Blockchain For Cybersecurity in Smart Grid A Comprehensive Survey
Blockchain For Cybersecurity in Smart Grid A Comprehensive Survey
1, JANUARY 2021 3
Abstract—Blockchain is an immutable type of distributed in Utah, which resulted in the loss of observability for part
ledger that is capable of storing data without relying on a of the electric grid [6]. Although this cyberattack has not led
third party. Blockchain technology has attracted significant to any blackouts in the Utah electric grid, it has shown that
interest in research areas, including its application in the
smart grid for cybersecurity. Although significant efforts the adversaries can launch severe cyberattacks against critical
have been devoted to utilizing blockchain in the smart grid infrastructures in the smart grid.
for cybersecurity, there is a lack of comprehensive survey With the development of the smart grid, the advanced mon-
on blockchain in the smart grid for cybersecurity in both itoring and control technologies are being deployed on the
application and technological perspectives. To fill this gap, customer side. Nowadays, most homes are equipped with smart
we conducted a comprehensive survey on blockchain for
smart gird cybersecurity. This conducted survey presents devices, such as smart robots and smart security systems. Since
the latest insights of ideas, architectures, and techniques of these devices can be remotely monitored and controlled through
implementation that are relevant to blockchain’s application a central controller, the cybersecurity becomes important for
in the smart grid for cybersecurity. This article aims at pro- customers [7]. Also, with the cutting-edge technologies, the
viding helpful guidance and reference for future research smart grid is emerging with water/gas supply, transportation,
efforts specific to blockchain for cybersecurity in the smart
grid. and other services to form the smart city [8], [9]. With the high
degree of interdisciplinary among different sectors in a smart
Index Terms—Blockchain, cybersecurity, resiliency,
smart contract, smart grid. city, the vulnerability of the smart grid to cyberattacks may cause
severe disasters to the society, which is no longer limited to the
I. INTRODUCTION electric systems. So, there is an urgent need to investigate the
cybersecurity of the smart grid.
HE ELECTRIC grid is undergoing massive revolutions
T toward the smart grid to better adopt the generation with
different sizes and technologies, encourage the participation of
In the smart grid, different information and communication
technologies (ICT) have been widely adopted over power gen-
eration, transmission, distribution, and utilization sectors to
customers for active system operation, and improve the system collect and transfer data for smart grid optimization control. For
reliability, stability, sustainability, and security [1]. The reliable the power generation, transmission, and distribution, the data
and efficient smart grid operation relies heavily on the two- are collected using remote terminal units (RTUs) of SCADA
way communication networks for data transfers [2]. However, systems, phasor measurement units (PMUs) of the wide area
the current communications over transmission control protocol measurement system (WAMS), sensors of intelligent electronic
(TCP)/internet protocol (IP) and ethernet-based technologies devices (IEDs), and geographic information system (GIS). For
expose the smart grid to public data networks [3], which makes power utilization, the smart meters embedded in the advanced
it vulnerable to severe cyberattacks [4]. metering infrastructures (AMIs) are typically used to collect the
In December 2015, the cyberattack targeted on three electric customers’ power usage data. The collected data are transferred
distribution companies in Ukraine successfully seized the su- through communication networks to SCADA systems and used
pervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems using for advanced management and control, such as automatic gen-
spear-phishing emails, and remotely switched substations OFF, eration control (AGC), electric system state estimation (SE),
which resulted in a power outage of 230 000 customers [5]. distribution automation control (DAC), and demand side man-
In March 2019, a denial of service (DoS) attack was launched agement (DSM).
