Cognition and Motivation

This collection examines the many internal and external factors affecting cognitive
processes. Editor Shulamith Kreitler brings together a wide range of international
contributors to produce an outstanding assessment of recent research in the field.
The contributions go beyond the standard approach of examining the effects of
motivation and emotion to consider the contextual factors that may influence
cognition. These broad and varied factors include personality, genetics, mental
health, biological evolution, culture, and social context. By contextualizing cog-
nition, this volume draws out the practical applications of theoretical cognitive
research and brings separate areas of scholarship into meaningful dialogue.

Shulamith Kreitler is a professor of psychology at Tel Aviv University. Her work

focuses on the cognitive foundations of meaning, creativity, and personality as
well as psycho-oncology and behavior disorders. In addition to her work at Tel
Aviv University, Professor Kreitler teaches regularly at the University of Haifa and
is director of the Psycho-oncology Research Center at the Sheba Medical Center.
 Cognition and Motivation
Forging an Interdisciplinary Perspective

Edited by
Shulamith Kreitler
Tel Aviv University
 cambridge university press
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Cognition and motivation : forging an interdisciplinary
perspective / [edited by] Shulamith Kreitler.
p. ; cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-521-88867-7 (hardback)
I. Kreitler, Shulamith.
[DNLM: 1. Cognition. 2. Motivation. BF 311]
616.8–dc23    2012021042

ISBN 978-0-521-88867-7 Hardback

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This book is dedicated to the memory of Hans Kreitler (1916–1993),
my late husband, who accompanied me with love and inspiration
for many years along the road of cognitive and motivational
explorations in science and life
 Contents

List of Contributors page xi

Foreword by Jerome Bruner xix

Introduction 1
Shulamith Kreitler

Part I. Explanatory Concepts and Contexts

1. The Role of Epistemic Motivations in Knowledge Formation 15
Arie W. Kruglanski & Anna Sheveland
2. The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation: A
Motivational Approach to Cognition 32
Shulamith Kreitler
3. Personality and Cognition 62
Phillip L. Ackerman
4. Cognition in the Context of Psychopathology: A Selective
Review 76
Josef Zihl, Nicole Szesny, & Thomas Nickel
5. The Impact of Anxiety on Cognitive Performance 96
Michael W. Eysenck
6. Biological Foundations: The SEEKING System as an Affective
Source for Motivation and Cognition 109
Jeff Stewart & Jaak Panksepp
7. Motivation, Cognition, and Emotion: A
Phylogenetic-Interdisciplinary Approach 137
Manfred Wimmer

vii
viii Contents

8. The Social and Cultural Context of Cognition: A Knowledge

Perspective 158
Evelyn Au, Wendy Wan, & Chi-yue Chiu
9. Biological Models of Organisms and Their Evolutionary
Change: Their Importance for Epistemology and Different
Cultural Traditions 173
Karl Edlinger
10. What Do Genes Have to Do with Cognition? 192
Wendy Johnson
11. Brain, Behavior, and Cognition 215
Norbert Jaušovec & Ksenija Jaušovec
12. Physical Health and Cognition 238
Shulamith Kreitler, Kineret Weissler, & Frida Barak

Part II. Domains of cognition in context

13. Motivation, Goals, Thinking, and Problem Solving 273
Ken J. Gilhooly & Evridiki Fioratou
14. Motivation and Heuristic Thinking 289
Dan Zakay & Dida Fleisig
15. Motivation, Decision Theory, and Human Decision Making 307
Ola Svenson
16. Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management: Reflecting
the Limits of Decision Making 321
Rainer P. Born & Eva Gatarik
17. Interest, Cognition, and the Case of L- and Science 352
K. Ann Renninger & Kathryn R. Riley
18. Metacognition, Motivation, and Affect in the School
Context: Metacognitive Experiences in the Regulation
of Learning 383
Anastasia Efklides
19. Motivation in Language 407
Klaus-Uwe Panther
20. Intelligence and Cognitive Exceptionality: The Motivational
Perspective 433
Edward F. Zigler
 Contents ix

21. How Conscious Thought, Imagination, and Fantasy May

Relate to Cognition and Motivation 450
Jerome L. Singer & Dorothy G. Singer
22. Creativity and Motivation 468
Mark A. Runco & David J. McGarva

Index 483
 Contributors

Phillip L. Ackerman is a professor of Psychology at the Georgia Institute

of Technology. He received his doctorate from the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign in 1984. Dr. Ackerman is a Fellow of the American
Psychological Association, the Association for Psychological Science, the
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, and the American Educational
Research Association. He was the 1992 recipient of the American Psychological
Association’s Distinguished Scientific Award for Early Career Contribution
to Psychology.
Evelyn Au is a professor of Psychology at Singapore Management University.
She received her doctorate in social and personality psychology from the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Her research focuses on the
interaction of culture, ecological restraints, the evolution of belief systems,
and social cognition.
Frida Barak is Director of Oncology at the Oncology Institute, Barzilai
Medical Center, Ashkelon, Israel. She received her training in oncology in
the former Soviet Union, Israel, and the United States. Dr. Barak is currently
a lecturer in the Faculty of Health Sciences at Ben-Gurion University of the
Negev, Israel.
Rainer P. Born is a professor at Institut für Philosophie und
Wissenschaftstheorie in Linz, Austria. He received his doctorate in mathe-
matics and has taught philosophy of science, knowledge management, model
theory, ethics, systems theory, and cognitive science in Austria and Vienna.
Dr. Born is the co-founder of the Austrian Society for Philosophy and served
as the organization’s president from 1998 to 2002.
Jerome Bruner is Research Professor of Psychology and a Senior Research
Fellow in Law at New York University. Dr. Bruner, who received his doctorate

xi
xii Contributors

from Harvard in 1941, has helped to shape the fields of cognitive, develop-
mental, and linguistic psychology.
Chi-yue Chiu is a professor of Management and Marketing at the Nanyang
Business School, Nanyang Technological University, in Singapore. Dr. Chiu
is also a specially appointed researcher at the Institute of Sociology, Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, and Research Director of the Institute on Asian
Consumer Insight. He received his doctorate in social psychology from
Columbia University.
Karl Edlinger is a curator in the Department of History of Science at the
Vienna Natural History Museum. His doctoral research focused on the struc-
ture and function of sensory organs in Cephalaspidea, marine gastropod
mollusks. Dr. Edlinger’s current research involves systemic studies of issues
in mollusks, evolution, and organism theory.
Anastasia Efklides is a professor of Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece. Her research interests include
cognition and meta-cognition, particularly in relation to motivation and self-
control. Dr. Efklides is the recipient of several major awards, including a com-
mendation for Outstanding Career Contribution to Educational Psychology
from the International Association of Applied Psychology and the 2011
Oevre Award from the European Association for Research on Learning and
Instruction.
Michael W. Eysenck is Professorial Fellow at Roehampton University at
London. Dr. Eysenck was a professor of Psychology at Royal Holloway
University from 1987 to 2009 and has published widely in the areas of cogni-
tive psychology and anxiety and cognition.
Evridiki Fioratou is a research Fellow at the Multidisciplinary Assessment
of Technology Centre for Healthcare at the University of Nottingham. She
received her doctorate in psychology at Lancaster University. Dr. Fioratou is
an experimental and applied cognitive psychologist, whose work focuses on
problem solving, insight and learning, as well as decision making and diag-
nostic processes in healthcare contexts.
Dida Fleisig is a lecturer in the College of Management and Academic Studies
at Tel Aviv University, Israel. She received her doctorate in cognitive psychol-
ogy from Tel Aviv University and currently performs research in the areas of
judgment, decision making, and overconfidence.
Eva Gatarik is a research associate at the University of Applied Sciences
Upper Austria, Steyr. She previously worked as a research assistant at the
 Contributors xiii

Institute for Philosophy and Philosophy of Science at the University of Linz,

and she participated in EU-based regional development projects focusing on
network economics.
Ken J. Gilhooly is a professor in the School of Psychology at the University
of Hertfordshire. Dr. Gilhooly received his doctorate from the University of
Stirling and has published widely in the area of thinking and problem solv-
ing. His current work focuses on insight problem solving, creative thinking,
the effects of incubation, decision making, and the effects of aging on higher
mental processes.
Ksenija Jaušovec has been a researcher at the University of Maribor since 1999.
Her current neuropsychological research examines the relationship between
neuroelectric and hemodynamic brain activity and problem solving.
Norbert Jaušovec has been a researcher at the University of Maribor since
1984. His current neuropsychological research examines the relationship
between neuroelectric and hemodynamic brain activity and problem solving.
Dr. Jaušovec serves on the editorial boards of The Curriculum Journal, BMC
Neuroscience, and The Open Neuroimaging Journal.
Wendy Johnson received her doctorate in behavior genetics and individual
differences at the University of Minnesota after a twenty-year career as a con-
sulting actuary. She is a reader in Psychology at the University of Edinburgh.
Shulamith Kreitler is a professor of Psychology at Tel Aviv University. Her
work focuses on the cognitive foundations of meaning, creativity, and per-
sonality, as well as psycho-oncology and behavior disorders. In addition to
her work at Tel Aviv University, Professor Kreitler teaches regularly at the
University of Haifa and is Director of the Psycho-oncology Research Center
at the Sheba Medical Center.
Arie W. Kruglanski is a distinguished university professor at the University
of Maryland, College Park. He has published widely on subjects including
human judgment and belief formation, motivated cognition, and the psychol-
ogy of goals and is the recipient of many honors and awards. Dr. Kruglanski
is a Fellow of the American Psychological Association, the American
Psychological Society, and the Society for Personality and Social Psychology.
He currently serves as an investigator at the National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
David J. McGarva teaches psychology, counseling, and therapy at the College
of Social Sciences at the University of Phoenix. Dr. McGarva is a licensed
counselor and psychotherapist based in Woodland Hills, California. His
xiv Contributors

research interests include the motivation of creative behavior, particularly

creative writing and writer’s block.
Thomas Nickel is a senior psychiatrist and head of the outpatient unit at the
Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry in Munich. Dr. Nickel received his train-
ing in psychology and medicine at Freiburg University. His research interests
include antidepressive therapy and the cognitive and neurobiological effects
of antidepressants.
Jaak Panksepp holds the Bailey Endowed Chair of Animal Well-Being
Science at the Washington State University College of Veterinary Medicine
and is Emeritus Distinguished Research Professor of Psychology at Bowling
Green State University. Professor Panksepp pioneered the neuroscientific
study of primary-process emotions in mammals and coined the term “affec-
tive neuroscience” to describe the field that studies the neural mechanisms of
emotion. He has received attention in the popular press for his research on
laughter in nonhuman animals, which has led to the identification of novel
treatments for depression.
Klaus-Uwe Panther is a retired professor of English linguistics at the
University of Hamburg and is currently a visiting distinguished professor at
Nanjing Normal University, China. Professor Panther is past president of the
International Cognitive Linguistics Association and the German Cognitive
Linguistics Association and co-editor of the book series Human Cognitive
Processing. His research focuses on the role of meaning and pragmatic func-
tion as motivational factors of grammar and the lexicon.
K. Ann Renninger is the Eugene M. Lang Research Professor and Chair of
the Department of Educational Studies at Swarthmore College. Her research
focuses on the conditions that support the development of interest and learn-
ing. She is a former Spencer Fellow of the National Academy of Education
and a consultant to National Research Council working groups on the topics
of interest and STEM, interest development and STEM integration and edu-
cation, and the assessment of interest in informal science learning.
Kathryn R. Riley is a doctoral student in chemistry at Wake Forest
University. A graduate of Swarthmore College, Riley previously worked with
K. Ann Renninger on research and evaluation studies of the extracurricu-
lar Science-for-Kids workshops held on the Swarthmore campus and funded
through a grant from the Howard Hughes Medical Institute.
Mark A. Runco is the E. Paul Torrance Professor of Creativity Studies at
the University of Georgia, Athens. He received his doctorate in cognitive
 Contributors xv

psychology from the Claremont Graduate School and has published widely
on the subject of creativity. Professor Runco is the founder of the Creativity
Research Journal, a Fellow of the American Psychological Association, and
the President of Creativity Testing Services. He is the recipient of honors
including a Spencer Foundation Research Grant and the Early Scholar Award
from the National Association for Gifted Children.
Anna Sheveland is a doctoral candidate at the University of Maryland,
College Park. Her research interests include motivated cognition, epistemic
authority, political ideology, and terrorism.
Dorothy G. Singer is a retired senior research scientist in the Department of
Psychology at Yale University. Dr. Singer is co-director of the Yale University
Family Television Research and Consultation Center, affiliated with the
Zigler Center for Child Development and Public Policy, and a Fellow of the
American Psychological Association. Her research and publications focus
on early childhood development, television effects on youth, and parent
training in imaginative play. She received the 2006 Distinguished Alumni
Award from Columbia University Teachers College and the 2009 Award
for Distinguished Lifetime Contributions to Media Psychology from the
American Psychological Association.
Jerome L. Singer is Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Yale University and a
Fellow of the American Psychological Association. His research focuses on the
psychology of imagination and daydreaming, and he has published widely on
the subjects of thought processes, imagery, personality, psychotherapy, chil-
dren’s play, and the effects of television. Dr. Singer is the recipient of the 2008
Rudolf Arnheim Award for Distinguished Contributions to the Psychology of
Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts and the 2009 Paul Farnsworth Award for
Lifetime Contribution and Service, both from the American Psychological
Association.
Jeff Stewart is an independent scholar living in rural Maine. His 2006 doc-
toral dissertation at Harvard was entitled “The Development of Consciousness
from Affective Sources.” He is currently finishing a book on consciousness
and the self.
Ola Svenson is a researcher at Decision Research, Oregon, and Professor
Emeritus at Stockholm University. He received his doctorate from Stockholm
University in psychophysics and measurement theory and has conducted
research on cognition and decision making, pioneering process perspective,
and the think-aloud method in behavioral decision research. His applied
xvi Contributors

research includes studies of traffic safety, risk analysis, risk perception, and
nuclear safety. Dr. Svenson founded the European Group for Process Tracing
of Decision Making and is the recipient of the U.S. Society for Risk Analysis
1997 European Distinguished Achievement Award.
Nicole Szesny is a clinical psychologist and research assistant at the Max
Planck Institute for Psychiatry in Munich. She received her doctorate in psy-
chology at the University of Munich in 2011. Dr. Szesny’s research interests
include cognition and neurobiological markers in depression.
Wendy Wan is an associate professor of Business Management at Sun Yat Sen
University. She received her doctorate in social and personality psychology
from the University of Hong Kong. Her current research examines cultural
effects on consumer culture and conflict-related behavior.
Kineret Weissler is a doctoral candidate studying olfactory perception at
Tel Aviv University and the Weitzman Institute of Research. Her research
uses the framework of the cognitive orientation theory of motivation devel-
oped by Shulamith and Hans Kreitler. Weissler was employed by the Israeli
ministry of health until 2012.
Manfred Wimmer is a lecturer at the Institute for Scientific Theory and
Research at the University of Vienna, as well as a docent and free research
collaborator at the Konrad Lorenz Institute. His research interests include the
biological origins and sociocultural dynamics of emotions, and both inter-
and transdisciplinary approaches to cognition research.
Dan Zakay is a professor of Psychology at Tel Aviv University, from which
he received his undergraduate and graduate degrees. His research focuses on
fundamental issues in cognitive psychology and its applications in fields such
as transportation safety and national and community resilience. Professor
Zakay founded and directs the graduate program in Organizational Behavior
at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya and is the 2011 recipient of the EMET
Prize in Psychology.
Edward F. Zigler is Sterling Professor of Psychology, Emeritus, at Yale
University. He received his doctorate in clinical psychology from the
University of Texas, Austin, in 1958, joining the Yale faculty the following year.
Professor Zigler founded and is Director Emeritus of Yale’s Edward Zigler
Center in Child Development and Social Policy, one of the first centers in the
United States to combine training in developmental science and social policy
construction. He is one of the founders of applied developmental psychology
and has played a significant role in education reform, including advocacy for
 Contributors xvii

universal preschool education. Professor Zigler has served as a consultant to

every U.S. presidential administration since that of Lyndon Johnson, contrib-
uting to the development of Head Start and the Family and Medical Leave
Act. He is a member of the Institute of Medicine and the American Society
of Arts and Sciences.
Josef Zihl is a professor of Neuropsychology at the University of Munich. He
received his doctorate in psychology at the University of Innsbruck in 1973.
Professor Zihl’s research interests include the neuropsychology of depression,
cognition and psychopathology, and the plasticity of the visual brain.
 Foreword

Jerome Bruner

The interaction of motivation and cognition continues to be one of the ­central

dilemmas in what we now call the human sciences – psychology included.
And it has been so from the earliest times; witness Aristotle’s searching exam-
ination of the dilemma in the De Anima. At the outset, cognition is both
driven by its own intrinsic motives, like the need for closure or completion,
and shaped or influenced by presumably extrinsic motives, like a sexual crav-
ing or a desire for dominance. I say “presumably” because closer inspection
makes clear that this distinction is misleading.
Alas, as psychology strove to become a “laboratory science,” it increasingly
divorced itself from the in vivo study of human action, tending to obscure or
ignore the critical interdependence of motivation and cognition. Now, at last,
we are returning to the in vivo study of the life of mind, and to the ancient and
subtle issue of the interaction between desiring and knowing. The present book
is a striking example of this new trend. Yet, for all that, it is not altogether a
“new” trend: it has always lurked in the background formulation of psychology.
How could it not? After all, what impels cognition? What shapes our motives?
Here I must become somewhat autobiographical. When I was a young
instructor in psychology at Harvard in the mid-twentieth century, senior col-
leagues were fond of drawing a distinction between what they called biotro-
pic and sociotropic psychology. The former treated psychological functions
as, so to speak, self-contained and rooted in the presumably inherent, if
slightly alterable, properties of the nervous system. The biotropic system was
(and had to be) describable in the “centimeters-grams-seconds” system (the
famous CGS system) of the natural sciences. Sociotropic psychology, on the
other hand, looked outward to such matters as culture, social and educational
background, and personal desires, among others. The implicit assumption, of
course, was that when the sociotropes became scientifically biotropic, they
would behave biotropically like their more scientific colleagues.

xix
xx Foreword

I was in those days principally interested in the nature of perception – per-

ception in the everyday world, not just in the strictly controlled dark room.
It became plain to me early that what we perceived and how we contextual-
ized it was a function not only of what we desired or expected to see but how,
necessarily, we went about perceptually structuring what we encountered –
necessarily in the sense that there was no such thing as “neutral” percep-
tion. Phenomenal experience, in a word, was as much an outcome of our
expectancies as it was of a so-called stimulus input. And so, we ­“regularized”
and ­“conventionalized” stimulus inputs not only in terms of the ­stimulus
impinging on our sense organs, but in accordance with our established
expectancies.
Indeed, I shocked some of my more staid senior colleagues at that time by
referring to this as the “hypothesis theory of perception.” Those were the early
days of the so-called New Look in perception. In a word, cognition and moti-
vation were, in vivo, inseparable, even in such seemingly neutral domains as
size perception. I recall with amusement now that when one of our studies
showed that poor kids overestimated the size of coins more than well-off kids,
The New York Times ran a story on it, but some of my then-biotrope senior
colleagues were definitely not amused: “What are you trying to do, upset the
Weber–Fechner law?”
What is striking about the present volume is its rejection of that old sep-
aratism. In its opening chapter, for example, Arie W. Kruglanski and Anna
Sheveland refer to a “need for cognitive closure.” Is it a motive or is it intrinsic
in cognition itself? Well, it may be specific or nonspecific. It may be strongly
driven or not. If nonspecific and lightly driven, it comes close to what we
speak of as ­“reflection.” If the opposite, we speak of it as some sort of “bias.”
Why then strictly classify the processes involved as either strictly motiva-
tional or strictly cognitive? The two are inseparable, and they lead to broader
so-called behavioral tendencies as well – like, for example, that those given to
a strong need for cognitive closure tend to be more intolerant of the unusual.
But let us also bear in mind that the two necessarily work in close and nec-
essary concert. What is to be gained by irreparably separating cognition and
motivation? Neither could function without the other.
So let me close these introductory remarks with a “Bravo!” for this book.
Cognition and motivation simply cannot operate independently of each
other. The task is to delineate more clearly (and more empirically) the nature
of their intrinsic reliance on each other, and this book is a real step in that
direction.
 Introduction

Shulamith Kreitler

I love knowing. My heart loves to know and so my heart tells my brain to do every-
thing necessary in order to know and it happens.
(Jonathan Kreitler, age 5 yrs.)

It is difficult to determine precisely the date on which cognition was “born,”

that is to say, identified as a discipline in its own right within the broader
context of psychology. However, it is quite clear that soon thereafter the issue
of its relations with motivation arose.
While such notable theorists as James (1890), Baldwin (1911), and Dewey
(1913) each discussed the relation of cognition and motivational engagement,
it has only been in the last few years that there has been a revival of interest
in motivation and the interrelation of cognition and personality. This has led
to publications dealing with the interrelations of cognition with motivation
(Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986), social behavior (Baltes & Staudinger, 1996),
personality (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1990; Saklofske & Zeidner,1995), interest
(Renninger, Hidi, & Krapp, 1992), and emotion (Power & Dalgleish, 2008),
to mention only a few. This emerging interest in motivation is linked to an
increasing concern for studying the individual in context, examining func-
tion as well as structure, analyzing the relation between cognitive and social
development, recognizing the importance of cognitive science to the study
of learning, and acknowledging the powerful impact of affective functioning
on cognition.
The growing awareness of the role of cognition in various fields of psychol-
ogy has been paralleled by the extension of information about the amazing
evolutionary development of the human brain, in particular of those areas
that implement cognition. This has led to the deepening conviction that since
cognition is so highly developed in human beings and has come to engage
such an important part of the human brain – especially in recent phases of

1
2 Introduction

evolution – it is highly probable that it fulfills an important role in regard

to the major aspects of human functioning and survival – including every-
day behavior, social behavior, emotions, physical health, mental health, and
well-being.
The increasing impact of cognition in different domains of psychology
could be viewed as revealing the unfolding ontogenetic development of cog-
nition. The increasing cerebral space occupied by cognition could be viewed
as revealing the phylogenetic development of cognition. The present book is
the outcome of the insights generated by the confluence of both the ontoge-
netic and phylogenetic developments of cognition.
Primary indications of insights of this kind have occurred within partic-
ular subfields of psychology. In the present volume, these insights have been
offered a much more extended space and salience. Moreover, the range of
contexts in which cognition is analyzed has been enlarged. The standard con-
texts – such as emotions, learning, and personality – have been amplified by
the addition of newcomers on the scene – such as physical health, genetics,
and biological evolution.
Accordingly, following this extension, motivation has emerged as a con-
cept with a new unfolding connotation. Motivation is commonly conceived
as representing those forces that arouse organisms to action toward a desired
goal and provide the reason and purpose for behavior. This conception
seems to attribute to motivation a specific directionality, awareness of a goal
or purpose on the part of the organism, the involvement of consciousness
of the acting organism as well as of needs for purposefulness and mean-
ingfulness. Assumptions of this kind may have unduly limited the mean-
ings of motivation, excluding the wealth of connotations that have accrued
to the concept of motivation in recent years, including – at least in regard
to cognition – the impact of personality, emotions, health, and situational
factors, to mention just a few. The more updated conception of motivation
considers it as “a modulating and coordinating influence on the direction,
vigor and composition of behavior”, which “arises from a wide variety of
internal, environmental, and social sources” (Shizgal, 1999, p. 566). In that
sense, motivation has turned, rather, into a kind of cognition-modulating
context whose functioning impacts not only the activation of cognition per
se but also determines the manner, extent, and form of its involvement and
manifestations.
The reconceptualization of the concepts of motivation and context in rela-
tion to cognition has led to a renewed emphasis on interdisciplinary consid-
erations in studying cognition and exploring the range of its manifestations.
The implementation of this approach has made it necessary to apply an
 Introduction 3

innovative strategy to interactions between cognition and its contexts. This

strategy consists in a double-pronged approach whereby, on the one hand,
the impact and effects of various major motivational factors in regard to cog-
nition are explored and, on the other hand, the effects of motivational factors
are explored in regard to the functioning of cognition in specific cognitive
domains. The two approaches represent two complementary modes of inter-
disciplinary thinking.
The first approach prompts questions such as ‘How do emotions affect
cognition’? ‘What is the impact of culture on cognition’? ‘In what ways does
genetics affect cognition’? ‘How does personality shape cognition’? It will be
noted that in these questions emotions, culture, genetics, and personality are
conceived as motivational forces or vectors external to cognition that affect
its activation, development, and functioning.
The second approach leads to questions such as ‘How does motivation
of any sort affect the functioning of cognition in the domain of creativity’?
‘How does motivation affect problem solving’? ‘What kinds of motivation
were found to affect learning’? ‘In what ways could a broader and deeper
exploration of motivation improve our understanding of the functioning of
intelligence’?
The first approach is represented in the different chapters of Part I in the
book. They are grouped together under the heading of ‘Explanatory Concepts
and Contexts’. The second approach is represented in the chapters of Part
II of the book. They are grouped together under the heading ‘Domains of
Cognition in Context’. In the first part, the emphasis is on the explanatory
concept that is expected to shed light on cognition as a whole, as a system
within the total functioning human being. In the second part, the emphasis
is on specific domains of cognition and the manner in which motivation is
interwoven within each domain and its actual or potential contribution to
shedding light on the functioning of that domain.
Part I includes 12 chapters. Chapter 1 (by Kruglanski & Sheveland) focuses
on epistemic motivation, which has been one of the major cornerstones in
opening up the vista of the interactions of cognition with motivation. The
chapter deals with the role that epistemic motivation plays in the knowledge
formation process, in particular reference to the need for cognitive closure
construct. Following a general depiction of the epistemic process and the
function that the need for closure fulfills in this endeavor, empirical research
is presented about the need for closure’s consequences at the intrapersonal,
interpersonal, and group levels of analysis. Finally, the real-world implica-
tions of the need for cognitive closure in domains of political ideology and
intergroup relations are described.
4 Introduction

Chapter 2 (by S. Kreitler) focuses on the cognitive orientation (CO) theory,

which is one of the most comprehensive approaches to cognitive motivation.
The chapter presents the CO theory of cognition, which enables predicting
cognitive acts as well as changing and improving them. Cognitive acts are
described as a function of a motivational disposition, anchored in clusters
of four belief types referring to themes representing underlying meanings,
and of a cognitive program implementing the motivational disposition. The
motivational disposition is shaped by CO clusters for cognition, cognitive
functions (e.g., memory, curiosity), types of thinking (e.g., creativity, intui-
tive thinking), and domains of contents (e.g., mathematics, psychology).
Cognitive performance is further affected by the state of the cognitive system
as a whole (viz. state of consciousness) and current emotions.
Chapter 3 (by Ackerman) deals with the multiple and constantly emerging
effects of personality on cognition. Ackerman reviews a conceptual frame-
work that differentiates between typical behaviors (in the absence of a strong
situational press) that are the target of most personality-trait assessments and
behaviors of maximal performance (under conditions that elicit the greatest
level of effort) that are the target of most cognitive ability and aptitude-trait
assessments. Trait complexes, that is, groups of personality and cognitive
traits that have significant common variance, are described along with per-
sonality traits that have more pervasive associations with cognitive process-
ing. Interactions among these personality and cognitive traits are considered
in a broad developmental context, with an emphasis on implications for work
and school contexts.
Chapter 4 (by Zihl, Szesny, & Nickel) focuses on cognition, emotion, and
motivation from the pathological perspective. Psychopathology is one of the
factors whose impact on cognition has been recognized quite early in the
history of psychology. Neurobiological, neuropsychological, and psycho-
pathological evidence supports a concept of functional specialization in these
functional systems. However, there is intensive interplay between the systems
of cognition, emotion, and motivation. The consideration of dissociation and
association of impairments in cognition, emotion, and motivation is impor-
tant not only for a better understanding of the context in which, in particular,
cognition and emotion operate, but also for a valid characterization of cogni-
tive and emotional dysfunctions resulting from morphological or pathophys-
iological alterations of the structures that build the underlying networks.
The following three chapters deal with various aspects of the emotional
impacts on cognition. Chapter 5 (by M. Eysenck) is concerned with the nega-
tive effects of anxiety on cognitive performance. The main focus is on pro-
cessing efficiency theory and attentional control theory, which are designed
 Introduction 5

to account for those effects. Both theories assume that there is an impor-
tant distinction between performance effectiveness and processing efficiency
reflecting the relationship between performance effectiveness and use of
processing resources. In addition, attentional control theory assumes that
anxiety impairs two major executive functions involving inhibitory and shift-
ing processes, respectively. The chapter provides a detailed discussion of the
research in recent years concerned with testing aspects of these theories, out-
lining future research directions.
Chapter 6 (by Stewart & Panksepp) delves into the biological foundations
of affective systems that serve as sources for both cognition and motivation.
Motivation is derived from core emotional command systems in the mam-
malian brain. Central to the different emotional command systems is that
of SEEKING, a spontaneous generator of neurobiological events that goad
the animal toward exploration. The eagerness and expectancy corresponding
to this exploratory/investigative foraging drive are massively integrated by
brain dopamine activity into a coherent BrainMind state called SEEKING
that helps establish the neural conditions for appetitive learning for all kinds
of rewards, including the urge to PLAY. SEEKING remains central through-
out life, promoting enthusiasm for learning and living, is critical for a life well
lived, but can also be led to excesses, in the form of addictions.
Chapter 7 (by Wimmer) deals with the organic origins and evolution
of motivation, emotion, and cognition. The major assumptions are that in
early periods of phylogenetic development, cognition, emotion, and motiva-
tion have been closely bound together, without ever losing their interactive
dynamics, and that cognitive functions even on the highest levels are always
closely tied to their emotional and motivational substructures. Thus, each
analysis of the evolution of cognition has to consider the evolution of emo-
tion/motivation. This transdisciplinary approach is supported by data from
classical ethology and developmental psychology as well as by investigations
of the symbolic abilities of human beings.
Chapter 8 (by Au, Wan, & Chiu) complements the phylogenic approach by
focusing on the social and cultural context of cognition. The authors define
culture as a network of procedural and declarative knowledge, shared among
a collection of interconnected individuals. If a knowledge item is activated
(i.e., when it is cognitively accessible to the individual and applicable to the
context), it can affect subsequent judgments and behaviors. Cultural differ-
ences in judgments and behaviors reflect cultural differences (a) in the specific
knowledge items available in the culture or (b) in the prevalence of situational
cues that render a certain subset of knowledge items chronically accessible to
members of a culture. Situational and individual difference factors (e.g., need
6 Introduction

for firm answers, need to belong, cognitive load, or mortality salience) that
increase individuals’ reliance on culture to provide quick and widely accepted
answers tend to enlarge cultural differences in judgment and behavior.
The next three chapters are devoted to more purely physiological aspects.
Chapter 9 (by K. Edlinger) addresses the confluence of evolutionary and cul-
tural developments as an epistemologically active vector. Human beings, and
in particular perception and cognition, result from a long evolutionary pro-
cess shared by all species. In Darwinian theories, evolution of organisms and
their abilities are considered as outcomes of adaptation. The shortcoming of
these approaches is that they lack a consistent theory of organisms, viewed as
mosaic-like arrangements of characteristics. In contrast, the theory of organ-
ismic constructions, grounded in constructive realism, considers organisms
as mechanical constructions constantly engaged in converting energy, func-
tioning in accordance with internal needs. Organisms are not blueprints of
their environment. Their prime qualities are dynamics, autonomy, and spon-
taneity. Cognition is an activity of autonomous entities, actively construct-
ing their own realities in accordance with special internal needs. This view
­corresponds also to medicine and applies to the functioning of the nervous
system, characterizing the organism’s relations with the environment, espe-
cially perception and cognition.
Chapter 10 (by W. Johnson) explores the issue of what and how genes affect
cognition. In particular, the chapter addresses the problem of the paradox
between the claims that cognition is heritable but that genes do not con-
trol our thoughts. The author reviews the history of the paradox since the
development of Mendel’s ideas of genetic transmission across generations
and Darwin’s theory of evolution, and describes the Modern Synthesis that
underlies current ideas of genetics and evolutionary biology. The Synthesis
has been used to develop the common measures of genetic influences on
human cognition. The likely common violations of the assumptions underly-
ing these measures have implications for understanding genetic influences on
cognition. Also, issues involved in identifying the specific genes that contrib-
ute to cognition are discussed.
Chapter 11 (by N. Jaušovec & K. Jaušovec) addresses the issue of the rela-
tionship between brain functioning and cognition. It describes the brain
and techniques for studying its function and structure, referring to the the-
ories about the interactions. Following this introduction, it focuses on the
relationship between intelligence and brain activation patterns in response
to the performance of cognitive tasks employing many different demands.
Further, it presents recent neuroscientific research of emotional intelligence,
creative thinking, and individual differences in personality traits as well as
 Introduction 7

the evidence on gender-based differences in performance and some possible

relations to differences in brain structure and function.
The closing note of Part I is provided by Chapter 12 (by Kreitler, Weissler,
& Barak), which leads us into the exciting presently unfolding domain of
the impact of physical health on cognition. The review presents empirically
found effects on cognitive functioning of physical disorders (i.e., cardiovas-
cular, diabetes, gastrointestinal, hematological, nephrological, respiratory,
hormonal, cancer, neurological, chronic pain, and dermatological), of sen-
sory disabilities (e.g., deficiencies in vision or hearing), special bodily states
(e.g., sleep loss, pregnancy, menstruation), medical treatments (e.g., surgery,
chemotherapy, common drugs), and psychological reactions to physical dis-
orders and treatments (e.g., anxiety, worry, denial). In view of the pervasive
impact of physical disorders on cognitive functioning, it is recommended to
consider the physical effects in the research and theory of cognition.
Part II includes 10 chapters. They are devoted to highlighting the actual
and potential contributions of motivational factors to cognition in its dif-
ferent manifestations, in a variety of domains. Chapter 13 (by Gilhooly &
Fioratou) deals with interrelationships between motivation, goals, thinking,
and problem solving. It is argued that general motives lead to more specific
goals, which in turn guide problem-directed thinking by providing a basis
on which to select possible actions or develop possible subgoals. Concerning
expert problem solving, it is noted that expertise is developed as a result of
extensive deliberate practice carried out typically for at least ten years. Such
extended practice depends on high continuing levels of motivation. Intrinsic
enjoyment of the domain is important to begin and maintain the process
of expertise acquisition. Intrinsic motivation also plays an important role in
regard to creativity. In many circumstances, extrinsic motivators are found to
impair creative performance, especially if they do not depend on results and
are not informative about performance quality.
Chapter 14 (by Zakay & Fleisig) examines the role of motivation in heu-
ristic thinking. Any kind of heuristic, cognitive or motivational (i.e., with or
without evident motivational gains), is initiated by a fundamental motiva-
tion to act as fast as possible while minimizing the consumption of mental
resources in face of uncertainty. Since the activation of motivational heuris-
tics is associated with a need to overcome some motivational threat, it should
be a product of a dual-stage process: first, the meaning of the situation is ana-
lyzed and the existence of a potential motivational threat is identified; then,
the activation of a specific heuristic is executed in line with the identified
meaning. Regular metacognitive processes monitor the heuristic thinking
process so that a decision is reached whether or not a correction is needed.
8 Introduction

Chapter 15 (by Svenson) is devoted to the domain of decision making. The

author differentiates in human decision making between process approaches
that focus on how decisions are reached and structural approaches that pre-
dict choices by the parameters of the problems. The motivation for decision
making can be studied in terms of fundamental motivation (resulting from
needs for food, social closeness, etc.) or process and representation motiva-
tion that focuses on how the individual is motivated to process the infor-
mation to reach a decision. From the 1950s to the 1990s, process approaches
dominated the scene. The situation changed when an interest in emotion,
affect, and individual differences brought different fundamental motivations
into the field, enriching research on decision making with advanced treat-
ments of fundamental motivation.
Chapter 16 (by Born & Gatarik) extends the exploration of decision mak-
ing. It focuses on the relation between knowledge and decision making on
the basis of the relation between language, information, and reality, which
depend on both cognition and motivation. In this context meaning-both
as mediator as well as an explanatory way to think about the world – can
play a decisive role, determining the limits of any formal decision sup-
port system. Both the interplay of knowledge and life and the scheme
Language-Information-Reality are essential tools for analyzing the influence
of meaning on the acceptance of decisions, and both contribute to an under-
standing of the relations between decision making and knowledge, cogni-
tion and emotion/motivation.
Chapter 17 (by Renninger & Riley) deals with relations of interest and cog-
nition. The theory and research on the relation between interest and cogni-
tion suggest that interest affects both the “why” of attending to some content
as well as the “what” of cognition. The chapter includes a detailed presenta-
tion of the case of L –, an adolescent girl who participated for five years in
out-of-school summer science workshops for at-risk youth. Data from her
and her peers’ engagement in the workshop are contrasted with those from
a study of student writers of the same age in order to highlight new aspects
of the interplay between interest development and cognition in the learning
environment.
Chapter 18 (by Efklides) focuses on learning in the broad sense of the con-
cept. It presents the Metacognitive and Affective model of Self-Regulated
Learning, describing the relations between metacognition, cognition, affect,
and motivation. The model includes two functioning levels: (a) the Person
level that represents traits and what the person brings to the task situation;
and (b) the Task x Person level, which involves close interrelations of cogni-
tion, affect, metacognition, and regulation of effort (i.e., motivation) when the
 Introduction 9

person works on the task, so that there is consistency and coherence in the
person’s actions and updating of person characteristics. Metacognition relates
cognition and affect and motivates control of cognition and effort/affect as
well as attributions about competence in co-regulation and other regulation
in collaborative learning.
Chapter 19 (by Panther) shows that motivation is a crucial concept in lin-
guistic theorizing. In particular, a case is made for the relative motivation
of grammatical structure by conceptual and pragmatic factors. For purposes
of illustration, a case study on English question tags is presented, and it is
shown that their form is motivated, although not predictable, by factors
such as communicative function, metonymic principles, inferencing within
speech–act scenarios, and economy of coding. Tags are found in many other
languages than English, but what kinds of tags appear in a specific language
cannot be predicted.
Chapter 20 (by Zigler) deals with the role of motivation in regard to cog-
nitive functioning of individuals at the extremes of the IQ curve – the men-
tally challenged and the gifted. The motivational factors are, in both cases,
environmental circumstances, such as educational opportunities, family
­support, and encouragement in the workplace; personality and behavioral
tendencies, such as outerdirectedness or innerdirectedness, responsiveness
to tangible or intangible rewards, positive or negative reactions to others; and
cognitive-motivational determinants, such as beliefs referring to motivation-
ally orienting themes in regard to cognitive performance. Despite differences
in the specific nature of these factors, their joint impact affects the level of
cognitive performance in the two groups.
Chapter 21 (by Singer & Singer) deals with reflective self-awareness, day-
dreaming, anticipatory fantasy, and planning, relating such consciousness to
more general cognition, theories of emotionality (e.g., Mandler, Baars, and
Tomkins), motivation as reflected in Klinger’s current concerns studies, and
exploring its origin in the imaginative play of children as well as its implica-
tions for theory of mind and heightened self-awareness. Further, research is
presented about ongoing consciousness in adults on the basis of signal detec-
tion experiments, natural occurring thought, and concepts of a self. Findings
based on brain-imaging methods have supported the psychological experi-
mentation by demonstrating a brain-default network that becomes active
when external stimuli processing is reduced. The implications of these studies
for understanding not only retrospective thought but also planning, imagina-
tion, aesthetic, and scientific creativity are indicated.
Chapter 22 (by Runco & McGarva) concludes the book with a focus on
creativity. In the last decades, the study of creativity has grown dramatically,
10 Introduction

reflecting the recognition that it affects not only the arts but all forms of
innovation and entrepreneurship in the sciences, technology, and education.
Runco approaches the field by considering the who, what, where, when, why,
and how of creativity, focusing mainly on the why. The chapter explores what
that means, that creativity is motivated or is the result of particular motives –
both extrinsic and intrinsic – from various theoretical perspectives (i.e., the
Freudian, humanistic, behavioral, psychoeconomic theory, and theory of
personal creativity).
Each of the chapters is independent of other chapters, and represents the
authors’ view with respect to the discussed subject matter as a whole as well as
their own special view of the theme, addressing theories, methodologies, and
empirical findings. In most cases, no specific studies are presented in detail.
The presentation is inclusive, relying on empirical material as examples dem-
onstrating theoretical constructs, conclusions, and implications.
The chapters in each of the parts of the book separately and in the two parts
together as a whole complement each other and are designed to constitute the
groundwork of an integrative and coherent foundation for forging a recon-
ceptualization of cognition in the context of motivation and beyond.
The explorations of cognition in the multiple motivational contexts may
promote the emergence of a new approach to cognition that will highlight
its pivotal role in psychology, nurtured by the new unfolding interactions
between the motivations and performance, needs and emotions, genetics and
learning, thinking and feeling, internal and external environments, and last
but not least between physiology and psychology. Only the future can tell
whether this growing and enriched ecological environment for cognition will
result in a second cognitive revolution in psychology.
This introduction would not be complete without expressing the deep
appreciation and gratitude of the editor to the authors of the diverse chapters
who have contributed of their expertise, knowledge, and extraordinary abili-
ties and insights to each of the chapters, which constitute real steps forward
along the broadening road of exploration and expanding role of cognitive
sciences as a whole and cognition in particular. In particular, I would like to
mention the special contribution of Ann Renninger, whose insights, coopera-
tion, and support all along in diverse forms have served as a source of inspira-
tion and great help in completing the project of this book.
This book would not have been produced without the continuous sup-
port of the editors of Cambridge University Press, whose encouragement,
patience, and belief in the goal have been a major motivational force in regard
to the present cognitive project.
 Introduction 11

References
Baldwin, J. M. (1911). The individual and society. Or psychology and sociology. Boston:
Richard G. Badger.
Baltes, P. B., & Staudinger, U. M. (Eds.) (1996). Interactive minds: Life-span perspectives
on the social foundation of cognition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dewey, J. (1913). Interest and effort in education. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology (Vols. 1 & 2). New York: Holt.
Kreitler, S., & Kreitler, H. (1990). The cognitive foundations of personality traits. New
York: Plenum.
Power, M., & Dalgleish, T. (2008). Cognition and emotion: From order to disorder (2nd
ed.). Hove and New York: Psychology Press.
Renninger, K. A., Hidi, S., & Krapp, A. (1992). The role of interest in learning and devel-
opment. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Saklofske, D., & Zeidner, M. (Eds.) (1995). International handbook of personality and
intelligence. New York: Plenum.
Shizgal, P. (1999). Motivation. In R. A. Wilson & F. C. Keil (Eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia
of the Cognitive Sciences (pp. 566–568). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Sorrentino, R. M., & Higgins, E. T. (Eds.) (1986). The handbook of motivation and cogni-
tion: Foundations of social behavior. New York: Guilford.
 Part I

Explanatory Concepts and Contexts

 1

The Role of Epistemic Motivations

in Knowledge Formation

Arie W. Kruglanski & Anna Sheveland

The formation of knowledge is among the most ubiquitous human activi-

ties, and persons engage in it continuously as individuals and group mem-
bers. Individual knowledge is indispensable for intelligible action; collective
knowledge is indispensable for human progress, as advances in knowledge
build on prior views and strive to improve on them. In this chapter, we define
human knowledge subjectively (and intersubjectively) as beliefs that people
subscribe to and alter under appropriate circumstances.1 Although at any
given time individuals may be completely sure of their knowledge on various
subjects, their confidence may still be undermined by new information, or by
contrary opinions of trusted sources.
Broadly speaking, the formation of knowledge contains two major ele-
ments: the cognitive element constituting the “grist” of the epistemic process,
and the motivational element, metaphorically the “mill” that transforms the
grist. The cognitive element represents the fact that new knowledge is con-
structed from epistemic blocks of prior and current knowledge: new knowl-
edge constitutes conclusions based on evidence, and such conclusions are
derived from the prior knowledge in a deductive fashion. More specifically,
new knowledge is mediated by inference rules when these are instantiated
by confirmed facts. The rules constitute prior knowledge to which the indi-
vidual subscribes; they can be thought of as preexisting major premises in a
syllogism. The confirmed facts constitute the current information that serves
as minor premises (see Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski et al., 2010; Kruglanski
et al., 2007). Both constitute preexisting types of knowledge that individuals
may subscribe to, namely the belief that if X is the case then Y follows, and that
X is indeed the case. It is in this sense then that any new knowledge is con-
structed from the (cognitive) building blocks of prior knowledge.
The number of inference rules from which a given bit of knowledge is con-
structed may vary. For instance, each such rule may connect the occurrence

15
16 Kruglanski & Sheveland

of a specific behavior to a given personality trait, and the number of such

relevant behaviors that a knower may consider might be few or many. Thus,
in forming an impression (knowledge) about an individual’s friendliness, a
given knower might consider instances in which the target person offered
help, sought social interaction, forgave an insult, and made appreciative com-
ments on a colleague’s performance. Another knower might consider only a
subset of those behaviors in forming an impression of the target. The implica-
tions of each behavior for the trait in question may then be drawn and inte-
grated for an overall impression. All this requires time and effort. It is here
that the motivational element becomes relevant. Its function has been exten-
sively discussed under the label of epistemic motivation (Kruglanski, 1989,
1996, 2004).
Generally speaking, epistemic motivation affects two aspects of knowledge
formation: the extent of information processing en route to a judgment, and
its directionality or bias toward specific conclusions. Specifically, a knower
may be more or less inclined to (1) retrieve large numbers of inference rules
from memory, (2) search for information relevant to those rules, and (3) inte-
grate their implications for an overall impression. Furthermore, a knower may
be more or less pleased with the rules’ implications and give greater weight
to pleasing versus displeasing implications. In the remainder of this chapter
we describe those motivational properties in greater detail and review a pro-
gram of empirical research that explored their consequences for phenomena
on intra-individual, inter-individual, and group levels of psychological analy-
sis. The central construct in our discussion is the need for cognitive closure
defined in what follows.

The Need for Cognitive Closure

The need for cognitive closure has been defined as the desire for a definitive
answer to a question and the eschewal of continued uncertainty or ambigu-
ity concerning the nature of such an answer (Kruglanski, 1989). Because a
definitive answer eliminates the need for further cognitive deliberation, it is
said to provide closure. An individual’s closure motivation is assumed to lie
on a continuum ranging from a strong need for closure to a strong need to
avoid closure. A second, orthogonal dimension pertains to the type of closure
(nonspecific versus specific) that the individual may be seeking or avoiding
(Kruglanski, 2004).
The desire for closure is nonspecific if it is unbiased toward a particular
conclusion; given such a need, any conclusion would suffice as long as it was
firm, and hence closure-affording. For example, we might expect jury duty
 Epistemic Motivations 17

to elicit in an impartial jury member a heightened need for nonspecific clo-

sure. The juror’s need for closure should be (1) elevated because the situation
requires that a verdict be reached and (2) nonspecific because an impartial
juror would not have preferences for a verdict of guilt or innocence.
In contrast, the need for specific closure introduces a bias toward a par-
ticular conclusion. For instance, if the juror was prejudiced against a social
category of which the defendant was a member (such as her or his gender,
religion, age, or ethnic group), she might prefer a verdict that was congruent
with those prejudices. This may introduce an unwitting selectivity in infor-
mation processing and the assignment of disproportionate weight to items
supportive of such a conclusion. Also, the juror might have a conflict or com-
monality of interests with the defendant; these too might induce needs for
specific closure that favor a guilty or innocent verdict, respectively
The magnitude of the need for closure of both the specific and nonspecific
kinds is assumed to be determined by the perceived benefits of (this type of)
closure relative to the costs of its absence (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). In
other words, when the benefits of closure (e.g., being able to act as a result of
the closure formed) outweigh its costs, the need for closure should be height-
ened. Conversely, the need for closure should be diminished when the costs
of closure (e.g., the fear of suffering the consequences of a major error of
judgment) outweigh its benefits.
Various needs for specific closure (e.g., esteem protective or enhancing
motives, impression management motives, and so forth) received consid-
erable attention in social cognition research. In general, it was found that,
when aroused, such needs bias the judgmental process in a need-congruent
direction (see Dunning, 1999; Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda & Sinclair, 1999 for
reviews). In the domain of knowledge formation, however, the need for non-
specific closure commanded incomparably greater amount of research atten-
tion. Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter is devoted to the description
of a research program focused on the latter type of motivation. In what fol-
lows, we consider nonspecific closure effects on intrapersonal, interpersonal,
and group levels of analysis.

The Intrapersonal Level

As noted earlier, the magnitude of the need for closure is determined by the
perceived benefits of closure and the costs of lacking closure. For instance,
the need for nonspecific closure is assumed to be elevated where action is
required because the launching of intelligible action requires prior clo-
sure. Additionally, the need for closure is assumed to be elevated where the
18 Kruglanski & Sheveland

possession of closure would obviate costly or laborious information process-

ing, as may occur under time pressure, in the presence of ambient noise, or
when a person is fatigued or intoxicated (see Kruglanski, 2004 for a review).
When the need for closure is elevated, the absence of closure is aversive and
stressful. In a recent pair of studies, Roets and van Hiel (2008) found that
in a decision-making context (i.e., where closure was required), high (but
not low) need for closure individuals evinced increased systolic blood pres-
sure and heart rate as well as a rise in self-reported feelings of distress (Study
1). Moreover, as long as no conclusive solution was obtained, high (but not
low) need for closure individuals evinced a progressive increase of arousal
assessed via a galvanic skin response. In addition to the transient situational
determinants of the need for closure, this motivation was also assumed to
represent a dimension of individual differences, and a scale was constructed
to assess it (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). By now, this scale has been trans-
lated into numerous languages and been shown to converge in its results with
situational manipulations of the need for closure2; an improved version of the
scale was recently published by Roets and van Hiel (2007).
Seizing and freezing phenomena. A heightened need for nonspecific closure
induces in individuals the tendency to “seize” on early, closure-affording evi-
dence and “freeze” upon the judgments (beliefs) it suggests. These tendencies
were studied in reference to several classic phenomena in social cognition
and perception.
For instance, Kruglanski and Freund (1983) presented participants
with information about a target person’s past behaviors in a work context.
Participants were then asked to make a judgment about how successful the
target would be at a new job. The target information included both positive
and negative information, with the order of this information varied so that
some participants saw the negative information first and others saw the posi-
tive information first. Need for closure was manipulated via time pressure by
giving some participants a three-minute limit to make their judgments (after
listening to the information), with a stopwatch in sight reminding them of the
time constraint. In the low time-pressure condition, participants were told
they would have an unlimited amount of time to complete the judgments.
Orthogonally, we manipulated the accountability variable assumed to lower
the need for closure. Half the participants were informed that their responses
would be checked by the experimenter (the high-accountability condition),
whereas the remaining half were not told this (the low-accountability condi-
tion). It was predicted that because of the “seizing and freezing” tendency
induced by the need for closure, participants under time pressure (vs. no
pressure) would manifest a stronger primacy effect in impression formation,
 Epistemic Motivations 19

giving greater weight to early (vs. later) appearing items of information,

whereas participants in the high versus low accountability condition would
manifest a weaker primacy effect. The results lent strong support to these
predictions. The primacy effect of the need for closure was subsequently
replicated in a number of further studies (Ford & Kruglanski, 1995; Freund,
Kruglanski, & Shpitzajzen, 1985; Richter & Kruglanski, 1998; Webster, Richter,
& Kruglanski, 1996).
In an intriguing demonstration of need for closure’s impact on the use of
contextually activated information, Pierro and Kruglanski (2008) conducted
a study on the influence of the need for closure on the transference effect in
social judgment. The Freudian concept of transference refers to the process by
which a psychotherapeutic patient superimposes onto the therapist her or his
childhood fantasies with regard to a significant childhood figure (typically a
parent). Andersen and her colleagues (e.g., Andersen & Cole, 1990; Andersen
et al., 1995) showed, however, that the transference effect could be part and
parcel of normal socio-cognitive functioning in which a significant other’s
schema is mistakenly applied to a new target that resembles the significant
other in some respects. In a first session of Pierro and Kruglanski’s (2008)
experiment, participants completed the revised 14-item need for closure scale
(Pierro & Kruglanski, 2005) and were asked to visualize and describe a sig-
nificant other. In a second session, participants were presented with informa-
tion about a target person with whom they expected to interact. The target
person was either described in similar terms as their significant other or was
depicted as dissimilar from that person. After having studied this informa-
tion, participants were presented with a recognition test of their memory
for the target. Items about the target person that were not presented in the
description were included in the recognition test. The degree of transference
was operationally defined as the proportion of statements falsely recognized
as having been included in the description of the target person, which were
consistent with the representation of the significant other provided in the first
session. The results indicated that participants high on the need for closure
exhibited a more pronounced transference effect, as indicated by higher false
alarm rates, in the similar (vs. dissimilar) condition than did participants low
on the need for closure.
Other studies found evidence that the need for closure, whether induced
situationally or measured via a scale, augments the effects of prevalent stereo-
types on judgments about persons (Dijksterhuis et al., 1996; Jamieson &
Zanna, 1989; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). A stereotype represents a knowl-
edge structure affording quick judgments about members of a stereotyped
“category.” That the need for closure augments the tendency to utilize
20 Kruglanski & Sheveland

stereotype-based evidence in impression formation supports thus the notion

that this need induces the seizing and freezing tendencies assumed by the lay
epistemic theory.

