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Naming and The DNS: 39 Name Address

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
26 views12 pages

Naming and The DNS: 39 Name Address

Uploaded by

Nour Radwan
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Naming and the DNS

Names and Addresses

39¢

name Arvind Krishnamurthy


544 Paul G. Allen Center
address University of Washington

 Names are identifiers for objects/services (high level)


 Addresses are locators for objects/services (low level)
 Binding is the process of associating a name with an address
 Resolution is the process of looking up an address given a name

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Internet Hostnames
 Hostnames are human-readable identifiers for end-
systems based on an administrative hierarchy
 dogmatix.dyn.cs.washington.edu is my desktop
machine
 IP addresses are a fixed-length binary encoding for end-
systems based on their position in the network
 128.208.7.230 is uranium’s IP address

 Original name resolution: HOSTS.TXT


 Current name resolution: Domain Name System
 Future name resolution: ?

Original Hostname System


 When the Internet was really young …

 Flat namespace
 Simple (host, address) pairs

 Centralized management
 Updates via a single master file called HOSTS.TXT
 Manually coordinated by the Network Information Center

 Resolution process
 Look up hostname in the HOSTS.TXT file

2
Scaling Problems
 Coordination
 Between all users to avoid conflicts

 Inconsistencies
 Between update and distribution of new version

 Reliability
 Single point of failure

 Performance
 Competition for centralized resources

Domain Name System (DNS)


 Designed by Mockapetris and Dunlap in the mid 80s

 Namespace is hierarchical
 Allows much better scaling of data structures
 e.g., dogmatix.dyn.cs.washington.edu

 Namespace is distributed
 Decentralized administration and access
 e.g., *.cs.washington.edu managed by CSE

 Resolution is by query/response
 With replicated servers for redundancy
 With heavy use of caching for performance

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DNS Hierarchy

edu com mil org … au

mit • “dot” is the root of the hierarchy


• Top levels now controlled by ICANN
ai lcs • Lower level control is delegated

DNS Distribution

 Data managed by zones that contain resource records


 Zone is a complete description of a portion of the namespace
 e.g., all hosts and addresses for machines in washington.edu with
pointers to subdomains like cs.washington.edu

 One or more nameservers manage each zone


 Zone transfers performed between nameservers for consistency
 Multiple nameservers provide redundancy

 Client resolvers query nameservers for specified records


 Multiple messages may be exchanged per DNS lookup to
navigate the name hierarchy

4
Example
root DNS server
Host at cis.poly.edu
wants IP address for
2
gaia.cs.umass.edu 3
TLD DNS server
4
local DNS server
dns.poly.edu 5

7 6
1 8

authoritative DNS server


dns.cs.umass.edu
requesting host
cis.poly.edu gaia.cs.umass.edu

Recursive vs. Iterative Queries


 Recursive query root DNS server

 Ask server to
get answer for 2
you 3
TLD DNS server
 E.g., request 1 4
local DNS server
and response 8 dns.poly.edu 5
 Iterative query
 Ask server who
to ask next 1 8
7 6

 E.g., all other


request- authoritative DNS server
dns.cs.umass.edu
response pairs requesting host
cis.poly.edu

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5
Hierarchy of Nameservers

Root
name server

Princeton … Cisco
name server name server

CS … EE
name server name server

DNS Bootstrapping
 Need to know IP addresses of root servers before we
can make any queries
 Addresses for 13 root servers ([a-m].root-servers.net)
handled via initial configuration (named.ca file)
A Verisign, Dulles, VA
C Cogent, Herndon, VA (also Los Angeles)
D U Maryland College Park, MD K RIPE London (also Amsterdam, Frankfurt)
G US DoD Vienna, VA
H ARL Aberdeen, MD I Autonomica, Stockholm
E NASA Mt View, CA J Verisign, ( 11 locations) (plus 3 other locations)
F Internet Software C. Palo
Alto, CA (and 17 other m WIDE Tokyo
locations)

B USC-ISI Marina del Rey, CA


L ICANN Los Angeles, CA
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DNS Caching
 Performing all these queries take time
 And all this before the actual communication takes
place
 E.g., 1-second latency before starting Web download
 Caching can substantially reduce overhead
 The top-level servers very rarely change
 Popular sites (e.g., www.cnn.com) visited often
 Local DNS server often has the information cached
 How DNS caching works
 DNS servers cache responses to queries
 Responses include a “time to live” (TTL) field
 Server deletes the cached entry after TTL expires 13

Negative Caching
 Remember things that don’t work
 Misspellings like www.cnn.comm and www.cnnn.com
 These can take a long time to fail the first time
 Good to remember that they don’t work
 … so the failure takes less time the next time around

14

7
DNS Resource Records

DNS: distributed db storing resource records (RR)


RR format: (name, value, type, ttl)

• Type=A • Type=CNAME
– name is hostname – name is alias name for some
– value is IP address “canonical” (the real) name
www.ibm.com is really
 Type=NS servereast.backup2.ibm.com
 name is domain (e.g. – value is canonical name
foo.com)
 value is hostname of • Type=MX
authoritative name server for
this domain – value is name of mailserver
associated with name
15

DNS Protocol

DNS protocol : query and reply messages, both with


same message format

Message header
• Identification: 16 bit #
for query, reply to
query uses same #
• Flags:
– Query or reply
– Recursion desired
– Recursion available
– Reply is authoritative
16

8
Reliability
 DNS servers are replicated
 Name service available if at least one replica is up
 Queries can be load balanced between replicas
 UDP used for queries
 Need reliability: must implement this on top of UDP
 Try alternate servers on timeout
 Exponential backoff when retrying same server
 Same identifier for all queries
 Don’t care which server responds

17

Inserting Resource Records into DNS

 Example: just created startup “FooBar”


 Register foobar.com at Network Solutions
 Provide registrar with names and IP addresses of your
authoritative name server (primary and secondary)
 Registrar inserts two RRs into the com TLD server:
• (foobar.com, dns1.foobar.com, NS)
• (dns1.foobar.com, 212.212.212.1, A)
 Put in authoritative server dns1.foobar.com
 Type A record for www.foobar.com
 Type MX record for foobar.com

18

9
Playing With Dig on UNIX
 Dig program
 Allows querying of DNS system
 Use flags to find name server (NS)
 Disable recursion so that operates one step at a time

19

Future Evolution of the DNS


 Design constrains us in two major ways that are
increasingly less appropriate

 Static host to IP mapping


 What about mobility (Mobile IP)

 Location-insensitive queries
 What if I don’t care what server a Web page comes
from, as long as it’s the right page?
 e.g., a yahoo page might be replicated

10
Akamai
 Use the DNS to effect selection of a nearby Web cache

client Server

Nearby DNS servers


Cache for akamai.com

 Leverage separation of static/dynamic content

DNS DoS Attacks


October 22, 2002
 The attack lasted for approximately one hour. Of the
thirteen servers, nine were disabled
 The largest malfunction of the DNS servers before this
event were seven machines in July 1997, due to a
technical glitch

11
DNS DoS Attacks
February 6, 2007
 The attack lasted about five hours. none of the servers
crashed, two of the root servers "suffered badly", while others
saw "heavy traffic".
 The botnet responsible for the attack has reportedly been
traced to South Korea.

"If the United States found itself under a major cyberattack


aimed at undermining the nation’s critical information
infrastructure, the Department of Defense is prepared, based
on the authority of the president, to launch a cyber
counterattack or an actual bombing of an attack source."

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