Case Compliation

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IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 8

PETITIONER:
STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
CH. BHAJAN LAL AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT21/11/1990
BENCH:
PANDIAN, S.R. (J)
BENCH:
PANDIAN, S.R. (J)
REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J)
CITATION:
1992 AIR 604 1990 SCR Supl. (3) 259
1992 SCC Supl. (1) 335 JT 1990 (4) 650
1990 SCALE (2)1066
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950: Article 226--Quashing of
criminal proceedings--Circumstances under which power could
be exercised-Guidelines given.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 154, 155,
156, 157, 159--Cognizable offence--Field of
investigation--Exclusive domain of investigating
agencies--Court’s interference--When justified.
Section 482--Inherent powers of courts--Exercise
Of--Circumstances necessitating quashing of criminal pro-
ceedings--Guidelines indicated.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947: Section 5--Investi-
gation by designated officers--Express prohibition of offi-
cers below certain rank---Whether directory or
mandatory--Exceptions only on adequate reasons--To be dis-
closed--Authorising such non_designated officers without
reasons--Whether legal and valid--Investigation carried on
by such officer--Quashing of.
Words & Phrases: "Reason to suspect"--Meaning of.
HEADNOTE:
The First Respondent was a Minister and subsequently
Chief Minister of Haryana State. Later he became Union
Minister. On 12.11.1987 a complaint was presented before the
Haryana Chief Minister, wherein serious allegations were
levelled against the First Respondent. The main allegations
were that he accumulated huge properties worth crores of
rupees in the names of his family members, relations and
persons close to him by misusing his power and position and
by undervaluing the market price, and all those transactions
were benami in character. According to the complainant,
since the accumulation of the properties by the First Re-
spondent, in the shape of buildings, land, shares, ornaments
etc. was far beyond his legal means, an investigation should
be directed against him.
260
The Chief Minister’s Secretariat marked the complaint to
the Director General of Police, who in turn endorsed the
same to the Superintendent of Police concerned. On the
direction from the Superintendent of Police, the SHO regis-
tered a case under Sections 161 and 165 of Indian Penal
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Code, 1860 and under section 5(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 and took up the investigation.
Meanwhile, the First Respondent filed a Writ Petition
before the High Court for a direction to quash the First
Information Report and for restraining the appellants from
proceeding further with the investigation. The High Court
quashed the entire criminal proceedings holding that the
allegations did not constitute a cognizable offence for
commencing lawful investigation.
Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the appel-
lants preferred the present appeal by special leave, con-
tending that the allegations contained in the complaint,
either individually or collectively, constituted a cogniza-
ble offence warranting the registration of a case as contem-
plated under Section 154(1) Cr. P.C., and a thorough inves-
tigation in compliance with various statutory provisions Ã¯7
3
On behalf of the Respondents, it was contended that on
account of the deep rooted political animosity and rivalry
entertained by the then Chief Minister, he used the com-
plainant, who was stooge in his hands, to file the complaint
containing false and scurrilous allegations against the
First Respondent and hence the criminal proceedings rightly
deserved to be quashed.
Disposing of the appeal, this Court,
HELD: 1. The judgment of the High Court quashing the
First Information Report is set aside as not being legally
and factually sustainable in law. However, the commencement
as well as the entire investigation, if any, so far done is
quashed on the ground that the third appellant (SHO) is not
clothed with valid legal authority to take up the investiga-
tion and proceed with the same within the meaning of Section
5A(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. [319A-C]
2. The observations made by the High Court are unwar-
ranted and the historical anecdote is out of context and
inappropriate. If such a view is to be judicially accepted
and approved, then it will be tantamount to laying down an
alarming proposition that an incoming
261
Government under all circumstances, should put its seal of
approval to all the commissions and omissions of the outgo-
ing Government ignoring even glaring lapses and serious
misdeeds and the deleterious and destructive consequences
that may follow therefrom. [318E-F]
Krishna Ballabh Sahay & Ors. v. Commissioner of Enquiry
JUDGMENT:
Anr., [1988] 2 SCC 602; State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh,
[1980] 1 SCR 1071; relied on.
P.V. Jagannath Rao & Ors. v. State of Orissa & Ors.,
[1968] 3 SCR 789; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and
Ors., [1983] 1 SCC 438 and Sheonandan Paswan v. State of
Bihar & Ors., [1987] 1 SCC 288; referred to.
3.1. If any information disclosing a cognizable offence
is laid before an officer-in-charge of a police station
satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Crimi-
nal Procedure Code, the said police officer has no other
option except to enter the substance thereof in the pre-
scribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the
basis of such information. [279G]
3.2. Though a police officer cannot investigate a non- Ã¯7
3
offence, he can investigate a non-cognizable offence under
the order of a Magistrate having power to try such non-
cognizable case or commit the same for trial within the
terms under Section 155(2) of the Code but subject to Sec-
tion 155(3) of the Code. Further, under the newly introduced
Sub-section (4) to Section 155, where a case relates to two
offences to which atleast one is cognizable, the case shall
be deemed to be a cognizable case notwithstanding that the
other offences are non-cognizable and, therefore, under such
circumstances the police officers can investigate such
offences with the same powers as he has while investigating
a cognizable offence. [279H; 280A-B]
4. The core of the Sections 156, 157 and 159 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure is that if a police officer has reason
to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence, he must
either proceed with the investigation or cause an investiga-
tion to be proceeded with by his subordinate; that in a case
where the police officer sees no sufficient ground for
investigation, he can dispense with the investigation alto-
gether; that the field of investigation of any cognizable
offence is exclusively within the domain of the investiga-
tion agencies over which the Courts cannot have
262
control and have no power to stiffle or impinge upon the
proceedings in the investigation so long as the investiga-
tion proceeds in compliance with the provisions relating to
investigation and that it is only in a case wherein a police
officer decides not to investigate an offence, the concerned
Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation
or in the alternative, if he thinks fit, he himself can, at
once proceed or depute any Magistrate sub-ordinate to him to
proceed to hold a preliminary inquiry into or otherwise to
dispose of the case in the manner provided in the Code.
[283G-H; 284A-B]
State of Bihar and Anr. v. J.A.C. Saldanha and Ors.,
[1980] 1 SCC 554; S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and
Ors., [1970] 3 SCR 946; Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR
1954 P.C. 18 and Abhinandan v. Dinesh, [1967] 3 SCR 668;
referred to.
5.1. The expression "reason to suspect the commission of
an offence" used in Section 154(1) Cr. P.C. would mean the
sagacity of rationally inferring the commission of a cogniz-
able offence based on the specific articulate facts men-
tioned in the First Information Report as well in the Annex-
ures, if any, enclosed and any attending circumstances which
may not amount to proof. In other words, the meaning of the
expression "reason to suspect" has to be governed and dic-
tated by the facts and circumstances of each case and at Ã¯7
3
in the First Information Report does not arise. [286E-F]
5.2. The commencement of investigation by a police
officer is subject to two conditions, firstly, the police
officer should have reason to suspect the commission of a
cognizable offence as required by Section 157(1) and second-
ly, the police officer should subjectively satisfy himself
as to whether there is sufficient ground for entering on an
investigation even before he starts an investigation into
the facts and circumstances of the case as contemplated
under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 157(1) of the
Code. [288B-C]
Pakala Narayanaswami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 P.C. 47;
Emperor v. Vimlabai Deshpande, AIR 1946 P.C 123; United
States v. Cortez, 66 L.Ed. (United States Supreme Court
Reports) page 623; Dallison v. Caffery, [1964] 2 All E.R.
610; State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal J. Porwal, [1987] 2 SCC
364; Pukhraj v. D.R. Kohli, [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 866; State of
West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors., [1982] 3 SCR
121; referred to.
263
Webster’s Third International Dictionary; Corpus Juris
Secondum, Vol. 83 pp. 923, 927; Words and Phrases, (Perma-
nent Edition 40A) pp. 590, 591; referred to.
6. The investigation of an offence is the field exclu-
sively reserved for the police officers whose powers in that
field are unfettered so long as the power to investigate
into the cognizable offences is legitimately exercised in
strict compliance with the provisions falling under Chapter
XII of the Code and the Courts are not justified in obliter-
ating the track of investigation when the investigating
agencies are well within their legal bounds. A noticeable
feature of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is that
a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the
police investigation but he is not authorised to interfere
with the actual investigation or to direct the police how
that investigation is to be conducted. But if a police
officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly
and illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach
of any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to the
personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then the
Court, on being approached by the person aggrieved for the
redress of any grievance has to consider the nature and
extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders as may be
called for without leaving the citizens to the mercy of
police echelons since human dignity is a dear value of our
Constitution. No one can demand absolute immunity even if he
is wrong and claim unquestionable right and unlimited powers
exercisable upto unfathomable cosmos. Any recognition of Ã¯7
3
Power’ which no authority on earth can enjoy. [290D-G]
Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 P.C. 18; R.P.
Kapur v. The State of Punjab, [1960] 3 SCR 388; Nandini
Satpathy v. P.L. Dani & Anr., [1978] 2 SCC 424; S.N. Sharma
v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Ors., [1970] 3 SCR 946; Prabhu
Dayal Deorath etc. etc. v. The District Magistrate, Kamrup &
Ors., [1974] 2 SCR 12; State of West Bengal and Ors. v.
Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors., [1982] 3 SCR 121; referred to.
7.1 The view of the High Court that the non-filing of a
written statement by a competent authority of the State
Government by way of reply to the averments in the Writ
Petition was serious flaw on the part of the appellants and
as such the averments of Respondent No. 1 should be held as
having disproved the entire crimination alleged in the
F.I.R., is neither conceivable nor comprehensible. [293D]
7.2. It is true that some of the allegations do suffer from
misty
264
vagueness and lack of particulars. Further, there are no
specific averments that either Respondent No. 1 or his
relations and friends had no source of income to accumulate
the properties now standing in their names and that Respond-
ent No. 1 showed any favour to them by misusing his official
position. [294B-C]
These are all matters which would be examined only
during the course of investigation and thereafter by the
court on the material collected and placed before it by the
investigating agencies. The question whether the relations
and friends of Respondent No. 1 have independently purchased
the properties out of their own funds or not, also cannot be
decided by the Court at this stage on the denial statement
of Respondent No. 1 alone. [294C-D]
State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha and
Ors., [1982] 3 SCR 121; distinguished.
State of Bihar and Anr. v. J.A.C. Saldanha and Ors.,
[1980] 1 SCC 554; relied on.
8.1. In the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under
Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, the following categories of
cases are given by way of illustration wherein such power
could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of
any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though
it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guide- Ã¯7
3
myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exer-
cised:
(a) where the allegations made in the First Information
Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the ac-
cused;
(b) where the allegations in the First Information
Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R.
do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investi-
gation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code
except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code;
(c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or ’complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose
265
the commission of any offence and make out a case against
the accused;
(d) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code;
(e) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused;
(f) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institu-
tion and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there
is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party;
(g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge. [305D-H; 306A-E]
8.2. In the instant case, the allegations made in the
complaint, do clearly constitute a cognizable offence justi- Ã¯7
3
on and this case does not call for the exercise of extraor-
dinary or inherent powers of the High Court to quash the
F.I.R. itself. [307B]
State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak, [1963] 2 SCR 52;
distinguished.
R.P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab, [1960] 3 SCR 388;
S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Ors., [1970] 3 SCR
946; Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameshwar Prasad and Anr. etc.,
[1972] 1 SCC 452; Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration,
[1974] 3 SCR 794; Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, [1977] 4
SCC 137; Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, [1977] 4 SCC
551; Kurukshetra University and Anr. v. State of Haryana and
Anr., [1977] 4 SCC 451; State of Bihar and Anr. v.J.A.C.
Saldanha and Ors., [1980] 1 SCC 554; Municipal Corporation
of Delhi v. Purshotam Dass Jhunjunwala and Ors., [1983] 1
SCC 9; State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha
and Ors., [1982] 3 SCR 121; Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shiva-
lingappa Konjalgi
266
& Ors., [1976] Supp. SCR 123; Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar
and Anr., [1985] 2 SCC 370; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and
Ors. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and Ors., [1988] 1
SCC 692; State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan and Ors., [1988] 4
SCC 655; Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondekar
and Anr., [1958] SCR 1226; L.U. Jadhav v. Shankarrao Abasa-
heb Pawar, [1983] 4 SCC 231; J.P. Sharma v. Vinod KumarJain
and Ors., [1986] 3 SCC 67; State of U.P.v.V.R.K. Srivastava
and Anr., [1989] 4 SCC 59; Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad,
AIR 1945 P.C. 18; referred to.
9.1. The entire matter is only at a premature stage and
the investigation has not proceeded with except some prelim-
inary effort taken on the date of the registration of the
case. The evidence has to be gathered after a thorough
investigation and placed before the Court on the basis of
which alone the Court can come to a conclusion one way or
the other on the plea of mala fides. If the allegations are
bereft of truth and made maliciously, the investigation will
say so. At this stage, when there are only allegations and
recriminations but no evidence, this Court cannot anticipate
the result of the investigation and render a finding on the
question of mala fides on the materials at present avail-.
able. Therefore, it cannot be said that the complaint should
be thrown overboard on the mere unsubstantiated plea of mala
fides. Even assuming that the complainant has laid the
complaint only on account of his personal animosity that, by
itself, will not be a ground to discard the complaint con-
taining serious allegations which have to be tested and
weighed after the evidence is collected. [307G-H; 308A-D] Ã¯73
9.2. The dominant purpose of registration of the case

and the intended follow up action are only to investigate
the allegations and present a case before the Court, if
sufficient evidence in support of those allegations are
collected but not to make a character assassination of the
person complained against. [308H; 309A]
S. Pratap Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1964] 4 SCR
733; State of Haryana v. Rajindra Sareen, [1972] 2 SCR 452;
Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors., [1985] Supp. 3 SCR 382; P.V. Jagannath Rao & Ors. v.
State of Orissa & Ors., [1968] 3 SCR 789; The King v. Minis-
ter of Health, [1929] 1 K.B. 619; Rex v. Brighton Corpora-
tion Ex-parte Shoosmith, 96 L.T. 762; Earl Fitzwilliam’s
Wentworth Estate Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Town and Country
Planning, [1951] 2 K.B. 284; referred to.
10.1. A police officer with whom an investigation of an
offence
267
under Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is
entrusted should not proceed with a pre-conceived idea of
guilt of that person indicated with such offence and subject
him to any harassment and victimisation, because in case the
allegations of illegal accumulation of wealth are found,
during the course of investigation as baseless, the harm
done not only to that person but also to the office he held
will be incalculable and inestimable. [297C-E]
10.2. In the instant case, the SP seems to have exhibit-
ed some over-enthusiasm, presumably to please ’some one’ and
had directed the SHO to register the case and investigate
the same even on the very first day of the receipt of the
complaint from the DGP, in whose office the complaint was
lying for merely 9 days. This unprecedented overenthusiasm
shown by the S.P., without disclosing the reasons for making
an order entrusting the investigation to the SHO who is not
a designated officer under Section 5A(1), really shocks
ones’ sense of justice and fair play even though the untest-
ed allegations made in the complaint require a thorough
investigation. Still, it is an inexplicable riddle as to why
the S.P. had departed from the normal rule and hastly or-
dered the SHO to investigate the serious allegations, le-
velled against a former Chief Minister and a Minister in the
Cabinet of the Central Government on the face of the regis-
tration of the case. However, this conduct of the SP can
never serve as a ground for quashing the FIR. [298C-E]
Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, [1970] 3 SCR 931; The
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, [1964] 3
SCR 71; relied on. Ã¯73
11.1. A police officer not below the rank of an Inspec-
tor of Police authorised by the State Government in terms of
the First proviso can take up the investigation of an of-
fence referred to in clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, only on a separate and inde-
pendent order of a police officer not below the rank of a
Superintendent of Police. A strict compliance of the second
proviso is an additional legal requirement to that of the
first proviso for conferring a valid authority on a police
officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police to
investigate an offence falling under clause (e) of Section
5(1) of the Act. This is clearly spelt out from the expres-
sion "further provided" occurring in the second proviso.
Thus, investigation by the designated Police Officers is the
rule and investigation by an officer of a lower rank is an
exception. [311H; 312A-B]
11.2. The granting of permission under Section 5A of the
Preven-
268
tion of Corruption Act authorising an officer of lower rank
to conduct the investigation is not to be treated by a
Magistrate as a mere matter of routine, but it is an exer-
cise of his judicial discretion having regard to the policy
underlying and the order giving the permission should, on
the face of it, disclose the reasons for granting such
permission. The Superintendent of Police or any police
officer of higher rank while granting permission to a non-
designated police officer in exercise of his power under the
second provision to Section 5A(1), should satisfy himself
that there are good and sufficient reasons to entrust the
investigation with such police officer of a lower rank and
record his reasons for doing so; because the very object of
the legislature in enacting Section 5A is to see that the
investigation of offences punishable under Sections 16 1,
165 or 165A of Indian Penal Code as well as those under
Section 5 of the Act should be done ordinarily by the offi-
cers designated in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 5A(1). The
exception should be for adequate reasons which should be
disclosed on the face of the order. Strict compliance with
Section 5A(1) becomes absolutely necessary because it ex-
pressly prohibits police officers below certain ranks, from
investigating into offences under Sections 161, 165 and 165A
IPC and under Section 5 of the Act without orders of Magis-
trates specified therein or without the authorisation of the
State Government in this behalf and from effecting arrests
for those offences without a warrant. [314H; 3 15A-D]
11.3. The main object of Section 5A is to protect the
public servant against harassment and victimisation. Section
5A of the Act is mandatory and not directory and the inves- Ã¯7
3
illegality but that illegality committed in the course of an
investigation does not affect the competence and the juris-
diction of the Court for trial and where the cognizance of
the case has in fact been taken and the case is proceeded to
termination the validity of the proceedings with the preced-
ing investigation does not vitiate the result unless miscar-
riage of justice has been caused thereby. [311C; 312D-E]
11.4. In the instant case, there is absolutely no rea-
son, given by the S.P. in directing the SHe to investigate
and as such the order of the S.P. is directly in violation
of the dictum laid down by this Court in several decisions.
The third appellant, SHO is not clothed with the requisite
legal authority within the meaning of the second provision
of Section 5A(1) of the Act to investigate the offence under
clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act. [315E-F]
H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi, [1955] 1
269
SCR 1150; The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali, [1959]
Supp. 2 SCR 201; A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration, [1973]
3 SCR 477; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, [1984] 2 SCR 914;
Major E.G. Barsay v. The State of Bombay, [1962] 2 SCR 195;
Munna Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1964] 3 SCR 88; S.N.
Bose v. State of Bihar, [1968] 3 SCR 563; Muni Lal v. Delhi
Administration, [1971] 2 SCC 48; Khandu Sonu Dhobi & Anr. v.
State of Maharashtra, [1972] 3 SCR 510; relied on.
12. The Government order authorised the Inspector Gener-
al of Police to investigate only the offences failing under
Section 5 of the Act. Therefore, the SHO who has taken up
the investigation of the offences inclusive of those under
Section 161 and 165 IPC is not at all clothed with any
authority to investigate these two offences, registered
under the IPC, apart from the offence under Section 5(2) of
the Act. However, as the question relating to the legal
authority of the SHO is raised even at the initial stage, it
would be proper and also desirable that the investigation,
if at all to be proceeded with in the opinion of the State
Government, should proceed only on the basis of a valid
order in strict compliance with the mandatory provision of
Section 5A(1). [315G-H; 3 16A-B]
&
2023:DHC:2247
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of decision: 29th March 2023
+ CRL.M.C. 2792/2017
THE WIRE THROUGH ITS EDITOR & ANR. ..... Petitioners
Through: Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Rahul Kripalani,
Ms. Rea Bhalla and Ms. Supraja V,
Advocates.
versus
AMITA SINGH ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Alok Kumar Rai, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI
J U D G M E N T
ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI J.
By way of the present petition under section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 („Cr.P.C.‟ for short) read with Article 227
of the Constitution of India, the petitioners seek quashing of
summoning order dated 07.01.2017 made by the learned Metropolitan
Magistrate, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, whereby the
petitioners/accused have been summonsed to face trial in CC No.
32203-16 filed by the respondent/complainant alleging offences under
sections 499/500/501 and 502 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 („IPC‟
for short).
2. The petitioners impugn the summoning order on various grounds, as
detailed in this judgement, the principal contention being that there
Signature Not Verified

Digitally Signed
By:NEERAJ
Signing Date:29.03.2023 CRL.M.C. 2792/2017 Page 1 of 14
14:34:57
2023:DHC:2247
was no material on record on the basis of which the learned

Magistrate could have summonsed the petitioners.
3. The court has heard Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioners; and Mr. Alok Kumar Rai,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent. The court has also
heard Professor Amita Singh, the respondent in-person.
4. Briefly, the factual matrix relevant for purposes of the present petition
is the following :
4.1. The criminal complaint alleges offences punishable under
sections 499/500/501/502 IPC arising from a publication
carried on the on-line news portal “The Wire” on 26.04.2016
(„subject publication‟). The criminal complaint as filed, arrays
11 persons as accused. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 („A1‟ and „A2‟)
are respectively the Editor and the Deputy Editor of The Wire;
and Accused Nos. 3 to 11 are other persons, including a
politician, two assistant professors, two other major
publications, two students, an SHO and a website;
4.2. The complainant, who is a Professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi („JNU‟) had prayed for the court to take
cognizance of offences punishable under sections
499/500/501/502 IPC against all accused persons, and for
issuance of a direction to the SHO P.S.: Vasant Kunj, North to
investigate the matter and take action in accordance with law;
4.3. The learned Magistrate recorded the depositions of 05
witnesses on behalf of the complainant, viz. CW-1 : the
complainant herself, CW-2 : Professor Bupinder Zutshi, CW-3

Digitally Signed
By:NEERAJ
14:34:57
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: Dr. Rahila Sikandar, CW-4 : Nazia Khan and CW-5 : Manu