The Interpersonal Level

Beyond its effects on intrapersonal phenomena in the domain of social judg-
ment, the need for nonspecific closure was shown to exert a variety of inter-
personal phenomena in realms of linguistic expression, communication,
persuasion, empathy, and negotiation behavior.
Linguistic expression. Several studies looked at need-for-closure effects on
linguistic abstractness in interpersonal communications. Abstract language
indicates a permanence of judgments across situations, and hence a greater
stability of closure, consistent with the freezing tendency discussed earlier.
For instance, characterizing an individual’s behavior in a given situation as
aggressiveness (an abstract depiction) implies that he or she may be expected
to behave aggressively in other contexts as well. By contrast, depicting the
same behavior as a “push” (that is, concretely) carries fewer trans-situational
implications. If individuals under high (vs. low) need for closure tend to
freeze on their formed knowledge in the interest of epistemic permanence
and stability, they should tend to employ abstract terms in their communica-
tions. Consistent with this prediction, Boudreau, Baron, and Oliver (1992)
found that participants communicating their impressions to a knowledge-
able and potentially critical other (assumed to induce a fear of invalidity and
lower the need for closure) tended to describe a target in abstract trait terms
less often than participants communicating their impressions to a recipient
assumed to have little knowledge on the communication topic.
Using Semin and Fiedler’s (1991) linguistic category paradigm, Rubini and
Kruglanski (1997) additionally found that participants under high (vs. low)
need for closure (manipulated via noise or measured via the need for closure
scale) tended to frame their questions in more abstract terms, inviting recip-
rocal abstractness from the respondents. That, in turn, contributed to the cre-
ation of greater interpersonal distance between the interlocutors, lessening
their liking for each other.
Webster, Kruglanski, and Pattison (1997) explored need-for-closure effects
on the linguistic intergroup bias (LIB). The LIB reflects the tendency to
describe negative in-group behaviors and positive out-group behaviors in
concrete terms (suggesting their specificity), and to describe positive in-group
behaviors and negative out-group behaviors in abstract terms (suggesting
their generality). Consider now how the need for closure may impact these
 Epistemic Motivations 21

phenomena. On the one hand, the need for closure should induce a general
tendency toward abstraction because of the desire of individuals with high
need for closure for stable knowledge that transcends the specific situation.
However, abstract judgments about positive out-group and negative in-group
behaviors should run counter to the tendency for individuals with high need
for closure to display in-group favoritism (insofar as the in-group is typi-
cally the provider of stable knowledge). This then is one case in which the
need for a nonspecific closure is in conflict with the need for a specific clo-
sure (implying an in-group bias). The resultant tendencies toward abstract-
ness and concreteness work in concert as far as judgment of positive in-group
and negative out-group behaviors are concerned, and are in conflict (hence
possibly canceling each other out) as far as negative in-group and positive
out-group behaviors are concerned. Consistent with this prediction, Webster
et al. (1997) found that high (vs. low) need-for-closure participants exposed
to positive in-group or negative out-group behaviors described such behav-
iors more abstractly. However, as predicted, high and low need-for-closure
participants did not differ on the abstractness of their descriptions of negative
in-group or positive out-group behaviors.
Persuasion. Research by Kruglanski, Webster, and Klem (1993) explored
the conditions under which the need for closure may increase or decrease
individuals’ susceptibility to persuasion. To do this, participants were pre-
sented with information about a legal case, allowed time to process the infor-
mation, and later engaged in a discussion with a partner (fellow “juror”) in
order to reach a verdict in the case. When participants were given complete
information about the case, including legal analysis suggesting the appropri-
ate verdict, individuals high (vs. low) on the need for closure were less likely
to be persuaded by their fellow juror (who argued for the opposite verdict).
However, when individuals with high need for closure were given incomplete
information lacking the legal analysis, they were more likely to be persuaded
by their fellow juror than their counterparts with low need for closure. In
short, individuals high (vs. low) on the need for closure tend to resist per-
suasion attempts when they have formed a crystallized opinion about a topic
on which they may freeze, but tend to change their attitudes when presented
with persuasive appeals when they lack an opinion about the topic.
Empathy. Webster-Nelson, Klein, and Irvin (2003) found that, because
individuals with high need for closure tend to “freeze” on their own perspec-
tive, they are less able to empathize with their interaction partners, espe-
cially when those are dissimilar from themselves. In the Webster-Nelson et
al. (2003) study, the need for closure was manipulated via an induction of
mental fatigue. In a similar vein, using a dispositional measure of the need
22 Kruglanski & Sheveland

for closure, Shteynberg et al. (2008) found that high (vs. low) scorers were
less sensitive to injustice done to their teammate by the experimenter (i.e.,
perceived the experimenter as less unfair). Finally, using a referential task
paradigm, Richter and Kruglanski (1999) found that individuals with high
(vs. low) dispositional need for closure tended less to implement an effective
“audience design.” They tended less to “tune” their messages to their inter-
locutors’ unique attributes; as a consequence, their communications were less
effectively decoded by their recipients.
Negotiation behavior. To test the effect of the need for closure in the domain
of negotiation behavior, DeDreu, Koole, and Oldersma (1999) measured par-
ticipants’ dispositional need for closure and then (after a 30 min. delay) had
them engage in a task in which they operated as sellers and interacted with
presumed buyers (actually simulated by computer-programmed responses).
The participant’s (seller’s) task was to negotiate the terms of the sale, includ-
ing delivery time, price, and form of payment. Each of these was associated
with rewards for the participant in the form of chances in a lottery such that
greater profit for the seller was associated with higher chances of winning.
Participants engaged in six rounds of negotiations, beginning with the buyer.
The buyers’ responses were pre-programmed to remain at a moderate level,
conceding slightly more at each round. To manipulate the focal point to which
participants might adjust their negotiations, they were either told that previ-
ous participants had received 11,000 points (high focal point), 3,000 points
(low focal point), or simply that the range of possible points extended from
0 to 14,000 (no focal point).
Three dependent measures were assessed. First, prior to the start of the
negotiations, participants were asked to indicate the minimum amount they
would be willing to accept in the negotiation. Second, participants’ concessions
in the task were determined by the decrease in the amount of points partici-
pants demanded from the first to the last rounds of negotiation (with greater
numbers indicating a larger concession). After the six trials (in which most
participants did not reach an agreement), participants completed a self-report
measure of the extent to which they thought systematically during the task.
The results indicated that individuals with high (vs. low) dispositional need
for closure tended more to adhere to anchor values. That is, they determined
the minimal profits they themselves would accept according to the alleged
profits attained by others in the task. When no focal point was provided, par-
ticipants with high versus low need for closure did not differ in the minimal
value they expressed their willingness to accept. In addition, participants with
high (vs. low) need for closure made smaller concessions to their negotiation
partners and engaged in less systematic information processing.
 Epistemic Motivations 23

In another study on the negotiation process, De Dreu and Koole (1997)

lowered participants’ need for closure via accountability instructions
(Tetlock, 1992) or by increasing the costs of invalid judgments (Kruglanski &
Freund, 1983). These manipulations lowered participants’ tendency to use the
‘consensus implies correctness’ heuristic, as well as their tendency to behave
competitively and to reach an impasse when a majority suggested a competi­
tive strategy.

Group Phenomena
The foregoing findings exemplify need for closure effects on a variety of
intrapersonal and interpersonal phenomena (for an extensive review see
Kruglanski, 2004). Extensive research also examined the effects of the clo-
sure motivation on groups, including the group centrism syndrome described
next.
Group Centrism. Some people are more group-oriented than others, and
most people are more group-oriented in some situations than in others.
Kruglanski et al. (2006) introduced the concept of group centrism, defined
by the degree to which individuals strive to enhance the “groupness” of their
collectivity. Groupness, in turn, has been defined by a firm, consensually
supported shared reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996), unperturbed by dissents
and disagreements. Although reality sharing has been regarded as the defin-
ing essence of groupness (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1990, 2000), its attainment may be
facilitated by several aspects of group interaction enhanced by the need for
closure. At the initial phases of group formation, this can involve members’
attempts to arrive at a speedy consensus by exerting uniformity pressures on
each other, as demonstrated in a series of studies by DeGrada et al. (1999).
To further test the influence of need for closure on the group
decision-making process, Pierro et al. (2003) engaged participants in a group
task after participants’ need for closure had been assessed, several months
earlier. Participants were divided into groups based on their need-for-closure
scores, with some groups containing high need-for-closure individuals and
others individuals low on need for closure. Each group was composed of four
individuals, role-playing managers in a corporation. The group’s goal was to
determine which of the company’s employees should be given a cash award
for their work performance. Each “manager” represented a candidate nom-
inated by this manager’s department. The dependent measures included the
asymmetry of speaking time (seizing and holding the floor), perceptions of
each participant’s influence over the group, and each member’s style assessed
on the laissez fair-autocratic dimension.
24 Kruglanski & Sheveland

Results indicated that groups composed of high need-for-closure ­members

(but not of low) evinced the emergence of an autocratic group structure
wherein influence emanates from a centralized authority, enhancing the
likelihood of commonly shared opinions. Specifically, in groups composed
of high need-for-closure persons, some members more than others dis-
proportionately controlled the group discussion by seizing the discussion
floor and continuing to talk even when others attempted to interrupt them.
Furthermore, in high need-for-closure groups (but not low), members’ level
of autocratic style (as assessed by independent judges) was positively corre-
lated with their control of the discussion floor. Finally, individuals’ floor con-
trol was positively correlated with their influence on the group (as indexed
by self-report and by assessment of independent observers). This research
supports the notion that groups composed of high need-for-closure members
are more likely to form autocratic structures in which a single person or a
restricted number of individuals serve as the foci of influence that shape the
groups’ commonly shared realities.
The laboratory findings just described are consistent with Gelfand’s (2008)
cross-cultural research in 35 countries across the globe in which she finds
a significant relationship between the country’s degree of autocracy and
situational constraint, in turn correlated with inhabitants’ need for closure.
Although these results may reflect the notion that high need-for-closure
individuals tend to construct autocratic societies, they may also mean that
life in tight, autocratic societies tends to engender members with a high
need for closure. These two tendencies are not necessarily incompatible;
their existence and interrelation could be profitably probed in further
research.
In addition to influencing group structure, intensified quest for unifor-
mity under heightened need for closure leads to an intolerance of diversity
within one’s group (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Shah, Kruglanski, & Thompson,
1998). Diversity is a feature that may impede arrival at consensus, thereby
reducing the group’s ability to reach closure. In this vein, the need for clo-
sure heightened via time pressure and ambient noise has been shown to lead
to a rejection of opinion deviates in a work group (Kruglanski & Webster,
1991). Elevated need for closure was also found to foster favoritism toward
one’s in-group, in direct proportion to its degree of homogeneity and opin-
ion uniformity. Finally, the need for closure was found to foster out-group
derogation (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Shah et al., 1998), the degree to which
was inversely related to the out-group’s homogeneity and opinion uniformity
(Kruglanski et al., 2002). These findings are consistent with the notion that
high need-for-closure individuals are attracted to groups (whether in-groups
 Epistemic Motivations 25

or out-groups) that promise to offer firm shared realities to their members,

affording stable cognitive closure.
The quest for stable shared reality on the part of individuals with high need
for closure should express itself in conservatism and the upholding of group
norms and traditions. Indeed, both political conservatism (Jost et al., 2003)
and the tendency to maintain stable group norms across generational cycles
(Livi, 2003) were found to be related to a heightened need for closure. In
this vein, Chirumbolo (2002), and Van Hiel, Pandelaere, and Duriez (2004)
found that the relation between the need for closure and conservatism was
mediated by general political attitudes, notably right wing authoritarianism,
and social dominance orientation. Roets and Van Hiel (2006) found addi-
tionally that these relationships reflected both the freezing and seizing ten-
dencies induced by the need for closure, the latter being specifically assessed
via the Decisiveness facet of the need for closure scale.
Additionally, Chirumbolo and Leone (2008) found in two election stud-
ies (the 2004 European elections and the 2005 Italian Regional elections)
that the need for closure was linearly (and positively) related to voting along
the left–right continuum. Finally, Chirumbolo, Areni, and Sensales (2004)
found that Italian students high (vs. low) on the need for closure were more
nationalistic, religious, exhibited a preference for right-wing political parties,
reported anti-immigrant attitudes, scored lower on pluralism and multicul-
turalism, and preferred autocratic leadership and a centralized form of politi-
cal power.
Kosic et al. (2004) found evidence that the need for closure augments loy-
alty to one’s in-group and instills a reluctance to abandon it and “defect” to
alternative collectivities. Such loyalty persists to the extent that one’s in-group
is salient in the individuals’ social environment. If, however, an alternative
group’s views became overridingly salient, high need for closure may prompt
members to switch groups. In the Kosic et al. study (2004), Croat and Polish
immigrants to Italy who were high (vs. low) on the need for closure tended
to assimilate less to the Italian culture (i.e., they maintained loyalty to their
culture of origin), but only if their social environment at entry consisted of
their co-ethnics. However, if it consisted of members of the host culture (i.e.,
of Italians) high need-for-closure immigrants (vs. low) tended to defect more
and assimilate to the Italian culture.
The need for closure may also influence the attitudes of members of existing
groups toward potential newcomers. We already reported Chirumbolo et al.’s
(2004) finding as to the anti-immigration attitudes of high need-for-closure
(vs. low) Italians. More recently, Dechesne et al. (2008) investigated whether
individuals high on the need for closure would prefer groups with impermeable
26 Kruglanski & Sheveland

(vs. permeable) boundaries. Dutch undergraduate students first completed

the need for closure scale, and subsequently read a news article highlight-
ing either the permeability or the impermeability of their college’s boundar-
ies. Participants in the impermeable condition read a passage stating, “The
choice of one’s university is virtually irreversible,” whereas participants in the
permeable condition read a passage depicting the choice of one’s university
as reversible. It was found that participants high (vs. low) on the need for
closure expressed greater identification with impermeable permeable (vs.)
group boundaries that do not allow much traffic in and out of the group.
The same pattern of results was found for liking of the group. Dechesne et al.
(2008) also found that American students with high (vs. low) need for closure
had more negative attitudes toward immigration into the United States.
Conclusions. In summary, a great deal of research attests to the consider-
able role that the need for nonspecific cognitive closure plays in intrapersonal,
interpersonal, and group processes. At the individual level, these processes
affect the formation of social judgments, attitudes, and impressions. At the
interpersonal level, they enter into communication and persuasion, empathy,
and negotiation behavior, and at the group level, into the formation of con-
sensus and the forging of stable social realities for the members. In all these
domains and on all these levels of analysis, the need for closure has been
shown to constitute a variable with implications for major classes of social
psychological phenomena.

Epilogue: Real-World Implications of the

Need for Cognitive Closure
Because much of the empirical work on the need for closure has been con-
ducted in lab settings somewhat removed from the real world, we would feel
remiss in concluding this chapter without a discussion of the substantive and
far-reaching real-world implications of the construct.
Recall, for one, our previous discussion of the established link between
the need for closure and political ideology and behavior, specifically in that
a higher dispositional need for closure is positively related to conservatism
(Jost et al., 2003) and right-wing voting behavior (Chirumbolo et al., 2004).
We have also discussed Kosic et al.’s (2004) findings on the need for closure’s
role in immigrants’ acculturation, which not only provides additional evi-
dence of the need for closure’s relevance to important real-world phenomena
but also illustrates the complexity and dynamism inherent in the interplay
between the need for closure and real-world conditions such as proximity of a
community of co-ethnics affording one a sense of shared social reality.
 Epistemic Motivations 27

In addition to at times interacting with the need for closure, real-world

contexts can also serve to augment individuals’ need for closure under some
conditions. Situations of conflict and uncertainty, for example, can heighten
individuals’ need for closure. This is evidenced by Orehek et al.’s (2008) elic-
itation of a heightened need for closure in American college students who
watched a video of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Study 1) and elderly Dutch citi-
zens who were led to believe that a high percentage of Muslims lived in their
neighborhoods (Study 2). In both instances, the elevated need for closure fos-
tered greater in-group favoritism. It appears thus, that real-world situations
of uncertainty and conflict induce a heightened need for closure, which in
turn engenders a tendency to hew to one’s group and its norms and exhibit
hostility toward the out-groups.
It is important to emphasize here that the need for closure is a value-neutral
construct; that is, closure in and of itself is neither inherently good nor bad.
What matters is not that something is seized and frozen but what is seized
and frozen, and its social consequences within a given environmental context.
If the resulting closure results in behaviors that are valued in some circum-
stances (e.g., decisiveness, loyalty, patriotism) then the need for closure can be
said to have positive consequences. If it results in negatively valued behavior
(e.g., discrimination, prejudice, closed-mindedness) the need for closure can
be said to have negative consequences. Be that as it may, the need for closure is
an indispensable psychological mechanism involved in knowledge formation,
and for that reason it underlies a wide variety of psychological phenomena at
intrapersonal, interpersonal, group, and intergroup levels of analysis.

Notes
1. This view is consistent with philosophical conceptions of scientific knowledge,
arguably the most evolved and substantiated variety of knowledge, as perennially
conjectural and potentially subject to refutations (Popper, 1963).
2. In a recent paper, Roets, Van Hiel, Cornelis, and Soetens (2008) argued that in addition
to exerting a direct motivational effect similar to that of dispositional need for closure,
situational manipulations of need for closure (via time pressure or noise) exert an effect
on cognitive capacity as well manifesting itself in deteriorated task performance.

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Webster, D. M., Kruglanski, A. W., & Pattison, D. A. (1997). Motivated language use
in intergroup contexts: Need-for-closure effects on the linguistic intergroup bias.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1122–1131.
Webster, D. M., Richter, L., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1996). On leaping to conclusions
when feeling tired: Mental fatigue effects on impressional primacy. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 181–195.
Webster-Nelson, D., Klein, C. F., & Irvin, J. E. (2003). Motivational antecedents of empa-
thy: Inhibiting effects of fatigue. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 8, 133–173.
 2

The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation

A Motivational Approach to Cognition

Shulamith Kreitler

Introduction: Some Assumptions about Cognition

and Motivation
The theme of cognition has evoked interest and admiration in individuals
for many thousands of years, regardless of whether they studied it in phi-
losophy and science or depicted it in art and myths. In different cultures, a
special god was appointed for representing it, which at least in some cultures
was a woman (e.g., Pallas Athena, Sophia, or the Mahavidyas). Notably, one
feature characterizing cognition in these different settings is its aloofness, the
special elevated status it enjoys, its sublimity, and the atmosphere of aristo-
cratic reservation surrounding it. This may be due to the fact that cognition
is traditionally upstage, representing as it were higher levels of functioning
than other psychological systems. It could also be because of its intimate rela-
tions with the brain, which is itself a mysterious organ. This aloofness of cog-
nition is still evident, despite the fact that evidence is accumulating about
the ties, even interactions, of cognition with other domains – mainly emo-
tions. Nevertheless, the impression is that cognition has not lost its peculiar
separateness.
However, there is a set of assumptions that supports very different con-
clusions about cognition. In contrast to the envisaged restricted relations of
cognition with different spheres of action and behavior, the relations of cog-
nition with the brain are not viewed as restricted in any way. Regardless of
the espoused model of the brain, it is evident that cognition uses the major
parts of the brain; moreover, the development of cognition is related closely
to the development of the brain in the course of evolution (Geary, 2005; Roth
& Wullimann, 2001). These facts suggest that it is hardly reasonable or likely
that a function that uses such large parts of the brain has only limited involve-
ment in the daily occurrences and processes of the organism as a whole. It is

32
 The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation 33

more likely that the involvement of cognition in the different domains and
functions of the organism is pervasive, and most probably in both directions;
that is, it affects the different processes and is also affected by them. This
assumption is the first of several that guide this chapter.
The second assumption is that motivation is a major factor affecting the
contents and processes of cognition. This statement may seem trivial were it
not for the implicit prevalent assumption that cognition simply takes place,
similar to digestion and breathing in the physical domain. Because cognition
fulfills a basic role concerning the organism and survival in general, it is pos-
sible that part of the motivation for cognition is automatic or built-in, as in
the case of physical functions. However, as cognition consumes so much of
the time and energy resources of the organism, the so-called apparent auto-
matic motivation does not cover the whole of the motivational role for cogni-
tion. Hence, it is likely that motivation for cognition is complex in the sense
that it includes several components or levels. External or internal triggers
may be important constituents of motivation for specific behaviors, but they
are implemented in the course of development by further layers of motiva-
tion, represented by cognitively shaped beliefs, supported by personality dis-
positions and emotional tendencies.
The third assumption is that cognition is a major constituent of motiva-
tion. This holds regarding behavior in general, emotions, and even physiolog-
ical processes, at least those involved in physical health or diseases. As will be
shown later (see The Cognitive Orientation Model: General Description), the
assumption about the cognitive nature of motivation holds regarding behav-
iors of all kinds – habitual and non-habitual; normal and psychopathologi-
cal; motoric or emotional. Furthermore, it holds regarding different kinds of
individuals – young (at least down to the age of 3–4 years) or old (over 90);
normal or psychopathological; and most important of all, regardless of the
intellectual level of the person – individuals with normal intelligence as well
as those at the lower tail of the IQ curve (see the chapter by Zigler in this
book).
The fourth and final assumption is that cognition functions in terms of cog-
nitive acts. This assumption highlights the similarity in motivational effects
between cognition and other behavioral domains. A cognitive act denotes an
organized sequence of steps including some starting point, the major part of
the action, and some concluding point. Examples of cognitive acts are mak-
ing a plan, recalling something specific, making a decision, solving a certain
problem, answering a question, making an act of analysis, drawing a con-
clusion from a set of data, categorizing an array of inputs, choosing one of
two strategies, or deciphering a code. Thus, in case of planning, the starting
34 Kreitler

point of the cognitive act would be a question such as, “How do we go about
it,” and the end point would be some kind of plan. In the case of decipher-
ing a code, the starting point would be a question such as, “What does this
mean,” and the endpoint of the act would be the transcription of the code or
statement of the message in an understandable form or a conclusion, such
as, “I am sorry, I failed to decipher the code.” A cognitive act may also be
called mental action, and resembles what Piaget called an operation (Piaget
& Inhelder, 1973). It is not unlike any other act that an organism performs,
the difference being that the components of the act are cognitive in nature –
namely, cognitive contents and processes, as distinct from motoric or phys-
iological components. Cognitive contents are items of information, denoted
for example by nouns or verbs (e.g., table, to go) and their combinations (e.g.,
in the form of sentences or images). Cognitive processes are specific changes
in cognitive contents resulting in transformations in terms of function, loca-
tion, combinations, and so forth (e.g., the combination “the table is here” is
changed into “the table is broken” or is replaced by “the table is a piece of
furniture”). It should further be noted that cognitive acts are not necessarily
conscious, nor under voluntary control, although some parts of them may be
accessible to awareness. The major point is that cognitive acts are not identical
with the underlying cognitive contents and processes of which they consist.
The distinction between the cognitive act and its constituents is important
in the context of motivation because motivation, as commonly conceived in
psychology, refers to cognitive acts but not to the constituent processes. The
same holds concerning motor acts, for example. Here too, motivation affects
the act of moving from one room to the next, but not the kind of muscles,
joints, or blood vessels that are involved in the implementation of the act of
movement.

The Cognitive Orientation Model: General

Description
There are four major issues or questions comprising motivation in the con-
text of psychology: (1) Why does the organism move/behave at all? (2) Given
that it moves/behaves, why does it move in a specific direction or to a specific
goal? (3) Given that it moves in a specific direction/toward a specific goal, why
does it move in a specific manner or way? (4) Given that it moves in a spe-
cific manner/way, why does it stop the movement/behavior? All of the major
approaches and theories of motivation in psychology provide answers to one
or more of these questions, sometimes emphasizing one at the expense of the
others. Thus, drive theories deal mainly with the first and second questions;
 The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation 35

incentive and goal theories deal mainly with the second question; instinct
theories and habit-formation theories deal mainly with the third question;
and feedback theories with the fourth.
In the present context, motivation for cognition will be dealt with from
the point of view of the theory of cognitive orientation (CO). The particular
advantages of this theory for cognition are that it is a comprehensive theory
of motivation regarding cognition; it enables prediction of cognitive acts; and
despite being a cognitive-motivational approach, it does not assume rational-
ity, realism, reasonableness, conscious decision making, and voluntary con-
trol of the cognitive proceedings. Another important advantage of the CO
approach is that it enables a systematic change and improvement of cognitive
acts (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1990a; Zakay, Bar El, & Kreitler, 1984).
A major thesis of the CO theory is that any act, cognitive or other, is a func-
tion of a motivational disposition and a behavioral program that implements
it. The motivational disposition consists of a cluster of beliefs, whereas the
behavioral program consists of cognitive contents and processes structured
in sequences, schemes, strategies, or heuristics. For describing the formation
of the motivational disposition and behavioral programs, we will apply the
system of meaning that provides a presentation of a comprehensive set of
cognitive contents and processes – namely, the meaning variables. The mean-
ing variables and their combinations into patterns also provide access for
the influence of personality traits and emotions on cognitive performance.
Finally, the enactment of the cognitive acts is dependent on the atmosphere
of the overall cognitive environment, including mental sets and states of
consciousness.
Meaning is a concept that plays a major role in the CO theory. Meaning is
defined as a pattern of cognitive contents (e.g., a color, an emotion) focused
on some input (e.g., a stimulus, an object) that is expressed verbally or nonver-
bally, and forms together with the input or subject a meaning unit (Kreitler &
Kreitler, 1990b). Examples of meaning units are “The sea – is made of water,”
“Law – a social institution.” In a given context, meaning consists of one or more
meaning units, each of which may be characterized in terms of the contents
(e.g., causes, sensory qualities) assigned to the subject (viz. referent) and rela-
tions between it and the subject (e.g., its directness, generality). Meaning vari-
ables characterize the contents or the relations between the contents and the
subject (e.g., causes or actions characterize the contents; conjunctions or met-
aphors characterize the relations of the contents to the subject) (see Table 2.1).
Thus, meaning variables characterize both the contents and the process of its
generation. Meaning assignment proceeds by assigning to a subject one or
different kinds of contents. Meaning includes the more interpersonal part as
36 Kreitler

Table 2.1. Major Variables of the Meaning System: The Meaning Variables

Meaning Dimensions Forms of Relation

Dim. 1 Contextual Allocation FR 1 Propositional (1a: Positive; 1b:
Negative)
Dim. 2 Range of Inclusion (2a: FR 2 Partial (2a: Positive; 2b: Negative)
Subclasses; 2b: Parts)
Dim. 3 Function, Purpose, & Role FR 3 Universal (3a: Positive; 3b:
Negative)
Dim. 4 Actions & Potentialities for FR 4 Conjunctive (4a: Positive; 4b:
Actions (4a: By referent; Negative)
4b: To or with referent)
Dim. 5 Manner of Occurrence & FR 5 Disjunctive (5a: Positive; 5b:
Operation Negative)
Dim. 6 Antecedents & Causes FR 6 Normative (6a: Positive; 6b:
Negative)
Dim. 7 Consequences & Results FR 7 Questioning (7a: Positive; 7b:
Negative)
Dim. 8 Domain of Application (8a: FR 8 Desired, wished (8a: Positive; 8b:
As subject; 8b: As object) Negative)
Dim. 9 Material
Dim. 10 Structure SHIFTS IN REFERENTb
Dim. 11 State & Possible Changes in it SR 1 Identical
Dim. 12 Weight & Mass SR 2 Opposite
Dim. 13 Size & Dimensionality SR 3 Partial
Dim. 14 Quantity & Mass SR 4 Modified by addition
Dim. 15 Locational Qualities SR 5 Previous meaning value
Dim. 16 Temporal Qualities SR 6 Association
Dim. 17 Possessions (17a) & SR 7 Unrelated
Belongingness (17b)
Dim. 18 Development SR 8 Verbal label
Dim. 19 Sensory Qualitiesc (19a: Of SR 9 Grammatical variation
referent; 19b: By referent)
Dim. 20 Feelings & Emotions (20a: SR 10 Previous meaning values
Evoked by referent; 20b: combined
Felt by referent)
Dim. 21 Judgments & Evaluations SR 11 Superordinate
(21a: About referent; 21b:
By referent)
Dim. 22 Cognitive Qualities and SR 12 Synonym (12a: In original
Actions (22a: Evoked by language; 12b: Translated in
referent; 22b: Of referent) another language; 12c: Label
in another medium; 12d: A
different formulation for the
same referent on the same level)
SR 13 Replacement by implicit meaning
value
 The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation 37

Types of Relationa Forms of Expression

TR 1 Attributive (1a: Qualities to FE 1 Verbal (1a: Actual enactment; 1b:
substance; 1b: Actions to Verbally described; 1c: Using
agent) available materials)
TR 2 Comparative (2a: Similarity; FE 2 Graphic (2a: Actual enactment; 2b:
2b: Difference; 2c: Verbally described; 2c: Using
Complementariness; 2d: available materials)
Relationality
TR 3 Exemplifying-Illustrative (3a: FE 3 Motoric (3a: Actual enactment; 3b:
Exemplifying instance; 3b: Verbally described; 3c: Using
Exemplifying situation; 3c: available materials)
Exemplifying scene)
TR 4 Metaphoric-Symbolic FE4 Sounds & Tones (4a: Actual
(4a: Interpretation; 4b: enactment; 4b: Verbally
Metaphor; 4c: Symbol) described; 4c: Using available
materials)
FE5 Denotative (5a: Actual enactment;
5b: Verbally described; 5c:
Using available materials)
a
Modes of meaning: Lexical mode: TR1+TR2; Personal mode: TR3+TR4.
b
Close SR: 1+3+9+12 Medium SR: 2+4+5+6+10+11 Distant SR: 7+8+13.
c
 This meaning dimension includes a listing of subcategories of the different senses/sensations: (for
special purposes, they may also be grouped into “external sensations” and “internal sensations”)
for example, color, form, taste, sound, smell, pain, humidity, and various internal sensations.

well as the more personal-subjective part, and may vary in contents, struc-
ture, variety, and complexity. The various phases of progression from the
input stimulation to the output of behavior consist of different kinds of elab-
oration of meanings.

The CO Theory: How Does it Function? Major

Theoretical Stages
The CO theory was first formulated in the late sixties in regard to observ-
able behaviors, and underwent several extensions; for example, in regard to
emotions, psychopathologies, and the latest in regard to health phenomena
(Kreitler, 2004; Kreitler & Kreitler, 1965, 1972, 1976, 1982, 1991a, 1991b). In
the present context, the CO model will first be presented briefly in its gen-
eral standard form, which will serve to introduce the following more detailed
description of the model regarding cognitive acts (Figure 2.1).
The CO theory provides detailed descriptions of the processes inter-
vening between input and output. These can be grouped into four stages,
38 Kreitler

INPUT
What is the input?

Input Input dealt

identified Reflex, with
Meaning action Conditioned Exit
Response, etc.

Input not Input identified

identified for molar action
Input not dealt with
What does
it mean for me?
Exit
Action not required
Action
required

What action?

4 types of beliefs:
Cog. Orientation
Cluster

Behavioral Intent

How to perform
action?

Behavioral Output
Program (Behavior)

Figure 2.1. A schematic flow chart of the CO Model.

each characterized by metaphorical questions and answers. The first three

stages describe mainly the formation of the motivational disposition and the
fourth focuses on the performance. The first stage is initiated by an exter-
nal or internal input and is focused on the question “What is it?” It consists
in identifying the input in terms of a limited and primary “initial mean-
ing” as one of the following: (a) a signal for a defensive, adaptive, or condi-
tioned response, (b) a signal for molar action, (c) as irrelevant in the present
 The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation 39

situation, or (d) as new or especially significant, and hence as a signal for an

orienting response.
The second stage is initiated by feedback indicating failure of the condi-
tioned or unconditioned responses to cope with the situation, a meaning sig-
naling the need for molar action, or an input that has failed to be sufficiently
identified despite the orienting response. It is focused on the question “What
does it mean in general and what does it mean to or for me?” An enriched
process of meaning generation sets in based on extended elaboration of both
interpersonally shared and personal kinds of meaning, in terms of meaning
units in the form of beliefs. By examining the extent to which the person’s
goals, norms, beliefs about oneself, and reality are involved, meaning genera-
tion leads eventually to a specification whether action is required or not. If it
is required, a tendency for performing some action emerges.
The tendency for action initiates the third stage, which is focused on the
question “What will I do?” The answer is sought by means of relevant beliefs
of four types: Beliefs about goals, which express actions or states desired or
undesired by the individual (e.g., “I want to be respected by others”); beliefs
about rules and norms, which express ethical, aesthetic, social, and other
rules and standards (e.g., “One should be assertive”); beliefs about self, which
express information about oneself, such as one’s habits, actions, feelings, or
abilities (e.g., “I rarely become excited,” “I enjoy thinking about the past”);
and general beliefs, which express information concerning others and the
environment (e.g., “The world is a very dangerous place”). Figure 2.2 presents
the formal structure of the four types of beliefs.
The cognitive elaborations in the third stage refer to beliefs that represent
deep underlying meanings of the involved inputs rather than their obvious
and explicit surface meanings. The meaning elaborations consist in match-
ings and interactions between beliefs (belief clustering) based on clarifying
the orientativeness of the beliefs (i.e., the extent to which they support the
indicated course of action). If the majority of beliefs of a certain type support
the action, that belief type is considered positively oriented concerning that
action. Alternately, it may be negatively oriented or lack any orientativeness.
If all four belief types support a certain action, or at least three, whereby the
fourth is neutral, a cluster of beliefs is formed (CO cluster) orienting toward
a particular act. It generates a unified tendency orienting toward the per-
formance of an action. This tendency is called behavioral intent, and can be
considered as a vector representing the motivational disposition toward a
given behavior (see Figure 2.3). When there are not enough beliefs in at least
two belief types orienting toward the course of action, no CO cluster will
be formed. Other resulting possibilities are the formation of two behavioral
40 Kreitler

BELIEF SUBJECT RELATION

Self I Factual

Norms Non - I Desirable

Goals I Desired

General Non - I Factual

Figure 2.2. Formal characteristics of the four types of beliefs.

Beliefs about Self

Beliefs about Norms

Motivational Disposition
[Behavioral Intent]
Beliefs about Goals

General Beliefs
Figure 2.3. The vector of the four belief types representing the motivational disposition.

intents when there are two CO clusters (intent conflict); the retrieval of an
almost complete CO cluster on the basis of past recurrences of similar situ-
ations; the formation of incomplete clusters due to the paucity of beliefs of a
certain type; or the formation of an inoperable cluster due to the inclusion of
as-if beliefs in one or more belief types that may orient toward daydreaming.
The fourth stage is initiated by the formation of the behavioral intent, and
is focused on the question “How will I do it?” The answer is in the form of a
behavioral program; namely, a hierarchically structured sequence of instruc-
tions governing the performance of the act, including both the more general
strategy as well as the more specific tactics. Different programs are involved
in executing an overt molar act, a cognitive act, an emotional response, a
daydreamed act, conflict resolution, and so forth. There are four major
kinds of programs: (1) Innately determined programs (e.g., those control-
ling reflexes). (2) Programs determined both innately and through learning
 The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation 41

(e.g., those controlling instincts and language behavior). (3) Programs

acquired through learning (e.g., those controlling culturally shaped behav-
iors such as running elections) or personal habits (e.g., forms of relaxing,
arranging one’s cupboard). (4) Programs constructed by the individual ad
hoc, in line with contextual requirements. Implementing a behavioral intent
by a program requires selecting and retrieving a program, and often adapting
it to prevailing circumstances. A program conflict may occur between two
equally adequate programs or between one that is about to be enacted when
another is still in operation.

The CO Theory of Cognitive Acts

Applying the CO model to cognitive acts includes four stages, in line with the
theoretical model presented above. The first stage starts with some internal
or external input (e.g., an image, memory, word). The “What is it?” ques-
tion results in identifying the input as requiring an action involving resources
that exceed those involved in immediate conditioned responses. For example,
it could be an input identified as “an image, something I saw.” Moreover, it
is likely that the initial identification of the input already includes a feature
characterizing the general nature of the domain to which the input belongs,
namely, cognition (e.g., “an image in a book,” “a puzzle”). However, this does
not indicate that an action, cognitive or other, will actually be performed. In
the second stage, the meaning of the initially identified input is further elab-
orated in terms of references to both external reality and oneself. Some of
the beliefs that may be evoked around the input of “image in a book” could
include: “General impressions may be misleading”; “Unclear ideas cannot be
controlled” (general beliefs); “I want to have clear thoughts in my mind”; “I
want to have a perfect memory” (goal beliefs); “One should try to control
what goes on in one’s mind”; “Memories should be precise” (norm beliefs);
“I feel very uncomfortable if something is not quite clear”; “I like finding out
what is in books” (belief about self). Beliefs of this kind indicate that the input
initially identified as “an image in a book” is related to personal concerns,
reflected in beliefs about norms, goals, and oneself. Hence, a tendency for a
cognitive action is evoked. This flows into the third stage, which consists in
shaping up a pattern of beliefs of the four types triggered by meanings, some
of which appeared already in the second phase – for example, controlling one’s
thoughts, clarifying thoughts, finding out about books, and precise memory.
The beliefs that show up are partly retrieved and partly shaped ad hoc on
the basis of available meanings (e.g., a belief about one’s impulsivity may not
be available for retrieval but may be formed from beliefs about impulsive
42 Kreitler

people – “impulsive people do things without thinking” – and beliefs about

oneself – “I never do things without thinking”). The evoked beliefs refer to
norms, goals, reality, and oneself. The proportions of each are not necessar-
ily equal, and the order of evocation is probably determined by the involved
meanings. Some of the evoked beliefs support or point in the direction of the
action – “clarify the image” – others do not support this direction or support
others, such as, “let go, forget” or “wait and see if other relevant images come
up.” However, if a sufficient number of beliefs of the four types support the
action of “clarify the image,” a motivational disposition (or in term of the CO
theory, a behavioral intent) is shaped that brings about the evocation of an
adequate cognitive program for clarifying the image.
In other cases, the cognitive act may be more complex, calling for more
elaborate cognitive programs that deal with problem solving or classifica-
tion or critical thinking, and so forth (see Cognitive Performance: Cognitive
Programs and Procedures). The initial input may also be more complex, such
as a question or a description of a problem, which already include the impli-
cation of the need for a molar behavior act. The different phases may be more
or less coalesced and run through quickly, depending on how frequently the
action has been performed and how homogeneous the support for it is. In the
case of often-recurring cognitive acts, it is likely that the CO cluster may stay
in an “almost-complete state” and need to be complemented only through a
few currently relevant beliefs in order to generate a motivational disposition.
The description of the model for cognitive acts demonstrates that the
greater part of the model is devoted to the elaboration and formation of the
motivational disposition. Its emergence is a function of the merging of sev-
eral kinds of CO clusters. The basic one is the CO cluster for cognition, which
is amplified by CO clusters for more specific cognitive functions, such as
memory, imagination, or problem solving. These CO clusters merely set the
scene for the performance of the cognitive act. They are further amplified by
CO clusters specifying the kind of thinking that may be applied (e.g., creative,
intuitive, logical) and CO clusters specifying the kind of domain in which
the cognitive act is about to be performed (e.g., mathematics, design). These
CO clusters are followed by the emergence of the CO cluster for the specific
cognitive act.

The CO Theory: Predicting Cognitive Acts

In this section, the procedure for predicting cognitive acts will be described;
results will be presented in the next sections. In the framework of the CO
theory, predicting cognitive acts is done in conformity with the procedure
 The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation 43

that has been applied successfully concerning a great number of behaviors in

different domains. These include: coming on time; reactions to success and
failure; curiosity; achievement; assertiveness; conformity; cheating; overeat-
ing; breastfeeding; cessation of smoking; self-disclosure; rigidity; defensive
responses; undergoing tests for the early detection of breast cancer; compli-
ance in diabetes patients; paranoia; having colorectal cancer; and so forth.
All studies refer to actual observed behavioral or other outputs, in contrast
to self-reported ones. The participants were adults, adolescents, children,
retarded individuals, schizophrenics, individuals with different physical dis-
orders, and others (Kreitler et al., 1994, 2008; Kreitler & Chemerinski, 1988;
Kreitler & Kreitler, 1976, 1982, 1988a, 1991a,1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1997; Lobel,
1982; Kreitler, Schwartz, & Kreitler, 1987; Kreitler, Shahar, & Kreitler, 1976;
Nurymberg, Kreitler, & Weissler, 1996; Tipton & Riebsame, 1987; Westhoff &
Halbach-Suarez, 1989).
All studies demonstrated that behavior occurs if it is supported by at least
three belief types and a behavioral program is available. The success of the
predictions is based on applying the special standardized procedure devel-
oped in the framework of the CO theory (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1982). The pro-
cedure consists in assessing the motivational disposition for the behavior (viz.
behavioral intent) by means of a CO questionnaire and examining the avail-
ability of a behavioral program for implementing the intent. A CO question-
naire assesses the degree to which the participant agrees to beliefs orienting
toward the behavior in question or rejects those that do not orient toward it.
The beliefs differ in form and contents. In form, they refer to the four types of
beliefs: beliefs about goals, rules and standards (or norms), the self, and oth-
ers and reality (or general beliefs). In contents, the beliefs refer to themes that
represent meanings underlying the behavior in question (called themes).
The themes of the CO questionnaire are identified by means of a stan-
dard procedure applied to pretest participants that manifest the output (viz.
cognitive act) in question or not. The procedure consists in interviewing the
participants about the meanings of the key terms and then, in turn, sequen-
tially about their responses (see Figure 2.4 for a schematic representation of
the procedure). Repeating the questions about meanings leads to deeper-
layer meanings, out of which those that recur in at least 50 percent of the
interviewees are selected for the final questionnaire. For example, the themes
for planning include avoiding uncertainty and taking charge of situations
(Kreitler & Kreitler, 1987a). Examples of themes for different cognitive acts
follow (see The Motivational Dispositions for Cognition). It is important to
emphasize that the beliefs in the questionnaire do not refer in any way to the
behavior or cognitive act in question, but only to the themes that represent
44 Kreitler

Interpersonally shared meaning of behavior or disorder

Key-words

Level 1 : Personal meanings of key-words

Level 2 : Personal meanings of responses on level 1

Level 3 : Personal meaning of responses on level 2

Figure 2.4. Schematic description of the process of identifying themes by meaning
generation.

the underlying meanings and do not directly evoke associations to the behav-
ior or cognitive act.
Thus, a CO questionnaire mirrors the prediction matrix (see Figure 2.5). It
usually consists of four parts presented together in random order, each repre-
senting one of the four types of beliefs. Each part contains, in random order,
beliefs referring to the different themes. The participant is requested to check
on a four-point scale the degree to which each belief seems true (or correct)
to him/her. A CO questionnaire is examined for its psychometric properties,
including reliability and validity, before it is ready for application.
It is evident that for every kind of behavior it is necessary to construct a
particular CO questionnaire. This in itself is the “bad news.” However, the
“good news” is that a single CO questionnaire may predict a broad range of
relevant behaviors, for instance, the CO questionnaire of curiosity yielded
significant predictions of 14 different curiosity behaviors (Kreitler & Kreitler,
1994b).
The prediction procedure generated by the CO theory has provided a great
number of significant predictions of actual cognitive and other behaviors, of
many different kinds and from different domains, in participants of different
ages and intelligence levels, even cognitively challenged individuals. Notably,
the procedure does not enable the participants to tailor their responses so that
they would or would not correspond to their behaviors because it is impossible
 The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation 45

Beliefs about Beliefs about

Themes Beliefs about Self General Beliefs
Goals Norms
1)

2)

3)

n)

Figure 2.5. Schematic representation of the matrix of beliefs predictive of behavior.

to unravel the kind of involved behavior from the statements in the CO ques-
tionnaire. Further advantages of the prediction procedure are that applying it
does not require any special mind-set, preparation, intention, or even average
intelligence on the part of the participants. Additionally, success in predicting
does not depend on involving any further criteria or constructs or assump-
tions or the creation of particular conditions regarding any behavior.

The Motivational Dispositions for Cognition

In the present section, sets of themes for different cognitive acts will be pre-
sented. Each set of this kind constitutes the basis for one specific CO ques-
tionnaire designed to predict the enactment of a specific cognitive act. The
themes were identified by the standard procedure of interviewing pretest
subjects described above. Each theme was phrased in the form of beliefs of
the four types, one item per theme in each type of belief – some in the direc-
tion supporting the act, some in the reverse direction. The participants were
requested to check one of four presented response alternatives for each item
(agree completely, agree, disagree, disagree completely; scored as 4, 3, 2, and
1 points, respectively). The CO questionnaire provides four major scores for
belief types for each participant (one for each belief type) and additional
scores for each of the themes across belief types, and sometimes for the
groupings of the themes based on factor analysis. For predicting a cognitive
act, the responses to beliefs of each type are summed across all themes. It is
expected that the sums of the four types of beliefs will provide a significant
prediction of the cognitive act. We present the themes because they represent
the contents of the different motivational dispositions.
46 Kreitler

CO questionnaires for cognition and cognitive functions. The CO clusters

described in this section do not refer to specific cognitive acts but to the acti-
vation of cognition as a whole, and major functions or subsystems – such as
memory or curiosity – that may subserve many different cognitive acts. First
among these is the CO questionnaire of cognition. It is designed to enable assess-
ment of the tendency of individuals to deal with cognition, use it, apply it, seek
opportunities to engage in thinking activities, develop, and improve it. The
major themes identified for this questionnaire focus around understanding
oneself and the world; having complete freedom (e.g., in selecting the subject
matter and the procedures, in setting up the rules, in shaping the structure);
feeling one’s strength and testing one’s abilities in facing challenges; being in
complete control; downplaying emotions; and getting a distance from oth-
ers. Some of the themes, if endorsed, support dealing with cognition; others
(see especially the last two) may orient away from cognition. Specific themes
in the CO questionnaire of cognition are related to items or scales in other
instruments assessing motivation for cognition, such as need for cognition
and tolerance of ambiguity (Kreitler & Margaliot, in press). High scorers on
the CO of cognition differed from the low scorers in the following responses:
when given the choice, they more often preferred solving problems themselves
rather than looking up the solutions; when being presented with problems for
solving in their fields of expertise (e.g., construction engineering, electrical
engineering), they spent more time working on the problems and changed
strategies of solution (according to self-reports) more often, although the
solutions they attained were not better or more complete than those of the
low scorers (Kreitler & Casakin, 2012; Casakin & Kreitler, in press).
Curiosity represents a major function of the cognitive system. It is focused
on gathering or absorbing information, regardless of the source or means.
A great part of the functioning of cognition as a whole and of the specific
subsystems of cognition as well as the performance of specific cognitive acts
depend on the nature and amount of information that has been gathered and
is available. Absorbing and getting information is dependent on CO. The CO
of curiosity is based on themes focused, for example, on the value of knowl-
edge; fear or attraction of the unfamiliar; intrusion of privacy; and chang-
ing the order of things. The CO of curiosity predicted in preschoolers and
first graders the number of switchings between different presented stimuli,
number of inspecting and of exploratory manipulations of unknown objects,
and choices of unknown rather than known stimuli (Kreitler & Kreitler,
1986, 1994b) as well as conceptual explorations and setting up hypotheses in
a probability learning task (Kreitler & Zigler, 1990). Further, in a study with
first graders, an experimental training of five half-hour group sessions was
 The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation 47

performed for changing beliefs of the four types relevant for curiosity. The
training led to the expected increases in the level of curiosity behaviors in the
children whose CO of curiosity was raised (Kreitler, Kreitler, & Boas, 1976).
Finally, the CO of memory includes themes such as the centrality of inner
life, investing in oneself, the importance and value of a mass of information,
dealing with the past as a source of stability, conserving ones’ possessions,
continuity in development, and life as an organized structure rather than a
random set of points. High scorers on the CO of memory performed better
on various memory tests, verbal and nonverbal, than the low scorers. Notably,
this was observed in samples of undergraduates as well as in people over 65
(Kreitler & Kreitler, 1990b).
CO questionnaires for types of thinking. Types of thinking refer to structur-
ally and motivationally defined kinds of thinking that direct the activation of
cognition along specific lines. We will deal with creativity, inventiveness, and
intuitive thinking.
The CO questionnaire of creativity (Casakin & Kreitler, 2010; Kreitler &
Casakin, 2009). This questionnaire refers to 79 themes, which form the fol-
lowing 11 groupings: (1) self-development (investing, promoting, and guarding
oneself); (2) emphasis on the inner world (identifying, knowing, developing,
and expressing one’s thinking, feeling, and imagination); (3) inner-directedness
(emphasis on one’s desires, will, and decision; self-confidence in one’s ability
to succeed); (4) contribution to society (concern with contributing some-
thing meaningful to the community or society even if it does not involve
personal advancement); (5) awareness of one’s own uniqueness as an individ-
ual (emphasis on oneself as an individual unique in one’s talents and way of
perceiving, behaving, and being, not necessarily due to nonconformity); (6)
freedom in acting (need to act in line with rules and regulations set by oneself
rather than by others); (7) restricted openness to the environment (readiness
and need to absorb from the environment knowledge and inspiration coupled
with resistance to being overwhelmed and harmed by too much openness);
(8) acting under conditions of uncertainty (readiness to act under condi-
tions of uncertainty concerning the results, with no control over the circum-
stances, a tendency which may resemble risk-taking); (9) demanding from
oneself (demanding from oneself effort, perseverance, giving up comfort,
and readiness for total investment despite difficulties and even failures); (10)
self-expression (concern with using one’s talents and expressing oneself with
authenticity and characteristically); (11) nonfunctionality (readiness to act
even if functionality is not clearly evident from the start). The eleven group-
ings form two factors, confirmed in several different samples. The first factor
represents the themes focused on the self – its uniqueness, development, and
48 Kreitler

expression. The second represents the themes focused on maintaining open-

ness to the environment without endangering inner-directness.
The CO of creativity predicted in design students creativity of designs in a
particular task assessed by four architectural experts as well as the scores of
the four factors of creativity – fluency, flexibility, elaboration, and originality
applied to the produced designs (Kreitler & Casakin, 2009); creativity of solu-
tions to engineering problems in engineering students (Kreitler & Casakin,
2012; Casakin & Kreitler, in press); and performance on creativity tests of
students in elementary and high schools (Margaliot, 2005; Richter, 2003).
Inventiveness differs from creativity in being focused more on the func-
tional and operational aspects of the output and less on its uniqueness and
originality. The CO of inventiveness shares several themes with the CO of cre-
ativity, such as those that deal with freedom in acting and demanding from
oneself, but differs from it in other themes, such as the emphasis on func-
tionality. In general, of the two factors of the CO of creativity, the empha-
sis on the openness to the environment is more characteristic of the CO of
inventiveness, whereas the emphasis on the self is more characteristic of the
CO of creativity. In a study with students from different faculties, partici-
pants responded to both CO questionnaires and were presented several prob-
lems for solution from various domains, such as ecological, engineering, and
social. Each participant was characterized as having a higher score on the CO
of creativity or inventiveness. The presented solutions were identified by three
independent experts as higher in creativity or inventiveness (judgments were
unanimous in 69 percent of the solutions). The participants scoring higher in
the CO of creativity produced about 75 percent of solutions judged to be crea-
tive, whereas those scoring higher in the CO of inventiveness produced about
72 percent of solutions judged to be inventive (Kreitler, 2009b).
Intuitive thinking was defined as the kind of holistic, experiential, and fast
thinking, bound to rules of thumb, that puts special premium on heuristics.
The major themes in the CO of intuitive thinking are opening up to situations,
succumbing to the flow, being reactive, promoting one’s emotions and rely-
ing on them, preferring concreteness, overlooking details, accepting imper-
fection, being tolerant toward one’s mistakes and inconsistencies, readiness
to minimize efforts, and avoiding the investment of too many resources.
The high scorers on the CO of intuitiveness used heuristics that led them to
significantly more intuitive rather than reasoned or analytical solutions of
­problems – verbal and geometric – than the low scorers (Kreitler, & Margaliot
(in press)).
The CO questionnaires for specific domains of contents. Domains of con-
tents represent areas for the deployment of cognition, such as mathematics,
 The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation 49

design, technology, medicine, or psychology. So far, only two CO question-

naires of this kind are available – for mathematics and clinical versus experi-
mental psychology. The CO of mathematics included 17 themes that formed
two factors: (1) sticking to rules as the basis for excellence and control; and (2)
avoiding risks. The scores of the CO of mathematics significantly predicted
the grades in mathematics and students’ level of studies in mathematics for
matriculation (extended, medium, limited) in students of the 11th and 12th
grades (Kreitler & Nussbaum, 1998).
The study about psychology focused on predicting, by means of CO ques-
tionnaires, which choice – clinical psychology or experimental psychology –
psychology students would make at the end of the first three years of study.
The predictions were 95 percent correct as compared to self-reported prefer-
ences, which were 61 percent correct. The major themes in the CO of clini-
cal psychology were reactiveness, controlling others, focus on intuition, and
immediate comprehension, whereas the major themes in the CO of experi-
mental psychology were interest in understanding, tendency to manipulate,
high ambitions, and delay of gratification (Kreitler, 2008).
The CO questionnaires for specific cognitive acts. Specific cognitive acts
represent operations in the cognitive field that have structures that parallel
acts of behavior in other domains; that is, they have a starting point, a goal,
an end point, and procedures in between. Cognitive acts of this kind are for
example planning, organizing/ordering materials, classifying, criticizing,
playing chess, explaining, and problem solving of all kinds. The CO of plan-
ning will serve as one example. The major themes are avoiding uncertainty,
taking charge of situations, avoiding surprises, being the winner, prepared-
ness, readiness to be wasteful, and dealing with the future. In one study, the
subjects were children in different age groups ranging from 4 years and 9
months to 11 years and 4 months. They were presented 10 planning tasks in
different domains, and their plans were evaluated in terms of specific criteria
manifesting planning, such as number of alternative plans presented by the
planner, number of if-then eventualities considered explicitly in the plans,
and degree of chronological orderings in the plans. The high scorers on the
CO of planning presented significantly better plans in all domains than the
low scorers (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1987a). The same results were obtained in a
sample of undergraduates (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1987b).
The CO of chess playing includes a different set of themes, one of which is
planning. Other themes are acceptance of rules and restrictions, checking
all alternatives, considering difficulties as challenges, and readiness to accept
defeat or deal with a rival likely to win. The scores on the CO of chess pre-
dicted in children (from the age of 10 onward) and adults the amount of time
50 Kreitler

spent on average in playing chess and learning to play chess as well as the
level of expertise in the game itself, as evaluated by expert observers (Kreitler
& Margaliot, in press).
The CO questionnaires for cognitive styles. Cognitive styles are preferred or
habitual ways of performing various cognitive processes or acts. Some cog-
nitive styles are closer to habits (e.g., scanning, leveling versus sharpening);
others appear to be closer to personality traits (e.g., intolerance of ambigu-
ity, field independence). The CO of rigidity includes themes such as fear of
punishment, limited possibilities for doing things, trying harder or giving up
when a task gets difficult, and keeping track of one’s responses. Children with
IQs lower than 70 scoring high on the CO of rigidity persevered more in their
responses and were less likely to change their responses when required than
the low scorers (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1988a; see also Chapter 20 in this book).
Intolerance of ambiguity is one of the oldest cognitive styles or cognitive
traits. The themes of the CO of intolerance of ambiguity include, for example,
acceptance of authority, clear demarcation of domains, avoidance multiplic-
ity in favor of homogeneity, internal control, and avoidance of changes. High
scorers had a shorter reaction time before identifying ambiguous figures or
colors (Kreitler, Maguen, & Kreitler, 1975).
Chaotic thinking is one of the most recent cognitive styles. The CO of cha-
otic thinking includes themes such as acceptance of inconsistency, preference
for complexity, preference for ambiguities, avoidance of direct confrontation
with difficulties, trying not to miss opportunities, and being aware regard-
ing the environment. In tasks of planning, high scorers in the CO of cha-
otic thinking as compared with low scorers produced more different plans
and considered in each plan a greater variety of aspects, including consider-
ation for personal needs of involved individuals; in tasks of model building,
they produced more complex models, considering imaginary eventualities
(Kreitler, & Margaliot, in press).

