Commons and Community: Evidence

from the South-western Tribal Belt of

Madhya Pradesh

D.C. Sah∗

Sah and Shah (2003) have shown that the incidence of poverty
in the South-western tribal belt of Madhya Pradesh is alarmingly
high. About three-fifths of the households in this tribal belt were
categorised as chronic poor. A large part of chronic poverty is due to
population pressure and failure to access production resources,
decline in land holdings, recurring droughts, failure to access land-
based livelihood, lack of off-farm employment avenues and high
interest consumption loans from the moneylender resulting in a
debt-trap that pulls people into chronic poverty. Since the positive
impact of growth linkages on the chronic poor is weak and operates
with a time lag what becomes pertinent for them is inclusion in
various interventions by the state on the one hand and social
mobilisation that makes them aware of their rights on the other.1
This paper argues that lack of formal institutional structure and lack
of progress have not discouraged formation of social capital2 in this region.
With the help of civil society there is increased awareness of issues
pertaining to the loss of natural resources. This has strengthened the
social network's capabilities in terms of associational activities and led

∗
This paper is part of a larger study on Chronic Poverty in India, supported by
CPRC Manchester University, UK and IIPA, New Delhi. The article was first
read at a seminar on Tribal Issues in India held at MPISSR, Ujjain, June 21-22,
2002. Thanks are due to Amita Shah, Kate Bird, B.R. Purohit, Yatindra Singh,
Sandeep Joshi and an anonymous referee for critical comments and suggestions.
Usual disclaimers are applicable.

1
to trust among the social groups and individuals and collective action
for shared goals. In relatively less remote areas, the stratifications created
by political and economic processes have displaced the social hierarchy.
But in remote rural areas, where economic hierarchy is fragile and
reshuffles itself within a short span3, the social elites get an upper hand
even in non-social affairs. The dominance of social hierarchy in
decision-making would, however, not be due to the weakness of political
elites; it is rather lack of efficiency in local governance that gives space to
social norms and informal institutions in non-social affairs of the
community.
The Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act of 1996 has
provided a new turn to the process of reforming governance in the
tribal regions. The Act empowers the community to take hold of its land,
water and forest resources. Introduction of Gram Swaraj in 2001 by the
Madhya Pradesh government further empowered the community by
involving it directly in all the decision-making processes - power that
was earlier enjoyed by the Sarpanch alone. These changes in governance
are postulated on three basic premises. First, traditional ways of decision
making of tribal society could be integrated with decentralised
governance through PESA. Second, the community would get an
institutional space to govern its affairs. These provisions would be able
to level and homogenise the differences and lead to informed decision-
making by the people at the grassroots level. Lastly, the new system
would usher in a regime of people's participation, where, governance
would be more responsible and fruits of development distributed more
equitably. These political reforms have thrown up a new dominant
group that controls financial resources and challenges the existing
hierarchy. This may disturb the apparent homogeneity of the tribal society.
The emerging heterogeneity may curtail the participation of the
community in governance. On the other hand, the provisions of the
PESA have come in direct confrontation with the earlier Acts and the
existing state departmental rules that governed the natural resources in
the tribal regions. This has made the Act redundant in relation to
management of the natural resources of the region.
The objective of this paper4 is to understand the impact and efficacy
of these changes. More specifically, the paper addresses the following
three sets of propositions. First, if villages were socially, politically and
economically divided, dominance of any one of the groups in
decentralised governance would influence the distribution of gains.
Second, political reforms that give management of natural resources to

2
the community would create expectations that would be frustrated by the
existing departmental laws. Consequently, the community may resist state
interventions that curtail their access to natural resources. Lastly, transfer
of social capital in the political domain may be resisted by the economic
stratification within the society.

1. Historical Processes
The tribal belt of the South-western Madhya Pradesh, also known as
Nimar, comprises of Khandawa, Khargone and Badwani districts, and
is flanked by two hill ranges, the Vindhya in the north and the Satpura in
the south. Around 12th Century, small tribal communities, Bhil and
Meena, who lived in the forest and cultivated small patches of land that
they cleared by burning, populated Nimar. The tribal influx also
started during this time, mainly from Rajasthan and Gujarat. This was
the time when Pannar dynasty in the region was disintegrating. The
state was in anarchy and tribal chiefs emerged as landowners,
recognised Garasiay or unrecognised Bhumihar. Muslim invaders,
unfamiliar with the region, could not control the tribals and encouraged
Rajputs to settle and control them.
The Badwani state was established around 13th Century and over time
this small state with its barren soil and hilly surface escaped the notice of
the Mughals, Marathas and the British agents. Although there is no
known account about Badwani dynasty, what is known, is that Sisodia
Rajputs from Udaipur were the rulers of the state (Shrivastav 1970). As
a result of the Muslim invasion of Rajasthan, Gujarat and Malwa that
occurred around 1200 AD, many Rajput warriors fled and came to
settle in the Narmada Valley. Bhils who had ruled this entire region till
the eleventh century came to be gradually displaced, and could retain
their rule only in the hills of Vindhyas and Satpura. The Rajput take-over
reached its great heights in the fifteenth century. In order to establish
their control on land, the Sisodia rulers hired Bhil warriors for their army.
And thus, the local Bhil came under the protection and patronage of
Sisodia rulers. Many of these Rajput rulers married Bhil women and the
result of the union is said to be the origin of Bhilala tribe. The Bhil polity
that existed before the Rajput influx was not centralised. The territory
was divided into a large number of localities, each under a hereditary chief
called Patel. But there was no taxation, no system of surplus extraction
to make the chief richer than his band. Later as the Bhil were forced to
accede to their subjugation, the Rajput selected some tribal chiefs to
act as representatives of their authority in the villages, such that the
3
chiefs came to be the link between their ruling political system and the
traditional tribal polity. Till 1947, the Sisodias could manage personal
powers and hereditary perpetuity to rule Badwani.5
Between 1820s and 1860s, there were widespread Bhil disorders all
over Khandesh, Satpura and Nimar. When military action failed to quell
the Bhils, the British chose to investigate Bhil disorders, in order to
understand what caused them and through that knowledge, control them
and prevent their recurrence. Thus, a policy of pacification came to be
implemented (Shrivastav 1970). Despite British co-option of some Bhils
into an indigenous force like the Bhil corps, and their deployment against
other Bhils, resistance continued unabated throughout the region even
after 1860s. Economically, things were a lot worse off for the Bhils.
There are other reasons for Bhil insurgency. First, the 'bania' the
trader moneylender, became ever present in tribal life, both as financier of
agricultural operations and as a local agent for the collection of land tax
(Baviskar 1995). The bania became the instrument of worst process of
tribal exploitation, in nexus with the state, to extract surplus.6 Second,
with colonial rule, the authority of the headman, Patel, to permit fresh
clearings in the forest came to be abrogated and was instead vested in
state officials. In the process, property rights were sharply redefined.
Tribals were increasingly excluded from the forest and their customary
use rights restricted. Land was leased to contractors whose activities
turned vast tracts of forest into semi-barren land. The expansion of the
railways (1870-1910) also resulted in the widespread destruction of
forests and the beginning of the process of tribal land alienation. Third,
the British had tightened the system of taxation; both where they ruled
directly as well as in areas managed through the Rajput rulers. This
surplus extraction had added to the miseries of tribals. And lastly,
collection of excise duties was given out on contract to the bania who
would advance loans to the Bhil in exchange for first rights to their
produce. The bania who were intermediaries between the administration
and the people, encouraged taxpayers to grow market oriented cash crops
that were more risk prone during scarcity. The increasing burden of
taxation, depletion of natural resources and land alienation and extraction
by the bania made survival even more precarious than usual,
necessitating seasonal migration to far off places during bad agricultural
years.
Bhil insurgencies consisted of looting and plundering non-tribal
villages in the plains. The Bhil had been pushed from the agriculturally
more productive plains to the poorer hills because of the British
4
policy of encouraging immigrant Patidar settlement on fertile Narmada
plains. From that position, the non-tribal plains below were
prosperous targets. This resistance, however, was not directed against the
British, but against the rich villages that could be attacked more easily
and profitably (Baviskar 1995). This is also an indicator of the distance
and suspicion, born out of experience of the Bhil, for the non-tribals.
Around 1870, tribals were encouraged to stop shifting cultivation
and settle down on forestland.7 Most of land cultivated by tribals, even
today, consists of a part of depleted forestland. Such encroached
cultivation is essential to subsistence in a land-starved economy.
Although encroachment results in deforestation and soil erosion, it is
the only way out when opportunities are none and resources are
lacking. The necessity to encroach on forestland needs to be
appreciated within the social frame that values agriculture and the
autonomy it provides. Agriculture is the main source of livelihood of the
tribals. But agriculture is difficult in the hilly terrain for cultivation is
practised without terracing the slopes. As a result, only a small part of the
available land that is relatively plain has the capability the of retaining
moisture and exploiting its yield potential. Market oriented high
yielding crops like cotton, soyabean and wheat are grown on these fertile
plots. In the rest of the slopes that constitute the bulk of the cropped area,
traditional crops like maize, pulses, bajra, jowar and groundnut are grown.
Agriculture is rainfed and energised wells serve less than 10 per cent of
the cropped area during rabi. Since land productivity is poor and
monsoon failures are frequent, livestock rearing and migration
constitute the major coping mechanisms. The ownership of livestock
varies. The yardstick of wealth is the number of cattle, goats and hens that
a family possesses. Goats are important assets that can be converted into
liquid money during times of shocks. The forest by and large has
depleted but wherever accessible it is the source of fodder, fuel, fibre,
fruit, house-building materials, medicines, etc.
Demographic pressures amongst the tribals have resulted in rapid
fragmentation of agricultural land. The fragmentation of land has
become a source of chronic poverty in the community. With poor
resource base, seasonal migration provides much needed stability to
the households. There has been a long tradition of tribal migration in
search of employment from the region. While market mechanisms have
become more dominant, agricultural productivity depends on the
availability of fertile land and use of seed-fertiliser technology on it.
Fertile lands in the tribal villages are scanty. Thus, seasonal migration