against part of the SCADA infrastructures of electric utilities For the efficient and reliable communications among dis-
tributed and heterogeneous components within the smart grid,
Manuscript received October 20, 2019; revised January 20, 2020 layered communication networks consisting of home area net-
and April 14, 2020; accepted May 23, 2020. Date of publication May
29, 2020; date of current version October 23, 2020. This work was work (HAN), neighborhood area network (NAN), sensor net-
supported by the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council. work (SN), wide area network (WAN), and core network are
Paper no. TII-19-4678. (Corresponding author: Peng Zhuang.) developed. The HAN and NAN are established by networking
The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engi-
neering, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6G 1H9, Canada (e-mail: AMIs within a local area through ZigBee/Z-wave protocols
[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]). and IEEE 802.11/802.15.4/802.16 standards [10]. Within the
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this article are available WAN, the RTUs, WAMS, IEDs, and GIS first group through
online at https://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479 SN, then communicate with the SCADA systems and data
1551-3203 © 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See https://www.ieee.org/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS, VOL. 17, NO. 1, JANUARY 2021
centers based on distributed networking protocol 3.0 (DNP3), grid is featured by distributed generation and control; however,
Modicon communication bus (ModBus), and/or cognitive radio the communication networks in the smart grid still behave in
with IEEE 802.22 standard [11]. Then, the data are transferred to a centralized manner, which makes the smart grid extremely
the core network and used by different control authorities. In the vulnerable to a single point of failure [17]. To address the above-
core network, the common communication methods are TCP/IP mentioned cybersecurity issues in the smart grid, blockchain
network, WiMAX, and GPRS. For the ease of implementation technology has been seen as a promising solution [18]–[20].
in the smart grid, these protocols are designed to communicate Blockchain is a variant of distributed ledger technology
raw data with no restrictions of encryption and authentication, (DLT), which distributively stores and transfers data across
and there is no excessive overhead for data availability [12]. So, multiple devices within a system. By leveraging blockchain
the smart grid can be easily exploited by cyberattacks. technology, the field measurement data and local transaction
The vulnerabilities of different communication protocols in data can be transferred in a peer-to-peer (P2P) manner within
the smart grid are investigated in [13], and the most concerning the smart grid [21]. These data are replicated and stored dis-
cybersecurity issues can be summarized in four aspects: tributively on multiple devices, instead of a single data center.
1) integrity; The P2P data transfer and distributed replication of data storage
2) confidentiality; on multiple devices prevent the smart grid from suffering from
3) availability; and a single point of failure and guarantee high availability [22].
4) accountability/nonrepudiation. Also, due to the distributed data verification, validation, and
The integrity attack is based on unauthorized and stealthy storage features of blockchain, the data in the blockchain-based
modification, alteration, or destruction of field measurement data smart grid are nearly immutable, which can protect the data
in the smart grid. The false data injection (FDI) attack is a typical integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the smart grid. Once
integrity attack against SE. The FDI attack can compromise the data are added to a blockchain, it can never be manipulated by
field measurement data stealthily, which will alternate the SE attacks unless the adversaries own more than 51% of the devices
results and mislead the control center decisions. This can cause in the whole system. This property maintains high auditability
cascade electric grid failures [14]. in the blockchain-based smart grid and makes the accountabil-
The confidentiality attack targets on accessing or disclosing ity/nonrepudiation attacks nearly impossible. The asymmetric
privacy and proprietary information by unauthorized entities cryptography in the blockchain can increase the authentication
or individuals. In the smart grid, the AMIs are major sources and authorization levels of blockchain-based AMIs [23], which
of the confidential breach. The adversaries can gain access to can protect the customers’ privacy and integrity of electricity
AMI through root password recovery or exploitation of system data [24]. Furthermore, by leveraging the smart contract and de-
vulnerabilities [15], and obtain the customers’ electricity usage centralized applications (DAPPS) services, the blockchain can
information to invade customers’ privacy. In the smart grid, both provide cybersecured computation environment for advanced
authentications of information and authorization of accessing are smart grid applications.
