GREAT ZIMBABWE

UNIVERSITY
SIMON MUZENDA SCHOOL OF ARTS
NAME: MUNEMO MEMORY

REG NO: M206724

PROGRAMME: BA DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

COURSE CODE: AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS

COURSE TITLE : HDES425

LEVEL: 4.2

CELL N0: 0775718897

LECTURER: DR PHIRI

Qn. Examine the role of AU in coordinating regional organizations across Africa.

This essay traces the evolution of the African Union as a successor organization to the
Organization of African Unity in terms of its mandate for conflict prevention, peacekeeping,
peacemaking and peace-building. The Union has established a continent-wide peace and security
architecture through its Peace and Security Council. This write up shall look at the different
elements of AU architecture with special focus on peacekeeping operations and institutions such
as the Early Warning Mechanism, Peer Review Mechanism, Panel of the Wise and the Standby
Force, which together constitute the support structure of the Council. The regional economic
communities are the building blocks creating something like a ‘multi-layered security
community’. They function synergistically by acting as conduits of policy implementation of the
Union. In continuum, this essay shall look at how AU coordinates itself with other regional
bodies in its attempt to stamp authority in African continent.

The evolution of the African Union as a successor organization to the Organisation of African
Unity in terms of its mandate for conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-
building is without doubt a panacea to peace in Africa. The Union has established a continent-
wide peace and security architecture through its Peace and Security Council. The regional
economic communities are the building blocks of this architecture creating something like a
‘multi-layered security community’. No other regional organization has the peace matrix high on
its agenda as the AU. While most other regional organizations have emerged after eliminating
the possibility of war or after creating, in some cases, ‘security communities’ (Deutsch 1957),
the AU itself is borne out of the need for peace and security, especially human security, as a
necessary pre-condition for addressing the development-related problems of the continent. Africa
is considered to be low on all welfare indices such as Human Poverty Index, Human
Development Index, Physical Quality of Life Index and Global Peace Index.

No single African country can address the issues of conflict, refugee flows, the conscription of
child soldiers, bonded labour, human trafficking, the massacre of civilian populations, drug
trade, money laundering, illicit small arms trade and underdevelopment in isolation. With the
persistence of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa, the challenges for meeting the
Millennium Development Goals in the continent are daunting. Regional organizations contribute
to regional governance and, in this sense, either act as elements of global governance or
complement the efforts of other international bodies like the UN. Like many regions, Africa also
had a pan-African organization created in 1963, thanks to the unflinching commitment of some
first generation post-colonial leaders. The ‘federalist school’, as they are sometimes called,
represented by figures like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana essentially wanted a big bang
transformation of post-colonial Africa in order to optimize the potential benefits of a unified
region, including the tapping of the continent’s abundant resources. It was also grounded in the
belief that such unity was necessary to end the persistence of neo-colonial linkages with the
former colonial masters.
Kwame Nkrumah and Chief Albert Luthuli of South Africa intended to create something like the
United States of Africa, a point currently being advocated by the Libyan leader Muammar
Gaddafi, with a continental presidency and parliament and a common African military ‘High
Command’. However, the time was not ripe for pan-Africanism and what emerged was a much-
diluted OAU in 1963. The OAU Charter, known for its emphasis on decolonization, adhered
strictly to the principle of sovereignty of member-states and non-interference in their internal
affairs. This had weakened the organizations’ ability to intervene timely to prevent and manage
conflicts, especially those of an internal nature. The record of the OAU was not impressive in the
field of directly security-related activities and the organization was more involved in setting
norms and standards that it was incapable of enforcing (Møller, 2009). The OAU, however,
undertook some peacekeeping operations to end the civil war in Chad in 1981–1982 and in
Rwanda (1990–1993). They were not very successful ones, lack of finance, absence of clear
mandates and logistical shortcomings accounted for the failure.