5
becomes necessary for monetary supplement to the limited production
base. During years of scarcity, even well off tribals have to resort to
migration.

2. Dissent against the State

After independence, the administrative set-up did not change,
though the rationale of development8 did. Independent India inherited an
economy with intense poverty. Agricultural production was stagnating and
productivity was falling (Blyn 1966). The industrial sector was small and
traditional manufacturing and trade were stunted. Moreover, trade and
infrastructure were designed to feed colonial interests. Modern industry
was discouraged and the regime flooded the Indian market with low
cost industrial goods that further depressed indigenous industry. The
capability of industry to absorb the work force was marginal. Reduced
death rates and increased pressure from growing population led to
fragmentation of land. The landless class increased rapidly. The system of
collecting agricultural tax reinforced these tendencies. Consequently,
agriculture - the dominant sector of the country - was characterised
by a large labour-force tilling small and fragmented plots with seed
varieties just capable of feeding its growing population.
The debate over the development strategy after independence was
guided by these considerations. The prime need before the country was
to 'accelerate the rate of material capital formation'. The limiting factor in
this regard was low saving. It was argued that shortage of saving was
mirrored in the inadequacy of production of capital goods. It was
assumed that with faster growth in production, benefits would trickle
down to the masses. But growth remained too little to trickle down.
The situation further deteriorated with respect to distributive
justice when second generation problems of new agricultural technology
started emerging in the mid 1970s. The new agricultural strategy created
islands of prosperity amidst a mass of poverty. Inequality across groups
of people and across locations got intensified. Tribals, marginal
farmers and landless labourers were losers and so were the areas that
remained outside the purview of the new agricultural technology. The
lopsided investment in Research and Development between irrigated and
dry farming technology adversely affected the tribal who depended on
dry farming. This capital-intensive approach resulted in inequality and
concentration on the one hand and violent social disruption on the other.

6
 Government support for large irrigation projects has further affected
tribal interests adversely. The critical relationship between the tribal,
environment and development led to ideologically driven struggles
that brought together concerns for conserving nature with the issue of
justice. The tribal of Madhya Pradesh, including of Nimar, has a history of
revolts (Dubey 1998). In contemporary Madhya Pradesh despite
numerous interventions by the state, movements against state policy have
been quite successful. Small informal loans supplied by bania during
scarcity or input credit on failed crops with high interest rates end up with
the tribal debtor losing his land. The immigrant Patidars are settled on
the fertile alluvial lands in the Narmada plains whereas hilly infertile
dry lands are left to the tribal. The rapidly increasing tribal population
moved into the forests that, since Independence, have come to be fully
under state control. Tribals who cleared forest areas for cultivation now
face charges of encroachment.9 Control over forest is a major contention
that has brought into play civil society institutions like the Adivasi Mukti
Sangathan (AMS). On the other hand, displacement due to large dams in
the region has rationalised the presence of movements like Narmada
Bachao Andolan (NBA), an NGO that has provided alternatives in existing
development paradigm.
The concepts of development, environment and governance have
different meanings for the tribals and the state. State as the authority of
development rationalises its action through projects of national interest
and through interventions that rest on out-dated mode of land
acquisition, that make the tribals powerless. The struggles against the
state are placed within the discourse of ecology and development as
the case is with Narmada Bachao Andolan or are located against state's
force and repression as in the case of Adivasi Mukti Sangathan. These
struggles are able to mobilise Bhil, Barela and Bhilala, and have gained
support from a number of institutions outside the region (Baviskar
2001). The success of these initiatives in weakening the state repression
and strengthening the development initiative is mixed.
The Adivasi Mukti Sangathan attributes tribal oppression to their
powerlessness before state and market. Corrupt revenue officials, brutal
policemen and foresters, poor education facilities and failing health
services make up a system that marginalises the tribals. In the last three
years, the political activities of AMS have brought it into direct
confrontation with the power elite. The AMS has successfully compelled
the government to retrieve tribal lands and other property that had been
taken over by moneylenders. The campaigns of the AMS forced the

