sensors

Article
Risk-Based Fault Detection Using Bayesian Networks Based on
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Bálint Levente Tarcsay 1, *,† , Ágnes Bárkányi 1,† , Sándor Németh 1 , Tibor Chován 1 , László Lovas 2
and Attila Egedy 1

1 Department of Process Engineering, University of Pannonia, 8200 Veszprém, Hungary

2 Hungarian Gas Storage Ltd., 1138 Budapest, Hungary
* Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +36-88-624-447
† These authors contributed equally to this work.

Abstract: In this article, the authors focus on the introduction of a hybrid method for risk-based
fault detection (FD) using dynamic principal component analysis (DPCA) and failure method and
effect analysis (FMEA) based Bayesian networks (BNs). The FD problem has garnered great interest
in industrial application, yet methods for integrating process risk into the detection procedure are
still scarce. It is, however, critical to assess the risk each possible process fault holds to differentiate
between non-safety-critical and safety-critical abnormalities and thus minimize alarm rates. The
proposed method utilizes a BN established through FMEA analysis of the supervised process and the
results of dynamical principal component analysis to estimate a modified risk priority number (RPN)
of different process states. The RPN is used parallel to the FD procedure, incorporating the results
of both to differentiate between process abnormalities and highlight critical issues. The method is
showcased using an industrial benchmark problem as well as the model of a reactor utilized in the
emerging liquid organic hydrogen carrier (LOHC) technology.

Keywords: fault detection; dynamic risk assessment; Bayesian networks; FMEA; DPCA

Citation: Tarcsay, B.L.; Bárkányi, Á.;

1. Introduction
Németh, S.; Chován, T.; Lovas, L.; In this work, the authors introduce a hybrid framework of fault detection and risk
Egedy, A. Risk-Based Fault Detection assessment techniques which utilizes a modified risk priority number (RPN) to highlight
Using Bayesian Networks Based on safety-critical process abnormalities and minimize superfluous alarm rate. A combination
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis. of dynamic principal component analysis (DPCA) for fault detection (FD) and a failure
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511. https:// mode and effect analysis (FMEA) based Bayesian network (BN) for risk assessment is
doi.org/10.3390/s24113511 proposed. The two methods work in parallel, utilizing each other’s results to pinpoint
Academic Editor: Andrea Cataldo the presence of abnormalities and the simultaneous estimation of risk associated with the
abnormalities through an RPN based on the results of both approaches. Only safety-critical
Received: 11 April 2024 process states are highlighted through alarm signals, while non-safety-critical process states
Revised: 19 May 2024
where faults are present are only shown by warnings. The method thus mitigates alarm
Accepted: 24 May 2024
floods by eliminating alarms for faults which hold little risk to the process performance
Published: 29 May 2024
and safety going forward.
In the past, various techniques have been proposed for FD, and their performance has
been continuously enhanced since to minimize the false alarm rate (FAR) and missed alarm
Copyright: © 2024 by the authors.
rate (MAR) and allow for subsequent crisp fault detection using model- [1], data- [2] and
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. qualitative knowledge-based [3] logic. While these techniques and, specifically, multivariate
This article is an open access article statistical process monitoring [4] methods among data-based techniques have adequate
distributed under the terms and performance for system supervision and great popularity in the FD community, the problem
conditions of the Creative Commons with many FD methods as noted by multiple authors is the fact that they usually do not take
Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// the risk associated with each fault into account [5].
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ Among the multivariate statistical process monitoring (MSPM) techniques, the most
4.0/). popular, principal component analysis (PCA) based methods, utilize T 2 and Q statistics

Sensors 2024, 24, 3511. https://doi.org/10.3390/s24113511 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/sensors

Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 2 of 25

for FD and compare these metrics calculated from process data to predefined statistical
thresholds to decide whether a sample can be categorized as normal or abnormal [6].
The performance of the FD method therefore is usually evaluated using only the FAR and
MAR metrics. The issue with this approach is that since no risk is associated with the
out-of-control process states in traditional MSPM FD, alarms will be raised regardless of
whether the detected abnormality is just a simple nuisance that holds no process risk or if
it is a state that could cause severe damage if left unchecked [7]. Therefore, many nuisance
alarms are raised, which could lead to alarm floods in complex systems, especially when,
due to fault propagation, other alarms are raised as well [8].
To circumvent this issue, methods have been developed that take the risk of each
indicated fault into account during the FD process through dynamic risk assessment (DRA);
however, the arsenal of techniques which utilize risk assessment in coordination with
FD is still sparse [9]. Among the first instances of such methods was a technique which
proposed a PCA model for the supervision of chemical processes and incorporated risk
estimation using a quantitative risk assessment model. Using this technique, alarms were
only raised when a fault was detected by the PCA metrics and the predicted risk exceeded
a defined threshold [7]. Later on, self-organizing maps were utilized to address the FD
problem of non-linear systems. Using a probabilistic approach, faults were categorized
into several classes based on severity, and FD was performed while taking the risk into
account as well [10]. Qualitative models have also become researched for the risk-based
FD methodology, such as the use of the R-vine copula and the event tree methods for the
supervision of non-linear and non-Gaussian processes [11].
The techniques for risk-based FD have become increasingly more researched and
popular as the previous examples show but are still relatively scarce. While most methods
propose risk estimation techniques which are in a manner related to traditional techniques
of industrial risk assessment, such as hazard and operability study (HAZOP) [12], event
trees (ETs) [13], fault trees (FTs) [14] or FMEA [15], these methods are not intrinsically
integrated into the framework and performed rigorously [7].
For example, in the previously noted articles [5,7,10], the general definition of risk was
formulated as a product of the probability of a fault occurring, which leads to an unwanted
catastrophic event (P) and the severity score assigned to each fault consequence (S) as per
Equation (1), from which a dynamic risk profile for the process was calculated [16]. This
procedure and its basic logic are fairly similar to the calculation of RPN in FMEA:

Risk(t) = P(t) · S (1)