Cognitive Performance: Cognitive Programs

and Procedures
According to the CO approach, for an output to occur the motivational disposi-
tion needs to be implemented by a plan that controls actual performance. There
are four basic kinds of programs in the cognitive sphere: (1) innately determined
programs, which control the initial response to inputs – the primary reaction
to the input and its identification, and if the identification fails, the evocation
of the orienting response designed to provide more information for identifica-
tion; (2) programs determined both innately and through learning (e.g., those
 The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation 51

controling scanning input arrays or language behavior); (3) programs acquired

through learning (e.g., those controlling problem solving, searching for infor-
mation, strategies of argumentation, and so forth); and (4) programs con-
structed by the individual ad hoc, in line with contextual requirements.
The programs acquired through learning are the major kinds of programs in
the cognitive sphere. They are often denoted by labels, such as schemes, strate-
gies, structures, heuristics, or models. Notably, these programs consist mainly of
cognitive components ordered in some structure, which determine the kind of
cognitive operations to be undertaken and their order. Cognitive programs use
a great variety of cognitive components. Some programs, such as algorithms,
consist of a set of well-defined instructions describing the route from an initial
state through a well-defined series of successive states, eventually reaching a
final ending state. Some programs consist of more general terms that describe
phases, such as problem orientation, problem definition, generation of several
solutions, choice of solution, and solution implementation. Still other pro-
grams refer to skills that are themselves mini programs, such as using a decision
tree, applying “hill climbing” (i.e., start with a random solution and improve
it by making successively small changes in it), identifying the major factors in
the situation, or troubleshooting (for repair of faulty products). Other differ-
ent programs include steps, such as comparing (e.g., given state with desired
state), fine-tuning of declarative or procedural knowledge, finding an analogy,
or detecting contradictions (e.g., Altshuller, 1984; Anderson, 1993; Newell &
Simon, 1972; Polya, 1957; Sternberg & Frensch, 1991). Many cognitive programs
match the description of hierarchically structured cognitive operations.
A careful analysis of the involved steps reveals that they refer to cognitive
processes, directly (as in the case of steps, such as compare, detect contra-
diction, delete negation) or indirectly (as in the case of steps, such as define
problem). Hence, it is to be expected that cognitive programs should have
correlates in terms of cognitive processes. Several studies have confirmed this
expectation. The cognitive processes were assessed by means of the Meaning
Test, which provides a comprehensive profile of cognitive processes available
to the individuals (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1990b; see Table 2.1). Thus, compar-
ing the profiles of subjects performing well or poorly in a standard set of
planning tasks yields a set of cognitive processes differentiating significantly
between the two groups. These variables constitute the profile of cognitive
processes whose presence or absence underlies the programs of planning, for
example, temporal qualities, causality, implications and consequences, man-
ner of occurrence, and operation. The higher the number of relevant cog-
nitive processes the individual has the better his or her performance in the
cognitive programs of planning (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1987a, 1987b).
52 Kreitler

Similarly, regarding curiosity, five major cognitive programs were iden-

tified: manipulatory exploration, perceptual exploration, conceptual explo-
ration, exploration of the complex or ambiguous, and adjustive-compliant
exploration. Each of these programs corresponds to a set of cognitive processes
assessed by means of the Meaning Test. For example, conceptual exploration
makes use of conjunctive and disjunctive relations, shifting to a network of
related subject matters, consideration of function, manner of operation, and
causes and results (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1986, 1994b). Another study showed
that even conserving object constancy relies on the use of a cognitive pro-
gram anchored in meaning variables (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1988b).
The selection of cognitive programs for implementing the motivational
disposition for a specific cognitive act is determined by both beliefs and
bonds formed through frequent joint evocation of the act and the program.
The beliefs guiding the choice are included at least partly in the CO clusters
for cognition and cognitive functions, and especially in the CO clusters for
particular thinking types and specific domains of contents. These are cogni-
tive programs bound, for example, to intuitive thinking or for mathematics.
It may be assumed that cognitive styles, supported by CO clusters, are one
of the factors contributing to the selection of one cognitive program over
another.
In some cases, the programs for implementing cognitive acts include a part
that consists of actual behaviors or are complemented by a part of this kind.
For example, manipulatory exploration may involve actual motor handling
of objects, responses to a task of rigidity may require physically changing the
location of stimuli, and getting information may require questioning people
or searching in archives. These examples indicate that the implementation of
cognitive acts may be affected by factors that are not purely cognitive, such
as tendencies to approach others or handling objects that belong to others.
Considerations of this kind suggest that behavioral tendencies that them-
selves are dependent on CO clusters cannot be overlooked in the context of
implementing cognitive acts. Major among these are achievement, reactions
to success and failure, perseverance, delay of gratification, and responsiveness
to tangible or intangible rewards for one’s actions (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1988a;
Kreitler et al., 1995).

The Impact of States of Consciousness

The evocation and formation of motivational dispositions, anchored in CO
clusters, and of cognitive programs for their implementation do not occur in
a vacuum. They take place in the framework of a cognitive system that itself is
 The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation 53

characterized by being in a particular state at any given moment in time. The

state of a system is commonly defined as a description of a system in terms
of parameters relevant for that system – say, positions and momentums in
the case of classical mechanics or temperature, pressure, and composition in
the case of thermodynamics. Because it was shown that meaning variables
constitute the materials with which cognition functions, and that they under-
lie cognitive acts, it is likely that the state of the system of cognition can be
described in terms of meaning variables. The description consists in spec-
ifying which meaning variables or sets of meaning variables are salient in
the cognitive system at a given time. Salience of meaning variables implies
that the contents and processes corresponding to these meaning variables
are more easily retrievable and hence are more likely to be involved in the
prevailing cognitive activity in the system. Thus, the state of the system rep-
resents a constellation of meaning variables.
At any given time, the cognitive system is dominated by a particular con-
stellation of meaning variables. These constellations may change. The factors
that may bring about changes of this kind include physical determinants,
such as intoxication, fatigue, specific medications, and drugs; certain behav-
iors, such as dancing or perseverative movements; meditation and various
mystical-spiritual practices; emotional states; specific cognitive tasks; and
experimental manipulations. It is possible that some changes occur spontane-
ously due to the internal dynamics of the system. The prevailing sociocultural
atmosphere may be a contributing factor in promoting the greater frequency
or stability of a certain state of the system.
Studies showed that some meaning variables exert a pervasive impact on the
cognitive system, for example, those that constitute the personal-subjective
mode of meaning and those that constitute the interpersonally-shared
mode of meaning (Kreitler, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2009a). These two modes
of meaning differ in the nature of the bonding within the meaning units,
between referents and the meaning values assigned to them (see Table 2.1).
In the personal-subjective mode, the bonds are exemplifying-illustrative and
metaphoric-symbolic, whereas in the interpersonally-shared lexical mode
they are attributive and comparative. The personal-subjective mode is used
mainly for expressing one’s inner world of experiences, which may be subjec-
tive and individually shaped. In contrast, the interpersonally-shared mode
is used preferentially for expressing one’s references to reality and the world
shared with others socially and in action. Studies showed that there are dif-
ferences in cognitive functioning when one or the other mode of meaning is
induced experimentally to dominate the scene for a given time (by a brief stan-
dard procedure). Dominance of the personal-subjective mode of meaning in
54 Kreitler

the cognitive scene led to the following findings as compared with the dom-
inance of the interpersonally-shared mode: identifying embedded figures is
faster and with fewer errors; gestalt completion is faster; there are more asso-
ciations, especially personal associations; judging emotional expressions on
faces is faster and with fewer errors; visual memory is better; understanding
of poetry is better; art preferences in the visual arts change in the direction
of the expressionistic and symbolists art works; scores on creativity tests are
higher; reaction time of response to neutral stimuli is slower; judging validity
of syllogisms is poorer; indices of emotional control and reality testing on the
Rorschach test are poorer; accuracy of size estimations and size comparisons
of lines and circles is poorer. (Kreitler, Kreitler, & Wanounou, 1987–1988).
Because the modes of meaning were correlated with and led to so many
different and variegated cognitive effects and in addition to other effects (e.g.,
self-image, emotions), it seemed justified to consider the changes in the cog-
nitive system as representing states of consciousness.
Further studies showed that other configurations of meaning variables also
led to pervasive results in cognitive performance, although of a different kind
than those obtained by means of the meaning modes. In these studies, the
experimental induction did not focus on the meaning variables but on attitu-
dinal approaches (abstract or concrete approach) or emotional states (anger
or joy). Each of these inductions produced specific changes in the meaning
variables dominating the cognitive scene. These changes in the dominant
meaning variables were responsible for changes in cognitive performance.
For example, the induction of the concrete approach led to the salience of
the meaning variables relating to the concrete aspects of objects (e.g., sensory
qualities, material, weight, size, location) and to weakening of the meaning
variables relating to more abstract features (e.g., superordinate categories,
subclasses). Accordingly, the judgments of the subjects about severity of situ-
ations were more limited in scope and reflected consideration of fewer rele-
vant aspects (Rotstein, 2010).
The conclusion supported by these preliminary studies is that the state of
the cognitive system at a given time – which may be called state of conscious-
ness – plays a role in codetermining the cognitive output. However, it is still
unclear at present in which ways the state of the cognitive system affects the
output. One way may be assumed to be through cognitive programs. This is
likely because these programs depend on meaning variables (see Table 2.1)
and the state of the cognitive system consists in the differential salience of
meaning variables.
Another possibility would be that the state of the cognitive system also
affects the salience of different CO clusters. It could be the case that in a
 The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation 55

certain state of consciousness, specific CO clusters are promoted: the CO of

intuitive thinking or the CO of creativity when the personal-subjective mode
of meaning is salient; and the CO of analytical thinking or the CO of the
cognitive style of ordered thinking are promoted when the interpersonally-
shared lexical mode of meaning dominates the cognitive system.

The Involvement of Emotions and

Personality Traits
Emotions are involved in different ways in cognitive performance. One
way was discussed previously (see The Impact of States of Consciousness).
Emotions may be assumed to alter the state of the cognitive system and hence
to function in a way similar to other transformations identified as produc-
ing states of consciousness. We may call this the setting-producing function of
emotions. Studies showed for example that when a negative emotion domi-
nates the scene, there is a focusing on details and information from exter-
nal sources; when a positive emotion dominates the scene, there is focusing
on generalizations and information from internal sources (e.g., Yiend, 2010).
Further, there is evidence that positive affect facilitates careful, thorough
thinking and problem solving, promoting both new learning as well as uti-
lization of existing knowledge (Isen, 2004). Studies in which emotions were
evoked experimentally showed that each of the emotional states of anxiety,
anger, and joy corresponds to a specific constellation of meaning variables
that becomes dominant. It is likely that the same holds concerning other
emotions. Thus, emotions may contribute to the evocation of CO clusters
and cognitive programs for implementing the evoked motivational disposi-
tions. It may be assumed for example that the same or similar motivational
disposition would be implemented by different cognitive programs under the
impact of different emotional states.
A second way in which emotions are involved in cognitive performance
can be called the adjunctive-evaluative function of emotions. Emotions
accompany cognitive performance. They may provide signals about how the
cognitive performance is getting along (e.g., “fine”), whether the chosen track
(defined by the evoked CO clusters and the emergent motivational disposi-
tion) is adequate, and if the task is at a stage that justifies closure and subse-
quent completion. Other characteristic emotional evaluations may become
manifest as pride over the cognitive achievement; the experience of “flow”
(CsíkszentmihályI, 1998) when things move on just right; the aha experience
of enlightenment when a creative idea appears; euphoria in response to a
good solution to a problem; or the feeling of being stuck when no solution
56 Kreitler

is in sight. A good example of this function of emotions from the analogous

domain of behavior is the anxious reaction a driver may have if while driv-
ing on a highway he or she suddenly swerves out of the lane. Anxiety did not
determine the driving; it merely indicates the role of emotions in continu-
ously checking the operation. Observations of this kind exemplify Damasio’s
(1994) claim that neurological impairment of emotional reactions (such as
the famous nineteenth-century case of Phineas Gage) involves a loss of prac-
tical reasoning ability. Several studies, mainly in the field of decision making,
suggest that decisions are aided by emotions evoked during the consider-
ation of different options and their consequences (Bechara, 2004; Greenspan,
2004; Naqvi, Shiv, & Bechara, 2006).
The impact of personality traits on cognitive performance is of a different
order than that of emotions. Personality traits may be expected to affect cog-
nitive performance because they are currently conceptualized and assessed
in psychology as configurations that include attitudes, modes of perceiving,
and some kind of behavioral tendencies. This general conception is rendered
more specific by the work of Kreitler and Kreitler (1990b), which showed that
each personality trait corresponds to a specific pattern of meaning variables.
Patterns of this kind make it possible to account for the diverse effects of
personality traits. Personality traits are neither attitudes nor modes of infor-
mation absorption or processing or behavioral habits. However, as sets of
meaning variables, they may exert an impact on these and hence on different
phases in the evocation and operation of cognitive functioning. These may
include mainly the identification of the input as relevant for cognition, elab-
oration of the meaning of the input as relevant for one or another CO cluster,
and the elicitation of specific cognitive styles that may affect the selection
of particular cognitive programs. These effects seem at present to be of sec-
ondary order because they are not specific and occur only under particular
circumstances.

Blueprint for a Model of Motivation for

Cognitive Performance
The great variety of factors involved in the production of a cognitive act calls for
an integration in the form of a blueprint for an inclusive model. In the frame-
work of the CO theory, the motivation for a cognitive act is based on two major
factors: the motivational disposition and the cognitive programs. The former
are behavioral intents anchored theoretically and operationally in CO clusters;
the latter are mainly hierarchically structured cognitive operations, anchored in
cognitive processes and meaning assignment variables (Figure 2.6).
 The Structure and Dynamics of Cognitive Orientation 57

Motivational Disposition Performance Means Performance

Cognitive Cognitive
Types Acts

Cognition Meaning Variables

Specific
Cognitive Act

Cognitive
function Cognitive Programs

Cognitive Cognitive
Domains Styles

Personality Traits Emotions

Figure 2.6. The general cognitive orientation model of cognitive acts.

The motivational disposition is formed gradually and is shaped by the

evocation of different kinds of CO clusters. The major ones are the CO for
cognition and the CO clusters for cognitive functions, such as curiosity and
memory; the CO clusters for different types of thinking, such as creativity or
intuitive thinking; the CO clusters for specific domains of contents, such as
technology or mathematics; and finally the CO for the specific cognitive act
that is implemented in action. The motivational disposition for the specific
cognitive act reflects components from the antecedent CO clusters that were
evoked prior to the CO of the cognitive act, namely, for cognition, cognitive
functions, types of thinking, and domains of contents. In the case of recur-
ring cognitive acts or inputs, the antecedent CO clusters merge so that the
CO cluster for the cognitive act emerges fast without the more detailed elabo-
rations that take place otherwise. In cases of this kind, the CO cluster for the
cognitive act may be considered to be in an almost-ready state.
Cognitive programs are mostly in an almost-ready state, so they need
only to be retrieved, selected, and adapted to the situation at hand. Cognitive
programs may be expected to be mostly available, having been acquired and
learned in different contexts – at school or work – and often shaped by CO
clusters of cognitive styles. The whole procedure, including the evocation of
the relevant CO clusters and the cognitive programs, takes place in a setting
characterized by being in a specific state (viz. state of consciousness), affected
and monitored by current emotions, and mostly indirectly affected by steady
personality traits.
In order to predict a cognitive act, both the motivational disposition and
the cognitive program need to be considered. The assessed motivational dis-
position may be limited to the CO of the cognitive act because in most cases
58 Kreitler

one deals with recurrent acts. For many cognitive acts, there are already CO
questionnaires that may be freely used. Concerning the cognitive program, it is
mostly only necessary to check its availability by questioning or observation.
In the studies in which both the CO clusters of cognitive acts and the avail-
ability of cognitive programs were considered, it turned out that the rela-
tive weight of these two factors are approximately equal (Kreitler & Casakin,
2009; Kreitler & Kreitler, 1987a, 1987b).
In addition to predicting cognitive acts, the CO approach provides the the-
oretical and methodological means for changing cognitive performance by
focusing on the relevant CO clusters, cognitive programs, and state of con-
sciousness (Kreitler, 2009a; Kreitler & Kreitler, 1990a). A major role of the CO
model of cognitive functioning is to serve as a platform and framework for
further studies that will continue to clarify and improve the existing approach
and discover new venues and perspectives for the exploration of cognition.

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 3

Personality and Cognition

Phillip L. Ackerman

Three Families of Traits

(Cognition, Affect, and Volition)
Philosophers (e.g., Kant, 1790) and psychologists traditionally separate traits
(i.e., relatively stable and trans-situational sources of individual differences)
into three major categories: affective, cognitive, and conative traits. Affective
traits are personality characteristics (such as need for achievement, neuroti-
cism, conscientiousness). Cognitive traits include traditional concepts of broad
abilities (such as intelligence), narrower ability constructs (e.g., verbal com-
prehension, math ability), and even more narrow abilities and skills (reaction
time to simple stimuli and typing speed). Conative or volitional traits include
motivation and interests. More generally, conation is characterized as will.
For much of the twentieth century, with a few notable exceptions, researchers
were typically concerned with only a single category of traits, such as per-
sonality or abilities, and there were relatively few studies of the interactions
between and interrelations among these different categories of traits. In the
last two decades, this kind of isolated research has been augmented by inves-
tigations of how these different categories of traits relate to one another. In
this chapter, I will briefly review some of these streams of integrative research.
First, however, a few general considerations and qualifications are needed.

Situational Press
One of the barriers to traditional investigation of the relations between per-
sonality and cognitive traits is a mismatch between the context for these two
domains. As noted by Cronbach (1949), personality traits are considered an
individual’s needs and orientation in the context of typical behaviors. That is,
personality traits are less likely to be manifest in behaviors when the individual

62
 Personality and Cognition 63

is subject to strong environmental or situational press. In many environ-

ments, such as school or work, there are either strong cultural norms or other
situational constraints on the individual, which in turn tend to diminish the
individual’s range of expressed behaviors. The presence of high levels of envi-
ronmental press is most easily inferred when an individual is observed to
violate the norms (e.g., when a worker speaks rudely to a customer, a student
or employee is absent from work or school, someone who is talking loudly
in an elevator, a customer not carrying his/her tray to the waste receptacle
at a fast-food restaurant, and so on). Another key concept with respect to
personality traits is the concept of aggregation (e.g., see Rushton, Brainerd,
& Pressley, 1983). Individual differences in personality traits are rarely highly
predictive of isolated single behaviors, mainly because any individual action
is determined by multiple influences, of which personality traits represent a
relatively small contribution. Rather, when behaviors are aggregated across
multiple situations, one can infer the individual’s tendencies to respond in
a particular fashion – which is the essence of a personality trait. So, person-
ality traits are best characterized as behavioral tendencies in the absence of
strong environmental or situational press and over multiple opportunities for
expression.
In contrast to personality traits, cognitive traits are traditionally consid-
ered in a single context, that of maximal performance (Cronbach, 1949; see
also Ackerman, 1997). Cognitive or intellectual abilities are assessed when the
individual is fully engaged in performing his/her best – that is, when there is
a maximum level of motivation and effort devoted to the intellectual task at
hand. Abilities ultimately represent the individual’s limits of performance –
what the individual is capable of doing on a task that has some intellectual,
cognitive, or psychomotor requirements. This mismatch between the condi-
tions for cognitive traits and personality traits is the difference between what
an individual can do under intensive effort and what the individual will do
under weak or nonexistent situational press.
However, most of an individual’s interactions, intentions, and feelings
occur somewhere between the extreme situational press of an ability-test ses-
sion (such as when one sits for a university entrance examination) and the
extreme lack of situational press, say, associated with a package holiday in a
country far from home. Under such circumstances, for the cognitive compo-
nent, we would need to consider the individual’s typical intellectual or cog-
nitive engagement with the environment. For the personality component,
we would need to consider the individual’s attitudes and desires with respect
to things such as affiliation, achievement, tendency toward anxiety, and so
on. It is in this gray area that we are most likely to discover how affect and
64 Ackerman

cognition interact, in both the short-term and over the course of develop-
ment and maturation.
In contrast, one can also consider personality traits in a maximal perfor-
mance context. For example, an individual’s level of introversion/extrover-
sion describes that individual’s preference for being in social situations, but
it does not inherently describe the individual’s capability of performing in
social situations when there is a strong situational press. Many introverts are
quite unhappy when forced to give a presentation to a large audience, but are
nonetheless capable of performing well under such circumstances. Very little
research has been conducted in this area (Willerman, Turner, & Peterson,
1976), but it is possible that individual differences in personality traits set a
zone of tolerable problemiticity for particular kinds of situations. An individ-
ual who is highly extroverted may be able to work in isolation for an hour or
two, but perhaps no longer without needing a break to interact with others;
an individual who is highly introverted may be able to function well at a party
for a similar amount of time, but as time increases, remaining at the party
may become more and more aversive for the individual. It is also possible
that there are individual differences in the flexibility to adapt to situations
where the situational press works in ways that are counter to the individual’s
baseline preferences.

Normal Personality versus Psychopathology

The role of personality in cognitive functioning varies from relatively minor
ways, in which the normal individual orients toward different stimuli in the
environment, to major ways, in which psychopathology seriously impairs
or distorts cognitive functioning across many different sources of stimuli.
Considerations of the role of psychopathology and personality disorders in
cognitive processing, however, are beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead,
the treatment will focus entirely on the normal range of personality traits
and their relations with cognitive functioning, with specific attention paid to
individual differences in personality traits and cognitive functioning, broadly
considered.

Personality and Development of Cognition

At early stages of development, it is unclear whether personality and cog-
nitive functioning are highly malleable or whether we are unable to reliably
and validly measure these constructs prior to the development of language
and self-reflective skills. Prior to the age of first school entry, we are generally
 Personality and Cognition 65

limited to observational judgments and behavior ratings for personality and

for sensory and motor development as indicators of cognitive functioning. In
both cases, the reliability and validity of these assessments do not often reach
a level that is sufficient to examine the relations between personality traits
and cognitive processes. Nonetheless, studies of young children do appear to
point to significant associations between some aspects of personality traits
(e.g., agreeableness, conscientiousness) and cognitive/intellectual abilities
(see Harris, Vernon, & Jang, 2007).
As the child reaches adolescence, it is much easier to arrive at coherent
representations of personality traits and cognitive functioning, especially in
terms of broad factors of personality traits (e.g., introversion/extroversion,
conscientiousness, neuroticism) and cognitive functioning (e.g., verbal,
math, and spatial abilities). Although there is not a substantial amount of
research in this domain, results from a few large-scale studies, such as that
of Demetriou, Kyriakides, and Avraamidou (2003) suggest that at adoles-
cence, the relations between cognitive abilities and personality traits are rela-
tively weak. Rather, the main source of cognitive-affective relations is via the
individual’s self-attribution of ability – the individual’s assessment of his/her
own level of intellectual abilities, a construct rooted in the domain of aca-
demic self-concept (Shavelson, Hubner, & Stanton, 1976). Several other stud-
ies have also suggested that self-attribution, self-concept, or self-estimates
of abilities play an important role in mediating the relations between affec-
tive traits and cognitive abilities, both at adolescence and in adulthood (e.g.,
see Ackerman & Wolman, 2007; Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2008;
Chamorro-Premuzic, Furnham, & Moutafi, 2004; Marsh et al., 2005).

Trait Complexes
As individuals reach early adulthood, we tend to see greater coherence in a
plethora of affective, cognitive, and conative traits. In a meta-analysis of per-
sonality trait, intellectual ability, and vocational interest relations, Ackerman
and Heggestad (1997) found at least four broad sets of traits that had sig-
nificant degrees of overlap, namely: Social, Intellectual/Cultural, Clerical/
Conventional, and Science/Math. The Social trait complex is represented by
the relatively high correlations between measures of Extroversion and both
Enterprising and Social vocational interest themes. The Intellectual/Cultural
trait complex is represented by the overlap among crystallized intellectual
abilities (e.g., verbal abilities and domain knowledge). The personality trait
complex is represented by the overlap of openness to experience and artis-
tic and investigative vocational interest themes. The Clerical/Conventional
66 Ackerman

trait complex is represented by the overlap among personality traits such

as Conscientiousness, clerical and perceptual speed abilities, and the
Conventional interest theme. The Science/Math trait complex is represented
by math and spatial abilities and both Realistic and Investigative vocational
interest themes. Most notable about these trait complexes is that there are no
personality traits that have unique associations with the Science/Math trait
complex, and no ability traits that have unique associations with the Social
trait complex. The underlying reason for the lack of personality-cognition
overlap for these two trait complexes is not entirely clear. One explanation
is that there are insufficient measures for assessing social intellectual abili-
ties, and insufficient measures of personality traits associated with math and
scientific orientations. Another possibility is that affective traits are simply
not uniquely related to individual differences in orientation toward math/sci-
ence activities, and there are no common intellectual traits that are uniquely
related to individual differences in orientation toward social activities.
The trait-complex approach (Ackerman, 2003; Kanfer & Ackerman, 2000)
has an additional component beyond the expression of commonality among
affective-cognitive-conative traits. That is, the investment framework pro-
posed by Ackerman (1996) suggests that the trait complexes have facilitative
or impeding functions in orientation toward learning and skill acquisition.
Individuals faced with learning tasks that are in domains incompatible with
their dominant trait complexes are expected to fare more poorly in terms of
effort and performance than those who have a better alignment of their dom-
inant trait complexes and the learning tasks. On the one hand, when placed
in situations with low environmental press, individuals high in the social trait
complex, for example, may avoid opportunities to acquire knowledge and
skills in intellectual/cultural and science/math domains (Ackerman & Beier,
2006). On the other hand, individuals high in the intellectual/cultural trait
complex may seek out learning opportunities when the environmental press
is low. Regardless, when the environmental press is high, the role of the trait
complexes is expected to be diminished, as the individuals are faced with
maximal performance demands.

Cognition and Development of Personality

Genetic, biological, family environment, and other variables undoubtedly
account for the largest share of influences on an individual’s personality traits.
However, an individual’s cognitive life also appears to be influential in the
development of at least some personality traits. One salient source of such
influences is through the individual’s development of motivational traits and
 Personality and Cognition 67

interests (Holland, 1959). In Holland’s developmental theory of vocational

choice, vocational interests develop in tandem with an individual’s successes
and failures during early development, leading to development of individual
differences in self-evaluations or self-concept. These patterns of self-concept
lead in turn to particular preferences, such as for interpersonal interactions
or for orienting toward working with one’s hands or with abstract ideas.
In this context, development of an interest profile may proceed in concert
with development of some aspects of personality-trait profiles, especially for
those personality traits that show significant overlap with interest themes in
samples of adults and late adolescents, such as: (a) extroversion and social
and enterprising vocational interests; (b) conscientiousness and conventional
vocational interests; and (c) openness to experience and artistic vocational
interests (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997). Other major personality-trait con-
structs appear to be less associated with vocational interests, such as neurot-
icism and agreeableness.
Nonetheless, investment theories of cognitive/intellectual development
(Ackerman, 1996; Cattell, 1971; McDougall, 1933) have proposed that as sta-
ble patterns of personality, self-concept, and interests develop during child-
hood and adolescence, individuals begin to differentiate their cognitive effort
toward domains of knowledge and skill acquisition that are concordant with
their affective and conative traits, ultimately resulting in more or less coher-
ent patterns of abilities, skills, personality, and interests. Within this larger
context, the relations among traits associated with typical behaviors (affective
and conative traits) – behavioral tendencies under low levels of situational
press – tend to be most substantial in magnitude, and the traits that mismatch
on high and low situational press (e.g., personality and ability) tend to have
less substantial relations. The extant literature on the associations between
cognitive, affective, and conative traits tends to bear out this assertion.
Correlations between affective and conative traits, such as extroversion and
social interests, are often in the neighborhood of r = .5; correlations between
affective and cognitive traits are more often in the neighborhood of r = .1–.3
(Ackerman, 2006; Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997, Sullivan & Hansen, 2004).
Although the correlational data support an array of associations among
these families of traits, it is not entirely clear how these associations are built,
and it is quite possible that the influences are idiosyncratic for particular
individuals. An early talent for mathematics or social influence may give rise
to both interests in these domains and the pattern of supportive personal-
ity traits. Early developments in a propensity toward conscientiousness may
result in early success in building basic math skills that in turn yields a height-
ened interest in mathematics, leading to later attainment of knowledge and
68 Ackerman

skills in math. The most plausible framework for such developmental influ-
ences is that the profiles of affective, cognitive, and conative traits develop
in a manner where there are multiple feedback loops and cross-influences.
Furthermore, on a day-to-day basis, the influences are likely to take place
at such a low level that they do not even pervade conscious attention. By
the time an individual reaches adolescence, however, these profiles are surely
noticeable in terms of how that person interacts with his/her environment,
whether at school, home, or with his/her peers.

Neuroticism, Introversion/Extroversion, and Cognition

Up to this point, I have discussed a set of personality traits that have substan-
tial overlap with conative and cognitive traits, but where the influence is dif-
ferentiated along topic or thematic domains. Other personality traits, such as
neuroticism, have a more pervasive effect on cognitive processes; others, such
as introversion/extroversion, have more complex relationships with cognitive
processes. In the meta-analytic research by Ackerman and Heggestad (1997),
it was found that high levels of neuroticism are associated with lower levels
of cognitive abilities across a wide range, such as reasoning, math, verbal, and
spatial abilities. The correlations are not large in magnitude, but such rela-
tions suggest that ceteris paribus (if everything else is equal), individuals who
report higher levels of worries, personal concerns, anxiety, and upset tend to
do more poorly on tasks that require high levels of cognitive effort.
The relationships between introversion/extroversion and cognitive pro-
cesses have been investigated to a much higher degree than many of the other
personality-cognition relations. Most notable is a body of research reported
by Revelle and his colleagues (Humphreys & Revelle, 1984; Revelle et al.,
1980). The foundation for this work is the conceptualization that introverts or
low impulsives have a higher baseline level of arousal than extroverts or high
impulsives, and that under arousal and overarousal have consequences in
terms of decreasing cognitive efficiency (consistent with the Yerkes-Dodson
law of arousal and performance). The higher baseline arousal for introverts
appears to mean that they perform better than extroverts when the level of
stimulation is low or tasks are performed in the morning; extroverts tend to
perform better than introverts when the level of stimulation is high or tasks
are performed later in the day.

Affective States and Cognitive Processes

As discussed earlier, personality is generally considered in terms of stable
traits, but affective states also play an important role in cognitive processes.
 Personality and Cognition 69

Positive or negative moods, for example, although generally short-term in

duration, clearly influence an individual’s ability to focus cognitive attention
and further affect how cognitive stimuli are processed, especially when they
have personal emotional relevance. These influences are likely to be some-
what asymmetric, in that negative mood states (such as anger or fatigue)
tend to result in greater cognitive distractions and impairment than positive
moods for increased capabilities for attentional focus. To the degree that
such mood states are truly transitory, they may not have lasting effects on
development of cognitive skills and knowledge. However, when such mood
states are more frequent and lasting, they may indeed have both ramifica-
tions for changes to overall personality trait expressions and to cognitive
processing. It has been speculated that the trait of test anxiety has charac-
teristics along these lines. That is, an individual’s early experiences of fail-
ures in testing situations may result in greater apprehension and avoidance
behaviors in the face of future situations involving performance evaluation
(Sarason, 1959). Over the course of extended exposure to such situations,
the individual who is high in test anxiety essentially performs cognitive tests
while simultaneously being distracted by worry and dread, which in turn
reduces the cognitive attention resources available for test performance,
resulting in lower test performance.

Cognitive Processing of Affectively Laden Stimuli

Up to this point, most of the discussion has centered around cognitive/intel-
lectual processing of information that is not emotionally or affectively laden.
When it comes to cognitive processing of socially relevant information,
there has been substantial controversy about the primacy of affect or cogni-
tive processes, such as in laboratory situations were stimuli are presented for
short durations (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). There is also an earlier literature
associated with perceptual defense, where threatening or taboo stimuli are
briefly presented to the individual in recognition tasks. A substantial body
of research on cognitive processing of affectively laden stimuli has been con-
ducted on clinical populations of individuals with a variety of different affec-
tive disorders. However, there is still no current framework that adequately
describes cognitive processing of affectively laden stimuli differences among
individuals with different personality-trait profiles (within a normal popula-
tion). The extant data suggest that when there are strong personally relevant
affective cues (i.e., those that trigger fear, disgust, sexual interest) or when the
stimuli allow for minimal conscious cognitive processing, the role of person-
ality on cognitive processing may be stronger than when the stimuli are less
emotionally or affectively laden.
70 Ackerman

Personality and Cognition in Adulthood

It can be argued that the situational press in the school environment is not
uniformly strong, especially with respect to the intensity of cognitive effort
demanded. However, as schooling proceeds, the individual is often faced with
less situational press in terms of the direction of cognitive effort. For exam-
ple, when the student moves from the common school curriculum present in
elementary school to secondary and postsecondary education or vocational
training, the individual has more flexibility in terms of the topics or domain
selected for further study, whether it be math, science, humanities, technical
training, or learning a trade. When students reach this point in their training/
education, we expect that aspects of personality that are most associated with
cognitive abilities will be most likely to influence the intensity and direction
of the individual’s efforts. During this period, it is expected that the individual
will seek out educational and vocational opportunities that allow for a con-
vergence of the environmental demands and the individual’s interest/comfort
level. If, for example, the individual is high on the social trait complex, we
would expect an increased tendency to orient toward education and training
in domains that are most likely to have high demands for social interaction
(e.g., teaching, sales, health care worker). If the individual is low on the social
trait complex, we would expect an increased tendency to orient toward edu-
cation and training in domains that provide for a more solitary occupation.
As adulthood is reached and the individual transitions from the school
environment to the world of work, matches between personality trait pro-
files and the cognitive/affective demands of the job become manifest in
terms of job satisfaction (Judge, Heller, & Mount, 2002; Tokar & Subich,
1997). Mismatches take various guises, such as when an individual who is
introverted takes on a job with high demands for interpersonal interaction
or when an individual who is low in conscientiousness is faced with a job
that demands great attention to detail. At adulthood, personality traits are
much less malleable than they might be in childhood or adolescence. There
are, however, strategies that individuals who are otherwise committed to the
job or occupation may use to ameliorate or overcome the mismatch between
their personality traits and the job demands, such as acquiring cognitive skills
that may reduce the effortful aspects of the job requirements (e.g., by obtain-
ing training on improving interpersonal skills or learning how to improve
organizational skills).
Because personality traits are most often manifest when environmental
press is low, their expression in intellectual activities often takes place most
often outside of the structured workplace or school. Individual differences
 Personality and Cognition 71

in personality-trait profiles appear to affect the kinds of activities people

pursue in terms of avocational interests, such as hobbies or other activities.
Individuals who are high in openness to experience may orient toward learn-
ing about cultural domains, such as art, music, travel, and reading; individu-
als who are high in extroversion may orient toward activities that involve
high levels of interpersonal interactions. Individuals who are high on consci-
entiousness or harm avoidance may tend to limit themselves to a relatively
narrow set of outside interests. In the long run, these personality differences
can be expected to lead to a differentiated set of knowledge structures across
domains of science, politics and current events, humanities, business, health
and nutrition, and knowledge about other people (e.g., likes and dislikes of
friends, birthdays, names, and ages of children). By the time people reach
middle age, there is additional congruence between personality traits such
as extroversion and openness to experience, on the one hand, and domain
knowledge, on the other (Ackerman & Beier, 2006; Beier & Ackerman, 2001).
It is important to note that individuals who choose not to acquire domain
knowledge in some domains are not necessarily incapable of learning about
such domains, especially under high levels of environmental press. Rather, if
left to their own preferences, individuals with some patterns of personality
traits will gravitate toward or away from experiences that match or mismatch
their own interests or comfort level.

Age-Related Changes in Personality and Cognition

In middle age, personality traits and abilities are both relatively stable,
although changes have been noted in terms of mean declines in extroversion,
neuroticism, and openness to experience (Jones & Meredith, 1996) and some
abilities (e.g., reasoning, speeded processing) show declines across the pop-
ulation (Horn, 1989). Self-concept and self-estimates of abilities also show
age-related differences as individuals change their perceptions of their own
strengths and limitations (Ackerman, Beier, & Bowen, 2002). In addition,
changes in values and motives can be expected to result in changes in how
individuals view their place in the world and in their own work and fam-
ily environments (Carstensen, 1998). These changes in orientation and the
strength of emotional motives and needs may result in an increase in the
influence of personality in focusing cognitive effort. Although the strength of
situations may be unchanged, from an external point of view, the degree to
which the individual feels bounded by the situations when the extant contin-
gencies are no longer highly valued may be diminished (for a discussion of
these issues, see Kanfer & Ackerman, 2004).
72 Ackerman

Closing Thoughts
Affect and cognition have traditionally been considered relatively independent
areas of inquiry, and as a consequence, implicitly considered to be relatively
independent in their operations. In fact, it is quite common to see personal-
ity traits referred to in the literature as “non-ability traits.” In the context of
research from the last two decades, this label should be seen as misleading at
best. Cognitive activities involve a complex interplay of intellectual processes
and personality processes, such as when one is attempting to memorize new
names of people met at a party, trying to think of someone who will make an
ideal match for other members of a dinner party, or deciding what to do for a
vacation. Our likes and dislikes have an essential affective component that is
often mediated by our abilities and cognitive styles associated with our daily
problem solving.
Similarly, individual differences in personality traits affect the individual’s
orientation toward or away from various stimuli for further cognitive pro-
cessing. People who are high in neuroticism, for example, appear to devote
substantial cognitive attention toward parsing situations in search of person-
ally threatening stimuli (Matthews & Deary, 1998). How we code situations or
even evaluate the situational press of a particular environment also involves
both affective and cognitive processes. Some individuals will interpret a situa-
tion as having less environmental press than others, and may behave in a way
that is more typical for them than others who interpret the environmental
press as allowing little flexibility for behavior. An employee who shows up late
for the first day of work might represent someone who either has miscoded
the strength of the situation or who has a much lower level of conscientious-
ness than other employees who arrive on time or early to work. This pattern
is reflected in the so-called honeymoon effect described by Helmreich, Sawin,
and Carsrud (1986). That is, personality traits may not be highly related to
job performance and other job-related behaviors – such as citizenship behav-
iors – early in job tenure, but with additional time in the job, personality traits
become significantly correlated with job performance and other job-related
behaviors.
In the final analysis, although there is clearly justification for considering
personality and cognition as important domains in their own right, there are
various points of interaction and interplay that occur between an individual’s
preferences, desires, and modes of addressing the world, on the one hand,
and their cognitive processes and skills, on the other hand. The correlations
between personality traits and cognitive abilities are significant, but not espe-
cially large in magnitude. These correlations, however, mask two important
 Personality and Cognition 73

aspects of the larger picture. First, there is a mismatch between the condi-
tions of assessment for personality (typical behaviors) and cognitive ability
(maximal performance). Second, personality differences are most frequently
influential, when there are relatively low levels of environmental press. When
these considerations are taken into account, the correlations found between
personality traits and cognitive-ability measures suggest that even in the
maximal performance situations of cognitive-ability testing personality traits
have an influence, whether it is in the testing situation itself or more a result
of an accumulated set of the individual’s experiences.

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 4

Cognition in the Context of Psychopathology

A Selective Review

Josef Zihl, Nicole Szesny, & Thomas Nickel

Introduction
The fundamental interrelation between the rational and emotional elements
of human nature has been discussed since the old Greek philosophers Plato
and Aristotle. Although Plato’s theory of mind was essentially dualist, assum-
ing an earthly body that is inhabited by a divine soul, Aristotle proposed
a functionalist model of the mind. Plato’s idea that affect is a dangerous,
invasive force subverting rational thinking has recurred in many theories
throughout the ages. In his psychodynamic model, Freud, for example, sug-
gested that the Id has to be dominated by the ego (Lyons, 2008). The view
that emotion is also an essential component in cognition and behaviour has
emerged through advances in our understanding of emotion and social cog-
nition and their underlying neurobiological substrates (e.g., Adolphs, 2002,
2009; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Pessoa, 2008; Van Overwalle, 2009). This
renewed interest in the relationship between cognition and emotion has led
to the development of innovative interdisciplinary research approaches in
this field.
The main aim of this review is to identify normal and pathological con-
ditions in which cognition, emotion, and motivation can dissociate and act
independently of each other as well as conditions in which they are associated
and interact. Neurobiological, neuropsychological, and psychopathological
evidence supports a concept of functional segregation for these modalities,
albeit there is evidence suggesting in certain contexts that emotion and moti-
vation modulate – that is, enhance or impair, cognition, and emotion may
even dominate cognition (e.g., Clore & Palmer, 2009). Rather, it appears that
cognition serves as a tool that is used by the emotional and motivational sys-
tems. Thus, cognitive processes are always embedded in emotional and moti-
vational contexts. It is, therefore, the interplay between cognition, emotion,

76
 Cognition in the Context of Psychopathology 77

and motivation that guarantees successful adaptation to challenges arising,

for example, from acquired brain injury or depression.

Definitions, Neurobiological Foundation,

and Functional Interplay
Cognition. No uniform and agreed definition exists of what cognition is.
According to the APA Dictionary of Psychology (2007), cognition com-
prises all forms of knowing and awareness, including perceiving, conceiving,
remembering, reasoning, judging, imagining, and problem solving. Thus, the
cognitive system is composed of the functional subsystems of perception,
attention, memory, executive function (planning, problem solving, decision
making, self-monitoring), language, and action.
Posner and Raichle (1994) developed an integrative theory of cognitive
systems, which is based on the known neurobiological and functional prop-
erties of brain organisation. In their theory, elementary cognitive operations
are localised in separate brain areas, but performing cognitive tasks involves
widely spread networks of neural systems. Within a given network, interactive
processes allow a reciprocal information exchange as well as the hierarchical
control of functions and processes. Information processing (bottom-up) takes
place within several neural systems, which are also activated when processing
is guided by attentional networks (top-down). Thus, the different cognitive
interacting systems are organised in spatially distributed, parallel, and serial
processing modules that possess autonomy but are, at the same time, part of
a multistage integration processing system that also supervises the various
activities. The cognitive system is a highly complex system with dense local
and weaker long-range connections, suggesting a small-world architecture
that is, however, controlled by a frontoparietal component for initiating and
adjusting control activities; a prefrontal component for integrating emotional,
motivational, and cognitive determinants of goal-directed behaviour; and a
cingular-opercular component for set maintenance over activity (i.e., task)
periods (Dosenbach et al., 2008; Kouneiher, Charron, & Koechlin, 2009).
Emotion is central to the quality and amount of everyday human experi-
ence. It is understood as a complex reaction pattern involving behavioural
and physiological elements as well as experience by which ‘the individual
attempts to deal with a personally significant matter or event’ (APA, 2007,
p. 325). The specific quality of an emotion is determined by the particular
significance of the event but also by the attitudes and mood of a person.
Emotional adaptation is an individual’s ability to maintain a balance in the
emotional aspects of life as well as to express emotions appropriate to a given
78 Zihl, Szesny, & Nickel

situation. The self-regulation of the influence that one’s emotions have on

cognition and behaviour is known as emotional control (APA, 2007).
Experiences of emotions (‘feelings’) are labelled affect and range from the
simplest to the most complex sensations as well as from the most normal to
the most pathological emotional reactions (APA, 2007). Emotional cognition
means the ability to perceive, recognise, and interpret the emotions of other
individuals, particularly in facial expressions and prosody, and to interpret
one’s own emotions correctly (APA, 2007). The appropriate perception and
interpretation of other individuals’ emotions is also known as social cognition
(Adolphs, 2003; Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2003). Social functions (i.e.,
social perception, social cognition, sensitivity to the social context, and social
action) belong to particular functional systems in the brain. The amygdala
is involved in regulating social behaviour and recognising facial emotional
expressions; the orbitofrontal cortex is important to reward processing in
social conditions; the insula is involved in representing affective states of our
own body (e.g., empathy or pain) (Adolphs, 2009). The right amygdala plays
a particular role in evaluating sad but not happy faces, suggesting that this
brain structure is specifically involved in negative emotions, such as sadness
and fear (Adolphs & Tranel, 2004).
Cognition, particularly attention, is involved in the processing of emotional
stimuli and in emotion regulation (Koole, 2009). It appears that emotional
significance is rapidly and implicitly detected and processed pre-attentively,
and is given priority in the competitive access to attentional resources within
a subcortical–cortical network subserving the processing of emotional stim-
uli (Compton, 2003). Furthermore, emotion shapes behaviour via feedback,
anticipation, and reflection of actions, and can thereby alter guidelines for
future behaviour (Baumeister, Vohs, Dewall, & Zhang, 2007).
Perception and recognition of emotion, particularly from facial expressions
and prosody, are essential for both emotional responses and social commu-
nication, and rely on linking the perceptual properties of a social stimulus to
knowledge-based processes. These processes are based on the individual con-
cepts of emotions, such as happiness, fear, or sadness. The visual cortex, the
(right) temporal lobe, the amygdala, and the orbitofrontal cortex are essen-
tially involved in recognition of complex emotions (Adolphs, 2002; Adolphs
et al., 2003; Mitchell et al., 2003; Wildgruber et al., 2005). Perception of emo-
tions (so-called social perception) and cognition – for example, attention,
episodic memory, and executive functioning (e.g., multi-tasking, intentional-
ity, action monitoring) – may subserve social cognition. However, associated
brain activities do not overlap uniquely in the medial prefrontal cortex, indi-
cating a particular role of this structure in social processing (Van Overwalle,
 Cognition in the Context of Psychopathology 79

2009). For the integration of cognition, emotion, and motivation, the lateral
prefrontal cortex appears crucial, whereas other prefrontal cortical areas
(orbitofrontal, ventromedial, anterior cingulate areas) are strongly involved
in affective function (Pessoa, 2008).
It is commonly assumed that only the ‘objective’ information about objects –
or in social situations, about persons – determines our attitudes towards and
judgments about them. One’s evaluations, however, are also based on infor-
mation from one’s own affective states and reactions. Especially in social
situations, the feelings that are elicited in us by other people are the crucial
factor in the evaluation of other people (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). Although
knowing and feeling are intrinsically intertwined, there are methods to exam-
ine cognition and emotion separately through experimental control of one
or the other (Clore & Palmer, 2009). Interestingly, experimentally induced
mood states demonstrate differential effects of different affective conditions
on cognitive processing of stimuli (Westermann et al., 1996). Differences in
positive and negative mood have been found in regard to decision making,
memory, information processing, and attention (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999;
Clore & Huntsinger, 2007).
Interestingly, patterns of emotion function differentially in different peri-
ods of development and influence cognition and behaviour associated with
different forms of psychopathology (Izard et al., 2002). There are individual
differences in the motivation to approach or avoid emotion-inducing situa-
tions. This motivation is known as ‘need for affect’ (Maio & Esses, 2001), and
depends on cognitive processes (information processing and attention allo-
cation subserving the need for cognition; inhibition and activation of behav-
ioural responses), emotional processes (e.g., affect intensity, affect sensitivity),
and personality traits. In addition, individual differences in the need for affect
and social behaviour may be explained by individual differences in emotional
development, because feedback between cognition and emotion may gen-
erate, maintain, and reconfigure representations of emotional events. This
interaction between cognition and emotion also subserves self-organisation
of individual developmental paths through periods of stability and change,
thus stabilising the whole system and guaranteeing an emotional equilibrium
(Lewis, 1995).
Despite empirical evidence that cognition and emotion belong to different
brain systems and that many brain areas may be conceptualised as either cog-
nitive or affective, it is important to stress that both cognition and emotion
are intimately intertwined and dependent on each other. Pessoa (2008) sug-
gested that complex cognitive-emotional actions have their basis in ‘dynamic
coalitions’ of brain networks that possess a high degree of connectivity.
80 Zihl, Szesny, & Nickel

Furthermore, as Storbeck and Clore (2007) convincingly argued, emotion is

neither independent from cognition nor its prerequisite, and affect is also not
automatically elicited; however, emotion can regulate cognitive processing.
Motivation can be understood as ‘a modulating and coordinating influence
on the direction, vigor, and composition of behavior’, which ‘arises from a
wide variety of internal, environmental, and social sources’ (Shizgal, 1999,
p. 566). Internal sources are usually identified with intrinsic motivation; envi-
ronmental and social sources are comprised within extrinsic motivation. Jimura,
Locke, and Braver (2010) found evidence that the reward value of behavioural
goals can enhance cognition performance, whereby reward sensitivity differs
individually (see also Silverstein, 2010). Cognitive flexibility is known to be
strongly modulated by motivational control (Piech et al., 2009). Motivation to
engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive challenges (so-called need for cogni-
tion) is a potential predictor of dispositional individual differences in infor-
mation processing and executive functioning in terms of cognitive resource
(i.e., attention) allocation (Enge et al., 2008). In addition, intrinsic motivation
level and extrinsic reward predict the rate of improvement in cognitive tasks
and psychosocial functioning (Nakagami, Hoe, & Brekke, 2010; Silverstein,
2010). The interplay between attention (relevance of stimuli for a given task),
emotion (affective evaluation of stimuli), and motivation (predicted value of
stimuli) contribute to the prioritisation and appropriate selection of informa-
tion for the controlled guidance of actions. However, prior value prediction
plays a role in visual selection and conscious perception, indicating that moti-
vation can also act independently (Raymond, 2009).
Reward-related processing of information takes place in the striatum
(Delgado, 2007) and the ventral pallidum (Smith et al., 2009). Lateral parietal
structures are involved in the priorisation of attention in space by motivation
(Gottlieb et al., 2009); prefrontal structures are involved in the integration
of cognitive and motivational information (Sakagami & Watanabe, 2007)
and in the facilitation of cognitive processes required for goal achievement
(Jimura et al., 2010). To summarise, it appears, that the human brain is very
sensitive to motivational signals, which can modulate brain activity in struc-
tures involved in cognitive processing, in particular attention and memory
(Silverstein, 2010). In particular, prefrontal cortical areas facilitate atten-
tiveness to stimuli with motivational relevance, and are highly sensitive to
changes in reward values (Ochsner, 2008).
In the following section, empirical evidence is presented for the associa-
tion, dissociation, and interaction of cognition, emotion, and motivation
in the context of pathological conditions, in particular after acquired brain
injury and in depression.
 Cognition in the Context of Psychopathology 81

The Pathological Context

Studies on pathological brain conditions suggest that cognition, emotion, and
motivation can be jointly affected, but impairments can also dissociate (i.e.,
one domain may be affected whereas the others are not). Thus, under normal
and pathological conditions, emotion and motivation can modulate cogni-
tion, and cognition can regulate emotion and motivation (Taylor & Liberzon,
2007; Silverstein, 2010).
Brain injury. About 30–60 percent of patients with brain injury due to stroke
and 30–40 percent of cases with closed head trauma suffer from (chronic)
depression (Jorge et al., 2004; Kauhanen et al., 1999). Symptoms of depres-
sion include low mood, distorted self-attitude, lack of motivation, anhedonia,
subjective cognitive complaints, and hyperactive and disinhibited behaviour
(Jorge & Starkstein, 2005). Patients’ self-reports of their functional impair-
ments seem less related to their actual cognitive performance than to their
depressive symptomatology (Chaytor, Temkin, Machamer, & Dikmen, 2007).
Positive emotion can positively influence recovery (Ostir et al., 2008); post-
stroke depression is associated with higher cognitive impairment (Kauhanen
et al., 1999) and lower functional recovery (Parikh et al., 1990) as well as a
deterioration of cognitive and social functioning (Jorge et al., 1994). About
40–70 percent of patients do not exhibit depression, although they suffer
from similar cognitive dysfunction. It is, however, still unclear whether the
association between cognitive and emotional dysfunction is found in every
cognitive domain or whether specific domains are particularly affected and
others are spared. Interestingly, executive dysfunction, which is often associ-
ated with poststroke depression, can affect regulation of cognition and emo-
tion (Jorge et al., 2004; Milders et al., 2008), indicating a strong association
between these two domains. Furthermore, apathy following stroke, defined as
a reduction in voluntary goal-directed actions, is significantly associated with
cognitive impairment or may at least exacerbate cognitive deficits (Brodaty
et al., 2005; Jorge, Starkstein, & Robinson, 2010). On the other hand, even
pronounced cognitive impairment – for example in severe dementia – is not
necessarily associated with apathy (Starkstein et al., 2001).
Frontal lobe injury is known to cause persistent cognitive and psycho-
pathological symptoms (Paradiso et al., 1999). Subjects with lateral prefrontal
injury more frequently show cognitive slowness, reduced motivation (apa-
thy), greater severity of depressive symptoms, and social unease, but can
experience (negative) emotions. Subjects with medial prefrontal injury, in
contrast, show emotional dysregulation and inhibition of experience of mood
changes. Emotional (and personality) changes may also occur after small
82 Zihl, Szesny, & Nickel

orbitofrontal injury (Namiki et al., 2008) and in cases with traumatic dif-
fuse axonal brain injury (Green, Turner, & Thompson, 2004). Brain-injured
subjects suffering from executive dysfunction may benefit less from remedia-
tion of emotion recognition deficits (McDonald, Bornhofen, & Hunt, 2009).
Interestingly, subjects with retrograde amnesia may nevertheless be able
to recollect (pleasant) emotional events from their lives. Medial temporal
structures, but not the hippocampus, appear crucial for emotional autobio-
graphical memory, indicating dissociation between the long-term storage of
semantic (i.e., cognitive) contents and that of emotional contents (Buchanan,
Tranel, & Adolphs, 2005).
Patients with cerebrovascular or traumatic (right-sided) brain injury may
show impairments in recognising affective information from the face, voice,
bodily movement, and posture (Bornhofen & McDonald, 2008; Charbonneau
et al., 2003; Kucharska-Pietura et al., 2003), which may persistently interfere
with successful negotiation of social interactions (Ietswaart et al., 2008). In
addition, controlling and modulating vocal affect as well as comprehension
and expression of affective sentences (prosody) may also be impaired, and
may contribute to impaired communication competence and poor social out-
come (Marquardt, Rios-Brown, & Richburg, 2001; Watts & Douglas, 2006;
Wildgruber et al., 2006; Zupan et al., 2009). Interestingly, face perception,
the use of context cues, and semantic knowledge can be affected at the same
time the perception of linguistic specifications of prosody is relatively spared,
indicating a dissociation between cognition (face processing capacities and
semantic knowledge) and recognition of emotion from prosody and facial
expression (Croker & McDonald, 2005; Green et al., 2004; Pell, 1998).
Impairments of emotional and social behaviour are typically observed after
frontal lobe injury. It can be explained by defective or lost stimulus-reinforcer
associations, inaccurate evaluation of stimuli signifying reward or punish-
ment in a social context, and failures to translate emotional and social infor-
mation into task- and context-appropriate action patterns. These functional
impairments arise from impaired perception and interpretation of social and
emotional stimuli, inadequate hypotheses about the social environment, and
inadequate selection of emotional and social actions. Consequently, patients
may show deficient social judgements and decision making; social and per-
haps also cognitive inflexibility; lack of self-monitoring, particularly in social
situations; and deficient goal-directed behaviour, including apathy, disinhibi-
tion, task impersistence, and general disorganisation (Hornak, Rolls, & Wade,
1996; Rankin, 2007; Vecera & Rizzo, 2004).
Depression. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV), depression is a mental disorder that is characterised by
 Cognition in the Context of Psychopathology 83

low mood, loss of interest, feelings of guilt, low self-worth, disturbed sleep and
appetite, listlessness, and cognitive dysfunctions independent of its origin as
a result of head injury or as an entity on its own (APA, 1994). In depression,
there is evidence for associations as well as dissociations between cognitive
and emotional dysfunctions. Patients may exhibit affective and cognitive dys-
functions, but cognitive impairments may also persist even after improve-
ment of depressive symptomatology (Frasch et al., 2009; Landro, Stiles, &
Sletvold, 2001; Majer et al., 2004; Reppermund et al., 2007; Reppermund et
al., 2009). Yet, there is also evidence in these studies for preserved cognition
in the presence of depressive symptomatology. Because these differential pat-
terns can hardly be explained by a lack of motivation, it may be speculated
whether these two patterns of dysfunction represent two distinct subgroups.
However, irrespective of the presence of cognitive dysfunction, all patients
complain of more or less pronounced difficulties with attention, memory, and
executive function. This indicates that self-perception of patient’s cognitive
capacities does not always match with the objectively assessed cognitive sta-
tus, indicating that at the level of awareness, there seems to be no dissociation
between (self-perceived) cognitive performance and emotional dysfunc-
tion. Impairments of cognitive functions have been found in a wide range
of cognitive domains (e.g., episodic memory, learning, attention, and exec-
utive functions) (Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001; Bearden et al., 2006;
Stordal et al., 2004; Zihl, Groen, & Brunnauer, 1998). Reduced motivation
in depression is known to impair cognitive performance, possibly because
task-specific self-efficacy and enhancement of task-focused attention fail to
increase performance level (Scheurich et al., 2008). The impact of severity
and subtype of depression on cognitive dysfunction as well as the influence
of age, comorbid disorders, and persistence of these impairments after recov-
ery are still unclear (Austin et al., 2001; Castaneda et al., 2008; Majer et al.,
2004; Reppermund et al., 2009). However, cognitive deficits might persist
longer than the period of illness, yet this seems to be true for all depressive
sub-diagnoses (Neu, Kiesslinger, Schlattmann, & Reischies, 2001).
There is preliminary evidence that particularly executive dysfunction in
depression may represent a risk factor for relapse (Dunkin et al., 2000; Majer
et al., 2004; Simons et al., 2009), indicating that recovery of emotion regu-
lation and mood may not be sufficient for gaining and stabilising emotional
equilibrium. Multiple sources of evidence support the view that depression
is associated with frontal lobe dysfunction (Harrison, 2002; Lesser & Chung,
2007). This view would also explain the associative patterns of cognitive and
emotional dysfunction as well as the dissociations between the two domains;
differing degrees of dysfunction in prefrontal regions can result in more
84 Zihl, Szesny, & Nickel

regional frontal lobe syndromes (Duffy & Campbell, 2002). In a more recent
paper, Dichter, Felder and Smoski (2009) reported a double dissociation of
prefrontal responses in subjects with unipolar depression to the contexts in
which the target events were embedded. In a neutral context, they found a
hypoactivation of prefrontal structures, which is consistent with findings in
normal subjects. In contrast, cognitive control stimuli embedded in a sad
context revealed a greater activation of prefrontal structures in the depressed
group than in normal subjects. This result could be interpreted as a greater
cognitive effort that is required in depression for disengaging from the sad
images in order to respond to the target stimuli. Depressed subjects may also
show increased processing of negative stimuli and/or diminished processing of
positive verbal and visual stimuli, which is paralleled by corresponding brain
activation patterns, albeit this finding may only apply to specific subgroups
(Canli et al., 2004; Surguladze et al., 2004). These alterations may explain
impaired interpersonal functioning in depression, although the mode of pre-
sentation of emotional stimuli (e.g., facial expressions) may be crucial; when
dynamic facial expressions are used, subjects with depression may perform
like normal subjects (Kan et al., 2004). Thus, in a depressive state, additional
visual-social information may be required for proper processing and inter-
pretation (i.e., visual cortical areas can enhance emotion processing) (Schultz
& Pilz, 2009). Yet, because this enhancement effect also depends on attention
allocation to stimuli, the inability to accurately recognise subtle facial emo-
tional signals may be understood as a perceptual bias towards high arousal
emotions (Csukly et al., 2009). In bipolar disorders, emotion perception and
affect generation deficits have been reported in association with impaired
executive function (cognitive control and regulation), suggesting that the
variations in mood can be explained partly in terms of specific impairments
in the cognitive control of emotion (Green, Cahill, & Malhi, 2007).
A summary of the observations on the pathology of cognition and emo-
tion after acquired brain injury and in depression shows that there is convinc-
ing empirical evidence for the association as well as for the dissociation of
symptoms. Furthermore, negative emotions can lower functional recovery
after brain injury and positive emotions can enhance recovery. In depres-
sion, cognitive dysfunction may increase the risk for relapse. Thus, emo-
tion definitely can modulate cognition. Yet, cognition subserves emotion in
regaining and maintaining individual self-organisation in periods of change
(e.g., after highly challenging life events, brain injury, or in depression) and
may thus constitute a protective factor. Cognition may therefore be consid-
ered as a tool for planning, executing, and monitoring adaptation to chal-
lenging conditions and thus for developing and improving coping strategies
 Cognition in the Context of Psychopathology 85

(Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Emotion may elicit, maintain (via motivation), and
reinforce such cognitive activities unless successful tools for coping are devel-
oped and tested, and also found useful for transfer. Cognition, emotion, and
motivation are also engaged in the evaluation of the usefulness of such coping
strategies, either concerning their feasibility, accuracy, and speed (cognition)
or concerning their positive and negative value for an individual in terms of
the specific personal significance of the coping strategy and its effect on one’s
own behaviour and that of others. The resulting emotional and cognitive
adaptation is important for improving and maintaining self-regulated emo-
tional control based on various feedbacks between cognitive and emotional
components of the coping strategy. These feedbacks can then generate, main-
tain, and reconfigure the representation of the adaptation to the challeng-
ing task as cognitive and emotional events or as a cognitive-emotional event.
Emotional regulation involves the initiation of new or at least adapted (i.e.,
adequate) emotional responses and inhibition of inappropriate responses.
In conditions of reduced deployment of attentional resources, emotional
information is prioritised and receives privileged access to attention and
awareness (so-called emotional attention), which enhances processing of
emotional signals (Vuilleumier, 2005). For developing and using coping strat-
egies in emotion regulation, personality traits also come into play, as they
are known to influence cognitive activities (e.g., Connor-Smith & Flachsbart,
2007). Personality traits can thus enhance (viz. openness), impede, or at least
bias (viz. neuroticism) the development and selection of environment- and
task-related adaptation strategies. As Bienvenu et al. (2004) have shown, low
assertiveness and high openness to feelings are associated with major depres-
sive disorder; neuroticism is related to its acuity. It seems, therefore, that
personality traits exert their main influence on cognition via the domain of
emotion, which becomes manifest particularly in psychopathological states
such as depression.
In conclusion, cognition and emotion seem to represent two separable but
intensively and reciprocally interacting functional systems, which can modu-
late each other positively and negatively. As a rule, they cooperate when devel-
oping, testing, and selecting strategies for coping with challenging events and
tasks as well as for maintaining emotional stability over time.