Singh;
4.4. Vide order dated 07.01.2017 the learned Magistrate was pleased
to issue summons - only to A1 and A2 - and to none of the other
accused persons. It is the said two accused persons who have
filed the present petition.
5. The relevant discussion appearing in order dated 07.01.2017, based
on which the learned Magistrate proceeds to summons the petitioners
as the only accused persons, is the following :
“This is a complaint made by the complainant Amita Singh, who
claims to be a Professor and the Chairperson of Centre for Study of
Law and Governance (JNU), u/s 500/501/502 IPC against certain
accused persons for imputing that she (complainant) prepared a
dossier allegedly depicting that Jawahar Lal Nehru University is a
“Den of Organised Sex Racket”. Complainant claims that she did
not prepare any such dossier. It is claimed by the complainant that
the said imputation was firstly made in an e-magazine “The Wire”
and thereafter the other accused persons, arrayed in the list of
parties, circulated/re-circulated/tweeted/retweeted the above
imputation, published by the said magazine, with their comments
which were also defamatory in nature. She further claims that she
is a victim of a hate campaign which has begun after the
publication of false information by the e-magazine, “The Wire”.
*****
“The complainant has placed on record computer printouts of the
said publication (in the e-magazine, “The-Wire”) in order to
substantiate her allegations.
*****
“It is pertinent to mention here that all the above mentioned

documents are actually copies of electronic records. In order for
the said documents to be read in evidence, the complainant is
supposed to prove a certificate u/s 65-B of the Evidence Act on the

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judicial file. However, the complainant has failed to do so for the

reasons best known to her. Only an affidavit, sworn before an Oath
commissioner, has been placed on record. But that too has not been
tendered in evidence. Consequently the print outs of all the
defamatory material, as relied by the complainant, could not be
read in evidence at this stage.
*****
“Now this Court is left only with oral accounts as deposed by the
complainant and her witnesses.
*****
“She claims that the accused no. 1 and 2 have defamed her by
wrongly imputing the preparation of the aforesaid dossier. It is
further claimed by her that the other accused have made
defamatory comments against her on the basis of said imputation.
She further claims that she did not prepare any such dossier.
*****
“… All the other witnesses have deposed that they have read the
defamatory publication in the e-magazine "The Wire" and have
further deposed categorically that the complainant has been
defamed on account of the publication of the said report …
*****
“In the considered opinion of this Court, there are sufficient
materials on record to summon the editor of accused no. 1 “The
Wire” as well as the accused no. 2 who authored the said
defamatory article. The other witnesses have not made any
statement supporting the assertions of the complainant qua the role
of other accused persons in defaming her. Except for oral testimony
of complainant Amita Singh, there is nothing on record to assume
culpability of the remaining accused persons at this stage.
Accordingly, this court is not inclined to summon the remaining
accused persons.”
(emphasis supplied)
6. It is accordingly the admitted position, as narrated in the summoning
order and as also evident from the record, that at the stage summons
were issued vide order dated 07.01.2017, no certificate under section

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65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 („Evidence Act‟ for short) in
support of a „print-out‟ of the on-line publication, had been filed by
the respondent. This on-line publication is the only matter which has
been imputed to the present petitioners. Absent the section 65-B
certificate, the print-out of the on-line publication could not be read in
evidence, as correctly observed by the learned Magistrate.
7. The aforesaid position is unequivocally settled by the verdict of the
Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs. Kailash Kushanrao
Gorantyal & Ors.1, where the Supreme Court holds thus :
“61. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under

Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of
evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar
P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 : (2015) 1
SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108],
and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammad [Shafhi
Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801 : (2018) 2 SCC 807 :
(2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 346 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 351 : (2018) 1 SCC
(Cri) 860 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 865]. Oral evidence in the place of
such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a
mandatory requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle
in Taylor v. Taylor [Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426], which
has been followed in a number of the judgments of this Court, can
also be applied. Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states
that secondary evidence is admissible only if led in the manner
stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section
65-B(4) otiose.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. So, what was before the learned Magistrate at the stage of passing the
summoning order was only the portion of the subject publication
which was extracted in the criminal complaint which contains the
1
(2020) 7 SCC 1.

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allegations against the petitioners. The relevant extract from the

complaint reads as follows :
“2. That the Accused Persons have started HATE CAMPAIGN
against the Complainant to malign the reputation of the
Complainant.
A. Accused No.1 & 2 The Wire, Its Editor, Siddharth Bhatia,
The Wire, has not verified the authenticity of the Dossier and has
used the same for the monetary benefits of its magazine and thereby
damaging, defaming and maligning the reputation of the
Complainant. Accused No.2 Ajoy Ashirwad Mahaprastha has
wrongly used the name of the Complainant in the same Dossier,
thereafter shared/distributed/uploaded the same on the Public
Domain/Social Websites, thereafter it was made available to the
millions of use of the Internet and the Accused Persons have
shared/posted/commented Defamatory words/phrases/statements/
remarks against the Complainant. the extract of the Dossier has
been reproduced below:
ANNEXURE C-3(Colly)
“Dossier calls JNU “Den of Organised Sex Racket” Students,
Professors Allege “Hate Campaign” By AJOY ASHIRWARD
MAHAPRASHASTA on 26/04/2016 . Leave A Comment””
(emphasis in original)
9. A plain reading of the aforesaid extract shows, that in and of itself,
there is nothing in the said extract that could be taken to be
defamatory of the respondent. As explained above, the aforesaid
caption only says that the dossier called JNU a “den of organised sex
racket”, but nothing in the extract says anything against the
respondent herself, much less anything that could be taken to be
defamatory of the respondent.
10. The aforesaid extracted portion is all that there was before the learned
Magistrate by way of the contents of the subject publication. All else

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was only the allegations, comments, inferences and grievances of the

respondent herself. In fact, the learned Magistrate himself correctly
observes in the summoning order, that he “... is left only with oral
accounts as deposed by the complainant and her witnesses ...” and
that he has therefore proceeded solely on the basis of the oral
testimony of some of the complainant's witnesses in relation to the
written matter. The written matter, viz. the subject publication, was
not before the learned Magistrate in any admissible form.
11. The learned Magistrate correctly appreciates the position of law in
this behalf; but then erroneously proceeds to pass the summoning
order on the basis of oral evidence in substitution of the electronic
record.
12. This, the learned Magistrate could not have done since no certificate
under section 65B of the Evidence Act had been filed in support of
the subject publication, which was an on-line publication; which, as
observed above, was the only subject-matter of the criminal complaint
against the present petitioners.
13. It is also noticed, that even assuming that the subject publication
could have been read in evidence, all that was stated in the article was
that the respondent had led a team of persons, who had compiled a
dossier, which dossier purported to expose certain wrongdoing at
JNU. The subject publication did not say that the respondent was
involved in any wrongdoing; nor did it speak of the respondent in any
derogatory, derisive or denigrating terms.
14. As the summoning order itself records, it is founded only upon the
depositions made by CW-1 to CW-5 at the pre-summoning stage. For

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one, the depositions of the complainant‟s witnesses were at best only

their conclusions and inferences in relation to whether the subject
publication was defamatory of the respondent or not. A reading of the
criminal complaint further reveals that the respondent has alleged that
other accused persons have made derogatory references to her, except
she blames all of that on the subject publication. However, the learned
Magistrate did not find any material to summons the other accused
persons, which would a-fortiori mean that the learned Magistrate was
of the opinion that ex-facie the allegations that the other accused
persons had made derogatory references to the respondent, were
baseless. If that be so, then to say that the subject publication carried
by the petitioners, was the cause for such derogatory references, loses
any meaning.
15. On point of fact, some of the witnesses who deposed in the
respondent‟s favour, do not even confirmedly say that they had read
the subject publication.
16. It may also be observed, that essentially, the learned Magistrate
proceeds on the basis of the oral testimony of the complainant's
witnesses who say that they find the matter defamatory. Since the
subject publication is not on record, it is only the opinion of those
witnesses about the publication that was read by the learned
Magistrate. In any case, whether or not the subject publication was
„defamatory‟ in law or not was a matter for judicial determination
and an opinion that must be formed by the court. The mere
interpretation, inferences and conclusions drawn by the complainant's

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witnesses on that score cannot have been the basis for summoning the
petitioners.
17. At this point, a closer reading of the provision defining the offence of
defamation under section 499 IPC is necessary. The said provision
recites as under :
“499. Defamation.—Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to
be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or
publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm,
or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will
harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases
hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.
Explanation 1. * * * * *
Explanation 2.— * * * * *
Explanation 3.— * * * * *
Explanation 4.—No imputation is said to harm a person's
reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the
estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of
that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his
caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes
it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state,
or in a state generally considered as disgraceful.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. The Supreme Court has also held that before issuing summons in a
criminal complaint alleging defamation, a Magistrate must act with
great circumspection, and be careful in assessing whether or not an
offence is disclosed. This is what the Supreme Court has said in
Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India2 :
“207. Another aspect required to be addressed pertains to issue of
summons. Section 199 CrPC envisages filing of a complaint in
court. In case of criminal defamation neither can any FIR be filed
2
(2016) 7 SCC 221.

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nor can any direction be issued under Section 156(3) CrPC. The
offence has its own gravity and hence, the responsibility of the
Magistrate is more. In a way, it is immense at the time of issue of
process. Issue of process, as has been held in Rajindra Nath
Mahato v. T. Ganguly [Rajindra Nath Mahato v. T. Ganguly, (1972)
1 SCC 450 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 206], is a matter of judicial
determination and before issuing a process, the Magistrate has to
examine the complainant. In Punjab National Bank v. Surendra
Prasad Sinha Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha,
1993 Supp (1) SCC 499 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 149] it has been held that
judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or
needless harassment. The Court, though in a different context, has
observed that there lies responsibility and duty on the Magistracy
to find whether the accused concerned should be legally
responsible for the offence charged for. Only on satisfying that the
law casts liability or creates offence against the juristic person or
the persons impleaded, then only process would be issued. At that
stage the court would be circumspect and judicious in exercising
discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances
into consideration before issuing process lest it would be an
instrument in the hands of the private complaint as vendetta to
harass the persons needlessly. Vindication of majesty of justice and
maintenance of law and order in the society are the prime objects of
criminal justice but it would not be the means to wreak personal
vengeance. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate
[Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749
: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400], a two-Judge Bench has held that
summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter
and criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. Guiding the High Courts on the same subject, in Mehmood Ul
Rehman vs. Khazir Mohammad Tunda 3 the Supreme Court has
further held thus :
3
(2015) 12 SCC 420.

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“20. The extensive reference to the case law would clearly show
that cognizance of an offence on complaint is taken for the purpose
of issuing process to the accused. Since it is a process of taking
judicial notice of certain facts which constitute an offence, there has
to be application of mind as to whether the allegations in the
complaint, when considered along with the statements recorded or
the inquiry conducted thereon, would constitute violation of law so
as to call a person to appear before the criminal court. It is not a
mechanical process or matter of course. As held by this Court in
Pepsi Foods Ltd. [Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5
SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400] to set in motion the process of
criminal law against a person is a serious matter.
“21. Under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC, the Magistrate has the

advantage of a police report and under Section 190(1)(c) CrPC, he
has the information or knowledge of commission of an offence. But
under Section 190(1)(a) CrPC, he has only a complaint before
him. The Code hence specifies that “a complaint of facts which
constitute such offence”. Therefore, if the complaint, on the face
of it, does not disclose the commission of any offence, the
Magistrate shall not take cognizance under Section 190(1)(a)
CrPC. The complaint is simply to be rejected.
“22. The steps taken by the Magistrate under Section 190(1)(a)

CrPC followed by Section 204 CrPC should reflect that the
Magistrate has applied his mind to the facts and the statements and
he is satisfied that there is ground for proceeding further in the
matter by asking the person against whom the violation of law is
alleged, to appear before the court. The satisfaction on the ground
for proceeding would mean that the facts alleged in the complaint
would constitute an offence, and when considered along with the
statements recorded, would, prima facie, make the accused
answerable before the court. No doubt, no formal order or a
speaking order is required to be passed at that stage. The Code of
Criminal Procedure requires speaking order to be passed under
Section 203 CrPC when the complaint is dismissed and that too the
reasons need to be stated only briefly. In other words, the

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Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking cognizance of each

and every complaint filed before him and issue process as a matter
of course. There must be sufficient indication in the order passed by
the Magistrate that he is satisfied that the allegations in the
complaint constitute an offence and when considered along with the
statements recorded and the result of inquiry or report of
investigation under Section 202 CrPC, if any, the accused is
answerable before the criminal court, there is ground for
proceeding against the accused under Section 204 CrPC, by issuing
process for appearance. The application of mind is best
demonstrated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction. If there is
no such indication in a case where the Magistrate proceeds under
Sections 190/204 CrPC, the High Court under Section 482 CrPC
is bound to invoke its inherent power in order to prevent abuse of
the power of the criminal court. To be called to appear before the
criminal court as an accused is serious matter affecting one’s
dignity, self-respect and image in society. Hence, the process of
criminal court shall not be made a weapon of harassment.
“23. Having gone through the order passed by the Magistrate, we

are satisfied that there is no indication on the application of mind by
the learned Magistrate in taking cognizance and issuing process to
the appellants. The contention that the application of mind has to
be inferred cannot be appreciated. The further contention that
without application of mind, the process will not be issued cannot
also be appreciated. Though no formal or speaking or reasoned
orders are required at the stage of Sections 190/204 CrPC, there
must be sufficient indication on the application of mind by the
Magistrate to the facts constituting commission of an offence and
the statements recorded under Section 200 CrPC so as to proceed
against the offender. No doubt, the High Court is right in holding
that the veracity of the allegations is a question of evidence. The
question is not about veracity of the allegations, but whether the
respondents are answerable at all before the criminal court. There
is no indication in that regard in the order passed by the learned
Magistrate.”
(emphasis supplied)

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20. On a plain, objective and careful reading of the extract of the subject
publication as contained in the criminal complaint, it appears that the
controversial dossier exposes wrongful activities that it says are
going-on within the university campus; and that the respondent was
leading a team of persons who compiled the dossier. At the risk of
repetition, the subject publication nowhere says that the respondent is
involved in the wrongful activities; nor does it make any other
derogatory reference to her in connection therewith. This court is
unable to discern therefore, as to how the subject publication can be
said to have defamed the respondent.
21. The discussion and reasoning in the summoning order shows, that
what the respondent is aggrieved by is the comments posted by other
accused persons against her, criticising her for what is contained in
the dossier, claiming that what was contained in it was false.
22. It would appear that the grievance of the respondent is not that what is
stated in the dossier is false, since she nowhere says so. The
respondent‟s grievance is that she did not lead the team of persons
who compiled the dossier. Her grievance is that the comments made
by the other accused persons against her are defamatory. However,
the learned Magistrate has considered it fit to summons only the
petitioners; and has chosen not to summons any of the other persons
arrayed in the complaint.
23. In view of the foregoing discussion, in the opinion of this court,
firstly, the subject publication itself was not before the learned
Magistrate since in the absence of requisite certificate under section
65B of the Evidence Act, the print-out of the subject publication filed

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could not be read in evidence. The learned Magistrate was cognisant

of this; and has specifically so observed in the summoning order.
Secondly, on a plain reading of the extract of the subject publication
which is all that was contained in the complaint, there appears to be
nothing „defamatory‟ in it, as understood in law, since all it says is
that the dossier calls-out certain wrongdoing in the university. Since,
on point of law, there can be no oral evidence in substitution of a
certificate under section 65B of the Evidence Act 4 , there was no
material before the learned Magistrate based on which the summoning
order could have been passed.
24. As a sequitur to the above, summoning order dated 07.01.2017 made
by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate in criminal complaint bearing
C.C. No. 32203/2016 cannot be sustained in law; and is accordingly
quashed and set-aside.
25. The present petition is disposed of.
26. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J

MARCH 29, 2023/ds
4
cf. Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (supra)

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K. Paka Singh @ Konthoujam Paka Singh vs Miss Nivedita Sengupta & Ors on 12 August, 2021
K. Paka Singh @ Konthoujam Paka Singh vs Miss Nivedita

Sengupta & Ors on 12 August, 2021
Author: Shekhar B. Saraf
Bench: Shekhar B. Saraf
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Shekhar B. Saraf
C.R.R. 2369 of 2003

K. Paka Singh @ Konthoujam Paka Singh
-Versus-
Miss Nivedita Sengupta & Ors.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Abhra Mukherjee

Mr. Sauradeep Dutta
For the State of West Bengal : Mr. Rana Mukherjee
Heard on : 30.06.2021 & 12.08.2021
Judgment on : 12.08.2021
Shekhar B. Saraf, J.:
1. The petitioner has filed this criminal revision against proceedings initiated against him under
section 448/500 of IPC before the court of Judicial Magistrate 1st court in case no. 50 of 2003. It is
prayed by the petitioner that the pending proceedings before the learned judicial magistrate, Purulia
are liable to be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Facts:
2. The complainant is the warden of Girl's Hostel of the Free Progress Academy Centre -1, Hura. She
has filed the complaint against the accused father of student named Sharmila residing at the
abovementioned institute at the time of commission of the alleged offence. It is alleged in the
complaint that on the date of occurrence the accused gained entry into the campus on the plea of
meeting his sons who were also studying at the same institution. Thereafter, he gained unauthorised
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/71356338/ 1
entry into the Girl's Hostel and after entering he called the complainant by her name. Later on, the
accused asked the complainant, "Have you shown naked picture (Pornography) to my daughter
Sharmila?"
3. After hearing about this statement in front of the staff, the complainant advised the accused to file
a written complaint before appropriate authorities. The complainant felt insulted and defamed
before the staff of the Academy and sought an apology from the accused before he left the
institution. Since no apology was tendered by the accused the complainant decided to file a criminal
complaint before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Purulia. On the basis of examination of complaint filed
before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, process was issued against the petitioner to appear
before the court of Judicial Magistrate 1st court. On the day of appearance, the accused was granted
bail. Arguments
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the allegations made in the complaint do not
form a case under Section 448 and Section 500 of the India Penal Code, 1860. He further submits
that the ingredients of offence under Section 448/500 are not attracted and the complaint has been
filed 21 months subsequent to the date of the alleged offences. In light of the delay in filing of the
complaint, the petitioner submits that the bar of taking cognizance under Section 468 Cr. P.C. has
kicked in.
5. It is submitted by the petitioner that facts of the case show that the complaint was filed as a
counter blast of two suits for defamation and cheating filed by the accused against the complainant.
Further submission made by the petitioner is that no case of defamation is made out as no
publication was made whatsoever in the instant case. Finally, the petitioner submits that the
complaint has been filed with a mala fide intent to harass the petitioner.
Analysis with Order
6. I have heard the submissions and perused the materials placed on record by the learned counsel
for the petitioner. Since this criminal revision seeks to quash the criminal proceedings pending
before the Learned Judicial Magistrate, Purulia, I would like to discuss the principles laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein quashing power of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr. P. C.
can be exercised.
7. In the landmark case of State of Haryana -v- Bhajan Lal reported in (1992) SCC (Cri) 426, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court listed the following categories of cases where power under Section 482
could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) "102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section

155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected
in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against
the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an
order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on
the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act
concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of
the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal
proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite
him due to private and personal grudge."
It in aforementioned judgement it was also made clear that it was not possible to lay down precise
and inflexible guidelines or any rigid formula or to give an exhaustive list of the circumstances in
which such power could be exercised.
8. In a recent judgement delivered by the Apex Court, Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. -v-
State of Maharashtra reported in (2020) 10 SCC 118, a three-judge bench discussed the scope of
power exercised by the High Courts under Section 482 Cr. P.C. It exhaustively lays down various
principles which the courts must keep in mind while quashing criminal proceedings under Section
482. Relevant paragraph of the judgement is mentioned below for reference:
"80. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on
the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an
interim order of stay of investigation and/or "no coercive steps to be adopted", during
the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article
226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High
Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or "no
coercive steps to be adopted" during the investigation or till the final report/charge
sheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not
entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, our final conclusions are as under:
i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a

cognizable offence;
ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;
iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed
in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;
iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it

has been observed, in the 'rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation
in the context of death penalty).
v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot

embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR/complaint;
vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;
vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary

rule;
viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police,
since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one
ought not to tread over the other sphere;
ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;
x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of

justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of
investigation of offences;
xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary
jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;
xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts
and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the
police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the
FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature
to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not
deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After
investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the
application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an
appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered
by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power
requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on
the court;
xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the
parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the
parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal
(supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;
xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court
when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether
the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The
court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the
allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the
investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;
xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are
required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a
quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can
be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely,
casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy
and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself
from passing the interim order of not to arrest or "no coercive steps to be adopted" and the accused
should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent
court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest
and/or "no coercive steps" either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed
and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while
dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226
of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion
that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after
considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give
brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can
demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was
weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.
xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of "no coercive steps to be adopted"
within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by "no coercive
steps to be adopted" as the term "no coercive steps to be adopted" can be said to be too vague and/or
broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied."

9. The aforementioned latest judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court does not restrict the power of
High Courts to quash criminal proceedings in certain category of cases as mentioned in the case of
Bhajan Lal (Supra). This begs the question whether the instant case falls under any of the categories
as delineated in the case of Bhajan Lal (Supra). In order to answer this question, it must be
examined whether an offence has actually been made out against the accused which would justify
continuation of proceedings in the interest of justice.
10. "Defamation" is defined under Section 499 IPC. It reads as under:
"499. Defamation. --Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by

signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning
any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such
imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases
hereinafter excepted, to defame that person."
In the case of Jeffrey J. Diermeier -v- State of W.B. reported in (2010) 6 SCC 243, ingredients of
defamation under Section 499 of IPC have been discussed by the Apex Court. Relevant paragraph of
the judgement is mentioned below:
"29. To constitute "defamation" under Section 499 IPC, there must be an imputation
and such imputation must have been made with the intention of harming or knowing
or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person about whom
it is made. In essence, the offence of defamation is the harm caused to the reputation
of a person. It would be sufficient to show that the accused intended or knew or had
reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the
complainant, irrespective of whether the complainant actually suffered directly or
indirectly from the imputation alleged."
11. From the abovementioned discussion it flows that the ingredients essential to constitute an
offence under Section 500 of IPC are not fulfilled based on present factual scenario. Moreover, there
is no publication of the alleged defamatory statement which would justify criminal proceedings
before the Learned Judicial Magistrate. Hence, this case squarely falls under the 1st category
described in the case of Bhajan Lal (Supra), and accordingly, the criminal proceeding under Section
500 is not justified. As far as offence under Section 448 is concerned, I am of the view that filing of
such complaint would be barred by Section 468(2)(b) of Cr. P.C. because there is a delay of 21
months in filing of the complaint. The prescribed limitation period under Section 468 of Cr. PC is
not more than one year i.e., 12 months.
12. Upon considering the submissions made before this Court, I am of the view that this is a good
case for quashing of the complaint and the proceedings thereunder. Accordingly, the complaint case
no. 50 of 2003 and all proceedings thereunder are quashed.
13. With this observation the revisional application is allowed.

14. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon
compliance of all necessary formalities.
(Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)

Lakshmi Priya, V. Chockalingam And Mrs. ... vs B. Rabu Manohar on 9 March, 2006
Lakshmi Priya, V. Chockalingam And Mrs. ... vs B. Rabu

Manohar on 9 March, 2006
ORDER
M. Jeyapaul, J.
1. The petition is filed seeking quashment of the complaint in C.C. No. 496 of 2006 pending on the
file of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai-8.
2. The complainant, who is the respondent herein, has launched prosecution as against the
petitioners herein for offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code.
3. The allegations found in the complaint filed by the respondent/complainant are as follows:-
The complainant is married to Anitha Mabel and was blessed with a son. He is active
in politics. He has appeared in many sensitive cases. He has carved a niche for
himself as a professional of high standard. His wife Smt.Anitha Mabel Manohar is
working as an Associate Professor at National Institute of Fashion, Chennai from
1996. She is also a Specialist Consultant for several institutions for fashion
technology.
4. The complainant's acquaintance with the first accused Lakshmi Priya was purely professional in
nature. She applied several crafty plots to create occasions for proximate contact with the
complainant. She started sending vulgar SMS to him. On 14.7.2005, the first accused came to the
house of the complainant in his absence and threatened to do away with the life of his wife. She had
also threatened to commit suicide if the complainant did not permit access to her.
5. On 3.8.2005, the first accused notified in the gazette her change of name as though she was the
wife of the complainant. She had also shot off a letter to the Director of Institute of Fashion,
Chennai, under whom the complainant's wife is working, alleging that the first accused had married
the complainant on 5.5.2005 at Tirutani Murugan Temple as per Hindu Rites and Customs. She was
pitching in on the innuendoes against the complainant and his wife periodically. With the help of
the second and third accused, the first accused put up a shamiana within the High Court Campus on
29.9.2005 unauthorisedly and made an ugly show with placards alleging that the complainant had
committed deceit. The first accused is indulging in blackmailing and is attempting to fabricate issues
for bringing disrepute to him.
6. The persistent false complaint is clearly motivated to sully the image of the complainant and his
wife and also to secure a huge amount. The publicity made by the first accused as though the first
accused had married the complainant, is prima facie defamatory. There could not have been a lawful

marriage at Tirutani Murugan Temple as alleged by the first accused. The first accused has been
giving another news to the press media which has been covered widely in the State. The complainant
had already made a civil claim for damages for the defamation. The accused has to be punished
under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code also.
7. The petitioners/accused have contended in the petition seeking quashment of the proceedings as
follows:-
The respondent herein who is an advocate informed the first petitioner who is also a
practising advocate that his wife Mrs.Anitha passed away a couple of years back and
he was living with a son. As he expressed his willingness to marry the first petitioner,
the marriage was arranged in Tirutani Murugan Temple on 5.5.2005. On circulation
of invitation, close friends and relatives blessed the couple after their marriage at
Tirutani Murugan Temple. The first petitioner and the respondent started their
marital life at Pattabiram in Chennai. The first petitioner was shocked to know that
his first wife Mrs.Anitha is still living. With a fraudulent intention, the respondent
refused to register their marriage which was solemnised in the temple precincts. The
first petitioner has launched prosecution as against the respondent with B.4 Police
Station, Chennai for the offences of cheating and bigamy. She was shadowed by some
goondas and was threatened with dire consequences. The first petitioner had given a
complaint to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Madras High Court. She also made
representation to various associations, High Court and the Commissioner of Police.
She observed fasting until death before the High Court Campus to highlight her
problem. A defamation suit had already been filed against the first petitioner by
respondent. Therefore, the petitioners pray that the criminal proceedings in C.C. No.
496 of 2006 may be quashed.
8. The elaborate argument submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the
respondent were heard.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the marriage solemnised at the temple in
Tirutani, in the presence of the relatives and advocates, was not denied specifically by the
respondent. When the first petitioner was married and was left in the lurch, she had chosen to
ventilate her grievance through various Forums. Such conduct of the first petitioner does not
amount to intentional action to harm the reputation of the respondent.
10. Learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the first petitioner is not at all the wife of
the respondent. She has caused damage to the reputation of the respondent and his wife in the eye
of the public with sinister imputations. The private complaint given by the respondent gives graphic
account of the defamatory action of the petitioners, it is further submitted.
11. The first petitioner has produced before this Court an invitation alleged to have been printed and
circulated amongst friends and relatives. But such an invitation card produced by the first petitioner
is objected to by the other side. This Court does not like to embark upon an enquiry to test the

veracity of such a marriage invitation which is in dispute.
12. The respondent has specifically stated in the complaint that the first petitioner chose to address
a letter to the Director of Institute of Fashion, Chennai, alleging that the first petitioner had married
the complaint on 5.5.2005 at Tirutani Murugan Temple as per the Hindu Rites and Customs. As
rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the respondent has not specifically
denied such a marriage held at Tirutani Murugan Temple between the first petitioner and the
complainant. There is only very vague and indirect denial. It has been averred to in the complaint
"the complainant is a Protestant Christian and there could not have been a lawful marriage at
Tirutani Murugan Temple as alleged by the first accused". So the first petitioner/accused has chosen
to attack the legality of the marriage between a Christian and a Hindu in Tirutani Murugan Temple
sans registration.
13. The first petitioner had admittedly changed her name even as early as on 3.8.2005 annexing the
name of the respondent herein. She has changed her name to give an indication that she is the wife
of the respondent. At the instance of the first petitioner, a criminal case has been booked as against
the respondent for the offences of cheating and bigamy. It is seen that she has approached many
associations to ventilate her grievance in the fond hope of getting justice.
14. Declaring that she is the wife of the respondent, she staged a protest in the Campus of the High
Court, Madras, to attract the attention of the public. A suit has already been filed by the respondent
seeking damages for the loss of reputation on account of the action of the first petitioner.
15. The Court finds that all the actions of the first petitioner have been initiated by her only to get
justice for the alleged claim made by her. There can be no intention on the part of the first petitioner
to spoil the reputation of the respondent and his wife.
16. {Para-redacted as per Supreme Court Order in Criminal Appeal No 1955 of 2008 dated
September 18, 2009}. 17. {Para-redacted as per Supreme Court Order in Criminal Appeal No 1955 of
2008 dated September 18, 2009}. 18. In the result, the criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 496 of 2006
on the file of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai-8 stands quashed and the
criminal original petition stands allowed. Consequently, connected criminal miscellaneous petitions
stand closed.

2023 INSC 687
REPORTABLE
I
N THE SUPREME COURT OFI
NDI
A
CRI
MINALAPPELLATE JURI
SDI
CTI
ON
CRIMINALAPPEALNO.2344 OF2023
(
Ari
singoutofS.
L.P.(
Cri
minal
)No.3152of2023)
SALI
B @ SHALU @ SALI
M …APPELLANT(
S)
VERSUS
STATE OFU.
P.& ORS. …RESPONDENT(
S)
JU D G M E N T
J.
B.PARDI
WALA,J.:
1. Leavegr
ant
ed.
2. Thi
s appeali
s att
he i
nst
ance ofan accused char
ged
wi
tht
heo⇡encepuni
shabl
eunderSect
ion 506 oft
heI
ndi
an
PenalCode (
for shor
t,“
IPC”
)in connect
ion wi
tht
he Fi
rst
I
nfor
mat
ion Repor
t(FI
R)No.175 of2022 dat
ed 11.
08.
2022
r
egi
ster
ed wi
th t
he Mi
rzapur Pol
ice St
ati
on, Di
str
ict
Sahar
anpur
,St
ate ofU.
P.and i
s di
rect
ed agai
nstt
he or
der
passed by t
he Hi
gh Cour
tofJudi
cat
ure atAl
lahabad dat
ed
17.
10.
2022passedi
ntheCr
imi
nalMi
sce
llaneousWr
itPe
tit
ion
No.13339of2022fil
edbyt
heappe
llanther
einf
orquashi
ngof
1
t
he af
oresai
d FI
R by whi
cht
he Hi
gh Cour
tre
jec
ted t
he Wr
it
Pet
iti
on and t
her
eby decl
ined t
o quash t
he FI
Rref
err
ed t
o
above.
3. The FI
R dat
ed 11.
08.
2022 l
odged by t
he r
espondent
No.3her
einr
eadst
hus:
-
“To,t he S. H. O.
,Pol i
ce St ation Mi rzapurPaul ,Di stric
t
Sahar anpur .Respec tfully submi tted thatt he applicant
Husna wi fe ofIrafan r esidentofvi ll
age Mi r
zapurPaul
police stat i
on Mi rzapurPaul ,Di stri
ctSahar anpurhad
submi t
ted an appl i
cation in Mahi l
at hana againstI qbal
@ Bal aandhi sassoc iatesbei ngCaseCr i
meNo.122/22
u/s 376D, 323, 120B, 452 I PC whi ch is under
investigat i
on. Due t ot hi
sr eason Khur sheed son of
Asagarand Far ooq son Must ak and Mahar ajwi fe of
Faroq r esidents of Shahpur Gadda, Pol i
ce Stat ion
Mi r
zapurPaul ,Di stri
ctSahar anpurar ethreateni
ng me
thec ompl ai
nant.Theyt oldmeonphoneandf acetof ace
thati fyouhavenotset tl
edt hisc aset henyouandyour
fami l
ywi llbekilledandSul emanKabadihasshownme
pistolandt oldthatwear ec ompani onsofI qbal@ Bal l
a.
Ifther ehasnotbeen any dec i
sion then shouldremai n
readyt osu8erc onsequenc es.Yourar erequestedtot ake
legalac tion.Ishal lremai nobl iged.”
4. Thusi
tappear
son apl
ainr
eadi
ngoft
heaf
oresai
d FI
R
t
hatt
he vi
cti
m name
ly Husna (
respondentNo.
3 her
ein)had
ear
lier l
odged an FI
R No. 122 of 2022 f
or t
he o⇡ences
puni
shabl
eunderSect
ions376D,323,120B, 354A and 452
r
espl
y oft
he I
PC and underSect
ions 7 and 8 r
espl
y oft
he
Pr
otect
ion ofChi
ldr
en f
rom SexualO⇡encesAct
,2012 agai
nst
Haj
iIqbal @ Bal
a(f
ather
-in-
law of t
he appe
llant her
ein)
,
2
Me
hmood,Javed,Al
ishan,Af
jaland Di
lshad.I
tisal
leged t
hat
whi
let
he i
nvest
igat
ion oft
heFI
R No.122 of2022 r
efer
red t
o
above was goi

ng on,t
he accused per
sons namel
y Khur
shi
d,
Far
ukh,Mahar
ajandSul
emanhadt
elephoni
cal
lyaswe
llasi
n
per
son t
hreat
ened t
he vi
cti
m sayi
ng t
hat t
hey ar
e t
he
associ
ates of I
qbal al
ias Bal
a and t
hat i
f she woul
d not
wi
thdr
aw t
hesai
dFI
R No.122of2022,t
hensheaswel
lasher
f
ami
lymember
swoul
dbeki
ll
ed.
5. Theappe
llanther
einwentbef
oret
heHi
ghCour
tbyway
offil
ingt
heCr
imi
nalMi
sce
llaneousWr
itPe
tit
ion No.13339of
2022 wi
th apr
ayert
oquash t
heFI
Rlodged agai
nsthi
m.The
Hi
ghCour
tdecl
inedt
oquasht
heFI
R vi
det
hei
mpugnedor
der
dat
ed17.
10.
2022.Theor
derr
eadst
hus:
-
“HeardShriIndr
aBhanYadav,l
earnedc ounsel
f
or the pet i
ti
oner
, Sri Nami
t Sri
vast
ava f or t he
c
omplainant and l ear
ned A.G.
A, for t he St ate
r
espondents.
Thereli
efsoughtinthispeti
ti
on i
sf orquashing
ofthe i
mpugned FIR dated 11.08.
2022 register
ed as
CaseCrimeNo.175of2022underSec ti
on506I PCPoli
ce
St
ationMir
zapur,Di
str
ictSaharanpur
.
Furt
herprayerhasbeenmadenott
oar
restt
he
pet
it
ionerintheaf
oresai
dcase.
Lear
ned counselforthepet
it
ionersubmi t
st hat
thei
mpugnedFI R hasbeenl odgedonfalse/vexati
ous/
misc
hievousall
egations,and noo8encesaremadeout
agai
nstthepeti
ti
oner.
3
Lear
ned AGA opposed theprayerf
orquashi
ng
oft
heFI
R,whic
hdisc
losescognizabl
eo8ence.
Perusaloft hei mpugned fir sti nformat ionr epor t

prima f aci
er evealsc ommi ssion ofc ogni zabl e o8enc e.
The c orrect
ness oft he al l
egat i
ons woul d have t o be
tested ont hebasi soft hemat erialsc ollected dur ingt he
cour se ofi nvestigation as by i nsertion ofnot ific
ation
No. 1058/79- V-1-19- 1( Ka)-
20-2018dat ed6t hJune2019
and t her ef
ore,in view oft hel aw l aid down by Hon' ble
Supr eme Cour ti nt he c ase ofSt ate ofHar yana and
other svs.Bhaj an Laland ot hers,1992 Supp.( 1)SCC
335andM/sNeehar ikaInfrastruc t
urePvt .Lt d.vs.St ate
ofMahar ashtra,AIR2021SC 1918andi nSpec ialLeave
to Appeal ( Cr l
.) No. 3262/2021 ( Leel avat i Devi @
Leel awat i& anot her vs.t he St ate ofUt t
ar Pr adesh)
dec idedon07. 10.2021,noc asehasbeenmadeoutf or
interferencewi ththei mpugnedfir stinf ormat ionr epor t
.
Therefor
e,thewr itpeti
ti
on isdi smissed l
eaving
i
topen forthepet i
ti
onertoappl y befor
et hec ompetent
cour
tforantic
ipator
ybail/bailasper missibl
eunderl aw
andinac c
ordancewi t
hlaw.
I
tis made cl
earthatwe have notadjudicated
the c ont
enti
ons r ai
sed by l ear
ned counsel f
or the
petit
ionerandthesamear eleftopenfort
hepetit
ionerto
raise at an appr opri
ate stage in an appr opri
ate
proceeding,i
naccor
dancewi t
hl aw.”
6. I
n such ci
rcumst
ancesr
efer
redt
oabov
e,t
heappe
llant
i
sher
ebe
for
ethi
sCour
twi
tht
hepr
esentappeal
.
SUBMI
SSI
ONSON BEHALFOFTHE APPELLANT
7. Mr
.Si
ddhar
thaDave,t
hel
ear
nedseni
orcounse
lappear
ing
f
ort
heappe
llanther
eini
n hi
swr
itt
en submi
ssi
onshasst
atedas
under
:-
4
“a)Iti srespec tfull
y submi tt
ed thatt he Pet
it
ioneri s not
named i nt he pr esentFI R butsubsequent l
y dur ing the
courseofi nvestigation hewasnamed f orthefirsttimei n
thestatementoft healleged eye-
wi t
nessSal man r ecor
ded
underSec ti
on 161 CRPC on 12. 08.2022,who gave an
improved version oft heal l
eged i
nc i
dentand on t hebasi s
of the said st atement , vi
de G.D. Ent ry No. 30 dat ed
12.08.2022 t he o8enc e under Sec tions 147,148,149,
195-A,386,504 and 506 I PC wasadded i nt heFI R No.
175/2022.I tisper t
inenttosubmi tthatnowher ei ntheFI R
hast heCompl ainantment i
onedaboutt hepresenc eoft he
all
eged eye- witness Sal man at t he t i
me and pl ace of
inci
dent.
b)Theal legationsi nt heFi r

stInformat i
on Repor tarenot
onlyabsur dbutal sohi ghl
yi mprobablegi venthatt her
ei s
no ment i
on oft he dat e and time ofi ncidentint he FIR.
Moreover apar tf rom omni bus allegations therei s no
specific allegation agai nst the ac cused per sons. The
Peti
ti
onerwas notpr esentatt he time and pl ace ofthe
inci
dentnamel y,VillageMi rzapur,Distri
ctSahar anpur,and
infactt hePet i
tioneri sper manentlyresidingi nKunjagrant,
Vikasnagar ,Dehr adun,Ut t
arakhand.
c)I ti sr espec t
ful l
y submi tted t hat the al leged Fi rst
Infor mat ionRepor ti sabsolutelyf alseandf ri
volous,andon
ar eadi ngoft hesai dFIR,t heo8enc eunderSec t
ions147,
148,149,195- A,386,504 and 506 ofI PC isc lear
ly not
madeoutagai nstt hePetiti
oner.Theent i
real l
egationint he
FIRr evol ves around an ear l
ierFI R No.122/2022 dat ed
21. 06. 2022l odged byt heCompl ainantagai nstHaj iIqbal
ali
as Bal a (Petitioner’
s f ather-in-law) and hi s fami l
y
member sunderSec t
ions376,323,354( A)I PCandSec t
ion
7and8oft hePr otecti
onofChi ldrenf rom SexualO8enc es
Act,2012.I ti s submi tted thatt he Petiti
oneri s notan
acc used i nt he sai d FI R No. 122/2022 and t here was
ther eforenoquest ionoft hePet i
tionerhavi ngt hreatenedt he
Compl ainanttowi thdraw thesai dFI RNo. 122of2022.
d)Thatt he Complainantisin a habitofmaking si

milar
baselessand falseall
egat
ionsagai nstot
herpersonsand
has lodged t
he presentFIR atthe behestofthe pr
esent
ruli
ngpar t
yint heStateofUttarPradeshtoset
t l
epoli
ti
cal
scoreswiththePet i
ti
oner’
sfather-
in-l
aw HajiI
qbalashe
5
bel
ongst oarivalpoli
ti
calpar
tyandhewasaMemberof
Legi
slat
iveCouncilf
rom 2011to2016.
e)I tis submi t

ted thatt he Respondent s have incorrectl
y
stated thatthe Petiti
onerisi nvolved in mult
ipl
ec r
iminal
cases wi thoutment ioning the c ases all
egedlyr egi
stered
agai nstthe Peti
ti
oner .The Pet i
tioneris nota memberof
anyGangandhei sbeingf alselyimplicatedinthepr esent
case simpl y because he ist he son-in-l
aw ofHaj iIqbal
aliasBal aandal sothepai rokaroft hef amil
ymember sof
Haj iIqbalal i
as Bal ais some c ases pending be f
oret he
Lear nedTr i
alCour tandt heHon’ bl eHighCour t
.
f)Itisr espec
t f
ull
y submi
tted t
hatthe Pet
it
ionerhas no
cri
minalant ecedentsand apartfr
om thepresentFIR No.
175 of2022 t herearenoot hercri
minalcasesregi
ster
ed
againsthim.
g)Theal l
egat i
onsmadei nt heFir
stInformationRepor tdo
notpr i
maf ac i
ec onstit
uteanyo8enc eormakeoutac ase
underSec tions147,148,149,195- A,386,504 and 506
IPC ofIPC againstt hePetit
ionerandt hus,theFIRi sliable
tobequashed.I tisper t
inenttomentiont hatevenaf t
ert he
chargesheethasbeenfil ed,thepeti
tionf orquashingofa
FIRi swellwi t
hint hepower sofac our toflaw [
Pleasesee:
ANAND KUMAR MOHATTA & ANOTHER VS. STATE
(
NCT OF DELHI ),DEPARTMENT OF HOME & ANOTHER
(
2019)11SCC706atpar agraph14& 16] .
h)Fort he reasons mentioned above,t

he Speci
alLeave
Pet
it
ionmaybeal l
owedandt heorderoftheHon’bl
eHigh
Courtrefusi
ng to quash the FI
R No.175 of2022 dated
11.
08.2022besetasi de.
”
SUBMI
SSI
ONSON BEHALFOFTHE STATE
8. Ms. Gar
ima Pr
asad, t
he l
ear
ned Addi
ti
onal Advocat
e
Gener
al appear
ing f
or t
he St
ate of U.
P. i
n her wr
itt
en
submi
ssi
onshasst
atedasunder
:-
“a)Thatthe pet
it
ionerbei
ng t
he f
amily memberofthe
gang and t
he ot
hermember s oft
he gang ar
ecri
minal
6
mindedpersonsandindulgei
nantisoc
ialacti
vit
iesand
t
hepetit
ioneri
salsoi
nvolvedi
nthevari
ousil
legalwork.
b)Thati ni
ti
all
ythenameoft hepet
iti
onerwasnoti nthe
FIR; however,the invest
igat
ing agency, during t
he
i
nvestigati
onadded147,148,149,195A,386,504, 506
IPC hasbeenaddedandt henameoft hepetit
ionerwas
added.
c)Af terr egistrat

ion ofthe FI R,t he investigati
on was
conduc t
ed by t he I nvestigation ONc er, dur ing
i
nvest igation, number of not ices under sec t
ion 41A
Cr.P.
C.wasi ssued t
ot hePet i
tionerbuthedi d notgive
anyheedoni tandnotr eplyt henot i
cesandhedi dnot
co-oper at
ewi ththeinvesti
gationt ofindt heac tualtr
uth.
Fur t
her ,itwast hatthePetit
ioneri sabsc ondingand he
i
ssuspec t
edt ohavel ef
tthec ount r
y.
d)During invest
igat
ion,t
he stat
ementofCompl ainant
was recorded under secti
on 161 Cr.
P.C. and other
mater
ialevidencewasc ol
lec
tedwherei
nthec l
aim ofthe
compl
ainantisproved.
e)Int heaboveFI R/CrimeNo.175/2022U/s147,148,

