Passive Fire Substations

Network Standard
Document No : NW000-S0007
Amendment No : 2
NETWORK Approved By : Manager - AES
Approval Date : 30/07/2020
Supersedes Network Standard (NETWORK) NW000-S0007 Amendment No.1
NW000-S0007 NS187 PASSIVE FIRE MITIGATION DESIGN OF MAJOR

SUBSTATIONS
NW000-S0007 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 1 of 28

For Official use only
NS187 Passive Fire Mitigation Design of Major Substations Amendment No 2
ISSUE
For issue to all Ausgrid and Accredited Service Providers’ staff involved with the design of substations.
Ausgrid maintains a copy of this and other Network Standards together with updates and amendments on
www.ausgrid.com.au.
Where this standard is issued as a controlled document replacing an earlier edition, remove and destroy the superseded
document
DISCLAIMER
As Ausgrid’s standards are subject to ongoing review, the information contained in this document may be amended by
Ausgrid at any time.
It is possible that conflict may exist between standard documents. In this event, the most recent standard shall prevail.
This document has been developed using information available from field and other sources and is suitable for most
situations encountered in Ausgrid. Particular conditions, projects or localities may require special or different practices. It is
the responsibility of the local manager, supervisor, assured quality contractor and the individuals involved to make sure that
a safe system of work is employed and that statutory requirements are met.
Ausgrid disclaims any and all liability to any person or persons for any procedure, process or any other thing done or not
done, as a result of this Standard.
All design work, and the associated supply of materials and equipment, must be undertaken in accordance with and
consideration of relevant legislative and regulatory requirements, latest revision of Ausgrid’s Network Standards and
specifications and Australian Standards. Designs submitted shall be declared as fit for purpose. Where the designer wishes
to include a variation to a network standard or an alternative material or equipment to that currently approved the designer
must obtain authorisation from the Network Standard owner before incorporating a variation to a Network Standard in a
design.
External designers including those authorised as Accredited Service Providers will seek approval through the approved
process as outlined in NS181 Approval of Materials and Equipment and Network Standard Variations. Seeking approval will
ensure Network Standards are appropriately updated and that a consistent interpretation of the legislative framework is
employed.
Note that compliance with this Network Standard does not automatically satisfy the requirements of a Designer Safety
Report. The designer must comply with the provisions of the Workplace Health and Safety Regulation 2011 (NSW - Part 6.2
Duties of designer of structure and person who commissions construction work) which requires the designer to provide a
written safety report to the person who commissioned the design. This report must be provided to Ausgrid in all instances,
including where the design was commissioned by or on behalf of a person who proposes to connect premises to Ausgrid’s
network, and will form part of the Designer Safety Report which must also be presented to Ausgrid. Further information is
provided in Network Standard (NS) 212 Integrated Support Requirements for Ausgrid Network Assets.
INTERPRETATION
In the event that any user of this Standard considers that any of its provisions is uncertain, ambiguous or otherwise in need
of interpretation, the user should request Ausgrid to clarify the provision. Ausgrid’s interpretation shall then apply as though
it was included in the Standard, and is final and binding. No correspondence will be entered into with any person disputing
the meaning of the provision published in the Standard or the accuracy of Ausgrid’s interpretation.
KEYPOINTS
This standard has a summary of content labelled “KEYPOINTS FOR THIS STANDARD”. The inclusion or omission of items
in this summary does not signify any specific importance or criticality to the items described. It is meant to simply provide the
reader with a quick assessment of some of the major issues addressed by the standard. To fully appreciate the content and
the requirements of the standard it must be read in its entirety.
AMENDMENTS TO THIS STANDARD
Where there are changes to this standard from the previously approved version, any previous shading is removed and the
newly affected paragraphs are shaded with a grey background. Where the document changes exceed 25% of the document
content, any grey background in the document is to be removed and the following words should be shown below the title
block on the right hand side of the page in bold and italic, for example, Supersedes – document details (for example,
“Supersedes Document Type (Category) Document No. Amendment No.”).

KEY POINTS OF THIS STANDARD
Egress Provisions and Public

Scope and Risks Addressed Passive Fire Protection Bushfire Protection
Safety
This standard is limited to scope identified Fire mitigation design shall consider the Egress provisions include consideration of This section provides guidance for
below and provides controls for associated substation criticality, fuel loading, response access to escape safely as well as protecting the substation against bush fires.
risks as listed below: time, and public/personnel safety. Key providing access for switching and control It does not cover the requirements for
design criteria include: of equipment. Provisions include: protecting the bush against fire from
 This standard details minimum levels equipment failure. Key points in protection
of passive fire protection systems for  the fire intensity, fire duration and oil  Minimum of two paths of emergency during bushfire events include:
the protection of Ausgrid’s substations containment capabilities. egress from a compartment with HV
 Design of emergency egress  fire separation wall requirements equipment, except where an  Availability to maintain supply during
capabilities within substations is an  vertical and horizontal separation exemption is allowed and after the bushfire to support the
important focus of the standard distances between buildings and  Consideration of radiant heat levels needs of the local community
 The standard applies only to sub- equipment and exposure times  Overall approach taken will be site
transmission, and zone substations.  compartmentalisation  Effect of wind on fire plumes dependent and based on substation
Chamber substations are covered by  radiant heat exposure limits for criticality
NS 113. different construction materials and  Table 3 provides the radiant heat flux
 This standard does not apply for Minimum standard for Public Safety is limits for different equipment types.
equipment Building Code of Australia. Consideration is
kiosks substations or pole top  protection requirements for different  Adequate set-backs from property
equipment, e.g. transformers, also given to: boundaries or suitable fire barriers are
equipment types
capacitors and reclosers.  proximity and construction materials considered the main defence against
 The design concepts are intended to  Adjacent and adjoining properties radiant heat damage from bushfires
used in adjacent properties  Heat flux limits
be applied to new substation designs  location of doors, windows and vents
although they can be applied to  Building materials used in adjacent,
 use of fire stopping to seal cables and adjoining properties.
existing substations as directed by other openings in walls, floors and
Asset Standards ceilings
 Protection of buildings against fire  cable fire retardant coatings (see
shall be to minimum requirements of NS171 for more detail)
the Building Code of Australia.  substation overpressure (see more
 This standard addresses only passive detail in NS188)
fire controls.
 Passive control systems are required
to be the primary fire protection system
 Examples of passive systems include
fire separation walls, fire barriers, fire
stopping, fire dampers, minimum
separation distances, bunding, etc. Where to for more information? Where to for more information? Where to for more information?
Section 7, 8, 10 Section 9, 11 Section 12
Where to for more information? Tools and Forms Tools and Forms Tools and Forms
Section 1, 2, and 6 Annexure D – Sample Compliance Checklist Annexure D – Sample Compliance Checklist Annexure D –Sample Compliance Checklist

Network Standard
NS187
Passive Fire Mitigation Design of Major Substations
Contents
1.0 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................................. 6