Towards an Integrative Neuropsychological View

of Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation
Many neurological disorders and mental illnesses are characterised by pro-
nounced deficits in cognitive and emotional behaviour. The relationship
86 Zihl, Szesny, & Nickel

of cognitive and emotional dysfunctions in subjects with brain injury and

depression has been discussed above in detail. Yet, other diseases such as
schizophrenia (e.g., Herbener et al., 2008; Silverstein, 2010), obsessive com-
pulsive disorder (Green et al., 2007), dementia (Rosen et al., 2006), anxiety
disorders (McNaughton, 1997), and post-traumatic stress disorder (Moore,
2009) can also be characterised by pathological alterations and interactions
of cognition and emotion. In contrast to the condition of brain injury, where
the underlying cause for cognitive and emotional dysfunctions and their
interactions is more or less exactly known, the causes of most psychiatric dis-
orders are still largely unknown. Thus, a better understanding of the interde-
pendence of cognition and emotion (Storbeck & Clore, 2007) and the direct
and indirect pathways by which cognition regulates emotion and vice versa
may improve our knowledge of the neurocircuits underlying the pathomech-
anisms of psychiatric disorders (Grady & Keightley, 2002; Taylor & Liberzon,
2007). When comparing neuropsychological and psychopathological profiles
between subjects with acquired brain injury and those with depression, it
appears that cognitive dysfunction can (indirectly) affect emotion and social
perception, but emotional and social dysfunction can also affect cognition.
This mutual modulation suggests that cognition and emotion build a final
common pathway via reciprocally interacting functional systems (Barbas,
2000), which subserves individual self-organisation and in addition stabi-
lises and guarantees emotional equilibrium (Lewis, 1995). Of course, injury
to or dysfunction of prefrontal structures and/or their partner structures
and interconnections may affect both cognition and emotion (e.g., Duffy &
Campbell, 2002; Pessoa, 2008). Interestingly, similar patterns of interaction
between cognition and emotion as well as between cognitive dysfunction and
psychopathology have been reported after childhood brain injury. Persisting
emotional difficulties are often associated with impaired cognitive capaci-
ties, in particular executive dysfunction (Powell & Voeller 2004; Tonks et al.,
2009), although they can also dissociate (Tonks et al., 2008).
Currently, psychiatric diagnoses are not based on neurobiological findings.
Instead, they are based mainly on subjectively defined and reported symptoms
and psychopathology. A more detailed neurobiological and neuropsycho-
logical characterisation of psychiatric disorders may allow a rearrangement
of diagnostic classifications based on more objective, neurobiologically ori-
ented data (see also Dubrovsky, 1995; Levin et al., 2007; Shenal, Harrison &
Demaree, 2003). In addition to sleep parameters; genetic, molecular, and
endocrine variables; environmental information; neuroimaging technolo-
gies; and last but not least cognition and emotion as interacting functional
parameters are important variables for a more detailed characterisation of
 Cognition in the Context of Psychopathology 87

patients that is independent of DSM-IV (APA, 1994) or ICD-10 (WHO,

1993) diagnoses (see also Garety et al., 2007). Examples for such research
approaches are the studies of Reppermund et al. (2007) and Majer et al.
(2004). Reppermund et al. examined interdependencies between depressive
symptoms, cognitive impairment, and dysregulation of the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenocortical system and found a dissociation of psychopathol-
ogy and cognition. Despite a significant reduction of depressive symptoms
between hospital admission and discharge, a high rate of patients remained
cognitively impaired after treatment. Selective attention improved signifi-
cantly in remitters and non-remitters, and the speed of information process-
ing increased only in remitters (Reppermund et al., 2007). The study of Majer
et al. (2004) addresses the relationship between cognition and the course of
depression. However, the authors observed cognitive impairment in most
cognitive domains along with acute depression; at discharge, the cognitive
performance was still below that of normal subjects, albeit impairments were
less pronounced. Divided attention, but also verbal memory (Simons et al.,
2009) and executive function (Dunkin et al., 2000) might predict response to
treatment, remission of symptoms, and risk of relapse.
In addition to the identification and functional characterisation of
disease-relevant variants, one major focus of this approach is the identification
of subgroups within different psychiatric disorders that display greater etio-
pathogenetic homogeneity. Especially patients suffering from major depres-
sive disorder seem to represent a rather heterogeneous entity consisting of
different phenomenological subgroups. Patterns of association and dissocia-
tion between cognitive dysfunction and psychopathology and other aspects
of the disease are interesting parameters for the identification of more homo-
geneous subgroups within the category of depression. Castaneda et al. (2008),
for instance, emphasise that it remains unclear why some depressed patients
suffer from severe impairments in cognition and others show only mild
impairment or perform within the normal range of cognition. This conun-
drum can be solved only by identifying subsets of disorders and characteris-
tics that are associated with the extent of cognitive impairment. Reppermund
et al. (2009) proposed three subtypes of depression regarding the dissocia-
tion between cognitive deficits and psychopathological symptoms, which can
be described as follows: (i) presence of severe psychopathological symptoms
combined with only mild cognitive dysfunction; (ii) cognitive symptoms
combined with only mild to moderate psychopathological symptoms; and
(iii) a combination of severe depressive symptoms and severe cognitive dys-
function. Reppermund et al. suggested that these three subtypes may cor-
respond to the dysfunction of different neural networks that regulate mood
88 Zihl, Szesny, & Nickel

and emotion-associated cognition. The main functional networks affected in

depression may overlap with those subserving executive cognitive function
(dorsal convexity system), motivation, and emotion (mesial frontal system).
These different subtypes might correspond to the apathetic mesial frontal
syndrome, the dysexecutive dorsal convexity syndrome, or a combination of
both (Duffy & Campbell, 2002).
There is no doubt that cognitive impairment is present during a depres-
sive episode, but many studies have shown that specific cognitive deficits can
persist and may therefore represent trait markers (Frasch et al., 2009; Majer
et al., 2004; Porter, Bourke, & Gallagher, 2007; Reppermund et al., 2009).
Thus, cognitive dysfunction in depression is not merely an epiphenomenon
of psychopathological symptoms. Cognitive deficits that are closely associ-
ated with depressive symptoms might represent a useful measure, that is, a
state marker of treatment response that could be used effectively in clinical
trials as well as in clinical practice for determining recovery of core abnor-
malities and prognosis. In addition, there is evidence that even subclinical
depressive symptoms may contribute to cognitive deficits (Clark, Iversen, &
Goodwin, 2002). It remains unclear whether such cognitive deficits should
be interpreted as a residual depressive syndrome after remission of a depres-
sive episode or as a stable trait marker, indicating the risk of developing a
major depressive disorder in general. Yet, it appears important to identify this
subgroup of patients for special therapeutic intervention strategies aimed at
improvement of cognitive capacities.
In conclusion, converging evidence from the study in normal and abnor-
mal conditions supports the view that cognition, emotion, and motivation
represent separate but closely intertwined domains, whereby emotion and
motivation play a modulatory role in cognition and cognition subserves the
guidance of goal-directed behaviours. The patterns of association and disso-
ciation between cognition, emotion, and motivation are in line with the idea
of functional specialisation of the brain. Yet, it appears that cooperations are
the rule in this strategic partnership (i.e., cognitive functions always operate
in the context of emotion and motivation). The dysfunction of one domain
weakens the functional capacity of the other domain, reducing the degrees of
freedom in coping with cognitive or emotional demands, and may thus cause
serious disability in everyday-life activities (Naismith et al., 2007). Thus, the
selection and optimisation of strategies for coping with challenges in normal
and pathological life conditions (e.g., after brain injury and in depression)
can succeed only when cognitive and emotional resources and (intrinsic and
extrinsic) motivation are available at least to a critical minimum. However,
as challenges consist not only of physical, cognitive, and emotional demands
 Cognition in the Context of Psychopathology 89

but also depend on the social environment, perception and expression of

social signals represent an important repertoire in human behaviour. This
repertoire is also partly based on basic cognitive and emotional functions
and their interactions. Studies on the association and dissociation of cogni-
tive and emotional functions might therefore also substantially contribute to
the development of advanced treatment algorithms considering cognition,
emotion, and motivation.

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 5

The Impact of Anxiety on Cognitive Performance

Michael W. Eysenck

Introduction
This chapter is concerned mainly with the effects of individual differences
in anxiety as a personality dimension on various kinds of cognitive perfor-
mance. More specifically, the emphasis will be on trait anxiety (a dimension
relating to general susceptibility to anxiety) and test anxiety (a dimension
relating to susceptibility to anxiety specifically in test situations). Not surpris-
ingly, there is typically a negative association or correlation between anxi-
ety and performance. For example, Hembree (1988) reviewed hundreds of
studies and found that the mean correlation between anxiety and aptitude or
achievement was −0.29. There are obvious issues here concerning the direc-
tion of causality: does anxiety impair performance or does poor performance
create anxiety? The evidence from intervention studies strongly suggests that
much of the association occurs because anxiety impairs performance. For
example, Schwarzer (1990) reviewed the findings from 137 intervention stud-
ies. Participants who received treatment for test anxiety had higher scores
on test performance and grade point average than participants in placebo or
waiting list groups.
There is another issue that needs to be addressed at this point. In addition
to the causality issue, there is an additional problem of interpretation with
studies, in which it is found that individuals scoring high in trait or test anx-
iety perform significantly worse than those scoring low. There is typically a
moderate correlation between trait measures of anxiety and state measures
(assessing current levels of anxiety). Accordingly, the findings may reflect the
direct influence of trait or test anxiety on performance or the influence may
be indirect via state anxiety. Surprisingly, this issue has been addressed in rel-
atively few studies, so it is not possible to adjudicate between these two pos-
sibilities. However, it would be useful in future research to use experimental

96
 The Impact of Anxiety on Cognitive Performance 97

designs including low and high stress conditions to clarify the respective roles
of trait and state anxiety in affecting performance.

Processing Efficiency and Attentional

Control Theories
Several theories have been put forward over the years to account for the neg-
ative effects of trait and test anxiety on performance (see Eysenck, 1992, for a
review). These theories vary in terms of the extent to which they are explicitly
cognitive in their approach (i.e., having an explicit focus on the specific cog-
nitive mechanisms most affected by anxiety). In my opinion, such cognitive
theories offer the best prospect of understanding the effects of anxiety on
performance. In view of space limitations, I will focus mostly on two cog-
nitive theories that I developed with colleagues. The first one is processing
efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) and the second is a development of
that theory known as attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007).
Two theoretical assumptions are of crucial importance within processing
efficiency theory. First, a distinction is drawn between performance effective-
ness and processing efficiency. Performance effectiveness simply refers to the
quality of performance (e.g., number of items correct). In contrast, processing
efficiency is based on the relationship between performance effectiveness and
the resources used to achieve that level of performance. Processing efficiency
(especially in high-anxious individuals) can be reduced by task-irrelevant
thoughts (e.g., worries, self-preoccupations). It is assumed that anxiety has a
greater adverse effect on processing efficiency than on performance effective-
ness. The reason is that anxious individuals will often attempt to compensate
for the negative effects of anxiety on processing efficiency by deploying addi-
tional processing resources or effort.
Second, it was assumed within processing efficiency theory that the adverse
effects of anxiety on processing efficiency are mediated by the working
memory system proposed by Baddeley (1986). This theoretical approach was
developed further by Baddeley (2001), but we will focus on the earlier version
of the theory, according to which the working memory system consists of
an attention-like, domain-free central executive plus two ‘slave’ systems. One
of these slave systems (the phonological loop) is involved in the rehearsal of
verbal information and the other slave system (the visuospatial sketchpad) is
involved in the processing and temporary storage of visual and spatial infor-
mation. It was predicted that there would be strong negative effects of anxiety
on the functioning of the central executive plus smaller negative effects on
the functioning of the phonological loop. Why were these predictions made?
98 Eysenck

It was assumed that anxiety is associated with task-irrelevant thoughts such

as worry, and that these task-irrelevant thoughts utilise some of the limited
processing capacity of the central executive and phonological loop.
Attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) incorporates the major
assumptions of processing efficiency theory, but provides a more compre-
hensive account of the effects of anxiety on performance. This theory (also
discussed by Derakshan and Eysenck, 2009) makes several new assumptions,
but we will consider only the most important one in detail. It was argued
that the assumption that anxiety impairs the functioning of the central
executive is imprecise in view of the accumulating evidence that the cen-
tral executive fulfils various functions. For example, Miyake et al. (2000)
applied latent-variable analysis to the data obtained from several executive
tasks and identified three functions. One was the inhibition function, which
involves using attentional control to resist disruption or interference from
task-irrelevant stimuli or responses. Another was the shifting function, which
involves using attentional control to shift attention in a flexible way to main-
tain focus on currently relevant task stimuli. Finally, there was the updat-
ing function, which is concerned with updating and monitoring information
contained within working memory. According to attentional control theory,
anxiety impairs attentional control in two different ways. First, it impairs the
efficiency of the inhibition function, which involves using attentional control
in a negative way to prevent attention being focused on task-irrelevant stim-
uli and responses. Second, it impairs the efficiency of the shifting function,
which involves using attentional control in a positive way to redirect atten-
tion to respond appropriately to changing task demands.
There is one other assumption of attentional control theory that merits a
brief mention at this point. There has been much research on attentional bias,
which is a tendency to attend to threat-related stimuli rather than neutral
ones. In a recent meta-analysis (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), there was convinc-
ing support for the hypothesis that high-anxious individuals are significantly
more likely than low anxious ones to exhibit attentional bias. As a conse-
quence, the performance of high-anxious individuals in the presence of dis-
tractors is especially more likely to be impaired than that of low anxious ones
when the distractors are threat-related (e.g., an angry face) than when they
are neutral. Most of the available evidence supports that prediction (Eysenck
et al., 2007).
In what follows, we consider the research relating to the three major
assumptions discussed above. The relevant evidence was reviewed by Eysenck
et al. (2007). Accordingly, the focus here will mostly be on recent research
 The Impact of Anxiety on Cognitive Performance 99

postdating that review, but will also include some of the most important ear-
lier research.

Working Memory
According to processing efficiency theory, anxiety is associated with worry,
and worry utilises some of the processing resources of the working memory
system. The assumption that worry requires working-memory capacity was
tested by Hayes, Hirsch, and Mathews (2008). They asked high and low wor-
riers to think about a current worry or a positive personally relevant topic
when attempting to press keys in a random order. High levels of performance
on this task require considerable use of the resources of working memory.
The key finding was that high worriers performed worse than low worriers
on the random key-press task only when engaged in worry. The implication
is that worry consumes some of the available attentional resources of working
memory and thus impairs task performance.
Evidence that the anxiety reduces the available capacity of working mem-
ory was reported by Derakshan and Eysenck (1998). They used a load par-
adigm, in which participants performed a primary task concurrently with
a secondary or load task that imposed low or high demands on working
memory capacity. The primary task involved simple reasoning, and the main
dependent variable was response latency on this task. There was no difference
between the low- and high-anxious groups on this measure when the second-
ary task imposed low demands on working memory capacity. However, the
adverse effects of a concurrent highly demanding secondary task on response
latency on the reasoning task were substantially greater for high-anxious than
for low-anxious participants. These findings suggest that individuals high in
trait anxiety had fewer available working memory resources to process the
reasoning task.
Additional evidence that the effects of anxiety on performance depend in
part on working memory capacity was reported by Johnson and Gronlund
(2009) in a study using a dual-task paradigm. They considered four groups of
individuals based on the two dimensions of trait anxiety and working mem-
ory capacity. There was a significant interaction between anxiety and work-
ing memory capacity: the adverse effects of high trait anxiety on dual-task
performance were especially great among those individuals low in working
memory capacity. This is consistent with the notion that reduced available
working memory capacity is in part responsible for anxiety’s impairment
effect on performance.
100 Eysenck

Eysenck, Payne, and Derakshan (2005) reported one of the most direct
attempts to test the prediction that anxiety impairs central-executive func-
tioning more than that of the other components of the working-memory
system. High- and low-anxious participants performed a primary com-
plex visuospatial task concurrently with a secondary task that varied in its
demands on the working memory system. More specifically, the secondary
task predominantly required use of the central executive or the phonological
loop or the visuospatial sketchpad. The key finding was that the high-anxious
group performed the primary visuospatial task significantly worse than the
low-anxious group only when the secondary task involved the central execu-
tive. These findings suggest that anxiety reduces the available capacity of the
central executive but has small or nonexistent effects on the capacity of the
phonological loop or the visuospatial sketchpad.
Owens et al. (2008) used a different experimental approach to show that
adverse effects of anxiety on performance depend on working memory. They
assessed verbal working memory (central executive + phonological loop) and
academic performance in individuals varying in their level of trait anxiety.
Anxiety was negatively associated with academic performance. However,
the key finding was that this association was mediated by verbal working
memory. In other words, much of the negative effect of anxiety on academic
performance occurred indirectly because anxiety impaired verbal working
memory.
Findings apparently discrepant with those of Owens et al. (2008) were
reported by Shackman et al. (2006). They found that threat-induced anxiety
impaired performance on a task involving spatial working memory but not
on one that involved verbal working-memory performance.
In sum, there is considerable evidence (much of it not discussed here) indi-
cating that high levels of trait anxiety are associated with impaired working-
memory functioning. Of the components of working memory, anxiety most
consistently impairs the central executive as predicted by processing efficiency
theory. However, there are apparently inconsistent findings concerning the
effects of anxiety on the phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad.
In principle, the most direct approach to identifying the components of the
working memory system adversely affected by anxiety is to use a dual-task
design with secondary tasks predominantly involving a single component
(Eysenck et al., 2005). It is more difficult to interpret the findings when the
effects of anxiety on a single task involving two separate components of the
working memory system are assessed (e.g., Owens et al., 2008; Shackman
et al., 2006).
 The Impact of Anxiety on Cognitive Performance 101

Efficiency versus Effectiveness

One of the major predictions of processing efficiency theory is that the adverse
effects of anxiety will typically be greater on processing efficiency than on
performance effectiveness. The same prediction follows from attentional con-
trol theory, but that theory makes the slightly more specific prediction that
this processing inefficiency relates primarily to attentional control mecha-
nisms. Several studies over the years have tested this prediction. However, it
has proved difficult to operationalise processing efficiency because of prob-
lems with assessing an individual’s use of processing resources.
Nearly all of the relevant research until comparatively recently involved
behavioural data only. Some of this research involved the probe technique,
in which a primary task is performed either on its own or concurrently with
a secondary task (e.g., responding as rapidly as possible to sporadic auditory
probes). The instructions for the latter dual-task condition emphasise that
the primary task should be performed as well as possible with only spare pro-
cessing capacity being used to perform the secondary task. It is assumed that
reaction times to the probes provide an approximate measure of processing
efficiency: participants who are relatively inefficient in their processing of the
primary task will have fewer spare processing resources than those who are
more efficient, and will thus respond more slowly to the probes. The predic-
tion is that high-anxious individuals will have slower reaction times to the
probes than low anxious ones.
Eysenck and Payne (in preparation) used the probe technique in two
experiments. In one experiment, the main task was a verbal one and in the
second experiment it was mathematical. In both experiments, the demands
of the main task on working memory increased as participants worked their
way through each trial, and the probe could be presented at any point during
a trial. There were no effects of anxiety on performance effectiveness on the
primary task in either experiment.
The two main findings relating to probe reaction time were obtained in
both experiments and were as predicted theoretically. First, there was a sig-
nificant main effect with high-anxious individuals having longer reaction
times to the probe than low anxious ones. Second, there was an interaction
between anxiety and task demands at the moment the probe was presented:
high-anxious participants performed especially slower to the probes relative
to low anxious ones when task demands were high.
Murray and Janelle (2007) carried out a study resembling the experiments of
Eysenck and Payne (in preparation) in some ways. Participants were exposed
102 Eysenck

to conditions designed to produce high or low levels of anxiety. They carried

out a simulated driving task and responded periodically to a target light. The
anxiety manipulation had very little effect on performance effectiveness as
reflected in driving speed. However, participants in the high-anxiety condi-
tion had a reduced P3 to cue onset on the light-detection task. The implica-
tion is that participants in this condition had reduced processing efficiency
and so had impaired processing of the cue.
Nearly all of the research discussed so far has focused on behavioural evi-
dence. An alternative way of assessing processing efficiency is to make use
of various techniques for assessing brain activity during task performance.
There would be evidence that anxiety is associated with impaired process-
ing efficiency if there were no effects of anxiety on performance effectiveness
but high anxiety was associated with greater increases in brain activation in
areas involved in attentional control. Several recent studies have used approx-
imately this approach. For example, Savostyanov et al. (2009) compared indi-
viduals high and low in trait anxiety using the stop-signal paradigm, in which
participants need to inhibit a dominant motor response on those trials on
which a stop signal is presented. There were no effects of anxiety on reaction
times or on error rate, so anxiety did not affect performance effectiveness.
However, Savostyanov et al. also considered event-related perturbations of
EEG spectral power in two analyses. In the first analysis, they focused on
EEG desynchronisation before and after the button press on trials on which
participants were required to respond. High-anxious participants showed
significantly greater alpha and beta desynchronisation before and after the
button press than low-anxious participants. In the second analysis, the focus
was on EEG desynchronisation on stop trials in the time period following
onset of the stop signal. High-anxious participants had greater EEG desyn-
chronisation during the first 600 ms after stop-signal onset, predominantly
in 8–13 Hz. These findings suggest that high-anxious participants exhibited
greater processing inefficiency than low anxious ones by engaging in pro-
longed attempts at cognitive control.
Fales et al. (2008) presented their participants with the three-back task, in
which they had to indicate whether a given word was the same as (or different
from) the word displayed three words back. There were no effects of anxiety
on performance effectiveness on this task. However, high-anxious partici-
pants had greater transient activation in brain areas such as dorsolateral and
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex that are associated with attentional control,
which is suggestive of impaired efficiency.
Telzer et al. (2008) carried out a study on attentional bias in individuals
high and low in trait anxiety. They considered brain activation in conditions
 The Impact of Anxiety on Cognitive Performance 103

differing in their demands on attentional control, focusing on the difference

in brain activation between the more demanding and the less demanding
condition. This difference was significantly greater in the right dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex in high-anxious individuals than in low anxious ones. This
is consistent with the hypothesis that anxiety reduces processing efficiency.
In sum, the use of functional neuroimaging and event-related potentials
is making it easier to compare processing efficiency in high-anxious and
low-anxious groups. It is easiest to relate the findings to processing efficiency
theory and attentional control theory when there are no effects of anxiety
on performance effectiveness. When that is the case, greater brain activation
in areas associated with attentional control among high-anxious rather than
low-anxious individuals is suggestive evidence that anxiety has impaired
processing efficiency. The studies by Savostyanov et al. (2009) and Fales et
al. (2008) exhibit this discrepancy between the behavioural and neuroimag-
ing findings. Another study discussed later in the chapter (Santos, Wall, &
Eysenck, submitted) also fits that pattern.
It is often more difficult to relate the findings to the theories when anx-
iety impairs performance effectiveness. For example, Bishop (2009) found
that when using a target-detection task high-anxious individuals took longer
than low anxious ones to detect the targets. The high-anxious individuals also
showed reduced prefrontal activity compared to the low-anxious individu-
als. Processing efficiency is defined approximately as performance effective-
ness divided by use of resources. With Bishop’s data, the numerator and the
denominator were both significantly less for high-anxious than low-anxious
individuals. That means that it is difficult to decide whether high-anxious
participants had less or more processing efficiency than low anxious ones. It
is possible that high-anxious individuals find it harder than low anxious ones
to modulate attentional control. In other words, they may engage in exces-
sive attempts at attentional control in some circumstances (e.g., Savostyanov
et al., 2009), but may show deficient attempts at attentional control in other
circumstances (e.g., Bishop, 2009).

Inhibition and Shifting Functions

There has been much more research on the effects of anxiety on the inhibition
function than the shifting function. Most research on the inhibition func-
tion has focused on the effects of distraction on performance. The obvious
prediction from attentional control theory is that anxious individuals will be
more susceptible to distraction because of their impaired inhibition function.
Nearly 20 studies have obtained support for this prediction (see Eysenck et al.,
104 Eysenck

2007, for a review). However, there is a limitation with most of these studies
in that they do not reveal the mechanisms responsible for the greater suscep-
tibility to distraction among high-anxious individuals.
The above issue was addressed by Derakshan et al. (2009). They assessed
the inhibition function by using the antisaccade task. On this task, partici-
pants are presented with a peripheral cue to the left or right of the fixation
point. They are instructed to avoid looking at the cue and instead to fixate on
the other side of the fixation point as rapidly as possible. What is of interest is
the latency of the first correct saccade to the side opposite that to which the
cue was presented. There is also a control condition (the prosaccade task), in
which the requirement is to fixate the cue as soon as it appears.
Derakshan et al. (2009) assumed that the antisaccade task requires use of
the inhibition function, whereas the prosaccade task does not. Accordingly,
they predicted that high-anxious individuals would take longer than low anx-
ious ones to make a correct saccade on the antisaccade task, but that anxiety
would have no effect on this dependent variable on the prosaccade task. This
was precisely what Derakshan et al. found in their first experiment, in which
the cue was an oval shape. In their second experiment, they used angry,
happy, and neutral facial expressions as cues. In view of the evidence that
anxious individuals have an attentional bias for threat-related stimuli (e.g.,
Bar-Haim et al., 2007), it was predicted that the slowing effects of anxiety on
the antisaccade task would be greatest when the cue was an angry face. That
prediction was supported.
As mentioned earlier, there has been very little research on anxiety and the
shifting function. However, Ansari, Derakshan, and Richards (2008) recently
reported findings from a task-switching study involving the antisaccade
and prosaccade tasks. There were two conditions. In the single-task condi-
tion, there were separate blocks of antisaccade and prosaccade trials. In the
mixed-task condition, antisaccade and prosaccade trials were interspersed. In
line with findings previously reported by other researchers, they found that
there was a paradoxical improvement in that the latency of the first correct
saccade on the antisaccade task was faster in the mixed-task condition than in
the single-task condition. The precise reasons for this paradoxical improve-
ment when the shifting function is required are not known, although it is
likely that it reflects a greater level of task engagement in the task-switching
condition. The key finding reported by Ansari et al. was that this paradox-
ical improvement in the task-switching condition was not obtained from
high-anxious participants but only from low anxious ones. The implication is
that high-anxious individuals are less efficient than low anxious ones at using
the shifting function.
 The Impact of Anxiety on Cognitive Performance 105

Derakshan, Smyth, and Eysenck (2009) carried out the most thorough
study to date. What is required in order to assess the effects of anxiety on the
shifting function in a relatively direct way is to have two conditions differing
only in terms of the demands on the shifting function. Derakshan et al. used
pairs of tasks (e.g., multiplication and division). In the switching condition,
the task alternated on every trial. In the non-switching condition, in contrast,
each block of trials was devoted to a single task. The problems used were the
same in the switching and non-switching conditions.
Derakshan et al. (2009) obtained a highly significant interaction between
anxiety and task switching, and the nature of this interaction was as predicted
by attentional control theory. The high-anxious participants performed much
more slowly when task switching was required than when it was not, whereas
the low-anxious participants were relatively unaffected by the presence versus
absence of task switching.
Santos et al. (submitted) also investigated the effects of anxiety on the shift-
ing function. Participants performed three simple tasks under high-switching,
low-switching, and no-switching conditions. The fact that the tasks were all
simple probably explains why there were no effects of anxiety on performance
effectiveness in terms of reaction times and error rate. In order to assess
processing efficiency, Santos et al. used fMRI to record brain activity. It was
assumed that the increase in brain activation in the high- and low-switching
conditions compared to the no-switching condition was due to greater use
of processing resources when the shifting function was required. The fur-
ther assumption that high-anxious individuals would make more inefficient
use of the shifting function than low anxious ones led to the prediction that
there should be a greater increase in brain activation for individuals high in
anxiety. It was also predicted that the effects of anxiety on brain activation
should be especially pronounced in areas activated when the shifting func-
tion is used (e.g., BA9/46; anterior cingulate: see Wager, Jonides, & Reading,
2004, for a review). Both of these predictions were confirmed.
In sum, there is accumulating evidence that anxiety impairs the inhibi-
tion and shifting functions. This is of considerable importance. Both of these
functions relate to attentional control, and both are required to perform a
very wide range of tasks. Accordingly, many of the negative effects of anxiety
on processing efficiency and performance effectiveness can be interpreted in
terms of adverse effects of anxiety on those two functions.
Miyake et al. (2000) also identified an updating and monitoring function.
There are various tasks that can be used to assess that function. For example,
there is the N-back task, in which a series of items is presented. As soon as
the series has finished, the participant has to indicate the identity of the item
106 Eysenck

presented a given distance back in the series (e.g., three back, four back). It
is assumed within attentional control theory that this function involves basic
memory processes and is essentially unaffected by anxiety. Some support for
this assumption was discussed by Eysenck et al. (2007). There is also a more
recent study by Walkenhorst and Crowe (2009), in which they considered
the effects of trait anxiety on verbal and spatial N-back tasks. They found that
their high-anxious participants responded faster than the low anxious ones
on both of these tasks, suggesting that anxiety does not impair the updating
and monitoring function.

Conclusions
Much progress has been made in understanding the various ways in which
the effects of anxiety on processing efficiency and performance effectiveness
are mediated by the cognitive system. As we have seen, there is convincing
support for several of the major assumptions incorporated within process-
ing efficiency theory and attentional control theory. First, anxiety impairs
the efficiency of the working memory system, especially the central execu-
tive component of that system. Second, more specifically, anxiety adversely
affects the efficiency of at least two of the functions associated with the cen-
tral executive, namely, the inhibition and shifting functions. Third, anxiety
has a greater negative effect on processing efficiency than on performance
effectiveness.
What issues remain to be investigated systematically in future research?
Two issues seem to be of special importance. First, it is assumed that anx-
iety impairs processing efficiency more than performance effectiveness
because high-anxious individuals often utilise more processing resources or
effort than low anxious ones. As yet, we have little understanding of the pro-
cesses responsible for this enhanced motivation. Eysenck and Calvo (1992)
speculated that high-anxious individuals attempt to reduce their negative
self-thoughts (e.g., ‘I can’t do this task properly’; ‘I am doing really badly’) by
increasing effort to produce a reasonable level of performance. The notion
that negative self-thoughts can have motivational consequences remains
plausible, but there is as yet a dearth of directly relevant evidence.
Second, attentional control theory made much use of Miyake et al.’s (2000)
identification of three central executive functions based on their impres-
sive empirical research. However, there is no consensus as yet concerning
the number and nature of executive functions. Collette and van der Linden
(2002) reviewed brain-imaging studies of executive functions, and concluded
that there was support from such studies for the three functions identified
 The Impact of Anxiety on Cognitive Performance 107

by Miyake et al. In addition, however, they argued persuasively that dual-

task coordination should be added to the list of executive functions. It is an
important task for the future to see whether anxiety impairs the efficiency of
dual-task coordination in the same way that it impairs the efficiency of the
inhibition and shifting functions.

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 6

Biological Foundations
The SEEKING System as an Affective Source
for Motivation and Cognition

Jeff Stewart & Jaak Panksepp

. . . whatever elements an act of cognition may imply . . . it at least implies the existence
of a feeling.
William James, 1909 (1987), p. 833

This chapter will focus on how the most basic motivational urges – those
essential for all goal-directed actions – may be instantiated in brain systems.
We will first focus on dopamine as a principal factor in the embodied mecha-
nisms that bring about exploratory behavior in mammals; secondly, we will
focus on one core emotional-motivational command system that is ener-
gized by dopamine, namely the SEEKING/Expectancy system as described
in Affective Neuroscience (Panksepp, 1998a, 2005a). We will introduce
research findings and theoretical perspectives that make clearer the mean-
ing of motivation/exploration/SEEKING as a mental-affective function that
intrinsically helps us penetrate the many predictive relationships hidden in
­environments – especially social ones – that are complex and often constantly
in flux. With the SEEKING system, animals can extract causal convictions
to guide behavior from predictive correlations among environmental events.
We will also suggest that the SEEKING system contributes a fundamental
­phenomenal dimension of primary process consciousness, one that is affec-
tively full of positive zest and enthusiasm for life – essential ingredients for
effective learning.
Let us be clear at the outset: Our reading of the evidence is that felt dimen-
sions of certain basic (primary-process) brain activating systems lead to psy-
chological states that are accompanied by phenomenal experiences, namely
affectively experienced states. Further, we take these basic systems as cru-
cial to the developmental unfolding of higher order cognitive systems (i.e.,
those based on learning and thoughts, or secondary and tertiary processes as
we conceptualize them). Specifically, the core emotional command systems

109
110 Stewart & Panksepp

appear to generate specific affects essential for learning and thereby guar-
anteeing and fine-tuning the appropriate behavioral sequences and timings
necessary for diverse survival-promoting behaviors. The emotional com-
mand systems accomplish this partly by having evolutionary representations
of the body coded in neural circuits, yielding and experientially sensitising
the mind and the whole body into an affective action state that is immedi-
ate and undeniable and pervasive. Human infants, like most animals, live in
the immediacy of this felt world, and similar to other animals, they gradu-
ally develop complex behavioral patterns that are learned responses to the
affective MindBrain promptings experienced as bodily states. Unlike most
other animals, however, human children develop the capacity to cognitively
reflect on the unceasing patterns of emotional activations of their brains and
bodies as higher-order mental states. That is, they learn how to interpret the
language of their embodiment as a language of representations – elements
of experience that appear as discontinuous with the virtual body represen-
tations that gives rise to them. There is much work to be done in research-
ing this remarkable transformation of affective commands into higher-order
cognitive structures, and in this chapter we will provide an account of the
originating brain states that need to be understood before there can be any
full account of the developmental transitions that depend on them.
Motivation. Animals appear to be endowed with their own purposive
agency. Evolution has seen to it that they possess an innate group of emo-
tional mechanisms that are essential for the survival of animals by generating
“intentions in action,” which command sets of behaviors and supportive auto-
nomic changes that coordinate organismic actions needed for survival. Irving
Kupferman, in Principles of Neural Science (1991), writes: “Specific motiva-
tional states, or drives, represent urges or impulses based upon bodily needs
that impel humans and other animals into action.” However, as Kupferman
later adds:

Drives or motivational states are inferred mechanisms postulated to explain the

intensity and direction of a variety of complex behaviors. . . . Behavioral scientists
posit these internal states because observable stimuli in the external environment
are not sufficient to predict all aspects of these behaviors. . . . As more is learned
about the actual physiology of hypothetical drive states, the need for invoking
these states to explain behavior may ultimately disappear, to be replaced by more
precise concepts derived from physiology and systems theory. (pp. 750–751)

Kupferman is suggesting that the scientific use of the ideas of motivation

and drive is only a case of substituting provisional terms for behaviors and
brain mechanisms that are not yet understood. The same can be said for the
 Biological Foundations 111

inference that reinforcement is a real brain process. We believe this type of

radical eliminative reductionism is fatally flawed, for it fails to recognize lev-
els of neuromental complexities that have causal efficacy in the control of
behavior arising from neural activities. We prefer a view that is as materi-
alistic as ruthless reductionism but accepts emergent complexities, such as
affective feelings, in our aspirations to understand what the MindBrain really
does. Let’s consider this situation.
There is no doubt that specific behaviors are built into the action repertoires
of animals to automatically take care of their survival needs. These include
seeking water, food, comfort, and the perpetuation of the species. The prob-
lem Kupferman notes is that a term such as “motivation” is not sufficient for
clarifying how a biological mechanism can produce the purposeful behaviors
that unfailingly lead to the satisfaction of survival needs. We put the question
this way: How is it that animals reliably act on various states of their bod-
ies and brains (e.g., energy and water depletion) as if they were commanded
to act in ways perfectly fitted to meeting its needs? Specifically, is it true, as
assumed by a self-appointed committee of behaviorists early in the twentieth
century, that the concepts of affective “urges or impulses” are difficult to cash
out in sufficient detail to clarify what it means for them to function in the way
they do. In fact, we believe those “mental” entities are true and fundamental
neural functions of the BrainMind and that animal models can illuminate
such neuro-evolutionary foundations (Panksepp, 1998a, 2010). How did we
reach a point where mind was eliminated from the brain?
Jacques Loeb was one of the earliest transplants from the Berlin biophys-
ics school that sought to bring a totally mechanistic view of behavior, with
no mental processes, into scientific psychology. For him, motivation was a
“tropism” that could be explained by specifying how it was engineered in
the physiology of a particular animal. It was Loeb’s intention to eliminate
the metaphysical elements that were common in the scientific debates of his
time (Pfaff, 1999), and to base the study of behavior on mechanical practicali-
ties such as those of physics. Loeb’s engineering mentality contributed to the
mind-eliminating behaviorism of Watson and Skinner (Panksepp, 2005a) and
greatly influenced how scientific inquiries were conceptualized, leading to
the elimination of psychological processes in work on animal – and at times
human – motivations. The engineering orientation that Loeb introduced,
along with the scientific shunning of terminology based on human mental
characterizations of animal states, has led to the situation where researchers
such as Kupferman disdain the concepts of motivation and drive mechanisms
and hope to replace all that kind of talk with functional neural diagrams. To
this day, there are few researchers in animal behavior who are willing to go
112 Stewart & Panksepp

against this state of affairs in describing the mechanisms that drive behaviors
and that seem to parallel in unmistakable ways the urges or impulses found in
humans. Things are slowly changing, however, and some are calling for better
conceptual approaches, such as that enunciated in the rapidly growing field
of affective neuroscience (Panksepp, 1998a, 2005b).
Affective Neuroscience. The core thesis of Affective Neuroscience (Panksepp,
1998a, 2005a) is that emotional processes and subjectively experienced feel-
ings do play a fundamental role in the unfolding neural events – large-scale
brain network functions – that organize the actions of humans and animals
alike. Various basic emotional systems provide a variety of internal values
upon which complex behavioral choices are based. However, such internally
experienced states are not simply mental events derived from higher cog-
nitive appraisals; rather, they are generated through neurobiological events
that directly shape instinctual emotional behaviors. This provides a straight-
forward empirical strategy to study how basic affective processes emerge
from brain activities: Affective feelings are part and parcel of the uncondi-
tioned responses generated by the primary-process emotional networks of
the brain.
This is a revolutionary idea. Since Darwin’s era, there has not been a more
coherent strategy for advancing our understanding of how we come to have
the kinds of core emotional feelings that we do, which highlights our deep
psychological connection with other animals. Affective Neuroscience offers
the detail Kupferman was calling for – it spells out the physiology behind the
ideas of motivation and drive through empirical research. It accomplishes
more than that, however. It brings back psychological processes as meaning-
ful brain events that cannot be discarded in our attempt to understand behav-
ior. Here are a few of the key points developed in the book.
Decades of empirical study have led to the proposal made in Affective
Neuroscience that there exist at least 7 primary-process emotional “command
systems” found in all mammals. We first go over criteria for selecting the 7,
and then briefly describe them. The idea of a command system or ­“emotional
circuit” is based on 6 neural-systems criteria: (1) Core emotional systems are
“genetically prewired” to function in relevant situations, and do not need
higher brain functions for activation (empirical verification is based on
studies of direct electrical brain stimulation to specific brain areas arousing
coherent emotional states); (2) relevant motor subroutines and autonomic
processes controlled by specific neurochemical processes reflect internal
regulations of these evolutionarily ancient circuits; (3) these circuits concen-
trate arousal and behavioral specificity by changing the sensitivities of sen-
sory systems; (4) arousal often continues in the neural circuits after the initial
 Biological Foundations 113

elicitations; (5) the circuits may contribute to other behavioral outcomes than
those called emotions; and (6) the “[e]motive circuits have reciprocal inter-
actions with brain mechanisms that elaborate higher decision-making pro-
cesses” (Panksepp, 1998a, p. 49) and conscious awareness. A further corollary
is that raw emotional feelings are generated by the neurodynamics of these
coherently operating, functionally unified, BrainMindBody functions.
The 7 primary-process command systems that have been reasonably firmly
established (with secondary and tertiary manifestations once the systems
interact with cognitive structures) are:
1) SEEKING (motivation, expectancy, investigation)
2) RAGE (anger to frustration and hatred)
3) FEAR (anxiety to worry)
4) LUST (sexual eroticisms to obsessions)
5) CARE (nurturant social relationships to empathy)
6) PANIC (separation distress, loneliness, and grief)
7) PLAY (joyful social engagements to humorous delights)
The names of the core systems are written in the upper case to remind us that
the vernacular or folk-psychological terms are to be understood in an explic-
itly scientific way. These circuits are the “executive, command, and operating
systems” because “executive implies that a neural system has a superordinate
role in a cascade of hierarchical controls; command implies that a circuit can
instigate a full-blown emotional process; operating implies that it can coordi-
nate and synchronize the operation of several subsystems” (Panksepp, 1998a,
p. 49). The neural systems are concentrated in the subcortical regions of the
brain, but clearly they operate throughout the entire web of the brain/body
and regulate emotion-specific learning whereby neutral world events are
imbued with affective meaning (e.g., we are not just angry, we are angry at
someone).
The SEEKING system, which we describe in greater detail below, is the
biggest background emotional system that also participates in the control of
all the other emotions and it is a spontaneous generator of expectancies. This
“appetitive motivational system” (Panksepp, 1998a, p. 51) should be thought
of as a default active-waking state of the brain/body that initially simply pro-
motes forward movement and exploration. Dopamine facilitates the “antic-
ipatory eagerness” (Panksepp, 1998a, p. 54) that is a characteristic feature of
the SEEKING system.
The RAGE system energizes the body to angrily defend its territory and
resources. When conflicts or frustrations are present, this system contributes
the psychomotor responses that are crucial for resolving the situation.
114 Stewart & Panksepp

The FEAR system includes a variety of states from terror to anxiety, and
acts in a general way to help an animal avoid danger. It is evident in sev-
eral instinctual behavioral patterns in most mammals, but as documented by
many investigators (e.g., LeDoux, 2002), it is also tightly interconnected with
learning systems that support its safety features for obvious survival reasons.
FEAR brings about freezing and hiding when danger is some distance away,
but it leads to rapid fleeing when danger is nearby.
The remaining four systems mediate primary social emotions, highlighting
their difference in function from the basic emotional and motivational pro-
cesses of SEEKING, RAGE, and FEAR. The social emotions are responsible
for behaviors that are relevant to survival among conspecifics.
The LUST system relates to mate selection (fitness evaluation and courting
behaviors, among others), reproduction, and many gender-specific behav-
iors. LUST should be differentiated from nurturance, but it has many linkages
with it neurochemically and behaviorally, and may well have been its evolu-
tionary progenitor (Panksepp, 1998a).
The CARE system concerns the bonding and nurturing behaviors that dra-
matically increase with mammals. This affiliative capacity, generally, “refers to
social behaviors that bring individuals closer together” (Carter, Lederhendler
& Kirkpatrick, 1997, p. xiii). One of the most powerful activities of this sys-
tem may be the opioid and oxytocin-mediated mother/child bond, but it is
also prominent in the expressions of love, altruism, empathy, and maintain-
ing social tolerance.
The PANIC system becomes aroused when young animals are separated
from their social support system. It has evolutionarily emerged from the pain
circuits of the brain (Panksepp, 2003) and plays a significant role in human
loneliness, sadness, grief, and depression. PANIC is meant to ensure survival
by means of painful internal alerts when contact is lost with important social
supports.
The PLAY system remains the least studied of the above systems and is still
deemed a frivolous area of inquiry among many neuroscientists. Still, this may
be a crucial emotional circuit for helping developmentally in the organization
of the mature social brain. Early rough-and-tumble play may be essential for
determining subtle synaptic connections required for social knowledge and
sustaining joyful attitudes in mammals. It is widely recognized that laugh-
ter is most common during playful social interactions, and the possibility
has emerged that other animals, from rats and dogs to other primates, also
exhibit an ancestral form of laugher (Panksepp, 2007b; Panksepp & Burgdorf,
2003), accompanied by the capacity for joy (Burgdorf & Panksepp, 2005).
Children who are not given sufficient daily rough-and-tumble play may
 Biological Foundations 115

become prone to a variety of psychobehavioral deficits, perhaps explaining

the ever-increasing incidence of attention deficit hyperactivity disorders in
Western cultures (Panksepp, 1998b, 2001, 2007b)
These 7 emotional systems have their own dedicated pathways (interactive
with many other brain systems, of course) that have been examined experi-
mentally in a number of mammalian species. They have an intrinsic organiza-
tion that maintains comfort zones for a given animal – evolutionarily coded
values that organize behaviors for maintaining the necessities of living. It is
our position that affects are the psychological signatures of the different evolu-
tionary comfort zones, and that the fundamental nature of reinforcement may
be deeply affective, an issue that behaviorism has chosen to ignore throughout
its past and continuing history. Based on this short sketch of the circuits, it
seems easy to think of them as programs that command the basic behaviors of
survival, but it is not so simple to understand how or why raw affects are func-
tional aspects of the instinctual affective apparatus. Let us attempt to clarify.
Emotion and affect should not be thought of as being the same. The activi-
ties of basic emotional operating systems of the brain generate intrinsic affec-
tive values, but other brain-mind systems also possess affective properties.
Although the core affects or felt characteristics of basic emotional and moti-
vational systems are generated by lower functions in the brain, some may also
be generated by other, higher neocortical functions such as those arising from
specific sensations, perceptions, or even cognitions; however, it is likely that
even those mental states require subcortical participations. The fact that any
specific process is felt does not make it an emotion. On the other hand, when-
ever there is an emotional motor expression, there seems to be an affiliated
affective component, whether it is evident or suppressed. Affects, then, appear
to participate in moving animals to facilitate survival-oriented behaviors.
Indeed, because emotion has such an evident etymological base in motion
(e-motion), it is understandable that many have thought of such brain states
as primary organizers of psychobiological actions. Basic emotions are clearly
pre-wired action programs for survival that incorporate affective features to
help effectively orchestrate the onset and course of behavior sequences, with
the affects being similar to compasses or gyros for guiding behavior. Because
the primary-process emotional affects are organized in the lower portions of
the neuroaxis, there is reason to believe that they are fundamental to many
if not all subsequent organizational developments and are therefore critically
important for learning as well as other guidance characteristics afforded by
higher brain functions. All of this will become clearer as we consider one of
the most important basic emotional command systems in more detail – the
SEEKING system, which figures heavily in every other emotional process.
116 Stewart & Panksepp

It should be briefly noted here that this research on the emotional com-
mand systems – and especially the SEEKING system – is consistent with
experimental work in psychology generally called functional emotion theory.
Frijda (1987, 1988), Lazarus (1991), and Fischer et al. (1990), among others,
have given evidence for how emotions help elaborate general organizations
of bodily activity. The guiding concept that cognitive, motivational, and rela-
tional dimensions of emotion are found in a spectrum of activities from bio-
logical organization to social organization offers a helpful extension in our
understanding of emotion from its more general psychological and behav-
ioral manifestations to the evolutionarily “given” neural foundations. The
focus here on the research described in Affective Neuroscience is a further
exploration of functional emotion theory, developing in greater detail the
neurophysiological and neurochemical pathways of the emotional and affec-
tive organizing of behavior.
The SEEKING System. Affective Neuroscience envisions the appetitive moti-
vational SEEKING system (SS) to be “a goad without a goal” (p. 144) at the
onset of psychological life. (When quotes are followed by page numbers, they
refer to Panksepp, 1998a). This highlights the main function of the system:
It drives the animal forward into its environment, with no other directive
than to explore, investigate, and ultimately forage for resources in the ini-
tially unpredictable environments in which organisms find themselves. A
more fully elaborated designation for this the system might be “a ‘foraging/
exploration/investigation/curiosity/interest /expectancy/SEEKING’ system”
(p. 145). This system is especially active when animals are experiencing vari-
ous homeostatic imbalances such as hunger, thirst, and sexual arousal, but it is
also set to go when there are no special bodily urges to be fulfilled. It appears
that the SS is a default mechanism that activates (when other demands, such
as resting or eating, are satisfied) to arouse the animal to actions that may
potentially lead to future rewards. Thus, it is not surprising that positive affect
accompanies the SEEKING urge – getting to know the world should be an
intrinsically positive activity, at least until the organism encounters danger.
Why should it be so positively engaging to be in such a state of arousal?
It is not easy to contemplate how affective experiences participate in the
control of animal behavior without using our own types of felt emotions as
comparisons. This kind of anthropomorphism has been frowned on, but a
scientific variant of this kind of thinking is about the only way to fathom the
many homologies that exist in the brains of all mammals. The affective qual-
ities of human SEEKING states – those of intense interest, engaged curiosity,
and eager anticipation – make sense to us through the simple fact that we can
readily understand – almost feel – the meaning of such words. However, are
 Biological Foundations 117

they in fact valid descriptors of the affective states of the SEEKING system as
manifested in the minds of animals? The answer appears to be yes, at least in
a class-similar way (i.e., nothing across species is precisely the same, which
led to the novel affective nomenclature of capitalizing the emotional primes).
Indeed, at present there is no other language that is available to help us artic-
ulate with any precision what is presumed to be happening in the core of the
behavioral expressions of the other animals. Researchers who caution against
anthropomorphizing animal behavior are, more often than not, the ones who
also tend to write about animals as if they felt no pain or have no conscious-
ness or are too simple (i.e., machinelike) to justify having homologous psy-
chological concerns for their own well-being as humans have.
When your pet dog sees you put your coat on and ready its leash, the
energetic tail wagging accompanied by rambunctious jumping and bark-
ing is eager anticipation! It seems indisputable, unless one is in denial about
the emotional subtlety of emotional life, that the animal is in the grip of a
strongly felt state. You could say that the dog is exhibiting high motor activ-
ity, repeated vocalizations within a specific range, increased respiratory func-
tion, and so on. Why should the fact that the animal is eagerly anticipating
going outside for a walk not qualify as a perfectly reasonable description?
Because this state has to be inferred only from behavioral signs, but follow-
ing traditional Cartesian skepticism, scientists to this day typically do not
deem behavioral changes to be sufficient evidence for any quality of mind.
Still, every aspect of the state of the animal suggests increased positive affect,
and by all measures imaginable, animals seek out such states, including via
self-administration of artificial stimuli (electrical and chemical stimulations)
directly into the relevant regions of the brain but not others (such as neocor-
tex). Thus, a very reasonable working hypothesis is that a distinct emotional
feeling is either primed or instantiated by arousal of the SEEKING system,
and that with a little experience, this system induces a positive anticipation
of the exploring of a world that is filled with potentially important informa-
tion about the psychic state of dogs. Before reaching any definitive conclu-
sions, however, we are well advised to go deeper into the neural nature of
the SEEKING affect, beyond outer behavioral expressions, to the underlying
functional components. Such work now definitively indicates the existence of
affect in all mammals that have been studied.
The SEEKING system, along with its affective intensity, coaxes each animal
to explore its environment: It makes a cow investigate anything new showing
up in her pasture; at times it makes us seek sweets when we should have no
more, and perhaps even wonder whether we should look for a different job.
It also promotes the addictive qualities of various activities from compulsive
118 Stewart & Panksepp

drug consumption to obsessive web-browsing. How does the core biology of

the Seeking system “make” all these behaviors happen? Specifically, how does
the motivation that is intrinsic to SEEKING (or any of the basic emotional
systems) generate the strong feeling that appears to encourage all animals to
seek and explore?
The Neurobiology of SEEKING. The origins of the motivating energy of
SEEKING “are concentrated in the extended lateral hypothalamic (LH) cor-
ridor,” which contains an enormous pathway connecting midbrain and lower
brain stem regions to the forebrain. Through most of its course, it is very
enriched in neuromodulators such as dopamine. The LH dopamine contin-
uum runs from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) to the nucleus accumbens.
This includes most areas of the brain where local application of electrical
stimulation will promptly evoke the most energized exploratory and search
behaviors an animal is capable of exhibiting (and the animals like to self-
administer stimulation into such regions of the brain) (Panksepp, 1998a). A
critically important energizer of appetitive behavior and desire in these brain
areas is the modulatory neurotransmitter dopamine (DA).