The probability of fault occurrence leading to catastrophic events was fitted as a

cumulative normal distribution function in these cases, with the probability of catastrophe
increasing as the process variables deviate from their expected values. Severity scores
were calculated based on the type of process variable deviating, with each process variable
having an assigned severity parameter and the S score being defined as a sum of the
product of severity parameter and a function of the deviation of each variable from their
normal value [5]. While the method proved applicable especially when combined with
latent variable modeling techniques such as PCA [7] or self-organizing maps [10] where
the latent variables were used for risk estimation, the approach has an issue in the case of
real-world industrial application.
Since the probability of fault occurrence which could lead to catastrophic results was
fitted as a cumulative normal distribution function, the probability of faults leading to
catastrophic events would change uniformly regardless of which variables deviate. From a
general process perspective, it is obvious that the probability of fault occurrence which
could lead to catastrophic results is dependent not only on the magnitude of the process
variable deviation from its normal state but also on the type of process variables which
deviated [16].
For example, in industrial systems, for safety-critical process variables such as tempera-
ture or pressure, often, inherent safety protocols or fail-safes are in place which significantly
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 3 of 25

lower the probability of catastrophic events occurring even if, due to some fault, a critical
process variable shows abnormal behavior [17]. Therefore, the probability of safety-critical
events occurring may not be properly characterized by simply observing the deviation
of process variables from their normal states without taking the general construction of
the system, presence of fail-safes, inherent safety, and possible fault propagation paths
into account.
To overcome this issue, established risk assessment methods and models from the
literature have been evaluated to propose hybrid techniques for more rigorous risk-based
FD [18]. Based on previous trends, the most popular methods for quantitative risk as-
sessment are probabilistic graphic models, such as dynamic event and fault trees, event
sequence diagrams, Markov models [19], Monte Carlo simulation [20], BNs, Petri nets [21],
etc., to estimate the risk of certain system states under both static and dynamic condi-
tions [22].
In recent years, BNs have gained especially great popularity in the risk assessment
community, with many applications aiming to extend their applicability and combining
them with previously established methods such as FMEA or ETs [23]. The allure of these
techniques is a more rigorous way to estimate the probability of process risks than the
traditional FMEA or HAZOP techniques and addressing the entirety of the system (fail-safes
and components included) and taking possible failure propagation paths into account [23].
In light of this, the key idea of this article is to extend the framework of risk-based FD
using a method based on dynamic principal component analysis (DPCA) and BN-FMEA-
based risk assessment, which can be used to give a more accurate estimate of process risk
by taking fault propagation paths into account as well (fail-safes and inherent safety as
well) when evaluating possible abnormal process states.
The authors utilize DPCA to characterize the observed process and produce indicators
for the presence of process faults and risk events. After establishing the model under
normal operating conditions, the presence of characteristic faults is observed, and statistic
indicators such as the Q statistic are calculated for the different fault scenarios. Parallel to
the FD procedure, a risk profile is observed for the system based on BN-FMEA. Severity
scores are assigned based on the deviating principal components, detectability is evaluated
using MAR metrics of the DPCA technique, and the probability of fault presence is eval-
uated using the BN. This approach results in a modified RPN, which is used to indicate
whether a process state poses significant risk to process operations or not through alarm
and warning signals. In the paper, the following definitions of alarm and warning signals
are used:
• Alarms: Signals with intense visual and vocal prompts used to signal operators
that a shutdown of the supervised system or other immediate and severe actions
are necessary.
• Warnings: Signals with vocal and visual prompts which signal to operators that
process functions are lost/process states changed due to process faults, but immediate
shutdown is not necessary, as the disturbances are not critical from a safety perspective.
As can be seen, safety-critical system states are highlighted using alarm signals, while
non-safety-critical process conditions are still recognized by warning signals. Going for-
ward, the main contribution of our approach can be summarized in the following points.
• Development of a risk-based fault detection method which combines standardized
expert knowledge (failure mode and effect analysis) with data-based techniques
(Bayesian network) for risk assessment.
• Introduction of a modified RPN containing both FD and risk assessment consideration
for the raising of alarms.
In the following, the mathematical formalization and background of the employed
techniques are introduced in Section 2. The flowchart and general logic of the proposed
algorithm are formalized is Section 3. Case studies for method evaluation are given in
Section 4, including both a case study of an FD benchmark problem and a case study utiliz-
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 4 of 25

ing a dehydrogenation reactor of the liquid organic hydrogen carrier (LOHC) technology.
The discussion and critical evaluation of the results are shown in Section 5.

2. The Proposed Risk-Based FD Method and Utilized Techniques

In this section, the basic techniques of DPCA, FMEA and BN are introduced and
formalized; subsequently, the proposed technique utilizing the methods for risk-based FD
is explained.

2.1. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Dynamic Principal Component Analysis (DPCA)
Consider a data set describing the behavior of a process, denoted by X ∈ Rn× p with n
observations and p process variables. The columns of X are centered and scaled to have a
mean of zero and unit variance. The centered and scaled X matrix shall be denoted as X̃.
The sample covariance matrix Z ∈ R p× p of X̃ may be calculated according to Equation (2):

1
Z= X̃ T X̃ (2)
n−1
The eigenvalue decomposition of the covariance matrix Z according to Equation (3)
results in P ∈ R p× p , which is a matrix containing the eigenvectors of Z, while Λ ∈ R p× p is
a diagonal matrix containing the eigenvalues of Z.

Z = PΛP T (3)

After arranging the eigenvectors based on the value of their corresponding eigenvalues
in descending order, we obtain the matrix P̃. The optimal number of PCs to be retained
( a) can be calculated according to Equation (4), where θ is the cumulative value of the
p
eigenvalues to be retained, provided that ∑i=1 ṽi ≥ θ holds true:
!2
q
a = arg min
i
∑ λ̃i − θ (4)
i =1

The PCA transformation is then realized in the form of Equation (5) with T ∈ Rn×a :

T = X̃P̃a (5)

The PCA data decomposition model thus takes the form shown in Equation (6), where
the matrix E ∈ Rn× p is the prediction error:

X̃ = TP̃aT + E (6)

After dimensionality reduction, control statistics such as the Hotellings T 2 statistic

or the Q statistic can be used for system supervision [24]. The T 2 statistic measures a
sample’s variance within the expectance of the model and detects samples with great
deviation as outliers. On the other hand, the Q statistic, also known as Squared Prediction
Error (SPE), provides a measure for the prediction error of the PCA model for a given data
point and classifies data points which do not follow the model as outliers regardless of
their variance [25]. The T 2 statistic for a given i-th sample can be calculated according to
Equation (7) using the calculated principal components:

Ti2 = Ti Λ−1 Ti (7)

