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 If it be asked why the Russians, with whom there were only some
twenty thousand Austrians, did not wait for their third army, under
Bennigsen, or reduce Bonaparte to the greatest perplexity, by taking
up a strong position in Hungary or Upper Silesia, or remaining
quietly upon the heights of Pratzen, the reply is, that the whole
system of supplies was bad, and that want had reached so great a
pitch, that it would have been impossible for them to remain. Certain
it is that they suffered themselves to be drawn down from the
heights, and away from Austerlitz, near Brünn, where the talents of
their generals were unable to devise any plan of battle which
Napoleon could not immediately oversee; it would have been
otherwise in the mountains. The French allege, that Napoleon had
long before fixed upon the very place in which the Russians offered
him battle at Austerlitz, on the 2nd of December, as his battle-field,
and laid all his plans accordingly. The possession of the heights of
Pratzen was regarded by those skilled in strategy as the key of this
battle-field. The Russians were in full possession of these heights,
with all their force, on the 1st of December; on the 2nd they
descended from them, when Bonaparte drew back one of the wings
of his army. He had long calculated on gaining the victory by the
possession of these heights, and thus rendering the retreat of the
Russians impossible. He did not, therefore, fail, in the very opening
of the battle, to seize upon them.
A column of the third Russian army, under Bennigsen, commanded
by Michelson, just arrived at the decisive moment when Napoleon
had also called to his aid Bernadotte’s corps, and when the
Bavarians were on their march from Budweis to Moravia; but none of
their leaders could lay any claim to the reputation of a commander
of genius. Napoleon’s proclamation to his army shows his full
confidence in his own superiority, as well as in that of his generals
and soldiers; and this confidence was fully realised on the bloody
field of Austerlitz on the 2nd of December.