149,195A,386,504, 506I PC,register
edatP.S.Mirj
apur,
Distri
ct Saharanpur,ther e ar
et otalfour (
4)ac cused
persons namely Khur shid,Far ukh,Mahar aj,Suleman
Kabadi .Furt
herdur i
ngt heinvestigati
on,t
henameoft he
petit
ionerwasal soadded butonl ythepetiti
onerc ome
beforethi
sHon’ bl
eCour ttoquasht hesaidFIR.
f)TheInvestigationhasbeencompletedandc hargesheet
isready to file agai
nstt
he Pet
iti
oners butdue to st
ay
order dated 02. 01.
2023 of t
his Hon’ bl
e Court,the
chargesheetc ouldnotbesubmit
ted.
g) Dur ing i nvest

igat
ion, t he st at ement of
Compl ainant/Vict
im under sec t
ion 161 Cr .P.
C. was
recorded,wher einthevict
im hasr evealed thatshewas
pressurized to make sett
lementi nt he aforement i
oned
FIR No.122 of2022 by t he Gang member s oft he
Petit
ioner No. 1 Mohd. I qbal. Fur t
her,i t was al so
i
nformed t hatKhur shi
d S/oAsgar ,Far ooqS/oMut aaq,
Mehr ajS/o Far ooq and Suleman KabadiS/o Khur f
an
hast hreatenthevicti
m andSul emanKabadihasshown
7
t
he pist
oland war
ned t
hatifshe has notset
tl
ed t
he
i
ssues,shewoul
dhavetofac
etheconsequenc
es.
In vi ew of t he aforementioned f act
ual & l egal
submi ssions,itis mostr espect
fully submi t
ted t
hatt he
presentspec iall
eavepet i
ti
onoft hePet i
tionersi
sliableto
be dismi ssed with exempl ar
yc ostand t he impugned
orderdat ed 17.10.2022 passed by t he Hon’ble High
Courti nCr iminalMi sc
.Wr itPet
itionNo.13339of2022
isli
abl etobeuphel d.”
ANALYSI
S
9. Havi
ng hear
dthe l
ear
ned counse
lappear
ing f
or t
he
par
tiesand havi
nggonet
hrough t
hemat
eri
alson r
ecor
d,t
he
onl
yquest
iont
hatf
all
sforourconsi
der
ati
oni
swhe
thert
heFI
R
shoul
dbequashedsof
arast
heappe
llanther
eini
sconcer
ned?
10. Wet
akenot
iceoft
hef
oll
owi
ngf
act
s:-
1. Theappe
llanther
einhasnotbeennamedi
nthe
FI
R as one of t
he accused per
sons. Ther
eis no
al
legat
ionwor
tht
henamei
ntheent
ireFI
R agai
nstt
he
appe
llanther
ein.
2. I
t appear
sthat f
urt
her st
atement oft
he fir
st
i
nfor
mantwasr
ecor
dedunderSect
ion 161oft
heCode
ofCr
imi
nalPr
ocedur
eand i
nthesai
d st
atement
,the
nameoft
heappe
llanther
einsur
faced.
11. The fir

st i
nfor
mant i
n her f
urt
her st
atement
dat
ed12.
08.
2022st
atedt
hus:
-
8
“… Yest er day mor ni ngatar ound 7. 00 am Ial ongwi th
my daught erSal ia wasgoi ngt oShahpurGada t osee
mybr otheratmy mot her ’shouseassoon asIr eac hed
aheadoft hepet rolpump,t henaBol er oc arc olourwhi t
e
numberunknown c ame and st opped nextt o me,t he
peopl e sitting i ni tl ower ed t he gl ass oft he c ar .So I
recognized t hatt hisi s Sul eman kabaadi .That ’
s why
Suleman,si tti
ngont hef rontseat ,gotdownf rom t hec ar
and sai dt hatyou di d notunder stand af tersayi ng i t
repeatedl y.We had al so expl ained t o you t hatdo not
compl ain aboutt he dec ision t aken by Haj iI qbal .But
afterabusi ngyou,youdi dnotagr ee.Now about10l akh
rupeeswi l
lbespentonourj ai landc our t
.Whatwi llyour
fathergi veyou?Thenal lthepeopl esi ttingi nt hec argot
downandsur roundedme.Rashi dPr adhanMahmudpur
said eitherwi thdr aw t hec ompl aintnow orgi veRs10
lakh.Ot her wi seyou wi lldefini t
ely di e.Yourf ami ly wi ll
also die wi t
h you.That ’s why Asl am al ias Shubha
residentofShahpurGada t ook outa pi stolf r om hi s
poc ketandpoi ntedatmeandsai dt hatyouhavehear d,
giveusatl east10l akhr upees.Ot her wi sewi thdr aw t he
case.Ot her wi se,you know t hatnot hi ngwi llbeknown
aboutyou.Andt ellyourf ami l
ynott ot esti
fyagai nstus.
Other wise ever yone be r eady t o die.Seei ng t he pi stol,
meandmydaught erst ar tedr unni ngawayi nf ear .Even
ourvoi cec oul d notc ome out .Rao At ifofRai pursai d
wher ewi llshegoaf terr unni ngaway.Andhow l ongwi ll
itrun?Wi llei thert akeadec isionorgi veRs.10l akhor
die.The per son st andi ng near by,Sal ib alias Sal u s/o
Dilshad, r esident of Kunj a Gr ant Vi kas Nagar ,
Dehr adun,who i s al so t he nephew and son- in- l
aw of
Iqbalal iasBal a,wasr epeat edl y sayi ng t hatsur round
heri nt hec ar .Ei thershewi l
ldec ideorgi vemoney or
shewi l
ldi et odayi tsel f
.Onl yt henSal man’ ssonLat ifof
vil
lageMi rzapurwhom Ial readyknew.Hec ameonhi s
bike and st opped near us and asked what
happened…. .SoSul emanKabaadisai dt hati thasbeen
al ongt imenow,peopl ehavest artedc omingandgoi ng.
Sayi ng t his,peopl e sati nt he c ar and r an t owar ds
Shahpur Gada.Isather e on t he r oad.Ic oul d not
under standanyt hing.It oldal ltheset hingst oSal man’ s
son Lat if,Mr .Khur sid,Far ooq,Mahar ajwhobel ong t o
my f ami ly.Thesepeopl et hr eat en meby t al king t omy
fami l
ymember sovert hephonet ogeta dec ision i nt he
9
caseagainstIqbalali
asBala and hi
sf amily.SirIam
verywor r
iedpleasehelpme.Hereismyst at ement.Sir
,
thepersonswhosenamesIhavet old you used tovisi
t
Iqbalal
iasBala’shouse,t
hatiswhyIknow t hem fr
om
befor
e.…”
12. Wi
tht
her
ecor
dingoft
hef
urt
herst
atementr
efer
redt
o
above,t
hei
nvest
igat
ingagencyaddedSect
ions147,148,149,
195A,386and504oft
heI
PC.
13. Wemayal
sor
efert
oonepol
icest
atementofso-
cal
led
eyewi
tnessnamel
ySal
man.Thest
atementr
eadst
hus:
-
“St
atementEyewi
tness…Sal
man s/o Lat
if
eresi
dentof
Kal yavpol icest ati
on Mi rzapurdi strictSahar anpurt old
on bei ng asked t hat11. 06.2022 mor ning ar ound 7. 00
am he was goi ng from hi s home Mi rzapurt o Shahpur
Gada f orsome wor k,t hen on t he way Isaw t hatour
own vi ll
age some peopl e ar e standi ng ar ound Mr s.
Husnaont her oad.Thosewhoar ear oundus.Whom I
know ver ywel l,oneofwhom i sSul emanKabaddi ,son
of Fur kan, r esident of vi ll
age Mi rzapur Paul , pol ic e
station Mi rzapur Paul , di stri
ct Sahar anpur , t own
Mi rzapur and t he ot her per son,Rashi d’s son Mohd.
Resi dentShahpurGada pol icestation Mi rzapurdi str ict
Sahar anpurand nameoft hef our t
h per son At i
fson of
Hameed r esi dentRai purpol icestation Mi rzapurdi str ict
Sahar anpurand t he name oft he fift
h per son is Sal i
b
alias Sal u s/o Di l
shad r esident Kunj a Gr ant Vi kas
NagarDehr adun who i sa r elati
ve ofHaj iIqbalal ias
Bal a,ever yonei sa r espec tableper son,ever yonekeeps
comi ngand goi ngi n ourvi l
lageMi rzapur .Thesepeopl e
wer eabusi ngandt hr eateningHusnawi f
eI r
fanr esident
ofvi ll
ageMi r
zapurPaulpol i
cest ation Mi rzapurdi str ict
Sahar anpur t ot ake a dec ision int he c ase wr itt en
agai nstHaj iIqbalal iasBal a and hi sfami ly member s.
And wer e demandi ng money f or the expenses t o be
incur r
ed int he wr itten c ase.When Ir eached her e,al l
thesepeopl esati nt hei rBol eroc arand wentt owar ds
ShahpurGada.Wher eMr s.Husnawassi t
ti
ngt her ei n
a bod mood. When Iasked heraboutwhathappened,
10
HusnaDevit ol
dmeal lthesethi
ngsont hespot.Sir
,itis
truethatwhen Ir eac
hed therewith a motorc
ycle,these
people surrounded Husna and wer e standing on the
road i
nf rontoft he petrolpump and wer et hr
eatening
her.Oft heseAsl am alsohadapi stolinhi shand.Iam
givi
ngt hi
sst atementwi thoutany pressure.Ihavet old
youwhatIhaveseen.Ihavenot hi
ngt odowi thanyone.
Thisismyst at
ement .
”
14. I
tappear
sfr
om t
heaf
oresai
dthatt
hefir
sti
nfor
manti
n
herf
urt
herst
atementmade outal
toge
thera di
⇡er
entst
ory
t
han whatshenar
rat
ed i
ntheFI
R.Wewoul
d notgo t
othe
ext
entofsayi
ngt
hatsi
ncet
henameoft
heappe
llanther
ein
doesnotfigur
eint
heFI
R andi
tcamet
obedi
scl
osedonl
yfor
t
hefir
stt
imei
nthef
urt
hers
tat
ementoft
hevi
cti
mthati
tse
lf
can beagr
ound t
oquash t
heFI
R.However
,ther
ear
emany
ot
herat
tendi
ng ci
rcumst
ances emer
ging f
rom t
he r
ecor
d of
t
hecasewhi
chi
ndi
cat
est
hatt
hecaseonhandi
soneoff
alse
i
mpl
icat
ion.Jus
tbecauset
heappe
llanther
ein happenst
obe
t
heson-
in-
law ofav
eryhar
denedcr
imi
nalasal
legedbyname
I
qbal@ Bal
a,he has al
so been r
oped i
n by way off
urt
her
st
atement
.Iti
sper
tinentt
o not
ethatt
hevi
cti
m i
n herFI
R
hasnoteven r
emot
elyr
efer
redt
othepr
esenceofSal
man s/o
Lat
if
e atvi
ll
age Mi
rzapurPaul
.We ar
e hi
ghl
ight
ing al
lthi
s
onl
ytodemonst
rat
e,how t
heent
irecasewasf
abr
icat
ed st
ep
byst
ep.
11
15. Ther
eisa di
⇡er
entangl
etot
hismat
ter
.Itappear
sthat
t
hei
nvest
igat
ing agency hasi
nvoked Sec
tion 195A oft
heI
PC.
Sect
ion195Aoft
heI
PC r
eadst
hus:
-
“Section 195A. Thr eatening any per son to gi ve

false evidence..Whoevert hr
eatens anotherwith any
inj
uryt o his person,reputati
on orpr opert
y ort ot he
personorr eputat
ionofanyonei nwhom t hatpersoni s
int
erested,withintenttocauset hatpersont ogi
vef alse
evi
denc eshallbepuni shed withimprisonmentofei ther
descri
pt i
onforat erm whichmayext endt osevenyear s,
orwi t
hfine,orwithboth;
and i finnocentperson isconvic
t ed and sent
enc ed i
n
consequenc e of such f al
se evidenc e, wit
h deat h or
impr i
sonmentf ormoret hansevenyear s,t
heper sonwho
threatensshal lbepuni shed wit
ht hesamepuni shment
and sent encei nt he same manner and t othe same
extentsuc hinnocentpersonispuni shedandsent enced.
”
16. Apl
ainr
eadi
ngoft
heaf
oresai
dpr
ovi
sioni
ndi
cat
est
hat
i
fanyi
ndi
viduali
sthr
eat
ened wi
th anyi
njur
ytohi
sper
son,
r
eput
ati
on orpr
oper
ty and such t
hreat
s ar
e admi
nist
ered
wi
thi
ntentt
o cause t
hatper
son t
o gi
ve f
alse evi
dence,t
he
samewoul
d const
itut
ean o⇡enceunderSect
ion 195A oft
he
I
PC.I
n ouropi
nion,noneoft
hei
ngr
edi
ent
stoconst
itut
ethe
o⇡ence puni
shabl
e under Sect
ion 195A of t
he I
PC ar
e
di
scl
osed, on pl
ain r
eadi
ng of t
he FI
R and t
he f
urt
her
st
atementoft
hefir
sti
nfor
manti
ncl
udi
ngt
hest
atementoft
he
so-
cal
led eye wi
tness.The al
legat
ion i
nthe FI
Rist
hatt
he
accused per
sons t
hreat
ened and pr
essur
ised t
he fir
st
12
i
nfor
mantt
owi
thdr
aw herfir
stFI
R bear
ingNo.122 of2022
r
egi
ster
ed f
ort
heo⇡encespuni
shabl
eunderSect
ions376D,
323,120B,354Aand452r
espl
yoft
heI
PC.Ther
eisnot
hing
t
oindi
cat
ethat t
he accused per
sons t
hreat
ened t
he fir
st
i
nfor
mant wi
thi
ntent t
hat t
he fir
st i
nfor
mant gi
ves f
alse
evi
dence be
for
ethe Cour
tofl
aw. The l
aterpar
tofSect
ion
195A makes i
tver
ycl
ear t
hat f
alse evi
dence means f
alse
evi
dencebef
oret
heCour
tofl
aw.On such f
alseevi
dencei
fa
per
son i
s convi
cted and sent
enced,t
hen t
he per
son f
ound
gui
ltyofadmi
nist
eri
ngt
hreat
swoul
dbel
iabl
etobepuni
shed
wi
tht
hesamepuni
shmentandsent
encei
nthesamemanner
and t
othesameext
entassuch i
nnocentper
son i
spuni
shed
and sent
enced. Thewor
d“f
alse”i
n Sect
ion 195A shoul
d be
r
ead i
nthecont
extwi
th whathasbeen expl
ained i
n Sect
ion
191oft
heI
PC whi
chf
all
sin Chapt
erXI–ofFal
seEvi
dence
and O⇡encesAgai
nstPubl
icJust
ice.Thus,even i
fwebe
lieve
t
he al
legat
ions l
eve
lled i
nthe FI
Rto be t
rue,none oft
he
i
ngr
edi
ent
stoconst
itut
etheo⇡encepuni
shabl
eunderSect
ion
195A ar
edi
scl
osed.Togi
vet
hreatt
oaper
son t
owi
thdr
aw a
compl
aint or FI
R or set
tlet
he di
sput
e woul
d not at
tract
Sect
ion195Aoft
heI
PC.
13
17. I
nthe af
oresai
d cont
ext
,we mustl
ook i
nto Sect
ion
195Aoft
heCodeofCr
imi
nalPr
ocedur
e(Cr
PC)
.Sect
ion195A
oft
heCr
PC r
eadst
hus:
-
“Secti
on 195A.Pr oceduref or witnesses in case
ofthreateni
ng,etc.—A witnessoranyot herperson
may fil
ea complai
ntinr el
ati
on to an o8ence under
sect
ion195AoftheIndianPenalCode( 45of1860) .
”
18. Thepl
ainr
eadi
ng oft
heaf
oresai
d pr
ovi
sion i
ndi
cat
es
t
hati
fa wi
tness orany ot
herper
son r
ecei
ves t
hreat
s and
such t
hreat
s ar
e admi
nist
ered wi
th an i
ntentt
o cause t
hat
per
son t
o gi
vef
alse evi
dence bef
oret
he Cour
t,t
hen such
wi
tness or per
son can fil
e a compl
aint i
nre
lat
ion t
othe
o⇡enceunderSect
ion195Aoft
heI
PC.I
tgoeswi
thoutsayi
ng
t
hat such compl
aint has t
o be l
odged be
for
ethe Cour
t
r
ecor
dingt
heevi
dence. Sect
ion 195A oft
heCr
PC pr
ovi
desa
r
emedy offil
ing a compl
aint
.“Compl
aint
”means as defined
underSect
ion2(
d)oft
heCr
PC whi
chr
eadst
hus:
-
“Secti
on 2( d) “complaint” means any allegation
madeor all
yorinwr i
ti
ngt oaMagist
rate,withavi ew
tohistaki
ngac t
ionundert hi
sCode,t
hatsomeper son,
whether known or unknown, has c ommitt
ed an
o8ence,butdoesnotincludeapoli
cereport.
Expl
anati
on. —A reportmadeby a pol i
ceoNc erina
case whi ch di scl
oses, aft
er i nvest
igation, the
commissi
on of a non- c
ogni
zabl
e o8enc e shall be
deemed to be a complai
nt;and t
he police oNcerby
whom suchr epor
ti smadeshallbedeemedt obet he
compl
ainant;”
14
19. Wear
econsci
ousoft
hef
actt
hatSect
ion 195A oft
he
I
PC i
sacogni
zabl
eo⇡ence.I
nacogni
zabl
eo⇡ence,pol
icehas
power t
oinv
est
igat
e. We ar
e not goi
ng i
ntot
he quest
ion
whet
hert
hebarofSect
ion 195 oft
heCr
PC woul
d appl
yto
Sect
ion 195A oft
heI
PC aswehavet
aken t
hevi
ew t
hatnone
oft
hei
ngr
edi
ent
stoconst
itut
etheo⇡encepuni
shabl
eunder
Sect
ion 195A oft
he I
PC ar
e di
scl
osed i
nthe f
act
s oft
he
pr
esentcase
.
20. Wet
akenot
iceoft
hef
actt
hatSect
ion 386 oft
heI
PC
has al
so been i
nvoked.Sect
ion 386 oft
he I
PC r
elat
es t
o
ext
ort
ion by put
ting a per
son i
nfear ofdeat
h or gr
ievous
hur
t.Sect
ion386oft
heI
PC r
unsasf
oll
ows:
—
“Section 386.Ext ortion by put ting a person i n

fearofdeat h orgri evoushurt .—Whoeverc ommi t
s
extor
tion byputt
inganyper son i
nf earofdeat h orof
gri
evoushur ttothatper son ortoany other,shal lbe
punishedwi t
himprisonmentofei therdescri
ptionf ora
ter
m whi chmayext endt otenyears,andshal lalsobe
li
abletofine.
”
21. “
Ext
ort
ion”hasbeen definedi
n Sect
ion 383oft
heI
PC
asf
oll
ows:
—
“Sect
ion 383. Ext ortion.—Whoever i ntentional l
y
putsanyper soninfearofanyi njur
yt othatper son,
ortoanyot her,and ther
ebydi shonestl
yi nducest he
person so puti nfeart o del
iverto any person any
proper
ty orval uablesec uri
ty oranything signed or
15
sealed whic
h may be c onver
ted i
nto a val
uabl
e
securi
ty,c
ommit
s‘ext
ort
ion.
I
ll
ust
rat
ions
(a) A t hreatens to publish a de

