Bartolome vs. Bartolome
Bartolome vs. Bartolome
Bartolome vs. Bartolome
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EN BANC
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Plaintiffs seek, by writ of error, the review of an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila dismissing the complaint in this case.
Its factual background is this: On November 25, 1953, Flaviana Fajardo and Justo
Bartolome executed a deed of extrajudicial partition stating that they are the widow and
the only legitimate son, respectively, of Venancio Bartolome, who died intestate in
Manila on August 4, 1948, and adjudicating unto themselves, in equal shares, three (3)
houses, located in the district of Sampaloc, City of Manila, belonging to said
deceased.1awphil.net
Less than two (2) years later, or on July 8, 1955, Jose Manangol Bartolome filed, with
the Court of First Instance of Manila, a petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No.
26785 of said court, alleging that he is a legitimate son of the deceased Venancio
Bartolome and the aforementioned Flaviana Fajardo, and praying that he (Jose
Manangol Bartolome) be appointed administrator of the estate of said deceased; that
said deed of extrajudicial partition between Flaviana Fajardo and Justo Bartolome be
declared of no force and effect; and that the estate of the deceased be settled and
distributed in accordance with law. After appropriate proceedings, decision was
rendered therein dismissing said petition, upon the ground that Jose Manangol
Bartolome was, not a legitimate son of Flaviana Fajardo and Venancio Bartolome, but
an illegitimate offspring of the latter and one Sotera (Emilia) Pangilinan. On appeal,
taken by Jose Manangol Bartolome, this decision was, on March 30, 1959, affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 19361-R.
Soon thereafter, or on May 24, 1959, Flaviana Fajardo died in Manila. On December 23,
1959, the Court of First Instance thereof approved in said Special Proceeding No.
26785, the project of partition of the estate of Venancio Bartolome, deceased, between
the estate of Flaviana Fajardo, deceased, and Justo Bartolome, in equal shares.
Presently, or on January 5, 1960, the latter executed an affidavit adjudicating unto
himself the estates of Flaviana Fajardo and Venancio Bartolome, consisting of cash
amounting to P5,896.52 and the aforementioned three (3) houses. Thereupon, or on
January 21, 1960, said Court issued an order declaring the aforementioned Special
Proceeding closed and relieving the administrator therein appointed from further
responsibility, as such, Justo Bartolome having acknowledged receipt from him of the
properties constituting the estates of his aforementioned parents.
Over three (3) years later, or on November 4, 1963, said Jose Manangol Bartolome and
Antonio and Adalaida, both surnamed Bartolome — hereinafter referred to collectively
as plaintiffs — commenced the present action, in the same Court, against Justo
Bartolome — hereinafter referred to as the defendant — alleging that plaintiffs Antonio
and Adalaida Bartolome are the children of Venancio Bartolome and Francisca Untalan;
that said plaintiffs had enjoyed the status of children of said Venancio Bartolome, by
direct acts of the latter and by admissions, made, in judicial proceedings, by the late
Flaviana Fajardo and defendant, Justo Bartolome; that said plaintiffs and Jose Manangol
Bartolome used to believe that Venancio Bartolome and Flaviana Fajardo were
married;. that plaintiffs Antonio and Adalaida Bartolome, accordingly, thought that they
were illegitimate children of Venancio Bartolome; that, sometime in 1962, plaintiffs
found that the marriage of Venancio Bartolome and Flaviana Fajardo does not appear in
the indices of marriages, from 1900 to 1904, of the Civil Registrar for the City of
Manila; and that defendant Justo Bartolome, acting in conspiracy with Flaviana Fajardo,
had deliberately and fraudulently deprived the plaintiffs of their lawful share in the
estate of Venancio Bartolome, as his acknowledged natural children, by
misrepresenting that he was married to Flaviana Fajardo, and concealing his
competence to contract marriage at the time of the conception and birth of said
plaintiffs.