7
government to suspend several corrupt revenue officers, policemen
and forest officers.
To counter the AMS, the non-tribal deputy chief minister of Madhya
Pradesh, Subhash Yadav, organised the Adivasi Samaj Sudhar Shanti Sena
(ASSSS) in 1997. Commercialisation of country liquor replacing home
made Moudee10 has assumed notoriety in the Nimar tribal belt. The anti-
liquor campaign of AMS had resulted in the closure of legal and illegal
liquor vends in around 250 villages with considerable losses to both
vendors and their protectors. One such 'injured party' was Bhanjgadia
Patel, the hereditary tribal headman, of Kabri village and the block
Congress committee president. The AMS took the battle to Bhanjgadia's
own door when its members in Kabri declared that no liquor would be
sold in the village during Indal, the most important tribal festival. The
campaign turned violent and had to face state repression. The incident
was reported in the media as rivalry between two tribal groups. Unlike
Narmada Bachao Andolan, the Adivasi Mukti Sangathan is declared by the
state as an armed struggle that is trying to misguide tribals (Baviskar
2001).
The campaign of the Narmada Bachao Andolan started with Sardar
Sarovar Project in Gujarat11 in late 1980s and took a decisive form in
Madhya Pradesh with the construction of a 400 MW hydroelectric plant at
Maheshwar. This project would submerge 61 villages, about 5,000
hectare of rich agricultural land in Nimar plains and would adversely
affect the livelihood of 2,500 households. In the mid 1990s the NBA
started mobilising project affected persons (PAPs) in the submerging
villages on the issue of the futility of this unsustainable pattern of
development that results in environmental destruction as well as serious
relocation and rehabilitation (R and R) problems. The successful
campaign around these issues forced the Madhya Pradesh
government to review the project and suspend the work on the project in
early 1998. The success of the NBA campaign was due to three major
factors. First, the Maheshwar campaign was an extension of a larger
process against the state's unsustainable approach to development that
brought together national and international NGOs, environmentalists
and the PAPs. Second, it brought to the forefront the issue of
involuntary displacement, outdated mode of land acquisition, and
human rights violation of the PAPs. Lastly, all through, the campaign was
projected as the non-violent struggle of tribals against environmental
destruction.

8
 The differences in these two struggles are acute. While Narmada
Bachao Andolan campaign was instrumental in making the state
realise its mistakes, the Adivasi Mukti Sangathan turned out to be a
violent campaign between groups of tribals fighting to gain
supremacy over each other. Despite these differences, the effect of
the two campaigns within the tribal community of Nimar has been
binding and has created social capital in the form of closer ties
between the communities. When it comes to non-tribal intervention
in their affairs, no outsider shall be able to create space, no matter
how harmless it could be to their land and livelihood, if there is even
an iota of misgiving. Notwithstanding the changes around them, this
suspicion is neither unjustified nor detrimental to tribal livelihood.

3. Commons and Community

Multiplicity of institutions in development is a feature of all Indian
communities. In the tribal context, they have a uniqueness affecting
the evolution of new institutions and their relations with the old with
different value systems of trust, reciprocity and non-competitiveness.
While the analysis deals with some of them, the setting is mainly
around the metamorphoses of relationship between the commons and
the community. Depletion of tribal resources - land, forest and water - has a
history. After independence tribals lost control over the forest because of
the Forest Laws. The PESA transferred the power to manage natural
resources, including land, water and forest, to the community in
accordance with its tradition and in harmony with the provisions of the
constitution and with due regard to the spirit of other relevant laws. This
section argues that even after reforming political governance, the existing
forest laws have not allowed the control of forest to pass to the
community.
Kirchali had a dense forest adjoining the village about 20 years ago.
Today it is a depleted thin forest located about a km away. Depleted
though, the remains are still sufficient for meeting the timber, fodder and
fuel needs of the villages around the forest, including Kirchali. As the
forest falls under the control of the forest department, the
administration of the forest does not fall within the purview of the Gram
Panchayat. Entry to the forest has been restricted and any use - in the form
of wood, minor forest produce, fuel and fodder - is deemed as illegal by
the forest department. Pospur, on the other hand, is surrounded on all
four sides by steep hills. A few decades back the area had forest but today
it is barren. The forest department is trying to rejuvenate this forest by
9
creating undisturbed natural rooting environment and also by sapling
plantation. The upper hills are under the administration of the forest
department; whereas the lower reaches including the valley are
administered through the Panchayat. The lower reaches are the only land
that can be brought under agriculture. A few years ago, the
community had access to upper reaches of the hills for grazing animals
as well as for wood but now the entry to the upper hills has been
restricted. This was done mainly to restrict the entry of the cattle that
destroyed the forestation, as unrestricted movements helped gully
formations and erosion of thin topsoil that holds the vegetative growth.
In these villages, as a part of Gram Panchayat, the institutional forest
and watershed committees are in place. But these committees are not
empowered to control the structure created by the forest department.
Although these resources, are within the villages they are out of the reach
of the community. Though the control of these resources should have
been with the Gram Panchayat and its committees, forest laws govern their
management. The community in Kirchali is, nonetheless, using the
forest resources, illegally. The villagers in Kirachli are not too resentful
of this loss of access to forests, but in Pospur, the community is much
more agitated about the restrictions and more aware about its rights.
Their inability to manage their resources is not because of their illiteracy
or lack of awareness about the laws. In a sense, PESA is a legislative Act
that has no locus standi of its own; the overlapping power of the state
forest department is a crucial impediment in passing the control of the
forest to the community. Without reforming it, the grassroots situation
may not change.
About half of hundred two villages falling in the Pati Janpad are
outside the control of decentralised governance. These villages, called Van
Gram, are administered by the forest department. Unlike Panchayat
administered villages that get a life long lease of the land, agricultural
land in a Van Gram is allocated to individual households at a maximum
of 6.25 acres for 15 years and the lease is renewed afresh by the forest
department. The forest officer of the range manages land, water and
forest in these Van Gram. The community's access to forest for timber,
fodder and fuel is much better in Van Gram than forests falling under
Panchayat administered villages. The community is aware about the
denial to control their resources and the consequent hardships caused
by it. But it accepts the superiority of laws of the Forest Department.
The failure of access to natural resources needs to be viewed within
the context of the efforts of PESA to empower the community as well
10
as the discredit that the state receives due to its repressive ways.
Discrediting of the state originated due to tribal migration into these
virgin hills, even as late as early 1950s, in search of arable land that has put
the community as well as the commons into an impasse. Both the
livelihood and the commons have transformed over the years into a new
politics of environment. Tribals who cleared areas under the control of
the Forest Department for cultivation now face the charge of being
encroachers and destroyers of forests. Control over land, especially
forestland, is highly challenged by the Adivasi Mukti Sangathan. On the
other hand, the process of empowering the community was a new
approach of managing commons; it was meant for changing laws to
accommodate community participation in governance of the commons.
The theoretical strength to these steps has been provided by the seminal
work of Gadgil and Guha (1992):
That (a) the use of natural resources with a monopolistic command
by a few influential castes in the society was in fact a prudent way of
natural resource use for, it provided checks against over exploitation by
others; (b) the traditional societies had non-exploitative and harmonious
relationship with nature whereas modern society has subordinating
relationship with it; (c) the fissures in a traditional society are naturalised
by non-competitive nature of their interests; (d) any violation in the
traditional use of nature is an aberration rather than the traditions; and (e)
an opportunistic behaviour by traditional communities is an infection of
the modernity. Implicit in the formulation are first, variations of uses and
abuses of commons arising from the binary nature of local, traditional,
women and tribal versus outsider, global, state and market. The
traditional amounts to sustainable use of commons, whereas commercial
exploitation by the state is implicit in the arguments (Agrawal and
Sivaramakrishnan 2001). Secondly, the naturalising non-competitive
behaviour of the society reflects that conflicts over the resources were
actually conflicts over sustainability of resources. The dichotomy, thus,
provided strength to two differing ways. The civil society took a leaf
out of the ecological history of India and attributed powerlessness of
tribals before state and market as the cause of tribal access failure to
natural resources. This resulted in the NBA and AMS mobilisation of
tribals against repressive markets and state. The other process
influenced by the construct was the appealing aspect of traditional
communities with conservation; and so started joint management where
communities have become equal partners in management of natural
resources like forest and water or in Madhya Pradesh that PESA gave
control of commons to the community.
11
 The above, however, de-links the environmental politics from
livelihood struggles of the community. The uniform tribal character as
protector of nature artificially homogenises and hides the social
identities and conflicts. On the other hand, treating livelihood and
environment simultaneously could provide understanding of how both
apply to each other, so that one can ask what do we mean by sustainable;
sustainability of livelihood or environment!
It can be argued that economic growth adversely affects the natural
resources because of critical interactions between livelihood, technology
and nature. But the implications of environmental degradation are
conceptually different in remote tribal economies and in dynamic non-
Remote Rural Areas. In the former situation (RRAs), the livelihood
processes influence nature not because of over-use per se but because of
sheer survival of different participants. Stagnation and low level of
economic activities are, thus, the cause of degradation. This calls for
developing new opportunities that create interest for protecting nature.
In the latter situation (non-RRAs), nature degrades owing to
uncertainty of availability of natural resources to various segments of the
society. Over-use of nature is not because of availability of resources per
se but owing to mistrust and uncertainty about their availability. In order
to maximise his or her returns in this uncertainty, everyone over-uses
nature. Regeneration rests on sharing information with trust between
community, classes and social groups that have varying perceptions about
the access to commons.
It will be worth understanding how these macro processes are
influencing the micro realities.