THE CAMPAIGN OF EYLAU AND FRIEDLAND (1806-1807

A.D.)
 After the defeat at Austerlitz the emperor
[1806 a.d.] made an attempt, whether sincere or not is
uncertain, for a reconciliation with Napoleon. He
sent D’Oubril to Paris, who, after a negotiation of ten days,
concluded a treaty with the French plenipotentiary, General Clarke
(July 20th, 1806). But Alexander refused to ratify the treaty, upon
the very questionable allegation that his ambassador had exceeded
his powers.
Prussia now suffered the just consequences of her policy.
Disappointed in her hopes of acquiring Hanover, the reward for
which she crouched to Napoleon, she imprudently provoked him to
war without waiting for the arrival of the aid due to her by Russia.
The campaign was decided in one day by the two terrific defeats of
Jena and Auerstadt (October 14th, 1806). Prussia was hopelessly
ruined before the Russian armies, ninety thousand strong, under
Bennigsen and Buxhövden, could arrive to save her. The Russians
entered Prussia in November, and on the 26th of December the
battle of Pultusk was fought with great obstinacy and loss of blood
on both sides. The French spent the whole of a December night
without covering; rain and snow fell incessantly; they waded up to
their knees in marshes, spent twelve hours in making an advance of
eight miles, and were obliged to pay dearly for their passage over
the Narev. During the battle, Marshal Lannes and other generals
were several times obliged to put themselves at the head of single
regiments and battalions, and yet no decisive advantage was gained.
The French, indeed, boasted of the victory; because the Russians,
after having maintained their ground on a part of the field, retreated
the next day.
If the victory at Pultusk, of which Bennigsen boasted, and on
account of which he was afterwards rewarded by his emperor, and
appointed commander-in-chief, was very doubtful, on the other
hand, Prince Galitzin completely defeated the French at Golymin, on
the very day on which they were to attack Buxhövden, at
Ostrolenka. This victory, too, was the more glorious, inasmuch as the
Russians were less numerous than their opponents. The French,
however, had not been able to bring up their artillery; and the
superiority of the Russians in this particular decided the event. The
weather and the time of the year rendered active operations
impossible for some weeks. Bennigsen retired to Ostrolenka, and
afterwards still farther; whilst the French, under Ney and
Bernadotte, were scattered in the country on the farther side of the
Vistula, in which Ney at length pushed forward as far as Heilsberg.
In January, 1807, Bennigsen and Napoleon
[1807 a.d.] came, almost simultaneously, upon the idea of
changing the seat of war from the extreme east
to the west. In the east, the struggle was afterwards carried on by
two particular corps—a Russian, under Essen, and a French, first
under Lannes, and then under Savary. This bloody struggle,
however, had no influence on the issue of the war. Bennigsen no
sooner learned that Ney had scattered his troops widely over the
country on the farther side of the Vistula, than he broke up his
quarters, and resolved to attack him, before Bernadotte, who was
near, could come to his relief; but he was too late. Ney had already
retreated when Bennigsen arrived; whether it was as the French
allege, because Napoleon, who had seen the danger with which he
was threatened, sent him orders to retreat, which arrived on the
very day on which he was to be attacked by the Russians, or that
General Markov was at first too eager, and Bennigsen afterwards too
irresolute. Ney luckily marched from Heilsberg, nearer to the Vistula,
and Bennigsen followed him hesitatingly, so that Bernadotte was
able to keep him employed for some days till Napoleon came up. On
receiving news of Bennigsen’s march, the French emperor had sent
orders to all his corps to renew the campaign on the 27th, and he
had so taken his measures, that before the Russians had any
suspicion of an attack, the main army of the French would fall upon
their left flank, whilst they were on their march. For this purpose,
Bernadotte was to allure Bennigsen quite to the Vistula; and then to
advance again as soon as Napoleon had outflanked the left of the
Russians.
 The despatch containing these orders for Bernadotte fell into the
hands of the Russians, through the inexperience of the officer
entrusted with it, who failed to destroy the document at the right
time. Thus warned of the impending danger, and finding themselves
pressed on all sides, they allowed their stores and heavy baggage,
at various places, to fall into the hands of the enemy, and thereby
escaped being surrounded. After considerable sacrifices, they
succeeded, on the 6th of February, in reaching the Prussian town of
Eylau, which is only nine hours’ distance from Königsberg. Soult
attacked their rear, on the low hills behind the town, on the 7th, and
drove them in; on the following day a general engagement took
place. The honour of the victory is probably due to the Russians, as
even Savary admits, who shared in the battle. It is not less certain,
however, that the whole advantage accrued to the French, who,
indeed, admit that the battle was one of the most dreadful recorded
in history. The French accuse Bernadotte of having, by his delay,
prevented the victory from being complete; whilst the Russians are
just enough to admit that Lestocq, with his Prussians, saved their
wing from utter defeat. The number of deaths in the battle, and on
the day preceding it, was immense. Great numbers fell, not by the
sword, but by cold, want, and excessive exertion. Whole battalions
and regiments of the French—as, for example, that of Colonel
Sémelé—were literally annihilated. Few prisoners were made,
because the whole battle was fought with the bayonet.
The royal family of Prussia was placed in a very melancholy
position by the issue of the battle, for they were obliged, in the
middle of winter, to flee to Menel, where they found themselves
among Russians, of whom their own emperor alleged, that,
notwithstanding his despotic power, he was not able to restrain their
barbarity, or to put a stop to their rapacity. Here, in the farthest
corner of Prussia, they received news every month of the fall of one
fortress after another, or of forced contributions levied upon their
people.
The French army also retired after the battle of Eylau as well as
the Russians. Bennigsen marched towards Königsberg, and although
Berthier, on the morning of the 7th, wrote to the empress that they
would be in Königsberg with their army on the following day, the
French, nevertheless, drew off nearer to the Vistula. Nothing
important was undertaken by either party for some months, but
vigorous preparations were made for a new struggle; whilst new
means were tried to prevent Prussia from taking any energetic
measures—that is, from forming a close union with England and
Russia. The king hesitated between the bold advice of Hardenberg
and his friends, and the unconditional submission to the will of
Napoleon, which was recommended by von Zastrov. The Russians
were thoroughly dissatisfied with the English, and complained of
being very badly supported by them; they suffered want of all kinds,
were worse treated in many places in Prussia than the French, and
even borrowed 660,000 dollars in coin from the king of Prussia.
Hardenberg, who accompanied his master to Tilsit, succeeded in
having a new treaty entered into at Bartenstein between Russia and
Prussia. Its principle was the same as that of the agreement made
on the 12th of October, of the preceding year, at Grodno, by virtue of
which the emperor bound himself to support the cause of the king
with all his forces. In this treaty, it was not only promised, just as if
they were before Paris, that Prussia should receive back all that had
been lost, but it was formally determined what was to be done with
the conquests wrested from France, and how even the left bank of
the Rhine was to be partitioned among the allies.
About this time Bennigsen was appointed commander-in-chief of
the Russian armies; but he is generally accused of incapacity, and
fearful descriptions are given of the disorders, fraud, and
embezzlement which prevailed, and of the plunder and barbarity
which they practised against unfortunate Prussia. The emperor
Alexander, as soon as he arrived at the army, did everything in his
power to restore order; he was able, however, only to remedy single
abuses; even Nicholas, who manifests a degree of severity from
which Alexander shrank back, is not able to reach the source of the
evil. Towards the end of May, Bennigsen thought his troops already
sufficiently reinforced to make an attack upon the French, and drive
them across the Vistula; whilst the combined army of English,
Swedes, and Prussians, were to make an attack from Pomerania.
The French army, lying from Dantzic to the Narev, was brought,
before the beginning of June, when the campaign commenced, to
150,000 men, whose pay and sustenance were drawn from the
requisitions and contributions imposed on Prussia. In April, 1807, the
French senate passed a decree levying 80,000 conscripts, 60,000 of
whom were to be immediately sent to the army; and the Poles, too,
deceived by the hope of the restoration of their nationality, raised a
body of between 25,000 and 30,000 men, among whom were whole
regiments recruited by the Polish nobility, or formed exclusively of
nobles who volunteered their service, although Napoleon limited all
the expectations of the Poles to the country on this side of the
Vistula.
As soon as Bennigsen, in the beginning of June, made a serious
movement in advance towards the Vistula, a series of murderous
engagements began, similar to those which preceded the battle of
Eylau; on the 9th, the main body of both armies came in sight of
each other at Heilsberg, and on the 10th the French made an
attempt to drive the Russians from their position. The united corps
of Soult and Lannes, supported by the cavalry under Murat, made
repeated attempts to force the Russians to give way; they, however,
kept their ground.
Bennigsen afterwards heard, at Wehlau, that the French had
separated into two divisions, and he resolved on the 13th, instead of
continuing his route on the farther side of the Alle, to wheel about
before Wehlau, and attack the French. By this step, as all writers
admit, he gave himself into the hands of his great opponent, who
never suffered his enemy to commit a fault with impunity. The
position taken up by Bennigsen was such as to leave him no
alternative between victory and destruction, for he had the Alle in
his rear, and a marsh on one flank. Napoleon took advantage of this
mistake, as usual; and the orders which he issued before the battle
prove that he was sure of the victory. About five o’clock in the
evening of the 14th of June, a battery of twenty guns gave the
signal for the fight; it was bravely maintained on both sides, and
both armies suffered great loss. The French accounts exaggerate the
number of the Russians who were led into the battle of Friedland, as
well as the number of prisoners: certain it is, however, that
seventeen thousand Russians were either killed or wounded.
After the battle of Friedland, there was no longer any account to
be taken of the Prussians: and it was a piece of great good fortune
that such a sovereign as Alexander reigned in Russia, otherwise
Prussia would have been wholly lost. Lestocq, with his Prussians,
was obliged hastily to cross the Haff to Memel; and their magazines,
considerable stores of powder and ammunition, together with one
hundred thousand muskets, which the English had sent by sea to
Königsberg, fell, with the town, into the hands of the French.
Bennigsen was not very closely pursued on the other side of the
Alle; he passed the Niemen on the 19th, and burned down the
bridge behind him; immediately afterwards, Bonaparte arrived in
Tilsit. Of all the Prussian fortresses, Colberg alone might have been
able to maintain itself for some weeks, and Graudenz was saved
merely by the peace. The treaty with England, which the Prussian
minister signed in London on the 17th of June, and by which
£1,000,000 sterling was promised in subsidies, came too late.
Schladen informs us that all those who were about the king of
Prussia had so completely lost courage, that Von Hardenberg, Von
Stein, Von Schladen himself, and many others who recommended
perseverance, found none upon whom they could reckon. With
respect to the Russians, he informs us that there was a party who
assumed a threatening aspect—that the army was dissatisfied with
the war—that the grand duke Constantine behaved often very rudely
towards the Prussians, and allowed himself to be used as an
instrument for working on the fears of his brother Alexander. On the
7th of June, the emperor manifested a disposition altogether
contrary to the agreements and partition-projects of the convention
of Bartenstein. He was dissatisfied with England, and perceived that
the Austrians had no other object than to fish in troubled water, and
he was, therefore, desirous, as much as possible, to withdraw from
the whole affair. He proposed a truce for himself, with a clause that
the Prussians also should obtain a cessation of hostilities; but the
Russians and Prussians were to negotiate each for themselves
respecting the conditions. Napoleon having entertained the proposal,
Russia agreed, that during the continuance of the truce, the French
should retain possession of the whole of Poland, except the circle of
Bielostok. The agreement was signed on the 21st, and a four weeks’
notice of the renewal of hostilities was reserved. By the terms of the
truce granted to Prussia, the French remained in possession of the
whole kingdom; and the few fortresses which were not yet reduced
were not to be supplied either with new works, ammunition, or
provisions. Blücher, who commanded the Prussian auxiliary forces in
Pomerania, was to leave the king of Sweden to his fate. The peace
was to be negotiated at Tilsit, and for that purpose one half of the
town was to be declared neutral.k

Meeting of Alexander and Napoleon at Tilsit (1807 A.D.)

