Admin(VII)

Public Officers
A. Norms of conduct and Rights and privileges of public officers (continuation)
1. Right to reinstatement and backwages in case dismissal is illegal –MABUTIN

Read: David vs. Gania, G.R. No. 156039 (disregard ruling on procedural issues, focus on ruling
re backwages issue)- MANOZO

The Court has, time and again, held that an illegally dismissed government employee
who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to back wages and other monetary benefits from the
time of his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement. The policy of “no work, no pay” cannot be
applied, for such distressing state of affairs was not of her own making. To withhold her back
salaries and benefits during her illegal dismissal would put to naught the constitutional guarantee
of security of tenure for those in the civil service.

Facts

Respondent Zenaida D. Pangandaman-Gania is a Director II and Manila Information and

Liaisoning Officer of the Mindanao State University (MSU). She has been holding this position
after the confirmation of her appointment by the MSU Board of Regents on 1 June 1995. Special
Order No. 477-P dated 28 September 1998 designating a certain Agnes Mangondato as Acting
Director in her place in view of the alleged expiration of her term and was no longer allowed to
report for work. She verified the status of her appointment and found out that her appointment
was not submitted to the Civil Service Commission for attestation. Respondent immediately
brought the matter to the CSC for a ruling on the validity of the termination of her employment.
In Resolution No. 00-1265 dated 24 May 2000 the CSC upheld her dismissal for lack of
attestation and prolonged absence without official leave from the time she was removed from her
post in September 1998 as a result of Special Order No. 477-P. Upon respondent’s motion for
reconsideration, Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 the CSC found merit in her
motion, declared her removal from office as illegal and ordered here reinstatement but
disallowed the payment of back salaries for the period she was not working as a result of the
illegal dismissal. However, MSU refused to employ her back.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent has the right to back salaries.

Ruling:

YES.

The Court held that an illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered
reinstated is entitled to back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal
dismissal up to his reinstatement. This is only fair and sensible because an employee who is
reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left his office and
should be given a comparable compensation at the time of his reinstatement. Respondent cannot
be faulted for her inability to work or to render any service from the time she was illegally
dismissed up to the time of her reinstatement. The policy of “no work, no pay” cannot be applied
to her, for such distressing state of affairs was not of her own making or liking even as her family
suffered tremendously as a consequence of her removal and while she was jobless. Verily, to
withhold her back salaries and other benefits during her illegal dismissal would put to naught the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure for those in the civil service

2. Next in rank principle

Read: Meram vs. Edralin, G.R. No. 71228- MASECAMPO

Facts

The appointee is nine (9) or 10 salary ranges below the next-in-rank personnel.

Issue

Whether or not the Office of the President acted correctly in taking cognizance of E’s
letter-petition and passing upon the same, and thereafter setting aside the decision of the MSB
and CSC.

Ruling

Respondent below next-in-rank personnel. – “In the case at bar, the BFD personnel who
are considered next-in-rank to the vacated position were identified. Respondent E was not one of
them. In fact, she was nine or ten salary ranges below the next-in-rank.

Luego vs. CSC, G.R. No. 69137- MONFORTE

FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City,
by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described as
“permanent” but the Civil Service Commission approved it as “temporary.” On 22 March
1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the
petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private respondent in place
of petitioner’s position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new
mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment
as well as to question the Civil Service Commission’s order and the private respondent’s title.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the
basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

RULING:
NO.
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not
empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing
officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of
the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commission’s resolution is set
aside.

B. Disabilities and inhibitions of public officers

1. Prohibition against engaging in political partisan activity, Constitution, Art. IX-B, Section
2(4), Art. XVI, Section 5(3) – OGUIS

Read: People vs. De Venecia, G.R, No. L-20808 - ROLLO

Facts:
Braulio de Venecia, a classified civil service employee, was prosecuted for electioneering
in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The prosecution alleged that De Venecia distributed
handbills endorsing Felipe Oda, the Nacionalista Party (NP) candidate for Municipal Mayor of
Binalonan, during the November 10, 1959 election. The handbills urged voters to support Oda
and avoid voting for the independent candidate, Atty. Roque Tomelden.
The trial court dismissed the case, stating that Section 54 of the Revised Election Code,
which prohibits such activities, had been repealed by Section 29 of Republic Act 2260. The
government appealed, arguing that Section 54 had not been repealed and De Venecia's actions
violated it.

Issue

Whether or not distributing handbills which bore the symbol of the Nacionalista Party is
undoubtedly "aiding" candidate Felipe Oda.

Ruling
 YES.

SEC. 29. Political Activity. — Officers and employees in the civil service, whether in the
competitive or classified, or non-competitive or unclassified service, shall not engage directly or
indirectly in partisan political activities or take part in any election except to vote. Nothing
herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee from expressing his
views on current political problems or issue, or from mentioning the names of candidates for
public office whom he supports.

Distributing handbills like the above is undoubtedly "aiding" candidate Felipe Oda. It is
not merely mentioning the candidate whom De Venecia supported, nor mere expression of his
opinion on current political problems. It is solicitation of the elector's vote in favor of Oda. It is
an indorsement of the request for his support by gubernatorial candidate Conrado F. Estrella.