4. Political Freedom and Community

Unfreedom
The political leadership in Pospur-Gupsee village Panchayat is with a
woman Sarpanch from Gupsee village. She represents the political interests
of her husband who is a representative of Pati Taluka (Janpad) Panchayat.
He is a seasoned political figure in the tribal area, and guides her in her
political affairs. Though the Panchayat headquarter is in Pospur, the
village is neglected with respect to amenities, facilities, investment and
agricultural infrastructure. A large part of investment is diverted to
Gupsee.12 Moreover, Pospur is not intensely divided on economic lines.
On the other hand, though the affairs in Kirchali-Ramkula Panchayat are

12
no different,13 the individual initiatives in technology transfer in
agriculture have resulted in significant prosperity to a few in the village.
Since both the Panchayat and the Sarpanch are located in Ramkula, Kirchali,
like Pospur, is also discriminated against. The community keeps itself
detached from the affairs of governance in both the villages.
Economic stratification in Kirchali is well-developed and visible
when one moves in the villages during early rabi season. The two
hundred plus household village looks deserted and unmanned, except
for about thirty households that are engaged in wheat and gram
cultivation; pre-sowing irrigation and sowing of the crops are the major
activities that engaged some of the family members. These households
have perennial irrigation, obtained at a very high cost and risk. Kirchali
is an un-electrified village enclosed from two sides by Ramkula and
Surana villages that have electric connections. Individual initiatives have
resulted in intensive investment in irrigation and energising the farm in
order to reap economic gains. Two families, the Patels and the Bhagats,
took the early initiatives in investment in agriculture in Kirchali. They
have strong political clout and could get cheap institutional credit for
risky agricultural investment in digging a well and energising it.
Demonstration of economic gains attracted others to come forward
for such investment; substantial investment is involved in such transfer
of agricultural technology that includes digging wells in rocky terrain,
drawing electricity line from some distance, investment in new seed
varieties and yield increasing fertilisers. All this has to be borrowed at a
high interest and with sizeable risk.14 The risk involved in digging a well in
Kirchali is high. But the economic incentives in the form of cropping
pattern changes and increase in yields keeps the desire to invest alive.
Half of the wells in Kirchali provide water only up to November. The
perceptions on size and certainty of economic gains of investment attract
new entrepreneurs; as such, there are individual attempts to draw
electricity even from a distribution point that lies two km away. The
community in Kirchali is stratified on economic lines; there are about 25
wealthy families with perennial irrigation while 100 poor households
have less land and no irrigation facility. The middle constitutes
average farmers. Each group has its own agenda; the rich want cheap
labour, modern yield increasing inputs and investment so that their
agricultural income is protected. The poor, on the other hand, want
employment and labour opportunities nearby so that they do not need
to migrate. Such economic stratification has not yet developed in Pospur.
The irrigation well failures are very high in Pospur, and this implies
repayment of loan to the bania at an exorbitant interest, which is
13
disastrous. Consequently, there are only a few irrigated farms in Pospur;
the economic homogeneity of the community is, by and large,
undisturbed.
Sen (1999) has conceptualised that unfreedom - economic, political,
social, transparency and security - can pull people into poverty. Sen's
proposals of unfreedom include both inability of the community to
exercise its rights freely as well as opportunities of individuals to
operate freely for, poverty can manifest by unavailability of services at the
macro level as well as access denial at the micro level. Political
unfreedom can surface by micro processes of lack of freedom to
choose who governs as well as macro principles of how to govern.
Political freedom, it can be argued, could create an environment that
helps the community to participate freely in the process of governance:
choose the leaders that are committed; plan and manage their resources
for local development; criticise the approach and monitor the
functions of those who are governing. If the political process is free, it
can help fulfil the expectation of the community. Political freedom, thus,
can be operationalised as freedom to individuals to (a) choose who
governs them; (b) be governed in a participatory process; (c) plan and
manage their natural resources; and (d) be able to criticise and organise
protests against uninformed decisions so that gains are equitably
distributed within the community. One can use the findings of this paper
to evaluate the extent to which each of these freedoms has successfully
been attained.
The findings reveal that the process of choosing who governs them
is free and fair. People have used their franchise in deciding who would
govern them freely. But the process created fissures in a homogenous
community with social, political and economic interests. Once the
political leaders took over their responsibility, the process of decentralised
governance, instead of becoming participatory, became highly
centralised. The gains of decentralised governance have been too few
and highly iniquitous. The community's expectations remained
unfulfilled and participation slowly dwindled. The role of the Sarpanch,
and the exclusive group of his people, has made people lose their
faith in the Panchayat. Political decentralisation has not only
fractured the homogeneity of the tribal society but has also made
governance highly centralised.
The community does monitor how those in governance have
neglected it. But it does not get enough opportunity to register its protest
about such governance. It is only once in five years that they get the
14
freedom to punish bad governance by rejecting those involved in
such governance. The community has no freedom in the process of
planning the programmes it needs. The blame for this unfreedom to
decide what local development should take place and how, falls at various
levels. First, the process of centralisation at the Panchayat level is too
overpowering for the community to exert pressures for initiating
participatory processes. Secondly, the quantum of financial
allocation is too thin to meet the demands of the community. Third, the
desire of the bureaucracy and the elected representatives, at higher
echelons, to control the activities and finance of the Gram Panchayat, does
not allow independence to the Panchayat. Lastly, existing laws that govern
the natural resources obstruct the process of giving their control to the
community.