With its decolonization and anti-apartheid agenda becoming irrelevant by 1994 following the
establishment of black majority rule in South Africa, it was widely felt that the organization was
no longer structurally poised to take on the new challenges faced by the continent in the 1990s.
The region had also a high degree of democratic deficit. The end of the Cold War and the failure
of the international community to prevent the Rwandan genocide suggested that African states
would have to address African problems primarily through their own efforts. There are three
inter-related ideas that seem to have worked behind the formation of the AU. The first is the urge
to come together, a vision that harks back to the days of pan-Africanism of the 1960s. Despite
the fact that the continent has a legacy of three distinct subcultures, namely, Anglophone,
Francophone and Arab, the message of unity and continental consciousness has gained
considerable foothold in the cognitive framework of the leaders of the region in the last two
decades. This unity is expected to be accompanied by recognition of responsibilities towards one
another, particularly towards the citizens when states fail to protect them.

This shift in focus has motivated the leaders to do away with the OAU principle of non-
interference and adopt what has now come to be known as the principle of ‘non-indifference’.
Further, there is also a greater realization that Africans themselves must search for solutions to
the region’s problems, and that any assistance from outside should be so tailored as to uphold
African ownership. This idea was promoted vigorously by Thabo Mbeki, the former president of
South Africa, through the project of African renaissance (Pirozzi 2009). The AU, with its sheer
size of 53 members spread over the entire continent, could be described as the largest regional
organization anywhere in the world. While this jumbo character of the organization may appear
to be a disadvantage, there are also signs that it provides space for many African countries and
their leaders to wield a sort of symbolic power in the international arena and gain certain degree

Small states having relatively underdeveloped diplomatic machines and weaknesses in national
capabilities would find operating through regional organizations particularly crucial for their
voices to be heard. It also serves as a mechanism for socialization aimed at developing a larger
African identity that sits comfortably with other palpable identities, a vision that is associated
with the school of constructivism in international relations. Its most widely known exponent
Wendt (1999) tells us ‘that the structures of human association are determined primarily by
shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors
are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature’.

The UN has increasingly recognized the role of regional organizations in undertaking some of its
own assigned tasks relating to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace
building. This has happened partly due to the increasing demand for UN intervention caused by
the spectacular rise in the number of conflicts in the post-Cold War era, and because of the
additional burden emerging from diversification of the UN role from peacekeeping to
peacemaking and peace building. Ever since the Agenda of Peace (Ghali 1992, 1999) was
published, the UN has adopted a strategy that relied on four Ps, and has promoted this formula
everywhere, including through regional organizations like European Union and the AU. The four
Ps start with preventive diplomacy or conflict prevention; that is, acting early on preventing
conflicts from occurring in the first place, including creation of early warning systems. If the
conflict cannot be prevented, the next step is to engage in peacemaking. If some agreements are
reached that warrant peacekeeping, it would constitute the third stage of the process.

Peacekeeping would also embrace monitoring of ceasefire agreement (if there is one) and
assistance in its implementation. The last stage is peace building, which addresses the root causes
of the conflict and seeks to rebuild the country, promote reconciliation and achieve transition to
democracy so that conflicts of the kind that created instability will not recur. The ideas
emanating from the establishment of 1996 SADC Organ for Peace Defense and Security (OPDS)
as well as the experiences of the OAU organ for conflict management were key inputs into the
AU protocol. Unlike the OAU, which had focused on conflict management in the 1990s, the
focus of the AU is supposed to be in the area of conflict prevention. Regional organizations are
not only closer to the conflict situation, but can better anticipate conflicts and enjoy greater
popular legitimacy in conflict zones than international mediators and peacekeepers. They also
have local knowledge and cultural sensitivity to carry out nuanced and constructive conflict
resolution policies.