Napoleon desired, as far as means and powers would allow, to

give all possible pomp and solemnity to the interview with his mighty
adversary. With this object, in the middle of the Niemen, opposite
Tilsit, a raft was constructed, on which were two pavilions, covered
in white cloth. The one which was destined for the two monarchs
was of vaster dimensions and was adorned with all possible luxury;
the other and smaller one was for their suites. On the frontals of the
pavilions were painted in green, on the Russian side, an enormous
A, and on the side turned towards Tilsit an N of equal size. To the
annoyance of the Prussians, the monogram of Frederick William III
was absent from the decorations of the Niemen raft. The French
guards were ranged in lines, fronting the river. “All this army,” writes
an eye-witness, “awaited the appearance of their invincible leader,
their thunder-bearing semi-divinity, in order to greet him at the
moment of his swift passage to the wharf.” Thousands of the
inhabitants of Tilsit and French soldiers covered the high left bank of
the Niemen.
 The emperors got into the boats simultaneously. When both boats
put off, the grandeur of the spectacle, the expectation of an event of
world-wide importance took the ascendency over all other feelings.
Universal attention was concentrated upon the boat that carried that
wonderful man, that leader of armies, the like of whom had never
been seen or heard of since the times of Alexander the Great and
Julius Cæsar. Napoleon stood on the boat in front of his suite,
solitary and silent, his arms folded on his breast as he is represented
in pictures. He wore the uniform of the Old Guard and the ribbon of
the Legion of Honour across his shoulder, and on his head that little
historical hat, the form of which has become famous throughout the
world. Reaching the raft somewhat sooner than Alexander, Napoleon
rapidly got onto it, and hastened to meet the emperor. The rivals
embraced and silently entered the pavilion, accompanied by the
joyful acclamations of the troops and the inhabitants, who were
witnesses of a world-wide event—the reconciliation of Russia and
France. At that moment a large boat put off from the left bank of the
Niemen, having on it about twenty armed soldiers—and remained
between the raft and the Russian shore. Evidently Napoleon did not
hesitate to take open measures of safeguarding against any possible
unforeseen occurrences.
That day the king of Prussia did not assist at the interview:
Napoleon did not wish to see him, and Frederick William remained
on the right bank of the Niemen. “In that fateful hour, whilst the
destiny of his monarchy was being decided, his gaze was constantly
fixed and his ear directed towards the raft, as though he desired to
listen to the conversation between the two emperors. Once he went
down to the edge of the river and only stopped when the water was
up to his horse’s middle.” The first interview between Alexander and
Napoleon lasted an hour and fifteen minutes. “I detest the English
no less than you do,” were the first words of the emperor Alexander,
“and I am ready to support you in everything that you undertake
against them.” “If such is the case,” answered Napoleon, “then
everything can be arranged and peace secured.”
 Taking advantage of Alexander’s inimical disposition towards Great
Britain, Napoleon entered upon a terrible philippic against the
perfidy of Albion, representing it as a greedy, extortionate nation
ever ready to sacrifice everyone, even its most faithful allies, for its
own profit. In further conversation Napoleon strove to instil into
Alexander that he was victimised by his allies, that he was mistaken
in protecting the Germans, those ungrateful and envious neighbours,
and in supporting the interests of a set of greedy merchants who
showed themselves to be the representatives of England; all this was
occasioned, according to him, by a feeling of generosity carried to
excess, and by doubts which arose from the incapacity or corruption
of ministers. After this Napoleon began to praise the valour and
bravery of the Russian troops, with which he had been much struck
at Austerlitz, Eylau, and Friedland; he considered that the soldiers on
both sides had fought like veritable Titans and was of the opinion
that the united armies of Russia and France might dominate the
world, and give to it prosperity and tranquillity. Up till now Russia
had squandered her forces, without having any recompense in view;
by an alliance with France she would acquire glory, and in any case
reap substantial advantages. Of course Russia was bound by certain
obligations to Prussia, and in that respect it was indispensable that
the honour of the emperor Alexander should be carefully guarded. In
conclusion Napoleon expressed his intention of restoring to Prussia
sufficient territory honourably to rid the emperor of his ally; after
that, he affirmed, the Russian cabinet would be in a position to
pursue a fresh line of policy similar in everything to that of the great
Catherine. Only such a policy, in Napoleon’s opinion, could be
possible and advantageous for Russia.
Having flattered Alexander as emperor, Napoleon in order to
complete the charm proceeded to flatter him as a man. “We shall
come to an agreement sooner,” said he, “if we enter upon
negotiations without intermediaries, setting aside ministers, who
frequently deceive or do not understand us; we two together shall
advance matters more in a single hour than our intermediaries in
several days. Nobody must come between you and me; I will be
your secretary and you shall be mine,” added Napoleon. Upon this
basis he proposed to the emperor Alexander for convenience’s sake
to transfer the negotiations to Tilsit, declaring the position of the
town to be a central one. The emperor gladly accepted Napoleon’s
invitation, and it was settled that negotiations should at once be
entered upon in order to come to a definitive agreement[55] on the
matter.g

RUSSIA DECLARES WAR AGAINST ENGLAND (1807 A.D.)

The English government, alleging that in the secret articles of the

treaty of Tilsit, of which they had possessed themselves, they had
proof of Napoleon’s design to seize the Danish fleet, fitted out an
expedition against Denmark with extraordinary celerity. Copenhagen
was bombarded for three days, and a great part of the city
destroyed. The Danes then capitulated (September 7), and
surrendered their fleet to the English, with all their naval stores in
their arsenals and dockyards.
The expedition against Copenhagen was soon followed by a
declaration of war on the part of Russia against England. In the
manifesto published on this occasion (September 16th), Alexander
complained bitterly of the bad faith of England, as manifested
especially in the little aid she had afforded to the allies who had
taken up arms in a cause in which she was more directly interested
than any other power, and in the robber-like act of aggression she
had committed against Denmark. He annulled all former conventions
between Russia and England, especially that of 1801; proclaimed
anew the principle of the armed neutrality; and declared that there
should be no communication between the two powers until Denmark
had received just compensation, and peace was concluded between
France and England. In consequence of this declaration, an embargo
was laid on all the English vessels in Russian ports, and Prussia was
compelled to follow this example.
 THE CONQUEST OF FINLAND (1807 A.D.)