2.0 SCOPE .................................................................................................................................................. 6
3.0 REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................... 7
3.1 General....................................................................................................................................... 7
3.2 Ausgrid documents .................................................................................................................... 7
3.3 Other standards and documents ................................................................................................ 7
3.4 Acts and regulations ................................................................................................................... 7
4.0 DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................................................ 8
5.0 ASBESTOS ............................................................................................................................................ 8
6.0 THE APPROACH................................................................................................................................... 8
6.1 General....................................................................................................................................... 8
6.2 Fire risk zones ............................................................................................................................ 8
6.3 Passive fire protection ................................................................................................................ 8
6.4 Active fire protection ................................................................................................................... 9
6.4.1 General ........................................................................................................................... 9
6.4.2 Limitations of active systems ......................................................................................... 9
6.4.3 Application of active systems ......................................................................................... 9
6.5 Typical properties of combustible liquids ................................................................................... 9
7.0 PASSIVE FIRE MITIGATION DESIGN ................................................................................................. 9
7.1 General....................................................................................................................................... 9
7.2 Key design criteria .................................................................................................................... 10
7.2.1 Oil fires ......................................................................................................................... 10
7.2.2 Fire separation walls .................................................................................................... 10
7.2.3 Special design requirements ........................................................................................ 11
8.0 PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS ......................................................................................... 11
8.1 General..................................................................................................................................... 11
8.2 Passive fire protection within buildings .................................................................................... 11
8.2.1 Separation distances .................................................................................................... 11
8.2.2 Compartmentalisation .................................................................................................. 12
8.3 Passive fire protection external to buildings ............................................................................ 12
8.3.1 General ......................................................................................................................... 12
8.3.2 Separation distances for buildings and transformers ................................................... 12
8.3.3 Fire separation walls for transformers .......................................................................... 13
8.3.4 Separation distances for other switchyard equipment ................................................. 14
9.0 EGRESS PROVISIONS....................................................................................................................... 15
9.1 Emergency egress within buildings .......................................................................................... 15
9.2 Emergency egress external to buildings .................................................................................. 15
9.2.1 Effects of radiant heat exposure .................................................................................. 15
9.2.2 Radiant heat and personnel safety .............................................................................. 15
9.2.3 Minimum egress provisions .......................................................................................... 15

10.0 SPECIAL DETAILED DESIGN REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................. 16

10.1 Scope ....................................................................................................................................... 16
10.2 Openings in fire barrier walls and fire separation walls ........................................................... 16
10.2.1 General ......................................................................................................................... 16
10.2.2 Doors ............................................................................................................................ 16
10.2.3 Vent openings .............................................................................................................. 16
10.2.4 Minimum clearance to fire doors and fire dampers ...................................................... 16
10.3 Switchyard trenches and other locations ................................................................................. 17
10.4 Firestopping ............................................................................................................................. 17
10.5 Smoke seals ............................................................................................................................. 17
10.6 Roof system ............................................................................................................................. 17
10.6.1 General ......................................................................................................................... 17
10.6.2 Internal fire protection................................................................................................... 17
10.6.3 External fire protection ................................................................................................. 17
10.7 Impact resistance ..................................................................................................................... 17
10.8 Substation overpressure .......................................................................................................... 17
11.0 PUBLIC SAFETY AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ..................................................................... 18
11.1 General..................................................................................................................................... 18
11.2 Adjacent or adjoining properties and buildings ........................................................................ 18
11.3 Heat flux limits .......................................................................................................................... 18
12.0 BUSHFIRE ........................................................................................................................................... 19
12.1 General..................................................................................................................................... 19
12.2 Approach to bushfire protection ............................................................................................... 19
12.3 Buildings ................................................................................................................................... 19
12.3.1 Doors ............................................................................................................................ 19
12.4 Switchyard equipment .............................................................................................................. 19
12.5 House keeping ......................................................................................................................... 21
13.0 DOCUMENTATION ............................................................................................................................. 21
13.1 Design report ............................................................................................................................ 21
14.0 RECORDKEEPING ............................................................................................................................. 21
15.0 AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES .......................................................................................... 21
16.0 DOCUMENT CONTROL...................................................................................................................... 22
ANNEXURE A – PASSIVE FIRE MITIGATION REQUIREMENTS ................................................................ 23
ANNEXURE B – TYPICAL PROPERTIES OF COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS ..................................................... 25
ANNEXURE C – BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATING TO PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION ............. 26
C.1 General..................................................................................................................................... 26
C.2 Cable marshalling areas .......................................................................................................... 26
C.3 Oil containment bund drainage ................................................................................................ 26
C.4 Transformer bushings .............................................................................................................. 27
C.5 Transformer tank ...................................................................................................................... 27
C.6 Response to major fires ........................................................................................................... 27

1.0 PURPOSE
This Network Standard details the minimum levels of passive fire protection systems at Ausgrid’s
major substations.
The primary aim is to provide a greater level of awareness and direction regarding passive fire
protection of substations and surrounding properties, as well as the minimum requirements for
personnel safety and emergency egress in the event of fire.
2.0 SCOPE
This Standard covers sub-transmission and zone substations. Chamber substations are covered by
NS 113, and some details have been included in this Standard for completeness and reference
purposes only.
This Standard does not include provisions for kiosk substations (refer to NS 141) or pole top
equipment such as transformers, capacitors and reclosers.
The minimum requirements that shall apply for the protection of buildings against fire are those
contained in the Building Code of Australia (BCA). The requirements in this Network Standard in
some instances are over and above the minimum requirements of relevant statutory regulations
given the unique risks of substations.
Where this Network Standard is to be applied to proposed works within an existing substation,
Asset Standards will provide additional recommendations on the type and extent of passive fire
protection to be applied.

3.0 REFERENCES
3.1 General
All work covered in this document shall conform to all relevant Legislation, Standards, Codes of
Practice and Network Standards. Current Network Standards are available on Ausgrid’s Internet
site at www.ausgrid.com.au.
3.2 Ausgrid documents

• Bushfire Risk Management Plan
• Company Procedure (Network) – Network Standards Compliance
• Electrical Safety Rules
• Electricity Network Safety Management System Manual
• NS001 Glossary of Terms
• NS171 Firestopping in Substations.
• NS181 Approval of Materials and Equipment and Network Standard Variations
• NS185 Major Substations Building Design Standard.
• NS188 Design for Substation Overpressure
• NS189 Oil Containment for Major Substations
• NS190 Oil Containment Operational Requirements for Major Substations
• NS212 Integrated Support Requirements for Ausgrid Network Assets
3.3 Other standards and documents

• AS/NZS 1170.0 Structural design actions - General principles.
• AS 1530.1 Methods for fire tests on building materials, components and structures –
Combustibility test for materials.
• AS 1530.4 Methods for fire tests on building materials, components and structures Fire-
resistance tests of elements of building construction.
• AS 1530.8.1 Methods for fire tests on building materials, components and structures - Tests
on elements of construction for buildings exposed to simulated bushfire attack - Radiant heat
and small flaming sources.
• AS 1530.8.2 Methods for fire tests on building materials, components and structures - Tests
on elements of construction for buildings exposed to simulated bushfire attack - Large flaming
sources.
• AS 2067Substations and high voltage installations exceeding 1kV a.c.
• AS 2484.1 Fire - Glossary of terms – Fire tests.
• AS 3600 Concrete structures.
• AS 3700 Masonry structures.
• AS 3959 Construction of buildings in bushfire-prone areas.
• AS 4072.1 Components for the protection of openings in fire resistant separating Elements –
Service penetrations and control points.
• AS 4100 Steel structures.
• ENA Doc 001 National Electricity Network Safety Code
• National Construction Code Series (NCC)
• IEC 61039 Ed. 2.0 Classification of insulating liquids.
• NSW Rural Fire Services Guide, Planning for Bushfire Protection
3.4 Acts and regulations

• Electricity Supply (General) Regulation 2014 (NSW)
• Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation 2014
• Work Health and Safety Act 2011 and Regulation 2017

4.0 DEFINITIONS
Refer to NS001 Glossary of Terms.
5.0 ASBESTOS
All materials and equipment used for construction of Ausgrid’s assets are to be free from Asbestos
and or Asbestos related products. Suppliers are expected to comply with the Work Health and
Safety Act 2011 (NSW) together with the Work Health and Safety Regulation 2011 (NSW) and
confirm in writing that all products supplied to Ausgrid contain no Asbestos related materials.
6.0 THE APPROACH