required to maintain the integrity and confidentiality. In the literature, there are several papers that have conducted
The availability that ensures timely and reliable access to surveys on the application of the blockchain in the smart grid
information is essential for efficient and stable operation of the covering various topics. A systematic review of the blockchain in
smart grid. By interrupting the data transfers, the cyberattacks the energy sector is conducted in [25], in which an overview of a
against availability can delay, block, or even corrupt the control variety of energy applications of the blockchain is presented with
signal, and cause severe impacts on stability, efficiency, and detailed discussion on benefits and limitations of blockchain
security of the smart grid operation [16]. technologies in the energy sector. Also, the review and classifi-
For the accountability/nonrepudiation in the smart grid, the cation of around 140 most recent commercial and research ini-
actions made by systems or customers cannot be denied later. tiatives of energy blockchain are performed. With more focuses
With the integration of distributed generators (DGs), local on the blockchain-based smart grid, the authors in [26] review a
power trading is an important concept in the smart grid. The variety of prospects and approaches for blockchain applications
local power trading involves valuable resources and infor- in the smart grid. The advantages and technical challenges of
mation, which makes the cyberattacks against accountabil- implementing the blockchain in the smart grid are discussed,
ity/nonrepudiation now a major issue [13]. To maintain the and the frameworks for the key blockchain-based smart grid
accountability/nonrepudiation, it is required that the smart grid applications are presented. In [27], a comprehensive survey is
communication networks have high auditability so that the com- presented for the blockchain-based P2P energy transaction in
plete information history can be reconstructed from historical the smart grid with main focuses on the P2P energy trading
records in a trust manner [16]. architecture, demand response (DR) optimization models, and
For enterprise communication networks, different cybersecu- power routing mechanisms. Furthermore, the authors in [28]
rity technologies, such as firewalls with an intrusion detection present a comprehensive survey for the blockchain-based P2P
system (IDS) for network security, encryption and authentica- energy transaction from the perspective of the designing of
tion for data security, and host IDS for device security [10]. How- local energy markets, in which the current research activities
ever, due to the real-time performance requirement and contin- on local energy market mechanisms, customer preferences, DR
uous operation feature of smart grid communication networks, strategies, and impacts of energy storage are reviewed and as-
these techniques can hardly fit in the smart grid [16]. The smart sessed. Although the existing survey papers have mentioned the
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ZHUANG et al.: BLOCKCHAIN FOR CYBERSECURITY IN SMART GRID: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY 5
TABLE I
COMPARISON AMONG PUBLIC, CONSORTIUM, AND PRIVATE BLOCKCHAINS [2], [4], [21]
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8 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS, VOL. 17, NO. 1, JANUARY 2021
The data flow through these networks is published on corre- B. Development Platforms for Smart Grid Cybersecurity
sponding blockchains, and that published data (verified by the
Special applications and programs specific to the smart grid
nodes) are used and communicated among networks with added
can be developed on IBM and Microsoft Azure development
security, transparency, automation, and privacy protection func-
environments, which ensure cybersecurity of the blockchain.
tionalities [67]. However, the existing research mainly focused
Furthermore, the Ethereum platform can also be used to de-
on developing independent blockchains for specific applications
ploy smart contracts that are publicly available and verifiable.
in each communication network. Significant research efforts
Ethereum development can be done on the Microsoft Visual
are still required to investigate different blockchains’ interoper-
basic platform or online using Solidity remix. The Ethereum
ability, especially for the synchronization of data flow through
platform is open-source, easy to implement, and has more se-
different blockchains.
curity features; however, the usage of Ethereum for large-scale
In the smart grid, the smart generation, smart transmission
smart grid applications is inefficient, due to the gas limits and
and distribution, and smart homes/buildings are monitored and
gas costs [75]. Like Ethereum, other platforms also support
directly controlled by field IoT-enabled ICT devices, such as
smart contract functionality, such as Quorum, Wan chain, Ater-
RTUs, IEDs, and WAMS for system operation, and AMIs for
nity, Zen, Counter party, Root Stock, Rchain, and Qtum. All
smart homes/building management [68]. By incorporating the
these blockchains are different variants of Ethereum with some
field measurement and control blockchain with smart contracts
modifications. For example, Quorum has a major advantage of
to these IoT-enabled ICT devices in WAN, NAN, and SN/HAN,
no gas usage for its transaction [76], which is more suitable
the field measurement data can be securely and automatically
in large-scale smart grid applications. Quorum platform comes
collected [69]. Furthermore, with the DAPPS services, the
with functionality that Solidity can be embedded [22]. Quorum
blockchain-enabled AMIs can perform decentralized DR, local
is capable of executing private transactions between selected
power management, and local power trading within cyberse-
parties using constellation.
cured environment [70].
