct involving U.S. Department of Homeland
Security programs, personnel, and funds, please visit: www.oig.dhs.gov/hotline
If you cannot access our website, please contact the hotline by phone or mail:
Call: 1-800-323-8603
U.S. Mail:
Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305
Attention: Hotline
245 Murray Drive SW
Washington, DC 20528-0305

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LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

OIG-24-42 July 31, 2024

The Secret Service's Preparation for, and Response to,

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

July 31, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ronald L. Rowe, Jr.

FROM: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.

CUFFARI Date: 2024.07.31 15:42:25

Please send your response or closure request to [email protected].

OIG Project No. 21-025-SRE-DHS

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS

July 31, 2024 What We Found

For Further Information:

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

CAT Counter Assault Team

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

PID Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Figure 1. Locations of Three Sites Where the Secret Service Conducted

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Figure 2. Timeline of Events Related to Secret Service’s Protective Operations on

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Relevant Secret Service Divisions for January 6 Events

Office of Protective Operations

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

• Uniformed Division–Performs day-to-day security operations at the White House,

Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division

USSS/PID supports protective operations by analyzing information, investigating threats,

Technical Security Division

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

. 10 USSS/PID staff share information with Secret Service leadership and

Rather, according to USSS/PID personnel,

USSS/PID personnel included information about

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Source: The March for Trump protective intelligence brief

Many of the groups planning to engage in demonstration activities on January 6,

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

The report concludes with this assessment of the

[USSS/] PID assesses there is a continued threat of low to mid-level violence

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

USSS/PID received an anonymous tip

Some USSS/PID staff also received alerts from a system that

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

The Secret Service Relies on for Information but Did Not

This report contained some information

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Source: DHS OIG generated based on Secret Service documents