There is growing acceptance that this emotional function of the brain [the SS] –
the basic impulse to search, investigate, and make sense of the environment –
emerges from the circuits that course through the LH. The anatomy of brain DA
circuits corresponds to the general trajectory of this psychobehavioral system,
and brain DA itself is an essential ingredient in allowing the circuitry to operate
efficiently, although many other brain chemistries are involved in the overall con-
struction of the SEEKING response. (Panksepp, 1998a, p. 145)

Here, we will first go over a few details about the brain regions involved,
and then we will discuss the work of dopamine in those areas as well as in
the extended areas that form the larger dopamine-energized SEEKING sys-
tems. Readers wishing more details are directed to a variety of recent reviews
(Alcaro, Huber, & Panksepp, 2007; Berridge, 2007; Ikemoto & Panksepp,
1999; Panksepp & Moskal, 2008).
Hypothalamus. The hypothalamus and the thalamus make up the dienceph-
alon, a large and functionally diverse brain region situated in the uppermost
part of the brain stem just under the neocortex and the other telencephalic
structures. The thalamus processes information coming from the external
world to the cerebral cortex and also has intrinsic midline systems for elab-
orating social emotions and sustaining and amplifying cognitive conscious-
ness. The hypothalamus is concerned with the internal milieu – the regulation
of the autonomic, endocrine, and visceral systems as well as a host of emo-
tional urges. The regulation of those systems requires monitoring the internal
 Biological Foundations 119

environment and bringing about appropriate changes in the heart, lungs, vis-
cera, musculature, and the exocrine and endocrine glands. The hypothalamus
regulates the moment-by-moment conditions in the body, and thereby has a
very sophisticated and diffuse intrinsic map of the viscera, the state of which
is essential for the nature of many emotional feelings. The hypothalamus
incorporates several nuclei (neuronal clusters), and more complex tissues
where many nuclei and pathways intersect (reticular regions), that are dedi-
cated to a variety of functions, among which is the temporal orchestration of
psychological and behavioral expressions (Card, 2002; Swanson, 2003). One
of those reticular regions is the lateral hypothalamic area (LH), which pro-
vides a “superhighway” for extensive intercommunication with other regions
up and down the neuroaxis – this is part of the medial forebrain “corridor” we
have described. The corridor is a network that extends from lower midbrain
regions such as the ventral tegmental area (VTA) through to regions of the
basal ganglia such as the nucleus accumbens, and further upward to medial
cortical regions. If this system is damaged on both sides of the brain, an ani-
mal’s capacity for normal motivated behavior and affective consciousness is
terminally compromised, and if the damage is not complete, the organism
has to be nursed for a long time before it will again sustain itself, albeit much
more weakly and inconsistently than before.
The ventral tegmental area (VTA). The ventral tegmental area is a brain
region that proceeds from the midbrain upward to the diencephalon. This
area is critical to SEEKING because it is a point of origination for mesolimbic
and mesocortical dopamine circuits, which we will consider in a moment.
The nucleus accumbens and ventral pallidum. This region of the basal fore-
brain is instrumental in reward and various kinds of pleasures (which are
the foundations of reinforcement processes), and it is the prime target of
mesolimbic dopamine activity from the VTA. It is also rich in endogenous
opioids, and thus plays an important role in practically all drug addictions
(Berridge & Robinson, 1998).
The Extended Reticular Activating System (ERTAS). This is another corri-
dor, consisting of a number of nuclear and reticular regions running from the
medulla and up the neuroaxis to thalamic regions of the diencephalon and
regions of the cortex. At the core of this system is the midbrain and pontine
reticular formation, which is necessary for generating the state of ordinary
waking arousal. It is also continuous with the VTA, regions of the dienceph-
alon, parabrachial and raphe nuclei, the nucleus coeruleus, and the periaque-
ductal gray, all of which play a significant part in generating a global state of
consciousness (Watt & Pincus, 2004; Solms & Turnbull, 2002). Activations of
these instinctual emotional systems (with continual regulation by the global
120 Stewart & Panksepp

neurochemistries of the ERTAS such as acetylcholine, norepinephrine, and

serotonin) generate the behaviors of the instinctual survival actions (with the
addition of cortical supports for learning and remembering), but their acti-
vation also possesses a sense of embodiment – a global state of arousal that
functions as a felt dimension. One particular system – the periaqueductal
gray (PAG) – is essential in generating the characteristic sense of embodi-
ment that acts as a primitive self-representation essential for many emotional
feelings (Panksepp, 1998a; Solms & Turnbull, 2002) shared by all mammals
(Northoff & Panksepp, 2008; Panksepp & Northoff, 2009).
The periaqueductal gray (PAG). We describe the PAG as the “central
­coordinator” of emotion; it contains “the most massive convergence of brain
emotional systems,” and by means of electrical stimulation, it can facili-
tate nearly all emotional actions and the corresponding feelings (Panksepp,
1998b). There is a characteristic of the PAG that may help us understand how
global states are brought about through the function of the affects. The PAG
is adjacent to regions of the brain stem that map both the visceral body (inner
functions) and the musculoskeletal body (movement). In general, the PAG
helps generate positive emotional feelings in its ventral regions and vari-
ous negative, distressing feelings in its dorsal ones (Panksepp, 1998b). When
these two functional characteristics of body maps and the pleasure/displea-
sure spectrum are thought about as dynamically interactive, we begin to per-
ceive a fundamental organizing principle of the affective systems. The sense
of embodiment is generated as an integrated whole so that advantage can be
taken by responding to any survival requirement by a comprehensive and
robust activation of the whole brain and body in order to advance enthusias-
tically into the environment (with the potential for pleasure) or to pull back
(with feelings of displeasure) from it, decisively and unequivocally. The PAG
is very richly connected to the higher centromedial cortical regions that are
critically important in cognitive self-representation (Northoff et al., 2006).
Several issues become clearer by thinking about them in light of this pic-
ture of structural organization. First, it helps us understand why a global
state is essential to the operation of some affective processes. Coordinating
body-movement maps with visceral-state maps through their intercon-
nection within the PAG explains how there might be a unified sense to the
felt nature of affect. Second, the reason that “motion” is so central in emo-
tional responding implies that the musculoskeletal inputs are coordinated
with homeostatic and instinctual requirements for the execution of behav-
iors that must satisfy needs. For instance, survival demands are coupled with
the action plans that are necessary for guaranteeing appropriate behaviors.
Third, the reason SEEKING is a “goad without a goal” before learning is that
 Biological Foundations 121

early in development it cannot know what it is seeking (it is objectless). The

systems that support it are geared to approach or avoid at the most basic
level (and this command level is fundamental to all of the other emotional
operating systems, making SEEKING a base-level operator for the other 6
systems), at the same time requiring different brain mechanisms to facilitate
more extensively elaborated action repertoires for more specific behaviors.
Fourth, it may be clearer how a primitive sense of SELF can start to form
from the neural matrix that embodies raw affective states (Panksepp, 1998b,
2005b; Panksepp & Northoff, 2009). Fifth, we begin to understand how the
raw affects of globally felt states become organized by the necessity of moving
an organism into interactions with its environment. So far we have only really
been looking at the “hardware” that supports all this organization – at the bio-
logical structures that are involved. We should now ask what actually does the
moving; how do these structures bring about their motivation? To do that,
we must now turn to the substances that are involved in the communicating
that takes place between the brain regions. A major neurochemical facilitator
for SEEKING is dopamine. (Please note that many other substances – amino
acids, neuropeptides, and other monoamines – are also necessary for normal
brain function. We limit our discussion here to dopamine because of its spe-
cific importance to the SEEKING urge.)
The Dopamine (DA) Pathways. Dopamine is a chemical that acts as a neu-
rotransmitter and hormone; it is found in the nervous system and body of
many, many organisms, from invertebrates to humans. DA is studied under 2
main aspects: First, as how it operates in the four major DA pathways, which
are dedicated neural circuitries involved in specific functions; and second,
for its different roles in the 5 types of DA receptor sites, which help define the
varieties of DA functions.
DA receptors are classified as D1-types (including D1 and D5 variations) and
D2-types (including D2, D3, and D4 variations) (Civelli & Zhou, 2001). The
D1-type receptors are excitatory; the class of D2-type receptors are inhibitory
(Bannon, 2002). The various types, and the molecular and chemical differ-
entiations that serve them, suggest an evolutionary history of the develop-
ment of DA chemistries for modulating behavioral and regulatory activities
(Kapsimali, LeCrom, & Vernier, 2002). The recent developments in histologi-
cal staining techniques has permitted a better understanding of receptor sub-
types, and has led to an increasing awareness of how DA operates in different
systems and organisms as well as to a more effective approach to treating
DA-related pathologies. For decades, many hundreds of research papers have
been published annually on these receptor sites (Bannon, 2002). The study of
receptor locations and densities has contributed greatly to the understanding
122 Stewart & Panksepp

of the various functions of the DA pathways, which is helpful in discover-

ing just how DA regulates the global states we are interested in here. The
four major DA pathways are the mesocortical, mesolimbic, nigrostriatal, and
the turberoinfundibular, but there are minor circuits in other diencephalic
and basal forebrain regions as well as regions of the retina and olfactory bulb
(Bannon, 2002).
The Turberoinfundibular Pathway. This DA pathway connects the hypothal-
amus to the pituitary gland. It also plays a role in the regulation of a number
of hormones responsible for some maternal behaviors and sensory processes,
most prominently prolactin, which is important not only in reproduction and
maternal behaviors but also in social attachments (Panksepp, 1998a).
The Nigrostriatal Pathway (NP). This pathway has its source in the sub-
stantia nigra (SN) and proceeds through the striatum (caudate-putamen). It
is important in the regulation and production of movement, and is part of
a larger motor system found in the basal ganglia. A loss of DA in this sys-
tem leads to Parkinson’s disease, characterized by irregular motor functions.
The initiation of motor sequences and their smooth execution can become
compromised when DA is reduced, and may lead to “freezing,” where the
ability to initiate movement is stopped (Sacks, 1990). Schultz (2001) has dem-
onstrated that DA activations in the substantia nigra and VTA are related to
reward, especially reward prediction (but these systems also need to be char-
acterized in terms of their unconditional-instinctual capacities: Panksepp &
Moskal, 2008). Because the nigrostriatal pathway facilitates movements, it is
interesting to consider what reward prediction really means. Although cog-
nitive assessments seem to be indicated for prediction (and we will discuss
that part of it in a moment), there is an insight offered here from the fact
that the substantia nigra and striatum are both deeply concerned with move-
ments and their inception. In the exploratory activities that are characteristic
of SEEKING, it makes perfect sense that the elicitation of an anticipatory
affect would be part and parcel of those intrinsic motor acts allowing organ-
isms to investigate their environments. Also, when neural developments (and
evolution) have permitted memory and cognition to formulate explicit rep-
resentations of rewards, SEEKING continues to function as a source for the
motivation to explore, with the same affect of anticipation and expectation
being aroused, but utilized in expanded ways. So the goad-without-a-goal
function of the SEEKING system should be underscored as a generalized
motivation and action-initiating system.
It is also important to note that the receptor-site analysis of the nigros-
triatal pathway shows that DA has both excitatory and inhibitory functions
(vide supra). There are several implications here (particularly for the types
 Biological Foundations 123

of motor impairments Sacks describes), but there appears to be a suggestion

that temporal organization may somehow be facilitated in this pathway. There
are 2 ideas that bring this question up. First, is the idea of initiating an action
or action sequence. Here, the nature of motivation is emphasized as a “turn-
ing on” of movement, and the result of that action in the organism points to
a temporally oriented phenomenon. Second, the idea of a smooth execution
appears to demand the temporal fine-tuning of systems that require coordi-
nation over spatiotemporal dimensions (or else they become the akinesias
that Sacks documents). Such types of temporal dynamics may be the bedrock
of phenomenal consciousness.
The Mesolimbic Pathway (MLP). Originating in the midbrain’s VTA and
continuing to the nucleus accumbens, amygdala, and septal structures within
the limbic system, this pathway is described as modulating states of motiva-
tion, pleasure, and reward. The feeling of euphoria is promoted by the MLP
as an important component of motivation, and it is not only the anticipa-
tory pleasure of SEEKING but also nearby opioid systems that mediate the
reward pleasures derived from activities such as sex, eating, and drug use. The
mesolimbic pathway, along with the mesocortical innervation of the medial
frontal regions, are often considered together in discussions of motivation
and reward and in the study of addiction and psychosis, so we will move on
to a view of the two systems together.
The Mesocortical Pathway (MCP). This pathway proceeds from the VTA to
the general region of the frontal lobes, especially to the medial areas of the
prefrontal and cingulate cortex. The DA activity of this pathway is important
in planning, attention, general arousal, and the systemic changes that come
about from learning. DA innervation of the orbitofrontal cortex contributes
to some of the exciting-pleasurable qualities of social interaction (Rolls, 2004;
Schore, 1994); negative social feeling, such as separation distress involving the
anterior cingulate cortex (Panksepp, 1998a), can promote depression through
overarousal (Watt & Panksepp, 2009). Several aspects of schizophrenia are
also amplified by the mesocortical-mesolimbic (MLMC) pathways, leading
to hallucinations, dreams, and other loose associations, and chemicals that
are antagonistic to the action of DA are widely used in treating such problems
in living. One of the central functions of these pathways is believed to be
reward processing, in a very general way.
Although DA activity in the MLMC pathways is now believed to “code
the rewarding aspects of environmental stimuli” (Schultz, 2001, p. 293),
one alternative is that it is necessary for ‘wanting’ various stimuli, but not
for ‘liking’ them (Berridge & Robinson, 1998). Much experimental work
has been dedicated to clarifying why the DA function is not concerned
124 Stewart & Panksepp

specifically with the simple reward of pleasurable feeling, but rather has
much more to do with fine-tuning the prediction and anticipation of
rewards. This is not all it does, however. DA facilitates the incentive values
of the SEEKING system, but not simply by focusing them on specific envi-
ronmental objects; DA relies on the stimulation of internal, affective motive
states to bring about behaviors that are most likely to lead to consummatory
rewards that can sustain bodily homeostasis. It is likely these same systems
are active when children learn about new and exciting relationships that
exist in their environments.
Let us now consider how the DA pathways integrate with other brain sys-
tems to yield a “psychobehavioral integrative system” (Panksepp, 1998a) for
the elaboration of SEEKING urges. Essentially, the nigrostriatal pathway
contributes motor-sequence arousal and synchronization, the mesolimbic
pathway contributes much of the emotional valence, and the mesocortical
pathway contributes to the organization of the cognitive and memory pro-
grams important in appetitive behavior and related affective experiences.
The cognitive components are largely mediated by glutamatergic systems
originating in the cortex, providing downward control of SEEKING urges by
knowledge representations. We can think of these various components as the
acting, feeling, and thinking constituents of SEEKING urges. From a global
perspective, these components represent the evolutionary development of
the Triune Brain (MacLean, 1990), with the reptilian core dedicated to move-
ments, the mammalian limbic system orchestrating various social emotions,
and the mammalian frontal neocortex committed to episodic and working
memory that allow for planning and cognitive processing of changing world
events, with all being coordinated with each other. Mechanistically, this is
an oversimplification, but it helps to see how the motivational systems have
their sources in deep strata of the brain that evolved a long time ago, and how
they have been conserved and elaborated in each species as especially effi-
cient for behavioral organizing functions aimed at particular survival needs.
Even the happy sounds that rats make when they are playing and tickled are
strongly influenced by brain dopamine dynamics (Burgdorf et al., 2007), and
these dynamics contribute to our mirthful joy related to humor and laughter
(Panksepp, 2007a).
Chemical precursors of DA have also been found in insects, where they
appear to function in parallel ways with the DA functions of mammalian
SSs. There is a neurochemical in bees called octopamine that is active in
reward seeking, and its action in the bees’ neural connections underscores
an organization that “sends projections to every nook and cranny of the
bee brain” (Blakeslee, 1996, p. 2). When the earliest animals began moving
 Biological Foundations 125

about on the ancient sea floors, there presumably already existed a family of
motivation-generating molecules that assisted in the coordination of motor
activity with homeostatic and consummatory requirements, and that were
conserved all the way up to us and all the other mammals. It is remarkable that
crayfish still exhibit conditioned place preferences where they received drugs
that promote DA activity (Nathaniel, Panksepp, & Huber, 2009; Panksepp
& Huber, 2004). The SEEKING system highlights a general principle of
brain function – the primitive affective regions of the brain generate global
affective-state functions that are essential tools for living and survival. We
will now take a closer look at some of the specifics of such global brain-body
states as possessing affective dimensions.
Motivation and “Experience.” When we think about the dopamine-
energized SEEKING states, we begin to glimpse how motivational urges
arise from bodily activation states that support specific types of action plans.
These global states are not simply tropisms or reflex arcs that mindlessly
reflect behavior programs triggered by environmental cues. Rather, such states
reflect wide-scale neural network activations and inhibitors that integrate
multiple brain/body processes in a global-dynamic brain-body entrainment
process. If we envision the evolutionary import of this kind of system-wide
engagement, we can begin to see an integrative strategy that seems to base the
guarantee of appropriate survival activities on the coherence of action plans
and psychological salience that transpires in animals as a recognizable aspect
of its own activity.
This is not simply proprioception, which is based in its own specific
somatic pathways, and which gives the animal information about its body
positioning. The global states that arise from SEEKING urges help to ensure
that the animal itself, as a single integrated entity, responds in the right way
to a variety of specific needs. The surest way of conferring this type of imper-
ative was to imbue it with brain functions that register as undeniable calls to
action, felt with unmistakable and unambiguous positively valenced salience.
This characterization of the global body state can most parsimoniously be
called a raw phenomenal “affective experience.” It is possible to go one step
further into the operation of the DA-energized SEEKING states, however,
to discover a final element in the search for clarifying how the physiology of
motivation is responsible for the felt, affective quality that generates subjec-
tive experience and consciousness.
As noted earlier, there is reason to suspect that the temporal dynamics of
some dopaminergically driven SEEKING functions may be central in pro-
ducing important dimensions of consciousness. We now introduce some
research supporting that idea.
126 Stewart & Panksepp

Schultz (2001) notes that “dopamine neurons subserve different functions

at different time scales” (p. 293). He points out the contrast between the “tonic
enabling function” of some DA circuits and the “short, phasic increases” that
are triggered by reward-predicting stimuli. However, we should point out
that electrophysiological studies of DA neuronal activities during learning
tell us much more about the various cognitive inputs into the DA systems
than what the outputs of those systems necessarily do, a nuance often forgot-
ten by electrophysiologists (Panksepp & Moskal, 2008).
There are many lines of evidence that DA neurons, especially in the VTA,
promote a general-purpose SEEKING urge that can control the emergence of
cognitive states in higher regions of the brain (Alcaro et al., 2007; Ikemoto &
Panksepp, 1999). In a study concerning vocal learning in finches, Ding and
Perkel (2002) found that some neurons utilize combined DA receptor types,
and that this mixing “enables the DA system to fine-tune the dynamics of the
song system” (p. 5210). Expanding on the author’s use of the term “dynamic”
here, we might envision it as an intricate organization of on/off timing, rel-
evant in the construction of a complex sequence of behavior. Gao, Krimer,
and Goldman-Rakie (2001), working with monkeys, found that “persistent
activity in prefrontal neurons is modulated by dopamine,” and they describe
“sustained activity during the time a stimulus is held in memory” (p. 295).
Of course, there is feedback from the medial frontal cortex, a major target of
the mesocortical system, back onto dopamine terminal fields in the nucleus
accumbens, the main target of the mesolimbic DA system. This suggests that
beyond questions of receptor differentiation or simple on/off mechanisms
there is a kind of looping DA activity that facilitates a durational, sustaining
mode: DA may act as enabling the holding-on-line of various psychobehav-
ioral tendencies. Hollerman and Schultz (1998), also working with monkeys,
demonstrated that “dopamine neurons display unique response character-
istics, which can be conceptualized as the coding of temporal-prediction
error,” and that “the predictions influencing dopamine neurons include not
only the occurrence but also the time of reward” (p. 308). This seems to sup-
port the idea that DA is far more than a simple on/off facilitator: DA may
be significant in permitting a sustained attention to events unfolding during
a structured time course. Working with computational models, Durstewitz,
Seamans, and Sejnowski (2000) have argued that VTA DA modulation of
higher brain regions may be important in maintaining information relevant
to reward in working memory. Here again we can see DA activities that
appear to be functioning in an on-line, time-sensitive, sustained unfolding
of processing. These few examples of the research on temporal aspects of DA
function appear to support the idea that DA can augment the dynamic flow of
 Biological Foundations 127

not only behavior but conscious experience, which is filled with enthusiasm,
interest, and zest for life.
If it is true that, along with the felt characteristics central to each global-state
emotional command system there is also a range of moment-by-moment
processing distinctions available to each system, then it could be said that
these systems have a felt aspect that is significant for the proper behavior
of the animal in its present moment. By definition, the ordered progression
of present moments is a characteristic of experience, at least in an incipient
form. By a remarkable evolutionary twist, it seems that DA and its precursors
hit upon the idea that the addition of the dimension of time could induce
the kind of psychological salience needed to make brain emotional operating
systems experientially functional. It may be possible that the goading quality
of such emotional/motivational command systems has a rough equivalence
to the degree of “now-ness” and the types of affective psychological pressure
that the systems can exert on cognitive processing. Indeed, it may be that the
“ticking” of DA neurons, which represents their background activity, amounts
to a clocking system for present moments, and when the ticking speeds up, as
in dopamine (DA) bursting, the passage of psychological time speeds up.
This may be better explicated through the main story line in two ground-
breaking books. In The Remembered Present (1989) and Bright Air, Brilliant
Fire (1992), Gerald Edelman explored how animals might have come to pos-
sess “primary consciousness,” an apparently necessary precursor to “higher
order consciousness.” His analysis of the neural organization of primary con-
sciousness resonates in striking ways with the systems described in Affective
Neuroscience; however, Edelman seems to think that the psychobehavioral
imperatives of the systems he describes emerge from the combinatorial
interactions within higher brain cognitive systems and are not, as we have
described, inherently powered by a few systems that remain continually oper-
ating at the base of all higher cognitive processes (without which those higher
processes could not effectively operate). Regarding the temporal aspect we
described above, Edelman (1992) says of primary consciousness:

It is limited to a small memorial interval around a time chunk I call the present.
It lacks an explicit notion or a concept of a personal self, and it does not afford
the ability to model the past or the future as part of a correlated scene. An animal
with primary consciousness sees the room the way a beam of light illuminates it.
(p. 122)

Edelman calls this spotlight-like interval the “remembered present,” the

“tyranny” of which had to be broken by evolutionary advancements in “sym-
bolic memory” in order for “higher order consciousness” to arise, including
128 Stewart & Panksepp

autonoetic consciousness, namely our ability to do mental time travel in

episodic working memory (Vandekerckhove & Panksepp, 2009). There are
two interrelated problems in Edelman’s picture, however. First, he limits
the sense of self to a personal self, whereas there may be an evolved nomo-
thetic self-like characteristic inherent in the way the command systems are
organized, which gives rise to idiographic selves through living in the world
(Northoff & Panksepp, 2008; Panksepp, 1998a; Panksepp & Northoff, 2009).
Second, Edelman downplays the dimensions of the present moment as if
it were no more than a frozen percept, a beam of light that was unable to
differentiate anything it illuminated. The present, for him, is a scene built
up through dynamic processes, but nonetheless a relatively simple percept
that carries no particularly affective salience in a global sense; it is a frozen
present that has no durational force. What does that mean for the sustained
nature of our moods and emotional lives, so important for what we do in
the world?
What Edelman may be missing by placing the perceptual binding of the
scene beyond the dynamism of the affective dimensions, is the real impact
on the animal of the present. As we have suggested, the force of the systems
involved in bringing out the salience of the present is not for the purpose of
reaping information about specific environments (spotlighting), but rather
to compel specific behaviors aimed at exploiting the environment. Edelman
may be right about primary perceptual consciousness as establishing a
cognitive present, but he misses the true function of the affective present,
which requires the postulation of a distinct form of affective consciousness
(Panksepp, 2007c) The present we have endeavored to shed light upon is a
durational intensification of affective salience, which promotes incentive
salience and is a highly effective way of channeling the unfolding behavioral
repertoires – the dynamic motivational states of the body. Those states per-
sist over the time course of their behavioral sequences due to the enduring
affective grip of the moment. The on/off DA controls are necessary, but it is
the unavoidable tug of the body state specific to its command system pro-
gram that is the direct cause of the durational present for the animal. These
body states may also act as a primitive sense of self for mammals because of
how their integral organization generates a characteristic experience of the
body-wide state – a situation that Edelman could not have permitted due to
his external focus on the way the present appears.
In describing present affective experience in the core self and cognitive
experiences in developmentally crafted incipient idiographic selves (Panksepp
& Northoff, 2009) it should not be forgotten that we have to think of them
with the experience and self that we ourselves possess. It is impossible to
 Biological Foundations 129

know what the precise experiences of each present moment might be for,
say, a mouse or a monkey. However, common sense allows us to realistically
infer their affective experiences from their instinctual emotional behaviors as
a sense of their now, perhaps as we watch them explore or otherwise respond
to new environments – cautious and alert, but with an evident determination
to discover what is there. We should not mistakenly anthropomorphize the
inner world of the animal, but neither should we make the mistake of remain-
ing oblivious to the nature of animal experience or of underestimating what
biology is capable of in the service of optimal survival.
It is worth considering the truth diagram that must be fully considered
as we attempt to relate human experiences and the nature of the animal
estate, because detailed functional neuroscience can only be done with ani-
mal models. We would like to have more accurate views of animal emotional
experiences because that is the only way to ever really obtain detailed neuro-
scientific insights into how primary-process human emotional brains might
operate. As summarized in Figure 6.1, we have some hard choices to make
about the true-world emotional nature of animal minds and our scientific
decisions about those minds. We want to avoid Type I and Type II errors, and
to accept anthropodenial when it is valid and anthropomorphism when it is
valid. Radical behaviorism made a shambles of this decision-making process
by following time-honored pre-neuroscientific Cartesian opinions that such
issues are outside the realm of science, a bias sustained to the present day
(Panksepp, 2005a), as opposed to recognizing that because of advances in
our ability to study psychobiological homologies, we must now consider and
weight all of the available evidence in our decision-making processes (e.g.,
Panksepp, 1998b, 2005b, 2010). There is now abundant evidence indicating
that there is much in the animal mind that will inform us of our own mental-
ity, especially in terms of the core processes such as basic emotional urges.
We believe that at the basic (primary-process) emotional level, anthropomor-
phism is a valid strategy for revealing the affective ground of being that is
common to all animals. Our primate and mammalian relatives may surprise
us with insights that will provide understanding of the nature of our own
affective experiences.
Such analyses of core emotional and motivational processes may also have
relevance for understanding the functions that support cognition. Cognition
is traditionally studied as a large set of relatively high-level processes that
inform and constitute the basic material of thinking; “cogito” means “I think.”
However, just as this chapter has looked into the basic-level processes that
not only shape specific behavioral repertoires but add to them a dimension
of felt activation that engages the entire mind and body, it might be helpful to
130 Stewart & Panksepp

Avoidance of Anthropomorphism
(e.g., “Anxiety-Like Behavior”)

The True Nature of the World

Our Judgements Animals Experience Animals have No

About the World Emotional Feelings Emotional Feelings

Animals Experience Valid Avoid

Emotional Feelings Anthropomorphism Type I Error

Animals have No Avoid Valid

Emotional Feelings Type II Error Anthropodenial

Figure 6.1. Validity of anthropomorphism.

consider the operations of cognitive processes by looking for deeper sources,

and for any parallels with the body-wide activations of motivation.
Very few researchers would argue with the idea that the vast majority
of operations contributing to cognition are beneath the level of conscious
awareness. Myriad computational elements, from sensory, motor, perceptual,
and other processing domains, converge in neocortical layers that integrate
“thoughts” for us. If we want to get a better understanding of this, we should
conceptualize thought not simply as higher-order intelligence; rather, we
should also ask about the function of thought – what is it actually doing for
us? At the simplest level, thinking is a process whose real objective concerns
successful performance in an environment containing complexity. It is an
anticipatory strategy for adaptively meeting the challenges of survival facing
each animal. This may seem a long way from human problem-solving, but it
is the core function of cognition. At this level, it is easy to see how the relation
to motivation comes about. In essence, one set of processors must compute
details about internal states and external affordances, and another set of pro-
cessors must organize actions and their execution. Cognitive processing ulti-
mately provides much of the context for the detailed expression of internally
motivated processes. The inborn emotional processes reflect strategies that
do not know much about the world initially, except simple-minded strategies
to behave and feel in certain ways. Although the emotional feelings are born
largely objectless, they become connected to world events through learning,
and the resulting developmental cognitive-affective landscapes tell organisms
how specifically to behave. Let’s take a moment to think how prevalent this is
in living systems, and how in some organisms the resulting “cognitive” pro-
cesses may be deeply unconscious.
 Biological Foundations 131

Research tells us that plants possess remarkable abilities for evaluating details
of their environment (Narby, 2005). They can determine which species of para-
site is chomping on their leaves by analysis of chemicals in the saliva of the pest
(Buhner, 2002) and in response, they can release chemicals that attract a spe-
cific predator that will feed on the pest the plant has targeted (Whitfield, 2001).
Plants can even notify their neighbors to prepare for attack by chemical means.
These behaviors are sophisticated responses to specific environmental chal-
lenges, and from the perspective of information processing, they resemble cog-
nitive processes. If plants are this sophisticated in their precognitive operations,
then maybe we should rethink the view that wants to conceptualize cognition
merely as thought. Maybe cognition has roots that draw upon the same exten-
sive activating networks of the body that grounds our various emotional and
motivational systems? Maybe cognition is far more complex in nonhuman ani-
mals than our verbal thought-based view has allowed us to appreciate? Surely,
creatures can think in terms of visual images, perhaps even in more strict affec-
tive terms. Maybe cognition, at its base, is not simply what we thought it was –
the apotheosis of neocortical function through language – but also a system of
systems, computing vast amounts of information and delivering appropriate
output to motivational systems at every step of the response sequence geared
to specific environmental demands. That would mean that cognition, too, may
be rooted in a body-wide network (and is not just highest-level neocortical
processing alone), and that it, too, has ancient evolutionary origins (and is not
dependent on “big” brains alone) – that it too is ultimately subservient to the
bodily survival needs of organisms and hence cannot do much unless it is nour-
ished, more than just metabolically, by affectively resilient brain-bodily states.
In some sense, we are subject to seeing cognition and motivation as dis-
tinct because of the history of science. Of course, different neural systems do
contribute different types of processes to the behaviors we parse as observers,
but functional parsing seems to have led to assumptions about living systems,
such as the idea that plants are the ultimate in passivity (and mindlessness)
and humans have exclusive access to top-quality problem solving because
they “think.” It may be that these assumptions are severely skewing our abil-
ity to see the extraordinary solutions nature has provided to all her creatures.
In addition, if we have mistaken the neocortical origins of our own ways of
knowing, it appears likely that what we are trying to accomplish in educating
our children may be subject to biases that emphasize our species centrism
over a kind of knowledge that would help us find our place in nature – and
our responsibility as natural beings within the matrix of living things. It is
long past the time to pretend our children only deserve cognitive education
(the flawed central tenet of No Child Left Behind), and time to begin rec-
ognizing that it is only through new and sophisticated forms of emotional
132 Stewart & Panksepp

education that breeds social intelligence (Goleman, 2006) that we will truly
leave no child behind.
Education appears to divide children up along the lines of the sciences we
have used to study them. Because cognition is the domain of the “highest”
abilities, we devise a curriculum to enhance their thinking ability by train-
ing them to organize and memorize facts, and to look for new ways to use
the facts. Far behind the perceived importance of cognition, so important
for making a buck, are the emotional, motivational, and physical domains
that make us truly human. Such issues are grudgingly or barely considered in
mainstream educational practice, but perhaps the times they are a changing
(Sunderland, 2006). Yet, from what we have tried to focus on in this chap-
ter, those deep and pervasively felt domains are the very foundation of what
we experience as thinking and cognizing. This subtle affective fabric of mind
should be brought back into the understanding of human behavior, and that
understanding might then take the fair measure of each child as the breath-
takingly sensitive open experiencer he or she is, needing little extra moti-
vation to explore, act, express, and learn . . . if only given the opportunity
to employ their natural enthusiasms. Clearly, the computer revolution has
opened up a world of information that they like to explore, and helped them
become self-motivated learners. Albeit, we must take care to help ensure they
do not become addicted to the crap that is also abundantly available on the
web. They should also have plenty of time and be allowed to play freely with
each other, so their social brains are allowed to grow and connect up as a
result of rich engagements with others. Obviously, these engagements will
often lead to trouble and dissention, but bright young adults should be sitting
at the edges of our playgrounds (or play sanctuaries) to help assure that all
the kids learn the one important rule without which no human society can
thrive – do not hurt another. Do not do unto others what you would not have
done unto you. In this age when parents consider drugging their children
with Ritalin so that they will settle down enough to be filled up with facts,
we have to consider whether we have gotten the science about ourselves right
in any essential way (Panksepp, 1998b, 2007b). If not, can we use our deep
mammalian motivations and cognitions, along with a few profoundly and
uniquely human insights, to do better?

Educational Applications
We have looked at how aspects of the core emotional command systems,
especially SEEKING urges, shape behaviors and play an essential role in
 Biological Foundations 133

their execution and timing as well as holding their expressions in robust and
dynamic experiential states. It may well be that almost all learning must be
accompanied by dynamic affective experiential states in order for lasting
and deeply positive behavioral-psychological change to occur. Cashing out
this suspicion in appropriate research is likely to have ramifications for how
learning is conceptualized – both in homes and in schools, and possibly in
social programs for workplace retraining. A clear recognition of how brain
dopamine dynamics and the resulting energizing of SEEKING urges inter-
face with our educational aspirations will be an interesting future chapter
of educational psychology. Perhaps we can see the importance of emotional
energies, especially the role of PLAY, most clearly during the preschool years,
when our children are supposed to become socialized, with emerging clear
ideas of what they can or cannot do to other people.
It may be that the best way to advance the healthy emotionally sensitive
socialization of our children, so as to promote increasing empathy and concern
for others – hopefully toward an “Empathic Civilization” (Rifkin, 2010) – is to
better deploy one of our most underutilized social resources – joyous child-
hood physical PLAY – to train each generation about what good humans can
and cannot do to each other. Let us re-emphasize the darker side of the point
just made: During the competitive joys of childhood play, kids will “naturally”
hurt each other. We adults should be there, more consistently, at many critical
moments, to gently intervene with sincere and nonpunitive guidance encourag-
ing the children toward pro-social options. If from the earliest ages we fostered
more independent, playful social engagements, under the watchful eye of those
who realize that playful joy brings children to the perimeters of their emotional
knowledge, might we more consistently train the young of our species not to
hurt each other? If at many critical moments, more of our young promptly
heard some good advice from above – “You shouldn’t have done that. . . . If you
want to play, don’t do that anymore. OK?” – might we be able to construct bet-
ter pro-social minds/brains? Can we diminish the potential for cruelty inher-
ent in our human bloodline through the promotion of more empathic touch/
speech and equitably joyous social policies? It’s at least worth a try.
Our raw emotions need to be used skillfully to educate our children. We
should reopen our playgrounds as perhaps the most important classrooms
that our children will ever have, as long as the instructors of the young are
sympathetically observing and assuring that no child is marginalized in those
all-important playful experiences that help construct social brains. Then,
when the SEEKING system takes over in full force, we can also guide that
joyful energy into optimal educational programs.
134 Stewart & Panksepp

Clearly, there is much at stake in our better understanding of the inter-

play of cognition and emotion. The other animals, that also lead rich affective
lives, still have much to teach us.

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 7

Motivation, Cognition, and Emotion

A Phylogenetic-Interdisciplinary Approach

Manfred Wimmer

Introduction
Compared to behaviourism, cognitive psychology has largely neglected moti-
vational issues. With the cognitive revolution, the whole topic of motives
and motivations moved out of the focus of scientific mainstreams. Except
for some social psychologists, the cognitive revolution did not consider basic
motivational forces seriously (LeDoux, 1996, p. 323).
The working hypothesis for explaining the functional principles of cogni-
tion in general have been deeply influenced by the computer sciences. The
concept of the brain as a computer has become the leading idea, and a lot of
metaphors from computer sciences influenced the view of cognitive func-
tions, which were treated as purely neocortical processes. Emotional and
motivational factors were considered as neutral energy or unspecified arousal
processes (Schachter & Singer, 1962).
In the course of the last decade, the situation changed as research from
the booming fields of neurobiology and neurophysiology increasingly pro-
vided evidence that cognitive functions are being seriously influenced by
deeper layers (motivational as well as emotional) of the brain. The view of
cognitive processes as purely neocortical functions more and more appears as
one-sided and insufficient (e.g., Ciompi, 1988, 2003; Damasio, 2003; LeDoux,
1996, 2002; Panksepp, 1998; Wimmer & Ciompi, 1996). The necessary exten-
sion that integrates emotional as well as motivational factors leads to a deeper
understanding of cognition in general, and clearly demonstrates the linkages
between cognitive processes and their emotional-motivational bases. This
shift has a deep impact on cognitive sciences and related fields of research as
well as on philosophy in general. Neglecting the whole emotional-biological-
motivational substructures of brain functions and reason in general leads to
one-sided and insufficient conceptions.

137
138 Wimmer

The following approach attempts to shed light on the emotion-motivation-

cognition interactions from a phylogenetic perspective. Intended is an inte-
grative approach devoid of any reductionistic attitudes. This means that the
demonstrated levels of emotional-motivational-cognitive interactions will be
analysed from two perspectives:
(a) The bottom-up perspective focusing on the constitutive elements (e.g.,
physiological processes; neurobiological structures and functions;
genetically based, hardwired behavioural programs, etc.)
(b) A perspective focusing on the internal dynamics of the analysed level
(e.g., the level of a single cell is different from the level of tissues, whose
dynamics are integrated within the whole of the organism’s processes).
Bottom-up and top-down processes as well as horizontal dynamics within
a specific level need to be separated clearly in order to avoid the traps and
serious failures of ‘nothing else but’ kinds of reductionism (Campbell, 1974,
p. 180; Riedl, 2000).

Where to Begin?
A serious challenge for each phylogenetic approach is the problem of the start-
ing point. It is a question located near the borderline between scientific and
more metaphysical issues. For the framework of this article, I will take into
account the perspectives from K. Lorenz and J. Piaget. Lorenz’s approach is close
to general phylogenetic considerations; Piaget’s frame is closer to ontogeny.
Concerning cognition, for Lorenz, as an evolutionary thinker, ‘life itself is
a process of acquiring knowledge’ (Lorenz as cited in Weiss, 1971, p. 231). This
statement was one of the basic ideas for Evolutionary Epistemology (Lorenz
1973; Lorenz & Wuketits, 1983; Riedl, 1984; Vollmer, 1981), which was designed
to enable a kind of naturalization of cognition in general. This means that the
typical frame of analysis for cognitive processes in general – containing sym-
bols, consciousness, language, rationality, and so forth – is enlarged to include
biological-evolutionary processes in a broad sense. Life itself and evolution in
general are considered as processes close to cognition.
From another perspective, J. Piaget, the founder of Genetic Epistemology,
argues, that ‘cognitive processes are the result of organic autoregulation,
whose main mechanisms they reflect’ (Piaget, 1967, p. 27; trans. M. W.). Piaget
also tried a specific kind of naturalization of cognitive processes beyond
Lorenz’s evolutionary naturalization with emphasis on autoregulative pro-
cesses (Piaget, 1967; Vuyk, 1981; Wimmer 1998, p. 181f).
 Motivation, Cognition, and Emotion 139

Although Lorenz and Piaget have quite different views on evolu-

tion in general (Wimmer, 1998) both propose a deep continuity from the
biological-organic processes to cognitive functions (see also Heschl, 1990;
Lorenz, 1977).
In order to emphasise the special features of cognitive processes at different
levels, Oeser and Riedl propose two levels of cognition:
(a) The level of organic processes, dominated by the basic biological tendencies
of self-preservation and preservation of the species, where cognition is consid-
ered as gain of information; and (b) more complex levels, characterised by higher
brain activity, consciousness, and reflexivity, where it is useful to speak about gain
of knowledge. (Oeser, 1987, p. 9; Riedl, 1984, pp. 2, 15)

One major approach that serves as background for both kinds of argu-
ments is Bertalanffy’s General Systems Theory, which considers organisms
as open systems whose permanent interactions with the environment estab-
lish a dynamic equilibrium (or steady-state). This means that specific inter-
nal structures are kept stable over a permanent change of matter and energy
(Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 149). These structures are maintained by regulative pro-
cesses, and it is these processes that are the main signs of life (Piaget, 1967, p.
27). A deeper understanding of motivational processes in general (i.e., basic
motivational as well as higher motivational processes) requires considering
these regulatory activities.
For a phylogenetic-evolutionary approach to motivation and related
emotional-cognitive fields, it is necessary to distinguish between three kinds
of regulative activities: structural, functional, and cognitive regulations.
According to Piaget and Bertalanffy, these different kinds of regulatory activ-
ities are closely interrelated, depending on the level of phylogenetic or onto-
genetic development.
a) Structural regulations: At the base of structural regulation there are reg-
ulatory activities without any specified regulatory organs. This kind of
regulatory activity depends on dynamic interactions, ‘where the order
is effectuated by a dynamic interplay of processes . . . e.g., embryonic
regulations where the whole is re-established from the parts in equifi-
nal processes’ (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 43). Further structural regulations
are based on the endocrine system and lead to changes of an ‘anatom-
ical or histological kind’ (Piaget, 1967, p. 31; trans. M. W.). Essentially,
this type of regulation involves concrete physiological parameters (e.g.,
body temperature, cellular dehydration) that have to be kept stable in
relation to permanently changing environmental conditions.
140 Wimmer

b) Functional regulations deal with the ‘activity or the physiological (or

psychophysiological) reaction of the organs’ (Piaget, 1967, p. 31; trans. M.
W.). These processes are based on activities of the nervous system and
are responsible for regulating behavioural patterns or actions in a broad
sense. In contrast to concrete structural regulations (e.g., ­digestion), the
main characteristic of functional regulation is a functional integration,
which integrates objects not to organs but to behavioural schemes. The
grasping scheme of a baby can serve as an example for a behavioural
scheme. When grasping for an object, the child is integrating this object
(the ball) into a behavioural scheme (the grasping scheme).
Similarly, within ethology, the ‘innate releasing mechanisms’ (IRM)
(Lorenz, 1981, p. 175f) can be considered as one main element of
functional–behavioural regulations. The IRM is a functional concept,
describing the sensory capacities, which enable the organism to per-
ceive and react to specific stimuli.
c) Cognitive regulations appear as regulations with maximal flexibility
including reversibility. They are active within the functional-mental
field and do not directly rely on environmental stimuli or physiologi-
cal parameters. In contrast to functional regulations whose stability
is due to behavioural schemes or physiological schemes and related
desired values, cognitive regulations are organized around so-called
invariances providing stability within cognitive structures. According
to Piaget, Platt formulates, ‘It seems possible that the dynamic search
for invariances may even be a general principle of organization in the
higher order processes in the brain’ (Platt, 1970, p. 38). In organizing
cognitive activities, these invariances are closely related to Kant’s aprio-
ris (Wimmer, 1998, p. 190ff).

Taking into account these basic assumptions about the roots of

organic-cognitive processes, it becomes evident that bodily changes or dis-
turbance of balance and re-establishment of this balance are basic to bio-
logical organization and seem to be a fundamental bipolarity inherent in life
(Ciompi, 1982, p. 96). The common root of motivation, emotion, as well as
cognitive processes can be found in this bipolarity and the associated regula-
tive processes.
According to H. Spencer, who characterised evolution as ‘a change from
an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogene-
ity through continuous integration and differentiation’, these primarily uni-
fied regulative processes, containing motivational, emotional, and cognitive
 Motivation, Cognition, and Emotion 141

components during ontogeny as well as phylogeny, get differentiated without

ever losing their close relations (Spencer, cited from Hillman, 1992, p. 158).
This view contradicts and reveals as totally artificial the widespread separa-
tion of cognition and emotion, which rests on a long philosophical (especially
rationalistic) tradition and is reflected also in the isolated status of cognition
within AI research and cognitive psychology.
In this chapter, I will outline emotion-motivation-cognition interactions at
four different levels. The first and most basic kind of interaction is the kine-
sis reaction, which is a kind of behavior manifested especially in unicellu-
lar organisms. Increasing complexity shows the second kind of interaction,
which is the taxis reaction. The third level is that of instincts and related
primary emotions. Finally, some characteristics of the human – symbolic
level – will be discussed briefly. The main goal is to show that an evolutionary
approach (also including ontogeny) clearly demonstrates the reciprocal rela-
tions between emotional, cognitive, and motivational processes. This means
that a deeper understanding of all these processes has to take into account the
interactions within this triangle as well as its specific dynamics on different
levels of phylogenetic and ontogenetic development.

Levels of Motivation: Cognition–Emotion

Interaction
Kinesis
Dealing with a behaviour of this kind may probably look inadequate for a
discussion about motivation and cognition. For a phylogenetic approach,
however, it seems necessary to elaborate on such a basic kind of behaviour.
Kinesis behaviour is a very simple kind of behaviour in unicellular organisms.
For the observer, it appears as increase of locomotor activities when reaching
worse environmental conditions. (e.g., high temperature). This behaviour can
be analysed quite well on a physiological level: Disruption of the physiological
homoeostasis (which may be perceived by specific receptor organs) automati-
cally leads to increased locomotor activities, and is reduced if homoeostasis
is re-established. If there is cognition, it is only in this basic sense of gain of
information, as mentioned above in regard to Lorenz and Piaget.
The organismic structure gets to ‘know’ the changes of homoeostasis and
compensatory mechanisms (e.g., locomotion) are induced. That which the
organism perceives is a change of the internal conditions. Something such as
an outside world does not exist yet. Obuchowski (1982, p. 236; trans. M. W.)
142 Wimmer

describes this behavioural pattern as the homoeostatic code that is character-

ised by the following features:
1) Information reaches the organism without the mediation of receptor
organs;
2) Information is not identified by a specific apparatus;
3) The behaviour of the organism is modified by homeostatic changes;
4) A lot of information gets lost;
5) The simplicity of orientation mechanisms compensates for the loss of
information.
Following Obuchowski, one of the basic functions of emotions can be con-
sidered as ‘being a marker which signals a disruption of homoeostasis’
(Obuchowski, 1982, p. 233; trans. M. W.). In the framework of this kind of
behaviour, there appears the almost inseparable unity of motivation, cognition,
and emotion (Leeper, 1970). The cognitive aspect can be found in the organ-
ism’s capacity to perceive the change of the internal conditions, or in the words
of Bateson, to find a difference that makes a difference (Bateson, 1983, p. 582).
This kind of perception includes the tendency to locomotor activity, which
represents the component of motivation. I would place emotional-affective
components somewhere in between perception and locomotion.
On a more general level, Sylvan Tomkins’ concept of motivation and emo-
tions presents a similar argument: ‘The affect system is therefore the primary
motivational system because, without its amplification, nothing else matters
and, with its amplification, anything else can matter. It thus combines urgency
and generality. It lends its power to memory, to perception, to thought, and to
action no less than to the drives’ (Tomkins, 1980, p. 147).

Taxis
On this level, the undirected locomotor activity of kinesis is replaced by a type
of behaviour that is ‘directly determined by the impinging stimulus’ (Lorenz,
1981, p. 227). The main characteristic that differentiates taxis from kinesis is
the goal directedness of this kind of behaviour. Examples are positive pho-
totaxis of moths and negative phototaxis of wood lice. Compared to kine-
sis, which in case of homoeostatic disruption leads to undirected increase of
locomotor activities, taxis is characterised by different kinds of goal-directed
behaviours, such as, ‘away from light’.
Higher forms of taxis reactions can be seen for example in the behaviour
of turbellarian worms. Their movement towards an olfactorily located feed-
ing site depends on their actual internal state (Holzkamp-Osterkamp, 1975,
 Motivation, Cognition, and Emotion 143

p. 156). The hungry animal will move towards the feeding site; the satiated
organism does not react to the same olfactory stimulation.
It has to be emphasised, that on this level the differentiation of the internal
conditions of the organism leads to different kinds of motoric patterns and
perceptions. Different types of internal states (e.g., hungry, satiated) render
the organism sensitive towards different kinds of external stimuli, connected
with corresponding motoric patterns, leading to appetitive (approach) or
aversive (avoid) reactions. Perceptive as well as motoric capacities are highly
dependent on the actual internal state. Compared to kinesis reactions, in
which stimulus and response are closely interrelated, in taxis behaviour a new
internal component appears between perception and reaction, which seems
to be one of the precursors of emotions.
This dependence of perceptive and motoric activities on the internal
organismic state appears as a fundamental functional principle within the
emotion-motivation-cognition triangle. In anticipation of later statements,
the internal organismic state may be considered as close to emotions, and
perceptions as close to cognitions. Each cognitive activity is closely con-
nected to the emotional-internal base, providing the necessary connection to
the basic organismic layers.