6.1 General
Fire protection shall be provided where a potential fire hazard exists due to a fire initiated or
propagated by any part or element of a high voltage installation.
The requirements in this Network Standard have been developed by assessing the unique risks
and past experiences relating to fuel loading, reduced reliability of active systems, isolation and de-
energising times and fire-fighting response times.
Fire protection can be broken down into two specific areas: Passive fire protection systems and
Active fire protection systems.
The intention of this document is to provide design guidance on passive fire systems, generally as
the first line of defence and preferred means of fire spread prevention in substations.
6.2 Fire risk zones

Fire risk zones for high voltage installations such as substations shall be based on a risk
assessment that considers, as a minimum, the provisions of AS 2067 Substations and high voltage
installations exceeding 1kV a.c. together with the additional requirements of this Network Standard
including, but not limited to, the thermal radiation thresholds.
If any part of the fire risk zone extends to include other buildings, parts of the same building that
house the high voltage installation, fire escape routes, or other fire sensitive locations and facilities,
then a potential fire hazard exists.
Where a fire hazard exists, high voltage installation enclosures within or adjacent to buildings shall
be designed with suitable fire protection to meet the requirements of AS 2067 and this Network
Standard.
6.3 Passive fire protection

Passive fire systems are required to minimise the risk of damage from the spread of fire from one
segregation zone to another.
Except where exceptional circumstances apply, active fire protection systems shall be used only as
additional protection to passive systems and not as a substitute to passive fire protection systems.
Refer to Clause 6.4 for the general requirements of active fire protection systems in relation to
passive fire systems.
Examples of passive fire protection systems include:
• Fire separation walls and fire barriers.

• Fire stopping and fire dampers to penetrations within fire barriers.
• Self-closing fire doors to openings in fire separation walls and fire barriers.
• Minimum fire separation distances from fire sources.
• Oil containment/bunding.

6.4 Active fire protection

6.4.1 General
The general requirements of active fire protection systems in relation to passive fire systems are
covered below.
Active fire extinguishing systems such as sprinklers and deluge systems aim at reducing the
damage due to burning equipment by reducing or eliminating any fire or smoke damage to the
remaining substation and equipment. Active systems assist in reducing the overall damage:
• by providing early warning for Ausgrid and/or Fire Brigade intervention.
• by reducing the duration of a fire and providing a safe means of extinguishing the fire without
isolating and earthing.
• by overcoming access problems for fire fighting.
• by limiting the spread of fire within a compartment.
• by reducing smoke.
• by providing, in some cases, cooling to adjoining areas.
• by providing a secondary system in the event the primary passive system is compromised prior
or during a fire event.
• where linear compartmentalisation is not possible, such as some CBD Zone Substation cable
basements. Note that alternative passive fire protection systems may be available at these
locations e.g. cable fire protection or flame retardant cable insulation.
6.4.2 Limitations of active systems

The Designer shall make allowances for all the credible limitations of active systems including any
WHS and environmental impacts.
6.4.3 Application of active systems

The following active fire systems shall be installed throughout Ausgrid substation buildings unless
otherwise specified:
• Smoke Detection System (except for distribution substations)

• Fire Extinguishers
These active fire systems shall comply with the design requirements of Ausgrid.
Consideration shall only be given to the use of other active fire systems when required by the BCA.
The use of an active fire system to supplement a passive system must have written approval from
Ausgrid.
6.5 Typical properties of combustible liquids

Annexure B provides information on the typical properties and characteristics of combustible liquids
commonly associated with Ausgrid substations.
7.0 PASSIVE FIRE MITIGATION DESIGN

7.1 General
Passive fire mitigation design involves the application of a fire rating to fire barriers or fire
separation walls, the provision of adequate separation distances or a combination thereof.
Passive fire mitigation design shall consider the substation category (substation criticality), building
re useability, fuel loading, response times following a fire and public and personnel safety. These

aspects shall be reviewed and determined by Ausgrid and may include consultation with the
Designer as required.
7.2 Key design criteria

7.2.1 Oil fires
The following design criteria shall be applied to fire barriers, fire separation walls and other building
elements exposed to potential oil fires:
1. Fire Intensity - the intensity of the fire (temperature-time curve) shall be equal to the
Hydrocarbon Curve specified in AS 1530.4 – Fire resistance tests of elements of building
construction.
2. Fire Duration - the duration of the fire shall be based on the amount of fuel available, the
energy content of the fuel and the time dependent fire intensity.
3. Oil Containment Bund Drainage - any oil containment bunds which are provided with
gravity drainage shall be assumed to function as designed, with any spilt oil draining at the
design flowrate (see Note 1).
7.2.2 Fire separation walls

In addition to the requirements of Clause 7.2.1, the following design criteria shall be applied to fire
separation walls (FSW) associated with power transformers and with other equipment exposed to
potential oil fires:
1. Fire resistance level (FRL) - the minimum FRL for structural adequacy shall be based on the
fire resistance period given in Annexure A using a hydrocarbon fire intensity (see Note 2). For
external locations, the FRL may be reduced to a minimum of 2 hours where the fire exposure
can be demonstrated to reduce significantly during the fire resistance period (e.g. due to fuel
limitation, bund drainage etc).
2. Bushings on adjacent transformers - the resin impregnated paper and solid porcelain
bushings on adjacent transformers shall be considered as replaceable items if damaged.
Specific protection from radiant heat is not required for these items (see Note 3). Where oil
filled porcelain bushings are installed, seek further advice from Asset Standards.
3. Radiant heat on adjacent transformers - the radiant heat on any oil containing components
of adjacent transformers (excluding bushings) shall not exceed the values given in Table 1 (see
Note 4).
4. Fire protection of cables - exposed cables in adjacent or nearby locations shall be
considered as replaceable items if damaged. Specific protection from radiant heat is not
required (see Note 5).
5. Minimum FSW height - the minimum height of a FSW shall be 0.3m higher than the highest
oil containing component of either transformer. The height of the FSW should not be less than
that required to break the line of sight between any oil containing components and the adjacent
equipment to be protected.
6. Minimum FSW width - the minimum width of the FSW shall be 0.3m wider on each side than
the widest part of either transformer. In addition, the width of the FSW shall be no less than the
width of the widest oil containment bund.
7. Design loadings during fire - the FSW shall be capable of withstanding the design permanent
loads, induced thermal loads and 25% of design wind loads using the combination of actions
for fire as given in AS/NZS 1170.0 Structural design actions - General principles. The
expected, fire induced, material temperatures shall be used for FSW strength calculations.
8. Stability during fire - the FSW shall have sufficient strength, end support and lateral restraint
to prevent structural collapse during a credible fire event.
9. Thermal response during fire - the deflection and load eccentricities arising due to thermal
response of the FSW to fire exposure shall be considered in the design and shall not cause
permanent damage to any adjacent building elements.