Assuming that the PCs are normally distributed, an upper control limit can be estab-
lished, which can be used to filter abnormal outlier points. In the case of the T 2 statistic
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 5 of 25

for a given confidence level α [26], the control limit Tα2 may be calculated according to
Equation (8), where F is the F-distribution [27]:

a(n + 1)(n − 1)
Tα2 = F (α, a, (n − a)) (8)
n2 − na
The Q statistic for an i-th data point can be calculated according to Equation (9), where
I ∈ R p× p is a unit matrix with appropriate dimensions [26]:
 T    
Qi = X̃i − TP̃aT X̃i − TP̃aT = X̃iT I − P̃a P̃aT X̃i = EiT Ei (9)

A control metric for the Q statistic has been proposed by Jackson and Mudholkar [26].
For a given confidence level, α the control limit Qα is calculated according to Equation (10):

 q  h1
dα 2θ2 h20 θ2 h0 ( h0 − 1) 
0

Q α = θ1 1 + + (10)
θ1 θ12

In Equation (10), dα is the deviate belonging to the upper 1 − α percentile of the

standard normal distribution, while θi and h0 are metrics derived from the polynomial
sums of the p − a eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the data.
In most industrial applications, the system to be supervised is dynamic, meaning
that the observed process data will be of a time-series nature. This, however, results in
the presence of significant autocorrelation between subsequent samples, which cannot
be accurately described by traditional PCA. The issue of autocorrelation has mainly been
addressed through the introduction of various DPCA algorithms, which augment the base
method with steps to account for dynamic changes in the data [28].
The most simple approach is the augmentation of the initial data matrix with lagged
versions of the process variables to indirectly include autocorrelation in the PCA proce-
dure [29]. This version of the method became generally known as the original DPCA
technique and is most widely applied.

2.2. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)

The traditional static FMEA method is a “bottom–up” inductive logic-based procedure
used to solve quality and reliability issues in the development stages of processes or later for
risk assessment of already existing technologies [30]. Base FMEA is at the core of the method;
this technique can be specified further to resolve specific issues related to safety and quality
with a focus on process (Process FMEA or PFMEA), product design (Design FMEA or DFMEA),
system functionality (Functional FMEA or FFMEA) and software issues [15]. The FMEA
technique is based on the hierarchical decomposition of the system and identification of failure
modes on the lowest possible indenture level. Subsequently, the effect of failure modes on the
higher-ordered subsystems is observed and iterated through them [31]. The FMEA analysis
can be enhanced through a subsequent criticality evaluation of identified failure methods.
The FMEA analysis should result in the following items:
• Systematic overview of possible failures;
• Evaluation of failure impact of the system performance;
• Identification of failure causes;
• Quantitative evaluation of risks associated with each failure mode;
• Specification of corrective actions for risk reduction.
The FMEA procedure is initiated by consulting relevant professionals who have
sufficient empirical and theoretical knowledge of the observed process. The specific topic of
FMEA is established (the scope of the observed system), and system specifics such as system
architecture, characteristics, and functions are analyzed by the professionals. For a reliability
and risk analysis, all possible system failure scenarios are evaluated. The failure modes are
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 6 of 25

most commonly identified based on observed issues of similar systems, based on historical
data or in case of novel processes system decomposition and analysis techniques, such as
product–function analysis, function–component relationship analysis, function–structure
relationship analysis, etc., during brainstorming sessions of the team of professionals. More
rigorous methods such as fault tree (FTA) or event tree analysis (ETA) are also often times
applied to perform the failure mode analysis [32].
After analyzing the failure modes and their propagation through the system, the risk
evaluation of each failure method is compiled. The risk evaluation of failure modes in
FMEA can be performed in a wide manner of ways, with the most common being the
application of the risk priority number (RPN) [31]. This involves either the addition or
multiplication of three factors associated with the failure mode, these being severity (S),
occurrence (O), and detectability (D). In order to express these scores, two main approaches
are utilized, these being the expression of risk factors S, O, D through fuzzy logic, the other
being the use of a 10-level integer scale to quantify each measure [30]. The RPN score using
the latter solution is calculated traditionally as per Equation (11):

RPN = S · O · D (11)
While the FMEA method is a great tool to ensure process quality and safety in the
design stages of a system, it lacks capabilities for online diagnosis, therefore limiting its
capabilities for system supervision and decision-making [33]. Therefore, FMEA is often
enhanced or fused using more rigorous risk assessment techniques with a probabilistic
framework to enable system diagnosis as well. A common approach is the integration of
FMEA into Bayesian networks or Markov models [34].

2.3. Bayesian Networks (BNs)

BNs are graphical models which are used for representing cause-and-effect relation-
ships using Bayes’ theorem of conditional probability [35].
BNs can be visually represented as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), where root nodes
are root causes of a series of events linked by causality, and leaf nodes are the final possible
consequences of the root event (an example is provided in Figure 1).
The nodes of BN are linked through conditional probability functions (CPFs); in gen-
eral, the CPF can be a continuous or discrete probability distribution function, the former
describing an infinite number of possibility values for process states for a node variable,
and the latter assuming only a certain amount of fixed probability values for the variable
states. In the risk estimation state, the possible event states are usually discrete variables
(for example, “Is the i-th system component faulty? “ − → the corresponding states can be
“true” or “false”); here, conditional probabilities determine each states’ likeliness based
on known event states within the DAG [36]. The individual CPFs of different states are
summarized in conditional probability tables (CPTs) describing the conditional dependence
of all states of a node, given all possible states of its parent nodes. To provide an example, in
Figure 1, the CPTs are displayed next to each node, depicting the conditional probabilities
of node states based on their parent nodes; binary states “True-T” and “False-F” are given
for each node.
During the quantitative analysis of the net, the user wishes to estimate the probability
of a given state of a variable in the BN through knowledge about the state of another
observable variable by means of inference. For this, the conditional dependence of the
variables in the network has to be analyzed. We denote the CPF of a given variable x
on another variable y as CPF ( x | y). For any given variable in the graph, the probability
distribution of its states may be calculated using the probability distribution of its parent
nodes’ states through the underlying assumptions of conditional independence encoded in
the graph using Equation (12):

i
∏ CPF


CPF ( x1 , x2 , . . . , xi ) = x j | pa( x j ) (12)
j =1
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 7 of 25

X1 true X1 false

X1

X1 X2 X1 X3

T X2 true X2 false X2 X3 T X3 true X3 false

F X2 true X2 false F X3 true X3 false

X2 X3 X4

X4 F F X4 true X4 false

T F X4 true X4 false

F T X4 true X4 false

T T X4 true X4 false

X5

X4 X5

T X5 true X5 false

F X5 true X5 false

Figure 1. Example of a BN structure with 5 nodes that have binary states.

