Consti 1 - 4 Digest
Consti 1 - 4 Digest
Consti 1 - 4 Digest
Facts:
The provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2, which says that
the provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake
for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. This is in pursuant to
Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is DEEMED NECESSARY in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
Under Executive Order No.2 all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola
and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan
and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of
Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with
this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in
accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were
ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their
native habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the
province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they
escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end
and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-
Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their
dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
Also one of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but
was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped
from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on his behalf
by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the
resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had
been illegally deprived of their liberty. Rubi and his companions are said to be
held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will .In this
case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, was challenged.
Issue: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power, rendering it unconstitutional.
Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty without due
process of law.
Ruling:
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely
conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and
the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is
necessary since the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge “when such as course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order”. As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are
better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for
improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.
2. No. The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not
deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of
the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat
analogous to the Indian policy of the United States.
Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal
meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees
of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious
belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were
being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their
seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to
the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro
was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things:
“. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their
own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process
of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and
equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies
alike to all of a class.”
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. To
constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not
always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule
which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the
administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases.
The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view
to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this
governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good
and the good of the country.
The doctrine of necessity is the basis on which extra-legal actions by state actors,
which are designed to restore order, are found to be constitutional.
Peoplevs. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997
PER CURIAM
Facts:The accused, Leo Echegaray y Pilo, was convicted of raping his ten-year-old
daughter in April 1994. The crime occurred during the effectivity of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law. As a result, Echegaray
was sentenced to death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on
the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the
alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. This was dismissed. On August
6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and
retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal
Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG). A supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant. In sum, the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed
factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged
incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are
inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes
are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human
standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so
destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-
political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated,
curtailed and altogether eradicated.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty.
Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be
valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first
be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty.
Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last
recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society.
It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an
"alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be
the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the
interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and
harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to
impose the death penalty for said crimes."
Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan, 302 SCRA 102 (1999)
FACTS: Lito C. Marcelo, along with two others, was convicted of qualified theft.
The information against them alleged that on February 17, 1989, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, Arnold Pasicolan (a public
officer) conspired with Ronnie S. Romero and Lito Marcelo (both private
individuals) to steal mail matters from the Central Post Office of Makati. The
stolen items included U.S. Dollar Bills worth $500 (or its peso equivalent of
P11,000.00).
On February 10, 1989, Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office,
disclosed to his chief, Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the
pilferage of mail matter in the post office. Among those mentioned by Merete were
Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed
Matters Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. For
this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation in
apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office.
On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi
Village following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on
that day. Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent
Arles Vela and two other agents in a private car.
At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front
of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. Pasicolan alighted from the jeep
bringing with him a mail bag. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail
bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner Lito
Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag to a travelling bag.
Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards
Amorsolo St., moved their car and started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in
time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At that
point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested the two accused. The NBI agents
followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.
The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters.
Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes
of the letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative
and Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time.
According to Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify
the letters as the very same letters confiscated from them.
A case for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan wherein the accused
were declared guilty.
Issue: Whether or not the letters signed by the petitioner were inadmissible as
evidence and not violates his rights to be witness against himself.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the letters were valid evidence. It is known that during
custodial investigation, a person has the right to remain silent and the right to an
attorney. Any admission or confession made in the absence of counsel is inadmissible
as evidence. Furthermore, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. In the instant case, even though the petitioner was asked to sign the letters,
the letters are still admissible as evidence because the accused was convicted not only
by means of these letters but also by testimonies made by the NBI agents. Moreover,
the Supreme Court held that the letters were validly seized as an incident of a valid
arrest and therefore can stand on their own. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is
affirmed.
Beltran Vs Samson
Facts:
Francisco Beltran filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against Judge Felix Samson
and Provincial Fiscal Francisco Jose of Isabela. The controversy arose when the
Fiscal petitioned, and Judge Samson granted, an order requiring Beltran to provide a
sample of his handwriting for investigation of alleged falsification of documents.
Issue:
The central issue in this case was whether compelling Beltran to provide a
handwriting sample violated his constitutional rights.
Ruling:
Constitutional Provision Invoked:
The petitioner relied on the constitutional provision found in paragraph 3,
section 3 of the Jones Law, which (in Spanish) reads: “Ni se le obligara a declarar en
contra suya en ningun proceso criminal” (translated: “Nor shall he be compelled to
testify against himself in any criminal case”). This provision was incorporated into
our Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4) and section 56.
The Supreme Court considered the extent of the privilege against self-
incrimination. While the English text of the Jones Law states that a person shall not
be compelled “to be a witness against himself,” it does not limit this protection to
mere verbal declarations. The Court emphasized that the privilege extends beyond
verbal testimony to any act that could incriminate the individual.