10. Loss of structural capacity - suitable design measures shall be taken to prevent extensive
concrete spalling and other significant loss of strength mechanisms. Alternatively, the FSW
shall be designed with sufficient residual strength to prevent structural collapse during a
credible fire event.
11. Damage due to fire - the FSW may sustain limited, repairable, damage to the exposed surface
materials, joints and connections. Alternatively, a more substantial level of damage can be
allowed provided that structural collapse does not occur and the FSW components can be
readily removed and reinstated (see Note 6).
Note 1. Routine inspection and clean-out of the oil containment flame traps, pipelines and
EGOWS tanks is essential. Gravity drainage of bunds is NOT provided where a PPS
system is installed. Refer to Annexure C.
Note 2. The minimum FRL for the integrity of panel joints and for panel insulation can be reduced
to 1 hour (i.e. FRL 120/60/60) provided the FSW is not integrated into a single common
wall that is shared with the substation building.
Note 3. Ausgrid uses resin-impregnated paper, porcelain clad bushings at 132kV and 66kV and
retains an inventory of spare bushings for most major transformers. Ausgrid’s 33kV and
11kV bushings are readily available from local suppliers. Replacement of damaged
transformer bushings can be achieved within an acceptably short time frame (approx.
7days - reducing significantly with emergency shiftwork). Refer to Annexure C.
Note 4. Full de-energisation of the substation is performed by the Network Control Room. This
will typically occur within 30 minutes from the commencement of a major transformer oil
fire. Refer to Annexure C.
Note 5. Low cost, localised radiation shields can be provided to exposed power and control
cables where necessary.
Note 6. Additional temporary support of the FSW can be provided during repair or replacement
works.
7.2.3 Special design requirements

The special detailed design requirements provided in Section 10 shall also apply to passive fire
mitigation design.
8.0 PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

8.1 General
Where a fire hazard exists, suitable fire protection shall be provided to address the potential fire
risk.
The two ways of achieving passive fire protection in substations are:
• by physical separation distance to prevent ignition; or
• by the provision of fire compartments.

Dependent on space availability, physical separation is the preferred method of passive fire
segregation.
8.2 Passive fire protection within buildings

8.2.1 Separation distances
Adequate separation both internal and external to buildings can achieve protection in a fire.
However, it is often not practical to provide adequate separation distances inside buildings.
Compartmentalisation is a more economical way of segregation internally.

For oil fires, calculation of design radiant heat levels shall be based on the relevant design criteria
given in Clause 7.2.
8.2.2 Compartmentalisation
8.2.2.1 Ausgrid design requirements
Compartmentalisation and other requirements of substations shall limit the extent of damage and
reduce restoration times for the building and equipment. On this basis, the Ausgrid design
requirements to reduce fire spread in substations can be more onerous than the Building Code of
Australia (BCA).
8.2.2.2 Compartment fire rating level

Where effective compartmentalisation is required, a fire rating shall be applied to all walls, floor,
ceiling and openings to the compartment. Refer to Annexure A for the fire rating requirements of
various building elements within the substation.
Where a fire barrier is required to prevent ignition, the table in Annexure A provides the minimum
fire rating.
8.2.2.3 Linear compartmentalisation in substation buildings

Where linear compartmentalisation is required, it is normally achieved by compartmentalisation.
Consideration should be given to balancing the need for linear compartmentalisation and the
introduction of obstructions in congested areas such as cable basements.
Linear compartmentalisation requires written approval from Ausgrid and may include cable coating
and other measures as part of the overall linear compartmentation system.
8.3 Passive fire protection external to buildings

8.3.1 General
Locating electrical equipment external to buildings does not eliminate the need to provide fire
segregated zones to substation equipment that are exposed to a fire hazard and that require
protection against fire. Where fire segregated zones are required external to buildings, this section
details the requirements for achieving the required level of fire protection.
8.3.2 Separation distances for buildings and transformers

8.3.2.1 General
The main fuel source features in open switchyards are power transformers and, to a lesser extent,
oil circuit breakers and smaller earthing and distribution style transformers.
The separation distances provided between external building elements and adjacent fuel sources
shall limit the extent of damage and reduce the restoration times for the building.
The separation distances provided between power transformers and adjacent fuel sources shall
ensure significant damage to the power transformer is reduced or eliminated. Consideration shall
be given to any long lead time vulnerable components of a transformer when determining
separation distances.
8.3.2.2 Wind factors

Determination of separation distances shall include a factor of safety of 1.5 to the distance
calculated to allow for prevailing wind effects. Alternatively, the fire plume can be modelled using a
radiant heat analysis with a flame tilt of 45o to the vertical.
8.3.2.3 Radiant heat factors

In determining the required separation distances, consideration shall be given to the fuel source,
fire intensity, fire duration, bund drainage and the ultimate transformer size.
The radiant heat exposure limits applicable to various fire sensitive elements within a substation
are indicated in Table 1 below.

Table 1 – Radiant Heat Exposure Limits
Maximum allowable
Item radiant heat flux Comment
(kW/m2)
Cable 12.5 Cables begin to distort and may ignite. Cables may
also sustain damage at lower radiant heat levels.
Steel support 15.0 To 60% of yield strength.
structure
Porcelain 12.5 Damage may occur requiring replacement or in
bushing/Insulators extreme case resulting in catastrophic failure. Refer to
Clause 7.2.2.
Polymeric 11 Damage may occur requiring replacement or in
bushing/insulators extreme case resulting in catastrophic failure. Refer to
Clause 7.2.2.
Aluminium busbar 12.5 Busbars may undergo significant distortion and impose
significant stresses on rigid insulators.
Copper busbar 12.5 Busbars may undergo significant distortion and impose
Transformer oil 4.5 Auto-Ignition is possible.
Transformer tank 25 (Top) Refer to Note 1 regarding bushings and cables.
17 (Side)
Conservator 20 Limited by maximum oil temperature.
Combustibles <12.5 typical Piloted ignition may occur on timber
Non-combustible <25.0
Note 1. Transformers always have some more vulnerable components such as bushings and
cables etc. Refer to Clause 7.2.
Radiant heat levels for oil fires shall be based on the relevant design criteria given in Clause 7.2.
The radiant heat exposure limits in Table 1 are not applicable to bushfire events which are typically
of much shorter duration than major oil fires. Refer to Section 12.
8.3.2.4 Minimum separation distances for outdoor transformers

A radiant heat analysis should be undertaken wherever possible to establish the required minimum
separation distances for outdoor transformers.
Where a radiant heat analysis is not available, AS 2067 Substations and high voltage installations
exceeding 1kV a.c. provides guidance for the segregation of outdoor transformers installed without
an enclosure. Table 6.1 of AS 2067 is a guide indicating the minimum separation distances for
outdoor transformers based on transformer type, insulating liquid volume and type and other
factors.
8.3.3 Fire separation walls for transformers

8.3.3.1 General
Where fire segregation zones are required and where the required separation distances cannot be
achieved, fire separation walls (FSW) shall be used.
FSW’s shall be designed to the relevant design criteria given in Clause 7.2. Consideration should
be given to ensure the design dimensions prevent fire spread over and around the wall.
Fire separation walls are not required between power transformers and “directly connected” neutral
earthing reactors/resistors and/or earthing transformers.