It was not till the 6th of October that a formal demand was made
upon Sweden to close the ports of the Baltic against English ships
and trade. The king persevered in his alliance with England; and
finally, because the emperor of Russia had conferred upon Napoleon
the order of St. Andrew, he sent back his insignia; whereupon
Alexander not only returned his Swedish order, but quietly adopted
measures to take possession of Finland, whilst the Danes were
preparing, in concert with the French, to invade the western
provinces of Sweden. Although in the months of November and
December, Gustavus repeatedly declined the proposals of the
Russians for a union against England, everything went on in Sweden
as in times of the most profound peace; and even when the Russian
forces were collected on the very frontiers of Finland, the
unfortunate king adopted no measures of defence whatever. On the
21st of January he was, for the last time, called upon to declare war
against England; he replied by concluding a new alliance with her on
the 8th of February. On the 21st, the Russians invaded Finland,
without any specific declaration of war, and on the 14th of March,
1808, Denmark declared war against Sweden. The whole of Finland
as far as Vasa, the island of Åland, and even the islands of Gotland,
Åbo, Sveaborg, and all the fortresses, were taken possession of by
the Russians even before the Swedish army and fleet were prepared.
It was not till the end of April and beginning of May that a Swedish
army under Klingspor and Aldercreutz, supported by a Swedish fleet,
appeared in the field, and fought with various success.
We have lately seen Alexander take military possession of the
Danubian provinces as a “material guarantee,” whilst affecting not to
be at war with Turkey. This was in exact conformity with Russian
precedents. Finland, as we have said, was occupied without a
declaration of war; but manifestoes were issued by General
Buxhövden, one of which contained the following passage: “Good
neighbours, it is with the greatest regret that my most gracious
master, the emperor of all the Russias, sees himself forced to send
into your country the troops under my orders. But his majesty the
king of Sweden, whilst withdrawing more and more from the happy
alliance of the two greatest empires in the world, draws closer his
connections with the common enemy, whose oppressive system and
unparalleled conduct towards the most intimate allies of Russia and
of Sweden herself cannot be coolly endured by his imperial majesty.
These motives, as well as the regard which his imperial majesty
owes to the safety of his own states, oblige him to place your
country under his protection, and to take possession of it in order to
procure by these means a sufficient guarantee in case his Swedish
majesty should persevere in the resolution not to accept the
equitable conditions of peace that have been proposed to him, etc.”
When the Russians took possession of Finland, the king gave them
a pretence for incorporating it with their empire, which, however,
they would no doubt have done in any case. He caused Alopeus, the
Russian ambassador, to be arrested. This took place on the 3rd of
March, and on the 25th a declaration was published on the part of
the emperor of Russia, announcing to all the powers that “from that
moment he regards the part of Finland hitherto reputed Swedish,
and which his troops had only been able to occupy after divers
battles, as a province conquered by his arms, and that he unites it
forever to his empire.”
It was easy to anticipate that the superior force of the Russians
must in the end prevail; although the Russian garrison in Gotland,
and that in the island of Åland, were at first taken prisoners, the
island occupied, and the Russians beaten by land at Vasa on the
26th of July, and by sea at Roggerwick on the 26th of August. The
Swedes lost all the advantages they had thus gained by the bloody
battle fought at Ormais on the 14th of September, and by the defeat
at Lokalar on the 18th. The Russian generals, probably in order to
give courage to the malcontents, who were very numerous in
Sweden, issued orders not to receive any letters or any flags of truce
which were sent in the king’s name, and carried on negotiations with
the Swedish generals alone, for a suspension of arms, which was
concluded for an indefinite time, on the 20th of September, but only
continued till the 27th of October, when the Russians resumed
hostilities, and the Swedes were driven to the north, across the
Kemistrom. On the 20th of November a new truce was agreed upon
between the Swedish general Adlercreutz and the Russian general
Kamenskoi, with the reserve of fourteen days’ notice before renewal
of operations. By the conditions of this agreement the Swedes were
to evacuate the whole of Uleåborg, and to retire completely behind
the Kemistrom, with all their artillery, arms, and stores.
On the 13th of March in the following year a revolution was
effected in Sweden, by which Gustavus was deposed; his uncle, the
duke of Södermanland, became regent, and was afterwards
proclaimed king (June 5, 1809) under the title of Charles XIII. At
Stockholm the people flattered themselves that the dethronement of
Gustavus would speedily bring peace to Sweden; but it was not so.
Alexander refused to treat with a government so insecure as a
regency, and hostilities continued. General Knorring who had passed
the Gulf of Bothnia on the ice with twenty-five thousand Russians,
took possession of the Åland islands, and granted the Swedes a
cessation of hostilities, to allow them time to make overtures of
peace. Apprised of this arrangement, Barclay de Tolly, who had
crossed the gulf with another body of Russians towards Vasa, and
taken possession of Umeå, evacuated west Bothnia, and returned to
Finland. A third Russian army, under Shuvalov penetrated into west
Bothnia by the Torneå route, and compelled the Swedish army of the
north under Gripenberg to lay down their arms (March 25th). This
sanguinary affair occurred entirely through ignorance; because in
that country, lying under the 66th degree of north latitude, they
were not aware of the armistice granted by Knorring. On the expiry
of the truce, hostilities began again in May, and the Russians took
possession of the part of west Bothnia lying north of Umeå.
The peace between Russia and Sweden was signed at
Frederikshamm on the 17th of September. The latter power adhered
to the continental system, reserving to herself the importation of salt
and such colonial produce as she could not do without. She
surrendered Finland, with the whole of east Bothnia, and a part of
west Bothnia lying eastward of the river Torneå. The cession of
these provinces, which formed the granary of Sweden and contained
a population of 900,000 souls, was an irreparable loss to that
kingdom which had only 2,344,000 inhabitants left. In the following
year Bernadotte, prince of Ponte Corvo, was elected crown prince of
Sweden, and eventual successor to the throne, under the name of
Charles John.
The loss of Finland had been but slightly retarded by some
advantages gained over the Russian fleet by the combined
squadrons of England and Sweden. The Russian vessels remained
blockaded on the coast of Esthonia, but in an unassailable position,
from which they were at last delivered by the weather and the
exigencies of navigation in those dangerous seas. Another Russian
fleet under Admiral Siniavin, which sailed to Portugal to co-operate
with the French against the English, was obliged to surrender to
Admiral Cotton after the convention of Cintra. It was afterwards
restored to Russia. The war declared by that power against England
in 1807, was little more than nominal, and was marked by no events
of importance.