Creation of Social Capital

The main support for social capital formation in the tribal
region comes from the pattern of settlement of villages. Each of the
hamlets comprises close relatives who easily forge their social solidarity
norms and frame of Jati Panchayat15. This pattern of settlement, where
social relationship converts into association, is capable of creating
issues at community level. This apart, the following processes are
instrumental in creating social capital and its varied manifestations. The
first of these is the presence of a left-oriented civil society that helped
ease economic repression. Second, dependence on informal community
legal structure that binds people together. Lastly, lack of development of
the region and livelihood struggles gave space to social elites to
oversee emerging political and economic leadership.
The space available to the social hierarchy in non-social decisions has
emerged not because of enactment of Gram Swaraj or PESA, for
these processes had marginal impact on community involvement in
development decisions. State inaction in this region has helped the
practice of informal community consultation. The informal
community consultation in development is a more recent phenomenon
forced by civil society mobilisation in the area. This mobilisation was the
result of development-induced displacement, awareness campaign on
depletion of natural resources and repression of tribal rights.16 State
failures made the contemporary movements succeed in mobilising the
community to protest against the access failure to natural resources on the
one hand and tribal exploitation on the other. The influence of Narmada
Bachao Andolan and Adivasi Mukti Sangathan in mid-1990s has changed the

15
political discourse of the region significantly. Earlier, the newly emerged
political hierarchy, through the state apparatus, would take every decision
without even consulting the individuals who were affected. Such
changes came first in the form of agitations of activists for redressal of
tribal grievances. In the late 1990s, the situation improved further;
individuals themselves started going to the concerned officials in the
Taluka Panchayat l7 for all decisions that affected them. But the more
recent changes go a step further. When the state-run watershed project
in Pospur, through Pospur-Gupsee Gram Panchayat, led the local
community to believe that their access to natural resources is being
adversely affected by the structures, the social hierarchy prevailed over
the political hierarchy and the community asked the project authority to
wind up the project. The community had the last word. The debate was
not only on access failure to natural resources but also about the
presence of outsiders in the village. The fear of outsiders has brought
the community together.
The consequences of development initiatives are rooted in the
tribal psyche; the fear of displacement due to Sardar Sarovar Project is
wide spread in the region. Also imprinted in their psyche are the state
repressions on the issue of natural resource management. Both of
these experiences - the former contemporary and the latter historical -
are painful. The response to outsiders is cautiously guarded, though it
varies in both the villages. While the inhabitants of Pospur are vocally
against any outside presence, the community in Kirchali is more
tolerant to outsiders. The community in Kirchali, as compared to
Pospur, seems to be much more calculative for prospective gains
accruing to them because of outside interventions. Although in both
the situations, social hierarchy, forced by the community at large and
also because of pressures of a few well to do and influential people,
resists outsiders, the nature and extent of economic stratification
guides their behaviour. Apprehensions about outsiders in Kirchali are
related to considerations of possible economic gains that individuals
could get. However, in Pospur the considerations are to protect the
community. The attitude of the social hierarchy in Pospur is loaded
with caution and apprehensions that outsiders would acquire their
resources. Community leaders are polite but firm in asking not to be
disturbed.18
Notwithstanding the catalytic role of civil society in creating social
capital, the relationship between civil society and governance could be

16
vicious as well as virtuous, as would be seen. The question is under
what conditions the social capital manifests itself in the political domain
in a virtuous pattern.

Informal Institutions
The second process that helped social capital formation is weak
institutional arrangements like constitutional and legal framework, and
administrative structure in the region. These institutions in a tribal
society have both formal as well as informal features. Experiences with
these formal institutions19 have also resulted in lack of faith of the
community in these institutions. Moreover, remoteness to state in
terms of non-availability of legal agencies and their fairness has resulted
in dispute resolution by the communities' own informal structures. The
community institutions control decisions on petty crimes, land disputes
originating from short-term land transitions, divorce and socially
unaccepted relations. This is partly because the legal apparatus in the area
is lacking and partly because the traditional ways of settling these
disputes are effective. The village social justice committee20 created
under decentralised governance has recognised this role of the
community. This kind of dependence on informal non-legal structures
that exercise their power through social hierarchy also strengthens the
social bond within the community.
Though informal legal and institutional arrangements exist in both
Pospur and Kirchali, the role of economic and political leadership has
been different in these two villages. Consequently, the local
community has become overpowering in Pospur. In Kirchali, where
state presence is regarded as necessary in providing electricity to energise
wells21, economic leadership dominates. The individualistic approach
towards economic prosperity, which consolidates productivity gains, is
regarded as more important than social processes. The community
initiatives do not pose any challenge to economic leadership. In short,
social capital exists in the tribal areas, albeit in dormant stage.

Social Exchanges under Market Failure

Lastly, state and market failures have influenced life and livelihood of
the tribals in both Pospur and Kirchali differently. As compared to
Kirchali, the relative remoteness of Pospur and its poor agriculture
have resulted in trust and cooperation for survival. The individualistic
approach in Kirchali made livelihood struggles less painful. Relatively
few households resort to migration in Kirchali compared with
17
Pospur. The interaction between economy and society has a positive
influence in daily livelihood struggles in Pospur. On the other hand, in
Pospur, the interaction between economy and the polity is marginal.
Livelihood struggles have forced about a third of the households to
migrate outside the village for more than seven months each year.22 This
hardship is also the cause of a process of developing trust and
cooperation. Migration pushes agricultural land into short-term
institutional arrangements like leasing, renting or mortgage. These short-
term land transactions are between trusted close groups. Short-term land
transitions are economic arrangements between the migrant family and
the family that manages his land in the migrant's absence. But it also
provides necessary representation to the migrant in social spheres; it acts
as social exchange.23
The contract that governs the land transitions through non-market
institutions significantly varies across households. The urgency of
forming a contractual relationship between the two parties - the migrant and
the tiller - decides the arrangements that would guide the economic
exchange. In the last few years, the short-term land transitions, both in
Pospur and Kirchali, have increased fivefold. Crop failure is one reason
for this development but equally pressing is fragmentation of land with
division of family. Small land holdings during droughts are not only
uneconomical to operate but also have a cost that makes alternative
livelihood options difficult to negotiate. Consequently, the owner enters
into an agreement with a prospective tenant so that he earns some rent
as well as uses his family labour properly. Short-term land
transactions, however, are negotiated not only within the village but
also within closely related families. Thus, the owner is free to move out
of the village with his family in search of some employment
opportunities. Such movements help the small landholder to optimise
returns to his family labour. The economic gains to a tenant, apart from
sharing the output, are in the form of claiming rental value for use of his
bullock and interest on capital used to purchase out-of-pocket inputs.
During the absence of the landowner, the tenant is morally bound to
inform the owner about important events that affect him; such events are
sickness of aged parents, social events, and situations that have
employment implications. During a crisis, close relatives do provide
support to the remaining members of the owners' family as a matter of
custom. On the other hand, the tenant spends money, when necessary,
on behalf of the migrant.24 In the process, land in exchange engenders a
symbolic presence of the migrant household in the village and his
representation in the social hierarchy without his being physically

18
present. The power to till land of a migrant protects economic interest
of both the migrant and the tenant but in the exchange, the migrant also
obtains control over his social interests. The most preferred
arrangement25 is crop sharing because it preserves the migrant's links
with the community. In order to force the contract in terms of labour use
and sharing output,26 the migrant has to make a number of trips to the
village, especially during the peak harvest season. That re-establishes his
severed interests in the social set up in his absence.