Zartman (1997) says that conflict management is a key function of governance. Good
governance should not only be focused on managing conflicts, but also on preventing them. The
connection between good governance and conflict prevention has been established in no
ambiguous terms in the African Union. The decision to establish the AU was taken at an
extraordinary OAU summit in Libya (Sirte) in September 1999, and it came into being at a
summit meeting of African leaders held in Durban on 9 July 2002. The AU envisages itself as a
continental organization focusing on the promotion of peace, security and stability as a
prerequisite for the implementation of the development and integration agenda of the Union. It
seeks to achieve greater unity and solidarity among African countries and people, promote
democracy.
The need to establish the AU was taken at an extraordinary OAU summit in Sirte, Libya in
September 1999 and was finalized at a summit meeting of African leaders in Durban, South
Africa on July 2002. Some of the core elements of the organization were to focus on the
promotion of peace, security and stability through it Peace and Security Council (PSC) and
promoting integration (Moolakkattu, 2010). The functions of the PSC include the promotion of
peace, security and stability in Africa, anticipation and prevention of conflicts, promotion and
implementation of peace building and post-conflict reconstruction activities. The elections were
contested by Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) party and General Robert
Gueï, following the exclusion of some politicians and a decision taken by others not to contest as
they questioned the credibility of the elections. When Robert Gueï saw that Gbagbo had taken
the lead he suspended the results and declared that he himself had won the elections (HRW
2011). This action elicited protests from Gbagbo supporters, forcing Gueï to flee. The Supreme
Court declared Gbagbo the winner as he had received most of the votes. On 19 September 2002,
there were reports of a mutiny by soldiers who had resisted plans to be demobilized as part of
efforts to reform of the security sector. It later emerged that it was actually a coup supported by
foreign governments and this prompted reprisals against those perceived to be immigrants living
in parts of the capital, Abidjan. The coup was thwarted by government forces but a rebel group,
the Patriotic Movement for Côte d’Ivoire (Mouvement Patriotique de La Côte d’Ivoire, MCPI),
emerged and took control of the north of the country. It called for Gbagbo to resign and for new
elections to be organized (HRW 2002).

Two other major groups, the Ivorian Patriotic Movement of the Great West (Mouvement
populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest, MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP)
challenged the government. The country was effectively divided into two, with the rebels
controlling the north and the government of President Laurent Gbagbo controlling the south and
other parts of the country. This phase in the Ivorian conflict and saw several failed attempts by
the government and rebel forces to implement successive peace deals. With the onset of violence
in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 following the attempted coup d’état, ECOWAS was better prepared to
intervene than it had been in previous conflicts in the region. Its immediate reaction to the crisis
was premised on the fact that the coup attempt violated the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy
and Good Governance, and the AU principles against unconstitutional changes of government.
Wary of the fact that the conflict could spread to other countries in the region, ECOWAS
Executive Secretary General Mohammed Ibn Chambas publicly condemned the rebels.

Furthermore, a group of West African leaders from Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria
and Togo formed a contact group to find a solution to the crisis. The group was formed during an
emergency meeting of ECOWAS leaders held in Accra, Ghana, on 29 September 2002, leading
to the signing of what became known as the Accra I Agreement (Gberie and Addo 2004). The
group called on the rebels to renounce violence and end the conflict, and was responsible for
initiating contact between the rebels and the Ivorian Government as well as the development of a
framework for resolving the crisis.
The Lomé Ceasefire Agreement that followed was initiated on 24 October 2002 under the
auspices of the AU contact group, which gave the Togolese President, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, a
mandate to lead negotiations aimed at resolving the political differences between the government
and the MPCI. The warring parties declared that they were committed to the ceasefire agreement
and promised to end human rights abuses and respect Ivorian institutions. The implementation of
the Lomé Agreement stalled, however, when the MPCI insisted that the Constitution be amended
and called on President Gbagbo to resign, while Gbagbo insisted that the rebels disarm to
preserve the country’s territorial integrity. ECOWAS leaders organized other meetings in Kara,
Togo, as well as in Abidjan and in Dakar, Senegal, to convince the warring parties to recommit
to the Lomé Ceasefire Agreement, but the MPCI and the Ivorian Government remained adamant
(ICG 2003).

From the context of the foregoing, the AU should be applauded for its role and efforts in
integrating regional organizations in an attempt to maintain peace and security in the region. This
saw the formation of ECOWAS, EAC, SADC, PSC and other organizations was not only a ploy
to push the agenda for change and development conundrum as the case may be. It is from this
point of landing that au should be held in high esteem for its relentless work in enhancing peace
and development in the region.

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