Some North American start-up companies have developed
The field measurement data will be aggregated by selected
their blockchain platforms, which are specifically for the smart
data aggregators while utilizing data aggregation blockchain
grid. BTL is a Canadian company that is working on cross-
in WAN and NAN. The purpose of using blockchain for data
border, large-scale, and cybersecured power trading platform
aggregation is mainly for additional data confidentiality protec-
backed by the Interbit private blockchain. Similarly, Drift is
tion in the smart grid [71]. After received by multiple receivers
an American company working on efficient and secure grid
of meter operators or SCADA systems and data centers, the
transactions with multiauthentication and privacy protection on
aggregated data will be automatically processed and stored
its blockchain. A German company is using IBM-Hyperledger
by the data management blockchain with smart contracts and
fabric blockchain for P2P power transactions with integrity and
DAPPS services [72], where the blockchain can protect the
confidentiality protection. Companies like Engro, XiWatt, and
integrity and auditability of stored data. For system operation
Consensys are using public blockchains for P2P power transac-
blockchain within WAN, by utilizing the smart contracts and
tions. A Spain company, named Pylon Networks, uses the Lite-
DAPPS services, the system operation decisions can be made
coin public type blockchain for AMIs, aiming to provide high
automatically with less human interface, which can reduce the
auditability for power tracing. The Omega grid has developed a
risk of cybersecurities caused by human mistakes [73]. Also, the
smart grid management platform for cybersecured system opera-
storage of historical records of decisions in the blockchain can
tion, which is based on a privately running blockchain [77]–[80].
provide better audibility in the smart grid.
A start-up blockchain company named by Tenup proposes an
The data flow within and among these four networks is verified
architecture with high power efficiency for remote areas and
and stored by the blockchains with a high degree of cybersecu-
works on a mixed consensus mechanism, in which the maximum
rity, and the replications of data storage across multiple devices
transaction time is 60 s, which makes it useful for large-scale
can effectively protect the data availability from a single point of
smart grid implementation [81].
failure [74]. With the advancement in the blockchain technology,
power transaction functionality can be integrated using specially
designed blockchain built over the DAPPS layer. For system op-
IV. APPLICATIONS OF BLOCKCHAIN IN
eration, the blockchain is able to increase the cybersecurity and SMART GRID FOR CYBERSECURITY
efficiency of the wholesale electricity market [25]. Some start-up
companies, such as Power Ledger, Grid+, and Greeneum, have In the literature, the research on the blockchain for the smart
started to use the blockchain for local power transactions [59]. In grid cybersecurity can be mainly categorized into three levels,
this method, the authentication and authorization can be involved i.e., field measurement and communications, power generation
in power transactions at low risk of confidential breach, and and transmission, and power distribution and utilization. In this
the integrity, availability, and accountability/nonrepudiation of section, the details of blockchain applications at different levels
transaction data can be well protected. In some works, the appli- will be presented. The application of the blockchain for the smart
cations of the blockchain for data management in EV charging grid cybersecurity against data integrity attack will be discussed
stations are also investigated, which mainly aim at providing in detail to better illustrate the cybersecurity mechanism of the
confidentiality protection and data availability. blockchain-based smart grid.
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ZHUANG et al.: BLOCKCHAIN FOR CYBERSECURITY IN SMART GRID: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY 9
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF REVIEWED RESEARCH WORKS FOR THE APPLICATIONS
OF BLOCKCHAIN IN FIELD MEASUREMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS
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ZHUANG et al.: BLOCKCHAIN FOR CYBERSECURITY IN SMART GRID: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY 11
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF REVIEWED RESEARCH WORKS FOR THE APPLICATIONS OF
BLOCKCHAIN IN POWER DISTRIBUTION AND UTILIZATION
from the world state and perform the economic dispatch to get the
locational marginal electricity price, which will be used to form
smart contracts. The smart contracts will be used by the peers distributed blockchain ledgers, which can prevent the loss of
to commit the power transactions among their corresponding control signals. Voltage control transformers at a transmission
clients automatically. This mechanism can significantly im- level can be monitored by a smart contract to provide automated
prove the efficiency and security of power system economic functionality. Besides protecting data integrity and accountabil-
dispatches. This method offers data protection and resiliency ity/nonrepudiation, the blockchain has a strong advantage in
against cyberattacks in the electricity wholesale market, such guaranteeing the data availability for distributed power transmis-
as DoS attack on economic dispatch [113]. Furthermore, the sion system operation [77]. Moreover, some parts of the com-
blockchain-enabled AMIs can also be implemented for renew- putation power of the blockchain can be potentially utilized to
able power certification [114]. calculate demand forecasting and ac power flow in a distributed
The integrity and accountability/nonrepudiation of distributed manner.