WAR WITH PERSIA AND WITH TURKEY

The annexation of Georgia to Russia, effected as we have seen, in

the beginning of Alexander’s reign, drew him into a war with Persia,
which did not terminate until 1813. The principal events of that war
were the defeat of the Persians at Etchmiadzin by Prince Zitzianov
(June 20, 1804); the conquest of the province of Shirvan by the
same commander (January, 1806); the taking of Derbent by the
Russians (July 3rd); and the defeat of the Persians by Paulucci, at
Alkolwalaki (September 1st, 1810).
About 1805 the condition of the Ottoman Empire, badly organised
and worse governed, was such that everything presaged its
approaching dissolution. Everywhere the sultan’s authority was
disregarded. Paswan Oglu, pasha of Widdin, was in open revolt. Ali
Pasha of Janina was obedient only when it suited his convenience.
Djezzar, the pasha of Syria, without declaring himself an enemy to
the Porte, enjoyed an absolute independence. The sect of the
Wahhabees was in possession of Arabia. After the departure of the
English from Egypt, first the beys, and afterwards Muhammed Ali
reigned over that country, and only paid their yearly tribute to the
sultan when they pleased. In Servia, Czerni George was making
himself independent prince of the Slavonians of the Danube. Ipsilanti
and Morusi, both Greeks, by the permission, or rather by the
command of Russia, were appointed hospodars of Moldavia and
Wallachia, for seven years at least, and were therefore rather
subjects of the Russians than of the Turks. Selim III, who had
reigned since 1789, convinced that the Porte could never re-
establish its authority except by better organising the army, had
endeavoured to model it on the European system. This attempt
afterwards cost him his throne.
The English and Russian ambassadors ruled either alternately or
together in Constantinople. But for their interference the old
friendship between France and the Porte would most likely have
been restored in July, 1802. At the time of the foundation of the
empire in France, the sultan hesitated long whether he would lean
upon the English and Russian, or upon the French influence, for he
felt a great want of confidence in Napoleon, since he had been
informed by the English of the language which fell from the emperor
in conversation with Lord Whitworth. He was reported to have taken
the partition of Turkey for granted—as a thing unavoidable; and that
on such partition the province of Egypt ought necessarily to fall to
the share of France. This conversation was printed, in 1803, among
the documents connected with the renewal of the war between
England and France, and was communicated to the sultan. The
French, indeed, in their official journals, contradicted the allegation;
but who ever put any faith in their official journals?
On this ground we must explain the fact that the Turks favoured
the Russians in the war which they were carrying on with the
Persians; suffered them to sail up the Rion (ancient Phasis), and
even to build a fort at its mouth. They were even desirous of
renewing the friendly alliance formed with Russia in 1798, which
renewal, indeed, the emperor of Russia was afterwards unwilling to
confirm, because the English had taken care to have the inviolability
of the Turkish Empire incorporated in the treaty of 1798. Had,
therefore, the emperor of Russia ratified the alliance, he would have
guaranteed to the Turks the actual condition of their empire in
Europe, which he did not wish to do. This excited the suspicion of
the Turks, who inclined more and more towards the French, and did
not suffer themselves to be frightened by the threats of the English
and Russians. Immediately after the Peace of Presburg, the Turks,
who had previously acknowledged Napoleon’s empire, sent a new
ambassador to Paris. In return, Napoleon sent engineers, officers,
artillerymen, workmen, and materials, in order to enable the sultan
to improve his army, artillery, and the bulwarks of his empire; whilst,
on the other hand, the Russian ambassador, Italinski, and the
English ambassador, Arbuthnot, threatened war if the alliance with
the French was not relinquished; and Italinski’s threats fell with a
double weight because a corps of Russians were ready for action on
the Bug.
About the time at which Napoleon adopted the resolution of
attacking Prussia also, and therefore foresaw a war with Russia, a
Turkish army was assembled to take the field against the Russians
on the Turkish frontiers, and Napoleon clearly saw how
advantageous to him a war between the Russians and the Turks
would be. He therefore sent General Sébastiani as ambassador
extraordinary to Constantinople. Sébastiani arrived there in August,
1806; and soon gained so great an influence that for some time the
Divan was entirely under his direction. At his instance it refused to
renew the treaty of alliance with England, which was on the point of
expiring; and it dismissed Ipsilanti and Morusi, as creatures of
Russia, from their offices. In consequence of the threatening
language held by Arbuthnot, the English ambassador, they were
reinstated; but when this took place hostilities had already begun.
The emperor Alexander had ordered General Michelson to enter
Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte then declared war against Russia
(December 30th); but deviating for the first time from a barbarous
custom, it allowed Italinski, the Russian minister, to depart
unmolested.
A few days afterwards, Arbuthnot quitted Constantinople, after
having repeatedly demanded the renewal of the alliance and the
expulsion of Sébastiani. On the 19th of February, 1807, an English
fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral Duckworth, forced the passage of
the Dardanelles, and appeared before Constantinople. Duckworth
demanded of the Divan that the forts of the Dardanelles and the
Turkish fleet should be surrendered to him; that the Porte should
cede Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia, and break off alliance with
Napoleon. But instead of profiting by the sudden panic which his
appearance had excited, he allowed the Turks time to put
themselves in a posture of defence. Encouraged and instructed by
Sébastiani, they made their preparations with such energy and
success that in the course of eight days the English vice-admiral
found that he could not do better than weigh anchor and repass the
Dardanelles.
Shortly afterwards Admiral Siniavin appeared in the Archipelago,
and incited the Greek islanders to throw off the Turkish yoke; whilst
Duckworth sailed to Egypt upon a fruitless expedition in favour of
the mameluke beys against Muhammed Ali. Siniavin defeated the
Turkish fleet on the 4th of April, captured several ships, and took
possession of some islands. The bad condition of his ships, however,
compelled him to give up the blockade of the Dardanelles, and to
retire, in order to refit, after having another time defeated the
Turkish fleet. Meanwhile, Selim had been deposed. His successor,
Mustapha IV, declared that he would continue to prosecute the war
with England and Russia. But Siniavin, before he retired to refit, met
the Turkish fleet off Lemnos, on the 1st of July: the Turks were
beaten, lost several ships, and a great many men.
The campaign of the Russians on the Danube, in 1807, was not
productive of any decisive result, as General Michelson received
orders to detach the third army corps to oppose the French in
Poland, Czerni George, the leader of the revolted Servians, took
Belgrade, Shabatz, and Nish, penetrated into Bulgaria, where he was
reinforced by some Russian troops, and gained divers signal
advantages. The war was conducted with more success on the
frontiers of the two empires in Asia. The seraskier of Erzerum was
entirely defeated by General Gudovitch (June 18); and that victory
was the more important, as it prevented the Persians from making a