famator
y l
ibel
concerning Z unless Z gi
ves hi
m money.He t
hus
induces Z t o gi
ve him money. A has commi
tt
ed
extor
tion.
(
b)A t hreatens Z that he willkeep Z'sc hi
ldi n
wrongf
ulc onfinement,unl
essZwi l
lsignand deli
ver
t
o A a pr omi ssor
y note bi
nding Z to pay cer
tain
monies t
o A.Z si gns and del
iver
st he not
e.A has
committ
edext orti
on.
(
c )At hreatenst osendclub-mentoploughupZ'sfiel
d
unlessZwi l
lsignanddel i
vertoB abondbi ndi
ngZ
underapenal t
yt odeli
vercert
ainproducetoB,and
therebyi nducesZt osi
gnanddel i
verthebond.Ahas
commi t
tedext ort
ion.
(d) A, by put ti
ng Z i n f ear of gr
ievous hur t
,
dishonestl
yi nduces Z t
o sign oraNx his sealtoa
blankpaperanddel iverittoA.Zsignsanddel i
vers
thepapert oA.Her e,ast hepapersosignedmaybe
converted i
ntoa valuablesecurit
y.A hasc ommitted
extor
tion.
”
22. So f
rom t
he af
oresai
d, i
tis cl
ear t
hat one of t
he
necessar
yingr
edi
ent
s oft
he o⇡ence ofext
ort
ion i
sthatt
he
vi
cti
m mustbei
nducedt
ode
livert
oanyper
son anypr
oper
ty
orval
uabl
e secur
ity
,et
c.Thati
sto say
,the de
liver
y oft
he
pr
oper
tymus
tbewi
th consentwhi
ch hasbeen obt
ained by
put
tingt
heper
soni
nfearofanyi
njur
y.I
ncont
rastt
othef
t,i
n
ext
ort
ion t
her
eisan e
lementofconsent
,ofcour
se,obt
ained
byput
tingt
hevi
cti
minf
earofi
njur
y.I
n ext
ort
ion,t
hewi
llof
t
hevi
cti
m hast
obeov
erpower
edbyput
tinghi
m orheri
nfear
16
ofi
njur
y.For
cibl
ytaki
ng any pr
oper
ty wi
llnotcome under
t
his defini
ti
on. I
t has t
o be shown t
hat t
he per
son was
i
nduced t
o par
twi
tht
hepr
oper
ty byput
tinghi
m i
nfearof
i
njur
y.Thei
ll
ust
rat
ionst
otheSect
ion gi
ven i
ntheI
PC make
t
hisper
fect
lycl
ear
.
23. I
ntheaf
oresai
d cont
ext
,wemayr
efert
othef
oll
owi
ng
obser
vat
ionsmadebyaDi
visi
on Bench oft
heHi
gh Cour
tof
Pat n Ramyad Si
na i ngh v.Emper
orCr
imi
nalRevi
sion No.
125of1931(
Pat
):
-
“I
fthe f
act
s had been t
hatt
he c
ompl
ainant
'st
humb
hadbeenf orc
iblysei zedbyoneoft hepetiti
onersand
had been appl ied t o t he pi ece of paper
notwi
thstanding hi s struggl
es and pr otests,then I
wouldagr eet hatther eisgoodgr oundforsayi ngthat
theo8encec ommi tt
edwhat everitmaybe,wasnott he
o8ence ofext ort
ion bec ause the compl
ai nantwoul d
nothavebeeni nduc edbyt hef earofinj
urybutwoul d
have simpl y been t he subject of ac
tual physical
compulsi
on. ”
I
twashe
ld:
-
“Iti
sc l
eart hatthisdefini ti
on makesi tnecessar yfor
thepr osecution topr ovet hatthevi c
timsNar ain and
Sheonandan wer eputi nfearofi njur ytot hemsel ves
ort o others,and f urther,wer et hereby di shonestly
induced t o deliver paper sc ontaining t heirt humb
impressions.Thepr osec ut
ionst or
yi nt hepr esentc ase
goes no f urthert han t hatt humb i mpr essions wer e
‘
forci
blyt aken’f rom t hem.Thedet ail
soft hef orci
ble
taki
ngwer eappar ently notputi n evi dence.Thet ri
al
17
Courtspeaksoft hewr istsoft hevicti
msbei ngcaught
and oft heirthumb i mpr essions being t hen ‘t
aken’
…….The l ower Courts onl y speak of t he f
orci
ble
taki
ng oft hevict
im'sthumb i mpression;and ast his
does notnec essari
lyi nvolve inducing the vi c
tim to
deli
ver paper s with hist humb i mpr essions (papers
whichc oul d no doubt be c onvert
ed i nto valuable
securi
ties),Imusthol dt hatt heo8enc eofext or
tionis
notestablished.”
24. Thus,i
tisr
elevant t
o not
ethat nowher
ethe fir
st
i
nfor
manthasst
atedt
hatoutoff
ear
,shepai
dRs.10Lakht
o
t
he accused per
sons.To put i
tin ot
her wor
ds,t
her
eis
not
hing t
o i
ndi
cat
e t
hat t
her
e was act
ual de
liver
y of
possessi
on ofpr
oper
ty(
money)byt
heper
son puti
nfear
.In
t
heabsenceofanyt
hingt
oev
enr
emot
elysuggestt
hatt
hefir
st
i
nfor
mantpar
tedwi
th apar
ticul
aramountaf
terbei
ngputt
o
f
earofany i
njur
y,no o⇡enceunderSect
ion 386 oft
heI
PC
canbesai
dtohavebeenmadeout
.
25. However
,asobser
vedear
lier
,theent
irecaseputupby
t
hefir
sti
nfor
manton t
hef
aceofi
tappear
stobeconcoct
ed
andf
abr
icat
ed.Att
hisst
age,wemayr
efert
othepar
ame
ter
s
l
aiddown byt
hisCour
tforquashi
ngofan FI
Rint
hecaseof
Bhaj
anLal(
supr
a).Thepar
ame
ter
sar
e:-
“
(1) Where t he all
egat
ions made in t he first
i
nfor
mati
on reportorthecompl
aint
,even i
ft hey are
t
akenatthei
rfacevalueandaccept
edinthei
rentiret
y
18
donotpri
maf aciec
onsti
tut
eanyo8enc
eormakeout
acaseagainstt
heaccused.
(
2)Wher etheall
egati
onsinthefirsti
nfor
mat ionreport
andothermat er
ial
s,ifany,accompanyingt heFIR do
not disc
lose a cognizable o8ence, j
ustifying an
i
nvesti
gati
onbypol i
ceoNc ersunderSection156( 1)of
theCodeexceptunderanor derofaMagi str
at ewithi
n
thepurvi
ew ofSect
ion155(2)oftheCode.
(3)Wher et
heunc ont
roverted all
egati
onsmadei nthe
FIRorc ompl
aintandtheevi dencec ol
lec
tedinsuppor
t
ofthe same do notdisclose the commissi
on ofany
o8enc
eandmakeoutac aseagai nsttheacc
used.
(
4)Wher e,theallegat
ionsintheFI R donotconstit
ute
a c ognizable o8ence but c onsti
tut
e only a non-
cognizableo8enc e,noinvest
igationispermit
ted bya
poli
ce oNc er withoutan order ofa Magi strat
e as
contempl at
edunderSec ti
on155( 2)oftheCode.
(
5) Wher e the allegations made i n the FI R or
complai
ntaresoabsur dandi nherent
lyimprobableon
thebasisofwhichnopr udentpersoncaneverr eacha
j
ust concl
usi
on t hat therei s suNcient gr
ound f or
proc
eedingagainsttheac cused.
(6)Wherether eisan expr essl egalbarengr afted in
anyofthepr ovi
sionsoft heCodeort hec oncernedAc t
(underwhichac r
iminalpr oceeding isi nsti
tuted)t o
the i
nsti
tut
ion and c ontinuance oft he proceedings
and/orwher ethereisaspec i
ficprovisionint heCode
ortheconcernedAc t,providi
ngeNc ac i
ousr edressf or
thegri
evanceoftheaggr ievedpar ty.
(
7) Where a c ri
mi nal proc
eedi
ng is mani festly
att
endedwi t
hmal afideand/orwher etheproceeding
i
s malic
iouslyinst
ituted wit
h an ult
eri
ormot i
ve f or
wreaki
ngvengeanc eont heac c
usedandwi t
havi ew
tospi
tehim duetopr i
vateandpersonalgrudge.
”
19
I
n ouropi
nion,t
he pr
esentcasef
all
swi
thi
nthe par
ame
ter
s
Nos.1,5and7r
espl
yref
err
edt
oabove.
26. At t
his st
age, we woul
dli
ke t
o obser
ve somet
hing
i
mpor
tant
. Whenev
er an accused comes bef
oret
he Cour
t
i
nvoki
ngei
thert
hei
nher
entpower
sunderSect
ion 482 oft
he
Code of Cr
imi
nal Pr
ocedur
e (
CrPC) or ext
raor
dinar
y
j
uri
sdi
cti
on underAr
ticl
e 226 oft
he Const
itut
ion t
o gett
he
FI
R ort
he cr
imi
nalpr
oceedi
ngs quashed essent
ial
ly on t
he
gr
ound t
hat such pr
oceedi
ngs ar
e mani
fest
lyf
rivol
ous or
vexat
ious ori
nst
itut
ed wi
tht
he ul
ter
iormot
ive f
orwr
eaki
ng
vengeance,t
hen i
nsuch ci
rcumst
ancest
heCour
towesadut
y
t
olooki
ntot
heFI
R wi
th car
eandal
it
tlemor
ecl
ose
ly.Wesay
so becauseoncet
hecompl
ainantdeci
dest
o pr
oceed agai
nst
t
he accused wi
th an ul
ter
ior mot
ive f
or wr
eaki
ng per
sonal
vengeance,et
c.,t
hen hewoul
densur
ethatt
heFI
R/compl
aint
i
sver
y we
lldr
aft
ed wi
th al
lthe necessar
y pl
eadi
ngs.The
compl
ainantwoul
d ensur
ethatt
he aver
ment
s made i
nthe
FI
R/compl
aint ar
e suc
h t
hat t
hey di
scl
ose t
he necessar
y
i
ngr
edi
ent
stoconst
itut
etheal
legedo⇡ence. Ther
efor
e,i
twi
ll
notbej
ustenough f
ort
heCour
ttol
ook i
ntot
heaver
ment
s
made i
n t
he FI
R/compl
aint al
one f
or t
he pur
pose of
20
ascer
tai
ning whe
thert
he necessar
yingr
edi
ent
sto const
itut
e
t
he al
leged o⇡ence ar
e di
scl
osed or not
.In f
riv
olous or
vexat
ious pr
oceedi
ngs,t
he Cour
towes a dut
ytol
ook i
nto
manyot
herat
tendi
ngci
rcumst
ancesemer
gingf
rom t
her
ecor
d
oft
hecaseoverandabovet
heaver
ment
sand,i
fneedbe,wi
th
duecar
eandci
rcumspect
ion t
ryt
oreadi
n be
tween t
hel
ines.
TheCour
twhi
leexer
cisi
ngi
tsj
uri
sdi
cti
on underSect
ion 482
oft
heCr
PC orAr
ticl
e226oft
heConst
itut
ionneednotr
est
rict
i
tse
lfonl
ytot
hes
tageofacasebuti
sempower
edt
otakei
nto
account t
he over
all ci
rcumst
ances l
eadi
ng t
o t
he
i
nit
iat
ion/r
egi
str
ati
on oft
he case as wel
las t
he mat
eri
als
col
lect
ed i
nthecour
seofi
nvest
igat
ion. Takef
ori
nst
ancet
he
caseonhand.Mul
ti
pleFI
Rshavebeenr
egi
ster
edoveraper
iod
oft
ime.I
tisi
nthe backgr
ound ofsuch ci
rcumst
ances t
he
r
egi
str
ati
on of mul
ti
ple FI
Rs assumes i
mpor
tance, t
her
eby
at
tract
ing t
he i
ssue ofwr
eaki
ng vengeance outofpr
ivat
e or
per
sonalgr
udgeasal
leged.
27. I
ntheover
allvi
ew oft
hemat
ter
,wehaver
eached t
he
conc
lusi
on t
hatt
he FI
R No.175 of2022 dat
ed 11.
08.
2022
deser
vest
o bequashed i
n so f
arast
heappe
llanther
eini
s
concer
ned.I
tisso appar
entt
hatast
heSt
atebe
lievest
hat
t
he f
ather
-in-
law oft
he appe
llantname
lyI
qbal@ Bal
aisa
21
ver
y har
dened cr
imi
nal
, hi
s son-
in-
law i
.e. t
he pr
esent
appe
llantwhohasbeeni
mpl
icat
edi
nthef
urt
herst
atementof
t
hefir
sti
nfor
manti
sal
soacr
imi
nal
.
28. I
n t
he r
esul
t,t
his appeal succeeds and i
s her
eby
al
lowed.The i
mpugned or
der passed by t
he Hi
gh Cour
tof
Judi
cat
ure at Al
lahabad i
s her
eby se
t asi
de. The cr
imi
nal
pr
oceedi
ngsar
isi
ngf
rom FI
R No.175of2022dat
ed11.
08.
2022
r
egi
ster
edatPol
iceSt
ati
onMi
rzapur
,Sahar
anpur
,St
ateofU.
P.
ar
eher
ebyquashed.
29. I
tisneedl
ess t
o cl
ari
fyt
hatt
he obser
vat
ions made i
n
t
hisj
udgmentar
ere
levantonl
yfort
hepur
poseoft
heFI
Rin
quest
ion and t
heconsequent
ialcr
imi
nalpr
oceedi
ngs.Noneof
t
heobser
vat
ionsshal
lhav
eanybear
ingon anyoft
hependi
ng
cr
imi
nalpr
osecut
ionsoranyot
herpr
oceedi
ngs.
……………………………….
.J.
(B.
R.GAVAI)
………………………………. .
J.
(J.
B.PARDI
WALA )
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 08,2023
22
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 393 OF 2022
1. Vijay s/o Jawaharlal Darda, aged about

66 years, occ. Chairman Lokmat Media
Private Limited, [Lokmat Newspaper
(P) Ltd.],
2. Rajendra s/o Jawaharlal Darda, aged

about 65 years, Occ. Editor-in-chief
Lotmat Media Private Limited, [Lokmat
Newspaper (P) Ltd.],
The applicants are having their office

at Lokmat Bhavan, Jawaharlal Nehru
Marg, Nagpur – 440 012
... APPLICANTS
VERSUS
Ravindra Ghisulal Gupta, aged
about 53 years, Occupation –
Service, r/o Police Station
Maregaon, Tq. - Maregaon,
Distt. Yavatmal.
… NON-APPLICANT
____________________________________________________________
Shri Firdos Mirza, Advocate for the applicants.
Shri Nitin Lambat, Advocate for the non-applicant.
____________________________________________________________
2
CORAM : VINAY JOSHI, J.

DATED. : 20.06.2022.
JUDGMENT :
Heard. ADMIT. By consent, the matter is taken up for
final disposal.
2. By invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this application takes an
exception to the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Yavatmal directing to issue process under Section 500 of the Indian
Penal Code in R.C.C. No. 614 of 2017. Applicant no.1 Vijay Darda is
the Chairman of Lokmat Media Private Limited (Lokmat Newspaper
(P) Ltd.) whilst applicant no. 2 Rajendra Darda is an Editor-in-chief
of Lokmat Media. Lokmat group is publishing a daily newspaper
having wide circulation in the State of Maharashtra. The non-
applicant (complainant) was aggrieved by a news item published in
the daily edition of ‘Lokmat’ dated 20.05.2016. It is the
complainant’s case that the applicants have published a false and
frivolous news item in connivance with the co-accused with the sole
intention of humiliating him, which has lowered his image in society.

3
3. Accordingly, the non-applicant lodged a private complaint
in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Yavatmal against the
applicants and others alleging that they have committed an offence
punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned
Magistrate by taking cognizance of the complaint has recorded
verification of the complainant. On examination of available
material, the learned Magistrate has issued a process against the
applicant and others. Aggrieved by the order of issuance of process,
the applicants have directly approached this Court in terms of
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by relying on the
decision of the Supreme Court in case of Prabhu Chawla vs. State of
Rajasthan and anr. (2016) 16 SCC 30 .
4. The facts leading to the controversy can be set out in a
narrow compass, that the applicant no.1 is a Chairmen of the
Editorial Board whilst applicant no. 2 is an Editor-in-chief of Lokmat
Group. Undisputedly, in the daily edition of “Lokmat” dated
20.05.2016, a news item was published concerning the complainant
and his family. For the sake of convenience, the said news item is
reproduced in vernacular as below :

4
“laiRrhP;k oknkrwu nksu xVkar gk.kkekjh”
;orekG & ;sFkhy ekjokMh pkSdkr laiRrhP;k oknkrwu

lkseokjh nksu xVkr okn gksmu gk.kkekjh >kY;kph ?kVuk
?kMyh- ;k izdj.kh nksUgh xVkarQsZ eaxGokjh ijLijkafo:/n
‘kgj iksyhl Bk.;kr rdzkjh ns.;kr vkY;k vkgsr-
,dk efgysus fnysY;k rdzkjhuqlkj vkjksih

v’kksd xqIrk] lqehr xqIrk] vkdk’k xqIrk] v:.k xqIrk o
veksy xqIrk jk- loZ ekjokMh pkSd ;kauh tkxsP;k
oknko:u frP;k irhy yks[kaMh ikbZius ekjgk.k dsyh-
rlsp frP;k xG;krhy 60 gtkj :i;s fdaerhps eaxGlw=
tcjhus rksMwu usys- rj ;kp izdj.kkr v’kksd xqIrk ;kauh
fnysY;k rdzkjhuqlkj vkjksih vjfoan xqIrk] f=yksd xqIrk]
fuf[ky xqIrk] johanz xqIrk o brj nksu efgykauh feGwu
laIirhP;k oknkrwu QkoMs o yks[kaMh jkWMus ekjgk.k d:u
xaHkhj nq[kkir dsyh rlsp vf’yy f’kfoxkG d:u thos
ekj.;kph /kedh fnyh- ‘kgj iksfylkauh nksUgh xVkafo:/n
xqUgk nk[ky dsyk vkgs-”
5. Precisely, it was a publication regarding the registration
of crime against the complainant and his family members. Feeling
aggrieved by such publication, the non-applicant (complainant) has
filed a complaint of defamation. It is the case of the complainant that
though the applicants were shouldering the responsibility of the
items published in the newspaper, they have published the
concerned news without verifying its truthfulness. The complainant
alleged that the police report lodged by the co-accused Ashok Gupta
was totally false and frivolous. On the date of the alleged occurrence,
5
the complainant was not present at the scene of the crime. Later on,
he was excluded from the charge sheet. It is alleged that the
applicants, without ascertaining the genuineness of the police report,
published the news item which has harmed his reputation and
therefore, the offence.
6. Primarily, on the reading of the aforesaid vernacular news
item of the impugned news, it is evident that the Journalist/News
Reporter has only reported the filing of the police report and the
registration of the First Information Report by the Police officials. It
is not in dispute that the news report was in consonance with the
police report.
7. Learned Counsel for the applicants made two-fold
submissions. Firstly, the applicant nos.1 and 2 are not the Editors of
the newspaper as per the declaration made under Section 7 of The
Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 (for short hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Act’). In support of said contention, my attention
has been invited to the imprint line of the newspaper. The said
imprint has a specific reference that one Dilip Tikhile is an Editor

6
and responsible person in terms of the Act. It is specifically argued
that the imprint note not only specifies the name of the Editor, but
also clarifies that the said person is responsible as per the Act. On
that basis, it is argued that no liability could be fastened against the
applicants in contradiction to the declaration made under the Act.
8. The scheme and scope of the Press and Registration of
Books Act, 1867 are relevant for adjudication of the issue involved.
Section 1 of the Act is the interpretation clause and the expression
“Editor” has been defined as follows:
“1. Interpretation clause.—(1) In this Act,

unless there shall be something repugnant in the
subject or context —
….
‘editor’ means the person who controls the
selection of the matter that is published in a
newspaper;”
9. Section 7 of the Act makes the declaration to be prima
facie evidence for fastening the liability in any civil or criminal
proceeding on the Editor. Section 7 of the Act reads as follows:

7
“7. Office copy of declaration to be prima

facie evidence.— In any legal proceeding whatever,
civil as well as criminal, the production of a copy of
such declaration as is aforesaid, attested by the seal of
some Court empowered by this Act to have the custody
of such declaration shall be held (unless the contrary be
proved) to be sufficient evidence, as against the person
whose name shall be subscribed to such declaration,
that the said person was printer or publisher, or printer
and publisher (according as the words of the said
declaration may be) of every portion of every
newspaper whereof the title shall correspond with the
title of the newspaper mentioned in the declaration or
the editor of every portion of that issue of the
newspaper of which a copy is produced.”
10. Therefore, from the scheme of the Act, it is manifest that
it is the Editor who controls the selection of the matter that is
published in a newspaper. Additionally, every copy of the newspaper
is required to contain the names of the owner and the Editor and
once the name of the Editor is shown, he shall be held responsible in
any civil and criminal proceeding. The interpretation clause
contained in Section 1, clarifies that there is presumption that the
Editor is the person who controls the selection of the matter that was
published in the newspaper. This presumption under Section 7 of the
Act is a rebuttable presumption and it would be deemed sufficient
evidence unless the contrary is proved.

8
11. By placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court
in case of K.M. Mathew vs. State of Kerala and anr. (1992) 1 SCC
217 it is contended that the presumption under Section 7 of the Act
is only against a person whose name is printed as an “Editor” and
not against every person who is connected with the newspaper. In
the said case the Supreme Court has specifically considered the said
question in the matter of newspapers. After referring to the
provisions contained in the Act, it was observed in paragraphs Nos.9
and 10 in the manner is as follows:
“9. In the instant case there is no averment against the

Chief Editor except the motive attributed to him. Even the
motive alleged is general and vague. The complainant
seems to rely upon the presumption under Section 7 of the
Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 (the Act). But
Section 7 of the Act has no applicability for a person who is
simply named as Chief Editor. The presumption under
Section 7 is only against the person whose name is printed
as editor as required under Section 5(1). There is a
mandatory (though rebuttable) presumption that the
person whose name is printed as Editor is the editor of
every portion of that issue of the newspaper of which a
copy is produced. Section 1(1) of the Act defines Editor to
mean the person who controls the selection of the matter
that is published in a newspaper. Section 7 raises the
presumption in respect of a person who is named as the
editor and printed as such on every copy of the newspaper.
The Act does not recognise any other legal entity for
raising the presumption. Even if the name of the Chief
9
Editor is printed in the newspaper. There is no

presumption against him under Section 7 of the Act. See
State of Maharashtra v. Dr. RB. Chowdhary & Ors., (1967)
3 SCR 708; U.P. Mishra v. Kamal Narain Sharma & Ors.,
(1971) 3 SCR 257, Narasingh Charan Mohanty v. Surendra
Mohanty, (1974) 2 SCR 39 and Haji C.H. Mohammed Koya
v. T.K.S.M.A. Muthukoya, (1979) 1 SCR 664.
10. It is important to state that for a Magistrate to take

cognizance of the offence as against the Chief Editor, there
must be positive averments in the complaint of knowledge
of the objectionable character of the matter. The complaint
in the instant case does not contain any such allegation. In
the absence of such allegation, the Magistrate was justified
in directing that the complaint so far as it relates to the
Chief Editor could not be proceeded with. To ask the Chief
Editor to undergo the trial of the case merely on the
ground of the issue of process would be oppressive. No
person should be tried without a prima facie case. The
view taken by the High Court is untenable. The appeal is
accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court is set
aside.”
12. In the present case, it is blatantly obvious that there is no
allegation against the present applicants that they were having
knowledge of the publication of such imputation or that they were
directly responsible for the publication of such imputation. The
Chairman is supposed to have the overall control over the
management of the establishment. He is not directly concerned with
the publication of the news items and unless there are materials to
10
come to such a conclusion, he cannot be roped in for having
committed the offence under section 499 of the IPC. The principle of
vicarious liability is not applicable to Criminal offences and in the
absence of any provision laid down in the statute, the Chairman
cannot be held vicariously liable for the offence committed by the
employees. Merely because the accused happened to be the
Chairman of the Lokmat group, no criminal case can lie against him
for an offence punishable under Section 500 of the IPC.
13. Contextually reference can be made to the decision of
this Court in Samir Jain s/o Ashok Kumar Jain v. Abhijit Chavan
1996 (2) ALL MR 93, wherein this Court has observed that the law is
well settled that an owner of a newspaper cannot be made accused
of defamation only on the ground of his ownership unless there is
specific material to show that he is in any way directly responsible
for the publication of impugned news items.
14. Pertinent to note that the imprint line though
conspicuously spells out that one Dilip Tikhile is Editor and
responsible under the Act, still he is not made accused. By any

11
stretch of imagination, the liability of publication cannot be stretched
to the applicants unless a case of conspicuous malice is made out.
The complaint is totally silent to indicate either the applicants know
the complainant or they had any reason to publish said particular
news. The intention on the part of the accused to harm the
reputation or the knowledge or reasonable belief that an imputation
will harm the reputation of the person concerned is an essential
ingredient of the offence of defamation. There is no material to show
that the applicants were somehow concerned with the publication of
the defamatory news item. Presumption regarding awareness of the
contents of the newspaper can be raised only against the Editor
whose name appears on the copy of the newspaper and not against
the other Editors like Editor-in-chief, Sub-editor, Resident Editor, etc.
15. Learned Counsel for the non-applicant submitted that the
applicants have deliberately suppressed the name of Editor though
repeatedly asked. In this regard, I have been taken through the
exchange of notices in between the parties. Initially, the complainant
vide notice dated 25.07.2017, has asked the name of a person at
whose instance the said news item was published. The said notice
12
was responded to by the Lokmat Group through their advocate vide
reply dated 08.08.2017. In said reply, the complainant’s attention
was invited to the imprint line of newspaper about the responsibility
of the particular named person. Learned Counsel for the
Complainant would submit that since no specific name of Editor was
furnished, the complainant issued a second notice dated 24.08.2017
once again enquiring the name of a responsible person /Editor for
taking appropriate action.
16. It is argued that since the applicants have deliberately
suppressed the name of the Editor, it amounts to mala fides. In a true
sense, the said exercise was unwarranted. Already as a mandate of
the Act, an imprint line was published in the newspaper displaying
the name of the Editor with a specific note that he is responsible for
the news items. In the circumstances, there was no obligation on the
applicants to refurnish the said information and therefore,
submission as regards mala fides is wholly untenable.
17. It takes me to another limb of submission. Learned
Counsel for the applicants would submit that mere publication of

13
registration of crime would not fall within the ambit of Section 499
of the Indian Penal Code. It is submitted that whatever was
registered in the First Information Report against the non-
applicant(complainant), was published in the newspaper, which
cannot be termed as defamation. In order to constitute the offence of
defamation, the dual requirement is to be met, that the publication
must be an imputation, and secondly, there must be an intention to
harm the reputation of the person.
18. It is not in dispute that at the instance of the Police report
lodged by co-accused Ashok Gupta, Police of Yavatmal City Police
Station registered crime no. 313 of 2016 for the offence punishable
under Sections 143, 148, 326, 294 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code
against the non-applicant (complainant) and 5 others. As far as the
news item is concerned, there is no allegation that the news was a
distorted version or a colourable exaggeration of the First
Information Report. In short, there is no dispute that the crime was
registered against the complainant and the news item reflects the
true gist of the allegations levelled in the report. Rather the said fact
cannot be disputed since the copy of the First Information Report has
14
been produced on record. The core question is whether publication
or reporting of registration of crime amounts to the intentional
imputation of a named person. Undoubtedly, the Press has great
power in impressing the minds of the people and thus it is essential
that the person responsible for publishing anything in newspapers
should take good care before its publication. No doubt, publication
of news on rumour or on hear-say information having no iota of
truth is fatal to a Journalist. Herein it is not the case that First
Information Report was not at all registered or the distorted news
item was published.
19. It was thus inquired from the Counsel for the non-
applicant as to how the action of reporting a news item could be said
to be defamatory. It is common knowledge that in daily newspapers
at least some space is devoted to the news about the registration of
crimes, filing of cases in Courts, the progress of the investigation,
arrest of persons, etc. It constitutes news events which public has the
right to know. Certainly, the Publishers are to report the true
happenings in their newspapers. I may reiterate that there is no
dispute that the fact of registration of crime was correctly reported.