Expressions of Social Capital

The social capital in Pospur, nonetheless, seems to be developing
and providing support to the traditional social hierarchy to exert its
power on the political hierarchy. In the process, programmes that
could have positive economic implications for the well being of the
community are resisted. The relationship between the community and the
society in the village did provide impetus to mobilisation of dormant
social capital but in local development affairs, the social capital could
only manifest itself in the form of resistance to development. This is
something to admire as well as to criticise. Does it not mean that the
social capital, in its negative aspect, isolates people from the outside world
and development? This seems to be keeping the community frozen in
time and denies social capital a space
in development. The criticism seems to be partially true. In as much as the
state repression and access failure to common resources are the basic
constraints in well-being, the importance of emerging social capital
cannot be overemphasised as an important force behind their united
struggle. But, the desire for change is also present in Pospur. This has
resulted in diverting the social trust and solidarity in the community in
the form of emerging organisations that take advantage of non-tribal
institutions, technology, markets and programmes.
The increasing popularity of self-help groups in Pospur is an indication
of the parallel leadership that is emerging. The first is the traditional
social leadership that helps the social capital preserve natural resources by
blocking explorative non-tribal entry in the village. Another is organising
tribals to take advantage of existing government programmes through self-
help group,27 that too against the wishes of the traditional social elites.
Though both processes have extended the social base, the latter is not
the legitimate successor of the former. Despite the fact that both forms
of social leadership are exploring a new base of social relations, the latter
does not directly contest the supremacy of traditional social elites and

19
their ways of employing the social capital. There is a possibility that,
like Kirchali, the traditional leadership may be influential only in social
processes while the economic processes may be governed by the
newly emerging leadership. It is difficult to define operation of self-help
groups in Pospur as an indicator of social capital formation. These groups
reflect the interests of individuals, so they are seen as decelerating the
trust within the community, as they function more as economic units
and hence they stratify the community on economic lines. Thus, the
associational value of self-help group is colonised by the competitiveness
of economic enterprise. The economic stratification counters the process
of trust building in the community. Such an association creates a
process where the moral capabilities of the community reach its limits in
acting as an impartial source of virtuous agency. Self-help groups, thus,
should not be regarded as a source of social capital as they are seen as a
process that erodes homogeneity that is a prerequisite for social capital to
manifest.28
The social capital as it manifests in Pospur may not be
operationalised by indicators like community engagements with
organisations and associations like religious bhajan mandalies, farmers'
organisation and self-help groups. It has to be observed in day-to-day
involvement of the community in the affairs of the village. As noted
earlier, the homogeneous social hierarchy has a potential to create space
for community involvement in politicising a debate, but it does not
ensure participation in decision-making. A vibrant social structure is
present in both Pospur and Kirchali but it is only in Pospur that one
witnesses the manifestations of social capital. Moreover, the way the
social capital is employed in Pospur only strengthens the fact that (a)
social capital may not necessarily manifest in virtuous imperatives;
(b) all associations may not create trust and cooperation in the society,
some, like SHGs with economic interests inbuilt, may even stratify the
society.
These findings are at variance with what Pai (2001) has tried to
establish. She observes that social segmentation emerges as significant
in determining development of trust and social capital between groups.
The findings of this study reveal that trust and social capital within
tribal context is omnipresent. Economic segregation and its. intensity
play a dominant role in manifestation of social capital. It remains
unutilised under some conditions, is used in virtuous pattern in some
and vicious in others.

20
 These findings, however, corroborate the observations of Rudolph
(2000) that not all associations are likely to create trust and cooperation
with positive implications.

5. Concluding Observations
Social capital is omnipresent in the tribal context. Its utilisation in
development decision-making and its pattern of manifestation would
be contextual to the milieu where it is operational. The findings of this
study reveal that (i) factors like the pattern of settlement, importance
of social norms, and failure of state have helped to perpetuate the trust
and cooperation in the community, (ii) civil society has played a
significant role in making this capital available for wider use, and (iii)
the pattern of manifestation of social capital depends on the
complexities of economic stratification and efficiency of decentralised
governance. Three different forms of leadership have emerged in this
tribal society: the traditional, the emerging economic leadership and
the political leadership. All the three have created their own space in
the community, but their relevance depends on their ability to deliver.
The efficiency of working of political decentralisation is not different
in both the villages but the political leadership is unable to use social
capital for the betterment of the condition of people in both Pospur
and Kirchali, because the policies and programmes it has introduced
are inappropriate and ineffective. What is different in the two villages
is the individualistic economic efforts in Kirchali that have paid
sizeable benefits as compared to Pospur. The dormancy of social
capital in development decision making in Kirchali is significantly
influenced by intense economic segregation that has given a strong
message to the community that well being is a function of individual
efforts. In contrast, in economically homogenous Pospur, the social
capital is much more vibrant.
However, the trust and concerns for fellow members in both
the villages is in perpetual conflict with the political hierarchy which is
self-serving. In Pospur, this conflict has vibrant expression of vicious as
well as virtuous pattern of social capital. On the other hand, in Kirchali,
the social capital has remained uninvested and dormant. Despite the fact
that the social capital has positively influenced non-social events since the
early 1990s, its manifestations in governance have been marginal. One
wonders why the social capital could not be transferred into the sphere
of governance. This raises issues regarding the nature of benefits that
decentralised governance could potentially give to the community and
21
of the likelihood of this process to address the livelihood problems of
the marginalised. The community at large finds that the benefits are not
worth wasting their days' labour.29
In remote rural areas, market and state failure has invited intense
community participation in informal institutions. This has helped in
developing and perpetuating social capital; the informal institutional
arrangements that replace markets and formal legal institutions, more
often than not, result in mutually beneficial exchanges that help the
creation and perpetuation of social capital. The civil society has given
the community the needed support for trust and cooperation to be
visible in different spheres. The inability of the community to use its
social capital for local development is rooted in the heterogeneity
created by the individualism of the economic and political elites. If
economic inequality is high, the social capital remains dormant and
under-utilised. Both virtuous and vicious investment of social capital
can take place simultaneously.
The following features of social capital are discerned from the
study:
1. Social capital in a traditional society is omnipresent but
remains dormant. Once activated by the catalytic action of
civil society, complexities of economic stratification guide its
manifestation.
2. Social capital not only enhances the efficiency of institutional
arrangements that have emerged due to market failures but
also strengthens the trust and cooperation between groups.
3. Social capital need not always lead to efficiency in governance;
it could work in a vicious pattern, obstructing options that are
virtuous in nature.
4. Virtuous and vicious patterns of social capital can
manifest simultaneously in one place.
5. Transfer of social capital from the social sphere to the political
sphere is possible only if the gains of decentralised governance
are large and equitable.
In economically homogeneous and relatively remote rural areas the
social capital is much more vibrant. The trust and concerns for
fellow members are in perpetual conflict with the political hierarchy
which is self-serving. Participatory democracy has capabilities to convert
cumulative unfreedom to distributive unfreedom. Gram Swaraj has failed

22
in theory but Gram Swaraj must succeed to harness the capabilities of the
social capital.