bold diversion in favour of the Turks.
The emperor Alexander had agreed by the public articles of the
Treaty of Tilsit (July, 1807) to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia; but
this was only a collusion between the two contracting parties. The
Russians not only aimed at the permanent possession of the two
provinces, but regarded all the Slavonians of the Danube as allies or
subjects of the czar. When the Turks, on the 14th of July, concluded
a peace with Czerni George, whereby Servia became in some
measure independent—and Czerni George afterwards called himself
prince of Servia—a Russian general guaranteed the treaty by his
signature, as one of the parties to the agreement. In the following
year Radovinikin, a Russian envoy, repaired to Belgrade to establish
the new principality; called an assembly of the nobles; drew up a
sketch of a constitution for Servia, and tried to organise the
administration.
The French general, Guilleminot, was sent to the Turkish camp to
negotiate a truce on the terms ostensibly laid down in the Treaty of
Tilsit: namely, that the Russians should evacuate Moldavia and
Wallachia, but that the Turks should not occupy the two provinces
until after the conclusion of a definitive peace. But Guilleminot’s
instructions contained a direct command to use the whole weight of
the French influence in favour of the Russians and against the Turks;
even one of Napoleon’s greatest admirers, although owning
occasional republican scruples, admits that their tone was very
equivocal. In fact, it very soon became obvious that the whole
mission of the general was a mere piece of diplomatic imposture and
treachery. A congress was held at Slobozia, in the neighbourhood of
Giurgevo, on the 24th of August, 1807, and a truce was signed,
which, it was said, was to continue till the 30th of April, 1808. The
Russians were to withdraw; the fortresses of Ismail, Braila, and
Giurgevo to be given up to the Turks, whose troops, however, were
to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia in thirty-five days. Everything,
however, which afterwards took place in consultation between the
French and Russians, in reference to Turkey, bore upon a scheme of
partition.
The Russians at length, on the 7th of August, had left Cattaro and
the other strong places in Dalmatia to the French; their emperor, on
the 9th, had ceded all his rights as protector of the republic of the
seven united islands to Napoleon, and the latter was busy making
preparations thence to extend his operations and his dominion
further to the east. Marmont, who administered the province of
Dalmatia, received orders to fortify Ragusa more strongly, and to
make a report on the best plan to be adopted in case it should be
desirable to send an army quickly from Corfu, through Albania,
Macedonia, and Thrace. The Russians continued to be quiet
observers of all this, and in the mean time made firm their footing in
the provinces on the Danube. They made a pretence of the conduct
of the Turks on the occupation of Galatz, and their ill-treatment of
the inhabitants of Moldavia, for not fulfilling the agreement entered
into at Slobozia. The Russian troops, who, according to the terms of
the treaty, were already retiring, received contrary orders; and the
Turks, again driven out of the two provinces, occupied Galatz anew.
The conduct of the negotiation respecting the division of the
Turkish booty, was committed to the chief of Napoleon’s secret
police, who had been actively engaged in the murder of the duke
d’Enghien. He now held a princely rank as the duke of Rovigo, and
was sent to St. Petersburg with this and similar commissions. In the
Russian capital the emperor Alexander and the duke acted as rivals
in the art of dissimulation; the emperor loaded him with civilities of
all kinds, as some compensation for the coolness and contempt with
which he was at first treated, to a surprising extent, by the empress-
mother and the Russian nobility. He was, indeed, soon consoled, for
the slaves of the czar were as zealous in showing respect in the
presence of their master, as they were gross in their insolence when
not under his observation. The accounts which Savary gives us of
the political principles of the pious emperor and his chancellor, and
their complete agreement with Napoleon’s morality and his own,
would be quite incredible to us, did he not literally quote their words.
Savary’s secret report to the emperor Napoleon, partly written in the
form of a dialogue, is to be found among the fragments of
Napoleon’s unprinted correspondence. A contempt for public
agreements, and the plunder of Sweden, even before the declaration
of war, astonish us less than Romanzov’s audacious contempt of the
opinion of all Europe; he thought it not worth a moment’s
consideration; and this was quite in accordance with the language
held by his master in speaking on the subject of Turkey. Thibaudeau
has given so correct an opinion of both the emperors—of the nature
of their consultations—of Savary and Romanzov that we cannot do
better than refer the reader to the words of that writer.
Turkey would at that time undoubtedly have been partitioned, had
Austria been willing to follow the numerous gentle hints to join the
alliance of the emperors, who imagined themselves able to make
their will the right and law of all nations; or if Napoleon had not
found it inconsistent with his plans to bring on at an unfavourable
moment a new war with Austria, which he clearly foresaw in 1808.
The Russians, in the mean time, remained, throughout the whole of
the year 1808, in quiet possession of the provinces which had been
previously evacuated by them, and ruled not only in them, but
extended their dominion as far as Belgrade, for the new prince of
Servia was likewise under Russian protection. The army under the
command of the grand vizir, which lay at Adrianople during the
winter of 1807-1808, dwindled, during the continuance of the truce
of Slobozia, to a few thousand men, because, according to ancient
custom, the janissaries returned to their homes in winter; it again
increased, however, in the beginning of summer. Bairaktar’s army,
which was organised on the new European principle, was computed
at from twenty to thirty thousand men; it remained on the Danube
till its leader, at length, resolved to put an end to the anarchy
prevailing in Constantinople. He deposed Mustapha IV, who
supported the faction of the janissaries, and placed his brother,
Mahmud, on the throne. Bairaktar perished, however, in an
insurrection (November 14th), and Mahmud, too, would have been
murdered, had he not been the last scion of the imperial family. But
he was compelled entirely to change his ministry, and to resign the
government into the hands of those who enjoyed the favour of the
ulemas and the janissaries.
During the disturbances in the internal affairs of the Turkish
Empire, the foreign relations continued the same as they were in the
year 1807, immediately after the truce of Slobozia. When Napoleon’s
plan of removing the negotiations respecting a peace between the
Russians and the Turks to Paris failed of success, he found it
advisable, in consequence of an impending war with Austria, to give
the Turks into the hands of the Russians. One of the chief causes of
the war between France and Austria in 1809 was the close union
between the latter power and England in reference to Turkish affairs,
which appeared in the co-operation of Lord Paget and Baron von
Stürmer, the English and Austrian ambassadors in Constantinople. It
was the Austrians who mediated the peace between England and
the Porte of the 5th of January, 1809, after the conclusion of which
the Turks refused to cede Moldavia and Wallachia to the Russians, at
the congress of Jassy, as they had formerly done at Bucharest. This
led to a new war, of which we shall have to speak hereafter.