The structure of BNs can be approximated using expert knowledge or data-based

techniques, the same being true for the various CPFs and CPTs. In our work, the structure of
the BN is based on the initial FMEA analysis of the system, while the CPFs are approximated
using maximum likelihood estimation [37] (where simulation data are available) and expert
knowledge in cases which are not observed during the simulation.

3. The Proposed Technique for Prediction of Safety-Critical Events

The outline of the proposed online supervision strategy is shown in Figure 2.
To set up the procedure, first, the structure of the system is evaluated through FMEA
analysis. Possible failure modes are summarized, and operation data are acquired through
the analysis, the resulting FMEA chart serving as a baseline for the BN structure. Generally,
the concept of inferring a BN from FMEA is not a novel idea; many approaches and tools
have been proposed, yet the use of expert knowledge is the most basic solution to establish
the subsequent BN [38].
In this work, the FMEA results are translated into BN, and the CPFs are established
through expert knowledge and maximum likelihood estimation using historical data where
applicable. This means that possible failure modes as identified by FMEA serve as root
nodes for the network, associated failure symptoms are derived from said root nodes and
are linked to the observable variables of the process. The causal relationships between the
nodes are established using simulation data. Conditional probability functions between root
causes and the resulting symptoms are identified using maximum likelihood estimation
based on generated simulation data. The DPCA model is established through simulation
results; accounted faults are the failure modes identified through the FMEA procedure.
As such, for each failure mode, missed alarm rates are calculated. Missed alarm rates serve
as the basis for the detectability scores of the RPN calculations.
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 8 of 25

Start

Input: Process data

BN-FMEA
(Risk assessment)

No Yes
Raise alarm Acceptable risk?

Fault detection

Yes
Stop Issue warning Fault present?

No

Figure 2. Flowchart of the proposed risk-based FD algorithm.

During the online supervision process, the real-time system behavior is observed. The
occurrence probability of failure modes could be directly calculated from the observed
process variables as symptoms of the function of time. The detectability of individual
failure modes based on the missed alarm rate and severity scores assigned based on expert
knowledge are used to create an RPN score for each possible failure mode. Should the
risk level for any failure mode indicated by the RPN exceed the acceptable range, alarms
are instantly raised, while in the case of no serious process risk, the evaluation of the
fault presence is performed. Thus, for real-time risk assessment, the detectability derived
from DPCA, the occurrence probability of failures estimated from the observed process
variables, the Bayesian network, and the severity assigned using expert knowledge and
FMEA analysis aer combined. If an observed anomaly holds no significant process risks, it
is still analyzed, and warnings are issued if faults are detected based on the DPCA results,
but alarms are not raised. If no faults are present, no immediate actions are taken.

4. Case Study and Method Evaluation

The method is tested using data gathered from a three-tank benchmark system and
for a model of a dehydrogenation reactor utilized in LOHC technology. The results are
displayed in the following subsections.
In case of the three-tank benchmark, the entire procedure starting from DPCA model
development until the BN and FMEA establishment is thoroughly explained. In the LOHC
case study, the procedure is showcased, but the thorough procedure is not explained in
detail, as it is identical to the steps described in the three-tank benchmark problem.

4.1. Case Study of the Three-Tank Benchmark Problem

The performance for risk-based FD of the proposed method is evaluated using data ob-
tained from the predefined model of the three-tank benchmark system shown in
Figure 3 [39]. This benchmark problem is widely recognized and frequently cited in FD
literature for testing various methods [40,41]. A comprehensive description of the benchmark
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 9 of 25

problem, including the measured input and output variables, system model, and system
parameters, is provided below.

Figure 3. Scheme of the investigated three-tank system [39].

4.1.1. First Principle Model of the Three-Tank Benchmark

The investigation focuses on a system comprising three linked cylindrical tanks in
succession, each sharing a consistent cross-sectional area denoted as S. Positioned at the
base of each tank is an outlet. Connecting these tanks are cylindrical pipes, all possessing a
cross-sectional area designated as Sn , enabling the flow of fluid between them.
The system’s measurable output variables encompass the liquid levels within each
tank, denoted as (l1 , l2 , l3 ). The influencing factors on these levels are the inlet flow rates into
the first and last tanks, represented as (q1 , q3 ). Flow rates between tanks are symbolized as
qi,j , where the indices i and j represent the connected tanks or the external environment (0).
These rates are contingent on the liquid levels within the tanks and the outflow coefficients
µi,j , regulated by the valve positions in the pipe segments.
To validate the methodology, six potential faults are scrutinized. The initial three faults
involve a reduction in the outflow coefficients within each pipe segment ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ), possibly
stemming from sediment accumulation or control valve dysfunctions. The subsequent
three faults pertain to leakages in each tank ( f 4 , f 5 , f 6 ).
A fundamental model of the system is constructed to gather data on its performance
under various normal and faulty conditions. The computation of flow rates between tanks
follows Torricelli’s law. The system of differential equations describing liquid levels as well
as the calculation of the flow rates can be seen in previous articles detailing the benchmark
problem [39,42].  
To ascertain the volumetric flow exiting the tank due to leaks qi, f , fault signals
f i+3 are binary, with a value of one indicating a leakage and zero indicating no leakage.
The model undergoes simulation to collect data under normal conditions. A steady-state
for the system is designated, and adjustments to the input variables (inlet flow rates) are
executed to monitor changes in the tank water levels. Subsequently, these data are utilized
in developing the DPCA transformation.
The operational parameters of the chosen steady state, alongside the tank construction
parameters and potential fault parameters, are detailed in Table 1.

Table 1. Operational and constructional parameters of the investigated system.

q1 m3 s−1 q3 m3 s−1
   
µ1,2 [−] µ2,3 [−] µ3,0 [−]
1.5 × 10−4 1.5 × 10−4 0.5 0.5 0.6
m2 S p m2 S f m2
     
µ f [−] S li,0 [m]
0.6 1.5 × 10−2 5 × 10−5 5 × 10−5 0
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 10 of 25

The training data for the DPCA method are obtained by observing system behavior
around the steady state under the conditions shown in Table 1. The development of
the steady-state conditions can be seen in Figure 4. The system of differential equations
describing liquid level changes is solved using Euler’s explicit method.