Endnotes
1. It is argued that through these processes the
concentrated marginalisation could be converted into
distributive marginalisation where one could be economically
poor but politically free and socially included.
2. Social capital comprises of systems of norms, institutions
and organisations that promote trust and cooperation in a
community. It is considered a form of capital because it helps
in accelerating the process of well-being and healthy decision
making in the community. Putnam (1993) is the best-known
exponent of the concept, though both neo-institutional
economists like North and sociologists like Bourdieu were early
proponents of this concept. Durston (1998) argues that:
In economic exchange, social capital reduces transaction
cost arising when dealing with outsiders in unregulated
environment; it helps in honest and efficient governance.
Social capital strengthens each time it is activated; social
capital, like culture, is perpetuated and it could take a
virtuous or a vicious path. Repeated social interaction
virtuous or otherwise strengthens civic participation or
non-participation; and social capital developed in culture
or religious spheres is transferable to political or
economic spheres.
3. Agriculture being the main economic activity, division of family
due to marriage of a son, leads to weakening of economic
hierarchy. The newly formed households are relatively resource

23
 deficient and rely on social networks for support not only in
social interactions but also for economic survival; also see, Sah
and Shah (2003), for details.
4. This research is a part of larger study on multi-dimensional
poverty in remote rural areas. Macro findings have identified
Southwestern tribal belt of Madhya Pradesh as one of the
economically poorest region in the country. Badwani district in
the region has been selected for in-depth study to understand
why and how people in Remote Rural Areas are trapped in
chronic poverty. Two Janpads, one relatively developed
Sendhwa and one resource poor Pati, are selected for the study.
One village from each of the selected Janpad, Pospur from
Pati, and Kirchali from Sendhwa, were selected based on
their relative remoteness; Kirchali is relatively less remote
compared to Pospur. The paper uses the case study method and
compares two communities, Kirchali and Pospur. For a
detailed write-up on the background, demographic, social
structure and brief history of communities, see, (Sah and Shah
2003).
5. Rajput rulers of Badwani were treated with honour by Mughals
and were given their original powers. These rulers in early 18th
Century, however, assisted the Maratha invasion in the Malwa.
British took over the state briefly in 1861 to 1873. From 1894
till 1910, the state was administered directly under the British
Political Agent. During the First World War, the then Prince of
the Badwani state, Ranjit Singh, served the forward line of
France. In recognition of this, he was granted powers to rule
again. In 1921 the prince received, with hereditary
perpetuity, some more powers. After his death, his minor son,
Devi Singh, was invested with administrative powers. Till
independence, the Sisodias ruled the state. In 1948, the state
was merged in India. For details, see, (Shrivastav 1970).
6. The interest rate charged by the bania in the region is as high as
50 per cent for four months. A shock in the form of death of
bread earner, prolonged illness or failed crop result in the tribal
debtor losing his assets - land, silver and animals. The riches
and affluence of the trading bania community in the towns of
Pati, Sendhwa and trading centres like Chacania, Dhanora etc. can
be traced to exploitation of tribals by them.

24
7. In contemporary Nimar hills, a large part of cultivation is
on encroached forestland. Tribals do not want to talk about
when they settled on these upper hill lands. It is recalled that
the most recent tribal influx in the hills has been in last 75 to
100 years. A significant proportion of the resettled households
have acquired land rights by 1970s. About 10 per cent of
encroachers are still fighting for their rights. Vast tracts of the
Nimar hills are still uninhabited. Population pressures may
encourage tribals to settle on these tracts for survival, fuelling a
new confrontation with the state. The British made shifting
cultivation illegal, reserved the forests and established sources of
revenue there (Morse and Berger 1992).
8. The economic critique of the colonial past legitimised the option
to govern the new nation state; in order to legitimise their
political authority, the Congress assumed the role of central
allocator with an aim to remove inequality by a process that
resulted in rapid economic growth. The process required efforts
and sacrifice by citizens. The dalits, the small and marginal
farmers, the landless labourers and the tribals were the groups
that made the sacrifices.
9. The scale of the problem is reflected in the fact that in the
Nimar hills many villages are identified as forest villages, i.e.,
lying outside the revenue system. In Pati taluka of Badwani
district, out of 106 villages, 46 are identified as forest villages.
Rights of tribals in the forest villages are highly restricted by
the forest department.
10. Commercialisation of liquor is a recent phenomenon. As forests
have dwindled and opportunity cost of fuel wood increased
many fold, Moudee (the home made brew made out of Mouda
flowers) making has become a costly affair. Consequently,
purchase of country liquor has replaced Moudee brewing.
The bania has also started liquor supply. A section of the
tribal population, about 5 to 7 per cent, is alcoholic. Country
liquor is cheap but is a cause of indebtedness for these
households.
11. Sardar Sarovar Project, a large irrigation project costing the
state Rs. 80 thousand million in 1986-87 prices, is one of 30
major, 135 medium and 3000 minor dams planned on the
Narmada river. These projects will displace a large number