electric power system SE results are crucial for dynamic load
redistribution in transmission systems. However, the current SE
is vulnerable to FDI attacks. By utilizing the blockchain-enabled C. Blockchain for Power Distribution and Utilization
ICT devices in the smart grid, the blockchain-based distributed For power distribution and customer-side power utilization,
SE function can reduce the risk of data tampering by providing the blockchain also provides a variant of cybersecurity function-
integrity protection and help detect manipulations of data in alities [28], [30], [44], [79], [82], [122]–[127], [129], [130]. A
addition to traditional bad data detection mechanisms [58]. summary of such research works is described in Table IV. The
Other severe data integrity attacks against SE, such as distributed conventional power distribution system is typically designated
DoS (DDoS), data framing, and cybertopology attacks, can also with enough reserve of capacity to provide electrical power for
be defended using the blockchain technology [115], [116]. For the customers stably and is left with a low degree of monitoring
example, during the DDoS attack, the AMIs communications is and control. However, with the integration of DGs with bidi-
not functional, but DAPPS layer of blockchain can still provide rectional power flow and at a high penetration level, the tradi-
actual data of power consumption [117]. Instead of protecting tional load and power flow patterns have changed significantly.
the measurement data from AMIs communication failure caused To address this issue, the power distribution system is being
by the DDoS attack, the blockchain-based IoT system can also redeveloped to integrate a large amount of IoT-enabled ICT
support the smart grid for DDoS detection by using counter and devices, to improve the system observability and controllability.
comparator components implemented in the smart contract [118] This redeveloped power distribution system is defined as an
and for DDoS prevention by implementing distributively static active cyberphysical distribution system (A-CPDS) [131]. The
resource allocation mechanism on the blockchian-based IoT P2P data transfer, cybersecurity, confidentiality protection, and
system [119]. Moreover, the utility can easily and securely detect transparency features of the blockchain technology have made
and redirect power to the affected area in case of an emergency, the blockchain a promising solution to improve the cybersecurity
as SCADA and PLC control is available through smart contracts and efficiency of A-CPDS [130].
in the blockchain network [117]. This enhances the performance Under the context of A-CPDS, the smart homes equipped
of dynamic load redistribution in the transmission system [120]. with a variant of IoT-enabled ICT devices, such as AMIs and
With the blockchain-based distributed SE function and em- power management systems, have created great interconnec-
bedded IoT system in the smart grid, the blockchain can provide tivity between the individual customer and electric grid. This
variant functionalities for secured and reliable distributed power improves the performance of power utilization on the customer
transmission system operation [121]. For example, the static side. However, the concerns about privacy leakage and smart
var compensator can be continuously and securely monitored grid data integrity attack caused by bad data intrusion from
and controlled using smart contract. Protection relays like long- the customer side have greatly impeded the development of
distance and differential voltage relays can be controlled by smart homes [68]. The blockchain has been seen as a suitable
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12 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS, VOL. 17, NO. 1, JANUARY 2021
the consensus delay. This algorithm proves to be better for the Currently, the lack of scalability is still a great challenge
case of P2P power transaction and can be beneficial for G2V and impeding the practical applications of the blockchain in the
V2G/V2V. A comparison of this technique with Hyperledger- smart grid for cybersecurity [147]. To address the scalability
PBFT consensus can be done to obtain further insights into issue, consortium blockchain is used for cybersecured micro-
this consensus. Furthermore, proof of probability algorithm also grid operation in [147] and [148] and data regulation mech-
shows good performance [128], which can also be adapted in anism in [71] for data aggregation in the smart grid. The
the grid space to achieve fewer transaction delays. Anonymous consortium blockchain introduced proves to be much faster
power trading between EVs is discussed in [129], with perfor- and secure. Computational complexity in the blockchain has
mance analysis and proof of practicality of the blockchain for been reduced significantly. The permissioned blockchain is used
cybersecured V2G/V2V applications. in [149] to perform a comparison between gas consumption
with a focus on privacy in the smart grid. The usage of such
V. POTENTIAL FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS modified blockchains gives a better computational performance
with a sacrifice on confidentiality protection. A fast and public
A comprehensive review for the blockchain in the smart
blockchain is the best choice for blockchain operation in the
grid for cybersecurity is presented above. In which, the sys-
smart grid. Yet, modifications are required to provide better
tem architectures, implementation platforms, and applications
privacy protection.