The latter prayed, therefore, that judgment be rendered declaring that they and the
defendant are acknowledged natural children of Venancio Bartolome and that the order
of distribution of his estate in Special Proceeding No. 26785 and the adjudication of
said estate, made by the defendant in his favor, is of no force and effect, apart from
adjudicating to the plaintiffs their respective shares in the estate aforementioned and
ordering the defendant to convey to each of the plaintiffs herein one-fourth of said
estate.1awphil.net
As above indicated, the lower court ordered this case dismissed, upon the ground: a)
that the complaint states no cause of action; b) that said court had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter thereof; and c) that said cause of action, if any, is barred by the
statute of limitations of action. Hence, plaintiffs' appeal, which is untenable for:
1) The complaint does not show that Venancio Bartolome and Flaviana Fajardo were not
married. The lack of reference to their marriage in the indices of marriages, for the
years 1900 to 1904, of the Office of the Civil Registrar for Manila, does not establish
plaintiffs' claim, for said couple may have been married at some other time or at some
other place. Besides, having concededly lived together as husband and wife for many
years, they are presumed to be legally married unless and, until the contrary is
satisfactorily proven.1 The allegations in plaintiffs' complaint, even if proven, are
inadequate to offset this presumption.
a) The very complaint shows that, up to 1962, plaintiffs thought that their father was
married to Flavania Fajardo; that the general impression, therefore, was that he could
not have married Francisca Untalan — the mother of plaintiffs Antonio and Adalaida
Bartolome — at the time of their (plaintiffs') conception and birth (on January 17, 1926
and December 16, 1928); that they (plaintiffs), accordingly, believed they were
illegitimate (not natural) children; and that this — status of illegitimate children — was,
therefore, the status the possession of which they enjoyed.
b) Continuous possession of the status of a natural child — which is not the status
plaintiffs had possessed — does not automatically confer the legal status of an
acknowledged natural child.2 Under the Civil Code of Spain — which was the law
applicable at the time of the death of Venancio, in 1948 — it was, at best, a ground for
compulsory recognition of said status, which must precede an action for adjudication of
their share as alleged heirs of the deceased.3 Indeed, under the provisions of said Code,
a natural child, who is not acknowledged as such, has no successional rights to the
estate of his natural father.4
c) Pursuant to Article 137 of the Civil Code of Spain, an action for compulsory
recognition of a natural child may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents except:
1. If the father or mother died during minority of the child, in which case the latter
may commence the action within the four years next following the attainment of its
majority.
2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some document, before unknown,
should be discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged.
In this case the action must be commenced within the six months next following
the discovery of such document.
The case at bar does not come under any of these exceptions, except as regards plaintiff
Adalaida Bartolome who became of age on December 16, 1949.5 However, she did not
bring this action until November 4, 1963, or long after the expiration of the period
prescribed in said Article 137, or that (2 years) provided in Section 45 of Act No. 190,6
or in Art. 285 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.7
3) The Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction to hear and decide cases for
acknowledgment of natural children. Pursuant to Section 38-A, par. (6) of Republic Act
No. 1401, such jurisdiction, in the City of Manila, is vested exclusively in the Court of
Juvenile and Domestic Relations. As we ruled in B. Paterno vs. J. T. Paterno:8
. . . by the creation of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, with its exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving paternity and acknowledgment, recognition of
children and recovery of hereditary shares can no longer be properly joined as
causes of action, since each lies within the jurisdiction of a different tribunal.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from be, it is hereby, affirmed, with costs against
plaintiffs-appellants.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
2 Article 131, old Civil Code; Art. 283, Civil Code of the Philippines.
4 "Under Art. 840 of the old Civil Code, the natural children entitled to inherit are
those legally acknowledged. In the case of Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, the following
pronouncement was made — 'the actual attainment of the status of a legally
acknowledged natural child is a condition precedent to the realization of any rights
which may pertain to such child in the character of heir. In the case before us,
assuming that plaintiff has been in the continuous possession of the status of
natural child, she is entitled to enforce legal recognition; but this does not in itself
make her a legally recognized natural child. It being a fact, conclusive in this
instance, that there is no requisite acknowledgment, the respondent's right to
inherit cannot be sustained.'" (Emphasis ours.) Magallanes v. Court of Appeals, 95
Phil. 795, 798.
6 Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135; Serrano vs. Serrano, 22 Phil. 10; Suarez vs.
Suarez, 43 Phil. 903; Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 744; ,Gabrinao vs. Latorre,
L-5825, Feb. 27, 1953; Mendoza vs. Cayas, 98 Phil. 107, 110-111; Narag vs. Cecilia
L-13353, Aug. 31, 1960; Paulino vs. Paulino, L-15091, Dec. 28, 1961; and Noble vs.
Noble, L-17742, Dec. 17, 1966.