25
 of families from Madhya Pradesh. Resettlement and
rehabilitation of the project affected persons has been casual to
put it mildly (Sah 1977; 2002).
12. Political leadership in the village is thoroughly corrupt; the
popular saying in the village is that during the first year the
elected Sarpanch renovates his house. In the second year he
invests in a motorcycle followed by investment on agricultural
infrastructure (well and energising it), in the next year. A diesel
engine arrives the following year and a tractor in the fifth year.
13. Kirchali is a part of Ramkula-Kirchali Panchayat. The
Sarpanch is from Ramkula. The political affairs of the
Sarpanch are dealt with as if that is his private business.
14. Ramesh, an educated tribal, who had to leave his Talati
training in early 1990s, and the Patel with their economic
clout and nearness to the Sarpanch, invested in drawing
electricity connections from the nearest distribution point
from village Surana. They are also the agency between the
community and the Ramkula-Kirchali Panchayat Sarpanch and
corner a substantial portion of IRDP loans and subsidy meant
for the community. Over a period of time, other villagers like
Vesta, Girdhar, Jagdish and Ristan came forward and
invested in a well and energising it. Vesta purchased an
electric motor (Rs. 3,200) two years ago and invested Rs.
6,000 for drawing electricity. He repaid the loan within two
seasons. In 2001 when the availability of water from the river
bed became uncertain, Vesta thought of investing in digging
the rocky fields for water and completed the well (an
investment of Rs. 10,000). He got water but not for the
whole crop season. Vesta intends to invest some more capital
for deepening the well. Since his land is irrigated all the
borrowings were repaid within two seasons. He was taking a
ratio of 2 kg seed resulting in 22 quintals of wheat.
15. In fact, caste Panchayat along with traditional village Panchayat are
the two tribal institutions that promote community
participation in all social decision-making. (Sah and Shah 2003).
16. Conflicts over natural resources between the state and the
community in this tribal belt have a long history. However,
the exploitation of natural resources is also from within. But
the solidarity created by outside (state and bania) exploitation did
26
 bind the society. Two of the most active NGOs that are
mobilising the tribals in the area are Narmada Bachao
Andolan and the Adivasi Mukti Sangathan. While the former is
mobilising the tribals on failures of development paradigm
adopted by the state, the latter is organising them against
natural resource depletion, state repression and their rights
(Sah and Shah 2003).
17. A discussion with the Chief Executive Officer of Pati taluka,
where the Advasi Mukti Sangathan is active, brings out the
fact that awareness about tribal rights has grown significantly
in the area over the last 7-8 years. Earlier when a tribal came
to the taluka Panchayat he was always accompanied by the
activists of AMS. Now they come on their own.
18. Even during the fieldwork of the study, because of the
nature of the investigation where land, assets, livelihood etc.
were being discussed, the community was apprehensive of the
presence of outsiders. There was a perception, in both Kirchali
and Pospur, that such investigation is part of state activities to
understand the pre-submergence situation so that resettlement
package can be identified for individual households. In
Kirchali the community accepted the team after discussions
on the nature, scope and implications of the study. But in
Pospur the situation became ugly and at one stage the social
leadership forced the team to abandon its work. The team was
told in no uncertain terms that the community is happy in
Pospur living as they are, earning their livelihood based
on thin agriculture, some through on-farm labour and
migration. Fortunately, a group of economic leaders, especially
those who have had benefits of self-help group, could feel that
the study is not for acquisition of land. The social hierarchy in
Pospur had a strong message: 'Please leave us as we are. We do not
need any outside help for our livelihood. We are content with our life and
livelihood despite poor agriculture, hard labour and degrading migration.
Do not disturb us'
19. This is especially true for forest guards and the police.
What is commonly discussed in the village is that
traditional local conflict resolution methods are far more
just, for the police will settle the dispute by taking money
from both the parties and would be biased against the group that
has given less bribe.
27
20. Eight committees deal with decisions relating to agriculture,
health, infrastructure, education, social justice, defence,
development and assets. The political decentralisation has
accepted the role of traditional leaders in both Pospur and
Kirchali. Traditional leaders are a crucial part of Village Security
Committee that deals with all disputes emerging in the village.
21. In Kirchali, individuals are investing over Rs. 20,000 for digging
wells in rocky terrain with high risk of failure and in drawing
electricity line from the nearest Distribution Point. There are over
thirty individuals that have such connections. This process
brought economic success to individuals, but has stratified the
society on economic lines. Remoteness of Pospur, its difficult
terrain, high risk and initial failures in such investment has made
the village more homogenous.
22. The remoteness of Pospur and poor agricultural base has
resulted in a relatively large population relying on migration as a
coping mechanism compared to the less remote Kirchali (Sah
and Shah 2003).
23. Tribal economy is based on reciprocity. The short-term land
transaction, especially share cropping and fixed rent, create
social trust based on social return in exchange of economic
gains. This latter (social) function of exchange is as important
as its formal (economic) function of exchange.
24. A sharecropper, Ramesh, said that I will have to look after the
aged parents of my close relatives in their absence in any case,
but I will have to bring a doctor and spend Rs. 30-50 on an
injection or two in case I have leased-in their land.
25. A large number of variations exist when the contracts are agreed
upon. With share cropping at one end and mortgage of land
on the other, a large number of fixed rent contracts fall in
the middle. Depending upon the bargaining power of different
participants, the urgency of the deal to materialise, and
perception of cost of enforcing the contract, terms and
conditions vary even in a village.
26. Moral hazards are involved in sharecropping: The tribal who
is leasing out land would like to ensure that the tenant, as
agreed, has applied labour and inputs on the field for he has
28
 to share the out-of-pocket cost. Similar is the case when the
crop would be harvested and shared, for the landowner has
to ensure that he receives the crop output portion as agreed.
For enforcing these, the landowner migrant has to either
make a number of visits to the village or leave all the
monitoring in trust on the other party. In this area the first
option is more prevalent, not because of lack of trust but
because it re-establishes his ties with the community.
27. In Pospur, seven 'Self-help Groups' comprising around 10
members each, are in operation. Members of these groups
contribute Rs. 50 to Rs. 100 per month. One of the 'Self help
Group' has provided loan of Rs. 20,000 to a farmer in order to
get his mortgaged land back from a trader. Another 'Self-
help Group' has over Rs. 20,000 in a nationalised bank and is in
the process of receiving a loan of Rs. 0.3 million for goat
rearing.
28. It has been argued that associations that draw on inherited
identities and solidarities need to be taken into account as
associations that may generate social capital. Rudolph (2000)
suggests that only those organisations that are
egalitarian, non-interest oriented and voluntary associations
would create collaborative and cooperative conventions that
can and do mediate between the individual and society
or individuals and the state.
29. Migration keeps a sizeable workforce out of the village for
over 6 to 7 months. Moreover, iniquitous distribution of
benefits and unfulfilled expectations of the community from
decentralised governance lead to more empathy towards the
institution. (Sah and Shah 2003).

References
Agrawal, A. and Sivaramakrishnan, K. 2001. 'Introduction: Agrarian Environment', in A.
Agrawal and K. Sivaramakrishnan (ed.), Social Nature: Resources, Representation and Rule in India.
New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Baviskar, A. 2001. 'Written on the Body, Written on the Land: Violence and Environmental
Struggles in Central India', Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

29
Baviskar, A. 1995. In the Belly of the River: Tribal Conflicts over Development in the Narmada
Valley. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Blyn, G. 1966. 'Agricultural Trends in India, 1891-1947: Output, Availability and
Productivity', University of Pennsylvania.
Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. 2000. 'Social Capital and Community Governance', (Mimeo),
Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Massachusetts.
Dubey, K. C. 1998. 'Tribal Uprising and Social Movements in Madhya Pradesh', in K.
Singh (ed.) Antiquity to Modernity in Tribal Area, Volume 4, Tribal Movements in India, New Delhi:
Inter India Publications.
Durston, J. 1998. 'Building Social Capital in Rural Communities', Social Development
Division, UN Economic Commission, Santiago, Chile.
Gadgil, M. and Guha, R. 1992. This fissured Land: An Ecological History of India. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Government of India 1959. Report of India's Food Crisis and Steps to Meet it, Ministry of Food and
Agriculture, New Delhi.
Mellor, J. W. 1967. The New Economics of Growth: A Strategy for India and the Developing Word.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Morse, Bradford and Berger, Thomas 1992. Sardar Sarovar: The Report of the Independent Review,
Resource Futures International, Ottawa.
Pai, S. 2001. 'Social Capital, Panchayats and Grassroots Democracy: Politics of Dalit Assertion
in Uttar Pradesh', Economic and Political Weekly, 36, February 24.
Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R. and Raffaella, Y. N. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in
Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rudloph, S. H. 2000. 'Civil Society and the Realm of Freedom', Economic and Political Weekly,
35, May 13.
Sah, D. C. 2002. 'Crop Commercialisation and Migration', in G. Shah and D. C. Sah
(ed.), Land Reforms in India, Volume 8: Performance and Challenges in Gujarat and Maharashtra.
New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Sah, D. C. 1997. 'Second generation Problems of Involuntary migration: Evidences from
Sardar Sarovar Project', Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 52(4).
Sah, D. C. and Shah, Amita 2003. 'Chronic Poverty in Remote Rural Areas of South-
western Madhya Pradesh', (Mimeo), Madhya Pradesh Institute of Social Science
Research, Ujjain and Gujarat Institute of Development Research, Ahmedabad.
Sen, Amartya 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Srivastav, P. N. 1970. West Nimar: Madhya Pradesh District Gazetteers, District Gazetteers
Department, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal.
Wade, R. 1988. 'Why Some Indian Villages Cooperate', Economic and Political Weekly,
33, April 16.

30