for field measurement and communications, power generation
Numerous research works have tried to improve privacy
and transmission, and power distribution and utilization of the
protection by adopting an anonymous external system. For
blockchain for smart grid cybersecurity have been discussed.
example, in [150], a blockchain-based anonymous reputation
However, as an emerging technology, the usage of the blockchain
system (BARS) is established to provide a privacy-preserving
in the smart grid still faces great challenges. In the rest of this
trust model for public blockchains. By leveraging BARS, the
section, some major issues that have not been fully considered
certificate and revocation transparency can be effectively im-
in the research work for cybersecurity of the blockchain-based
plemented in a public blockchain by leveraging the proofs of
smart grid mentioned above and recent advances in blockchain
presence/absence for public keys. The usage of the 5G technique
technologies for these challenges will be discussed. In the end,
is discussed in [151] for smart grid application to decrease the
potential future research directions in power transmission and
delay in communication time. However, high infrastructure costs
distribution systems will be highlighted.
will be a great challenge when it starts rolling out. Hyperledger
fabric technology that gives owner authority to control the
A. Major Issues and Recent Advances accesses of nodes has been proven to be a potential solution
For the wide applications of the blockchain for cybersecurity for cybersecurity of the large-scale smart grid [152].
in the smart grid, the size of distributed ledger will increase, and However, since Hyperledger fabric involves a small number
storage requirements will be enormous. This will slow down the of nodes and focuses mainly on the validation of data being
blockchain network for data processing and affect the efficiency added to a block, it still suffers from low cybersecurity lev-
and reliability of smart grid operation. In [141], an efficient ar- els [153]. In [153], a lightweight proof of block and trade
chitecture based on network coding (NC) and distributed storage (PoBT) consensus algorithm is proposed to improve the cyber-
(DS) for blockchain storage is proposed to reduce the storage security of private blockchains, which allows for both data and
room and improve the efficiency of the blockchain for large- block validations. More importantly, with a varying number of
scale applications. However, the framework proposed in this participated nodes, the PoBT can achieve a better throughput
article is vulnerable to pollution attacks. Advancement in this rate and a lower communication bandwidth requirement than
framework is being investigated to make it more robust against Hyperledger fabric. However, the PoBT proposed in [153] is
cyberattacks. Furthermore, a fast, low storage, and a nonlinear explicitly designated for business applications, where a trusted
fashioned blockchain is developed in [142], which utilizes a certified authority is required to guarantee the security and
lightweight node to connect to the blockchain network. These efficiency of PoBT. In the smart grid, there is a large number
lightweight nodes only carry the headers and are designated for of authorities, e.g., transmission/distribution system operator
verification without carrying much data. Such a blockchain was (T/DSO), microgrid operator (MGO), and EV aggregator, and
proven to be resilient to DDoS attacks and can provide better they represent different parties. There is no discussion in [153]
performances in robustness and efficiency compared with the on selecting a trusted certified authority out of a group of
NC- and DS-based architecture [143]. The study in [144] casts authorities representing different parties for the entire smart
light on types of blockchains that can be used for industrial grid system, which causes great challenges for applying PoBT
and other generic applications, and the work in [144] illustrates in the smart grid. One possible solution to address this is-
its applicability. Furthermore, researchers have discussed the sue is considering the extension of PoBT consensus algorithm
impact of using different consensus algorithms on the perfor- in [153] to consortium blockchains, with an added layer for
mance of blockchain-based IoT systems. A more comprehensive trusted certified authority/authorities selection in a way similar
analysis about these impacts can be found in [145], where the to the voting process of PBFT consensus algorithm. Another
usage of PBFT consensus is studied in depth. Furthermore, the possible solution is to leverage the cross-chain framework in the
comparison between PBFT and PoW in [146] proves that PBFT smart grid. Multiple sidechains are established in the cross-chain
is more suitable for blockchain-based IoT systems. framework for different application scenarios, e.g., distribution