Primary Emotions: Instincts, Emotions, and Motivation

The next phylogenetic level that will be discussed is the level of the so-called
primary emotions and accompanying instincts. The close relations between
instincts and emotions were emphasised especially by W. McDougall, W.
James, and more recently by evolutionary approaches such as Plutchik’s psy-
choevolutionary theory (Plutchik, 1980).
Thus:
[McDougall regarded an emotion] as a mode of experience which accompanies
the working within us of instinctive impulses. It was assumed that human nature
(our inherited inborn constitution) comprises instinct; that the operation of each
instinct, no matter how brought into play, is accompanied by its own peculiar
quality of experience which may be called a primary emotion. . . . The human
emotions were then regarded as clues to the instinctive impulses, or indicators of
the motives at work in us. (McDougall, 1933, p. 128)

Plutchik’s psychoevolutionary theory, which is closely related to Darwin’s

approach, considers emotions within biologically relevant functional areas,
where they ‘serve an adaptive role in helping organisms deal with key survival
issues posed by the environment’ (Plutchik, 1980, p. 8).
144 Wimmer

In relation to neurobiological research, Panksepp considers primary emo-

tions as ‘emotional systems’ or ‘executing, command and operating systems’
including strong motivational forces, which are defined by the six following
criteria (Panksepp, 1998, p. 52):
1. The underlying circuits are genetically predetermined and designed to
respond unconditionally to stimuli arising from major life-challenging
circumstances;
2. These circuits organise diverse behaviours by activating or inhibiting
motor subroutines and concurrent autonomic-hormonal changes that
have proved adaptive in the face of such life-challenging circumstances
during the evolutionary history of the species;
3. Emotive circuits change the sensitivities of sensory systems that are rel-
evant for the behavioural sequences that have been aroused;
4. Neural activity of emotive systems outlasts the precipitating
circumstances;
5. Emotive circuits can come under the conditional control of emotion-
ally neutral environmental stimuli;
6. Emotive circuits have reciprocal interactions with the brain mecha-
nisms that elaborate higher decision-making processes and conscious-
ness (Panksepp, 1998, pp. 48–49).
In order to get closer to the overlapping fields of emotional-motivational
dynamics, it is useful to take a look at classical ethology, which dealt with
motivational issues in a very intensive manner. In contrast to the behaviour-
ist tradition, which considered motivations from an external point of view
(stimulation theory) (LeDoux, 2006, p. 312ff), the European tradition consid-
ers motivation rather from an internal point of view, closer to the notion of
drives.1
Within classical ethology, the notion of instincts is very broad and
­heterogeneous. Generally speaking, most proponents of classical ethology
consider instincts as complex behaviours, including the following three
elements (Lorenz, 1981; Tinbergen, 1952): (a) perceptive components; (b) a
central coordinating part; and (c) specific motor components (a fixed action
pattern). Notably, all three elements form a functional unit. Each component
has different possibilities for modifications by external influences.
The perceptive component. Within classical ethology, the perceptions of
organisms are triggered by the so-called innate releasing mechanism (IRM),
which allows organisms to perceive specific and biologically relevant stimuli
(Lorenz, 1981, p. 175f). The IRMs is a functional concept demonstrating high
sensitivity for specific classe of stimuli, for example, mates are recognized
 Motivation, Cognition, and Emotion 145

by a specific colour pattern and prey by their shape. Compared to the motor
component, which appears as highly rigid, this sensory part is a major target
of learning processes and evolutionary changes (Lorenz, 1963).
The IRM appears as a function of the nervous system and shows increasing
specialization with growing complexity of neuronal activities. Invertebrates,
especially insects and spiders (Arachnidae), have IRMs not modifiable by
learning (Lorenz, 1981, p. 175). In higher animals, especially vertebrates, all
IRMs can be modified by learning, which O. Storch calls ‘receptor learning’,
demonstrated, for example, by Schleidt (1962). Examples of further modi-
fications of this sensory component appear in conditioned learning pro-
cedures, such as conditioned appetitive behaviour, conditioned aversion,
and ­conditioned action (Hassenstein, 1987, p. 274ff; Lorenz, 1981, p. 289ff;
Wimmer, 1996, p. 49).
All these modifications of behavioural schemes cannot be properly under-
stood if the emotional components are not taken into account. In general, they
provide the organism with a necessary feedback for behavioural acts, which
emotionally colour specific actions or situations. It seems evident that with
growing behavioural flexibility, these emotional capacities grew, allowing for
the evaluation of the outcomes of actions and their attendant conditions. ‘We
consider these evaluations as the most general character of emotional quali-
ties of life.’ (Holzkamp-Osterkamp, 1975, p.155; trans. M. W.)
These evaluations emotionally colour the sensory as well as the motor
component, clearly demonstrating that one main function of increasing emo-
tional capacities is the evaluation of internal as well as external stimuli in
relation to the organismic actual state (Holzkamp–Osterkamp, 1975, p. 155;
Obuchowski, 1982, p. 238ff; Panksepp, 1998a; Scherer, 1981, p. 311). According
to Panksepp (1998, p. 48), ‘Each emotion has a characteristic “feeling tone”
that is especially important in encoding the intrinsic values of these interac-
tions, depending on whether they are likely to promote or hinder survival’.
Notably, evaluative processes are primarily not manifested as conscious
deliberations. They refer to relations between the internal state and external
conditions (Holzkamp-Osterkamp, 1975, p. 157). The sensitivity of the IRMs
depends on the internal-central-motivational state (a component of the cen-
tral part) of the organism, making the organism sensitive in regard to these
categories of stimuli that are relevant for its actual state (for a comparison
with the ontogenetic level, see Wimmer, 1998).
The central coordinating part: The central part can be viewed as a mediator
between a sensory surface and motor pattern. In general, the main function
of the central component, which is also considered as internal state, is media-
tion between the sensory surface and behavioural (motoric) programs.2
146 Wimmer

In contrast to the behaviouristic tradition, which emphasized mainly that

organisms are determined primarily by environmental conditions and physi-
ological disturbances, in classical ethology, internal as well as external factors
are responsible for generation of specific internal states and related behav-
ioural tendencies. A major example is Lorenz’s notion of ‘endogenous built
up excitability’, which beside tissue needs and external stimulation plays an
essential part in generating behaviour (Lorenz, 1981, p. 187). This perspec-
tive also includes the assumption that all types of learning processes contain
inherited mechanisms providing severe biases for the content of learning,
determining what gets learned (Ohman, 1993).
In greater detail, the functions of the central coordinating part are to: (1)
motivate (i.e., affects as energisers of cognitive activities); (2) sensitise recep-
tor organs; (3) evaluate the input in relation to the internal needs and prefer-
ences; (4) facilitate storage, whereby it should be emphasised that especially
the hippocampus formation in the brain is essential for the so-called affective
memory; and (5) enable organization of cognitive elements (cognitive ele-
ments are stored depending on the actual affective background). This leads
to so-called integrated feeling-thinking-behaving programs (Ciompi, 1988;
Wimmer & Ciompi, 1996).
From a more physiological point of view, J. D. Vincent considers the cen-
tral component as a ‘fluctuating central state’ (Spector, 1982; trans. by M. W.)
providing the basis for behavioural acts as well as learning processes. This
concept is defined as predominantly physiological, but it contains more than
merely elements of physiological homoeostasis (Vincent, 1990). The assump-
tion of internal tendencies to actions performed without any actual physio-
logical disturbance shows close correspondence to ethological results.
The ‘fluctuating central state’ in animals as in humans is a global phenom-
enon, appearing as the ‘readout’ of the internal physiological state, the actual
perceptions of the surrounding conditions (which in higher mammals and
humans also include imagination and anticipations) and contents of memory
(ontogenetically established memory patterns as well as evolutionarily fixed
schemes of evaluation, etc.) These three components significantly determine
attention, perception, and storage of experiences as well as the mode of cog-
nitive processes (Vincent, 1990, p.183f).
Concerning the motivational component of these behavioural programs, it
is one of the main merits of ethology to have clarified that organisms are not
just reacting to external stimulation or to present tissue needs. Although both
components must be taken into account, there is also an internal, endog-
enous production of excitability, preparing the organism for a specific behav-
iour (appetitive behaviour) before actual deficiencies in the physiological
 Motivation, Cognition, and Emotion 147

field become dominant (Changeux, 1984; Holzkamp–Osterkamp, 1975, p. 86f;

Lorenz, 1981; Vincent, 1990).
The basic level of these evaluative mechanisms can be found in the inborn
teaching mechanisms and the related reward and punishment systems. The
inborn teaching mechanisms proves to be a very useful concept for discuss-
ing the functional components of the feeling part on this level. The built-in
teacher is defined as ‘checking on the exteroceptor and proprioceptor input
coming in as re-afference of a fixed motor pattern . . . a physiological mech-
anism in many ways comparable to an IRM’ (Lorenz, 1981, p. 299). Thus, the
built-in teaching mechanisms provide the organism with a kind of scale for
the evaluation of behavioural patterns.
As Livesey points out, the basic affects are generated by these mechanisms,
which appear as ‘products of genetically established neural systems and
accompany such stimuli as the taste and smell of food and drink, the tactual
sensations of sexual intercourse, the pain of a burn and so on. These feelings
are immediate perceptual correlates of the particular stimuli and constitute
affects without cognitive interaction, though they are vital for the establish-
ment of cognitive associations’ (Livesey, 1986, p. 251).
If an executed motor pattern conforms to this teaching mechanism, it is
combined with pleasure or, at a more basic level, does not cause any distur-
bances. Deviations from this prefixed standard lead to feelings of disharmony
and disturbance. ‘Without any known exception, animals that have evolved
a centralized nervous system are able to learn from the consequences pro-
duced by their own actions, success acting as a “reward” or “reinforcement”,
failure acting as “punishment” tending to “extinguish” the animal`s readiness
to repeat the action just performed’ (Lorenz, 1981, p. 289). Within the human
sphere, much more complex and socially transmitted norms and standards
function as evaluative criteria of performed actions, having their origins in
these basic mechanisms.
The behavioural part: The motor component: The basic level of behavioural
acts can be found in the so-called fixed-action patterns leading to highly com-
plex voluntary movements. In a search for the building blocks of behaviour in
general, different levels of analysis can be chosen. The most elementary one
is the level of motor activities as, for example, the muscular pattern necessary
for a specific movement (e.g., to fly, to walk, to cry). As shown by v. Holst and
v. St. Paul (1960), muscular-motoric patterns of this kind can be released by
higher command centres, such as the centre for flight or attack.
The low-level units (muscular-motoric pattern) are also called multi-
purpose activities because of their guidance by different higher ‘command
areas’ (Baerends, 1958; Lorenz, 1981, p. 220). For example, the same pattern of
148 Wimmer

muscular activity can be released by fight or flight impulses. The dependence

of the motor pattern on different behavioural ambits shows the difficulty of
drawing clear lines between separate instincts.
Ethological research clearly demonstrates that the building blocks of ani-
mal behaviour are quite rigid, hierarchically organized, and strictly combined
with specific patterns of internal or external releasing mechanisms, forming
a linear hierarchy. A big phylogenetic step towards a more flexible stock of
these building blocks is the so-called relative hierarchy of moods, as shown
by Leyhausen (1965), especially in cats (Felidae).
The acts of lying in ambush, stalking, catching, killing, and finally eating prey
form a sequence which is obligatory only with regard to their common teleo-
nomic function. Physiologically, each of the motor patterns involved retains the
character of a consummatory act that possesses its own appetitive behavior inde-
pendently of whether it is performed under the pressure of the higher level of
tissue need or acted out in play for its own sake. (Lorenz, 1981, p. 203)

The step forward towards increasing flexibility of behaviour consists in the

possibility to perform single elements of the behavioural range of prey catching
for its own sake and the ability to combine elements of different behavioural
ranges. This can be seen in play activities and most clearly in curiosity behav-
iours. Curiosity leads to performance of different behavioural elements in rela-
tion to exciting objects, which results in an immense growth of experience.
This excursion into the fields of classical ethology was designed to shed
some light upon the emotional-motivational dynamics in different periods of
phylogenetic development. Due to its strong cognitive biases, recent ethology
seems not to be deeply interested in motivational issues (Hurley & Nudds,
2006; Wassermann & Zentall, 2006). In contrast, classical ethology was
focused on motivational questions, and has exerted a deep impact on human
psychology (see, for example, the intense discussions about K. Lorenz’s book
On Aggression, 1966).
Without taking all results from classical ethology for granted, it has to
be emphasised that for motivational dynamics, internal as well as external
factors play an essential role. Animals as well as humans are neither totally
dependent on internal drives and forces nor directed exclusively by external
stimuli.

Human Level
‘With the disintegration of instincts, the hereditary programming disappears.
There follow two new types of cognitive self-regulation, which are mobile and
 Motivation, Cognition, and Emotion 149

constructive’ (Piaget, 1967, p. 59; trans. M. W.). Among the numerous fac-
tors leading to a fundamental change of behavioural organization in humans,
symbol usage can be considered as one of the core elements. Its tremendous
impact on emotional-motivational and cognitive issues in general (Deacon,
1998) will be discussed in relation to some specific topics.
The present context is not adequate for dealing with the issues of human
ontogeny and the developmental processes leading from concrete senso-motor
processes to symbolic behaviour. Piaget´s naturalistic theory of symbol for-
mation provides a detailed framework for these highly complex stages of
human ontogenetic development, emphasizing in particular the idea that
symbols arise from concrete actions (Piaget, 1967; Wimmer, 1995, p. 46f).
In contrast to basic assumptions of AI research and linguistically orientated
philosophical positions, within this context symbols are not taken as neutral
signs computed by specific rules and governed by language. This idealised
view of symbol manipulation is adequate only for so-called discursive modes
of symbolic expression, appearing very late in human ontogeny, representing
in its most developed version something such as an ideal language, which
most probably is realised only in mathematics. Symbols in these areas are
clearly defined and their usage follows generally accepted grammatical rules
(Langer, 1967, p. 155). The main advocates of discursive symbolisms, such as
Carnap, Russel, and Wittgenstein, drew clear boundaries between scientific
or discursive symbol usage and other more subjective ways of symbol usage,
in domains such as metaphysics, art, and emotions.
Susan Langer’s concept of presentational symbols plays an important role
in the latter type of symbolisation. Presentational symbols differ from dis-
cursive symbols mainly in that they have implicit meaning as well as per-
ceptual and emotional qualities. Consequently, the semantic relations of this
type of symbols are not stable and fixed (as, for example, in scientific lan-
guage or mathematics), and depend more on the whole context (Lachmann,
2000, p. 73).
Presentational symbols also have some affinity to metaphors, namely, ‘the
power of seeing one thing in another’, which is of major importance in regard
to feelings and language (Langer, 1962, p. 153). The concept of presentational
symbolism also embeds the arts and emotions within a framework of articu-
lated experiences and expressions, which are not irrational but follow another
kind of rationality.
Symbolic behaviour in this broad sense and its relations to the underly-
ing motivational bases was one of the major topics of H. Furth’s research. In
contrast to Freud, he tries to embed the Piagetian cognitivist view in a more
dynamic motivational-energetic framework (Furth, 1987, 1998; Wimmer,
150 Wimmer

1998). This view emphasises the affective transitions between concrete behav-
ioural acts and emerging symbolic systems. According to Furth (1987, p. 26ff),
there is an essential difference between the concrete motor output of behav-
iour, as it can be seen in animal behaviour, and human behaviour, where con-
crete motoric action patterns are replaced by symbolic forms of behaviour.
In early prehuman as well as most animal behaviour patterns, the con-
nection between cognition (perception), motivations, and related (motoric)
action patterns is very close. As discussed previously, classical ethology has
demonstrated in detail how the internal states (drives), cognitive activi-
ties, and action patterns are related and activated (Lorenz, 1981; Tinbergen,
1952). In most cases of animal behaviour, activated behavioural programs
include specific motor patterns. The major gap arises when the close rela-
tions between perception, motivation, and action get lost. When this occurs,
the genetically fixed sensory and motor components can escape from their
organizing frame.
Concerning motivational processes, Furth proposes that the energetic
dimensions of the motoric activities that have not been spent in concrete
behavioural acts remain active and are redirected into the symbolic sphere.
Therefore, the energy that normally supports concrete behavioural acts (i.e.,
sensorimotor actions) is now used within the symbolic domain for the gen-
eration and manipulation of symbols. This means that impulses to actions
that are no longer part of concrete actions are transformed in the symbolic
domains, opening up a new field of human experience. Increasing symbolic
capacities lead to a large expansion of motivationally relevant objects as well
as changing problem-solving strategies. The range of concrete stimuli guiding
behaviour gets broader through mentally constructed stimuli.
The new organizing principle is essentially guided by emotions, evaluat-
ing or colouring symbolic as well as sensory and motor components. These
emotional guidelines provide something such as a guarantee or yardstick that
the increasing (symbolic) freedom of behaviour keeps in touch with basic
biological necessities (Wimmer, 1995).3
According to Piaget, Furth considers object constancy as a major fact which
provides the basis for all kinds of symbolizing processes. An object attains a
permanent character, because ‘it is recognised as continuing to exist beyond
the limits of the perceptual field, when it is no longer felt, seen or heard etc.’
(Piaget, 1953, p. 9). Thus, an object is no longer just a ‘thing of action’, but
becomes an ‘object of contemplation’ (Werner & Kaplan, 1963, p. 67).
Within human ontogeny, object constancy appears in the sixth stage of
the sensorimotor period (between eighteen and twenty-four months) and
implies serious changes in affective as well as cognitive dynamics. To take
 Motivation, Cognition, and Emotion 151

only one example, releasing stimuli – which were normally concrete stimuli
configurations – eliciting concrete behavioural acts (e.g., fight, flight, mating)
are now effective also in the mental domain. This means that imagined situ-
ations and those projected in the future are now able to seriously influence
behaviour and probably destabilise the whole psychic domain.
Object constancy may be considered as leading to a stabilization of the
whole affective life because the mentally represented symbols as well as the
related affective qualities can remain active, even if the relevant object is out
of range for providing concrete input. Thus, affective qualities colouring
the mental entities remain active in absence of the concrete object.
In general, object constancy leads to a stabilization and expansion of inter-
nal, mental representations and the corresponding affective qualities. If these
representations are paired with phonetic cues, stabilization as well as storage
qualities seem to improve greatly. When phonetic entities such as words are
expressed, they can have strong effects on the affective as well as cognitive
bases.
A word – that is, a symbolic utterance – stored within a specific
affective-cognitive context, can be reproduced beyond this primary con-
text with weaker affective intensities. This leads to increasing flexibility and
increasing abstract modes of symbol usage and representation. Beside abstract
usage of symbols, the same word – produced in a more or less neutral atmo-
sphere – can evoke the primary, context-related original feelings and cog-
nitions. This opens a new dimension of sociocultural development, because
words can be representatives for specific events, persons, and situations and
can thus generate strong emotions – with related cognitions – which are now
beyond the primordial, concrete context (Wimmer, 2004).
There is strong evidence that language arises after symbolisation, and that
the phonologic dimension appeared after the semantic one. Semantic and
phonetic dimensions together seem to have a reciprocal feedback, resulting
in the phenomenal development of human language capacities.
According to Tomasello (1999, p. 96), ‘The central theoretical point is
that linguistic symbols embody the myriad ways of constructing the world
inter-subjectively that have accumulated in a culture over historical time,
and the process of acquiring the conventional use of these symbolic artifacts,
and so internalizing these construals, fundamentally transforms the nature
of children´s cognitive representations’. The core of the argument is that this
new symbolic dimension underlies two major influences: vertical and hori-
zontal conditions. The vertical dimension can be found in all the necessary
cognitive, social, and neuronal preconditions, providing the basis for the abil-
ity to produce and handle symbols.
152 Wimmer

The empirical evidence for the deep impact of the underlying

emotional-motivational forces on higher cognitive processes (e.g., decision
making) opens up new perspectives in regard to reason and rationality in
general (concerning the relations between rationality and emotions see also
Nussbaum, 2001; De Sousa, 1987). In relation to decision processes, Damasio
claims that two different mechanisms exist. One is based on conscious delib-
erations including anticipations and various options of the actual situation.
The second mechanism, functioning partly subconsciously, activates onto-
genetically acquired emotional experiences that had been made in similar
situations (Bechara, 2000; Damasio, 2005, p. 174f; Tversky & Kahnemann,
1973). This second mechanism underlying decision processes can also refer
to the whole evolutionarily acquired pattern of evaluations, which makes
the outcomes much more complex (compare Ben-Ze’ev, 2000, p. 164). Thus,
in each decision process beside rational thinking modes, the whole current
psychophysiological state as well as the phylogenetically and ontogenetically
established experiences enter the stage.
Ciompi calls this kind of vertical influence ‘operator–like organizing and
integrating functions of affects on cognitions’,4 which come into play at different
levels (Ciompi, 1982, 2003, 2005). For example, Wimmer and Ciompi claim:
The focus of attention is continually conditioned by basic emotional states. These
states have a decisive influence on selection and linkage of relevant cognitive
stimuli in learning processes. Specific types of logic . . . are thus generated by dif-
ferent emotional states [leading to]. . . a specific ‘fear logic’, ‘anger logic’, ‘sadness
logic’, ‘happiness logic’ etc. . . . In melancholic states, for example, only negatively
connoted cognitions are selected and combined into an entirely negative view of
the world. (1996, p. 42)

The horizontal dimension takes into account all of the pre-existing sym-
bolic universes, into which the individual human mind gets socialised (e.g.,
Assmann, 2000; Luckmann, 1967; Luhmann, 1980). These symbolic systems
have their internal coherence, their history, and social foundation.
In this field, culture, in a broad sense – including symbols, language, and
all kinds of meaning – functions as the necessary interface, intersubjectively
coordinating the arising subjective fields of symbolic experience, and adjust-
ing human spheres of life and biological programs (Eibl, 2009). It is especially
concepts originating in sociology and the cultural sciences that emphasise the
existence of something such as a ‘cultural memory’ (Assmann, 2000, p. 11f), a
‘sociohistoric apriori’ (Knoblauch, 1996, p. 16) reaching far beyond individual
memory and forming a necessary frame for human ontogeny. This frame pro-
vides basic dimensions of meaning and sense for each individual and also
transcends individual memory. Language can be considered an essential
 Motivation, Cognition, and Emotion 153

component of this frame, which contains specific world views, contexts of

meaning, and versions of understanding (Luckmann, 1967, p. 91f). It is this
frame, which forms a layer upon which basic, biological motivational forces
are integrated, leading to new kinds of motivational dynamics without ever
loosing the ties to phylogenetic history.

Notes
1. The author considers classical ethology as the early period of ethological research
mainly situated in Europe with the major figures of N. Tinbergen, E.v. Holst, and K.
Lorenz. Their ideas contradicted those of behaviourism.
2. The relations between this central, coordinating part and feelings is a controversial
topic. One line of argument interprets the feeling part merely as accompanying the
completion of these instinctive behavioural patterns (McDougall, 1933; Sullivan).
In the framework of this tradition, the feeling part is a secondary phenomenon, an
epiphenomenon, appearing as the result of brain and motor activities and neuro-
physiological changes. These are the primary sources of feelings, which arise as a
side effect of such activities.
A similar position was held by W. James who likewise proposed a close connec-
tion between instincts and emotions: ‘Instinctive reactions and emotional expres-
sions thus shade imperceptibly into each other. Every object that excites an instinct
excites an emotion as well’ (1890, p. 442; cit. from Hillman, 1992, p. 49).
The core thesis of James’ theory of emotions is ‘that the bodily changes fol-
low directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same
changes as they occur is the emotion. . . . Every one of the bodily changes, whatso-
ever it be, is felt, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs’ (James, 1890, p. 449f;
cit. from Hillman, 1992, p. 50). Thus, for James, feelings are just perceptions of
physiological-motor changes.
Other, more functionalist models view emotion as a mediating phase or event
between cognitive and motor parts (e.g., Plutchik, 1980, 1984). The close relation
between instinctive behavioural patterns and emotions seems evident, but the
hypothesis of ‘emotion as an accompaniment’ (Hillman, 1992, p. 45f) does not take
into account the evaluative functions of emotions leading to a broad scale of expe-
rienced emotions as well as modifications of behaviour.
3. Concerning the ‘decoupling’ of behavioural components, Scherer also emphasizes
the essential role of emotions: ‘Emotions “decouple” the behavioral reaction from
the stimulus event by replacing rigid reflex-like stimulus response patterns or
instinctive innate releasing mechanisms’ (Scherer, 1984, p. 295).
4. Operator is defined as a variable, influencing and changing other variables.

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 8

The Social and Cultural Context of Cognition

A Knowledge Perspective

Evelyn Au , Wendy Wan, &

Chi-yue Chiu

For too long, culture has been conceptualized as a contextual variable. The
key question of what culture is has not received adequate attention. In this
chapter, we attempt to directly address this question. Drawing on extant
research on cognitive psychology, we present a knowledge perspective on
culture. First, we describe cultural differences in cognition (i.e., procedural
knowledge, declarative knowledge, including cognitive representations of
others, the self, the group, events, and norms). Next, we describe how social
and situational contexts influence the relative accessibility of different kinds
of cultural knowledge. We will conclude the chapter by highlighting the
motivational base of cultural knowledge. That is, use of cultural knowledge
is motivated by basic social and psychological needs. For instance, individu-
als activate their cultural knowledge to reduce uncertainty in social living, to
manage existential terror, and fulfill the need for belongingness.
Individuals sharing the same cultural tradition incorporate similar cognitive
elements into their thought systems and assimilate their cognitive processes
and responses to certain culture-characteristic patterns. As such, culture’s cog-
nitive consequences bespeak the influence of context on human cognitions. At
the same time, cognitive effects of culture are flexible across situations; indi-
viduals recruit the cognitive resources their culture confers to achieve valued
social and personal goals in concrete settings. Contemporary research on cul-
ture and cognition has taken a trait approach to culture, focusing on overt
expressions of culture-characteristic cognitive traits in designated populations.
On the one hand, this approach illuminates chronic group differences in cog-
nition. On the other hand, it obscures the situational flexibility of the cognitive
effects of culture and the agentic nature of cultural cognition (Hong & Chiu,
2001). In this chapter, we take a knowledge perspective to culture, likening
enculturation to an expertise building process (Chiu & Hong, 2006, 2007).
We begin by describing how culture is conceptualized in this perspective,

158
 The Social and Cultural Context of Cognition 159

and proceed to explain the different kinds of knowledge structures individ-

uals living in the same cultural environment develop to process information
and grasp experiences. Next, we will review the cognitive and motivational
principles implicated in the situational flexibility of culture’s cognitive effects.
Because comprehensive reviews of the research literature are available in other
sources (Chiu & Hong, 2006, 2007; Lehman, Chiu, & Schaller, 2004), we will
include only a few illustrative research examples in this chapter.

A Knowledge Perspective on Culture

From a knowledge perspective, culture is a network of knowledge shared
(albeit incompletely) among a collection of interconnected individuals (Chiu
& Hong, 2006). Knowledge broadly refers to all the ways of understanding
that make up our experienced, grasped reality, comprising learned routines
of thinking, feeling, and interacting with others as well as a corpus of asser-
tions and ideas about many aspects of the world (Barth, 2002). In this chap-
ter, we focus on two main types of cultural knowledge: procedural knowledge
(knowing how) and declarative knowledge (know that).

Procedural Knowledge
Procedural knowledge provides us with information about how we can achieve
a particular result. It is knowledge acquired through practice. When a partic-
ular sequence of cognitive operations is frequently used, its performance is
automated and requires little cognitive deliberation. There is good evidence
for country differences in procedural knowledge. For example, compared
to each other, European Americans have a spontaneous tendency to engage
attention in the focal objects in the perceptual field, whereas East Asians tend
to focus on the relationship between the focal objects and the background
(Masuda & Nisbett, 2001).
Cultural experiences mold the development of procedural knowledge
through two major paths. First, particular aspects of the physical and social
environment in a culture offer opportunities to practice certain responses
repeatedly. Miyamoto, Nisbett, and Masuda (2006) illustrated this path in a
series of experiments. Based on a detailed textual analysis of pictures taken
of American and Japanese cities, the investigators discovered that objects
are usually distinct and stand out from the background in American cities.
Conversely, in Japanese cities, objects are ambiguous and tend to blend in
with the background. Miyamoto et al. posit that the experience of living in
the American environment may draw one’s attention to the distinctive focal
160 Au, Wan, & Chiu

objects rather than on the background, whereas the experience of living in the
Japanese environment may direct one’s attention to the relationship between
the focal object and the background. To test this hypothesis, Miyamoto
et al. had Japanese and European American undergraduates view scenes
from either Japan or America. As predicted, for both Japanese and American
participants, viewing Japanese scenes increased sensitivity to changes in the
background and viewing American scenes increased awareness of changes in
the focal objects.
Second, culture shapes procedural knowledge by structuring its members’
motivational environment. As members of a culture routinely pursue cultur-
ally important goals, the procedures for attaining these goals become auto-
mated and can be activated in response to the controlling stimuli without
the individual’s conscious awareness. For example, individuals seeking to
avoid social isolation are more attentive to contextual information. Because
avoidance of social isolation is a chronic concern in East Asian contexts, East
Asians have ample opportunities to practice the attention strategy connected
to this goal. In a series of studies, Kim and Markman (2006) showed that
East-West differences in the fear of isolation mediate East-West differences in
attention strategies described previously. Furthermore, experimental induc-
tion of the fear of isolation increases European Americans’ sensitivity to con-
textual information.

Declarative Knowledge
Declarative knowledge describes whether or not a certain object and event
possesses certain characteristic properties (Turban & Aronson, 1988). A
piece of declarative knowledge, when activated, may constrain subsequent
inferences and decisions, facilitating some and inhibiting others. Among the
many types of declarative knowledge, the three that have received the most
attention in culture and psychology research are representations of persons,
events, and norms.
Person representations. A person representation is a network connecting a
central concept with a number of individual features. The referent of the cen-
tral concept can be the self, a person other than the self, a group, or a social
category. The features linked to the central concept may include traits, pro-
totypic behaviors, or physical characteristics. The associations between the
central concept and the individual features differ in associative strength and
may be specific to a particular type of situation.
Numerous representations may be constructed for the same referent,
each having a different set of associative features. For example, a person can
 The Social and Cultural Context of Cognition 161

construct a personal self that is associatively linked to a set of personal attri-

butes; linked to a set of social roles and role expectations; and linked to a
set of collective memberships (Triandis, 1989). Each of these representations
forms a separate cognitive unit that can be independently retrieved from
memory (Wyer, 2004).
Among all representations of the same referent available in memory, at any
given time, only the most accessible one is retrieved. Cultural differences in
social perception can be understood in terms of the relative accessibility of
different person representations. Although people in every culture may have
constructed similar cognitive representations of a referent, cultural experi-
ences determine the relative accessibility of these representations, which,
in turn, affect how the referent is described. For example, when describing
a person or the self, European Americans prefer general trait descriptions
and Asians social-role descriptions (Hong et al., 2001). These cultural dif-
ferences may reflect that trait-based person representations are more acces-
sible to European Americans and role-based person representations are
more accessible to Asians. As another example, European Americans tend
to attribute the cause of an event to the dispositions of the individual actors
(“the individual is careless”), whereas Asians to the dispositions of the group
(“the group is disorganized”) (Menon et al., 1999). This cultural difference
suggests that the self-as-a-causal-agent representation is more accessible to
European Americans and the group-as-a-causal-agent representation is more
accessible to Asians.
Again, the motivational structure in a culture may constrain the relative
accessibility of different person representations. Cultures that privilege per-
sonal goals have more practices promoting personal influence (Morling,
Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2002). These practices confer many opportunities
of accessing the representation of the self as a causal agent. Conversely, cul-
tures that value collective goals have many practices promoting adjustment to
social constraints. These practices afford many opportunities of accessing the
representation of the group as a causal agent (Kashima et al., 2005).
Event representations. People construct event representations spontane-
ously to envision a state of affairs or an event in specific situations, and to
predict how it transforms into another state or event. A caption (e.g., “visiting
a restaurant”) can be attached to an event representation to capture the gist of
an event sequence (Wyer, 2004).
Cultures differ in how events are represented. For example, people in dif-
ferent cultures construct different representations of what a typical sequence
of events is like. In Confucian societies (e.g., China, South Korea), people
tend to believe that change will always be cyclical: from good to bad, and then
162 Au, Wan, & Chiu

from bad to good again. This belief is grounded on a widely accepted idea
in Confucian societies: two opposing forces (yin and yang) are constantly
at work, each pushing oneself into the place of the other, which results in
changes. These forces are assumed to manifested in various forms in nature
such as weak versus strong, evil versus divine, illness versus health, coldness
versus warmth, and darkness versus light. Although this conceptualization of
nature’s forces mandates a cyclical trajectory of changes, it also may give rise
to a stable reality over the course of time because all changes are transient.
The belief that changes caused by one force will be negated by changes engen-
dered by its opposing force may reinforce the belief in a fixed reality in East
Asia (Chiu et al., 1997).
In contrast, optimism and the belief in progress have dominated the social
philosophy of Western Europe and the New World since the beginning of the
Industrial Revolution. Witnessing the technological progress in their world
led the intellectuals to be optimistic about their future. They believed that
a better world was just around the corner, and the making of it was in the
people’s own hands (Burchell, 1966). At this time, the theories of biological
evolution and economic development that surfaced predicted the extinction
of unfit species and the decline of adaptive social systems; as a result, the
superior species will dominate and more advanced social systems will be
developed. These beliefs about the trajectory of change support a malleable
view of the world and its institutions in the West (Chiu et al., 1997).
These culture-characteristic beliefs about the trajectory of change con-
tinue to have authority over Chinese and North American students. When
things are moving in a particular direction, Chinese undergraduates are more
likely to anticipate a change in the direction of movement than their North
American peers. For example, compared to European Americans, Chinese
believe more strongly that a couple who have been dating each other for 2
years will break up, a student from a poor family will become rich one day,
and 2 kindergarten children who have been fighting will become friends one
day (Ji, Nisbett, & Su, 2001). Following this line of logic, individuals who
expect the development of events to change course should be less surprised
by unexpected events than those who expect events to progress in a linear
fashion. Consistent with the idea that East Asians subscribe to a cyclical
theory of change and Americans to a linear one, unexpected events surprise
Korean undergraduates more than they do American undergraduates (Choi
& Nisbett, 2000).
The belief that opposing forces operate at the same time also increases peo-
ple’s sensitivity to competing concerns in conflict situations and the motiva-
tion to reconcile them (Cheung et al., 2003). In one study, Peng and Nisbett
 The Social and Cultural Context of Cognition 163

(1999) asked Chinese and American students to analyze everyday life situa-
tions that involve intrapersonal conflicts (e.g., a conflict between having fun
or going to school) or interpersonal conflicts (e.g., a conflict between mothers
and their daughters). Consistent with the idea that the Confucian theory of
change is more widely distributed in Asia than in the United States, Chinese
responses tended to focus on the reconciliation of contradictions by consider-
ing merit and fault on both sides (“both the mothers and the daughters have
failed to understand each other”). In contrast, American responses tended to
come down in favor of one side or the other (“mothers should respect their
daughters’ independence”).
Norm representations. A norm representation consists of three elements:
the antecedent circumstances, norm, and consequent conditions (Lindahl &
Odelstad, 2000). The first element – the antecedent conditions – specifies
the circumstances under which the norm should be activated, including the
range of concrete situations where the norm is applicable. The norm refers
to the state of affairs that is generally believed to be the case (e.g., the shared
belief that the needy will receive help). In constructing a norm representa-
tion, individuals need to have access to the distribution of social knowledge
in the society (e.g., they need to know the extent of agreement in the group
with the idea of helping the needy; Ho & Chiu, 1998). Finally, the consequent
conditions specify the behavioral implications of the norm. When the ante-
cedent circumstances are present in a given situation, a certain state of affairs
is designated as the norm, and the individual is expected to ensure that this
state of affairs will take place. Because norm representations are implicative
propositions, they have direct authority over behavior.
Cultural norms are widely distributed norm representations. For example,
one of the most uniform norms in the United States is one for experiencing
emotions – Americans agree that they should feel happy (Eid & Diener, 2001).
However, different cultures have different norms. For example, in resolving
conflicts, the prevailing norms in East Asian societies prescribe the use of
mediational and accommodating strategies to minimize interpersonal ani-
mosity. In contrast, the prevailing norms in Western countries prescribe the
use of more direct, confrontational strategies to win the negotiation game
(Leung, 1987).
In summary, culture-characteristic declarative knowledge are represen-
tations of people, events, and norms individuals abstracted from cultural
experiences. Although people in every culture may have constructed many
different cognitive presentations, the dominant motivational structure in the
culture and its attendant practices render some of these representations more
accessible than others. Accordingly, cultural differences can be understood
164 Au, Wan, & Chiu

in terms of the differing contents of the widely circulated and highly acces-
sible knowledge structures in different cultures. Defining a culture tradition
in terms of its component knowledge items (procedural knowledge, person
representations, event representations, and norm representations) invites
researchers to clearly articulate the type and nature of each knowledge item
as well as its range of applicability, activation circumstances, and inferen-
tial and behavioral implications. For example, environmental affordances
support the development of procedural knowledge, which is activated auto-
matically in the presence of the controlling situational cues. Activation of a
particular representation of the self (e.g., interdependent self) will call out
its associated behaviors (e.g., behavioral mimicry) (Van Baaren et al., 2003).
The applicability of a norm is augmented in situations where cultural iden-
tities are salient (Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002) and when people are
accountable to their cultural group for their behaviors (Briley, Morris, &
Somonson, 2000).

Situational Flexibility of Cultural Influence

Although we all possess a large body of knowledge, the information retrieved
from our memories varies from situation to situation, and what is activated
and used often depends on the social and situational cues in our immedi-
ate surroundings. By taking a knowledge perspective to culture, researchers
can borrow the basic principles of knowledge activation to illuminate how
cultural knowledge impacts behaviors in a variety of concrete situations.
In this section, we describe how contextual elements can influence people’s
behaviors; sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly by evoking the urge
to fulfill certain social and psychological needs, such as the need to manage
existential terror, the need to reduce uncertainty in social living, and the need
for belongingness.

Principles of Cultural Knowledge Activation

The principle of chronic accessibility. When a body of cultural knowledge
has been used frequently, it gains chronic accessibility. Cultural knowledge
that has been frequently used in a cultural group is usually widely shared
(Lau, Chiu, & Lee, 2001), cognitively accessible to members of the group
(Hong et al., 2000), more frequently reproduced in communication (Lyons
& Kashima, 2003), and widely represented in external or public carriers of
culture (Menon & Morris, 2001). In the previous section, we discussed how
 The Social and Cultural Context of Cognition 165

cultural variations in the chronic accessibility of procedural and declarative

knowledge may mediate a wide range of cultural differences.
The principle of temporary accessibility. After individuals of a particular cul-
tural group have engaged in a new culture for a prolonged period of time,
their new experiences may render a previously inaccessible cognitive rep-
resentation more accessible (Hetts, Sakuma, & Pelham, 1999). Furthermore,
research findings have shown that cues in one’s immediate environment could
make an otherwise less accessible representation temporarily more accessi-
ble. For example, as mentioned, the role-based representation of the self is
less accessible to Westerners than Easterners. However, after being primed
with an interdependent self, Westerners increased the tendency to use group
memberships to describe oneself (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991).
That cultural cues can increase the temporary accessibility of a body of cul-
tural knowledge suggests that people with bicultural experiences can switch
their cultural frames flexibly in response to the changing demands in the
environment. Flexible switching of cultural frames is an experience famil-
iar to people with a multicultural background. When individuals who have
engaged in both Chinese and American cultures (e.g., Chinese Americans,
Westernized Hong Kong Chinese undergraduates) are primed with either a
Chinese cultural icon (e.g., the Chinese dragon) or American cultural icon
(e.g., Mickey Mouse), they assimilate their responses to the primed cul-
ture (Hong et al., 2000). For example, when primed with Chinese (instead
of American) cultural icons, these bicultural individuals make more group
attributions and fewer individual attributions.
The principle of applicability. The likelihood of applying a knowledge
item also depends on its applicability in the immediate context. Knowledge
applicability is defined by the extent of mapping between “the features of a
stored construct and the attended features of a stimulus” (Higgins & Brendl,
1995, p. 220). Several studies have illustrated the importance of ­applicability
for knowledge usage. For instance, Hong et al. (2003) found that, among
Chinese-American bicultural individuals, culture priming only influences
the likelihood of making group attribution or individual attributions when
the tension between group and individual agency in the stimulus event is
highlighted. By highlighting this tension, the cultural theory of group ver-
sus individual agency becomes applicable in the judgment task, and thus, is
used. Similarly, previous research has shown that in Chinese societies, the
norm of cooperation applies to friends, but not to interactions with strangers
(Ho & Chiu, 1994). Consistent with the principle of applicability, Hong Kong
Chinese who are primed with Chinese (vs. American) culture icons make
166 Au, Wan, & Chiu

more cooperative choices when they play a prisoner’s dilemma game with
friends, but not when they play it with strangers (Wong & Hong, 2005).
Self-relevance and contrast effect. Although priming a culture often leads
to assimilative responses, culture priming may lead to contrastive responses
if the participants feel that they do not belong to the primed culture. Bond
and his colleagues have reported contrast effects in a study that used lan-
guages to prime culture. For example, in one study (Bond & Cheung, 1984),
Cantonese-speaking Hong Kong Chinese undergraduates filled out a survey
of traditional Chinese beliefs. Mainland Chinese are generally seen as more
traditional than Hong Kong Chinese. Participants who received oral instruc-
tions in Putonghua (the spoken language in Mainland China) responded
more like Westerners than those who received instructions in Cantonese (a
dialect used in Hong Kong). For the participants who received instructions in
Putonghua, the presence of an out-group language reminded the participants
that they did not belong to the primed culture group of Mainland Chinese,
and as a consequence, a contrast effect was found.
Among bicultural individuals, whether they view their dual cultural iden-
tities as oppositional (e.g., I cannot be both a Chinese and an American at the
same time) or as independent or complementary (e.g., I am both a Chinese
and an American) influences their responses to culture priming (Benet-
Martinez et al., 2002). Those who view their dual identities as independent
or complementary tend to assimilate their responses to the primed culture,
whereas those who view their dual identities as oppositional may feel ambiv-
alent about either cultural identity, and respond reactively to the culture
primes, displaying contrastive responses. In summary, activation of cultural
knowledge follows the basic principles of knowledge activation, which govern
the dynamic interactions between cultural knowledge, the situation, the indi-
viduals’ current cognitive and motivational states, and cultural identities.

Situational Factors that Accentuate (or Attenuate)

Cultural Differences
Cognitive load. Culture has been likened to a collection of chronically acces-
sible cognitive tools, always ready for use (Chiu & Hong, 2005). Consistent
with this analogy, research has shown that people are likely to use these
tools when the problem solver lacks the capability or resources to consider
alternative solutions. For example, European Americans have a greater ten-
dency to make individual attributions than the Chinese under cognitive load.
However, when individuals are not cognitively busy, this cultural difference is
significantly diminished (Knowles et al., 2001).
 The Social and Cultural Context of Cognition 167

Need for firm answers. Culture confers well received, conventionalized

solutions to everyday problems. Individuals who prefer firm answers to ques-
tions in life tend to rely more heavily on cultural knowledge for answers.
For instance, European American undergraduates with a high need for firm
answers were more likely to attribute the causes of an event to the actor’s
personal dispositions, whereas their Hong Kong Chinese counterparts were
more likely to make group attributions (Chiu et al., 2000). Similar effects are
found when a need for firm answers is externally induced by having research
participants make speeded causal judgments. When participants were put
under time pressure, the cultural differences in attributions described above
were amplified: the Chinese participants made more group attributions and
the European American participants made individual attributions (Chiu
et al., 2000).
Additionally, Koric et al. (2004) found that some immigrants migrated
together and therefore are surrounded by other members of their ethnocul-
tural group. These immigrants perceive the knowledge of their home cul-
ture as valid. For them, a higher need for firm answers is associated with a
stronger motivation to adhere to the knowledge from the culture of origin.
However, some immigrants migrated alone and are surrounded by members
of the host country. They no longer perceive knowledge of their home culture
as valid. For them, a higher need for firm answers is associated with a stron-
ger motivation to assimilate to their host culture.
Mortality salience. Reminding people of their own inevitable demise is
likely to prompt one to question the purpose of one’s existence. According to
the terror management theory (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997),
the thought of one’s own death will induce a sense of existential terror. Until
the purpose of one’s own existence can be satisfactorily established, one will
experience psychological disturbance. Terror management theorists propose
two strategies that individuals use to allay this sense of terror: by defend-
ing one’s own cultural worldviews or distancing oneself from those who hold
worldviews that are dissimilar to one’s own.
These strategies enable individuals to mitigate fears of death because by
embracing one’s cultural worldviews, one now has an organized system of
beliefs from which answers to questions of life and death can be drawn (e.g.,
what is the meaning of life?) and a sense of immortality through concepts
introduced by religion (e.g., heaven and afterlife). Furthermore, a strict
adherence to cultural convention can offer individuals a sense of symbolic
immortality, by seeing oneself as a valued member of an imperishable culture
and by perceiving one’s actions as a contribution to the culture (Solomon,
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991).
168 Au, Wan, & Chiu

Therefore, if holding strongly onto cultural worldviews serves as a protec-

tion against people’s fear of death, then reminders of one’s mortality should
motivate them to maintain their cultural worldviews. This is referred to as
the mortality salience hypothesis. Numerous studies have provided support
for the mortality salience hypothesis. For instance, American undergraduates
who were reminded of death were more negative towards writers of essays
that openly criticize the United States than the writers of essays that explicitly
praise the United States (e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., 1997).
The need to belong. The desire to establish bonds with others or a group is
regarded as a fundamental motive that drives human behavior (Baumeister
& Leary, 1995), and this need is intensified when individuals see themselves
as being different from other members of the in-group or similar to members
of an out-group (Brewer, 1991). One way of satisfying this need to belong is
by participating in a culture. For example, research has shown that when the
need to belong is activated, individuals who strongly identify with their in-
group were motivated to attribute the qualities that are associated with the
group to the self (Pickett, Bonner, & Coleman, 2002). Jetten et al. (2002) also
showed how the use of cultural knowledge can be motivated by the need to
express or defend one’s social identity. Individuals from Indonesia (which is
associated with collectivism) and North American (which is associated with
individualism) participated in their first study. The investigators found that
Indonesians who identify with the Indonesian culture adhered more strongly
to collectivism (an important Indonesian value) than those who did not.
Americans who identified with the American culture adhered more strongly
to individualism (an important American value) than those who did not.
These findings illustrate how individuals can use cultural knowledge to derive
a sense of belongingness.

Conclusion
The cognitive effects of culture illustrate the contextual nature of human cog-
nitions: First, individuals acquire a habitual pattern of performing cognitive
operations and representing the reality as they develop expertise in a certain
culture. Second, individuals change their mental habits when they assimilate
into a new culture. Taking a knowledge perspective to culture, researchers
can go beyond viewing cultural differences as manifestations of culture-char-
acteristic latent cognitive traits and start to examine the situational flexibil-
ity of culture’s cognitive consequences. Furthermore, our review emphasizes
the important role of motivation in cultural cognition. On the one hand, the
dominant motivational structure in a cultural context (e.g., the kinds of goals
 The Social and Cultural Context of Cognition 169

privileged in a culture) affords opportunities for practicing certain mental

operations and accessing certain cognitive representations. On the other
hand, culture can be likened to a pool of cognitive resources individuals in a
culture have acquired to meet basic epistemic needs (having firm answers),
existential needs (finding meanings in life), and social needs (forging social
bonding). In all these, the social and motivational context determines to a
large extent how likely certain cultural knowledge items are and which items
will be activated and applied.

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 9

Biological Models of Organisms and Their

Evolutionary Change

Their Importance for Epistemology and Different

Cultural Traditions

Karl Edlinger

Introduction
This chapter deals with the importance and function of various models of liv-
ing organisms for epistemological concepts, on the one hand, and the philo-
sophical and epistemological presuppositions of organismic biology, on the
other hand. The objective is to show that for every epistemological approach,
not only philosophy is of importance but also biology as the science of the
neuronal basis of psychological as well as epistemological processes. This
interdependency claims for a theory of science, which avoids a predominance
of philosophy or natural sciences as well as of a vicious circle, which must
occur automatically when an attempt is made to establish philosophy or biol-
ogy as a so-called meta-level of cognition.
Constructive realism (CR) abstains from every meta-level of cognition and
knowledge. It conceives cognition as an outcome of knowledge of practice, as
a knowledge resulting from the individual’s activity in the world of everyday
life. Sciences function as microworlds, which contain a small sector of real-
ity, whereby reality is understood as the world that is constructed by human
beings rather than the totality of the given, in the sense of environment.
Knowledge in the sense of CR means to be able to act with competence
and handle objects in accordance with some special goals. This conception
does not provide any idea about the real structure of world and environment,
but it lets us better understand various contexts in which human beings are
engaged in acting and reflecting. In addition, the conception of CR gives us
the chance to highlight some essential methodological presuppositions of sci-
entific disciplines that are valid in every cultural context, despite differences
in conceptions of nature, techniques, or society, and serve as a basis of under-
standing various cultural developments.

173
174 Edlinger

These methodologies do not result from knowledge in the ontological

sense and should not be confused with the latter. The problem can be best
illustrated by biology.

Historical Retrospective
The development of European sciences during the modern age brought about
an impressive predominance of the so-called empirical natural sciences over
philosophy in many respects. Physics and chemistry as the classical empirical
sciences presented an enormous number of scientific facts and information
about nature; our most discussed models of the world are based mainly on
the results of physical and chemical experiments and theories, which result
from the former.
Human beings too are affected by this trend. By establishment of evolu-
tionary theories as common sense views of the realm of organisms and their
origin, humans have been incorporated definitively into the animal realm.
The generally accepted fact that humans are closely related to every member
of the animal realm gave rise to a different biological view of their nature and
abilities, the mental and intellectual in particular, than had prevailed before.
In this manner, the discussion about the basic mechanisms of thinking
and reflecting, cognition and epistemology as well as the mental construction
of the world by human beings eventually changed into a discussion about
biological reasons of activities in many respects. When human beings are
conceived as biological organisms, their various faculties may be reduced to
a biologically explicable basis. This becomes increasingly evident when the
close relations between some patterns of neuronal activities and mental con-
ditions are revealed in research.
This view of human development makes it possible to discuss and find
solutions to many urgent philosophical questions and problems, such as the
origin and function of consciousness, the isomorphism or non-isomorphism
between the outer world and its inner representations, the relations between
sensory data and physical processes affecting the human sensory system, and
the biological elements that contribute to shaping our models of nature and
world.
However, before attempts to solve these questions are discussed, it is neces-
sary to clarify whether these issues concern mankind in general at all times
or only a special cultural area at a special period of cultural development. In
addition, we must ask whether these problems are consequences of some spe-
cial ways of thinking and researching. It is possible that these questions arise
out of a special view of organisms, which are in turn conditioned by cultural
 Biological Models and Evolution 175

factors. It is necessary to consider that these questions make sense only when
we accept some special kinds of polarity, such as the polarity between the
individual and his or her environment as well as the polarity between physi-
cal processes and the nervous system and between biological and neuronal
structures and the outcomes of their respective activity.
Polarity, as well as dualism in general, is a characteristic of European think-
ing at the beginnings of the so-called period of Enlightenment. It seems to be
a special way of dealing with the contradiction between new experimental
methods of mechanistic physics, which are interpreted only quantitatively,
and the overwhelming variety of qualities in human minds in many respects.
By means of a rigid separation of matter, on the one hand, and the mental
experience with its various qualities, on the other hand, it was possible for
early philosophers such as Descartes to establish a mechanistic science and
save Christian religion as a domain of spirituality. The progress of the mecha-
nistic sciences has led with time to an absolute predominance of science over
religion and the so-called human sciences.

Evolutionary Theories
According to this general trend, the conception of organisms changed, too.
At the end of the eighteenth century, organisms were commonly conceived
by many authors, such as G. Cuvier, as some kind of mechanical working
machines consisting of finely balanced components. Some vague ideas of
evolutionary change and adaptation as presented by Buffon resulted in the
evolutionary theories of Lamarck, Wallace, and Darwin.
Organisms, including human beings, were seen as the outcome of a long
chain of step-by-step alterations. In contrast to Lamarck, who presented a
theory with teleological features – which had been disproved a long time
before – Wallace and Darwin elaborated ideas, which were in accordance
with mechanical theories about human societies. Similarly to human beings
in the period of capitalism, animals and plants were believed to be under
pressure of competition for food, energy, and biotopes.
The fittest or best adapted individuals were expected to have the optimal
chances for survival and reproduction. In line with this view, evolution is a
play of trial and error, resulting in the extinction of the nonadapted organ-
isms. Evolutionary change, just as natural selection, is a process of adapta-
tion according to the well-known procedures and techniques of the breeders.
The analogies with some economic and social processes as well as with the
experiences of breeders may have led to serious misconceptions in the early
Darwinian evolutionary theory and biology. Organisms were not conceived as
176 Edlinger

active entities, but in correspondence with the analogies with breeders, were
dissolved into aggregates and arrangements of features or characteristics. The
so-called synthetic theory of evolution gave rise to a transformed concep-
tion of evolution, which came to be considered as a process of permanently
changing frequencies of characteristics, namely, genetic alleles within animal
or plant populations. According to this view, organisms as well-integrated
units do not exist. All organs or characteristics were believed to be the out-
come of the play of various genetic changes and rigid selection, which should
result automatically in perfect adaptations. Each characteristic and feature of
an organism could be conceived as possible and, because it has necessarily
evolved by selection, it was viewed as a kind of reproduction or portrayal of
some environmental pressures and needs. This way of thinking has left quite
a number of problems unsolved, or rather, swept under the carpet. The state-
ment that a special characteristic or feature of an organism may be of evolu-
tionary advantage does not provide information about the reason for the real
character of this advantage nor an explanation of its origin.
In this manner, a mechanistic interpretation of world and nature led to a
dilemma. On the one hand, there was a world – including living beings and
humans in particular – which was believed to consist of eternally existing parti-
cles of matter, pushing and attracting one another and resulting in special mate-
rial arrangements. On the other hand, there was the world of human mind and
consciousness, which seemed to be poised upon lifeless physical structures.
On the background of the success of materialism and mechanism, it is
not surprising that the existence of mind and consciousness was denied or
that they were interpreted as epiphenomena, for which no reason could be
given at the time. For the future, it could be expected that reasons support-
ing the emergence of mind and consciousness would eventually be given by
Darwinian evolutionary theory.

Evolutionary Epistemology (EE)

The modern evolutionary theory of cognition is a logical consequence of the
theory of biological adaptation and the lack of a theoretical foundation of the
Darwinian organism. A Lamarckistic antecedent theory was developed by H.
Spencer (Frischeisen-Köhler, 1925), a philosopher and Lamarckist of the late
nineteenth century. This view was accepted by Darwinian scientists as well as
philosophers. Spencer pleaded for a view of human beings and their evolu-
tion not merely as biological subjects. Spencer reflected about the evolution
of the cognitive apparatus and the nervous system, including its faculties.
 Biological Models and Evolution 177

Haeckel (1866), Lorenz (1941, 1978), Campbell (1974a, 1988), Campbell &
Paller (1989), Riedl (1981), Vollmer (1975) and others attempted to provide
new arguments for this view on a Darwinian theoretical foundation, sug-
gesting an evolution by adaptation, which means the survival of well-adapted
living beings as a result of selection by the environment. Actually, the objec-
tive was to present a biological and realistic foundation for Kant’s Newtonian
concepts of space and time and his apriori tenets.
In consideration of modern physics, Vollmer developed the ideas of
Evolutionary Epistemology in terms of the very restricted concept of a
so-called mesocosmos (i.e., the Newtonian world of our everyday experience).
Further, Riedl revised his positions by considering the highly complicated
network-like causality of ecology, human societies, and “cultural evolution”
(Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Hence, it seems
necessary to conceive Evolutionary Epistemology, in the Lamarckistic sense
of Spencer as well as in the Darwinian sense, as a partial theory of an adap-
tational concept of evolution (Campbell, 1974a, 1974b, 1985, 1988; Riedl, 1981).
That means that the validity of the modern Darwinian evolutionary episte-
mology depends on the validity of Darwinism. If the theory of adaptation is
untenable, then evolutionary epistemology is also obsolete.
Also, in former periods other biologists and philosophers (e.g., Uexküll
1921, 1928; Cassirer, 1955–1957) proposed theories considering organismic
conditions of human thought and cognition. Yet, Evolutionary Epistemology,
just as original Darwinism, does not present concepts of organisms as sub-
jects, which fulfill the basic requirements for consistent theories of function-
ing organisms.

Theoretical Problems of Darwinism and the

Synthetic Theory
A critical revision of the theoretical and the empirical basis of traditional
Darwinism and Synthetic Theory (Edlinger, Gutmann, & Weingarten, 1991;
Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Linden, 2007) shows that this approach to the prob-
lem of evolutionary change of organisms lacks a consistent theory of the living
organism and, as a consequence, provides no consistent view of evolution-
ary change. In their ultimate level of development, these theoretical concepts
reduce organisms to arrangements of morphological or other characteristics
or to complexes of genes (Arias, 2008; Dawkins, 1978; Nüsslein-Volhard,
2004), conceiving the organism itself as an epiphenomenon of gene expres-
sion and nothing else.
178 Edlinger

Evolution in this context means changes of frequencies of charac-

ters or genes only in animal or plant populations (Mayr & Provine, 1998).
Evolutionary changes are seen as results of selection pressures, originating
exclusively in the environment. The organisms, as a consequence, figure as
some modes of representation or blueprints of environmental features.
Darwinian theories provide no consistent explanations of the structure, the
constructional properties of living beings, and the constraints and restraints
of evolutionary changes. Even this very limited view urges us to construct
consistent theories of morphogenesis and the evolution of living organisms
as wholes, as very complex entities, that are autonomous, spontaneous, and
permanently active. It is a logical consequence of autonomy and permanent
activity that organisms are not only affected and influenced by their environ-
ment but are also, and even to a greater extent, shaping their environment for
themselves. This consequence is ignored by Darwinian biology.
On the other hand, there exist various “physicalist” theories, such as syner-
getics (Haken, 1981, 1990; Haken & Wunderlin, 1986; Meinhardt, 1978, 1987),
the theory of dissipative structures (Prigogine, 1979; Prigogine & Stengers,
1981), or chaos theories (Gleick, 1987) that pretended they could provide rea-
sons for the high order of biological arrangements, in particular for symme-
try. Because these theories, at best, concern partial aspects of life that are of
lesser importance, we can say that they lack any theoretical foundations for
considering and explaining the organization of organisms as wholes. Physical
approaches and theories show us organisms mostly as cloudy arrangements
of molecules, without any operational or mechanical closeness.
Other theories conceive organisms as crystal-like or mosaic-like arrange-
ments of molecules or cells that must fit to the others in terms of special
structures of their surface. These theories can be shown as succeeding older
ideas, expounded by former theorists such as E. Haeckel (1866). In contra-
diction to these ideas, there exists no evidence for the suggestion that organ-
isms are organized and form-enforced as crystals or mosaics of atom-like
elements. Many elementary qualities and properties of organisms are ignored
by these theories.