Fire separation wall design details shall take into consideration the fuel source, fire intensity, fire
duration, bund drainage, ultimate transformer size, vertical clearance to buildings and the required
horizontal clearance to electrical equipment for egress and operational requirements.
Radiant heat levels for oil fires shall be based on the relevant design criteria given in Clause 7.2. A
factor of safety of 1.5 shall be applied to separation distances for exposed elements to allow for
wind effects. Alternatively, the fire plume can be modelled using a radiant heat analysis with a
flame tilt of 45o to the vertical. Where significant, convection shall also be considered.
All methods and design justification of fire separation wall sizes are to be submitted to Ausgrid for
approval if requested.
8.3.3.2 Vertical separation distances

Vertical separation distances above externally located transformers or the extremities of oil filled
transformer components shall comply with the following:
(a) For transformers with less than or equal to 1,000 litres of oil capacity, a minimum vertical
separation of 6m shall be provided.
(b) For transformers with an oil capacity greater than 1,000 litres but less than or equal to 2,000
litres, a minimum vertical separation of 7.5m shall be provided.
(c) For transformers with an oil capacity greater than 2,000 litres but less than or equal to
20,000 litres, a minimum vertical separation of 10m shall be provided. This distance shall not
be reduced, unless a lesser separation distance can be justified by a comprehensive fire
engineering analysis approved by Ausgrid.
(d) For transformers containing more than 20,000 litres of oil, a comprehensive fire engineering
analysis shall be undertaken by Ausgrid, or otherwise submitted as part of a detailed Design
Report approved by Ausgrid.
8.3.3.3 Requirements between transformers and buildings

Where there is a building compartment (or part thereof) within the fire risk zone then a fire hazard
exists and suitable fire protection shall be provided. Generally, the wall facing the transformer
should be of sufficient height and width to ensure fire protection of the entire building compartment
including the roof structure.
Alternatively, where there is a self-supporting ceiling that provides fire protection, the roof structure
does not need to be fire rated provided the self-supporting ceiling can support the collapsed roof
structure.
8.3.3.4 Requirements for boundary fire separation walls

Consideration shall be given to the height and type of construction of neighbouring buildings and
the likely fire size. In the event of a fire, the radiant heat emitted from the substation shall comply
with the requirements of the BCA. The effect of convection shall also be considered.
Refer to Clause 11.3 for the maximum heat flux that can be emitted from the boundary of the
substation.
8.3.4 Separation distances for other switchyard equipment

This Network Standard is not intended to cover the fire protection of all switchyard equipment and
structures. However, Table 1 can be applied where protection is required.
The specific switchyard equipment and structures which may require fire protection will vary on a
site by site basis depending on the equipment function and the substation criticality. This
equipment may include, but is not limited to, the following items:
(a) External cable trenches at specific locations (Refer to NS171).
(b) Manually operated outlet valves associated with outdoor oil containment tanks (Refer to
NS189).
(c) Project specific equipment where approved in writing by Ausgrid.

However, many items of switchyard equipment can be readily replaced in the event of damage
during a fire and other items may not be critical for the partial re-energisation and restoration of
service. Equipment which does not require fire protection includes, but is not limited to, the
following items:
(a) Power transformer insulated bushings (Refer to Clause 7.2.2 and Annexure C).
(b) Directly connected neutral earthing reactors/resistors.
(c) Directly connected earthing transformers.
Refer to Ausgrid for project-specific scopes in relation to switchyard equipment and structures
including sealing ends, circuit breakers and AC or DC boards.
9.0 EGRESS PROVISIONS

9.1 Emergency egress within buildings
General access and emergency egress shall be in accordance with Building Code of Australia
(BCA) requirements and AS 2067 Substations and high voltage installations exceeding 1kV a.c., as
a minimum. All compartments containing high voltage equipment in Ausgrid buildings shall have a
minimum of two points of safe egress, except where an exemption is allowed under NS 185 Major
Substations Building Design Standard.
Flash fires or effects of blasts caused by arc explosions are outside the scope of this document.
9.2 Emergency egress external to buildings

9.2.1 Effects of radiant heat exposure
Fire emergency egress within switchyards shall consider the effects of radiant heat exposure from
burning oil filled transformers or other oil filled electrical equipment with a similar fire hazard.
9.2.2 Radiant heat and personnel safety

Apart from preventing fire spreading to buildings, it is essential to have provisions for personnel
safety and emergency egress. This Section provides Ausgrid’s minimum performance
requirements for egress in relation to substation fires allowing for the effect that fires have on
human exposure limitations.
9.2.3 Minimum egress provisions

Egress points in gates shall be positioned such that exposure for personnel shall be limited to
2.5kW/m2 for egress where a single action handle is on the escape door/gate. Where there is no
single action door/gate 1.7kW/m2 for indefinite exposure shall be adopted for egress points.
Design of substation egress paths shall consider locations of safe egress points from site, radiant
heat levels of egress paths, all possible oil and other significant fire source locations and exposure
limits on personnel. Personnel shall not be exposed to a radiant heat flux of level greater than
2.5kW/m2 along designated egress paths during evacuation. This radiant heat flux shall be reduced
where exposure times greater than 30 seconds are possible.
Consideration shall be given to providing other means of protection if adequate separation
distances cannot be provided, such as refuge areas.
A factor of safety of at least 1.5 shall be applied to calculated separation distances to allow for
prevailing wind effects. Alternatively, the fire plume can be modelled using a radiant heat analysis
with a flame tilt of 45o to the vertical.

10.0 SPECIAL DETAILED DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

10.1 Scope
This section outlines special Ausgrid design requirements for passive fire mitigation of substations.
10.2 Openings in fire barrier walls and fire separation walls

10.2.1 General
Door openings in fire barrier walls and fire separation walls shall only be provided where access
and emergency egress requirements dictate. Refer to Section 9 for emergency egress
requirements.
Windows are not permitted in a substation fire barrier walls or fire separation walls.
Fire dampers should be considered for any openings in fire barrier walls and fire separation walls
that are not otherwise fire rated.
10.2.2 Doors
Where a door is located in a fire barrier, it shall be fire rated to the FRL of the wall. Doors are not to
impact on bund integrity.
In addition, doors shall be located such the radiant heat damage of vulnerable equipment or
components in adjoining compartments is minimised. Refer to Clause 10.2.4 below.
10.2.3 Vent openings

Vents in fire barrier walls and fire separation walls facing other fire compartments should be
avoided where possible.
All vent openings that are required in a fire barrier wall or fire separation wall shall be fitted with fail-
safe automatically controlled fire dampers having a fire rating not less than the required fire rating
of the fire barrier wall.
Where vent openings are provided, electrical equipment may need to be located a sufficient
distance away from the vent fire damper. This is to ensure that, for the duration of a fire event, the
equipment is not damaged by heat radiated through, or from, the vent fire damper due to a fully
developed fire in the adjoining compartment.
Refer to Clause 10.2.4 below.
10.2.4 Minimum clearance to fire doors and fire dampers

Ausgrid will provide direction on the minimum clearance requirements to be applied to a particular
substation based on the risks to the network.
To reduce potential heat damage and ensure the safe operation of a neighbouring compartment’s
equipment following a fire, a minimum set-back distance of equipment from the fire doors and fire
dampers may be required.
The minimum clear distance to electrical equipment shall ensure that radiant heat levels emitted
from the fire door or fire damper do not cause greater internal temperatures than the equipment’s
safe operational limits.
Maximum design temperatures are as specified in Table 2 below and apply for the duration of the
fire event to those components that are considered to be non-replaceable items only.
No factor of safety on separation distances to allow for wind effects is required for interior or
sheltered environments.
Table 2 – Maximum Design Temperatures of Electrical Equipment
Switchgear Transformer Cables

105 o C 130 o C 130 o C

The radiant heat flux emitted from a typical fire door opening can be assumed as 10kW/m 2 with the
door shut.
10.3 Switchyard trenches and other locations

Ausgrid will provide recommendations on the type and extent of external switchyard fire protection
to be applied to a particular substation based on the risks to the network. Refer to Clause 8.3.4.
NS171 Fire Stopping in Substations details the fire protection measures which may be required to
protect cable trenches and other locations in switchyards from catching fire due to transformer oil
fires or from bushfire related embers and radiant heat.
10.4 Firestopping
In general, where penetrations exist through fire rated building elements, it is essential that the
penetrations are sealed to prevent the passage of fire or smoke to other areas within the
substation. The requirements for substation fire rating are outlined in Annexure A and further
details are provided in Annexure C for cable marshalling areas.
Firestopping requirements, properties and installation procedures are detailed in NS171.
10.5 Smoke seals