CONGRESS OF ERFURT (1808 A.D.)

In consequence of the complete stoppage of

[1808 a.d.] trade which followed the declaration of war in
1807, Russia suffered much more severely than
England, and the Russian magnates, supported by the aversion of
the emperor’s mother to Napoleon, were very far from showing that
good-will to the French which their emperor manifested for Napoleon
and his representatives. This was soon experienced by Savary, duke
of Rovigo, who, though overloaded with marks of politeness by the
emperor, in reality proved unable to make any way at the court of
St. Petersburg. Caulaincourt, duke of Vicenza, was afterwards
deceived for some years by appearances, and by Alexander’s
masterly art of dissimulation; but Napoleon soon came to experience
in Spain that the personal proofs of friendship exhibited by the
emperor were by no means always in accordance with the Russian
policy. The emperor Alexander himself, for example, on the urgent
request of Caulaincourt, acknowledged Joseph Bonaparte as king of
Spain; whilst Strogonov, the Russian ambassador in Madrid, alleged
that he had no instructions to that effect, and corresponded with the
insurgents. In the same way, Admiral Siniavin, who, on the breaking
out of war with England, had taken refuge in Lisbon with nine ships
of the line and a frigate, not only refused to render any assistance to
Marshal Junot, who was threatened in that city by the English, but
even to make a demonstration as if he were prepared to assist him.
The manner in which he afterwards capitulated, on the 3rd of
September, 1808, to Admiral Cotton, who caused his ships to be
taken to England, might indicate a very different disposition,
especially as the ten ships were afterwards given back.
There was, indeed, no want of interchange of civilities between
the two emperors. Whoever compares the attentions and marks of
regard which have been recorded as shown by the one to the other
with the secret intrigues which they were at the same moment
weaving against each other in Turkey and Spain, and with the open
enmity which was shown as early as 1811, will learn from such a
comparison what is the real worth of diplomatic and princely
friendships. The emperor of Russia made presents to his imperial
brother of vessels and ornaments of malachite and other precious
stones, which the latter exhibited in the Salon du Prix in the
Tuileries, in order to be able to boast of the friendship of the
emperor of Russia in presence of the circles of the faubourg St.
Germain. Busts of Alexander were manufactured in the imperial
porcelain manufactory at Sèvres, and were everywhere to be seen in
the palace and rooms of the imperial family. All who had access to
the court, or wished to make themselves agreeable to the emperor,
found it necessary to purchase these ornaments, and place them
conspicuously in their houses. The friendship was so intimate that
one of the emperor of Russia’s adjutants accompanied the emperor
of the French when he went to Bayonne to set aside the whole
reigning family of Spain. This adjutant, however, was the same
Tchernitchev who was engaged in constantly travelling backwards
and forwards between St. Petersburg and Paris, who surrounded
Napoleon, in spite of all his police, with a net of Russian espionage,
and bribed all the employés who were venal in order to obtain
papers. He intrigued with ladies to elicit secrets from them; and
finally, in 1812, he even purchased a copy of the plan of operations
for the war, when it was too late to change it.
Napoleon knew that Austria was thinking of taking advantage of
the general discontent and the secret associations in Germany to
frustrate the plans of France and Russia with respect to Poland and
Turkey; he was, therefore, very desirous of assuring himself once
more of the Russian emperor before his journey to Spain. This
design was a cause of great anxiety to the very numerous partisans
of the English and Prussian policy at the Russian court, when the
question was raised of a conference between the two emperors in
Erfurt. Von Schladen, the friend of the minister von Stein, therefore
presented a memorial to the emperor of Russia, shortly before his
departure to Erfurt on the 7th of September, 1808, in which
Alexander was forewarned of all that would take place there. From
this it may be seen that the emperor of Russia was continually
receiving secret counsel and warning from the enemies of the
French, and that he played his part in Erfurt more ably than
Napoleon, from whom he separated, as even the French writers
report, with all the outward signs of indescribable friendship and
esteem, but inwardly full of distrust. Von Schladen says very freely
to the emperor, that he had given him the advice laid down in his
memorial, “in order that he might see through the sophisms,
falsehoods, and deceptions which were prepared for him by
Napoleon, and awaited him in Erfurt.”
 On his way to the congress, the emperor visited the king and
queen of Prussia in Königsberg, and arrived on the 26th of
September in Weimar, where his brother Constantine had been
staying since the 24th. On the 27th Napoleon entered Erfurt, and at
one o’clock drove out a distance of several miles from the town to
meet the emperor of Russia, who was coming from Weimar. Our
modest object does not permit us to incorporate in our prose the
poetry of the subsequent festivities, nor in glowing language to extol
the skill displayed by the masters of the ceremonies. That splendour
enough was exhibited in Erfurt may be sufficiently gathered from the
fact that the four vassal-kings of the confederation of the Rhine,
thirty-four princes, twenty-four ministers of state, and thirty
generals, were by express command to summon up for the occasion
everything which imagination could suggest in the way of courtly
splendour and extravagance. Talma and the Parisian company of
actors had been sent to Erfurt, to act, as Napoleon said, before a pit
of kings. Two armchairs were placed for the two emperors, whilst
the other rulers sat behind them on common chairs. We know not
what truth there was in the story, which was at that time in every
mouth, and related in all the French works written for effect, that
the emperor Alexander, whilst Talma was being applauded on the
stage, played his own part with Napoleon in the pit in quite as
masterly a manner. The latter, amidst applause, pronounced the
following line:
 The friendship of a great man is a favour of the gods.

when the emperor seized Napoleon’s hand, made a profound bow,

and feelingly exclaimed: “That I have never more truly felt than at
the present moment.” The festivities continued from the 27th of
September till the 14th of October, and furnished to the Germans the
most melancholy spectacle of their princes and nobles conducting
themselves publicly, not only as slaves of Napoleon, but even as
servants and flatterers of all his generals and courtiers.
In order to flatter the emperor of Russia, Napoleon acted as if he
had been influenced by Alexander’s application in favour of Prussia;
but in reality, oppressed the king and his subjects afterwards just as
before. He profited by Alexander’s admiration and friendship to make
a show of his pretended willingness to conclude a peace with
England. Though he had written three times directly to the king of
England, and had always been referred to the minister, he
nevertheless prevailed upon Alexander to unite with him in signing
another letter addressed to King George. The result was such as
might have been foreseen; the object, however, was attained: the
letters and answers were printed, and officially commented upon in
the journals.
The negotiations were carried on personally in Erfurt between the
two emperors themselves, and much was agreed upon which neither
the one nor the other intended to observe. A written treaty of
alliance was besides concluded by Romanzov and Champagny, which
was calculated with a view to a new war with Austria. The substance
of the agreement consists in a closer alliance of the two powers
against England, and the cession of Moldavia and Wallachia to
Russia. Hitherto Napoleon had only been willing to concede this last
point on conditions which referred to Silesia. In the fifth article of
the Treaty of Erfurt, which was kept strictly secret, the two emperors
agreed to conclude a peace with England on condition only that that
country should acknowledge Moldavia and Wallachia as a part of the
Russian Empire. Then follow several articles on the cession of those
Turkish provinces. In the eleventh article it is stated, that further
negotiations were to be carried on respecting a further partition. It
was agreed, too, that the treaty was to be kept secret for ten years.
Buturlin boasts, with reason, that the emperor Alexander in Erfurt,
by his Greco-Slavonian arts of deception, gained a victory over the
Italo-Gallic talents of Napoleon; and, in fact, the very highest
triumph is to outwit the deceiver.
Even as early as this Napoleon is said to have thrown out the idea
of a marriage with Catherine Pavlovna, Alexander’s sister, which
inferred, of course, a previous separation from the empress
Josephine. Alexander, on his part, is said to have raised difficulties
on the question of religion, and to have referred the matter to his
mother, who very speedily had the princess betrothed to Duke Peter
of Oldenburg. Moreover, the reception of the duke of Oldenburg into
the confederation of the Rhine was one of the results of the meeting
in Erfurt.
The war which broke out in April, 1809,
[1809-1810 a.d.] between France and Austria, put the sincerity of
the Russo-French alliance to a practical test.
Russia complied with the letter of her engagements to the one
belligerent power by declaring war against the other; but Prince
Galitzin, who was to have made a powerful diversion in Galicia, came
so late into the field and his movements were so dilatory that it was
evident he had no desire to contribute to the success of his
sovereign’s ally. There was no longer any show of cordiality in the
diplomatic intercourse between France and Russia; but both parties
found it convenient for the present to dissemble their mutual
alienation. By the Treaty of Schönbrunn, signed by vanquished
Austria (October 14th, 1809), that power ceded, partly to France
and partly to the confederation of the Rhine, several towns in
Germany and Italy, with their dependencies; she was despoiled, in
favour of the duchy of Warsaw, of all western Galicia and the city of
Cracow; and surrendered to Russia a territory whose population was
estimated at 400,000 souls. The emperor of Austria, moreover,
recognised the rights which Napoleon arrogated over the monarchies
of the south of Europe, adhered to his continental system, and
renounced all the countries comprised under the name of the Illyrian
Provinces. But the house of Habsburg, true to the adage, Tu, felix
Austria, nube, retrieved its fortunes at the expense of its pride, by
bestowing a daughter in marriage on the conqueror.