Figure 4. Steady-state liquid level within the three tanks under the operating conditions of Table 1.

4.1.2. Dynamic Principal Component Analysis for Fault Detection

The system was observed in a time window of 1200 h, with a sampling time of 600 s.
The observation period and sampling time was chosen based on the time-constant of the
system which was approximately 5 h. During this time, 30 changes were made in the value
of the input volumetric flow according to a ramp function. The deviation of the inputs from
their steady-state values were calculated as random variables with a normal distribution
according to Equation (13), where m is the expected value of set point change (0 in this
case), σ is the standard deviation of change (0.01 in this case), and N is a random variable
following the standard normal distribution:

u = usteadystate · (m + σN ) (13)

The changes in the input volumetric flow and the liquid levels compared to their
steady-state values are shown in Figure 5.
The DPCA model was constructed in accordance with the algorithm proposed by
Ku et al. in the original article detailing DPCA [24]. The PCA transform was calculated as
per Equation (3) to Equation (6). The lag number was tuned as well as the number of PCs.
To determine linear relations, a threshold was determined for the eigenvalues (λmin ) of the
corresponding PC scores. The chosen threshold for the eigenvalues was determined using
Equation (14):
λmin = max λi · 10−4 (14)
1≤ i ≤ p
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 11 of 25

Figure 5. Changes in the inlet volumetric flows (left) and the liquid levels (right) within the tanks
compared to their steady-state conditions.

During the tuning, lag values from 0 to 2 are utilized, for testing. The eigenvalues of
the DPCA transformation as well as the threshold are plotted for the investigated instances,
the results of which can be seen in Figure 6, in the form of a scree plot. As the lag number
increases, the numeric values of the first few eigenvalues also increase; therefore, at lag 2,
the third PC also becomes more significant. Based on the results, an optimal lag number
of 2 is determined, and the first two PCs are retained. The rnew value of new relations is
calculated during the different iterations and plotted, the results of which can be seen in the
second subplot of Figure 6. The subplot shows that the transform reveals new successive
relations due to the addition of lags, and the autocorrelation between data is properly
contained within the PCs; however, after a lag number of 2, no new relationships can
be observed.

Figure 6. Eigenvalues of the PCs (left) and the number of new relations for different lag values (right).

The auto and cross-correlation in the discarded PCs is observed to validate the results
as proposed by Ku et al. [24]. The results for the first two discarded PCs for both the original
PCA transform and the chosen DPCA transform with a lag value of 2 are displayed in
Figures 7 and 8. It must be noted that for 0 lags, the optimal PC number to be retained is 1,
and thus, the correlation plots are displayed for PCs 2 to 3. When comparing Figures 7 and 8,
it is shown that the DPCA transform with 2 lags significantly decreased the autocorrelation
of the discarded PC scores, meaning that the dynamic tendencies of the data are mostly
captured in the transform.
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 12 of 25

Figure 7. Autocorrelation plots for the first three discarded PCs in basic PCA.

Figure 8. Autocorrelation plots for the first three discarded PCs in basic DPCA, with a lag number
of 2.

To validate the performance of the model on the training data set, the Q statistic was
calculated and evaluated against the upper control limit calculated from Equation (10),
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 13 of 25

corresponding to a 95 % confidence level. The results are shown in Figure 9; the low value
of the Q statistic and the fact that it nowhere exceeds the control limit indicates that the
model accurately represents the process.

Figure 9. Q-statistic for original training data (Figure 5) with the trained DPCA model.

4.1.3. Risk Assessment of the Three-Tank Benchmark System

The FMEA analysis for the unit was performed with a focus on process functionality;
the core was a PFMEA evaluation. Using the observed system in Figure 3, the six main
failures used in the case studies were defined as root causes for the observable failure
modes. The results of the initial PFMEA analysis for each system component are shown in
Table 2. During the analysis, the following assumptions were made:
• The liquid stored in the tanks was water.
• The system contained both liquid level and flow rate measurement sensors.
• Failures of system components were accounted for, but no sensor failure was taken
into account.
The possible failures in this case are the degradation of the valve flow coefficient
due to fouling and leakages due to corrosion. Both issues can lead to abnormal level
changes within the tank. While valve fouling can decrease the flow rate between tanks,
leading to overflow, leakages result in direct material outflow from the tank. In both cases,
the end effect is water spill, which can lead to human injury through various accidents.
The evaluation of severity, observability, and occurrence scores were discretized onto the
traditional 10-scale FMEA, using the conditions and criteria displayed in [43].

Table 2. FMEA table of the three-tank benchmark system.

Potential Potential Cause Failure Current Recommended Severity Detectability

Fault Root Cause Function
Failure Mode of Failure Consequences Process Controls Actions Score (S) Score (D)
Flow rate Decreased Valve Overflow, Flow rate Valve
Valve 2 2
control flow rate fouling Human injury sensor Cleaning
Liquid Human Liquid level Tank
Tank Leakage Corrosion 3 4
containment injury sensor welding

Based on the analysis, a preliminary BN was established to model the process. The graph-
ical representation of the BN is shown in Figure 10. The model was developed using the
results of the FMEA analysis as well as expert knowledge and process data. The connections
between the observed variables (in this case the liquid levels in the tanks) and the fault
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 14 of 25

scenarios were established using historical data through process simulation of 7200 h, with a
data set containing 100 setpoint changes and 500 fault scenarios, including simultaneously
occurring fault instances. Since each valve and leakage failure mode has the same associated
severity and detectability scores, the individual valve and leakage failures ( f1 − f6 ) were
not represented. Using the historical data obtained through the simulations, the CPTs of
the liquid level values associated with valve fouling and leakage scenarios were calculated
using the maximum likelihood estimation algorithm (MLE) [44]. The probability of valve
fouling, leakage and the conditional probability of human injury could not be estimated, as no
historical data were available to the authors; therefore, the authors utilized expert knowledge
to give estimates for the probabilities.