15
Filing complaints about defamation on such news items are nothing
but an attempt to shut up and stifle the Reporters /informants and to
force them to withdraw the report filed against the persons who are
allegedly defamed. No reply in this respect was forthcoming from the
Counsel of the non-applicant nor has anything in this respect been
stated as to how the said act of Editor/Publisher gives rise to the
action for libel. If it was held so then no reporting of news could be
made till the final outcome of the investigation or the final orders of
the last Court. It would deprive the rights of the public to know the
happenings.
20. It is the primary function of the Press to provide
comprehensive and correct information, especially when it is brought
into the public domain. Freedom of the Press is implied from the
freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of
the Constitution of India. In other words, the freedom of making a
true report regarding the affairs which are in the public domain is a
right, which flows from the freedom of speech. The action of
defamation about true and faithful reporting is unhealthy for a
democratic setup.
16
21. Registration of a crime is no longer a private affair. The
Supreme Court in case of Youth Bar Association of India vs. Union of
India and anr. (2016) 9 SCC 473 has directed that the copies of the
First Information Report (barring cases of sensitive nature) shall be
uploaded on the website meaning thereby the registration of the
First Information Report falls in the public domain.
22. The main question that arises is as to whether a case is
made out for attracting the offences punishable under Sections 499
and 500 IPC from the averments contained in the complaint (R.C.C.
No. 614 of 2017). I have carefully gone through the averments in the
complaint. From the contents of the same, it is discernible that, apart
from the averment to the effect that the applicants are Chairman and
Editor-in-chief, the specific role played by them in selecting, editing
and publishing the said news item has not been stated therein. All
the allegations contained therein are general in nature.
Conspicuously, the person who is directly responsible for publishing
the news item has not been made an accused. Therefore, the
question that emerges here is whether merely because of the fact
that the applicants were holding high positions in the Newspaper
Group can be implicated for the offence alleged. Before going into
17
further details, the requirements to attract offences under Sections
499 and 500 IPC are to be examined. Section 499 IPC reads as
follows:
“499. defamation.- Whoever, by words either spoken

or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible
representations, makes or publishes any imputation
concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing
or having reason to believe that such imputation will
harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in
the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that person.
Explanation 1.- It may amount to defamation to
impute anything to a deceased person, if the
imputation would harm the reputation of that person
if living, and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of
his family or other near relatives.
Explanation 2.- It may amount to defamation to

make an imputation concerning a company or an
association or collection of persons as such.
Explanation 3.- An imputation in the form of an

alternative or expressed ironically, may amount to
defamation.
Explanation 4.- No imputation is said to harm a

person's reputation, unless that imputation directly or
indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral
or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the
character of that person in respect of his caste or of his
calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it
to be believed that the body of that person is in a
loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as
disgraceful.”
18
23. From the perusal of the definition of the term
“Defamation” as contained under Section 499 IPC, it can be seen
that, in order to attract the said offence, there must be a positive act
on the part of the accused by words either spoken or intended to be
read, or by signs or by visible representations, which contain any
imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or
having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the
reputation of such person. It is evident that the offence is person-
centric and only if the particular accused has made any act with the
specific intention or knowledge of its consequences, he can be
prosecuted for the said offence. In such circumstances, it is
absolutely necessary that the complaint should contain specific
averments, pointing out the specific role played by each of the
accused persons in expressing, making or publishing the
objectionable imputations with the intention or knowledge of the
consequences of such imputations.
24. The tenor of the entire private complaint is that the
allegations levelled in the Police report qua complainant Ravindra
are totally false. In the complaint of defamation, he pleaded that on

19
the date of the alleged occurrence, he was not present rather he was
elsewhere on duty. It is alleged that the publisher of the newspaper
without verifying the truthfulness of the news, had published the
news item, amounting to defamation. The complaint also bears
reference that complainant has been excluded while filing the charge
sheet, perhaps under Section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
As a matter of fact, the news item was published within three days
from the registration of the crime, therefore, subsequent exclusion
from the charge sheet has no bearing at all. Moreover, the news item
was based on the true facts i.e. about the registration of crime at the
Police Station. The responsibility of the Editor is to publish true facts
and nothing else. The complaint of defamation alleges that the
truthfulness of the contents of the First Information Report are not
verified. The publisher is not expected to investigate the matter and
ascertain the truthfulness of the First Information Report before
publishing the news item. The liability and responsibility of the
Editor are restricted to a limited extent therefore, the contention in
that regard is not acceptable.
25. Moreover, in the light of the legal position set out by the
20
Supreme Court in the above-referred case of K.M. Mathew it is not
possible to implicate the applicants in the absence of specific
averments indicating their role in the commission of the offence.
Further, there is also no provision under the Indian Penal Code
providing for vicarious liability upon persons other than persons
declared under the Act.
26. One cannot miss the fact regarding the conduct and
manner in which the news item was published. The whole reading of
the news item discloses that the reporting was not only as regards to
registration of crime against the complainant and his family
members, but in the same news another story i.e. registration of a
counter case against another group has also been published. The said
fact accentuates to infer that the sole intention behind publication
was to make true and fair disclosure about the fact of registration of
crimes.
27. To summarize the position as per the statutory imprint
line, the responsibility of publication would not lie on persons other
than the named responsible person. Moreover, the averments
contained in the complaint do not disclose the applicant’s role in

21
preparing, editing or publishing the news item, which is the subject
matter of the complaint. All the allegations contained therein are of
general nature. Conspicuously, the person who was directly
responsible as per statutory declaration was not made an accused.
The learned Counsel for the non-applicant has not disputed the said
position of law. Inasmuch as, fair reporting of the information, which
is brought in public domain i.e news item containing a statement of
facts may not attract action for defamation. I may reiterate that fair
reporting of a matter, without insinuations and innuendos i.e. a news
item is not actionable. Continuation of such prosecution amounts to
abuse of the process of the Court and would not sustain in the eyes
of law.
28. In view of that, application deserves to be allowed, and
allowed accordingly. The impugned order of issuance of process
dated 16.01.2018 against the applicants in R.C.C. No.614 of 2017 is
hereby quashed and set aside. The Criminal Complaint against
applicant nos. 1 and 2 stand dismissed. The Criminal Application
stands disposed of in the above terms.
(VINAY JOSHI, J.)

Trupti
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:000290
VERDICTUM.IN
CRM-M No. 39604 of 2018 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M No. 39604 of 2018 (O&M)

Reserved on: 16.10.2023.
Pronounced on: 04.01.2024
Vipin Pubby …..Petitioner

Versus
State of Haryana and another …..Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
Present: Mr. Manu K. Bhandari, Advocate

for the petitioner.
Mr. Rajat Gautam, Addl. AG, Haryana.
Mr. P.S. Poonia, Advocate, and

Mr. Pulkit Dhanda, Advocate,
for respondent No.2.
****
ANOOP CHITKARA, J.
Case no. Dated Sections Court

Complaint 09.08.2008 499, 500, Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Gurgaon
No.556 of 2008 501 IPC (now Gurugram)
Criminal Revision No. Date of Decision Court

09 of 2016 04-06-2018 Additional Sessions Judge,
CIS No. CRR/351/2016 Gurugram.
CNR No.HRGR01-008822-2016
1. An Editor of “The Indian Express” aggrieved by the dismissal of the criminal

revision petition by the Sessions Court refusing to quash the summons issued in the
above-captioned complaint filed for criminal defamation, had come up before this
Court by filing the present petition under Section 482 CrPC.
2. As per paragraph 2 of the petition, the petitioner declares that he was working
as Editor (Chandigarh) of “The Indian Express” (Chandigarh Edition), printed and
published by The Indian Express Private Limited, and at that time, the petitioner was a
resident of Chandigarh and now, a resident of Panchkula.
3. The petitioner is aggrieved by the issuance of summons and the upholding of

the said order by the Sessions Court in the above-captioned complaint filed by the
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respondent, Mr. Param Vir Rathee, IPS, against many journalists and political leaders, in
all thirty-four people. The petitioner relies on many grounds, including the issue of
cause and jurisdiction, and that even if the complaint is accepted as true, there is still
no violation of section 499 IPC, nor did the petitioner act with any malice or intention to
defame the complainant. The petitioner's counsel submits that during the interregnum
of pendency of this petition, the complainant has settled the matter with some of the
respondents; however, no such settlement took place with the petitioner.
4. The respondent-complainant has filed a reply and opposed the present petition
because it was the duty of the petitioner to verify the correctness of the news, and
without doing so, he let the news printed and published in Indian Express, which caused
irreparable loss/damage to the complainant’s reputation and petitioner is liable to be
prosecuted and punished under Sections 499 and 500 IPC.
5. In the complaint, Annexure P-2, the complainant alleged that he is an IPS Officer
of the 1997 batch and belongs to the Haryana cadre. He has been an honest officer,
performing his duties with exemplary devotion and sincerity. His Annual Confidential
Reports have rated him as an officer of integrity and honesty. At the time of the alleged
defamation and the filing of the complaint, he claimed to be posted as Additional
Director General of Police (CID), Haryana and asserted that a person of the highest
integrity is posted on such a sensitive post as CID Chief of the State. The complainant
further stated that he held a high reputation for honesty and integrity; for these
reasons, he has earned respect in society, among his colleagues, and the State.
6. As per paragraph no.5 of the complaint, it has been alleged that on June 17,
2008, the complainant noticed a news item in Indian Express with topic: "Accused says
he bribed ADGP, sought police protection." The complainant further stated that in the
news item, it was reported that Dr. Sandeep Sharma, an accused in the criminal case,
had confessed before the Central Bureau of Investigation [CBI] that Param Vir Rathee
had recommended Sandeep Sharma's police protection after taking a bribe. In the
complaint, the copy of Indian Express dated June 17, 2008, was annexed [Annexure C-
1]. In paragraph seven of the complaint, the complainant further declares that on
verification, he came to know that said CBI had not arrested Sandeep Sharma, and as
such, his confessing before CBI was out of the question, and consequently, there was no
occasion to the complainant recommending his police protection. The next day, the CBI
gave a statement, published in the Times of India on June 18, 2008, [C-2]/P-2], in which
the CBI clarified this part. In paragraph no. 8, the complainant mentioned a list of
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newspapers that had published such news and gave names of eighteen newspapers. In
paragraph no. 9 of the complaint, the complainant stated that the imputations
contained in the newspapers Annexure P-1, P-3 to P-19 therein showed that the
contents were defamatory, which in turn lowered his reputation in the estimation of his
friends, colleagues, and public at large, at his place of residence and wherever he
served as a police officer. All such reports were factually incorrect because Sandeep
Sharma had been provided security keeping in view the threat perception assessed by
the District Police, Panchkula, based on the criminal complaint given by Sandeep
Sharma wherein he had claimed threats to his life, based on which police registered an
FIR. Later, the said FIR was canceled, and his security was withdrawn. Paragraph no. 9
of the complaint explicitly mentioned that the complainant had neither any role in
granting such police protection nor Sandeep Sharma had confessed before the CBI
because he was never arrested. Those allegations and imputations published against
the complainant were factually incorrect and were intentionally made to lower the
complainant's credit as a police officer in the estimation of colleagues, friends, and the
public.
7. After filing the complaint, the complainant appeared as CW-1 before the
concerned Court and reiterated the allegations made in the complaint. It would be
appropriate to extract the relevant portion of the said statement, which reads as
follows: -
“On 17.06.08, I got mental shock and deep grief after reading an
article alongwith my photo, published in an English Daily National
Newspaper namely Indian Express. The heading of that news was
Accused Says He bribed, ADGP, sought Police Protection. It was
published in this article that Accused Dr. Sandeep Sharma has
admitted the statement of accused C.B.I. that I (Complainant)
have taken bribe from him to provide him police protection. The
copy of the newspaper is Ex. C-1 and related newspaper is
exhibited at Page-1 of Chandigarh News Line as Ex.C-1/A. This
news was clearly the news to cause defamation. This was
published with the intent to spoil my self-respect and image. On
the next day i.e. on 18.06.08, C.B.I. Has clearly stated through an
English National Newspaper Times of India that they have not
arrested the accused Dr.Sandeep Sharma.”
8. The complainant also examined CW4 Sandeep Khirwal, S.P. Panchkula who
testified that Sandeep Sharma had moved an application for threat perception (Ex.24).
Based on the threat perception, the Panchkula police appointed one gun man for the
personal security of Sandeep Sharma on 14.04.2006 and requisite entries were made in
the record. Subsequently, the investigation did not find any substance in the allegation
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of threat perception and closure report was filed in the said application and
consequently, the personal security was withdrawn on 20.09.2007 (i.e. after 01 year 03
months). Referring to the record, CW4 further testified that Sandeep Sharma was given
personal security because of the threat perception but later on it was withdrawn
because the threat perception was not proved. He explicitly stated that no order was
given to him to provide personal security from higher authorities. Thus, through CW4
the complainant tried to prove that the allegations that he had taken bribe from
Sandeep Sharma were dis-proved by an IPS rank officer. Panchkula Police had deputed
personal security w.e.f. 14-04-2006 to 20-09-2007, thus, CW-4 established that
Panchkula police provided security during this period based on threat perception and
not because of the complainant’s intervention. However, the witness did not prove
whether, after 20-09-2007, the Haryana Police had provided any personal security to
Sandeep Sharma or not. CW5 testified that 10 cases of fraud against bank were
registered against Sandeep Sharma. The complainant also examined the Inspector of
CBI as CW-3, who testified that Sandeep Sharma was under arrest in another FIR and
was lodged in Ambala Jail. He had applied for Sandeep’s production warrants on Aug
20, 2008, and interrogated him on Aug 21, 2008; before that, he had not arrested him.
Thus, the complainant established by leading evidence that on June 17, 2008, when the
news items were published, Sandeep Sharma had not been interrogated or arrested by
CBI, and thus, the basis for the news items was false and incorrect. The complainant
examined CW-2 & CW-6 to prove that after reading the news in question, the
complainant’s image and reputation were lowered in their opinion.
9. Vide a detailed order dated 17.04.2010, learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class found
prima facie evidence for commission of offence punishable under Section 500 and 501
IPC and accordingly summoned accused no.1 to 34. In the complaint, the petitioner has
been arraigned as Accused No.1.
10. The petitioner challenged the summoning order by filing a petition under section
482 CrPC before this court. However, vide order dated 11-05-2016, a co-ordinate bench
of this Court relegated the petitioner to the Court of first revision by observing that
they should have availed the remedy of criminal revision before the Sessions Court and
extended the limitation provided the revision is filed within 30 days. After that, the
petitioner challenged the summoning order by filing a criminal revision under section
397 CrPC before the Gurgaon Sessions Court. Vide the impugned judgment dated 04-
06-2018, the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram, dismissed the revision petition. It
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would be appropriate to refer the reasoning given by Additional Sessions Judge which
reads as follows: -
“[9]. More so, when any news regarding any person in the
authority has been published in public domain without verification
of facts and it has been found to be false, it cannot be said that
the same has been published in good faith. When the clarification
has been given by the CBI in news paper Ex.C2, published on
18.6.2008, it cannot be said on the face of it that the revisionist-
accused on earlier occasion had acted without malafide intention.
When said accused Sandeep Sharma has not made any statement
before CBI and he was not ever been taken in custody by CBI in
corruption related matter, the question of suffering of his
statement before CBI does not arise at all. At least reasonable
enquiry from all the concerned persons should have been made by
the revisionist- accused before giving statement and publishing in
news paper. Therefore, the learned trial court has rightly
appreciated the evidence before summoning the accused.
[10]. More so, it is settled law that at the stage of summoning,
the Magistrate has to evaluate the material placed before him
from the primafacie view and not from the point of view for
conviction or acquittal of the accused. Even otherwise, it has been
observed in U.P. Pollution Control Board Vs. M/s. Mohan Meakins
Ltd. & ors.,2002(2) RCB. Criminal (421) that;
"In a summoning order, a Magistrate is not
required to pass a speaking order but if complaint is
dismissed, the Magistrate is to record reasons for
dismissal and issuing process."
Similar view has been observed in S.W.P. Palantikar Vs. State of
Bihar 2001(4) RCC 437 (SC) and in M/s Pepsi Foods Ltd. & anr. Vs.
Special Judicial Magistrate & ors and in Shivjee Singh Versus
Nagendra Tiwary and others 2010(2) CCJ 93.
In Bhushan Kumar and another Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and
another 2012(2) RCR (Criminal) 794, Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held that:
"Once the Magistrate has exercised his
discretion, it is not for the High Court or even
Supreme Court to substitute its own discretion for
that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on
merits".
11. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner came up before this court by filing this petition
under section 482 CrPC, seeking to quash the summoning order and to set aside the
dismissal of criminal revision.
12. The petitioner’s counsel (without admitting any liability or conceding anything)
states that the news report was carried out in good faith in the public interest and
based on information provided by CBI officials and their report. Their journalist had not
only interacted with the complainant but also mentioned his viewpoint. Neither the
newspaper, its reporter, nor the petitioner had made any personal or biased comments.
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13. Petitioner’s counsel submitted that it is Delhi edition of The Indian Express which
is circulated in National Capital Region, viz the metropolitan area encompassing the NCT
of Delhi and adjoining urban areas including Gurgaon and the complainant did not lead
any evidence to primafacie establish that the newspaper which is published in Gurgaon
also carried the same news item because it was Chandigarh Edition, where it was
published, which had no circulation in Gurgaon. The Chandigarh edition of the
newspaper is meant for Chandigarh and adjoining areas of Chandigarh and carries, in
addition to National news, news of local interest to Chandigarh and adjoining areas. The
local edition covers news of local importance and relates to a specific city. The city
editions are like pullout supplements with the leading Indian Express newspaper and
carry the nomenclature of Newsline preceded by the name of the city, for example,
Chandigarh Newsline. There is no averment that the complainant and the witnesses had
read Chandigarh Newsline. Because the petitioner resided at a place that was beyond
the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate before whom the complaint was filed, as
the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 202, CrPC was not complied with,
and on this ground alone, the summoning order and dismissal of revision deserve to be
set aside.
14. The complainant-respondent opposed the present petition and filed his detailed
reply. Referring to the reply, the complainant’s counsel contended that the newspaper
had published a false and defamatory statement. Counsel for the complainant submits
that the media must publish reports after verifying their correctness, as any false
publication may affect the character and credibility of any respectable person in
society. In the present news report, the petitioner did not take any corrective measures
despite a clarification issued by the CBI, which was published in Times of India on
18.6.2008, denying the fact of Sandeep Sharma being taken into custody. Despite the
clarificatory news published in the Times of India, the petitioner took no corrective
measures. The complainant’s counsel further submitted that the Magistrate had issued
a summons after being fully satisfied and following the procedure under Section 202
CrPC. As such, there is no violation of Section 202 CrPC, and the Magistrate had
examined six witnesses, gone through all the evidence, and, on finding sufficient prima
facie material and applied his mind.
15. An analysis of the pleadings, the submissions, and the applicability of judicial
precedents will lead to the following outcome.
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16. On June 17, 2008, the Indian Express, Chandigarh, published the following news
report:
Shubham Hospital Case 'Sharma tried to influence officials’
Accused says he bribed ADGP, sought police protection
Varun Chadha
Chandigarh June 16,
Additional Director General of Police (Intelligence),
Haryana, P. V Rathee, has come under the Central Bureau of
Investigation's (CBI) scanner in the Shubham Hospital case after
accused Sandeep Sharma confessed on Monday that he had
bribed the officer. In return, Rathee had recommended police
protection for the accused and provided him with two gunmen of
the Haryana Police.
The Shubham Hospital and Diagnostic Centre in Sector 20
Panchkula, was sealed by the police after Sharma's certificates and
documents turned out to be 'fake'. Sharma had claimed to possess
an MBBS degree as well as an MS in Ophthalmology. He had also
availed loans worth crores from different banks with the forged
documents.
The gunmen came in handy when Sharma went to the bank
or district administration offices to avail loans or get things done.
He tried to exert influence on the officials by the these tactics,"
said a CBI Officer.
But Rathee claims he provided the security on the
recommendations of district police officials who said Sharma
faced "a threat to his life". Sharma confessed to the CBI that his
life was not under threat.
Rathee refuted all allegations of receiving money from the
accused. "I have never met the person. I don't know why he is
leveling such allegations against me," said the ADGP.
On the other hand, SSP Sandeep Khirwar said the police
cover was recommended only after Sharma lodged a police
complaint against unknown persons threatening him over phone.
Sources claimed no police verification was conducted in the
case as a senior police officer had made the recommendations.
The accused has named many senior politicians and bureaucrats
who used to loan him their official cars when Sharma had to visit
the bank. Bank officials also disclosed the names of many senior
bureaucrats and politician, who recommended Sharma's name for
the loans, to the CBI. In March 2007, Punjab and Sind Bank
officials reportedly went to him when they fell short of their
annual investment target by Rs.5 Crore. "He called up an IAS
officer of Haryana Dairy Development Federation Corporation and
ordered him to deposit the money with the bank to oblige the
bank officials. The very next day the money was deposited in the
bank. Later, the IAS Officer forced the bank officials to pass a loan
of the accused," bank officials told the CBI.
CBI officials said they will ask the bureaucrats and
politicians named by the accused to join investigations after
verifying the facts. "But one thing is certain many politicians and
bureaucrats will find themselves in trouble soon." said a senior CBI
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Officer.
17. On June 18, 2008, the Times of India published a news report containing the
following clarification from CBI:
No record of accused bribing ADGP, says CBI
TIMES NEWS NETWORK
Chandigarh: The central bureau of investigation (CBI), on
Tuesday, said Dr Sandeep Sharma, accused in the Shubham
Hospital case, hadn’t given any statement to the investigation
agency claiming that he had bribed an additional director general
of police (ADGP) for getting security. “There is nothing on record
about the accused bribing any Haryana police official. The
accused, Dr. Sandeep Sharma is in Ambala Central Jail and yet to
be taken into CBI custody” said a DIG rank official of CBI.
However, sources in the crime branch of Haryana police
maintained that the accused had been provided security in 2006
after he lodged an FIR in Sector 20 police station, alleging threat
to his life.
According to the FIR, which was registered on the
complaint of accused doctor, he had received threat calls from a
Shimla based STD. However, the first information report was later
cancelled.
The crime branch official maintained that a report –
mentioning how Sharma obtained security – was sent to senior
police officials in Haryana police headquarter, sector 6, two
months back. Apart from this, Sharma had also filed an
application regarding police security in the office of Haryana chief
minister.
A senior Haryana police official claimed that during the
interrogation Sharma had made several claims like gifting a
Scorpio to a senior politician of Punjab and bribing a number of
senior medical officials and politicians but had failed to provide
any proof.
18. In Shatrughna Prasad Sinha v. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi, (1996) 6 SCC 263,
Supreme Court holds,
[13]. …It is the settled legal position that a Court has to read the
complaint as a whole and find out whether allegations disclosed
constitute an offence under Section 499 triable by the Magistrate.
19. The relevant portion of the complaint reads as follows:

… [5]. That on 17.06.2008 the complainant was shocked and deeply hurt
to see a news item appearing in the "Indian Express" an English National
Daily with a title "Accused says he bribed ADGP, sought police
protection" along with a photograph of the complainant. In the said news
item it was reported that one Dr. Sandeep Sharma, an accused in a
criminal case, has confessed before the Central Bureau of Investigation
that the complainant had recommended police protection to the said
accused after taking bribe. A copy of the said news item which appeared
in the "Indian Express" English National daily newspaper dated
17.06.2008 is being annexed herewith as Annexure P-1.
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[6]. That the news item annexure P-1 is per-se defamatory. A bare
reading of the news item makes it abundantly clear that the imputations
made therein have intended to lower the reputation of the complainant
in the estimation of everybody whoever happens to read the same.
[7]. That on verification by the complainant it transpired that the said
Sandeep Sharma was yet to be taken into custody by the Central Bureau
of Investigation and hence the question of Sandeep Sharma making
confession before the C.B.I. that the bribed the complainant for seeking
police protection does not arise at all. This factual aspect was clarified by
the C.B.I. by way of a statement given to the Times of India an English
National Daily and the same was published by the Time of India in its
newspaper on 18.06.2008. A copy of the said news item, which appeared
in the Times of India English daily on 18.06.2008 is being annexed
herewith as Annexure P-2.
[8]. That similar publications containing above said malicious and
factually incorrect imputations were published by the various
newspapers. A list of newspapers, which published per-se defamatory
and factually incorrect imputations against the complainant is being
referred and annexed below for convenient reference of this Hon'ble
Court: -
Sr. Name of the newspaper Date on Annexure as

No. which the annexed with
news item the complaint
published
1 Dainik Jagran (Panipat Edition) 18.06.2008 Annexure P-3
2 Dainik Jagran (Ludhiana 18.06.2008 Annexure P-4
Edition)
3 Punjab Kesari 18.06.2008 Annexure P-5
4 Punjab Kesari (Sirsa Edition) 19.06.2008 Annexure P-6
5 Dainik Tribune 19.06.2008 Annexure P-7
6 Amar Ujala (Sirsa Edition) 19.06.2008 Annexure P-8
7 Dainik Jagran 19.06.2008 Annexure P-9
8 Dainik Lahoo Ki Loo 19.06.2008 Annexure P-10
9 Dainik Seema Kesari 19.06.2008 Annexure P-11
10 Amar Ujala (Chandigarh 19.06.2008 Annexure P-12
Edition)
11 Ajit Samachar 19.06.2008 Annexure P-13
13 Dainik Tribune 19.06.2008 Annexure P-15
14 Hindustan (HINDI) 19.06.2008 Annexure P-16
15 Ajit Samachar 24.06.2008 Annexure P-17
17 Dainik Jagran 24.06.2008 Annexure P-19
18 Amar Ujala 24.06.2008 Annexure P-20
[9]. That a bare reading of the news item, annexed hereinabove as

Annexure P-1 and Annexure P-3 to Annexure P-19 go to show that
imputations contained therein are per-se defamatory having tendency to
lower the reputation of the complainant in the estimation of his friends,
colleagues and public at large at Gurgaon wherein the complainant has
the permanent residence and has served as a Police Officer on different
positions, as enumerated hereinabove. In the above said publications the
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concerned accused responsible for the publications have published

defamatory imputations against the complainant, which is factually
incorrect. As a matter of fact Sandeep Sharma was provided security on
interim basis in view of the threat perception assessed by the District
Police, Panchkula and registration of a criminal case at his instance
bearing FIR No.78 dated 09.07.2006 under Section 387 IPC, Police Station
Sector 20, Panchkula wherein he had claimed threats to his life. Later on
said FIR was cancelled and security provided to him was withdrawn
against Rapat No.22 dated 20.09.2007 office of OHC, District Panchkula.
The complainant had no role to play in granting police protection to said
Sandeep Sharma, nor Sandeep Sharma ever confessed before C.B.I.,
which had registered case No.RCCHG2008A0011, dated 16.04.2008,
Police Station CBI/ACP/CHG under section 120B, 420, 467, 468 and 471
IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 against him (Dr. Sandeep Sharma) as the C.B.I. has
not even arrested the said accused till date and the said accused is
confined in Central Jail, Ambala. Thus, it is quite apparent that the
allegations/imputations published against the complainant are factually
incorrect and have been made with an intention to lower the credit of
the complainant as a police officer in the estimation of his colleagues,
friends and the public, thereby rendering accused Nos.1 to 30, who have
played their respective roles in the publication of the aforesaid offending
news items, liable for punishment for defamation.
[10]. That the respondent No.31-Om Parkash Chautala has made
defamatory statements against the complainant which have been
published in various newspapers already annexed as Annexure P-20,
Annexure P-17, annexure P-18 and annexure P-19. Om Parkash Chautala
has issued statements, which have been published in the above said
newspaper to the effect that an accused of criminal background with
allegations of forgery and cheating has leveled allegations against the
complainant of taking bribe for giving security guards. The said
statements issued by Om Parkash Chautala being per-se defamatory and
factually incorrect renders him liable for punishment under Section 500
IPC.
[11]. That the accused No.32-Ashok Arora has issued statements. which
have been published in various newspapers already annexed as Annexure
P-9, annexure P-12, P-13 and annexure P-14 & P-16. The statements
issued to "Dainik Jagran" Hindi Daily, which was published in the said
newspaper on 19.06.2008 shows that Mr. Ashok Arora has claimed that it
has come in the CBI Inquiry that Dr. Sandeep Sharma has bribed the
complainant for providing security whereas no such statement was made
by Sandeep Sharma before the C.B.I. and the said imputation against the
complainant given by Mr.Ashok Arora in his press statement is factually
incorrect and per-se defamatory. Similar imputations have been made by
Mr. Ashok Arora against the complainant in the other newspapers
mentioned hereinabove which renders him liable for punishment under
Section 500 IPC.
[12]. That the respondent accused No.33 - Mr.Abhay Singh Chautala has
issued defamatory statement to the press against the complainant, which
have been published by various newspapers as news items already
placed on record as annexure P-3, P-4, P-6, annexure P-7, P-8, annexure
P-10 and annexure P-11. Mr. Abhay Singh Chautala vide his statement,
published in the aforesaid news items, has claimed that C.B.I. inquiry Dr.
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Sandeep Sharma has leveled allegations against the complainant for

taking bribe for providing police protection. Mr. Abhay Singh Chautala on
the strength of said allegation has demanded complainant's suspension
and registration of a case against him. The said statements of Mr. Abhay
Singh Chautala are again apparently defamatory having tendency to
malign the image of the complainant besides being factually incorrect.
Thus, Mr. Abhay Singh Chautala is liable to be punished for offence under
Section 500 of IPC.
[13]. That the respondent No.34-Kuldeep Singh Bishnoi has also issued
defamatory statements against the accused with ulterior motive. The
statements of Mr. Kuldeep Singh Bishnoi issued to the press and
published in the newspaper has already been annexed as annexure, P-5,
P-3, P-4 & P-15. In his statement issued to "Punjab Kesari" a Hindi Daily
newspaper Mr. Kuldeep Singh Bishnoi has claimed that an accused has
made statement before C.B.I. to the effect that the complainant had
accepted bribe for giving him security whereas no statement was ever
given by any accused before C.B.I. The said statement of Kuldeep Singh
Bishnoi against the complainant is per-se defamatory being factually
incorrect. Mr. Kuldeep Singh Bishnoi has issued the above statement
against the complainant with ulterior motive of maligning the image of
the complainant as an honest police officer and hence he is liable to be
punished for the offence of defamation.
[14]. That the offences of the respondent-accused persons is further
aggravated by the fact that the Central Bureau of Investigation in its
statement, which was published in "The Times of India' English National
Daily newspaper on 18.06.2008 had clarifies that Sandeep Sharma
accused in the Subham Hospital case had not given any statement to the
investigating agency claiming that he had bribed the complainant for
getting security and that C.B.I. was yet to take Sandeep Sharma into
custody. Despite the publication of the said stand of Central Bureau of
Investigation the respondent-accused persons continued making
defamatory statements and published in newspapers stating that Dr.
Sandeep Sharma has made statement before the C.B.I. of having bribed
the complainant for seeking police protection upto 24.06.2008. The said
conduct of the respondent-accused persons goes a long way to show that
the respondent-accused persons made their statements and publications
with an ulterior motive to defame the complainant.
[15]. That on 17.6.2008 itself the complainant's old acquaintance,
namely, Shri Mahesh Kumar s/o Late Shri Lal Chand, Phool Flour Mill,
Rajiv Colony, Naharpura, Gurgaon, Police Station Sadar, Gurgaon, Shri
Sohan Lal Saini s/o Shri Brij Lal Saini, Gandhi Colony, Kanheri Road, Near
Jharsa, Sector-39, Gurgaon, Police Station Sadar, Gurgaon, Shri Satish
Kumar s/o Shri Ram Avtar Swami, Near Hanuman Mandir Primary School,
Jharsa, Gurgaon, Police Station Sadar, Gurgaon, read the aforesaid
defamatory news items and conveyed their pain and agony of the
complainant they suffered reading defamatory imputations made against
him. They expressed in clear words that they had high opinion about the
complainant as police officer of high integrity and honesty but now their
faith is shaken.
[16]. That the accused no.3, 7, 11, 15, 18, 21, 22, 26 and 30 have
knowingly made and reported; the accused no.1, 2, 4, 8 12, 16, 19, 23
and 27 have knowingly published and printed the factually incorrect
imputations against the complainant with an intention so as to harm his
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reputation and the accused no.5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 28
and 29 have played a vital role in selection of aforesaid defamatory and
false news material for publication in their respective news papers. The
said imputation has directly lowered his moral character as well as his
credentials as an honest and good police officer, in the estimation of his
colleagues, friends and the residents of Gurgaon in particular and the
public in general.
[17]. That the offence has been partly committed within the area of
Police Station Sadar, Gurgaon where the complainant's old acquaintance,
namely Shri Mahesh Kumar s/o Late Shri Lal Chand, Phool Flour Mill, Rajiv
Colony, Naharpura, Gurgaon, Police Station Sadar, Gurgaon, Shri Sohan
Lal Saini s/o Shri Brij Lal Saini, Gandhi Colony, Kanheri Road Near Jharsa,
Sector 39, Gurgaon, Police Station Sadar, Gurgaon, Shri Satish Kumar s/o
Shri Ram Avtar Swami, Near Hanuman Mandir Primary School, Jharsa,
Gurgaon, Police Station Sadar, Gurgaon, reside and therefore this Hon'ble
Court has got the jurisdiction to entertain and try the present complaint.
It is therefore, respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be please

to summon, try and punish all the accused for offences under Section
499, 500 and 501 IPC in the interest of justice, equity and fair play.”
20. The petitioner's main concern is that this complaint has been pending since
2008, and the complainant delayed its proceedings. The petitioner is not at fault, and
he is facing the trauma of criminal proceedings, which is causing mental agony,
draining out finances, and affecting the reputation of the petitioner, who is a senior
journalist and ex-editor of a respected newspaper 'Indian Express,' which has set
standards in investigative and fearless journalism. As such, the criminal complaint
violates the petitioner's fundamental rights, as provided under Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution of India.
21. Journalism is civilization’s mirror, and investigative journalism it’s x-ray.
22. Avay Shukla, in DeMocKrazy & MumboJumbo, Pippa Rann Books & Media, 2020,
[p.17] wrote, “Writing should be an expression of freedom - of thoughts, views and
statements. But this needs two prerequisites: an environment that does not censor, and
a medium of expression”.
23. A bare reading of the news published in Indian Express points to investigative
journalism where the complainant's version was also reflected. The complainant
nowhere states that his version was incorrectly mentioned or that the journalist had
withheld its material aspects. The complainant did not plead in the complaint or
establish in his testimony in the preliminary evidence any reasons or objectives for any
oblique motive, malice, ill-will, mala fide intention of the petitioner, or intention to
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defame him. There is a conspicuous silence about it in the complaint, the statement
before the court, and the reply filed to this petition. The following news extracts
corroborate the unbiases and point out that the reporting had mentioned and
highlighted the complainant's response and the supporting version of the
Superintendent of Police, Panchkula. The other news is unrelated to the complainant as
such qua that he should not grumble.
“But Rathee claims he provided the security on the
recommendations of district police officials who said Sharma faced
"a threat to his life.”
“Rathee refuted all allegations of receiving money from the

accused. "I have never met the person. I don't know why he is
leveling such allegations against me," said the ADGP.”
“On the other hand, SSP Sandeep Khirwar said the police cover
was recommended only after Sharma lodged a police complaint
against unknown persons threatening him over phone”.
24. Before the journalist wrote the news, he took the complaint’s view into account
and mentioned it in the news item, which shows that he adhered to the ethical
standards of reasonableness and impartiality, which are key to journalism. One of the
foundational responsibilities of a journalist is to seek the truth and report it with caution
while not distorting or manipulating any facts. The respective journalist cross-checked
the information, ascertained it, and explicitly mentioned the complainant’s version to
rule out whether the facts were true or mere concocted lies or rumors. This cross-
checking and accurate reporting of the complainant’s version demonstrates the
journalist’s sense of responsibility and decency while prudently discharging his duties.
What more can be expected from a journalist? The reporting itself proves by a
preponderance of probability of due care and caution, and there is no reason why it
should not be accepted as the discharging of their burden by the petitioner under S. 106
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Consequently, the Indian Express, its reporter, and its
Editors are entitled to benefit under the first and the ninth exceptions to S. 499 IPC, and
the petitioner has discharged his primary burden by demonstrating the contents of the
news report itself and is entitled to the benefit of the first and ninth exception of S. 499
IPC.
25. In Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 1372, Supreme Court holds
[15]. In order to come within the First Exception to Section 499 of
the Indian Penal Code it has to be established that what has been
imputed concerning the respondent is true and the publication of
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the imputation is for the public good. The onus of proving these
two ingredients, namely, truth of the imputation and the
publication of the imputation for the public good is on the
appellant. ...
[17]. The Ninth Exception states that if the imputation is made in
good faith for the protection of the person making it or for
another person or for the public good it is not defamation…. Good
faith requires care and caution and prudence in the background of
context and circumstances. The position of the person making the
imputation will regulate the standard of care and caution…
26. Section 52 of IPC reads as follows, “Good faith”. —Nothing is said to be done or
believed in “good faith” which is done or believed without due care and attention.
27. In Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1966 SC 97, a three-member bench of
[14]. It is true that under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, if an
accused person claims the benefit of Exceptions, the burden of
proving his plea that his case falls under the Exceptions is on the
accused. But the question which often arises and has been
frequently considered by judicial decisions is whether the nature
and extent of the onus of proof placed on an accused person who
claims the benefit of an Exception is exactly the same as the
nature and extent of the onus placed on the prosecution in a
criminal case; and there is consensus of judicial opinion in favour
of the view that where the burden of an issue lies upon the
accused, he is not required to discharge that burden by leading
evidence to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. That, no
doubt, is the test prescribed while deciding whether the
prosecution has discharged its onus to prove the guilt of the
accused; but that is not a test which can be applied to an accused
person who seeks to prove substantially his claim that his case
falls under an Exception. Where an accused person is called upon
to prove that his case falls under an Exception, law treats the onus
as discharged if the accused person succeeds "in proving a
preponderance of probability". As soon as the preponderance of
probability is proved, the burden shifts to the prosecution which
has still to discharge its original onus. It must be remembered that
basically, the original onus never shifts and the prosecution has, at
all stages of the case, to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt. As Phipson has observed, when the burden of
an issue is upon the accused, he is not, in general, called on to
prove it beyond a reasonable doubt or in default to incur a verdict
of guilty; it is sufficient if he succeeds in proving a preponderance
of probability, for then the burden is shifted to the prosecution
which has still to discharge its original onus that never shifts, i.e,,
that of establishing, on the whole case, guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
28. In M.A. Rumugam v. Kittu, (2009)1SCC 101, Supreme Court re-iterates,
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[16]. It is now a well-settled principle of law that those who plead

exception must prove it. The burden of proof that his action was
bonafide would, thus, be on the appellant alone.
29. In Aroon Purie v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2022(4) Law Herald (SC) 3177, Supreme
Court holds,
[18]. We now turn to the question: whether the benefit of any of
the exceptions to Section 499 of the IPC can be availed of and on
the strength of such exceptions, the proceedings can be quashed
at the stage when an application moved under Section 482 of the
Code is considered?
[21]. It is thus clear that in a given case, if the facts so justify, the
benefit of an exception to Section 499 of the IPC has been
extended and it is not taken to be a rigid principle that the benefit
of exception can only be afforded at the stage of trial.
[22]. Similarly, the law laid down in K.M. Mathew, (2002) 6 SCC
670, which has subsequently been followed, is to the effect that
though the benefit of presumption under Section 7 of the 1867
Act is not applicable so far as Chief Editors or Editors-in-Chief are
concerned, the matter would be required to be considered purely
from the perspective of the allegations made in the complaint. If
the allegations are sufficient and specific, no benefit can be
extended to such Chief Editor or Editor-in-Chief. Conversely, it
would logically follow that if there are no specific and sufficient
allegations, the matter would stand reinforced by reason of the
fact that no presumption can be invoked against such Chief Editor
or Editor-in-Chief.
[23]. In light of these principles, if we consider the assertions and
allegations made in the complaint, we find that nothing specific
has been attributed to A-1, Editor-in-Chief. He cannot, therefore,
be held liable for the acts committed by the author of the Article,
namely, A-2. The allegations made in the complaint completely fall
short of making out any case against A-1.
[24]. With regard to the role ascribed to A-2, it must be stated at
this stage that as an author of the Article his case stands on a
different footing. Whether what he did was an act which was
justified or not would be a question of fact to be gone into only at
the stage of trial.
30. S. 4991 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [IPC], makes defamation an offense in
1
499. Defamation.--Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible
representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing
or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except
in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.
Explanation 1.-It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the imputation
would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be hurtful to the fellings of his
family or other near relatives.
Explanation 2.-It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an
association or collection of persons as such.
Explanation 3.-An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically, may amount to
defamation.
Explanation 4.-No imputation is said to harm a person's reputation, unless that imputation directly or
indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers
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the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or
causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a lothsome state, or in a state generally
considered as disgraceful.
Illustrations
(a) A says-"Z is an honest man; he never stole B's watch", intending to cause it to be believed that Z did
steal B's watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the exceptions.
(b) A is asked who stole B's watch. A points to Z, intending to cause it to be believed that Z stole B's watch.
This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the exceptions.
(c) A draws a picture of Z running away with B's watch, intending it to be believed that Z stole B's watch.
This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the exceptions.
First Exception. -Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published.- It is not
defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the public good that the
imputation should be made or published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact.
Second Exception.-Public conduct of public servants.-It is not defamation to express in good faith any
opinion whatever respecting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, or
respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.
Third Exception. -Conduct of any person touching any public question. -It is not defamation to express in
good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of any person touching any public question, and
respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Illustration It is
not defamation in A to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting Z's conduct in petitioning
Government on a public question, in signing a requisition for a meeting on a public question, in presiding
or attending at such meeting, in forming or joining any society which invites the public support, in voting
or canvassing for a particular candidate for any situation in the efficient discharge of the duties of which
the public is interested.
Fourth Exception. -Publication of reports of proceedings of courts- It is not defamation to publish a
substantially true report of the proceedings of a Court of Justice, or of the result of any such proceedings.
Explanation. -A Justice of the Peace or other officer holding an enquiry in open Court preliminary to a trial
in a Court of Justice, is a Court within the meaning of the above section.
Fifth Exception. -Merits of case decided in Court or conduct of witnesses and others concerned. It is not
defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the merits of any case, civil or
criminal, which has been decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a party,
witness or agent, in any such case, or respecting the character of such person, as far as his character
appears in that conduct, and no further.
Illustrations (a) A says-"I think Z's evidence on that trial is so contradictory that he must be stupid or
dishonest." A is within this exception if he says this in good faith, inasmuch as the opinion which he
expresses respects Z's character as it appears in Z's conduct as a witness, and no farther. (b) But if A says-
"I do not believe what Z asserted at that trial because I know him to be a man without veracity"; A is not
within this exception, inasmuch as the opinion which expresses of Z's character, is an opinion not founded
on Z's conduct as a witness.
Sixth Exception.-Merits of public performance.-It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion
respecting the merits of any performance which its author has submitted to the judgment of the public,
or respecting the character of the author so far as his character appears in such performance, and no
farther.
Explanation. -A performance may be submitted to the judgment of the public expressly or by acts on the
part of the author which imply such submission to the judgment of the public.
Illustrations
(a) A person who publishes a book, submits that book to the judgment of the public.
(b) A person who makes a speech in public, submits that speech to the judgment of the public.
(c) An actor or singer who appears on a public stage, submits his acting or singing to the judgment of the
public.
(d) A says of a book published by Z-"Z's book is foolish; Z must be a weak man. Z's book is indecent; Z
must be a man of impure mind." A is within the exception, if he says this in good faith, inasmuch as the
opinion which he expresses of Z respects Z's character only so far as it appears in Z's book, and no further.
(e) But if A says-"I am not surprised that Z's book is foolish and indecent, for he is a weak man and a
libertine." A is not within this exception, inasmuch as the opinion which he expresses of Z's character is an
opinion not founded on Z's book.
Seventh Exception. -Censure passed in good faith by person having lawful authority over another.-It is not
defamation in a person having over another any authority, either conferred by law or arising out of a
lawful contract made with that other, to pass in good faith any censure on the conduct of that other in
matters to which such lawful authority relates.
Illustration A Judge censuring in good faith the conduct of a witness, or of an officer of the Court; a head
of a department censuring in good faith those who are under his orders; a parent censuring in good faith
a child in the presence of other children; a schoolmaster, whose authority is derived from a parent,
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terms of the legislative intent explicitly expressed and subject to the exceptions
provided. It reads, “Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs
or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person
intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will
harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to
defame that person.”
31. In N. Ram v. Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, 2012(3)RCR (Criminal)161, Punjab &