C. Liabilities of public officers

1. Liability for unexplained wealth, Republic Act No,. 1379, Section 2 (Forfeiture of
Unexplained Wealth)- SERVO

“Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,
said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired” (Sec. 2, Republic
Act 1379)

Republic Act No. 3018, Section 8 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt practices Act)- SINGZON

Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of

Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been
found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other
persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to
his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the
name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into
consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown.
Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section,
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.

D. Termination of official relations

1. Expiration of term
Term vs. tenure – YABAO

The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of
right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The
tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office.
Read: Ingles vs. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20390 – ALOTA

Facts:
The case "Ingles v. Mutuc" involves plaintiffs Raul R. Ingles, Roaldo G. Adviento, Isabel
C. Corpus, Consuelo M. Villanueva, and Esperanza M. Gutierrez. Plaintiffs were civil service
eligibles holding various positions under the Office of the President for the fiscal year 1961-
1962. They were terminated from their positions by Executive Secretary Amelito R. Mutuc
effective January 1, 1962. Plaintiffs appealed the termination to the President, but their appeal
was denied. They filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging illegal
removal from office without cause and due process.
The lower court dismissed their complaint, leading to this direct appeal. Positions held
included Senior Executive Assistant II, Clerk I, Supervising Clerk I, and Stenographer, with
varying years of service and compensation. Defendants argued that the plaintiffs' positions were
primarily confidential and thus subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power.

Issue:

Whether or not plaintiffs’ removal from office was illegal and contrary to law.

Ruling

YES.

SEC. 32. Disciplinary Action. — No officer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due process.

This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily

confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should be
noted, however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed"
or "dismissed" from office — his "term" merely "expires," in much the same way as an officer,
whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or
elected, is not and cannot be deemed "removed" or "dismissed" therefrom, upon the expiration of
said term. The main difference between the former — the primarily confidential officer — and
the latter is that the latter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed,
but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined
when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent.
When this event takes place, the latter is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office — his term
has merely "expired".

As regards the nature of the positions held by the plaintiffs herein, there is nothing in the
plaintiffs’ items to indicate that their respective positions are "primarily confidential" in nature.
On the contrary, the compensation attached and the designation given thereto suggest the purely,
or, at least, mainly clerical nature of their work. The fact that they, at times, handle "confidential
matters," does not suffice to characterize their " positions" as primarily confidential. Indeed, it is
admitted that plaintiffs, likewise, handle "other routine matters," and it has not even been shown
that their work is, at least, principally confidential.

Considering that plaintiffs herein are admittedly civil service eligibles, with several years
of service in the Government, and that positions which are policy determining, primarily
confidential and highly technical in nature are exceptions to the general rule governing Civil
Service officers and employees, it was up to defendants-appellees to establish that plaintiffs
belong to one of these excepted classes. This, defendants-appellees have failed, to accomplish.

Hence, plaintiffs' removal from office was illegal and contrary to law, and that they are,
accordingly, entitled to reinstatement to their respective offices and to the payment of their
corresponding emoluments, from January 1, 1962, up to their actual reinstatement.

Holdover principle
2. Resignation
Read: Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 14670-15 – BARDAJE

Facts

After the people’s clamor in EDSA for him to resign from his position, Petitioner Joseph
Estrada issued a statement that he will be leaving the Malacañang Palace in order to have a
peaceful transition of power and start the healing of the nation warped by confusion due to his
impeachment trial. Nevertheless, he sent a letter to the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House stating that he is temporarily unable to perform the duties of the office of the President
and let then Vice-President Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assume the position of Acting
President.

Later, the Office of the Ombudsman filed plunder and perjury charges against the
Petitioner. A special panel of prosecutors were assigned to investigate the charges against the
Petitioner. Thus, the Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court. He
alleged that he cannot be criminally charged by the Ombudsman on the ground of immunity
from suit. He claimed that he is still the President of the Philippines, and that Respondent is
merely holding the position in an acting capacity. Further, he claimed that he cannot be
considered as to have resigned because he is prohibited by law from resigning since he was
under an investigation, i.e. an impeachment trial.

Issue

Whether or not the Petitioner resigned as President.

Ruling
 YES.

The Supreme Court ruled that in a resignation, there must be an intent to resign,
and that intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is
not government by any formal requirements as to form since it can be oral or written,
expressed or implied. So long as the resignation is clear, the same act must be given legal
effect.

In the present case, it was established the Petitioner resigned from his position as
President of the Philippines. According to the Angara Diary, which serialized the final days of
the Petitioner in Malacañang Palace, the Petitioner made pronouncements which was interpreted
as intention of giving up the position such as when he proposed a snap election where he would
not be a candidate; non-defiance to the request of a peaceful and orderly transfer of power; prior
agreement to the transfer of power with conditions as to the state of the Petitioner and his family;
and the issuance of a statement wherein the Petitioner leaves the palace, the seat of the
Presidency, for the sake and peace and order. Hence, the resignation of the Petitioner was
implied by his actions to leave the Presidency.