V false V true L false L true

0.95 0.05 0.95 0.05

Valve
Leak
fouling

Level 1 Level 2 Level 3

L1 L1 L1 L3 L3 L3
V L
normal low high Human V L
normal low high

F F 0.84 0.08 0.08 injury F F 0.87 0.07 0.06

T F 0.05 0.01 0.94 T F 0.03 0.67 0.3

F T 0.06 0.93 0.01 F T 0.07 0.92 0.01

T T 0.1 0.84 0.06 T T 0.04 0.79 0.17

L2 L2 L2
V L
normal low high

F F 0.85 0.07 0.08

T F 0.02 0.29 0.69

F T 0.04 0.95 0.01

T T 0.07 0.87 0.06

Figure 10. BN for risk assessment of the three-tank system.

The valve fouling and leak instances both have two possible states “False-F” and
“True-T”, while the liquid level states can be “Low-L”, “Normal-N” or “High-H”. The state
of the liquid level scores was assigned using Equation (15), where m(li ) and σ(li ) are the
mean and standard deviation of the respective i-th liquid level over the simulation interval,
and li (t) is the i-th liquid level at a given time stamp t:

L
 li ( t ) < m ( li ) − σ ( li )
Stateli (t) = N if m(li ) − σ (li ) ≤ li (t) ≤ m(li ) + σ(li ) (15)

H otherwise


Subsequently, the risk profile of each failure mode could be continuously calculated
as a function of time through Equation (11). Since the severity and observability of both
faults modes is known a priori and statically, the time-dependent part of the RPN score
is the probability of a fault mode occurring. Using the BN, the risk of valve fouling and
leakage are constantly calculated using the PCs. Thus, for each failure mode, an RPN risk
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 15 of 25

profile can be observed, and an acceptable RPN threshold can be given. In the following,
the results of the method for the three-tank system are shown through a case study with a
timescale of 300 h and 5 simulated fault scenarios.
Figure 11 shows the changes in the input volumetric flow of the system as well as the
values of the fault signals over the observation period. Also displayed are the changes in
liquid level, compared to their steady-state values, and the values of the Q statistic for FD.
It can be seen that the greater values of the Q statistic correspond well to the fault signals.
The warning signals of FD, seen in Figure 12, when the Q statistic exceeds the statistic
limit correspond to the fault signals. After running a simulation of 10,000 h time with 1000
randomly generated fault signals and 50 set point changes, the FAR and MAR values were
estimated to be 1.7 and 12.9%, respectively.

Figure 11. Changes in inlet volumetric flow (upper left), system fault signals (upper right), sys-
tem level changes (lower left) and values of the Q statistic for the three-tank benchmark problem
(lower right).

Figure 12. Warning signals for the case study of the three-tank benchmark problem.
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 16 of 25

Using the values of the liquid levels, the probability of failure modes was calculated
using the BN structure of Figure 10. The resulting probabilities are shown as a function
of time in Figure 13. When comparing Figure 13 with the fault signals in Figure 11, it can
be seen that both leakages and valve fouling can be reliable identified using the BN; in
the case of leakages, the distinction is almost perfect, while in the case of valve fouling,
instances of leakages also result in small probability values of valve fouling but the actual
valve fouling events possess significantly higher probability scores.

Figure 13. Probability of leakage (left) and valve fouling (right) failure modes in the three-tank
benchmark problem.

The RPN scores as a function of time are shown in Figure 14 for both failure modes.
In the case of valve fouling, the low probability events which belong to leakages induce no
great differences in the final RPN score, while actual valve fouling events are characterized
by the maximal possible RPN for this failure mode (40). In the case of leakages, the
accurately identified leakage events all achieve their maximum RPN value (120). The RPN
threshold for this application is also shown; it was chosen as 100.

Figure 14. RPN scores of failure modes in the three-tank benchmark case study.

Finally, the actual alarm signals are shown in Figure 15, taking both process risk and
FD results into account. When compared with the warning signals in Figure 12, it can be
seen that while all fault instances may be reliably detected using the DPCA technique, the
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 17 of 25

FMEA-based BN risk analysis was able to sort out safety-critical events, which require
the attention of operators and possible shutdowns of the system to prevent accidents in
the technology.

Figure 15. Alarm signals in the three-tank benchmark case study taking both process risk and FD
results into account.

4.2. Case Study of the Liquid Organic Hydrogen Carrier (LOHC) Technology’s
Dehydrogenation Reactor
The LOHC technology is a promising industrial process for the safe storage and
transportation of hydrogen, which is fundamental for the hydrogen-based economy [45].
One of the critical questions of hydrogen-based energy involves the safe and economically
sustainable transport and storage of hydrogen during its lifecycle. The transport and
storage of hydrogen as a low density and highly explosive gas is a critical issue [46].
Various solutions have been proposed for this problem, such as binding hydrogen to
metal-hydrides or storing hydrogen as a high pressure gas or in a liquified state. As an
alternative to these techniques, the LOHC process for hydrogen transport and storage
involves chemically binding hydrogen during a reaction to a liquid organic carrier molecule
for safe transportation, which can be economically beneficial, as it allows storing hydrogen
at ambient conditions [45]. The transport of hydrogen during this procedure is based on
two steps: the first involves the binding of the hydrogen (hydrogenation) into the LOHC
molecule, and the subsequent, second step is the release of hydrogen (dehydrogenation) at
the site of use.

4.2.1. First-Principle System Model of the Dehydrogenation Reactor

In this case study, we have studied the dehydrogenation step of an LOHC reactor
with methyl cyclohexane (C7 H14 , from now on MCH) as a carrier molecule. During the
dehydrogenation step, the transported hydrogen (H2 ) is removed from the carrier in a
heterogeneous catalytic reaction, leading to the formation of toluene (C7 H8 , from now on
TOL) and H2 [47]. The formula of the reaction is shown in Equation (16):

C7 H14 → C7 H8 + 3H2 (16)

In this study, the kinetics of the reaction were assumed to follow the Langmuir–
Hinshelwood–Hougen–Watson (LHHW) kinetics, which is suitable for heterogeneous
reactions in the presence of a solid catalyst [48]. Parameters of the kinetic equation were
identified using experimental data from a laboratory-scale plug flow dehydrogenation reactor.
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 18 of 25

In our case study, we utilized a simplified structure of the system. The assumed
layout of the studied unit is displayed in Figure 16. The reactor is fed H2 and MCH,
and the gas streams are mixed before entering the system in the mixer unit (1.), in which
their concentration ratio is controlled. After creating the proper mixture, the gas stream is
heated in a heat exchanger (2.) to the temperature of the operating point before entering
the reactor (3.). The reactor is an adiabatic plug flow reactor where the dehydrogenation
process takes place. After exiting the reactor, the temperature (4.) and concentration of H2
and MCH in the outlet stream are measured using a sensor unit (5.).
4.) 5.)
H2
Temp. Conc.
1.) 2.) 3.)