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14 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS, VOL. 17, NO. 1, JANUARY 2021
system management, microgrid operation, and EV charging However, there still lacks proper and widely accepted stan-
management, with the main blockchain as the backbone. In this dards for seamless interoperability among different blockchains
way, the trusted certified authority for each sidechain can be with unique technologies. Therefore, there is an urgent need
easily selected based on their application scenarios. In [154], to achieve blockchain standardization in the smart grid under
the cross-chain framework for IoT data management has been no centralized authority that allows for seamless, cyberresilient,
studied. However, there are still many challenges that need to be and efficient exchange of data among different blockchains with
addressed for the application of a cross-chain framework in the distinctive technologies and objectives. Blockchain technology
smart grid, e.g., the side chain interoperability [155]. is an excellent alternative to many, but it still needs more refine-
The public blockchain provides better cybersecurity by devot- ment, especially for the smart grid.
ing the great computational power of mining nodes. However,
the increasing computational power attributes great impacts on
the energy efficiency of the blockchain-based smart grid. For B. Potential Future Research Directions
example, the widely used PoW consensus mechanism in public To better address the issues mentioned above, some research
blockchain requires large energy consumption for the consensus topics can be further studied. The development of a blockchain-
process and has a significant carbon footprint and electronic based smart grid framework with an IDS and DAPPS specifically
waste. The existing consensus mechanism is not in support of for smart grid applications can be studied further with different
the sustainable development of the smart grid. The design of architectures. Testing framework for the blockchain-enabled
proper incentive and penalty mechanisms that encourage the smart grid can be investigated and developed, considering DDoS
reduction of energy consumption and usage of renewable energy attacks, Sybil attacks, routing attacks, and man-in-the-middle
generation for consensus mechanisms is a crucial future research attacks. In this article, we will highlight the potential future
direction for the particular application of the blockchain in the research directions in power transmission and distribution sys-
smart grid. tems.
Since the blockchain still suffers from several cybersecurity 1) Distributed Power Transmission System Monitoring: The
vulnerabilities [156], the integration of the blockchain may blockchain with smart contract functionalities may be imple-
expose the smart grid to new types of cybersecurity issues. In the mented in a distributed manner, in which the blockchain network
past few years, cryptanalysis of the hash function has been an of the whole transmission system can be established by incor-
active research area, and various types of cyberattacks against porating multiple distributed blockchain networks. This enables
the hash function in the blockchain have been proposed [157]. the distributively and cybersecured monitoring and control of the
With the successful alternating hash function, the transaction transmission system, which can potentially address the increased
malleability attack can mislead the energy consumers in P2P en- penetration level of DGs and prevent the power transmission
ergy transactions to pay twice. A routing attack that partitions the system operation from a single point of failure. For example,
blockchain network that prevents nodes from communicating a power transmission system may be divided into different
with each other is able to tamper data in the smart grid through regions, which are monitored by different sets of IoT-enabled
delay attack. Targeting on the whole blockchain network, the ICT devices with smart contracts that contain controlling logic
DDoS cyberattack can disconnect multiple nodes from the net- and algorithms. One region may be selected as the command
work. As an important component of the blockchain-based smart center, and a mechanism can be developed to invoke contracts
grid, smart contracts’ vulnerabilities have severe impacts on the between divided regions while considering the synchronization
stability and reliability of the smart grid operation. As discussed of measurements and control signals. Also, the distributed con-
in [158], the smart contracts can be easily tampered through trol algorithm is required to allow for each divided region having
an alternating source code, penetrating virtual machines, and its subcontracts for controlling generation and utilization within
modifying runtime environment. Moreover, usability is also a its region.