Smoke management systems are detailed in NS171.
10.6 Roof system

10.6.1 General
Roof systems may need to prevent an internal fire from spreading or prevent external fires from
entering the building. External fire sources include transformer fires or bushfires. Refer to the fire
rating requirements in Annexure A.
Roof structures are not to be constructed of or contain any combustible material. Combustible
materials are those deemed to be combustible when tested in accordance with AS 1530.1 –
Methods for fire tests on building materials, components and structures – Combustibility test for
materials.
10.6.2 Internal fire protection

Fire spread through any ceiling void into other compartments of the building shall be prevented.
Preferably, fire should also be prevented from entering the ceiling void where possible.
10.6.3 External fire protection

If there is a risk of exposure to an external fire hazard, the roof structure shall be designed for the
appropriate fire resistance level.
Alternatively, where there is a self-supporting ceiling that provides fire protection, the roof structure
does not need to be fire rated provided the self-supporting ceiling can support the collapsed roof
structure.
10.7 Impact resistance

Fire barrier elements shall have sufficient impact resistance to ensure fire integrity is maintained
following any operational impacts.
10.8 Substation overpressure

Consideration shall be given to the effects of substation overpressure on all passive fire mitigation
systems. Refer to NS188 Design for Substation Overpressure.

11.0 PUBLIC SAFETY AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

11.1 General
The requirements of the Building Code of Australia (BCA) in terms of building element fire ratings,
set-backs, services, egresses etc. shall be met as an absolute minimum.
Where an Alternative Solution approach is used to satisfy the BCA provisions, the Alternative
Solution shall meet the intent and performance requirements of the BCA and shall comply with
Ausgrid’s Network Standards.
11.2 Adjacent or adjoining properties and buildings

The BCA regulates controls necessary to ensure required building performance with respect to a
fire. The main objective of the BCA with respect to fire safety and fire resistance is to provide
suitable protection to occupants from injury that may arise due to a fire within a building and while
the occupants are evacuating the building.
Furthermore, fire spread to adjoining buildings must also be prevented and other properties
protected from structural damage caused by structural failure of the building where the fire
originated. The BCA is not intended to include provision for building re-use following a fire.
New substation buildings shall comply with all the relevant performance requirements of the BCA.
With respect to fire performance, the BCA provides criteria for verification of the performance
requirements, placing limits on allowable levels of heat flux radiation with respect to distances
beyond a property boundary.
11.3 Heat flux limits

In all cases, the maximum potential heat flux between buildings on adjoining allotments, and on the
same allotment, shall not exceed those specified in the BCA.
At locations where the building adjoining the Ausgrid substation site is constructed of timber on or
near the boundary, a heat flux of less than 25 kW/m2 shall be achieved at the boundary. Where
flame impingement is possible this value should be reduced to 12.5 kW/m 2.

12.0 BUSHFIRE
12.1 General
The purpose of this Section is to provide guidance for the protection of the substation against
bushfires.
This Network Standard does not cover the requirements for protecting the bush against fire from
equipment failure. However, as a minimum, segregation distances to combustibles (using 12.5
kW/m2 where flame impingement is possible) shall be adopted at the boundary, or the yard fence
depending on the land use within the boundary.
Substations deemed to be in bushfire-prone areas shall satisfy all the requirements of AS 3959
Construction of buildings in bushfire-prone areas and the NSW Rural Fire Services (RFS) guide,
Planning for Bushfire Protection (PBP).
This section does not consider the use of fire separation walls to protect external equipment from a
bushfire as enough land to achieve adequate separation distances is generally available in bushfire
prone areas. Where adequate space is not available, seek advice from Asset Standards.
12.2 Approach to bushfire protection

Design of Ausgrid substations should ensure that they do not contribute to the bushfire and are
able to maintain supply at a minimum predetermined level after a bushfire event. If required, the
substation should be able to shut down safely in the event of radiant heat damage.
The criticality of Ausgrid substations and the level of service required during (and after) a bushfire
event will vary with location within the network. This aspect will impact upon the type and extent of
bushfire protection provided at a given site.
Where bushfire protection is required, the radiant heat exposure limits provided in Table 3 should
be applied to the critical substation elements only. Assessment of criticality should consider
substation importance, reliability of supply, repair / replacement options, potential bushfire
exposure and other aspects.
The overall approach to be taken for bushfire protection is expected to be site dependent. Subject
to the location and criticality, it is acknowledged that some HV components could be protected and
some could be sacrificed and readily replaced.
12.3 Buildings
In addition to the requirements of AS 3959, at locations where loss of facility or supply is
considered unacceptable, consideration shall be given to further measures aimed at preventing a
fire from entering through openings, roof systems, or any other means.
The building shall also be designed for the required fire resistance level (FRL). Refer to Annexure
A.
12.3.1 Doors
All external doors must match the fire performance FRL of the building and be fitted with fire
resistant smoke seals at the base of the door to prevent embers entering under the door.
12.4 Switchyard equipment

Radiant heat is the most likely cause of damage to switchyard equipment and structures. All
switchyard equipment must therefore be adequately set back from the boundary or fire barriers are
to be provided. Other causes of fire spread are embers to combustibles in the switchyard.
Therefore, consideration shall be given to the protection of combustible switchyard equipment
against ember damage.
Bushfire events can provide significant radiant heat flux levels but the peak exposure level is
typically of very short duration when compared to other fuel source features within a substation. As
a result, the allowable radiant heat exposure limits are correspondingly higher for most substation
elements based on the short-term exposure.

A typical radiant heat / temperature duration curve applicable to bushfires would be as follows:
• Peak values are reached after 1 minute;

• Values remain at peak for up to 4 minutes; and
• Values recede to ambient linearly over a further 5 minutes.
Refer to Table 3 for limiting radiant heat flux levels for determining minimum safe separation
distances. For bushfires, the NSW RFS PBP is the key reference document in establishing the
maximum bushfire intensity at a given location. A flame front length equal to the approach
boundary length is to be assumed and a flame height based on the PBP shall be used in
calculations.
Table 3 – Radiant Heat Exposure Limits for Bushfires
Maximum allowable
Item radiant heat flux Comment
(kW/m2)
Cable 12.5 PVC Cables begin to distort and may ignite.
20 Ignition of XLPE cables between 85 and 550 seconds.

Steel support 35 To 60% of yield strength after a maximum duration of 5
structure minutes. Applies where elastic deflections due to elevated
temperatures are not critical.
Porcelain >30 Damage may occur requiring replacement or in extreme
bushing/Insulators case resulting in catastrophic failure. See Note 2.
Polymeric >30 Damage may occur requiring replacement or in extreme
bushing/insulators case resulting in catastrophic failure. See Note 2.
Aluminium busbar 20 Based on 250°C after a maximum duration of 5 minutes.
Comparable to withstand temperature under fault
conditions.
Copper busbar 25 Busbars may undergo significant distortion and impose
Transformer tank >35 Refer to above regarding bushings and cables.
(see Note 1)
Combustibles 12.5 Piloted ignition may occur on timber.
Note 1. Transformers always have some more vulnerable components such as bushings and
cables etc. Refer to Clause 7.2.
Note 2. Detailed information on radiant heat exposure limits is not available. However in-service
applications exposed to bushfire indicate a high radiant heat limit and a low risk of
damage or failure.
The radiant heat limits provided in Table 3 are applicable to identified critical substation structures
and HV components. Critical elements are those deemed to be essential for return to service
following a bushfire event.
The location of critical substation elements, their sensitivity to radiant heat and their ease of
replacement will all impact upon the potential Asset Protection Zone (APZ) required at a given
substation.
APZ widths may potentially reduce where critical exposed elements nearest the boundary are able
to be locally protected and/or rapidly replaced following a bushfire event.
Substation design should aim for a high level of bushfire protection for critical assets and a rapid
return to service following a bushfire event.