Diameter

MCH
Length

Figure 16. Simplified layout of the reactor system.

The constructional parameters of the pilot reactor such as length (l), diameter (d),
cross-section area (A) and volume (V) are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Geometrical parameters of the reactor.

Construction Parameter Value

l [m] 4.5 × 10−1
d [m] 1.4 × 10−2
2
A [m ] 2.3 × 10−4
3
V [m ] 1.02 × 10−4

Observed variables within the reactor are the concentration of MCH, H2 within the
feed as well as the inlet temperature Tin , and the concentrations of the components at the
outlet as well as the outlet temperature Tout .
Using the identified kinetic parameters, a first-principle model for the system was
developed. The flow regime was approximated as being an ideal plug flow. During the
calculations of energy and component mass balance, the convection (in the longitudinal
direction) and source terms due to reaction were accounted for. Under the above assump-
tions, the component mass and energy balances for the unit were given as a system of
partial differential equations shown in Equation (17):

∂ci ∂c
= − v x i + ri
∂t ∂x
(17)
∂T ∂T ∑ N ∆Hr,i ri
= −v x + i =1
∂t ∂x ρc p

In the equation, ci refers to the concentration of the i-th component, v x is the flow
velocity in the longitudinal direction within the reactor, ri is the reaction source term for a
specific component, ∆Hr,i refers to the reaction heat of specific reactions taking place, and ρ
and c p are the density and heat capacity of the medium within the reactor.
The mathematical model of the system was solved using MATLAB R2020b, with the
appropriate initial and boundary conditions. The initial (x, t = 0) and boundary(x = 0, t)
conditions as well as the parameters of the material within the unit are seen in Table 4,
where B is the inlet volumetric flow rate of the feed. The dependence of heat capacity and
density of the material was studied as a function of temperature, and it was found that in
the investigated regime, the material qualities showed no significant changes. In light of
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 19 of 25

this, both the density and heat capacity of the material system were assumed to be constant
during the investigations.
Should the flow conditions in the system not allow the use of ideal system models such
as plug flow, then alternatively, computational fluid dynamics methods may be utilized to
obtain data pertaining to system behavior. In the case of material properties such as density
or heat capacity, when these greatly vary over the observation period, then experimental
functions may be fitted to account for their changes due to temperature fluctuations. While
these changes may cause increased computational loads for data generation, they have no
impact on the procedure of the proposed supervision algorithms. If DPCA performance
were to deteriorate, then alternative non-linear methods such as kernel principal component
analysis (KPCA) may be used to characterize system behavior, estimate missed alarm rate,
and perform fault detection.

Table 4. Initial and boundary conditions as well as material parameters within the unit.

Boundary Initial Conditions and

Values Values
Conditions Material Parameters
B  5.5 × 10−6  c MCH−3  0
m 3 s −1

mol m
v  3.5 × 10−3  c TOL−3  0
m s −1

mol m

 c MCH−3  12 c H2  0
mol m−3

mol m

 c TOL−3  0 T 593
mol m [K ]
c H2  3 ρ  2.99
mol m−3 kg m−3
 

T 593 cp 0.23
J kg−1 K −1
 
[K ]

4.2.2. Risk Assessment for the Dehydrogenation Reactor

In the following, the application of the proposed method for the LOHC case study is
discussed. An FMEA analysis was initiated to pinpoint safety-critical failure modes of the
system. During the analysis, the following assumptions were made:
• The system contains outlet temperature and concentration sensors. Faults in the
sensors were not taken into account during the FMEA analysis.
• A heat exchanger is present at the inlet of the unit, which heats the inlet mixture to
the desired temperature. No heat exchanger is present, however, along the length of
the reactor.
In the light of these assumptions, the FMEA table is shown in Table 5.

Table 5. FMEA table of the LOHC benchmark system.

Fault Root Potential Potential Cause Failure Current Recommended Severity Detectability
Function Failure Mode of Failure Consequences Process Controls Actions
Cause Score (S) Score (D)

Heat Temperature Abnormal Heat exchanger Explosion, Outlet temperature Heat exchanger
control temperature profile fouling catalyst fouling sensor cleaning, process shutdown 9 2
exchanger
Inlet Abnormal inlet Explosion, Inlet composition Shutdown,
Mixer Valve sticking 10 4
concentration control concentration profile product loss sensor valve change

The characteristic safety indicators of the process are the changes within the mixture
temperature and the concentration of hydrogen and MCH. Thus, the risk level of the
process is determined based on the deviation of these three variables. The root causes
for the deviations include the failure of the process heat exchanger due to fouling, which
causes deviation of the process temperature from its nominal values; this, in turn, can lead
to catalyst deactivation within the reactor unit.
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 20 of 25

In the case of abnormal MCH or hydrogen concentrations being simultaneously

present due to mixer control failure, this could lead to possible explosions. The BN estab-
lished through the FMEA analysis is shown in Figure 17.

M HX MCH MCH MCH

normal low high
M false M true HX false HX true
F F 0.98 0.01 0.01

0.95 0.05 T F 0.55 0.02 0.43 0.95 0.05

F T 0.03 0.96 0.01

T F 0.12 0.72 0.16

Heat exchanger
Mixer failure
failure

M HX H2 H2 H2 OT OT OT
M HX MCH
normal low high normal low high
F F 0.98 0.01 0.01 Outlet H2 Outlet F F N 0.98 0.01 0.01
Outlet temperature
concentration MCH concentration T F N 0.95 0.02 0.03
T F 0.63 0.05 0.32
F T N 0.96 0.02 0.02
F T 0.08 0.01 0.91
T T N 0.9 0.06 0.04

T T 0.18 0.01 0.81 F F L 0.82 0.02 0.16

T F L 0.93 0.01 0.06

F T L 0.02 0.01 0.97

T T L 0.21 0.01 0.78

Explosion Catalyst fouling F F H 0.92 0.05 0.03

T F H 0.96 0.03 0.01

F T H 0.87 0.01 0.12

T T H 0.97 0.01 0.02

E E CT CT
H2 OT OT
false true false true

N N 0.97 0.03 N 0.98 0.02

L N 0.98 0.02 L 0.95 0.05

H N 0.65 0.35 H 0.07 0.93

N L 0.96 0.04

L L 0.99 0.01

H L 0.72 0.28

N H 0.12 0.88

L H 0.23 0.77

H H 0.02 0.98

Figure 17. BN for risk assessment of the LOHC dehydrogenation reactor.