The Theory of Organismic Constructions

The Theory of Organismic Constructions provides a different and more use-
ful view of living beings as biological microworlds. This view, which may
seem strange in some respects, follows out of a special way of thinking and
reflecting based on the method of strangification. Strangification, as pre-
sented by Wallner (1992a, 1992b), consists in reflecting and examining one’s
 Biological Models and Evolution 179

theory by embedding it in a totally different context from the one in which it

has been developed and for which it has been originally considered adequate.
The result is a new and, in many cases, strange views of our prerequisites.
Strangification gives us the chance to elucidate many difficulties and internal
contradictions of scientific methods and theories, some of which have been
mentioned previously. Evaluations of biological theories highly similar – or,
in the sense of Constructive Realism, identical – to strangification were per-
formed in regard to some traditional views of organisms and evolution by
many representatives of the Theory of Organismic Constructions, also called
the Frankfurt Evolutionary Theory (Edlinger & Gutmann, 2002; Gutmann &
Bonik, 1981; Gutmann & Edlinger, 2002).
Evolutionary and organismic biology were discussed in many contexts.
The result was a theory of organismic constructions, including many aspects
of other scientific disciplines, such as physics, engineering, and medicine. In
previous years, biological theories were presented, in particular theories of the
organism, which meet the standards of theoretically well-founded theories in
the natural sciences. In accordance with the standards of modern natural sci-
ences and their special style of thinking, these theories are highly abstract and
not illustrative for the naive observer. The reward of high abstractness is that
by providing a new consistent theoretical foundation it produces the chance
for stringency and understanding of the basic requirements for living organi-
zation and organismic existence.
A gap between organismic biology and physics is produced by means
of the high abstractness of theories and physical laws at the lower levels of
organismic constructions, while inadmissible equations between the physi-
cal and the biological processes are rejected. It should, however, be pointed
out that evolution in the context discussed here means only a phylogenetic
change of organisms and nothing beyond that. The theory of Organismic
Constructions enables us to conceive of organisms as wholes. It gives us more
and better reasons for many properties of living beings, symmetry and rhyth-
micity in particular, which seem to be mysterious in the light of traditional
Darwinian biology. It can be shown that these properties are based on organ-
ismic presuppositions, which can be clarified only by a new consistent theory
of organisms.
This theory conceives of organisms as spontaneously acting autonomous
hydraulic and mechanical systems and energy converters. As energy con-
verters, they must be operationally closed to avoid dissipation of energy. The
organisms interact with one other directly and indirectly. All chemical reac-
tions and mechanisms, on which the fundamental processes of life depend,
happen in an aqueous solution. Essential requirements for all living beings
180 Edlinger

are a fluid filling with surrounding membranes that is partially impermeable

so as to prevent diffusion and dissolution.
Properties of living beings – in particular, special kinds of symmetry and
rhythmicity – can be understood in terms of the internal needs and construc-
tional constraints of organisms and nothing beyond these. They have nothing
to do with symmetry and asymmetry or rhythmicity in a physical sense. This
discussion concerns only the level of biology and organisms.
All chemical mechanisms, including the functions of enzymes and genetic
substance, depend on the mechanical properties of cells, cytosols, and cyto-
skeletal elements and fibrous structures of intercellular spaces in a direct or
indirect way (Edlinger 1991; Ghosh et al., 2008; Ingber, 1993a, 1993b; Ingber
et al., 1994; Mammoto et al., 2009; Yung & Ingber, 2009). Mechanical stress
can produce genetic expression directly or indirectly.
Chemical processes in whole organisms as well as in cells are highly com-
plicated. Enzymes and other catalytic structures must be arranged in sophis-
ticated patterns and sequences. These arrangements are possible only when
there exist a mechanical framework of membranes and also tubulous and
fibrous structures threading the inner liquid. Thus, the mechanical construc-
tion can be seen as an essential presupposition of the existence and endurance
of organisms. It is the framework in which all partial mechanisms of living
beings are enclosed and arranged. We must conceive of organisms primarily
as hydraulic systems.

Antagonisms and Rhythmicism

As mentioned previously, every frictionless and permanent action depends
on special arrangements of acting components of the body. The deformations
effected by contractile elements must be reversible by antagonistic actions.
When antagonisms should function frictionless, contractions and deforma-
tions must be rhythmical.
Rhythmical activity is of high importance for living beings, especially for
constructional and morphological changes during ontogenetic development.
Ontogenetic changes of form and rearrangements of mechanical elements
consist primarily of effects of mechanical forces (Edlinger, 2004; Edlinger &
Gutmann, 2002; Gutmann & Bonik, 1981). These forces result from various
activities of contractile elements, inflation of fluid-filled caves, and apposi-
tion of matter. Permanent and rhythmical activity drives the highly ordered
arrangement of all elements, such as muscles.
Rhythmicism depends on reversibility of contractions. As a consequence,
those arrangements that can work frictionless are the symmetrical ones. This
 Biological Models and Evolution 181

kind of symmetry is determined by the organization and function of rhyth-

mically working organismic constructions.

Stimulation of Musculature
Permanent activity of contractile fibers, namely muscles, is caused by perma-
nent interactions between the elements of the locomotor apparatus. Muscle
cells and muscles can stimulate one another. In this manner, highly compli-
cated patterns of excitation can be formed. Musculature can act as its own
pacemaker system. In more complicated constructions, this task can fall to
highly specialized cells of the musculature, which evolve step by step to vari-
ous kinds of nerve cells.
Nerve cells stand in contact with the musculature and other nerve cells,
arranging themselves in nervous systems. Synaptic connections between
nerve cells and, as a consequence, the patterns of the neuronal network, are
organized by trial and error processes in the neuromotor system (Edlinger,
1991). Only those connections that are ingenious for a frictionless locomotion
and efficient compensatory activity of the organism can persist.
Nervous systems always function in accordance with the needs of the loco-
motor apparatus, which in most cases persists in being symmetrical over all
evolutionary changes. So, all patterns that are generated by nervous systems
must be useful for conserving the symmetrical structure of the locomotory
apparatus and all adjacent and dependent structures, such as skeletons.

Motorium and Sensorium

As mentioned previously, the connection between sensorium and motorium
is undoubtedly very close (von Foerster, 1988, 1990, 1998; Glasersfeld 1987,
1995). Because of this close connection, the adjustment of propulsor organs
has the greatest influence on accumulation processes of the nervous system
(Edlinger, 1991). A highly accumulated central nervous system is conditioned
by a close relation with the motor system, which is functionally coordinated
and controlled by the former. So, in accordance with the localization of the
propulsory musculature, a central nervous system is established in vertebrates
at the dorsal side of the body and in invertebrates at the ventral side. The
arrangement and organization of the nervous system correspond with the
construction and arrangement of the locomotor apparatus. The symmetrical
motorium has a symmetrical central nervous system as its counterpart.
On the other hand, organs that are not involved in locomotor activities can
become asymmetric in various degrees when their frictionless functions are
182 Edlinger

unimpaired. It is possible, too, that some rhythmically active subsystems that

are not directly affected and influenced by locomotion, as are the circulatory
organs or the muscular and rhythmical active gut, evolve their own auton-
omous rhythmicity. On the basis of these presuppositions, it is possible to
follow the evolution of complicated and effective central nervous systems and
specialized sense organs.
Nervous systems function at first as pacemakers and coordinating struc-
tures of the musculature exclusively; they are diffuse and web-like. This orga-
nization of the nervous system persists in all organisms and spatial structures
that are stressed and pulled by mechanical actions (Edlinger, 1991; Edlinger
& Gutmann 2002). Notably, remarkable accumulations of neurons can hap-
pen only in those spaces that are unstressed and unperturbed. This is the case
with skeletal capsules and also with liquid-filled spaces in soft bodies, such as
the space around the pharynx of snails or many worms.

Reduction of Symmetry
It can be concluded that reduction and decrease of the perfect symmetry of
a globular shape to a bilateral symmetry causes the evolution of highly com-
plicated and effective organismic constructions as well as of effective nervous
systems (Linden, 2007). This aspect should also be seen in connection with
the ontogenetical development. Also, prior to fertilization the organisms are
complicated and permanently working constructions.
Eggs are not homogeneous, as suggested by many theories, which are
focused only on molecular biology. They have a complicated structure as
good as adult organisms. All transitory stages of development must function
frictionless as energy converters. Formation processes are mechanical and
depend on internal needs and constraints. Symmetry and asymmetry also
follow very strict mechanical rules during ontogenetical development.

Organisms and their Environment

Accumulations of neurons provide the necessary conditions for evolving
medullar cords, ganglia, and brains (Edlinger 1991; Linden, 2007). These are
the prerequisites of effective interactions between the organism and its envi-
ronment. Responses in regard to more complex sensoric patterns indicate
advanced stages of evolution. Such patterns make possible coordination and
inner representation in more complicated nervous systems.
Nevertheless, all these neuronal structures, which seem to be functionally
set over the other parts of the nervous system and the musculature, are the
 Biological Models and Evolution 183

result of an evolution of the locomotor apparatus. At first they function as

pacemakers for the locomotor apparatus, even when they fulfill other func-
tions (Edlinger, Gutmann, & Weingarten, 1989; Edlinger & Gutmann, 2002).
The environment and its energy flows are to be considered at first as obsta-
cles for the autonomous, spontaneously self-deforming, and moving organ-
isms. They can hinder the organism’s rhythmical locomotion and disturb its
rhythmicity. The reactions of the organism to such disturbances are attempts
to compensate by changes of its own rhythmical activity. The compensatory
activity continues until the former situation – namely, the organism’s own
internal generated rhythm – is re-established. Thus, by their deformation,
propulsion, and locomotion, animals set themselves into the energy con-
version of their environment, which is affecting the organisms retroactively.
Retroacting means irritations for the organisms.
Excitations and irritations represent essentially non-normal situations,
which are to be compensated. Organisms must compensate for various irrita-
tions produced by obstacles, energy conversion in the environment, or chem-
ical stimulation. In this manner, organisms stimulate themselves indirectly
through the environment. This retroaction can be perceived as sensory input.
In principle, we can assume a sensory input, which is reducible to autono-
mous actions of the organisms themselves. There are many examples for this
phenomenon in the physiological sciences; the best example is the saccadic
rhythm of vertebrate eyes.
The sensory input causes excitations by reaction potentials of nerve cells.
These potentials are the same in the whole nervous system. Thus, one can
say that the language of the nervous system is common in all its parts. The
only words of the nervous system are “click-click,” as formulated by G. Roth
(1987).
There still remains the question about how the nervous system can pro-
duce the manifold of different modalities and qualities known by humans
and, as we can suppose, also by other members of the animal kingdom. The
only reason for these phenomena is a new view of the excitation – namely, of
irritation and the compensatory reactions.
These new views of the sensory input and organisms shed a particularly
favorable light on E. V. Holst’s (1974) principles of permanent rhythmicity and
reafference. These principles can be supported by the theory of organismic
constructions. Accordingly, special structures of receptors determine which
modalities are sensed. Many reactions are thinkable and possible, but in the
special situation, defined by some very specific modalities of excitations,
only a few of these reactions contribute to the further successful behavior
and activity of an animal. Success or failure of compensatory actions lead to
184 Edlinger

increasingly specific reactions and, as a consequence, to increasingly differ-

entiated inner representations. In this way, at first a primitive differentiation
of modalities and qualities takes place. It arises out of various reactions to the
excitation of special receptors with special sensory poles.

For Example: Three-Dimensional Space – A Natural

Entity or a Construction?
The bilateral symmetry with special chances for effective locomotion causes
a new structure – new dimensions of the animal’s environment, in particu-
lar its space. Only elongated and bilateral symmetric organismic construc-
tions manifest unidirectional locomotion. The structure of their body makes
it possible for them to distinguish between the front and the rear of their
body and also between left and right and at the very least also between up and
down. By means of special sensory organs, which are evolved at a high level
of organization, the situation with respect to the space and gravitation can be
discerned and compensated for in a second step. Globular-shaped organisms
have no possibility for a comparable differentiation.

Environmental Adaptation of Perception? –

Refutation of Evolutionary Epistemology
The biological reasons for the organismically determined percep-
tion and internal three-dimensional construction of the space in which
bilateral-symmetrical animals live and move enable us to criticize any sug-
gestion that this organismic three-dimensionality is an inner representation
of a real situation in space – namely, in the environment. The importance
of the internal and constructional needs of the animal and of the human
being’s activity as well as their spontaneity and autonomous action invalidate
the various attempts of evolutionary epistomologies proposed by Spencer,
Haeckel, Lorenz, Campbell, Riedl and Vollmer (Edlinger et al., 1989, 1991).
The theory of organismic constructions clarifies that organisms are stimulat-
ing themselves indirectly by acting on their environment. All sensory inputs
originating in the environment are actually consequences of the organisms’
own activities.
Hence, we are led to assume that in every case, the modes of perception
depend on the organisms themselves. We cannot have any knowledge of real
things or processes. All we can perceive is designed and constructed by ner-
vous systems, sense organs included. In the case of humans, the so-called
reality emerges out of organismic constructions and our minds, which are
 Biological Models and Evolution 185

attachments of the material basis of the organisms. The propounded approach

concerning organisms and their interaction with the environment will be fur-
ther elaborated by describing the theories and work of two prominent think-
ers – the biologist Jakob v. Uexküll (1928, 1980) and the philosopher Ernst
Cassirer (1944, 1946, 1955–1957).

Jakob von uexküll and Ernst Cassirer

J. v. Uexküll was a non-Darwinian biologist in the first half of the twentieth
century, who focused his interests on the autonomous activity of organisms
in general and animals in particular. In contrast to the dominating Darwinian
view, Uexküll found out that each contact between organisms and their
environment follows primarily out of the organisms’ activity. Living beings
require an environment that includes parts that can be used in accordance to
their special nature and needs. The activity and effect of the organisms on the
environment in turn cause effects on the organisms. Thus, action and reac-
tion constitute some kind of self-reference:

He (v. Uexküll) too wanted to draw far-reaching conclusions from the anatomical
type to which an animal belongs, and he insisted that these conclusions would
have perfect certainty. . . . We know its characteristics and its activities; we look
into its “inner life” and we see its environment, for whatever it undergoes from
the outer world depends strictly upon the way it is able to accept and act on exter-
nal stimuli. An animal can receive only those impressions for which it is prepared
by its structure and can react to stimuli only in so far as it possesses the appropri-
ate organs (Cassirer 1944, pp. 23–24).

This highly selective approach to the environment, namely, only to some spe-
cial sectors of the environment is the rationale underlying v. Uexküll’s sugges-
tions that every organism fits perfectly, from the very beginning, to its special
environment, but always in accordance with its internal needs and not as a con-
sequence of Darwinian adaptation. Darwinian adaptation cannot take place in
Uexküll’s and Cassirer’s view. So for Cassirer every animal is closely bound up
with its environment through such functional circles, of which a number are
recognizable for almost every organism and which can be named by reference
to their corresponding objects, such as prey, enemy, sex, and habitat. Here it
is obviously erroneous to speak of an “adaptation to the environment” in the
Darwinian sense, for to do so is to convert into a process which requires time
something that is actually determinate and indispensible from the first to the
survival of the animal. If it is the inner structure that creates the environment
by its own activity, one should not say that an animal is more or less adapted to
186 Edlinger

the environment. Only thanks to itself alone is each animal entirely fitted into
into its environment (Cassirer 1944, p. 24).
In accordance with his non-adaptational conception, Uexküll claims that
every animal has an inner world, a world specific to it, which depends on its
special structure or construction and to which there is so far no access for
human beings. Cassirer wrote:

The experiences – and therefore the realities – of two different organisms are
incommensurable with one another. In the world of a fly, says Uexküll, we find
only “fly things”; in the world of a sea urchin we find only “sea urchin things”
(Cassirer 1944, p. 23).

Because effectors and receptors are connected, on the one hand, by an inter-
nal network of nervous structures and the environment, on the other hand,
Uexküll calls this circular arrangement of various activities and perceptions,
the arrangement of the perception system and the effector system, the “func-
tional circle” (Funktionskreis) of the animal (Cassirer 1944, p. 24). According
to Uexküll, organisms are highly autonomous in all respects. They create their
own worlds: the urchin an urchin world; the dog a dog world; and human
beings a human world.
Ernst Cassirer supports this view of organismic autonomy, but focuses his
interest on those sectors of the human world that seem to be exceptions of
Uexküll’s rule in some respect. Cassirer assumes that the so-called worlds
of animals consist of systems of signs, whereby signs resemble symptoms of
things and are defined as directly representing objects in actual situations;
hence, their importance for the animal’s actions and reactions. In contrast,
humans are characterized by a special mental activity that results in the con-
struction of “symbols.” S. Langer, a modern representative of Cassirer’s view
of symbolic forms, writes: “It is only when we penetrate into the varieties of
symbolic activity – as Cassirer, for instance, has done – that we begin to see
why human beings do not act as superintelligent cats, dogs, or apes would
act” (Langer 1957, p. 43).
Thus, in Cassirer’s philosophy, symbols function as substitutes of real
things, to which there is no direct access. Symbols occur within special sys-
tems of thinking and reflecting called the symbolic forms. Cassirer identifies
different symbolic forms, such as language, myth, religion, the arts, and the
sciences.
Because humans are endowed with the special ability of thinking in sym-
bolic forms, Cassirer calls man the “animal symbolicum.” In humans, the
circle of functions is complemented through the addition of the symbolic
system. It is this symbolic system that enables humans to get various views
 Biological Models and Evolution 187

of world and reflect about the world in highly different ways, which cannot
be considered as true or false in a traditional manner. This corresponds to
the approach of constructivist thinking, in particular constructive realism.
In this sense, Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms is a predecessor of
constructivism, especially constructive realism.
Cassirer’s philosophy is based to a high degree on biological presupposi-
tions, and in particular on Uexküll’s view of the relations between organisms
and the environment. The question now arises whether this basis is valid and
can survive in the face of critiques from the quarters of epistomology and
biology. Its survival depends on a well-founded refutation of the adaptation-
ist view of evolution and the presence of an alternative non-adaptationist
view of organisms and evolution, which can provide reasons for organismic
complexity by a non-reductionist model. Notably, although one of Uexküll’s
books is entitled Theoretical Biology, he did not develop a consistent theory of
the autonomous organism and its evolution.

Evolution of Cognition
The theoretical foundations of this kind are provided by the theory of organ-
ismic constructions. As was shown previously, it is possible to reconstruct
on this basis not only the evolution of organismic constructions but the evo-
lution of mental and cognitive abilities, as well. These are, in contrast with
Darwinian evolutionary epistemology, the outcome of special costructional
properties of autonomous organisms. They cannot be considered without a
very close connection with their organismic basis.
This holds also in regard to the evolution of complicated nervous systems
and the their abilities. In some special groups of animals, in particular the
vertebrates, there occur some inner spaces that are undisturbed by movement
and deformation. In these spaces, some concentration effects of nervous tis-
sues take place and enable many additional neuronal operations. With increas-
ing concentration, primitive anticipatory operations occur increasingly. They
cause the origin of some kind of an inner world, which, however, depends in
accordance to Uexküll on organismic properties.
The consequence of evolution of increasingly complicated nervous systems
is a continuous increase in the complication as well as autonomy of the inner
world of organisms. This development also entails a growing emancipation
from the organismic construction. This emancipation happened with the
increase of a mechanically undisturbed brain in vertebrate head capsules and,
in particular, with the evolution of special ape constructions whose eman-
cipation enabled them to evolve a differentiated symbolic language. This is
188 Edlinger

the point at which the beginning of cultural development may be identified.

Although some indispensable biological and constructional needs limit every
activity, no direct biological limitation is given. It follows from this that cul-
tural activities and development should be conceived as occurring on a level
of evolution that cannot be accounted for by biological theories.

Cultural Implications
As a consequence of the presuppositions of the theory of organismic construc-
tions and the autonomy of cultural development, only a constructivist view of
knowledge and cognition can be accepted. Constructivism can be considered
as the outcome of various traditions of thinking, the Kantian in the European
tradition in particular. Further, the suggestion of organismic autonomy has
highly radical and far-reaching consequences not only for thinking about
the relation between organisms and their environment but even for thinking
about the approach to nature in general. Although it has to be conceded that
every ontological description of nature is invalid, the mechanistic approach
in the tradition of European sciences cannot be upheld. Autonomous organ-
isms must act independently in their environment and must be pushed to
activity by their own inner mechanisms. Hence, they cannot be regarded any
more as some kind of cogwheels of a gigantic clockwork, as has been sug-
gested by some models of traditional natural philosophy.
Consequently, the theory of organismic constructions accepts the philos-
ophy of A. N. Whitehead in many respects. The acceptance of Whitehead’s
concepts can be seen as a strangification of traditional biology. Whitehead
conceived nature as an organic and organismic-like structure that is per-
manently in motion, change, and development, but is always spontaneously
pushed by impulses that come from within the organism. Whitehead’s world
consists of organisms. Organisms in the sense of Whitehead are very man-
ifold and occur on various levels of complexity. Because of the organismic
nature of the world, this philosophy is based on an all-embracing permanent
process and stands in no need of a “god” such as the supernatural clockmaker
so common in the European tradition. Indeed, a better understanding of the
complexity of the world is provided by some physicalistic theories, such as
the chaos theories, synergetics, or theory of dissipative structures, but they
cannot present a consistent view of living organisms.

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 10

What Do Genes Have to Do with Cognition?

Wendy Johnson

The genes sing a prehistoric song that today should sometimes be resisted but which
it would be foolish to ignore.
– David Lykken (Bouchard et al., 1990, p. 228).
Cognition is a scientific term for the process, content, and quality of thought.
As the rest of this book makes clear, it is a very broad concept that has very
different specific meanings to different psychologists, philosophers, cognitive
scientists, neurologists, and even linguists, computer scientists, and anesthe-
siologists. To all of them at some level, however, it refers to some faculty for
processing information, applying knowledge, and evaluating or expressing
preferences, whether consciously or unconsciously. As such, it has no content
at all that is distinct from the environment in which it develops and is main-
tained and used. To many, therefore, the possibility of genetic influences on
cognition is foreign, even frightening. How can something as ephemeral and
dependent on the environment as the momentary aesthetic appreciation of a
bird’s song or the knowledge that one can spell a particular word be genetically
influenced? The idea challenges our notions of ourselves as agents expressing
free will and our values of human equality. Yet any measure of cognition from
intelligence to memory to content of thought to problem-solving strategy will
show heritability or evidence of genetic influence.
We can say very similar things about motivation. Motivation is a scientific
term for the driving forces through which we achieve our goals. Again, it is
a very broad concept that takes different and very specific meanings to dif-
ferent scientists who make use of it. For none of them does the term carry
meaning that is distinct from the environment in which humans and other
organisms actualize it. Thus, the possibility of genetic influences on moti-
vation is as foreign and potentially frightening as the possibility of genetic
influences on cognition. How can something as ephemeral and dependent on
the environment as the impulse to comfort a hurt child or the drive to train
192
 What Do Genes Have to Do with Cognition? 193

to win an Olympic medal be genetically influenced? Yet, similar to cogni-

tion, any measure of motivation will show heritability or evidence of genetic
influence. To simplify the discussion that follows, I focus on cognition, and
often, specific ways of measuring cognition rather than motivation, but the
concepts and issues involved are essentially identical.
Despite this, the intuition that genes cannot possibly control the process,
content, and quality of thought from moment to moment is completely cor-
rect. Genes code for enzymes and the regulation of their formation, and
these enzymes in turn build proteins, neurotransmitters, and hormones that
­organize bodily functions and bodily structures, such as kidneys, bones, eyes,
brains, and hearts. Genes do not code for particular forms of knowledge or the
acquisition of experiences on which we base our thoughts, such as TV watch-
ing or oyster-eating. At the same time, because we are biological organisms
and our genes form the building blocks through which all of our ­biological
functions are organized, everything that takes place within our bodies takes
place through the expression of our genes. Because our minds are products
of our brains, which are parts of our bodies, cognition is just another exam-
ple of bodily function resulting from gene expression. From this perspective,
the view that genes cannot possibly control the process, content, and qual-
ity of thought from moment to moment is completely, if trivially, incorrect.
Reconciliation of the apparent paradox that cognition is heritable yet genes
do not control it and interpretation of the significance of this for understand-
ing cognition is the subject of this chapter.

Evolution of our Understanding of Genetic

Influences
Like our brains and bodies, our understanding of genetic influences has
evolved through a process that sifts a jostling mass of essentially chance
movements for those most empirically viable. As with our brains and bodies,
the resulting understanding at any point in time, including the present, is not
always or even often optimal, and the path through which the sifting of ideas
progressed has much to do with any current state of understanding. Because
of this, it is helpful to review the development of what is commonly called the
Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, after Julian Huxley’s (1942) book title. The
ideas that contributed to the Synthesis were developed over the period from
about 1936 to 1947, and reconciled highly specialized and apparently contra-
dictory observations from genetics, cytology, botany, ecology, paleontology,
systematics, and morphology. They form the basis of the current scientific
understanding of evolution and genetics.
194 Johnson

Gregor Mendel is considered the father of modern genetics because of

his famous experiments in cultivating peas that led to the articulation of
his two laws of inheritance. In his groundbreaking paper (Mendel, 1866) he
stated that each individual has two “factors” for each trait, one from each
parent. His first Law of Segregation states that when reproductive gametes
are formed, each gamete receives only 1 of each of these factors. His second
Law of Independent Assortment states that the factors of the various traits
sort independently of each other during gamete formation, so that recombi-
nation of traits in offspring is essentially random. Although originally pre-
sented at a conference in 1865, Mendel’s work was ignored until the turn
of the twentieth century, when it was rediscovered and quickly replicated.
In the meantime, the idea of evolution introduced in Darwin’s Origin of
Species (1859) had taken hold, and biologists had been exploring the impli-
cations of natural selection, the theoretical process whereby heritable traits
that increase the probability of survival to reproduction become more com-
mon over successive generations of a population. Thus, the robust results of
Mendelian genetics in discrete traits such as flower color fell into an intellec-
tual climate that saw them as incompatible with both dominant theoretical
ideas and empirical measurements of most morphological traits as varying
continuously.
The first step toward reconciling these contradictory ideas was the devel-
opment of population genetics, or the study of allele frequency distributions
and their changes as results of natural selection, genetic drift, mutation, and
gene flow. Fisher (1918) showed mathematically how continuous variation
could emerge from the independent actions of many discrete genetic loci.
Over the course of the next 12 years, he produced a series of papers and then
a book (Fisher, 1930) showing that Mendelian genetics was completely con-
sistent with evolution by natural selection. This was supported by a series
of papers by J. B. S. Haldane that showed this consistency mathematically
in real-world examples in specific species. Wright (1931) extended Fisher’s
mathematical development to show how complexes of genes transacting and
interacting together could push small populations that had become physi-
cally isolated away from adaptive peaks and force natural selection to drive
them to new adaptive peaks in their new circumstances. This appealed par-
ticularly to field naturalists such as Dobzhansky (1951), who showed that
real-world populations have more genetic variation than had been assumed
in Fisher’s early population genetic models, and argued that natural selection
maintained genetic diversity through maintaining recessive genes as well as
by driving evolutionary change.
 What Do Genes Have to Do with Cognition? 195

The ideas of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis came together in the late
1940s, before the discovery of DNA. As augmented to recognize the role of
DNA, they can be summarized as follows:
1) Heredity occurs through the transmission from one generation to the
next of germ-line DNA that is located on chromosomes and organized
into discrete units known as genes.
2) Hereditary variation reflects variation in DNA base sequence.
3) The variation in DNA base sequence that explains hereditary variation
results from the many random combinations of existing alleles that are
generated by the sexual reproductive processes and new variants in
DNA (mutations) that occur accidentally and spontaneously.
4) Selection occurs at the level of the individual organism and its pheno-
type (manifested trait), which may co-evolve with its symbionts and
parasites.
5) Heritable variations have small effects and evolution is gradual, with
few points at which mutation pressure has been of particular impor-
tance. The small changes involved in gradual evolution are important
when extended over time and can explain the large changes observed
in the paleontological record.

Detecting and Measuring the Presence

of Genetic Influence
Among the key accomplishments of the early population geneticists, were
the definition and establishment of methods for quantifying heritability or
the proportion of population variance that can be attributed to individual
differences in germ-line DNA transmitted from one generation to the next.
The formulas are simple to apply and tend to show that all measured traits in
plants, nonhuman animals, and humans are substantially heritable. Despite
the apparent simplicity of its definition, heritability is a notoriously subtle
concept that goes to the heart of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, and
understanding how is crucial to understanding how genes are involved in
cognition. To begin to explain this, it is easy to interpret the second tenet of
the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis – that hereditary variation reflects varia-
tion in base DNA sequence – as indicating that heritability implies the degree
to which a trait is genetically determined or passed from one generation to
the next. This is not correct. The genes – half from each parent – rather than
the trait are passed from one generation to the next, and they are expressed
196 Johnson

in the contexts of the other genes present and the environment in which the
offspring develops. This means that tall parents tend to have tall children, but
the variance in heights of children with tall parents is only slightly less than
that of the population as a whole.
Heritability takes two forms that are often distinct yet rarely clearly dis-
tinguished. People working with domesticated plants and animals had long
been aware and taken advantage of the fact that quantitative characteristics
are passed in varying degrees from parents to offspring, but Fisher and the
other early population geneticists specified how the varying degrees could be
quantified using various combinations of biological relatives who differed in
degree of biological relatedness. These “breeding values” or “narrow-sense
heritabilities” reflect the proportions of population variance that can be
attributed to the combined actions of genes that act independently of each
other and thus additively. However, not all genetic influences are additive
in this way. Genes recombine during the formation of each parent’s gam-
etes, and then the gametes with different genetic heritages combine to form
the zygote. This process produces combinations of genes that interact with
each other and generate other epistatic effects that can be very important
to genetic influences on characteristics in the individual. These nonadditive
effects tend to be dispersed during recombination in transmission to the next
generation, and thus are not part of narrow-sense heritability, but they may
be very important in the manifestation of traits in individuals. “Broad-sense
heritabilities” include all sources of genetic variance.
The best ways to estimate heritability make use of situations in which repro-
duction can be controlled, as in agriculture and laboratory situations; it is not
possible to use them in humans. The formulas generally used to estimate her-
itabilities of human traits rely on differences in extent of similarity of biolog-
ical relatives of different degrees. The most common comparison is between
similarity of monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twins. MZ twins are
derived from a single fertilized egg that splits early in gestation, and thus are
effectively genetically identical. DZ twins are derived from two eggs released
during a single ovulatory period and fertilized separately, and thus are genet-
ically related in the same way as singleton full siblings. When mating is ran-
dom, they share on average 50 percent of the genes that differ among human
individuals (Guo, 1996). Genetic similarity of MZ twins can thus arise from
both additive and nonadditive genetic influences, but genetic similarity of DZ
twins will tend to arise only from additive genetic influences, so the distinc-
tion between narrow- and broad-sense heritabilities is blurred. A correlation
between members of MZ twin pairs on a trait that is twice as large as the DZ
correlation is generally interpreted as indicating that similarity is due entirely
 What Do Genes Have to Do with Cognition? 197

to additive genetic influences, or narrow-sense heritability. An MZ correla-

tion more than twice as large as the DZ correlation is generally interpreted as
indicating the presence of nonadditive genetic influences. However, data sim-
ulations show that explicitly nonadditive genetic effects generate correlations
between relatives that are indistinguishable from those generated by additive
genetic effects (Hill, Goddard, & Visscher, 2008). This makes clear that twin
and other correlations between relatives cannot provide reliable indications
of the relative importance of additive and nonadditive genetic influences. It is
important because it emphasizes a point about the third tenet of the Modern
Evolutionary Synthesis. Although variation in DNA base sequence underlies
hereditary variation, many different combinations of genes and additive and
nonadditive genetic processes can underlie similar levels of quantitative traits
in different individuals and pairs of relatives.
By definition, heritability is a ratio of genetic variance to the sum of genetic
and environmental variances, calculated under the assumption that genetic
and environmental variances are independent of each other. Leaving aside the
independence assumption for the moment, the fact that genetic variance is
a term in both the numerator and denominator of the ratio means that the
magnitude of the ratio is very dependent on the magnitude of environmen-
tal variance, and changes in environmental variance can mean large changes
in heritability. Environmental variance itself consists of truly environmen-
tal influences but also of measurement error. This means, first of all, that the
more accurately we can measure a trait, the more heritable it will appear to be.
This may go far toward explaining, for example, the high heritability (80–90
percent) of human height. However, dependence of the heritability ratio on
the magnitude of environmental variance also means that if the environment
is constant (or if environmental differences have no effects on the trait), all
observed variance will be the result of genetic differences. Such environmental
imperviousness may explain the extremely high heritability (90–95 percent) of
fingerprint patterns. At the same time, the dependence of the heritability ratio
on the magnitude of environmental variance means that if the environmental
variance is very large relative to the genetic variance, heritability will be low
even when genetic variance is actually substantial. This is important because it
indicates the flip side of the third tenet of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis.
Although variation in DNA base sequence underlies the genetic variation that
produces heritability, the same genes (DNA base sequences) and genetic pro-
cesses can underlie very different levels of quantitative traits in different indi-
viduals when their environmental circumstances differ meaningfully.
Heritability is thus population- and time-dependent, because all of the
terms on which it depends (additive genetic variance, nonadditive genetic
198 Johnson

variance, environmental influences of all kinds) are specific to a population

at a particular point in time, and because the fourth tenet of the Modern
Evolutionary Synthesis firmly locates the operation of natural selection on
the individual’s manifested trait within its environment. Both kinds of genetic
variance depend on how the gene alleles that influence the trait are grouped
within the population, their frequencies, the magnitudes of their effects, and
the modes of their actions, all of which can differ across populations, and of
course environmental variance can also differ. Despite this, heritabilities of
similar traits are often very similar across populations, and even across species.
This can leave the impression that heritability is robust to population differ-
ences. There are two reasons, however, to think this an illusion. First, the heri-
tability of many traits is moderated by environmental circumstances within
populations. For example, heritability of physical health decreased with level
of income and level of perceived control over life (Johnson & Krueger, 2005a,
2005b) in a national U.S. sample. Emphasizing the importance of remember-
ing that heritability is a ratio, this was because genetic variance decreased with
increasing income. In contrast, heritability of life satisfaction increased with
level of income (Johnson & Krueger, 2006), due to decreased environmental
variance with increasing income. The second reason to think that robustness
of heritability to population differences is an illusion is that heritability esti-
mates tend to gravitate toward the moderate range of perhaps 30–50 percent
for essentially psychometric reasons completely unrelated either to genetic
or environmental population circumstances. These reasons include the pres-
ence of substantial measurement error in environmental variance and, ironi-
cally, efforts to reduce measurement error such as aggregating collections of
measurement items and including measurement items that generate a range
of response frequencies. Thus, similar heritabilities in different populations
can arise for very different combinations of reasons involving both factors
intrinsic to the genetic and environmental population circumstances of pri-
mary interest and properties of the measurement instruments used to assess
the traits.

Evolutionary Processes and Gene–Environment

Interaction and Correlation
In giving the definition of heritability as the ratio of genetic variance to the
sum of genetic and environmental variance, I noted but temporarily set aside
the underlying assumption that genetic and environmental influences are
independent of each other. It is now time to return to it. It occupies an uneasy
position in both the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis and the formulas used
 What Do Genes Have to Do with Cognition? 199

to estimate heritabilities, and exploring this uneasy position will help to illu-
minate how genes are involved in cognition. Darwin’s theories of evolution
and natural selection give a prominent role to environmental circumstances
in determining the long-term fate of genetic variation, but Mendel’s genetic
results, derived as they were essentially from a single pea plot, leave little
room for environmental variation because there essentially was none. Given
his approach of reconciling Mendel’s results with evolutionary theory mathe-
matically and statistically, Fisher (1918, 1930) saw the reconciliation problem
as how much of total variation could be attributed to genetic sources and how
much to environmental sources. This focus on variance was a both a major
conceptual departure and a major contribution to population genetics and
statistical analysis more generally.
To this day, most statistical analysis focuses on mean differences. This kind
of analysis incorporates assessment of variance because it is through com-
parison of mean differences with variance that we develop a conclusion that
mean differences are important. Focus tends to be on the standard deviation
as the measure of variance, however, because the standard deviation is stated
on the same scale as the mean, which makes it possible to directly assess
the relative importance of variation in ratio scales with real zero points. (Of
course, in psychology in general and cognitive science in particular we are
seldom working with ratio scales with real zero points, so the emphasis in this
field is not particularly well placed.) Despite this, the scale of mean and stan-
dard deviation is not natural for variability itself, so independent sources of
deviation from the mean cannot be summed to obtain total deviation when
they are stated as standard deviations. If stated as variances, however, they
can be summed, at least presuming they are independent. This was Fisher’s
reason for focusing on variance rather than standard deviation: it made his
conceptual goal of reconciling Mendel’s genetics with evolutionary theory
tractable using his methodological approach of choice – statistical mathemat-
ics – at least as long as genetic and environmental influences could be con-
sidered independent. Fisher was aware that nonadditive interactions between
genetic and environmental influences interrupted the ability to sum variance
components, but he treated this as merely a statistical complication. To him,
the statistical methods of analysis of variance that he developed were capable
of revealing the presence and importance of such interactions, and statistical
treatments to remove their effects were appropriate means of dealing with
them if they appeared. Fisher’s treatment was mathematically rigorous and
his (rather limited) experimental work convinced him that interactions were
rare and of little practical importance. Many followed him in effectively dis-
regarding them.
200 Johnson

Embryologists and evolutionary biologists, however, took a different view.

To them, phenotypic characteristics were the current products of ongoing
series of transactions between environmental circumstances and genetic
material, and individual differences in those characteristics could be attrib-
uted to genetic or environmental influences only if the developmental condi-
tions were specified. Failures of independence of genetic and environmental
influences were not only not just occasional and annoying exceptions to a
general rule; they were standard operating procedure in the natural world.
Interactions between genetic and environmental influences were not merely
statistical, either; they reflected variability arising from differential genetic
sensitivity to environmental conditions, or environmental control of genetic
expression.
This could be expressed through the norms of reaction or the patterns of
phenotypic expression of individual genotypes in different environments.
Figure 10.1 shows an example in fruit flies, taken from Dobzhansky and
Spassky (1944). Development in fruit flies is quite sensitive to temperature. In
this example, chromosomal types A and B were extracted from natural popula-
tions, and viability when hatched at two different temperatures was compared.
Chromosomal heterozygotes were the most viable at both temperatures, but
A/A homozygotes were much more sensitive to the warmer temperature than
B/B homozygotes. As can be seen by comparing the variations with genotype
at the two temperatures (the variations within each line of the graph), increas-
ing the temperature by 9 degrees dramatically increased the genetic variance.
In the example, environments were identical except for temperature, so heri-
tability of viability was 100 percent in both cases. The example makes clear,
however, that in real-world conditions in which both genotypes and environ-
mental conditions would vary, heritability of viability would be heavily depen-
dent on the population frequencies of the two chromosomes and the specific
temperature conditions in which the flies were hatched.
Such interactions are well documented in plants and nonhuman animals,
and we are starting to document them in humans, as well. Examples from
psychology are greater sensitivity to stressful life events in people carrying the
short allele of the serotonin transporter (Uher & McGuffin, 2007), and greater
sensitivity to childhood maltreatment in males carrying the low-activity
MAOA allele (Kim-Cohen et al., 2006). As might be expected given the com-
plexity of the human environment on which they are dependent, however,
these interactions have so far not replicated neatly. Statistically, these kinds of
interactions produce statistical effects on variance equivalent to the interac-
tions that Fisher considered of little practical importance, but they reflect a
very different way of looking at individual differences than Fisher’s. Where
 What Do Genes Have to Do with Cognition? 201

A/A A/B B/B

1.0

0.8

0.6
Viability

0.4

0.2

16.5°C.

25.5°C.
0.0 Genotype
Figure 10.1. Norms of reaction in viability in 2 genetic lines of fruit flies in response
to differences in temperature. A and B refer to chromosomal types. Adapted from
Dobzhansky (1951).

Fisher saw static, independent contributions of genes and environmental

influences to differing emerged phenotypes, embryologists and evolution-
ary biologists such as Lancelot Hogben, Ivan Schmalhausen, and Conrad
Hal Waddington saw ongoing variations in developmental processes caused
by individual differences in genetic accommodations to environmental cir-
cumstances. Where Fisher asked if total variation could be apportioned to
genetic and environmental sources, the embryologists asked how specific
environmental conditions affected different genotypes to produce individual
differences in outcomes, and they developed interventions to test the robust-
ness and magnitudes of the responses they observed. Unlike Fisher, who saw
gene-environment interactions as nuisance and distraction, these develop-
mental biologists saw gene-environment interactions as the very heart of the
developmental processes in which they were interested (Tabery, 2008).
There was, however, more to it even than this. The embryologists and evo-
lutionary biologists saw this differential sensitivity to environmental circum-
stances not just as a source of population variance now, but as the fundamental
202 Johnson

mechanism through which evolutionary change has taken place. Moreover,

they realized that genetic variation could lie dormant and unexpressed until
environmental circumstances triggered its expression (Gibson & Dworkin,
2004; Schmalhausen, 1949). Perhaps most importantly, they also realized that
many organisms can choose the environmental circumstances they experi-
ence to at least some degree. Plants tend to remain fixed in one place through-
out their lifespans; many animals (including, of course, humans) can and do
move through space to escape detrimental environmental circumstances and
seek more favorable ones. At bottom, the embryologists and evolutionary
biologists recognized that genes are involved in the development of individ-
ual organisms in exactly the same ways they are involved in evolution.
The existence of dormant genetic variation and the implications of power
to choose environmental circumstances are key to understanding this link
between evolution and speciation and phenotypic developmental processes.
Moreover, dormant genetic variation and power to choose environmental
circumstances lead to some of the properties of heritability estimates that we
observe in humans. Dormant genetic variance and power to choose environ-
mental circumstances also have consequences that are inextricably bound to
each other, and to gene-environment interaction, as well. This is important
to understanding the presence of genetic influences on broadly construed
traits such as cognition. Dormant genetic variation is primarily regulatory
rather than structural and functional (Gerhart & Kirschner, 2007). This is a
relatively recent understanding of genetic processes. It means that expression
of otherwise dormant genetic variance triggered by environmental circum-
stances tends to involve changes in levels of production of proteins that are
already being produced rather than production of proteins new to the system.
In turn, the regulatory, quantitative character of otherwise dormant genetic
variation tends to make phenotypic changes quantitative and gradual rather
than qualitative in nature, as well. This implies that the emergence of new
traits due to environmentally triggered expression of previously dormant
genetic variation is simply the most extreme pole of a continuous dimen-
sion of gene-environment interaction. At the other pole of this dimension are
ephemeral environmentally triggered fluctuations in continuously available
gene products.
Similar to other animals, humans of course are constantly experiencing
such genetically regulated fluctuations as they move through their envi-
ronments, and there are individual differences in response to any particu-
lar environmental circumstance. There are also individual differences in
the environmental circumstances experienced. Moreover, although choice
is never complete, humans have choices about many of the environmental
 What Do Genes Have to Do with Cognition? 203

circumstances they encounter. People tend to seek environments in which

they feel relatively comfortable and avoid those in which they do not, and
the environments selected tend to reinforce the traits that led people to seek
those environments in the first place (Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005), thus
tightly linking gene-environment correlation with gene-environment inter-
action at the developmental level. For example, individuals who easily expe-
rience sensory overload may seek very constrained environmental situations
in which they can focus attention on one kind of stimulus that appeals. They
may also experience something akin to panic when forced into situations
in which they are presented with large amounts of sensory input, restrict-
ing their ability to process that input to generate the synaptic connections
that reflect learning. Over time, if ability to choose environmental circum-
stances is high and/or exposure to hubbub is low, such an individual might
develop a calm and controlled personality with a highly specialized body of
knowledge. Depending on the subject of the specialized body of knowledge,
particular kinds of cognitions would be more likely than others, but a posi-
tive emotional outlook might be expected to predominate. In these circum-
stances, genetic tendencies toward psychopathology of many kinds might be
suppressed rather than expressed. An individual with an identical tendency
to experience sensory overload but limited ability to choose environmental
circumstances and constant exposure to hubbub, however, might over time
develop an anxious and explosive personality, difficulty in developing even
basic knowledge and educational skills, and a negative, alienated emotional
outlook, and genetic expression of tendencies toward psychopathology might
flower. In short, the two individuals’ habitual patterns of cognition might be
very different.
Of course, capacity to tolerate sensory input is far from the only trait on
which people make choices about the environmental situations they seek and
avoid, and many if not most such choices are not made with any conscious
awareness of particular traits or responses at all. Moreover, people have con-
flicting goals and motivations that may lead them to seek situations that
leave them comfortable now but vulnerable to trouble later, or vice versa.
For example, people choose to initiate a smoking habit despite knowledge of
the long-term health consequences for reasons that have to do with short-
term pleasure, setting in motion a series of patterns of social interaction and
cognition involving that habit. Others choose to master a skill they find dif-
ficult, such as public speaking, because they know it will be necessary in an
occupation they desire, again setting in motion patterns of social interac-
tion and cognition that become habitual. The multiplicity of traits on which
people may base their conscious and unconscious choices of environmental
204 Johnson

circumstances and the multiplicity of combinations of traits that people

exhibit, degrees of freedom to make environmental choices, and expressed
genetic backgrounds on which environmentally triggered genetic expres-
sion is placed virtually guarantee that there will be many different patterns of
genetic and environmental transactions that lead to the development of any
patterns of cognition we care to measure, from mental rotation to rumination
to spiritual awareness. Despite the existence of these different developmen-
tal pathways, all measurable patterns of cognition will tend to show genetic
influences, or heritability. I turn next to showing why.

Measuring Heritability of Cognition in

Humans – Twin and Adoption Studies
Recall that heritability is the proportion of variance in a trait that can be attrib-
uted to genetic influence, and that it is best measured by evaluating response
to selection in situations in which breeding is controlled. Because control of
breeding is not possible in humans, we typically take advantage of naturally
occurring experiments in which the extent of genetic relatedness of the sample
population is known to measure heritabilities in humans. This means making
use of samples of twins and adoptive and biological relatives for which the
extent of biological relatedness is known with some precision, and applying
general formulas that rely on the assumption that genetic and environmen-
tal influences are independent. As I have shown, however, this assumption is
commonly violated. When it is violated – that is, gene-environment interac-
tions and correlations are present – the heritability formulas generally used
generate results that appear interpretable but are biased in systematic ways.
To understand these biases, I need to explain the distinction between
shared and nonshared environmental influences. Genetic influences act to
make genetically related individuals similar; the individuals have common
genetic heritage. Environmental influences, however, could act to make
genetically related individuals similar or they could act to make them differ-
ent. When the environmental influences act to make the individuals similar,
they are termed shared. When the environmental influences act to make the
individuals different, they are termed nonshared. Measurement error is thus
always included among nonshared environmental influences. Often, people
think of environmental circumstances that family members share, such as
parental divorce and socioeconomic status in siblings in childhood, as shared,
but these environmental influences are shared in the sense the term is used
here only to the extent that they act to make the siblings similar. If the siblings
respond to such environmental circumstances differently, their influences are
 What Do Genes Have to Do with Cognition? 205

nonshared. It is harder to see how different experiences could act to make

relatives similar, but the same idea applies: the environmental circumstances
could be considered shared environmental influences if they do make the
relatives similar. For example, two siblings could develop similar levels of
trait perseverance, including ways of thinking about frustration and main-
taining motivation, one through participation on a sports team and the other
through practicing a musical instrument. In that case, access to opportunities
to develop and practice skills might be the shared environmental influence.
When genetic and shared environmental influences are correlated, esti-
mates of genetic and environmental influences that do not explicitly recognize
the existence of the correlation understate genetic influences and exaggerate
shared environmental influences. When genetic and shared environmental
influences interact but the interaction is not recognized, however, the effect
is the opposite: genetic influences are exaggerated and shared environmental
influences are understated. These distortions in the estimates can be demon-
strated mathematically (Purcell, 2002) and could be removed if the appro-
priate data were available, but this is relatively rare. In contrast, when genetic
and nonshared environmental influences are correlated but the correlation
is not recognized, genetic influences are exaggerated and nonshared envi-
ronmental influences are understated. The opposite is the case when genetic
and nonshared environmental influences interact: nonshared environmental
influences are exaggerated and genetic influences are understated. What does
this mean for thinking about genetic influences on cognition?
The greatest volume of data on genetic influences on cognition has been
compiled for measures of intelligence. These data show a clear and well-
replicated developmental pattern: in young childhood, shared environmen-
tal influences account for some 35 percent of variance; genetic influences
account for some 30 percent of variance; and nonshared environmental influ-
ences, including measurement error, account for the remaining 35 percent or
so of variance (Plomin et al., 2007). In samples of children of increasing age,
the proportions of variance attributable to genetic influences gradually and
steadily increase, and the proportions of variance attributable to shared and
nonshared environmental influences steadily decrease. The decrease is much
sharper for shared than nonshared environmental influences. In samples of
adults, the proportion of variance attributable to genetic influences can be as
high as 80 percent. This depends primarily on the reliability of the test, as the
proportion of variance attributable to shared environmental influences typi-
cally declines to 0 percent. Figure 10.2 shows how this typically works.
With respect to intelligence and many other aspects of cognition, there is no
question about the presence of gene-environment correlation. In childhood,
 206 Johnson

1.0
Genetic
Shared
Nonshared
0.8
Proportion of Variance

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0
1 3 5 7 9 11 15 17 21 35
Age
Figure 10.2. Typical patterns of changes in genetic and environmental influences on
intelligence with age.

the correlation likely centers on the home environment and its extension, the
school environment that parents have selected for their children. Brighter
parents pass whatever genes are involved in intelligence on to their children,
and brighter parents – particularly those with higher socioeconomic status
(SES), as that is the way the question has most often been studied – also pass
on more optimal childhood environments for the development of intelli-
gence (Hart & Risley, 1995; Heath, 1982). They read more to their children,
speak to them more using larger vocabularies, are more likely to talk to them
in intellectually stimulating ways, are more likely to expose them to intel-
lectually stimulating activities such as visits to museums and concerts and
participation in enrichment classes and science fairs, and are more likely to
make active choices about the schools their children attend. These activities
probably reflect some combination of parental lifestyle and parenting phi-
losophy applied consistently across siblings, tailoring of parental activities
to the individually expressed responsiveness and needs of each child, and
parental life circumstances that dictate available parenting resources. For
example, parents may read to each of their children in very similar amounts
because they believe that reading to children is important, but may find that
 What Do Genes Have to Do with Cognition? 207

one child wants to hear the same book over and over and therefore ends up
being exposed to relatively few books, and another is always asking for some-
thing new and ends up being exposed to many more. Parents may also find
it easy to pay for and transport a child to an enrichment course one year
and much more difficult another, due purely to their own job or financial
circumstances.
Because genes and environments are correlated this way in biological fam-
ilies, we know less than we would like about how much these activities actu-
ally matter in the development of intelligence. The best evidence we have
comes from studies of children born to parents of one SES and adopted by
parents in another. These studies generally show that children born to low
SES parents who are adopted into higher SES families tend to have higher
IQs than their siblings who remain with their birth parents by perhaps 12–15
IQ points (Capron & Duyme, 1989; van IJzendoorn, Juffer, & Klein Poelhuis,
2005). These studies also tend to show that adoptees born to high SES parents
tend to have higher IQs than adoptees born to low SES parents, no matter
who raises them, again by perhaps 12 IQ points. These findings are rather soft,
due to the relative rarity of studies, small sample sizes, and the absence of ran-
domized assignment to adoptive circumstances, appropriate control samples,
clear before and after adoption measurement, and follow up of most adoptive
samples into adulthood (van IJzendoorn, Juffer, & Klein Poelhuis, 2005).
Still, together, these adoption findings suggest that high SES environment
helps increase IQ, but it matters less to those born to high SES parents than
to those born to low SES parents. One way to interpret these findings is that
whatever genetic or prenatal or perinatal characteristics are associated with
being born to high SES parents are relatively insensitive to the kinds of dif-
ferences in environments associated with SES, but whatever genetic or pre-
natal or perinatal characteristics are associated with being born to low SES
parents are quite sensitive to those same differences in environments asso-
ciated with SES. Intelligence is unquestionably a developmental trait that
emerges at least partly through the acquisition of cognitive habits and skills
and knowledge. We could explain these findings if genes for traits that pre-
dispose children to seek experiences that develop intelligence – such as thirst
for knowledge, curiosity about how things work, desire to express themselves
clearly and accurately, and so on – were more common among children born
to high SES parents. If children carrying these genes but growing up in low
SES adoptive families had just enough access to books and other learning
materials to acquire these developmental experiences themselves, they could
acquire higher intelligence than most of their low SES peers through correla-
tion between genetic and nonshared environmental influences. Were these
208 Johnson

children growing up in their high SES birth environments, some of this cor-
relation would likely instead be between genetic and shared environmental
influences. At the same time, if genes for traits that predispose children to
adapt to the cognitive behaviors of those around them were more common
among children born to low SES parents, then these children might develop
higher intelligence when raised in high SES adoptive homes than they would
have if they had been raised by their low SES birth parents, and they would do
so through correlation between (different) genetic and shared environmental
influences as well as interaction between genetic and shared environmental
influences.
There is precedent for and some evidence supporting these propositions.
Hayes (1962) and Bouchard (1997) have proposed that genes drive the acqui-
sition of experiences through which intelligence develops, and Cronbach
and Snow and others (Cronbach & Snow, 1977; Freebody & Tirre, 1985; Shute
et al., 1996; Snow, 1982) have gathered considerable evidence that high-ability
students tended to benefit more from open-ended educational curricula that
encouraged active exploration and experimentation than from structured
instruction, but the opposite is the case for lower-ability students. If it were
the case that this involved genetic differences that had frequencies that varied
with SES, there might be relatively few if any genes for intelligence per se, yet
intelligence would show substantial genetic influence or heritability because
of the genetic influences on the traits contributing to its development. In a
general population of children containing representatives of all genetic back-
grounds growing up in all levels of SES, estimates of shared environmental
influences would tend to be exaggerated due to the presence of correlation
between genetic and shared environmental influences in those children
whose intelligence was developing in conformance with the cognitive behav-
iors of those around them. At the same time, estimates of genetic influences
would tend to be exaggerated, too, due to the presence of both interaction
between genetic and shared environmental influences in those same children
and correlation between genetic and nonshared environmental influences in
those children whose intelligence was developing in response to their own
intellectual exploratory behaviors. If the genes for intellectual exploratory
behaviors were more common among children born to high SES parents,
and those for adapting to others’ cognitive behaviors more common among
children born to low SES parents, we could expect that heritability estimates
would be higher (and exaggerated to a greater degree) in high SES groups and
estimates of shared environmental influences would be higher (and exagger-
ated to a greater degree) in low SES groups. Several studies have provided
evidence that this is the case (Harden, Turkheimer, & Loehlin, 2007; Rowe,
 What Do Genes Have to Do with Cognition? 209

Jacobson, & van den Oord, 1999; Turkheimer et al., 2003). Of course, it is
extremely unlikely that genetic influences on the development of any child’s
intelligence would be either exclusively exploratory or exclusively adaptive.
If we understand performance on intelligence tests to reflect cognitive skills
and habits broadly in use at time of testing, this same developmental empha-
sis on gene-environment correlation and interaction can be used to explain
the increases in estimates of genetic influences and decreases in estimates
of shared environmental influences on intelligence as samples move from
childhood to adulthood. Although gene-environment correlation and inter-
action likely center on the family environment in childhood, this changes
as children grow to adulthood. Once people reach school-leaving age, the
day-to-day need to maintain intellectual activity varies widely with occupa-
tion and interest, and tends to center on peer group rather than the families
in which people were raised. This means a likely shift of current environ-
mental influences from being primarily shared to being primarily nonshared.
Thus, in those whose intelligence is adaptive, the correlation between genetic
and shared environmental influences in childhood that acted to exaggerate
estimates of shared environmental influences would shift to a correlation
between genetic and nonshared environmental influences that acts to exag-
gerate estimates of genetic influences in adulthood. At the same time, the
interaction between genetic and shared environmental influences in those
same people that acted to exaggerate genetic influences in childhood would
shift to an interaction between genetic and nonshared environmental influ-
ences that acts to exaggerate estimates of genetic influences in adulthood.
The correlation between genetic and nonshared environmental influences
in those whose intelligence is exploratory that acted to exaggerate estimates
of genetic influence in childhood would continue to operate in adulthood.
Taken together, if these genetic and environmental correlative developmental
processes were operative, we would expect estimates of shared environmental
influences on intelligence to drop dramatically from childhood to adulthood,
and estimates of genetic influences to increase, exactly as has been observed.
Similar developmental processes could be involved in many other, if not all,
aspects of cognition.