12.5 House keeping

Substations in bushfire prone areas may accumulate leaf matter to levels where it becomes an
additional fuel source often up against the building or in alcoves.
Substations must be inspected and cleaned regularly to prevent the build-up of any combustible
matter.
13.0 DOCUMENTATION
13.1 Design report
A Design Report shall be prepared by an appropriately qualified engineer practicing in the specific
discipline of fire engineering. The report shall provide details of the schematic designs developed
and demonstrate by calculation how the objectives of passive fire mitigation performance
requirements stipulated in this Network Standard are satisfied.
The Design Report shall be prepared prior to the detailed design of the substation and submitted to
Civil & Building at the completion of the schematic design stage for approval.
Methods and calculations for determining all separation distances will be required as part of the
Design Report prior to detailed design.
14.0 RECORDKEEPING
The table below identifies the types of records relating to the process, their storage location and
retention period.
Table 4 – Recordkeeping
Type of Record Storage Location Retention Period*
Approved copy of the network Document repository Network sub Unlimited

standard process Standard – Company
Draft Copies of the network Work Folder for Network Standards Unlimited
standard during (HPRM ref. 2014/21250/303)
amendment/creation
Working documents (emails, Work Folder for Network Standards Unlimited
memos, impact assessment (HPRM ref. 2014/21250/303)
reports, etc.)
* The following retention periods are subject to change e.g. if the records are required for legal
matters or legislative changes. Before disposal, retention periods should be checked and
authorised by the Records Manager.
15.0 AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

For this Network Standard the authorities and responsibilities of Ausgrid employees and managers
in relation to content, management and document control of this Network Standard can be obtained
from the Company Procedure (Network) – Production / Review of Engineering Technical
Documents within the document repository. The responsibilities of persons for the design or
construction work detailed in this Network Standard are identified throughout this Standard in the
context of the requirements to which they apply.

16.0 DOCUMENT CONTROL

Document Owner : Head of Asset Risk & Performance
Distribution Coordinator : Manager Asset Standards

Annexure A – Passive Fire Mitigation Requirements

Refer to Ausgrid for scope on extent of segregation. Table A1 provides performance requirements
when segregation is required.
Table A1 does not include provisions for pole top equipment such as transformers and capacitors.
Table A1 Performance requirements where segregation required
Minimum Fire Resistance Period (hours) to

protected equipment or building elements (Note 1)
Fire Source Sub- Distribution &
CBD Zone Other Zone
transmission Chamber
Substation Substation
Substation Substations
Transformer/reactors – oil 4 hours or spatial 4 hours or spatial 3 hours or spatial 3 hours or spatial
filled (external & internal) separation separation separation separation
(see Note 4) (see Note 4)
Transformers non-oil filled 3 hours or spatial 3 hours or spatial 2 hours or spatial 2 hours or spatial
(external & internal) separation separation separation separation
(see Note 4)
Distribution centre Oil 4 hours or spatial 4 hours or spatial 3 hours or spatial 3 hours or spatial
Filled separation separation separation separation
Distribution centre Non-oil 3 hours or spatial 3 hours or spatial 2 hours or spatial 2 hours or spatial
Filled separation separation separation separation
(see Note 4)
Other oil filled equipment 4 hours or spatial 4 hours or spatial 3 hours or spatial 3 hours or spatial
separation separation separation separation
Other non-oil filled 3 hours or spatial Non-combustible Non-combustible 2 hours or spatial
equipment separation Comply with BCA. Comply with BCA. separation
Cable marshalling areas 4 hours 4 hours Non-combustible 3 hours or spatial
(basements etc.) Comply with BCA. separation
(see Note 6)
Cable Risers 3 hours 3 hours 3 hours 3 hours
Control Room 3 hours Non-combustible Non-combustible N/A
Comply with BCA. Comply with BCA.
Battery Room (where 3 hours Non-combustible Non-combustible N/A
provided) Comply with BCA. Comply with BCA.
Battery Enclosures Non-combustible Non-combustible Non-combustible N/A
Communication Room 3 hours Non-combustible Non-combustible N/A
(where provided) Comply with BCA. Comply with BCA.
Capacitors (where 3 hours or spatial 3 hours or spatial 2 hours or spatial N/A
provided) separation separation separation
(see Note 4)
Amenities, foyers and Non-combustible Non-combustible Non-combustible Non-combustible
other areas not containing Comply with BCA. Comply with BCA. Comply with BCA. Comply with BCA.
substation equipment
Audio frequency load N/A Non-combustible Non-combustible N/A
control (AFLC) Comply with BCA. Comply with BCA.

Notes:
1. Higher fire resistant periods may be required under the BCA particularly where multi
classifications exist when a substation is incorporated within another building.
2. AS 2067 – Substations and high voltage installations exceeding 1kV a.c. may have
additional requirements for fire protection where a fire hazard exists.
3. Spatial separation shall only be applied in outdoor applications.
4. The required fire resistance period associated with external power transformers,
external capacitors and other external oil filled equipment may be reduced to a
minimum of 2 hours where the fire exposure can be demonstrated to reduce
significantly during the fire resistance period (due to fuel limitation, bund drainage,
etc.).
5. Ausgrid may require a higher fire resistant period than those nominated in Table A1
for specific sites where loss of supply and/or safety issues dictate.
6. Refer to Annexure C for further discussion on the fire resistance period of cable
marshalling areas. Refer to NS171 Firestopping in Substations for firestopping of
penetrations and additional measures for cable fire protection.

Annexure B – Typical Properties of Combustible Liquids

Table B1 below provides information on the typical properties and characteristics of combustible
liquids commonly associated with Ausgrid substations.
Table B1 Properties and characteristics of combustible liquids
Property Characteristic
Material / Liquid Boiling Minimum Fire Ignition Smoke Heat

Fire Class
Point Flash Point Time Production Release
oC IEC 61100
Point oC oC
1. Transformers
Mineral Oil 140 170 O Short High High
Natural Ester - FR3 >300 >340 K2 Long Medium Medium
Synthetic Ester – 275 322 K3 Long Low Medium
MIDEL 7131
Polyol Ester – 269 Long Low Medium
VG32
Silicone Liquid – >310 >370 K Long Low Low
KF96-50CS
2. Capacitors
Jarylec – C101 144 154 Short
Faradol - 810 270 138 Short
The fire class “K Classification” used above is based on IEC 61039 Ed. 2.0 Classification of
insulating liquids as indicated in Table B2 below:
Table B2 Fire point and calorific values of insulating liquids
Class Fire Point Class Calorific Value
O <= 300 oC 1 >= 42MJ/kg
K > 300 oC 2 32 < CV < 42 MJ/kg
L In Flammable 3 < 32MJ/kg

Annexure C – Background Information Relating to Passive Fire

Protection
C.1 General
This Annexure provides general background information relating to some specific design
approaches that have been adopted by Ausgrid for passive fire protection at substations.
C.2 Cable marshalling areas