Mixer failure and heat exchanger failure as well as explosion and catalyst fouling have
two possible states “False-F” and “True-T”, respectively; the CPTs of these occurrences,
similarly to the previous instance, were filled out using expert knowledge, as no process
data were initially available. In contrast to this, the relationship between the failure modes
and the failure symptoms (inlet concentration and outlet temperature deviation) were
filled out using simulation case studies as before through the use of maximum likelihood
estimation. The failure symptoms have three possible states “Normal-N”,“Low-L” and
“High-H” respectively which were determined similarly as Equation (15).
After training the DPCA model using observation data of the process obtained for
1000 h using a set of 500 observed process faults and 100 set point changes, the FMEA-
based BN was utilized to simultaneously detect faults and observe process risks. There are
three distinct types of process faults, f 1MCH being the fault of the mixer causing changes
within the MCH inlet concentration, f 1H2 being the change in the inlet H2 concentration
due to mixer failure, and f 2 being the fault of the heat exchanger resulting in abnormal
outlet temperature.
The steady-state concentration and temperature profile of the unit are shown in
Figure 18 under the conditions given in Table 4.
The changes within the steady-state boundary conditions and the possible fault signals
are shown in Figure 19 under an investigation of 1 h of simulation time with 5 set point
changes and 5 fault signals. It can be seen that all faults could be isolated using the Q
statistic within reason.
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 21 of 25

Figure 18. Steady-state operating point of the LOHC technology under the conditions in Table 4.

Figure 19. Fault detection procedure of the LOHC process, operating point changes (upper left), fault
signals (upper right), system responses (lower left), and Q statistic (lower right).

The warning signals due to fault presence are shown in Figure 20; the warning signals
correspond to the fault presence.

Figure 20. Warning signals given based on the DPCA FD procedure.

Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 22 of 25

The risk of each failure mode was calculated using the trained BN; the results for both
the heat exchanger and mixer failure are displayed. The probability of each failure mode as
a function of time is displayed in Figure 21.

Figure 21. Probability of heat exchanger (left) and mixer (right) failure modes as a function of time.

The corresponding RPN scores are shown in Figure 22.

Figure 22. RPN score as a function of time.

Finally, the alarm signals based on the RPN score are shown in Figure 23.

Figure 23. Alarm signals as a function of time for the LOHC reactor.
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 23 of 25

Comparatively, it can be seen that the change in RPN scores of different failure modes
correspond to the actual failure scenarios shown in Figure 19. The RPN scores are defined
by the extent of deviation of the given process variables from their expected steady-state
values; in this case, all three process faults carried significant risks. However, as seen
in Figure 15, when non-safety-critical faults are present, they are eliminated by the RPN
screening. This way, the FD capabilities of the system are not decreased since warnings will
indicate fault presence; however, alarm floods can be prevented, as only critical failures
are highlighted.
This was tested in the case of both studies. In both instances, 10,000 fault random fault
signals were generated, and the alarm and warning numbers were compared. In the case
of the three-tank system, the ratio of alarms to warnings was 0.63, with a MAR of 12.5%.
For the LOHC example, the alarm-to-warning ratio was 0.89 with a MAR of 4.3%. In both
instances, the number of alarm signals was significantly decreased; only safety-critical
faults were highlighted, while faults which posed no significant risks were effectively
filtered out as warnings.

5. Discussion
Conclusively, the results show that the method could effectively diagnose systems,
pinpoint the presence of faults, and differentiate between safety-critical and non-safety-
critical process abnormalities.
Compared with previously introduced methods, the technique has the advantage of
being based on standard risk assessment techniques (FMEA), which is widely available for
industrial applications. In addition, opposed to previous works, where risk was calculated
based on a probability of system malfunction and associated severity scores, in this study,
the modified RPN for risk assessment took fault propagation paths, fault detectability, and
severity into account, integrating the established frameworks of FMEA, Bayesian networks,
and DPCA.
Through the tunable RPN threshold, the safety restrictions can be relaxed or increased,
effectively alternating between recognizing all faults as warnings or alarms (the latter case
being the use of DPCA results, as they are for alarm raising).

6. Conclusions
In this work, the authors introduced a risk-based fault detection (FD) method which
utilizes dynamic principal component analysis for FD and a Bayesian network (BN), con-
structed using failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) as a risk assessment tool.
The method was used for the online supervision of systems and was showcased using
a three-tank benchmark model and the model of a laboratory scale reactor used during
the dehydrogenation step of the liquid organic hydrogen carrier (LOHC) technology. In
both cases, the method managed to effectively reduce the number of process alarms by
filtering out non-safety-critical process faults, thus reducing the possibility of alarm floods.
The reduction in superfluous alarm signals was between 11 and 37%, respectively, for the
investigated case studies.
On average, the use of the technique reduced the number of raised alarms by 20–30%
in the observed case studies while being sensitive enough to pinpoint all fault presences.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, B.L.T.; methodology, B.L.T.; software, B.L.T.; validation,
Á.B., T.C., A.E., L.L. and S.N.; formal analysis, Á.B., T.C., A.E., L.L. and S.N.; investigation, B.L.T.;
resources, A.E., L.L. and S.N.; data curation, B.L.T.; writing—original draft preparation, B.L.T.;
writing—review and editing, Á.B., T.C., A.E., L.L. and S.N.; visualization, B.L.T.; supervision, Á.B.,
T.C. and S.N.; project administration, Á.B., T.C., L.L., A.E. and S.N.; funding acquisition, A.E., L.L.
and S.N. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This work has been supported by the project Aquamarine—Hydrogen-based energy storage
solution at Hungarian Gas Storage Ltd. funded by the Ministry of Technology and Industry under
grant agreement No 2020-3.1.2-ZFR-KVG-2020-00001. This work has been implemented by the
TKP2021-NVA-10 project with the support provided by the Ministry of Culture and Innovation of
Sensors 2024, 24, 3511 24 of 25

Hungary from the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund, financed under the 2021
Thematic Excellence Programme funding scheme.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is
not applicable to this article.
Conflicts of Interest: Author László Lovas has been involved as an expert at the at Hungarian Gas
Storage Ltd.

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