RENEWED WAR WITH TURKEY (1810 A.D.)

Immediately after Alexander’s return from Erfurt orders were

given to open negotiations with the Turks. The conference took
place at Jassy; but it was immediately broken off after the Russian
plenipotentiaries had demanded, as preliminary conditions, the
cession of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the expulsion of the British
minister from Constantinople. Hostilities were then resumed. The
Russians were commanded by Prince Prosorovski, and after his
death by Prince Bagration. With the exception of Giurgevo, all the
fortresses attacked by them fell into their hands, until they
encountered the army of the grand vizir, near Silistria, and being
defeated with a loss of ten thousand men (September 26th), were
compelled to evacuate Bulgaria. The grand vizir, without taking
advantage of his victory, retired to winter quarters.
In May, 1810, the Russian main army, under Kamenskoi, again
crossed the Danube at Hirsova, passed through the Dobrudja, and
marched straight against the Turkish main army to Shumla and
Varna. At the same time, the corps of Generals Langeron and Sacken
proceeded to blockade Silistria and Rustchuk. The Turks could
nowhere keep the field. At Kavarna they were routed; at the
storming of Bazardjik they lost ten thousand men; at the storming of
Rasgrad three thousand. Silistria was reduced in seven days by
Langeron. So far everything was favourable for the Russians. If they
had added to their advantages the conquest of Rustchuk, the passes
of Tirnova and of Sophia towards Adrianople would have been open,
the fortress of Shumla would have been avoided, and the main army
of the enemy would have been manœuvred out of it. The taking of
Rustchuk, and above all the sparing of the troops, was consequently
the next problem for General Kamenskoi. Instead of doing this, the
Russians attempted to storm almost simultaneously the fortifications
of Varna, Shumla, and Rustchuk, were repulsed from these three
places, the defence of which was conducted by English officers, and
suffered so enormously, that the Turks felt themselves strong
enough to come out from behind their intrenchments, and attack the
Russian camp before Shumla. They failed, however, in their attempt
to storm it.
To relieve Rustchuk, the grand vizir sent
[1810-1811 a.d.] Mukhtar Pasha with picked troops, by way of
Tirnova, to the Danube. But if the Turks with
their united forces were too weak to force the Russians to abandon
the intrenchments before Shumla, they could certainly not expect
with a part of their army to rout the enemy near Rustchuk, where he
stood with his united forces between their separate wings. Only in
case Mukhtar Pasha, who had increased his forces to forty thousand
men, entered Wallachia at Turna, and marched against Giurgevo,
could the offensive have a meaning, or any influence, upon the siege
of Rustchuk, because here it met with the weak point of the enemy.
But to enter upon the offensive with an army in Wallachia, whilst the
Russians stood before the fortresses of the Danube in Bulgaria,
never came into the heads of the Turks. Mukhtar Pasha intrenched
himself at the mouth of the Yantra to cover the passes of Tirnova
and Sophia. On the 7th of September he was attacked in front,
flank, and rear, held out with his best troops till the next morning,
and then surrendered with five thousand men, and all his artillery.
After this Sistovo and Cladova capitulated, and on the 27th of
September Rustchuk and Giurgevo surrendered.
The road to Adrianople was now open for the Russians, but their
enormous losses, caused by their own folly, would have prevented
their assuming the offensive beyond the Balkan for this year, even if
the season had not been so far advanced. Reinforcements for the
next year could not be expected, as Napoleon was preparing to
attack Russia, and therefore they began to negotiate. Another
insurrection of the janissaries interrupted these negotiations, but did
not induce the grand vizir to profit by this opportunity, and fall with
his whole force upon the Russians, who, at this time, were scattered
over the country from Widdin to Sophia and thence as far as Varna.
Not until Czerni George, in February, 1811, had placed the
principality of Servia under the protection of Russia, did the grand
vizir awake from his apathy in Thrace, and cross the Balkan, with
only fifteen thousand men. He, however, proceeded so slowly that
Kamenskoi had time enough to assemble sufficient forces.
They met at Lofteh on the Osma; the Turks were defeated, and
lost three thousand men. Achmed Pasha, however, a violent and
sturdy soldier, without any higher military education, led fifty
thousand fresh troops to Shumla, and insisted upon their taking the
offensive. The Russians had received no reinforcements, but Kutusov
had taken the command. Without any considerable losses, he
concentrated his small army at Silistria and Rustchuk, and
abandoned Bulgaria as far as the latter place, after having rased the
fortresses. In the battle before Rustchuk, on the 4th of July, the
Turks were driven back, but on the 7th, they forced the twenty
thousand Russians who stood on the right bank of the Danube to
give up Rustchuk also, though not until its works had been rased.
Instead of crossing the river from the Dobrudja, and operating
with a superior force upon the Russian lines of communication, the
grand vizir allowed himself to be induced, by the retreat of Kutusov,
to cross the Danube at Rustchuk, without a fortress in his rear.
Arrived on the left bank with his main army, a Russian flotilla barred
his retreat, while Russian corps recrossed the Danube above and
below Rustchuk, and took possession of the town (no longer
fortified) and of the Turkish camp (September 7th). The grand vizir
fled, but his main army, still consisting of 25,000 men and 56 pieces
of artillery, was forced to surrender in the vicinity of Giurgevo. A few
days afterwards Count St. Priest took Shirtov, with the whole of the
Turkish flotilla on the Danube. Nicopoli and Widdin next surrendered,
so that by the end of the campaign the Russians were masters of
the whole right bank of the Danube. The Servians, also, aided by a