Previous versions of NS187 required a fire resistance period (FRP) of 3 to 4 hours for all cable
marshalling areas (CMA) in Annexure A. For many substations this would often exceed the
minimum BCA requirements for the building overall.
Historically, the FRP requirements for CMA's were driven by a number of potential hazards that
adversely impacted on fire risk, including:
1. The use of oil filled and oil impregnated HV cables in the CMA.
2. The use of oil filled switchgear in the switchroom directly above the CMA.
3. Small and confined basement areas with limited internal space for physical separation of
cables.
4. Congested HV cable paths with multiple cable crossovers.
5. A prevalence of HV cable joints with inadequate separation to other cables and negligible cable
fire protection.
Today, these potential hazards have been significantly reduced through the use of modern
substation equipment and designs, the adoption of XLPE HV cable materials and the selective
application of cable fire protection.
For modular buildings, the CMA is also open on all sides and this would effectively prevent the
build-up of smoke and heat from a potential fire event.
Overall, the internal building fire risk for the CMA has been reduced to the point where a significant
FRP is no longer considered to be necessary other than at critical substations (CBD zone
substations or Sub-transmission substations) or where required by the BCA. This change has now
been incorporated into Annexure A of this Network Standard.
In addition, the treatment of penetrations through the various building elements can be
correspondingly reduced to comply with the revised requirements of NS171 Firestopping in
Substations, the BCA and AS 2067 Substations and high voltage installations exceeding 1kV a.c.
where appropriate.
At locations where the residual fire risk is considered to be significant (e.g. major LV cables, highly
congested HV crossovers), the Designer can choose to apply local cable fire protection as outlined
in NS171.
C.3 Oil containment bund drainage

For oil pool fires, this Network Standard requires that oil containment bunds with gravity drainage
shall be assumed to function as designed. In this regard, any oil which is spilt within the bund shall
be assumed to drain away via the flame trap and pipeline at the design flowrate.
For this to occur, the oil containment bund drainage system must be kept clean and in good
working order. Routine inspection and clean-out of the oil containment flame traps, pipelines and
EGOWS tanks is essential.
Refer to NS190 Oil Containment Operational Requirements for Major Substations for the Ausgrid
requirements relating to the operation and maintenance of the various oil containment systems.

It should be noted that gravity drainage of bunds is NOT provided for all oil containment systems.
Parallel Plate Separator (PPS) and other similar systems rely on a closed (undrained) system
which uses pumps to empty the bunds. For these closed drainage systems, any spilt oil will be
retained within the bund enclosure and hence would be potentially available as fuel for an oil pool
fire.
C.4 Transformer bushings

This Network Standard recognises that the resin impregnated paper and solid porcelain bushings
on new power transformers are potentially replaceable items if damaged. On this basis, specific
protection from radiant heat due to fire is not required for these items. Where oil filled porcelain
bushings are installed, further advice should be sought from Asset Standards.
Ausgrid uses resin-impregnated paper, porcelain clad bushings at 132kV and 66kV and retains an
inventory of spare bushings for most of its major power transformers. Ausgrid’s 33kV and 11kV
bushings are readily available from local suppliers. Replacement of damaged transformer bushings
can be achieved within an acceptably short timeframe and would typically involve the following key
steps:
• Day 1 – removal of HV connections and part drainage of transformer oil

• Day 2 – removal of damaged bushings
• Day 3 – workshop modifications to bushing flanges and connectors if required
• Day 4 – installation of new bushings
• Day 5 – refill transformer with oil
• Day 6 – contingency day
• Day 7 – transformer testing
• Day 8 – transformer testing
• Day 9 – reconnection of HV bars and cables
Overall, the bushing replacement process involves 7 to 9 days of work using regular hours and
depends on the amount of local modifications required.
Under emergency conditions, using multiple work crews and extended working hours, the work
duration could be reduced to a few days.
C.5 Transformer tank

This Network Standard allows for a permissible radiant heat flux exposure of up to 25 kW/m 2 for
adjacent power transformers exposed to a fire. The radiant heat flux exposure limit is based upon
using reasonable values for the key inputs including initial temperature, fire duration, time to de-
energisation and temperature gradients.
This limit applies to the main transformer tank and other non-replaceable oil filled components but
excludes the transformer insulated bushings (Refer to Clause C.4).
For Ausgrid’s current 132kV and 33kV power transformer designs, this radiant heat limit enables
the equipment to remain within the main limiting design temperatures, as indicated below:
1. Transformer HV Winding Temperature Rise: 900C
2. Transformer HV Winding Hotspot: 1400C
C.6 Response to major fires

During a major fire, the adjacent power transformers are likely to remain in service and will
continue to be actively monitored by the protection system. Adverse effects caused by heat and
smoke (conductor damage, flashover, etc.) are rapidly detected and the protection system will trip
the unit off-line as required.
Ausgrid’s Network Security has developed agreed response procedures in the event of
catastrophic events, including major transformer fires. There is recognition that major power
transformer fires are rare events, and that the insulated bushings of adjacent transformers are
potentially replaceable items that can be changed over if damaged by radiant heat exposure.

Network Security advises that, in the event of a major power transformer fire, full de-energisation of
the substation would typically occur within 30 minutes. A worst case scenario may increase this
time to 1 hour, although this would be rare.
De-energisation of the substation is undertaken from the Network Control Room, following a site
visit and confirmation by an Ausgrid Operator. Once de-energisation has been confirmed by the
Operator on site, the Fire Brigade will then enter the substation and commence their attack on the
fire.
During a major fire, the Fire Brigade has control of the site and its perimeter and will determine the
safe approach distance and who can access the site. These controls will also apply to any Ausgrid
representatives at the site.


Passive Fire Substations

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Network Standard

NW000-S0007 NS187 PASSIVE FIRE MITIGATION DESIGN OF MAJOR

NW000-S0007 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 1 of 28

AMENDMENTS TO THIS STANDARD

NW000-S0007 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 2 of 28

Egress Provisions and Public

NW000-S0007 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 3 of 28

1.0 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................................. 6

NW000-S0007 UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED Page 4 of 28

10.0 SPECIAL DETAILED DESIGN REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................. 16

For Official use only

For Official use only

3.2 Ausgrid documents

3.3 Other standards and documents

3.4 Acts and regulations

For Official use only

6.0 THE APPROACH

6.2 Fire risk zones

6.3 Passive fire protection

• Fire separation walls and fire barriers.

For Official use only

6.4 Active fire protection

• by providing early warning for Ausgrid and/or Fire Brigade intervention.

• by overcoming access problems for fire fighting.

• by limiting the spread of fire within a compartment.

• by providing, in some cases, cooling to adjoining areas.

6.4.2 Limitations of active systems

6.4.3 Application of active systems

• Smoke Detection System (except for distribution substations)

6.5 Typical properties of combustible liquids

7.0 PASSIVE FIRE MITIGATION DESIGN

For Official use only

7.2 Key design criteria

7.2.2 Fire separation walls

For Official use only

7.2.3 Special design requirements

8.0 PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

• by physical separation distance to prevent ignition; or

• by the provision of fire compartments.

8.2 Passive fire protection within buildings

For Official use only

8.2.2.2 Compartment fire rating level

8.2.2.3 Linear compartmentalisation in substation buildings

8.3 Passive fire protection external to buildings

8.3.2 Separation distances for buildings and transformers

8.3.2.2 Wind factors

8.3.2.3 Radiant heat factors

For Official use only

Table 1 – Radiant Heat Exposure Limits

8.3.2.4 Minimum separation distances for outdoor transformers

8.3.3 Fire separation walls for transformers

For Official use only

8.3.3.2 Vertical separation distances

8.3.3.3 Requirements between transformers and buildings

8.3.3.4 Requirements for boundary fire separation walls

8.3.4 Separation distances for other switchyard equipment

For Official use only

9.0 EGRESS PROVISIONS

9.2 Emergency egress external to buildings