big challenge as some users may lose their private keys, which 2) Power Distribution System Automation System: The
lead to their accounts get locked forever. Some of these issues blockchain-based smart contracts may also be developed with
are already corrected by new blockchains, but that leads to complex algorithms for cybersecured RTUs and IEDs control in
decreased privacy of the users. Currently, such tradeoffs still the smart grid. For example, in the power distribution system,
require great attention. Cyberattacks on the blockchain like blockchain-based smart contracts can be used to control tap
DAO, which occurred in 2016 on Ethereum, only strengthened changers for voltage regulation. A potential control procedure
and helped evolve this technology to be more cyberresilient and for blockchain-based voltage regulation is shown in Fig. 7.
robust [159]. Attacks like these will expose more loopholes in The smart contracts can be deployed in PMUs to measure
the coming future. voltage levels. The measurements can be published on a public
Several blockchain technologies that differ from each other blockchain and used by the smart contracts deployed in tap
in protocols, mechanisms, and techniques are being investigated changers to stabilize the voltage levels. The smart contracts may
and developed for blockchain-based smart grids. Also, due to also be deployed in DG controllers and used to command the
the geographical and operational complexities of the smart grid, DG outputs to respond to voltage regulation requirements. Fur-
multiple blockchains may be required to achieve effective oper- thermore, a performance scoring mechanism can be developed
ation of the smart grid, among which different entities may be to find the DGs that violate voltage regulation requirements and
responsible for different blockchains with distinctive objectives. credit the supporting DGs by using smart contracts. Moreover,
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ZHUANG et al.: BLOCKCHAIN FOR CYBERSECURITY IN SMART GRID: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY 15
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pp. 809–811. analytics.
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ZHUANG et al.: BLOCKCHAIN FOR CYBERSECURITY IN SMART GRID: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY 19
Talha Zamir received the B.Sc. degree in elec- Hao Liang (Member, IEEE) received the Ph.D.
trical and computer engineer from the University degree in electrical and computer engineering
of Management and Technology, Lahore, Pak- from the Department of Electrical and Computer
istan, in 2013 and the master’s of Engineering Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo,
degree from the University of Alberta, Edmon- ON, Canada, in 2013.
ton, AB, Canada, in 2019. He is an Assistant Professor and Canada
During the master’s, he started working as Research Chair with the Department of Elec-
a Researcher in the field of smart grids and trical and Computer Engineering, University of
came up with new ideas related to integration Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada. From 2013 to
of blockchain in grid communication space to 2014, he was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow
achieve robust cybersecurity. He specializes in with the Broadband Communications Research
the field of power system protection, coordination, instrumentation, and (BBCR) Lab and Electricity Market Simulation and Optimization Lab
renewable energy systems. He is currently with Dynawest Engineering (EMSOL), the University of Waterloo. His current research interests
Ltd., Edmonton, AB, Canada, as an Electrical EIT. His research interests include the areas of smart grid, cyberphysical systems, wireless com-
include smart grid, cybersecurity, power system protection, and power munications, and wireless networking.
quality. Dr. Liang is a corecipient of the IEEE Power & Energy Society (PES)
Prize Paper Award 2018, the Best Conference Papers on Electric Ve-
hicles, Energy Storage, Microgrids, and Demand Response from the
2016 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting (PES GM’16),
Boston, MA, USA, and the Best Student Paper Award from the IEEE
72nd Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Fall-2010), Ottawa, ON,
Canada. He serves/served as an Editor for IET Communications, a
Guest Editor for the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EMERGING TOPICS IN COM-
PUTING, and the Chair of Electric Vehicles, Vehicular Electronics, and
Intelligent Transportation Track for IEEE VTC Fall-2020. He was the
System Administrator of the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECH-
NOLOGY (2009–2013).
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