Haryana High Court observed,
The essence of the offence of defamation must have been made
either with the intention of causing harm, or knowing or having
reason to believe that such imputation would cause harm to a
person.
32. S. 499, Explanation 4.-No imputation is said to harm a person's reputation, unless
that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or
intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of
his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed
that the body of that person is in a lothsome state, or in a state generally considered as
disgraceful.
33. The reporter of Indian Express had explicitly mentioned the complainant’s denial
and the corroboration of such denial from the SP Panchkula. A wholesome and
complete reading by an ordinary prudent person would neither discredit nor lower the
complainant’s image. However, if the witnesses read this news with colored spectacles,
censuring in good faith a pupil in the presence of other pupils; a master censuring a servant in good faith
for remissness in service; a banker censuring in good faith the cashier of his bank for the conduct of such
cashier as such cashierare within this exception.
Eighth Exception. -Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person. -It is not defamation to prefer
in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person
with respect to the subject-matter of accusation.
Illustration If A in good faith accuses Z before a Magistrate; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of
Z, a servant, to Z's master;if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a child, to Z's father-A is within
this exception.
Ninth Exception. -Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other's interests.-It is
not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made
in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the
public good.
Illustrations (a) A, a shopkeeper, says to B, who manages his business-"Sell nothing to Z unless he pays you
ready money, for I have no opinion of his honesty." A is within the exception, if he has made this
imputation on Z in good faith for the protection of his own interests. (b) A, a Magistrate, in making a
report to his own superior officer, casts an imputation on the character of Z. Here, if the imputation is
made in good faith, and for the public good, A is within the exception.
Tenth Exception.-Caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good.- It is not
defamation to convey a caution, in good faith, to one person against another, provided that such caution
be intended for the good of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in whom that person is
interested, or for the public good.
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the report cannot be made liable for such misunderstanding.
34. The First Exception to S. 499 reads as follows, “Imputation of truth which public
good requires to be made or published.- It is not defamation to impute anything which
is true concerning any person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be
made or published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact”.
35. The Ninth Exception to S. 499 reads as follows, “Imputation made in good faith
by person for protection of his or other's interests.-It is not defamation to make an
imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good
faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or
for the public good.”
36. In Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1966 SC 97, a three-member bench of
[12]. Section 499 of the Code defines defamation. It is
unnecessary to set out the said definition, because it is common
ground that the impugned statement published by the appellant is
per se defamatory, and so, we must proceed to deal with the
present appeal on the basis that the said statement would harm
the reputation of the complainant. Exception 9 to Section 499
provides that it is not defamation to make an imputation on the
character of another, provided the imputation be made in good
faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or
for any other person, or for the public good. In the present case,
the ingredient of public good is satisfied, and the only question
which arose for decision in the Courts below and which arises
before us, is whether the imputation can be said to have been
made in good faith. There is no doubt that the requirements of
good faith and public good have both to be satisfied and so, the
failure of the appellant to prove good faith would exclude the
application of the Ninth Exception in his favour even if the
requirement of public good is satisfied.
[19]. That takes us to the question as to what the requirement of
good faith means. Good faith is defined by Section 52 of the Code.
Nothing, says Section 52, is said to be done or believed in 'good
faith' which is done or believed without due care and attention. It
will be recalled that under the General Clauses Act, "A thing shall
be deemed to be done in good faith where it is in fact done
honestly whether it is done negligently or not". The element of
honesty which is introduced by the definition prescribed by the
General Clauses Act is not introduced by the definition of the
Code; and we are governed by the definition prescribed by Section
52 of the Code. So, in considering the question as to whether the
appellant acted in good faith in publishing his impugned
statement, we have to enquire whether he acted with due care
and attention. There is no doubt that the mere plea, that the
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accused believed that what he stated was true by itself, will not
sustain his case of good faith under the Ninth Exception. Simple
belief or actual belief by itself is not enough. The appellant must
show that the belief in his impugned statement had a rational
basis and was not just a blind simple belief. That is where the
element of due care and attention plays an important role. If it
appears that before making the statement the accused did not
show due care and attention, that would defeat his plea of good
faith. But it must be remembered that good faith does not require
logical infallibility. As was held by the Calcutta High Court in the
matter of the Petition of Shibo Prosad Pandah, ILR 4 Calcutta 124,
in dealing with the question of good faith, the proper point to be
decided is not whether the allegations put forward by the accused
in support of the defamation are in substance true, but whether
he was informed and had good reason after due care and
attention to believe that such allegations were true.
[21]. Thus, it would be clear that in deciding whether an accused
person acted in good faith under the Ninth Exception, it is not
possible to lay down any rigid rule or test. It would be a question
to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case -
what is the nature of the imputation made; under what
circumstances did it come to be made; what is the status of the
person who makes the imputation, was there any malice in his
mind when be made the said imputation; did he make any enquiry
before he made it; are there reasons to accept his story that he
acted with due care and attention and was satisfied that the
imputation was true ? These and other considerations would be
relevant in deciding the plea of good faith by an accused person
who claims the benefit of the Ninth Exception.
37. In Sukro Mahto v. Basdeo Kumar Mahto, (1971) Supp SCR 329 at p. 332, Supreme
Court holds,
[10]. The second ingredient in the Ninth Exception is that the
imputation is to be made for the protection of the interest. The
protection of interest contemplated in the Ninth Exception is that
communication must be made bonafide upon a subject in which
the person making the communication has an interest or duty and
the person to whom the communication is made has a
corresponding interest or duty….
38. Journalism is the fourth pillar of any Democracy. As a journalist, the reporter’s
sacrosanct duty is loyalty towards the citizenry. They serve as independent monitors of
power, reporting information for public good and safety, addressing any problems or
lacunae in the public system for its effective functioning and immediate redressal. In the
fearless pursuit of their duties to uncover the truth and report such facts to the masses
through media, these brave journalists do face various hurdles, e.g., pressures from
influential parties, groups, or government agencies etc. To ensure honest and correct
reporting of actual events, such journalists require the protection of courts, especially
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constitutional courts, to enable them to publish news without fear of harmful

consequences. Thus, all courts must be more vigilant and proactive while safeguarding
the interests of such courageous humans.
39. The reporter and the newspaper did their jobs without committing any offense
under section 499 IPC because they exercised restraints, and the news had the inbuilt
safeguards, due care and caution, and reasonableness in the reported news. The
reporter, Varun Chaddha, and the publisher, Indian Express, acted within the parameters
of prudency and reasonableness, and whatever they wrote, they were entitled to
publish under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
40. In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1
SCC 641, a three-member bench of Supreme Court of India, holds,
[31]. ... The purpose of the press is to advance the public interest
by publishing facts and opinions without which a democratic
electorate cannot make responsible judgments…
[63]. Newspaper industry enjoys two of the fundamental rights
namely the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under
Article 19(1)(a) and the freedom to engage in any profession,
occupation, trade, industry or business guaranteed under Article
19(1) (g) of the Constitution, the first because it is concerned with
the field of expression and communication and the second
because communication has become an occupation or profession
and because there is an invasion of trade, business and industry
into that field where freedom of expression is being exercised.
41. In S Rangarajan v. P Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574, a three-judge bench of

Hon’ble Supreme court, holds,
[45]. The problem of defining the area of freedom of expression
when it appears to conflict with the various social interests
enumerated under Article 19 (2) may briefly be touched upon
here. There does indeed have to be a compromise between the
interest of freedom of expression and social interests. But we
cannot simply balance the two interests as if they are of equal
weight. Our commitment of freedom of expression demands that
it cannot be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing
the freedom are pressing and the community interest is
endangered. The anticipated danger should not be remote,
conjectural or far-fetched. It should have proximate and direct
nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should be
intrinsically dangerous to the public interest. In other words, the
expression should be inseparably locked up with the action
contemplated like the equivalent of a "spark in a powder keg".
42. In Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India v. Cricket

Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161, a three-member bench of Supreme Court of
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India, holds,
[9]. The freedom to receive and to communicate information
and ideas without interference is an important aspect of the
freedom of free speech and expression….
43. In Sanjoy Narayan Editor in Chief Hindustan v. High Court of Allahabad, 2011(13)
SCC 155, Supreme Court holds,
[5]. The media, be it electronic or print media, is generally called
the fourth pillar of democracy. The media, in all its forms, whether
electronic or print, discharges a very onerous duty of keeping the
people knowledgeable and informed.
[6]. The impact of media is far-reaching as it reaches not only the
people physically but also influences them mentally. It creates
opinions, broadcasts different points of view, brings to the fore
wrongs and lapses of the Government and all other governing
bodies and is an important tool in restraining corruption and other
ill-effects of society. The media ensures that the individual actively
participates in the decision-making process. The right to
information is fundamental in encouraging the individual to be a
part of the governing process. The enactment of the Right to
Information Act is the most empowering step in this direction. The
role of people in a democracy and that of active debate is
essential for the functioning of a vibrant democracy.
[7]. With this immense power, comes the burden of responsibility.
With the huge amount of information that they process, it is the
responsibility of the media to ensure that they are not providing
the public with information that is factually wrong, biased or
simply unverified information. The right to freedom of speech is
enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. However, this
right is restricted by Article 19(2) in the interest of the sovereignty
and integrity of
India, security of the State, public order, decency and morality and
also Contempt of Courts Act and defamation.
[8]. The unbridled power of the media can become dangerous if
check and balance is not inherent in it. The role of the media is to
provide to the readers and the public in general with information
and views tested and found as true and correct. This power must
be carefully regulated and must
reconcile with a person's fundamental right to privacy. Any wrong
or biased information that is put forth can potentially damage the
otherwise clean and good reputation of the person or institution
against whom something adverse is reported. Pre-judging the
issues and rushing to conclusions must be avoided.
44. In Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, 2016(7) SCC 221, Supreme Court holds,
[91]. Freedom of speech and expression in a spirited democracy is
a highly treasured value. Authors, philosophers and thinkers have
considered it as a prized asset to the individuality and overall
progression of a thinking society, as it permits argument, allows
dissent to have a respectable place, and honours contrary stances.
There are proponents who have set it on a higher pedestal than
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life and not hesitated to barter death for it. Some have
condemned compelled silence to ruthless treatment. William
Dougles has denounced regulation of free speech like regulating
diseased cattle and impure butter. The Court has in many an
authority having realized its precious nature and seemly glorified
sanctity has put it in a meticulously structured pyramid. Freedom
of speech is treated as the thought of the freest who has not
mortgaged his ideas, may be wild, to the artificially cultivated
social norms; and transgression thereof is not perceived as a folly.
Needless to emphasise, freedom of speech has to be allowed
specious castle, but the question is should it be so specious or
regarded as so righteous that it would make reputation of another
individual or a group or a collection of persons absolutely
ephemeral, so as to hold that criminal prosecution on account of
defamation negates and violates right to free speech and
expression of opinion. Keeping in view what we have stated
hereinabove, we are required to see how the constitutional
conception has been understood by the Court where democracy
and rule of law prevail.
[186]. One cannot be unmindful that right to freedom of speech
and expression is a highly valued and cherished right but the
Constitution conceives of reasonable restriction. In that context
criminal defamation which is in existence in the form of Sections
499 and 500 I.P.C. is not a restriction on free speech that can be
characterized as disproportionate. Right to free speech cannot
mean that a citizen can defame the other. Protection of
reputation is a fundamental right. It is also a human right.
Cumulatively it serves the social interest. Thus, we are unable to
accept that provisions relating to criminal defamation are not
saved by doctrine of proportionality because it determines a limit
which is not impermissible within the criterion of reasonable
restriction.
45. A complete reading of the news, which contained the complainant’s rebuttal, his
version, the version of the police, can be stated to have been published in good faith
and discharge of their functions in a democracy, and if restrictions are created to publish
such news, it would be just like killing a mockingbird.
46. The other sections invoked against the petitioner are 5002 & 5013 IPC that
prescribe punishment for the offences committed under S. 499 IPC.
47. Regarding the publication by the accused some of the other accused in their
respective newspapers, neither the Indian Express nor its Editor (Petitioner) can be held
responsible for the subsequent news reports, published in such newspapers.
2
Punishment for defamation. 500. Punishment for defamation.--Whoever defames another shall be
punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
3
Printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory. 501. Printing or engraving matter known to be
defamatory.-- Whoever prints or engraves any matter, knowing or having good reason to believe that such
matter is defamatory of any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
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48. The next ground on which the petitioner seeks quashing of the criminal
complaint is because he has been arrayed as accused of being the newspaper's Chief
Editor. The only averment against him is that he printed and published a news report,
which is incorrect, but the petitioner was neither the designated Printer nor the
Publisher of the impugned news report. In paragraph 9 of the petition, the petitioner
explicitly declares that there is no specific averment in the complaint that the petitioner
- Vipin Pubby, had played any role in selecting the alleged matter for publication in the
newspaper. The only averment against the petitioner is that the petitioner published
and printed a news report, which was prima facie false. However, the petitioner
declared that he was neither the Publisher nor the Printer of the newspaper, as was
evident from the statutory imprint line, which disclosed that the issue of Chandigarh
Newsline dated 17.6.2008 had nothing to do with Gurgaon and the same was circulated
only in the Chandigarh area. He further submits that the newspaper in Gurgaon is
printed from the Delhi edition, which is under separate control. The news item
published in Chandigarh Newsline dated 17.06.2008 is published by Varun Chadha.
49. In Haji C.H. Mohammad Koya Vs. T.K.S.M.A. Muthukoya, MANU/SC/0240/1978 :

(1979)2SC C 8, Supreme Court holds,
[37]. …It is obvious that a presumption under Section 7 of the
Press Act could be drawn only if the person concerned was an
editor within the meaning of Section 1 of the Press Act. Where
however a person does not fulfil the conditions of Section 1 of the
Press Act and does not perform the functions of an editor
whatever may be his description or designation, the provisions of
the Press Act would have no application.
50. The petitioner’s next argument is that the Magistrate erred in arriving at a
finding that the offense was committed within the area of Gurgaon without appreciating
the fact that the newspaper ‘Chandigarh Newsline,’ in which the alleged defamatory
news report was published is a Chandigarh city supplement and is not circulated
outside. He refers to the statutory declaration, which reads as follows:
IMPRINT LINE
Printed and Published by Manjit Chopra on behalf of Indian
Express Newspapers (Mumbai) Limited and printed at i.e. Press at
C-5, Institutional Area, Sector - 6, Panchkula - 134109 (Haryana)
and Published at SCO 309-10, Sector 35-B, Chandigarh-160022.
Chairman of Board: Vivek Goenka, Editor in Chief: Shekhar Gupta,
Managing Editor - Raj Kamal Jha, Executive Editor - Unni Rajen
Shankar, Editor (Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and
Chandigarh) Vipin * * Pubby Responsible for selection of news
under the PRB Act.
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51. Petitioner's plea that none of the complainant's witnesses at Gurgaon explicitly
mentioned that they had read Chandigarh Newsline. As such, there is no cognizable
evidence that can be accepted primafacie to establish that the complainant's reputation
was lowered in their eyes by reading such news because Chandigarh Newsline is
circulated only in the Chandigarh area. The complainant did not say that somebody had
passed on or supplied such news to the complainant's witnesses. An analysis of the
complaint and the complainant’s evidence and the reply establishes that there is no
averment in the complaint, and in the testimony of the witnesses examined in the
preliminary inquiry, of how these persons got access to the newspaper published for
circulation in the Chandigarh region. Those days, WhatsApp and Instagram were
unavailable, and there is no statement that the witnesses had read it from other social
media such as Facebook or Twitter or received it through E-mail or post. The primary
burden to meet the requirements of S. 202 CrPC was on the complainant, and the
satisfaction was of the concerned Court because the accused was residing in
Chandigarh, far away from Gurgaon, and not on the accused. It is not that the
concerned Judicial Magistrate disallowed any such evidence, question, or examination
of any such witness or restricted the complainant from proving its prima facie case in
compliance with section 202 CrPC. The complaint also fails on this count.
52. In M/s Pepsi Foods Ltd v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749, a three
Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[26]. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious
matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of
course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two
witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the
criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate
summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind
to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to
examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the
evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and that
would be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing
charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a
silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence
before summoning of the accused. Magistrate has to carefully
scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself
put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit
answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or
otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie
committed by all or any of the accused.
[27]. No doubt the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any
stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but
that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High
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Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the

Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against him when
the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he
must undergo the agony of a criminal trial…
53. The last argument on behalf of the petitioner is the protection under Section 7 of
the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867. Section 7 of the Press and Registration of
Books Act of 1867 raises the presumption regarding a person named the Editor and
printed as such on every newspaper copy. The Act does not recognize any other legal
entity for raising the presumption. However, since this Court has already given findings
that would lead to the quashing of the complaint, there is no need to adjudicate this
point, and even if this argument is rejected, it will not change the outcome; as such, this
Court is not answering it.
54. In the light of judicial precedents and appreciation of the complaint, the
preliminary evidence led by the complainant, and its analysis makes it clear that the
petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the first and ninth exceptions to S. 499 IPC, which
makes the order of summoning bad in law. Even if the allegations against the petitioner
mentioned in the complaint and the preliminary evidence are accepted entirely, those
fails to point towards any actual violation of Section 499 IPC. In the facts and
circumstances peculiar to this case, the court’s non-interference would result in a
miscarriage of justice, and thus, this Court invokes the inherent jurisdiction under
section 482 CrPC and quashes the summons and all subsequent proceedings as well as
the judgment passed in the above captioned criminal revision. Bail bond(s)/surety
Bond(s), if any, furnished, shall stand discharged.
Petition is allowed. All pending application(s), if any, stand closed.
January 04, 2024 (ANOOP CHITKARA)

Anju Saini/ Jyoti-II / Jyoti Sharma/ AK JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned : : Yes

Whether reportable : YES

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http://JUDIS.NIC.

IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 8

9.2. The dominant purpose of registration of the case

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

By way of the present petition under section 482 of the Code of

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was no material on record on the basis of which the learned

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: Dr. Rahila Sikandar, CW-4 : Nazia Khan and CW-5 : Manu

“It is pertinent to mention here that all the above mentioned

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judicial file. However, the complainant has failed to do so for the

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“61. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under

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allegations against the petitioners. The relevant extract from the

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was only the allegations, comments, inferences and grievances of the

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one, the depositions of the complainant‟s witnesses were at best only

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“21. Under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC, the Magistrate has the

“22. The steps taken by the Magistrate under Section 190(1)(a)

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Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking cognizance of each

“23. Having gone through the order passed by the Magistrate, we

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could not be read in evidence. The learned Magistrate was cognisant

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J

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K. Paka Singh @ Konthoujam Paka Singh vs Miss Nivedita

Author: Shekhar B. Saraf

Bench: Shekhar B. Saraf

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

The Hon'ble Justice Shekhar B. Saraf

C.R.R. 2369 of 2003

For the Petitioner : Mr. Abhra Mukherjee

For the State of West Bengal : Mr. Rana Mukherjee

Heard on : 30.06.2021 & 12.08.2021

Shekhar B. Saraf, J.:

Analysis with Order

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155(2) of the Code.

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iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of

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Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/71356338/ 5

10. "Defamation" is defined under Section 499 IPC. It reads as under:

"499. Defamation. --Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by

13. With this observation the revisional application is allowed.

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(Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/71356338/ 7