Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989

SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner,

vs.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:

The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a public officer, who has
been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former
position without need of a new appointment.

In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.
Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime
of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500. They were further ordered to
jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of
the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.

Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same.
She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on
December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December
21, 1984.

By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.

Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the
provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of appointment of treasurers from
the city governments to the said Ministry. In its 4th Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance
Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new
appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city
treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required to be
indemnified in favor of the government as well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied. 1

Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April 17, 1985
stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service
in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to
backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50. 2
The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner's letter to the Office of the President for further
review and action. On April 15, 1986, said Office, through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio S.
Factoran, Jr. held:

We disagree with both the Ministry of Finance and the petitioner because, as borne
out by the records, petitioner was convicted of the crime for which she was accused.
In line with the government's crusade to restore absolute honesty in public service,
this Office adopts, as a juridical guide (Miranda v. Imperial, 77 Phil. 1966), the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, in People v. Lising, Crim. Case No.
6675, October 4, 1985, that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer
is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment
of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite.

In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment
before he can reassume his former position. ...

Anent the civil liability of Monsanto, the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that
"a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence." (Sec. 36, par. 2).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office holds that Salvacion A. Monsanto is not
entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted
her but must secure an appointment to her former position and that, notwithstanding
said absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous
conviction. 3

Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition in
her behalf We gave due course on October 13, 1987.

Petitioner's basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of
the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in
this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant
city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited. In other words, without that final
judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of
her employment remained "suspended." More importantly, when pardon was issued before the final
verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the President
has declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has accordingly dismissed the same. 4

It is well to remember that petitioner had been convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced to imprisonment of four years, two months and one
day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. The
penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the
principal penalty. 5 Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or
employment, such disqualification to last during the term of the sentence. 6 Even if the offender be
pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same have been
expressly remitted by the pardon. 7 The penalty of prision correccional carries, as one of its
accessory penalties, suspension from public office. 8
The propositions earlier advanced by petitioner reveal her inadequate understanding of the nature of
pardon and its legal consequences. This is not totally unexpected considering that the authorities on
the subject have not been wholly consistent particularly in describing the effects of pardon.

The benign mercy of pardon is of British origin, conceived to temper the gravity of the King's wrath.
But Philippine jurisprudence on the subject has been largely influenced by American case law.

Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the
laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for
a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered
to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. ... A
pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without
acceptance." 8-a

At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power was governed by
the 1973 Constitution as amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The pertinent provision reads:

The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations

and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, and with the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa, grant amnesty. 9

The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final
conviction, implying that clemency could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner's
unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth
mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was restored.
But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was
bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted
the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by
the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.

Having disposed of that preliminary point, we proceed to discuss the effects of a full and absolute
pardon in relation to the decisive question of whether or not the plenary pardon had the effect of
removing the disqualifications prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

In Pelobello v. Palatino, 10 We find a reiteration of the stand consistently adopted by the courts on the
various consequences of pardon: "... we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v.
Labrador, G.R. No. 47941, December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an
absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the
conviction. ... (W)e are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this
jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after an
inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent
of relieving completely the party ... concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of
criminal conviction.

The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v. Labrador cases, 11 and several others 12 show the
unmistakable application of the doctrinal case of Ex Parte Garland, 13 whose sweeping
generalizations to this day continue to hold sway in our jurisprudence despite the fact that much of
its relevance has been downplayed by later American decisions.

Consider the following broad statements:

 A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he
had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the
penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil
rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
capacity. 14

Such generalities have not been universally accepted, recognized or approved. 15 The modern trend
of authorities now rejects the unduly broad language of the Garland case (reputed to be perhaps the
most extreme statement which has been made on the effects of a pardon). To our mind, this is the
more realistic approach. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of
guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the
offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or
remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and
the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not
forgetfulness. 16

The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's innocence)
as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the
disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. 17 But it relieves him from nothing more.
"To say, however, that the offender is a "new man", and "as innocent as if he had never committed
the offense;" is to ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty
of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment, though
left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than one never found
guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his conviction." 18

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. 19 It makes no amends for the past. It affords no
relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any
obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the offense has been established
by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed
to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." 20 This
would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost
earnings and benefits.

Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive declared her
not guilty of the crime for which she was convicted. In the case of State v. Hazzard, 21 we find this
strong observation: "To assume that all or even a major number of pardons are issued because of
innocence of the recipients is not only to indict our judicial system, but requires us to assume that
which we all know to be untrue. The very act of forgiveness implies the commission of wrong, and
that wrong has been established by the most complete method known to modern civilization.
Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they
cannot erase the stain of bad character, which has been definitely fixed. 22

In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to concede that
pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the
fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action,
we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that
once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the
judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to
equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained the
mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.

Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which, despite the
public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into
account in their subsequent dealings with the actor." 23

Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is
rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 24 This must be
constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege.

Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full
agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon
to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction 25 although such
pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. 26

The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection,
safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To
insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted
one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot
preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character,
a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.

For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public
office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification
of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment
were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner
may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in
considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense
must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can
once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has
resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment.

Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her
by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the
Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence
is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be
extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing
due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. 27

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J.:

I concur in the result but on grounds different from those relied upon by the majority
opinion.

Petitioner Salvacion A Monsanto was Assistant Treasurer of Calbayog City. Together with three (3)
other accused, she was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the complex crime of Estafa
through falsification of public documents. After trial, the accused were convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum,
to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P
3,500.00. They were also ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P
4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.

Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to this Court which affirmed the same. Petitioner then
filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
extended to her on 17 December 1984 an absolute pardon which she accepted on 21 December
1984.

By reason of said absolute pardon, petitioner in representations before the City Treasurer of
Calbayog, the Ministry of Finance and the Office of the President, asked that she be allowed to re-
assume her former office, as of 1 August 1982 (the date of her preventive suspension), that she be
paid her back salaries for the entire period of her suspension, and that she be not required to pay
her proportionate share of the amount of P 4,892.50.

Respondent Assistant Executive Secretary denied petitioner's request for automatic reinstatement
as well as her other claims, because of which denial, this petition for review on certiorari was filed
before the Court seeking the setting aside and reversal of the decision of the respondent Assistant
Executive Secretary, on the main contention that, as a public officer who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the President, she is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need
of a new appointment, and to the other reliefs prayed for.

There can be no dispute that the pardon extinguished petitioner's criminal liability. At the same time,
Art. 36 of the Revised Penal Code categorically covers the effects of a pardon on the pardoned's
right to hold office, suffrage and on his civil liability. It states:

ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. - A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by
the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence. (Emphasis supplied)

Applying Art. 36 of the Revised Penal Code to the case at bar, it is, to my mind, clear that the pardon
extended by the President to the petitioner did not per se entitle her to again hold public office
(including therefore the office of Assistant Treasurer, Calbayog City) or to suffrage; nor did such
pardon extinguish her civil liability for the criminal conviction, subject matter of the pardon.

An examination of the presidential pardon in question shows that, while petitioner was granted "an
absolute and unconditional pardon and restored to full civil and political rights", yet, nothing
therein expressly provides that the right to hold public office was thereby restored to the petitioner. In
view of the express exclusion by Art. 36, RPC of the right to hold public office, notwithstanding a
pardon unless the right is expressly restored by the pardon, it is my considered opinion that, to the
extent that the pardon granted to the petitioner did not expressly restore the right to hold public office
as an effect of such pardon, that right must be kept away from the petitioner.

It is a recognized principle in public law — hopefully to be honored more in its compliance rather
than in its breach — that a "public office is a public trust." The restoration of the right to hold public
office to one who has lost such right by reason of conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently
pardoned, cannot be left to inference, no matter how intensely arguable, but must be stated in
express, explicit, positive and specific language. To require this would not be asking too much.