3. Misconduct in office /Recall

Read: Palma vs. Fortich, G.R. No. L-596793 – BERGADO

Facts:
Teodulo M. Palma, Sr., the elected Mayor of Don Carlos, Bukidnon, faced criminal
charges for acts of lasciviousness filed by two office employees, Nelia Arandel and Susan
Palamine.
On March 30, 1981, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Vivencio P. Estrada filed Criminal Cases
Nos. 2795, 2796, and 2797 against Mayor Palma in the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon. The
offended parties requested an administrative investigation from Provincial Governor Carlos O.
Fortich to suspend Mayor Palma pending the resolution of the criminal cases. Governor Fortich
forwarded the complaint to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bukidnon, which scheduled a
hearing for April 13, 1981. Following the hearing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued
Resolution No. 82-87, suspending Mayor Palma from office. Palma accepted his preventive
suspension but later filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for Preliminary
Injunction to stop the administrative proceedings and nullify the suspension.
The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order on June 16, 1982, stopping the
respondents from continuing the administrative case and enforcing the suspension. During the
pendency of the case, the criminal charges against Palma were dismissed by the Regional Trial
Court of Bukidnon on February 24, 1983, due to insufficient evidence. Palma was replaced by
Officer-in-Charge Fabian Gardones following the promulgation of the Freedom Constitution on
March 25, 1986, by President Corazon C. Aquino.
Issue

Whether or not, such misconduct of petitioner affects his performance of his duties as an
officer and not only his character as a private individual.

Ruling

NO.

In administrative actions against municipal officers, the Supreme Court in Festijo v.

Crisologo, et al. (17 SCRA 868, 869 [1966]), classified the grounds for suspension under two
categories, namely: (1) those related to the discharge of the functions of the officer concerned
(neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other forms of maladministration of office) and (2)
those not so connected with said functions. Under the second category, when the crime
involving moral turpitude is not linked with the performance of official duties, conviction by
final judgment is required as a condition precedent to administrative action.

Misconduct has been defined as "such as affects his performance of his duties as an
officer and not only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said
at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer. "

Now, as to whether or not, such misconduct of petitioner affects his performance of his
duties as an officer and not only his character as a private individual, has been laid to rest by the
ruling of the Supreme Court in an analogous case where it was held that while "it is true that
the charges of rape and concubinage may involve moral turpitude of which a municipal
official may be proceeded against . . . but before the provincial governor and board may act
and proceed against the municipal official, a conviction by final judgment must precede the
filing by the provincial governor of the charges and trial by the provincial board."

Indeed, there is merit in petitioner's contention that the same ruling applies to acts of
lasciviousness which falls under the same classification as crimes against chastity. In the instant
case, not only is a final judgment lacking, but the criminal cases filed against the petitioner
were all dismissed by the trial court, for insufficiency of evidence, on the basis of its
findings that the attendant circumstances logically point to the existence of consent on the
part of the offended parties. Under the circumstances, there being no showing that the acts of
petitioner Mayor are linked with the performance of official duties such as "neglect of
duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of maladministration of office", there appears
to be no question that the pending administrative case against him should be dismissed for
lack of basis and the restraining order issued by the court should be made permanent.

Nonetheless, the replacement of petitioner Mayor by the Officer-in-Charge Fabian

Gardones has rendered the issues of removal and suspension from office, moot and academic.

Read: Claudio vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 140560- BOCABO

FACTS
Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City during the 11 May 1998
elections. He assumed office on 1 July 1998. On 19 May 1999, an ad hoc committee was formed
for the purpose of convening a Preparatory Recall Assembly (“PRA”). On 29 May 1999,
majority of the members of the PRA adopted a Resolution to Initiate the Recall of Mayor Jovito
Claudio for Loss of Confidence. On 2 July 1999, the petition for recall was formally submitted to
the Office of the Election Officer. Copies of the petition were posted in public places in Pasay
City and the authenticity of the signatures therein was verified by the election officer for Pasay
City. The petition was opposed on several grounds.
Principally, that the convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited
period under Sec. 74, LGC which provides:
Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. xxx
The COMELEC granted the petition. It ruled that the petition did not violate the one-year
ban because the petition was filed on 2 July 1999, one day after Claudio’s assumption of office.

ISSUE
Whether or not the term "regular local election" in the last clause of Sec. 74(b), LGC
includes the election period for that regular election or simply the date of such election.

RULING
NO.
The term “regular elections” does not include the election period. To construe the
word “regular elections” as including the election period would emasculate the right of the
people to exercise the power of recall. In Paras v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court held that the
limitations on Sec. 74 (a) and Sec. 74 (b) would mean that a local elective official may be subject
only to recall during the second year of his/her term (in this case, from 1 July 1999 to mid-May
2000) If the “regular elections” mentioned in Sec. 74(b) would include the election period, which
commences 90 days from the date of the election and extends to 30 days thereafter, the period
during which the power of recall may be exercised will be reduced even more. (in this case, from
1 July 1999 to mid-February 2000).