I am aware that there are broad statement in Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 341 and Pelobello vs.
Palatino, 72 Phil. 441 which may be understood to mean that an absolute pardon, without
qualification, restores full civil rights which have been construed, in turn, to include the right to hold
public office (Versoza vs. Fernandez, 55 Phil. 323).

If such be the message of said cases, then I submit that a modification is in order, so that an
absolute pardon to work a restoration of the right to hold public office must expressly so state, in
order to give substance and meaning to the sound provisions of Article 36 of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly in the light of our times and experience.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the petition.

Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in the important and eloquent opinion of the Chief Justice. I also join in
the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Padilla. At the same time, I would add a few brief
statements, basically for my own clarification. Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Article 36. Pardon; its effects. - A pardon shall not work the registration of the right to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by
the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence. (Emphasis supplied)

It is worthy of note that the rule embodied in Article 36 is reiterated four (4) times by the Revised
Penal Code in its following provisions:

Article 40. Death-Its accessory penalties. - The death penalty, when it is not
executed by reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual
absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty years following the
date of sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in
the pardon.

Article 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal. - Their accessory penalties.
- The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them
that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may
 be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer
even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.

Article 42. Prision mayor - Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of prision
mayor shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall
suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Article 43. Prision correccional - Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of prision
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen
months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)

The Chief Justice points out that the penalty imposed upon petitioner for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents, included the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification from public office or employment and perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage. The 17 December 1984 pardon extended to petitioner in the instant case was written on
a standard printed form which states in printed words that it was "an absolute and unconditional
pardon [which] restored [petitioner] to full civil and political rights." 1 While the right of suffrage and
the right to hold public office or employment are commonly regarded as "political rights," 2 it must be
noted that there are other "political rights" 3 and that the pardon given to petitioner did not expressly
and in printer's ink restore to petitioner the particular right to hold public office and the specific right
to vote at elections and plebiscites.

I join in the basic point of Mr. Justice Padilla that because of the nature of a public office as a public
trust, Articles 36 and 40-43 appropriately require a very high degree of explicitness if a pardon is to
work the restoration of such right to petitioner. Exactly the same point may, of course, be made in
respect of the restoration of the right to vote.

Articles 36 and 40-43 of the Revised Penal Code, quoted above, have been in our statute books
since 1930. I believe that they have been left intact by the constitutional provisions on pardon,
whether one refers to the 1935 Constitution or to the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. I do not believe
that Articles 36, et al. collided with any provision or principle embodied in either of our prior
constitutions. The Chief Justice appears to agree with this position when he referred to Article 36 of
the Revised Penal Code (Opinion, p. 5). He goes on, however, to say (in page 13) that: "the pardon
granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment
but it cannot go beyond that."

It is submitted, with respect, that Articles 36, et al. of the Revised Penal Code have not been shown
to be an unconstitutional restriction on the pardoning power of the President. The limitation on the
President's pardoning power, if limitation it be, does not appear to be an unreasonably onerous one.
Articles 36, et al. merely require the President to become completely explicit if the pardon he
extends is intended to wipe out not merely the principal but also the accessory penalty of
disqualification from holding public office and from voting and to restore the recipient of the pardon to
the exercise of such fundamental political rights. Such requirement of explicitness seems entirely in
line with the fundamental point made by the Chief Justice that a pardon does not blot out the factual
guilt of the recipient of the pardon. In other words, the mere grant of a pardon to a public officer or
employee who has been unfaithful to the public trust and sentenced to disqualification from voting
and from holding such office, does not create the presumption that the recipient of the pardon has
thereby suddenly become morally eligible once more to exercise the right to vote and to hold public
office.

In my view, the pardon extended to petitioner was ineffective to restore to her the right to hold public
office and on this ground, I vote to DENY the Petition for Review and to AFFIRM the assailed
Resolution of the then Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.

Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Sarmiento, JJ., concur.