Generating Heritability through Developing

Accuracy of Measurement – Abstraction of
Cognition
Many aspects of cognition are very ephemeral and, as noted at the beginning
of this chapter, the idea that there are genetic influences on fleeting cognitive
210 Johnson

images and idiosyncratic ways of thinking is foreign. The most ephemeral

aspects of cognition actually may tend to show little or no genetic influ-
ence, for exactly the same reasons that make them difficult psychometrically.
However, three familiar psychometric principles used to create precision of
measurement of cognition also generate heritability.
The first is aggregation. Individual items are always noisy indicators of
the construct of interest. Psychometricians aggregate a sufficient number
of items so that the independent sources of error in individual items tend
to cancel each other out, thus more clearly revealing the construct of interest
they share. Even individual scale items do tend to show heritability (Neale,
Rushton, & Fulker, 1986), but due to the principle of aggregation, they tend to
be less heritable than scales (Johnson et al., 2008). This applies at the molec-
ular genetic level, as well. Polygenic traits such as cognition tend to show
heritability in part because the traits themselves involve the expression of
many genetic polymorphisms. The broader the trait construct we consider
(and many aspects of cognition such as intelligence, memory, knowledge,
problem-solving strategies, and motivational attributions clearly are very
broad and involve many aspects of brain function), the more likely manifes-
tation of that trait is to involve a very large number of molecular mechanisms
and therefore genes, and thus to display a good solid heritability that is rather
stable across populations.
The second process that contributes to both sound psychometric prop-
erties and heritability is reliability. Measures of cognition can only be valid
if people’s responses are consistent over relevant time periods, and this is
true of heritability, as well. The third process involved in both is frequency
of response. Measurement is most accurate when scales include items that
reliably tap the full distribution of the underlying construct, but items at
the extremes of the distribution tend to have rather skewed response pat-
terns because almost everyone answers them the same way. As long as
there is systematic population variance in response, however, more closely
genetically related people will tend to answer them more similarly. Similar
to the first process, this also has an analog in molecular genetics. Genetic
polymorphisms differ in frequency. Even individual differences completely
under genetic control may show little or no heritability if the frequencies
of the genes involved are low. The gene involved in Huntington’s Disease is
an example of this. The deleterious gene involved is so rare that heritabil-
ity of the disease is effectively 0 in any population sample, yet at this time,
presence of the deleterious allele completely determines development of the
disease.
 What Do Genes Have to Do with Cognition? 211

Conclusions: Can/Should We Expect to Find

the Genes for Cognition?
I began this chapter by recounting the development of the Modern
Evolutionary Synthesis linking the basic principles of gene action discov-
ered by Gregor Mendel to the evolutionary principles articulated by Charles
Darwin. I then showed how this synthesis applies not just to understanding
the long-past evolution of the species we see today but to the development
processes and manifestation of individual differences in humans today. Along
the way, I described how these developmental processes are generally glossed
over in making estimates of heritability of cognitive and other psychologi-
cal traits in humans, leading to systematic biases in those estimates. Some
may be quick to seize on this as reason to dismiss the heritability estimates
or interpret the presence of bias in the estimates as an indication that there
really are no genetic influences on cognitive and other psychological traits.
This would be a serious mistake. Genes are involved in cognition as they are
involved in all aspects of human behavior. Moreover, their involvement is far
more than the tautological expression of the fact that it is through the actions
of our genes that all of our biological functions take place. Individual genetic
differences drive the experiences we seek and, simultaneously, our sensitiv-
ities to the effects of those experiences. This means that at some level our
genes drive what we take from those experiences – what we observe, what we
learn, how we interpret our experiences, and thus how we build and maintain
our cognitive understandings of the world. Our world is constantly chang-
ing, so our genetically influenced proclivities do not always drive us to seek
constructive experiences, and we never have complete freedom to act as our
genes might prompt, anyway. Fortunately as well, when it comes to cognition,
our genes rarely get the final word – we have the power to use our wills to
direct the ways in which they are expressed.
Throughout this chapter, I have been ignoring an elephant in the room.
Huge amounts of energy and resources are presently being devoted to trying
to identify the genes involved in human physical and mental diseases and
behavioral traits. If there are genetic influences on cognition (and/or moti-
vation), should we be able to find the specific genes involved? The prevail-
ing wisdom has been that high heritability indicates that finding the genes
is feasible. So far, though, this is has not been our experience (Maher, 2008,
p. 456). To date, we have not been very successful in identifying the genes even
for highly heritable, clearly measurable traits such as height (Flint & Mackay,
2009), and we have been spectacularly unsuccessful in identifying genes for
212 Johnson

normal-range intelligence, arguably the most well-defined measure of cogni-

tion. Instead, we have actually been more successful in identifying genes for
traits such as Huntington’s Disease that are not heritable at all in population
samples (Risch & Merikangas, 1996). In the cognitive area, we know of more
than 300 genes involved in mental retardation (Inlow & Restifo, 2004), but
for the same reason, the conditions involved show little or no heritability in
population samples.
Increasingly, geneticists are recognizing that initial indications from model
organisms that large proportions of variance in quantitative traits could be
accounted for by finite numbers of genes that had finite kinds of effects were
illusory, likely due to the oversimplified genetic background produced by
working with crosses between inbred strains. Many genes with very small
effects on any given trait and genes with effects on many different systems
throughout the body appear to be rules rather than exceptions (Flint &
Mackay, 2009). Broadly construed traits that have clearly heterogeneous
developmental courses such as cognition appear to be especially subject to
these complications of gene identification. If this is the case, it is far from
clear that identifying the specific genes involved is the best strategy to under-
stand even the genetic involvement in these traits, let alone their observable
manifestation. The effects of any genes identified are likely to be extremely
small and closely intertwined with those genes affecting other traits. We may
make much more rapid progress in understanding traits such as cognition
through trying to understand how developmental processes are modified
by environmental circumstances when the clearly important genetic back-
ground is controlled. This can be accomplished through innovative use of
twin and adoption studies (Johnson et al., 2009).

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 11

Brain, Behavior, and Cognition

Norbert Jaušovec & Ksenija Jaušovec

“Each of us lives within the universe – the prison – of his own brain. Projecting
from it are millions of fragile sensory nerve fibers, in groups uniquely adapted
to sample the energetic states of the world around us: heat, light, force and
chemical composition. That is all we ever know of it directly; all else is logical
inference” (Mountcastle, 1975, p. 131). Within a few million years, the central
nervous system has evolved at a spectacular rate and has become predomi-
nant in behavior control. It shapes our thoughts, hopes, dreams, and imagina-
tions. The brain – a spongy, one-and-a-half–kilo mass of fatty tissue – is what
makes us human. The present chapter will provide only a glimpse of what
is known about the relationship between brain functioning and cognition –
several facets of this relationship rather than a comprehensive overview.

A Few Brain Facts

The neocortex comprises most of the forebrain by volume with an area of
up to 2,500–3,000 cm2 and a thickness of only 1.5–3.0 mm (Nunez, 1995). It
seems that the neocortex is a device for the most widespread diffusion and
mixing of signals (Braitenberg & Schutz, 1991). Therefore, some authors have
made the analogy between cortical functioning and the density of social
gathering in a mob (Bullock, 1980) or the collective interactions of waves
and individual particles in hot plasma systems (Nunez, 1995). A numerical
illustration of the extreme interconnectivity of neocortical tissue is the esti-
mate of about a 4-km axon length per cubic millimeter. This interconnectiv-
ity in the neocortex is made possible by cortical neurons – pyramidal cells
and interneurons. Pyramidal cells account for more than three-fourths of
neocortical neurons, and are the primary intracortical cells with excitatory
axons; whereas interneurons are mainly inhibitory. Nearly every pyramidal
cell sends an excitatory axon into the white matter, and most of these re-enter

215
216 Jaušovec & Jaušovec

the cortex at some distant location in the same hemisphere (corticocortical

fibers) or opposite hemisphere (commissural fibers). In addition, multiple
branches of the axon provide input to regions within a 3 mm radius. The aver-
age number of synapses per cortical neuron is about 104.
Neocortical neurons are arranged in overlapping modular columns of dif-
ferent sizes (e.g., the minicolumn with a diameter of about 20–50 μm or the
macrocolumn with a diameter of 0.5–3 mm). An important modular unit is
the corticocortical column, with a 2–3 mm thickness, a diameter of about
0.3 mm, and containing about 103–104 neurons (Szentagothai, 1979). There
are about 1010 neocortical neurons, or about 2 × 106 corticocortical columns,
and nearly all send connections to other parts of the neocortex. It has been
speculated that each module projects to perhaps 10–100 other modules and
receives input from the same number (Eccles & Robinson, 1984). Therefore,
our neocortex can be viewed as a system involving the interaction of 106
corticocortical columns – a reflexive device working on its own input. To
illustrate the immense complexity of the neocortex, Nunez (1995) has argued
that if the neocortical state can be defined by the distribution of binary states
of each unit (on/off), then on the level of the macrocolumn one comes up
with the unimaginable number of 103162 states. For comparison, the number
of electrons that could be packed into the volume of the known universe is
approximately 10120.

Neuroimaging Techniques
A simple method for recording the electrical activity of the brain is electro-
encephalography (EEG). To record EEG, a small metal disk is attached to
the scalp to detect the electrical activity of neurons in the underlying brain
area. EEG measurement requires collection of a huge amount of data that are
unusable in raw form. Therefore, they are subjected to data-reduction meth-
ods. These reduction methods could be roughly classified into two groups:
first, methods that are partly or completely based on the magnitude of EEG
(e.g., absolute power measures); and second, methods that measure the inter-
relations of EEG activity between different scalp locations (e.g., coherence
measures). Most often, a Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) is performed on
artifact-free chunks of data to derive estimates of absolute power values or
relative percentage power values in different frequency bands: δ = 1.5 – 3.5
Hz; ϑ = 3.6 – 6.5 Hz; α1 = 6.6 – 8.5 Hz; α2 = 8.6 – 10.5 Hz; α3 = 10.6 – 12.9 Hz;
β1 = 13.0 – 17.5 Hz; β2 = 17.6 – 23.5 Hz; β3 = 23.6 – 31.5 Hz. The decision to select
these eight bands is mainly based on recent findings relating some of the
bands to different mental processes. In several studies using the event-related
 Brain, Behavior, and Cognition 217

desynchronization (ERD) method, Klimesch and his colleagues found that

theta synchronization and desynchronization in the lower alpha band were
associated with episodic memory tasks and attentional demands of the tasks
(Klimesch et al., 1997). On the other hand, semantic memory tasks showed
significant alpha desynchronization only in the upper alpha band (Klimesch,
Schimke, & Pfurtscheller, 1993). Some studies (Traub et al., 1999; Stein &
Petsche, 1995) have further associated neuronal oscillations within the EEG
beta and gamma bands (15–80 Hz) with intense mental activity and percep-
tion – the so-called binding phenomenon (the selection and binding together
of pertinent aspects of a sensory stimulus into a perceived whole). The major-
ity of analyses reported focus on measures in the alpha band (7.5–13 Hz).
Evidence indicates that alpha power is inversely related to mental effort (e.g.,
Nunez, 1995).
According to Petsche (1997), a more suitable indicator of brain functioning
than measures based on the magnitude of EEG is coherence, the normalized
cross-correlation that provides information about the cooperation between
various brain areas. Looking for functional relations between brain regions
rather than for localized power measures is useful because of the basic struc-
ture of the cortex.
Yet another measure using a recording technique similar to the ongoing
EEG are average evoked potentials (AEP), also called event-related potentials
(ERP). ERPs consist of a brief change in EEG signal in response to a sensory
stimulus. The changes are small and hard to see in the background of EEG
activity. Therefore, sensory stimuli are given repeatedly and the brain activity
is averaged. Major interest has been devoted to so-called late components in
ERPs, namely, those that occur 100 ms after the stimulus onset (Detterman,
1994). Furthermore, the ERP to a stimulus can be segmented into a sequence
of transient topographic patterns, also referred to as microstates. Similar to
the interpretation of ERP waveform components, microstates are thought to
reflect synchronized activity in functionally interconnected neural networks.
These networks correspond to different global stages in information process-
ing (Michel et al., 2001 for a review).
Some more recent methods for analyzing the EEG signal are low-­resolution
brain electromagnetic tomography (LORETA) (Pascual-Marqui, Michel,
& Lehmann, 1994) and dynamic causal modeling (DCM) (Friston, 2003).
LORETA is a functional imaging method based on electrophysiological and
neuroanatomical constraints. For instance, the cortex can be modeled as a
collection of volume elements (voxels) in the digitized Talairach atlas. In
this case, the LORETA inverse solution (which is consistent with the EEG/
MEG measurements) corresponds to the 3D distribution of electric neuronal
218 Jaušovec & Jaušovec

activity that shows maximum similarity (i.e., maximum synchronization) in

terms of orientation and strength between neighboring neuronal populations
(represented by adjacent voxels). The cortical surface can be modeled, also,
as a collection of surface elements with known orientation. LORETA can
accommodate this neuroanatomical constraint and find the inverse solution
that maximizes only the synchronization of strength between neighboring
neuronal populations.
In DCM, one views the brain as a dynamic network of interacting sources
that produces observable responses. The aim is to make inferences about
the coupling among brain regions or sources and how that coupling is influ-
enced by experimental factors. DCM uses the notion of effective connectiv-
ity, defined as the influence one neuronal system exerts over another. DCMs
can be phenomenological or biophysical. Biophysical DCMs are constrained
by the known physical or biological processes generating the observed sig-
nals. In contrast, phenomenological DCMs describe the causal dynamics in
a purely formal fashion. DCM is not an exploratory technique; it does not
explore all possible models: DCM tests specific models of connectivity and,
through model selection, can provide evidence in favor of one model relative
to others.
The major benefits of using EEG and ERPs are that the approach is non-
invasive, it can be used with alert subjects, and it provides the best tempo-
ral resolution between behavior and brain activity. The central problem with
EEG, however, is that it “is a composite signal from volume conduction in
many different parts of the brain, and it is far from clear what a signal means
in terms of how neurons in the relevant networks are behaving” (Sejnovski &
Churchland, 1989, p. 332).
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission
tomography (PET) can reveal active brain areas. PET takes advantage of the
unique characteristic of positron-emitting radio topes (Metter & Hanson,
1994). During the uptake period given by the half-life of the isotope, the sub-
ject works on a task given by the experimenter. Then the subject is placed in
a ring of sensors that measure the by-products of the decay of the radioactive
isotopes. The idea is that areas of the brain that are active will use more glu-
cose, and hence become more radioactive than less active brain areas. The
data are accumulated for the entire brain by sections or slices. MRI produces
a picture of any structure showing differences in tissue density. It is based on
the principle that hydrogen atoms behave similar to spinning bar magnets in
the presence of a magnetic field. When the magnetic field is turned off and
a pulse of radiation is beamed across the atoms, they emit detectable radio
waves that are characteristic of their density and chemical environment. MRI
 Brain, Behavior, and Cognition 219

can be used to assess task related changes in blood oxygenation, which yields
an fMRI (Binder & Rao, 1994).
In recent years, fMRI has become the method of choice because it has excel-
lent spatial resolution and subjects are not exposed to radiation. However, a
major problem derives from the so-called subtraction technique that is used
for determining areas of high activity for a particular task. Numerous t-tests
are performed to identify significant differences in the pixels of a pair of
images. If the significance levels are not adjusted to compensate for the num-
ber of tests performed, errors of statistical inference could occur. Another
problem is that fMRI, and especially PET, are rather expensive techniques that
restrict the sample size to less than 10 per group, thus rendering questionable
the reliability of statistical inferences made. Further, the low temporal resolu-
tion of PET and fMRI is inappropriate for investigating brain activity during
the solution of simple tasks, when the involved cognitive processes are in the
range of milliseconds (Wirth et al., 2007).
Another brain imaging technique is near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS),
an optical technique that can noninvasively measure changes in the state of
hemoglobin oxygenation in the human brain. NIRS is based on the principle
that near-infrared light is absorbed by oxygenated (oxyHb) and deoxygen-
ated hemoglobin (deoxyHb) but not so much by other tissues. When a certain
brain region becomes activated, oxyHb increases due to the dilation of the
blood vessels and the acceleration of cerebral blood velocity. Simultaneously,
deoxyHb decreases because the increase in cerebral blood volume is larger
than that of the oxygen consumption in the activated region. Although the
spatial resolution of NIRS is inferior to those of other functional neuroimag-
ing methodologies such as PET and fMRI, NIRS has a high time resolution
of less than 0.01 s, and subjects can be scanned under natural conditions.
The recent trend in neuroimaging consists in combining methods with high
temporal resolution such as EEG or MEG and those having high spatial res-
olution such as fMRI.

Ability
The goal of understanding the relationship between brain activity and ability
is fairly old. Almost two centuries ago, Gall (1825) claimed that gross anatom-
ical features of the brain are related to personality traits, such as wit, causality,
self-esteem, and many others. These phrenological inquiries gradually gave
way to eloquent studies of brain-ability relationships. Since Pavlov (1949),
brain function is understood to consist of distributed interactions between
cortical regions united to perform a common cognitive task. This approach
220 Jaušovec & Jaušovec

provides the conceptual framework that is the basis for most modern neu-
roimaging studies of intelligence, problem solving, and reasoning (Jung &
Haier, 2007).

Intelligence
Intelligence represents the individual’s overall level of intellectual ability. It
serves as a general concept that includes several groups of mental abilities.
One of the most influential divisions of intelligence splits it into verbal, per-
formance, and social intelligence (Thorndike, 1920). In recent years, the term
“social intelligence” has been replaced largely by emotional intelligence – the
ability to recognize emotion, reason with emotion and emotion-related infor-
mation, and process emotional information as part of general problem solv-
ing (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000). Neurophysiological research has been
mainly interested in the verbal and performance components of intelligence
(Haier & Benbow, 1995; Jaušovec, 1996; Lutzenberger et al., 1992; Neubauer,
Freudenthaler, & Pfurtscheller, 1995) and only recently has paid some atten-
tion to emotional intelligence (Jaušovec & Jaušovec, 2004a, 2005; Jaušovec,
Jaušovec, & Gerlič, 2001). Most of these studies demonstrated a negative cor-
relation between brain activity under cognitive load and intelligence. These
findings were explained by means of the efficiency theory. Efficiency may
derive from the non-use of many brain areas irrelevant for good task per-
formance as well as from the more focused use of specific task-relevant areas
in highly intelligent individuals. It has even been suggested that individuals
with high and low intelligence preferentially activate different neural circuits
even when no reasoning or problem solving were required (Haier, White, &
Alkire, 2003). Some studies showed a specific topographic pattern of differ-
ences related to the level of intelligence. High-ability subjects made relatively
greater use of parietal regions, whereas low-ability subjects relied more exclu-
sively on frontal regions (Gevins & Smith, 2000; Jaušovec & Jaušovec, 2004a).
More generally, these results suggest that higher-ability subjects tend to better
identify strategies needed for the solution of the task at hand. It was further
reported that individuals with high intelligence displayed more brain activ-
ity in the early stages of task performance; those with average intelligence
showed a reverse pattern. This temporal distribution of brain activity suggests
that cognitive processes are faster in highly intelligent individuals than in
those with average intelligence (Jaušovec & Jaušovec, 2004b).
A second line of research focuses on structural correlates of human intelli-
gence, attempting to answer the question: “Where in the brain is intelligence
located?” This body of research has recently been synthesized by Jung and
 Brain, Behavior, and Cognition 221

Haier (2007) in the form of their so-called parieto-frontal integration (P-FIT)

model of intelligence. In reviewing 37 neuroimaging studies, referring mostly
to structural correlates of intelligence, they tried to answer the question of
how the anatomical aspects of gray matter and white matter relate topograph-
ically to intelligence. In greater detail, the P-FIT model can be summarized
as follows:
• Humans gather and process cognitively salient information predominantly
through auditory and/or visual means; therefore, particular brain regions
within the temporal and occipital lobes are critical for early processing of
sensory information.
• This basic sensory/perceptual processing is then fed forward to the pari-
etal cortex, wherein structural symbolism, abstraction, and elaboration
emerge.
• The parietal cortex interacts with frontal regions that serve to test various
solutions to a given problem. Once the best solution is reached, the ante-
rior cingulate is engaged to constrain response selection as well as inhibit
other competing responses.
• This process is dependent upon the fidelity of underlying white matter nec-
essary to facilitate rapid and error-free transmission of data from posterior
to frontal brain regions.

Emotional Intelligence
Only recently has neurophysiological research paid some attention to emo-
tional intelligence. In our lab, we have conducted several studies investigat-
ing mainly individual differences in brain functioning related to the level of
emotional intelligence.
In our first two studies (Jaušovec et al., 2001; Jaušovec & Jaušovec, 2005),
we compared high and average to below-average emotionally intelligent stu-
dents when they were solving items from an emotional intelligence test. In
this task, the respondents had to mentally determine how much each feeling
(happiness, sadness, fear, surprise, etc.) is expressed by the presented face or
picture. In both studies, respondents in the alpha band displayed brain activ-
ity patterns that were in line with the neural efficiency theory. Similar find-
ings were also reported by Freudenthaler, Fink, and Neubauer (2006). On the
other hand, the pattern of ERD/ERS in the induced gamma band (Jaušovec &
Jaušovec, 2005) was contrary to what would be predicted by the neural effi-
ciency theory: the subjects high in emotional intelligence displayed induced
gamma band ERS; those of average emotional intelligence displayed induced
222 Jaušovec & Jaušovec

gamma band ERD. The difference increased from stimulus onset until 4000
ms. A possible explanation for the findings could be that the individuals high
in emotional intelligence identified emotions in faces by relying more on fig-
ural and less on semantic information provided by the displayed pictures.
This would account for the increased ERS in the induced gamma band and
the decreased ERD in the induced upper alpha band manifested by the group
high in emotional intelligence. It could be hypothesized that the group aver-
age in emotional intelligence would apply a reverse strategy – being more
semantically and less figurally oriented.

Creativity
Researchers investigating the relationship between creativity and brain func-
tion have been most attracted by hemisphericity. From a theoretical point
of view, this is a reasonable inference. Several authors have recognized the
importance of conceiving two or more opposites for the creative process.
Rothenberg (1983) used the term “Janusian process” to denote the simul-
taneous conceptualization of opposite or antithetical ideas; Koestler (1967)
proposed the term “bisociation,” which describes the creative process as an
act of combining unrelated structures, separate ideas, facts, and frames of
perception within a single brain. Therefore, two hemispheres representing
two distinct modes of cognitive processing seemed the ideal neurological
explanation of creativity. Still another characteristic in the creative process –
the phases of incubation and illumination, where attention to the problem is
defocused and later followed by the spontaneous appearance of solutions to
problems – gave rise to speculations that creativity is related to the nonspeak-
ing right hemisphere.
Two concepts relating creativity to hemisphericity were proposed.
According to the first, creativity was regarded mainly as a right-hemispheric
process (Gowan, 1979); according to the second, as an alternation between
left- and right-hemisphere modes of processing (Bogen & Bogen, 1969;
Torrance, 1982). Moderate research support exists for the relationship between
hemisphericity and creativity. Martindale and colleagues (1984) found that
the relationship between creativity and right-hemispheric activation is not
a general one. A difference between more and less creative respondents was
observed during creative production, but not during basal recordings or dur-
ing a reading task.
Recently, the idea of a right-hemisphere advantage in highly gifted indi-
viduals has gained new theoretical support. Giftedness is seen as a kind of
left-hemisphere pathology. This speculation is supported by several research
 Brain, Behavior, and Cognition 223

findings and opinions. Gazzaniga (1985) explained individual differences in

intelligence by means of the negative environmental influence on our brain.
Cranberg and Albert (1988) argued that there are three characteristics shared
by gifted chess players such as Fischer and Capablanca, composers such as
Mozart and Rossini, and mathematicians such as Gauss. First, all of them had
profound, original insights as preadolescents; second, all three domains –
chess, music, and mathematics – are dominated by males; and third all
three domains involve highly nonverbal capacities. The hormonal theory of
Geschwind (Geschwind & Galaburda, 1987) could account for some of the
characteristics displayed by gifted individuals. According to this theory, the
presence of intrauterine testosterone produced by the developing male fetus
slows the development of the left hemisphere, which leads to compensatory
enhanced development of the right hemisphere. In females, no such compen-
satory process is necessary. In a series of experiments, Benbow (1986, 1988)
established a link between extreme intellectual precocity and left-handedness,
immune disorders, and myopia, each of which may be considered a by-product
of advantaged right-hemispheric development. In an EEG study, these find-
ings could be only partly replicated (O’Boyle, Alexander, & Benbow, 1991).
At baseline, the left hemisphere of the mathematically gifted group was more
active, and not the right, as predicted. During mental activity on a nonver-
bal task, a significant reduction of alpha power over the right hemisphere
was found in the mathematically gifted group; no such alpha suppression was
found in the group of average individuals. On the verbal task, no significant
difference in alpha suppression between the two groups of individuals was
found. Similar findings were reported by O’Boyle, Benbow, and Alexander
(1995) and Jaušovec (1997).
Valuable insights about possible brain correlates of creative thinking have
been revealed by recent EEG studies that contrasted brain activity patterns
during convergent versus divergent modes of thinking. Mölle et al. (1999)
reported higher EEG complexity during the performance of more free-
associative types of tasks, which could be the result of a larger number of
independently oscillating neural assemblies during this type of thinking.
Similarly, Jaušovec and Jaušovec (2000) as well as Razoumnikova (2000)
reported findings that also indicate that convergent and divergent thinking
are accompanied by different activity patterns in the EEG. Taken together,
neuroscientific studies on creativity have shown that EEG activity in the
alpha frequency band was particularly sensitive to creativity-related task
demands (e.g., Bechtereva et al., 2004; Fink et al., 2007; Jaušovec & Jaušovec,
2000; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Razoumnikova, 2007). In general, a higher
level of alpha synchronization was observed in individuals high in creativity
224 Jaušovec & Jaušovec

as compared to less creative individuals. A similar pattern of neuroelectric

activity was observed during the production of more original ideas, which
corresponds to the subjective experience of insight or “a-ha.”

Learning
The best currently accepted idea about how information is stored in the ner-
vous system is based on the concept of the cell assembly, and what is now
called the Hebb synapse (Hebb, 1949). The Hebb synapse is a model synapse
with a rule that simultaneous presynaptic and postsynaptic activity increases
synaptic efficacy. The cell assembly is a sort of irregular three-dimensional
net of units connected to each other in a closed loop that reactivates itself
repeatedly. This recurrent connectivity and reverbatory activity keeps the cell
assembly active, allowing a newly formed assembly to retain information.
Therefore, cell assemblies are acquired, dependent on learning and develop-
mental experience. They are stored in a distributive way in the cerebral cor-
tex, and are built from neural building-blocks processes, described in Hebb’s
neurophysiological postulate. Hebb synapses generate cell assemblies. At a
superordinate level, in line with Hebb’s hierarchical scheme, cell assemblies
can be linked together associatively to form phase sequences. These consti-
tute the neural bases for higher-order percepts and concepts – the brain’s real-
ization of thoughts. Changes in the synapses resulting from the simultaneous
(or near-simultaneous) activation of the neurons that form them is generally
thought to be the basis for all changes in behavior due to experiences, includ-
ing those that involve learning. Hebb’s (1949) notion of the cell assembly was
based on evidence suggesting that memory is a time-dependent process, so
that it can be influenced in different stages. Priming refers to the facilitative
effect of performing one task on the subsequent performance of the same or
similar tasks; whereas consolidation refers to the post-training period during
which the hypothesized process of synaptic change occurs and transforms
from a labile state into a more permanent one. There is also evidence that
certain post-training treatments can modulate memory storage in a way that
enhances retention.
A recent study in our lab investigated the impact of Mozart’s music on
brain activity in the process of learning – priming and memory consolidation
(Jaušovec, Jaušovec, and Gerlič, 2006). It was shown that music had a benefi-
cial influence on both learning stages; however, physiological differences in
EEG patterns were observed only in groups that had been exposed to Mozart’s
music prior to and after learning. The displayed pattern of brain activity was
lower alpha and gamma-approximated entropy, which is a measure of low
 Brain, Behavior, and Cognition 225

deterministic chaos, more alpha and gamma-band-event related to synchro-

nization. The respondents who listened to Mozart’s music prior to and after
learning manifested a pattern of brain activity similar to that reported in
studies investigating neurophysiological differences in brain activity related
to verbal and performance components of intelligence. A similar finding was
reported by Haier and colleagues (1992). A PET study revealed a decrease in
glucose metabolic rate in a group of respondents after learning the computer
game Tetris.
The concept of plasticity – both neural and cognitive – lies at the heart of
learning across the lifespan. Plasticity of the nervous system denotes develop-
mental changes in synaptic density and pruning, and plays the key role in cell
loss and the growth and myelination of white matter. It allows for learning
and environmental adaptation, and is greatest in childhood (Craik, 2006).
One of many interesting points is the fact that synaptic density peaks in the
frontal cortex at the age of four years. Notably, Tulving (2005) suggested that
true episodic memory and self-awareness do not develop until that same age.
However, there is also evidence that there is some plasticity and fine-tuning
that continue across the lifespan. Maguire et al. (2000) found that in London
taxi drivers, the posterior region of the hippocampus is much larger than in
the rest of population, whereas the front region is much smaller. One impor-
tant role of the hippocampus is to facilitate spatial memory in the form of
navigation. There is also preliminary evidence that extensive practice of intel-
lectual skills is associated with higher performance on some cognitive tasks.
For example, Bialystok et al. (2004) showed that lifelong bilinguals display an
advantage over monolinguals on simple tasks requiring inhibitory control.
Such differences could point to anatomical change in a healthy adult brain
due to learning.

Personality
Hans Eysenck and Jeffrey Gray have been among the foremost exponents of
the hypothesis that personality traits provide a window on individual dif-
ferences in brain functioning. Eysenck (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985) identified
two key components of his conceptual nervous system: reticulo-cortical and
reticulo-limbic circuits. The reticulo-cortical circuit controls the cortical
arousal generated by incoming stimuli, whereas the reticulo-limbic circuit
controls response to emotional stimuli. Extraversion-introversion (E) relates
to arousability of the reticulo-cortical circuit, so that introverts are typically
more aroused than extraverts. However, methodological analyses of extra-
version studies (Gale, 1973) have illuminated two basic problems for testing
226 Jaušovec & Jaušovec

this theory. The first problem is that people actively seek a moderate level
of arousal; therefore, the relationship between extraversion and arousal may
also reflect individual differences in strategies for seeking or avoiding stimu-
lation. Second, according to Eysenck (1994), increasing stimulation provokes
increasing central nervous system reactivity until an optimal point is reached,
beyond which inhibition and decreasing reactivity set in. Hence, introverts
may have an arousal level higher, lower, or equal to that of extraverts, due to
complex interactions of personality type and environmental manipulation.
Neuroticism (N) was explained in terms of activation thresholds in the
sympathetic nervous system or visceral brain (the limbic system). Individuals
with higher scores in neuroticism had greater activation levels and lower
thresholds within subcortical structures (Eysenck, 1990)
There exist several reviews of the relationship between raw EEG measures
and E (Gale, 1983; O’Gorman, 1984; Zuckerman et al., 1991; Eysenck, 1994;
Matthews & Gilliland, 1999). According to Gale, several studies supported
the hypothesis that introverts are higher in cortical arousal than extraverts.
However, a similar number of studies found no differences, and three stud-
ies found results that contradicted the theory. Gale argued that moderate
arousal-inducing environments were the most amenable to testing the pre-
dictions of Eysenck’s theory. Low arousal-inducing environments resulted in
paradoxical arousal, especially in extraverts; high arousal-inducing environ-
ments (e.g., task-performance demands) resulted in possible over-arousal,
again especially in extraverts. Several recent studies (Fink, Schrausser, &
Neubauer, 2002; Fink & Neubauer, 2004) lend some support to Gale’s the-
ory. On the other hand, Matthews and Gilliland (1999) and Zuckerman
et al. (1991) have been less enthusiastic about the level of support that previ-
ous EEG studies provided for the cortical arousal hypothesis of extraversion.
Yet, Zuckerman et al. (1991) pointed out that studies using female subjects or
equal numbers of both genders seem more often to support Eysenck’s theory
than those relying on male subjects.
There have been a few more recent studies that are noteworthy in this con-
text. Matthews and Amelang (1993) reported significant correlations between
personality and EEG measures that were low in magnitude (i.e., not exceed-
ing 0.20) but on the whole matched expectations. Smith et al. (1995) reported
that introverts were generally found to produce lower levels of alpha activity
reflecting higher levels of arousal, showing a hemisphere by gender interac-
tion effect. Schmidtke and Heller (2004) found that neuroticism was associ-
ated with greater relative right posterior activity, whereas predicted effects for
neuroticism with frontal regions and extraversion with brain activity were
not significant. Gale et al. (2001) found that extraverts were less cortically
 Brain, Behavior, and Cognition 227

aroused than introverts, and that neuroticism was associated with larger left
versus right hemisphere differences in alpha-wave activity related to mood.
Tran, Craig, and McIsaac (2001) showed extraverted persons to be at least
three times more likely to have larger peak amplitudes in frontal alpha-wave
activity. However, they found no association between extraversion and alpha
activity in posterior regions, and no alpha-wave activity differences were
found between those with high and low anxiety levels.
Gray’s personality theory began as a modification of Eysenck’s theory, but
is now usually seen as an alternative theory (Gray, 1991). Gray has proposed
two major neurological systems: the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) and
the behavioral activation system (BAS). The BIS is sensitive to signals of pun-
ishment and frustrating non-reward promoting avoidance behavior, whereas
the BAS is sensitive to signals of reward and matches approach behavior.
These two brain systems underlie the personality dimensions of anxiety
(neurotic introversion) and impulsiveness (neurotic extraversion). Research
by Knyazev (Knyazev, Slobodskaya, & Wilson, 2002; Knyazev et al., 2003)
revealed that BAS was positively related to delta and negatively to alpha power
measures, whereas the BIS showed an opposite pattern of correlations. These
findings suggest higher arousal in subjects high on BIS and neuroticism, and
lower arousal in subjects high on BAS and extraversion.
From a psychometric perspective, there has been a growing acceptance of a
five-factor model of personality (FFM), incorporating two of Eysenck’s dimen-
sions, E and N, together with Openness to Experience (O), Agreeableness
(A), and Conscientiousness (C). Despite the growing acceptance of the FFM
of personality, there have been very few studies that examined the biologi-
cal basis of O, A, and C. In a preliminary study, Stough (Stough et al., 2001)
showed that individuals with higher scores in O tend to have a greater amount
of theta production. Because theta activity decreases with age, the interpre-
tation of the authors was that respondents high on O may have retained a
somewhat childlike wonderment and open-mindedness about their world,
coupled with a willingness to explore alternative views about issues. In a
recent large-scale study, Tran and colleagues (Tran et al., 2006) found only
mild significant correlations in the delta and theta band with E and C, and
few associations between personality and faster frequency bands.

Gender Differences
Gender-based differences in performance have been reported for complex and
simple cognitive tasks. Probably one of the first written accounts for female
superiority in verbal ability is found in an ancient Sanskrit book, suggesting
228 Jaušovec & Jaušovec

that nine shares of talk were given to women and one to men (Nyborg, 1994).
However, more recent systematic analyses suggest that females surpass males
in some but not necessarily all domains of verbal ability (Halpern, 2004).
Specifically, women seem to have an advantage in episodic memory tasks
where verbal processing is required or can be used as well as in verbal fluency
(Maitland et al., 2004). Further, it was found that females surpass males in
tests of emotional intelligence (Mayer et al., 2000; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso,
2002). It is also proposed that in selective attention tasks, female subjects’
processing entails more detailed elaboration of information content than
that of males (Myers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1991), and that female subjects
are more efficient in recognizing faces and facial expressions (Hampson, van
Anders, & Mullin, 2005). Female superiority in perceptual speed – namely,
the ability to rapidly absorb the details of a visual stimulus – has been recog-
nized since the 1940s (e.g., Kimura, 1999). On the other hand, men typically
demonstrate a distinct advantage in a broad range of visual tasks, including
visual-spatial orientation. A meta-analysis of studies published prior to 1973
found an average difference of about one-half of a standard deviation in favor
of males on tests of visuospatial ability (Hyde, 1981). Factor analytic studies
showed that spatial ability is not a unitary process, and can be divided into
three categories: spatial perception, mental rotation, and spatial visualiza-
tion (Linn & Peterson, 1985). Most pronounced gender differences of nearly
one standard deviation have been reported mainly for mental rotation tasks
(Mackintosh & Bennett, 2005).
Differences in brain activity between the genders have been observed
when respondents were solving complex and simple cognitive tasks. Some
recent EEG studies relating intelligence with brain activity under cognitive
load showed that when males are engaged in solving numerical and figural
tasks, they are more likely to produce cortical activation patterns that are
in line with the neural efficiency hypothesis (e.g., less activation in brighter
individuals), whereas in females, for the same tasks no significant differences
were reported (Neubauer, Fink, & Schrausser, 2002; Neubauer et al., 2005).
Similar gender-related differences as those reported for intelligence could also
be observed in regard to creative problem solving (Fink & Neubauer, 2006)
and emotional intelligence (Jaušovec & Jaušovec, 2008). Perhaps the most
important finding of these studies was that the inverse intelligence-activation
relationship (i.e., neural efficiency) appears to be moderated by task content
and the individuals’ gender. Males and females displayed the expected inverse
IQ–activation relationship in precisely that domain in which they usually
perform better: females in the verbal and emotional-intelligence domain and
males in the visuospatial-ability domain.
 Brain, Behavior, and Cognition 229

Further empirical evidence favoring gender differences in physiologi-

cal parameters of cortical activation in the course of solving more complex
tasks also comes from PET, fMRI, and functional near-infrared spectroscopy
(fNIRS). It was found that for figural tasks, males show significantly stronger
parietal activation and females show significantly greater frontal activation
(Weiss et al., 2003). A similar greater left-frontal brain activation in females
than in men was observed in relation to verbal-intelligence scores (Pfleiderer
et al., 2004). Nyberg, Habib, and Herlitz (2000) found gender differences in
brain activation during memory retrieval; Haier and Benbow (1995) reported
a positive relationship in glucose metabolic rate in temporal-lobe regions
and mathematical reasoning ability only in men. A similar finding was also
reported by Mansour, Haier, and Buchsbaum (1996). In a recent NIRS study
(Kameyama et al., 2004), higher O2Hb during a verbal fluency task was
observed for males as compared to females.
Gender-related differences employing the ERP methodology were inves-
tigated mainly for the P1-N1 complex and the P3 component. Numerous
studies indicate that the P1-N1 complex reflects sensory and early attention
processes (Luck & Girelli, 1999). There is some evidence that the P1 amplitude
is associated with the suppression of irrelevant information, and the N1 with
the processing of the attended relevant information. Thus, it was suggested
that the P1 reflects inhibitory and the N1 excitatory processes (Klimesch
et al., 2004, for review). The P3 represents the last phase in the identification
of a relevant stimulus caused by its significance or the requirements of the
task. As stressed by Kok (2001), the P3 amplitude is a reflection of the degree
of matching between the presented stimulus and the internal representation
of the stimulus relevant for the task.
Several studies demonstrated mixed gender-related effects on visually-
and auditory-evoked potentials. Some found lower amplitudes in males or
shorter latencies in females for early ERP components (Ehlers et al., 2001);
others found both increased amplitude and decreased latency for the early
components of the female ERP (Chu, 1987) or no gender-related differences
in the early ERP latencies and amplitudes (Wirth et al., 2007; Roalf, Lowery,
& Turetsky, 2006); and still others reported increased amplitudes in men
(Vaquero et al., 2004) or increased amplitudes in women (Gootjes, 2007).
Using both visual and auditory oddball tasks, Hoffman and Polich (1999)
found that females have a larger P3 component than males. Findings pointing
in the same direction were reported for semantic tasks (Wirth et al., 2007);
for Kanji characters (Shen, 2005); for visual stimuli (Steffensen, 2008) and
olfactory stimuli (Olofsson & Nardin, 2004). However, some studies contra-
dict these findings by showing that there is no significant difference between
230 Jaušovec & Jaušovec

male and female auditory P3 (Polich, 1986) or visual and auditory P3 (Shelton,
Hartmann, & Allen, 2002). Still others reported that males have larger P3
amplitudes for spatial-attention tasks (Vaquero et al., 2004). A possible expla-
nation for the diversity of the obtained results could be a methodological
one (e.g., differences in tasks, type of responses required, time windows used,
etc.). However, to our mind, the main shortcoming of the reported studies
is that they did not control for possible differences in ability that might have
biased the results. Research has shown that peak latencies as well as ampli-
tudes correlate with IQ (e.g., Jaušovec & Jaušovec, 2000).
Recently, gender-related differences were reported also for the gamma
response of the brain (Karakaş et al., 2006, Jaušovec & Jaušovec, 2009). There
are two basic types of event-related gamma responses: late and early. The late
gamma occurs in the 130–400 ms poststimulus time window, has an induced
character, and is of special relevance in pattern perception or higher-order
recognition processes (Karakaş & Başar, 1998). The early gamma response
occurs within 150 ms poststimulus and is time locked to the stimulus. It is
related to sensory processing and is basically a phenomenon of the sensory
register (Karakaş et al., 2001). To our knowledge, there are only two stud-
ies that have investigated the gamma response in relation to gender. Karakaş
and colleagues (2006) found no significant gender-related difference in the
amplitude of the evoked-gamma response for an auditory oddball task. On
the other hand, Jaušovec and Jaušovec (2009) found significant gender-
related differences, which were only observed in the amplitudes of the early
evoked-gamma response and the P3 component. Women displayed higher
amplitudes than men. A second finding was that these differences were
more pronounced for the visual than for the auditory stimuli. The NIRS data
showed that males displayed a higher percentage of StO2 in their frontal brain
areas than females; and males also showed a higher increase in percent of
StO2 during task performance as compared with the resting condition. Taken
all together, the results suggest that the females’ visual event-categorization
process is more efficient than males’.

Some Concluding Remarks

Research into the brain-cognition relationship is characterized by mountains
of data and weak theories. The theories are of rather low generality and explain
only specific relationships. For instance, the efficiency theory explains only
the brain-ability relationship; further, the explanation is adequate only when
problem-solving tasks as opposed to memory tasks are involved. In addition,
it has a gender-by-task bias. The fact that intelligence tests represent from a
 Brain, Behavior, and Cognition 231

psychometric perspective the most reliable measures of human psychological

characteristics renders biological explanations of other psychological charac-
teristics, such as personality, even less promising.
Chapters in a book such as ours usually end with an optimistic prognosis,
pointing to some promising imaging or modeling techniques that will enable
a real breakthrough in understanding in the near future. In our opinion,
it is more likely that we will just continue collecting data in rather specific
domains of the brain-cognition-behavior relations. At first glance this may
seem disappointing, but given the complex structure of human cognition and
behavior, on the one hand, and the immense complexity of the neural system,
on the other hand, it remains, probably, the only feasible endeavor.

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 12

Physical Health and Cognition

Shulamith Kreitler, Kineret Weissler, & Frida Barak

Introduction
This chapter deals with the impact of physical health on cognition. There
are several lines of research and thinking that support the conception that
physical health may be an important factor affecting cognition. One line of
research is represented by the body of studies showing that good health in
adulthood manifested in longer life expectancy (Deary et al., 2004; Hart et al.,
2003; Kuh et al., 2003; Osler et al., 2003), low prevalence of cardio-vascular
disease (Batty et al., 2005), and low incidence of serious illness, at least in the
30–39 year age group (Martin et al., 2004), is associated with good mental
ability (intelligence) during childhood. Martin et al. (2004) calculated that a
lower level of serious disease by a third is correlated with a 15 points higher
IQ. Further correlational studies show that straightforward indicators of
health in early childhood, such as birth weight and height growth, are related
positively to cognitive function in childhood, adolescence, and early adult-
hood as well as to educational attainment (Richards et al., 2001, 2002). The
impact of physical state on cognition is however not limited to childhood.
Cognitive ability at 18–20 years is also related to coronary health in middle
age (Hemmingsson et al., 2007). Notably, early cognitive function is a major
predictor of cognitive function and its rate of change in midlife and beyond
as well as of educational and occupational attainment (McCall, 1979). One
explanation for these effects is that a variety of hormones target brain areas
responsible for cognition at the same time they are playing a critical role in
determining body size and physical health. The effect remains valid even if
the explanation that hinges on the intermediation of socioeconomic factors
proves to be correct (Gottfredson & Deary, 2001).
Another relevant line of research refers to the beneficial effects of aerobic
health and exercise on cognition. For example, when previously sedentary

238
 Physical Health and Cognition 239

adults 60–75 years old were randomly assigned to either aerobic (walking) or
anaerobic (stretching and toning) exercise for a period of six months, those
who received aerobic training manifested substantial improvements in per-
formance on tasks requiring executive control – such as planning, scheduling,
inhibition, and working memory – compared with anaerobically trained sub-
jects (Kramer et al., 1999). There are many further examples: physical exercise
at 36 years is associated with a slower decline in memory between 43 and 53
years (Richards, Hardy, & Wadsworth, 2003); and moderate physical activity
for 12 months improved the cognitive performance of elderly participants on
the Digit Symbol Substitution Test (DSST), Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test
(RAVLT), modified Stroop test, and Modified Mini-Mental State Examination
(Williamson et al., 2009). A review by Ploughman (2008) concludes that in
clinical studies, exercise increases brain volume in areas implicated in exec-
utive processing, improves cognition in children with cerebral palsy, and
enhances phonemic skill in school children with reading difficulty.
A third line of research focuses on the influence that fulfilling basic physi-
cal needs has on cognitive functioning. Major among these is adequate nutri-
tion and sleep. Thus, concerning nutrition, a recent review emphasized the
beneficial effects of bioflavonoids on memory (Spencer, Vauzour, & Rendeiro,
2009). Further, it was found that an overall index of diet quality was correlated
positively with overall cognitive performance. Observations over a follow-up
period of 11 years showed that consuming a diverse diet that includes a variety
of recommended foods may help to attenuate age-related cognitive decline
among the elderly (Wengreen et al., 2009). A large body of evidence shows
that sleep, too, plays an important role in learning, memory encoding, and
cognition. Insufficient quantity or quality of sleep leads not only to short-term
neurocognitive dysfunction but also to permanent changes to the central ner-
vous system (Malhotra & Desai, 2010).
The three types of examples introduced indicate that good or improved
physical state has beneficial effects on cognition. Evidence of this kind
enhances the importance of studying the effects of impaired physical health
on cognition. Indeed, it is surprising that physical health and cognition have
remained largely dissociated. If a study in cognition is reported in a journal,
it is expected of the investigators to mention impaired mental health, such
as schizophrenia of all or some of the participating subjects. However, it is
still not the habit to report how many of the participants suffer from elevated
blood pressure, gastrointestinal disorders, or diabetes, or for that matter
which medication they use on a habitual basis.
There may be several reasons for that. One could mention lack of infor-
mation about specific effects or general medical knowledge in researchers
240 Kreitler, Weissler, & Barak

of cognition. Other reasons could be unclarity of the medical findings (for

example, in regard to the impact of vitamins B6 or B12 on cognition, see
Vollset & Ueland, 2005) or unclarity of the kind of effects that need to be
considered (e.g., diseases or medication). Finally, perhaps the reason for leav-
ing out the physical effects is just the difficulty of embedding cognition in
the framework of the body. It is notable that even the recently fashionable
approach to cognition – embodied cognition – which emphasizes the central
role of the body in shaping cognition (Clark, 1998) deals with the effects of
actions and environment on thinking but does not reserve a special location
for the effects of physical health on cognition. The objective of this chapter
is to review evidence concerning the effects of physical health on cognition
so as to suggest reasonable guidelines for considering physical health in the
study of cognition.

Guidelines and Domains of Impact

The range of possible and proved effects of physical health on cognition is very
broad. Because a review of this type can at best be only selective, it should be
preceded by a set of guidelines defining the selection and major domains of
relevance to the theme. The first guideline is the need to distinguish between
the impact of diseases and the psychological effects of diseases. The latter
include emotional reactions – such as stress, anxiety, or depression evoked
by the disease and the related treatments – as well as coping mechanisms
applied in regard to the disease – such as denial or hopelessness and even
behavioral and lifestyle changes brought about by the disease. Each of these
kinds of reactions could affect cognition (Kreitler, 2005). Effects on cognition
of these kinds could be considered as distal or indirect effects of diseases on
cognition. The distinction between the diseases and their psychological distal
effects is important because the latter are subject to individual differences and
can also be treated and changed. As the mechanisms through which diseases
and the psychological effects impact cognition are different, it is likely that
the cognitive effects of these two factors are also different.
A second important guideline requires distinguishing between the impact
of the diseases and the medical treatments applied because of the diseases.
Thus, the effects of cancer and of the applied treatments such as chemother-
apy need to be dealt with separately. The reason is that the effects of the dis-
ease and the treatment are very different. Moreover, not all those who have
the disease may be undergoing the treatment. Additionally, the treatments
for the particular disease may undergo changes, as is, for example, evident in
regard to the treatments for cancer where biological treatments with different
side effects start displacing the older more toxic chemotherapeutic agents.
 Physical Health and Cognition 241

Concerning medical treatments, it should be emphasized that sometimes

they are administered as prevention with no evident symptoms of a disease
(e.g., use of aspirin).
A third important distinction should be drawn between acute and chronic
diseases. There is no doubt that acute states of disease such as acute pain or
infection affect cognition (Kreitler & Niv, 2007). However, it is unlikely that
cognitive tasks would be administered to individuals in acute states of disease
without considering their state or reporting it. Hence, it is evident that the
major emphasis of this chapter would be on the effects of chronic diseases.
A fourth distinction should be drawn between diseases that affect the
brain directly or preponderantly and other diseases. Evidently, some diseases
are first and foremost diseases that implicate the brain. These include brain
tumors; Huntington disease (which involves atrophy of certain forebrain
structures including the entire cerebral cortex, and even more notably, the
caudate nucleus and putamen); Alzheimer’s disease (which involves atrophy
of the cerebral cortex and some other forebrain regions in the frontal and
temporal lobes, whereby the insula and medial part of the temporal lobe tend
to demonstrate the highest number of neuritic plaques); stroke; dementia;
Parkinson’s disease; and epilepsy. In the case of diseases of this class, the cog-
nitive impairment forms part of the symptoms and signs of the disease. Thus,
recent memory loss, difficulties using or comprehending language, time,
and place disorientation, distractibility, poor judgment, and difficulties with
abstract thinking are considered symptoms of dementia (Merck Manuals).
Many other diseases have traditionally not been considered as diseases of
the brain, such as hepatitis C or chronic kidney disease. In the case of some
of the diseases in this class, recent scientific developments have detected their
effects on the brain. One example is diabetes, which was found to affect blood
flow and oxygen supply to the brain with the possible result of memory loss
(Motta et al., 1996). Because the cognitive effects of brain diseases are well-
known, the present chapter will be devoted mainly to chronic diseases whose
primary location is the body rather than the brain. Finally, in view of the
abundance of diseases and evidence about cognitive effects, the present chap-
ter can be expected only to present examples sampled from the large reservoir
of studies.

Cognitive Effects of various Diseases

Cardiovascular Disorders
Widespread cognitive deficits have been reported in individuals with cardiac
disease (Barclay et al., 1988; Moser et al., 1999). A review of studies from 1996
242 Kreitler, Weissler, & Barak

to 2006 showed that in a pooled sample of 2,937 heart-failure patients com-

pared with 14,848 control subjects, there was significant evidence for deficits
in global cognitive performance, memory scores, and psychomotor speed in
the patients (the odds ratio for cognitive impairment was 1:62 among subjects
with heart failure) (Vogels et al., 2006).
A body of studies showed that coronary heart disease is associated with a
worse performance in mental processes such as reasoning, vocabulary, and
verbal fluency and that the longer ago the heart disease had been diagnosed
the worse the person’s cognitive performance (Singh-Manoux et al., 2008). In
population studies, coronary heart disease (CHD) has been associated with
worse performance on both mental-status tests (Breteler et al., 1994; Elwood
et al., 2002) and measures of specific cognitive functions (Singh-Manoux,
Britton, & Marmot, 2003). Cognitively intact individuals with vascular dis-
eases were found to have verbal memory deficits (Rafnsson et al., 2007).
Individuals with peripheral arterial disease were found to have generalized
cognitive deficits (Phillips, Mate-Kole, & Kirby, 1993; Phillips, & Mate-Kole,
1997) as well as poorer performance on domain-specific cognitive measures
(Breteler et al., 1994; Elwood et al., 2002). Individuals with atrial fibrillation
were found to have a general cognitive impairment of only slight magnitude
(Puccio et al., 2009). Individuals who have undergone cardiac failure or arrest
scored significantly lower than controls on 14 of 19 cognitive tests, and 46 per-
cent of the heart-failure patients were rated as having mild to severe cogni-
tive impairment compared to 16 percent of mild impairment in controls. The
degree of cognitive impairment was closely related to the number of myo-
cardial infarctions experienced (Sauvé et al., 2009). Individuals with cardio-
vascular disease who were treated with drugs and stents showed increasing
deficits on tests of verbal memory, visual memory, visuoconstruction, lan-
guage, motor speed, psychomotor speed, attention, and executive function
when compared to heart-healthy people who had no known risk factors for
coronary artery disease (Selnes et al., 2009).
The impact on cognition of risk factors or correlates of cardiovascular
disorders has also been studied. Thus, homocysteine was consistently and
strongly associated with worse neurobehavioral test performance in a vari-
ety of domains, especially in the domains of simple motor and psychomo-
tor speed, eye-hand coordination/manual dexterity, and verbal memory
and learning (Schafer et al., 2005). The findings concerning total cholesterol
are less consistent. Some studies found that high total cholesterol in midlife
was associated with poorer late-life episodic memory and category fluency
(Solomon et al., 2009); other studies found that lower cholesterol levels, either
natural or statin induced, were related to lower verbal memory, attention/
 Physical Health and Cognition 243

concentration, abstract reasoning, and a composite score measuring multiple

cognitive domains (e.g., Elias et al., 2005).
Also, elevated blood pressure exerts effects on cognition (Elias et al., 1993;
Waldstein, & Katzel, 2001). A review of 96 papers showed that as compared with
the common cardiovascular risk factors, hypertension had the strongest delete-
rious effect on cognition (Hendrie et al., 2006). In older adults (above 60), those
with high blood pressure tended to perform more poorly on cognitive tasks,
especially those involving inductive reasoning, and thus the ability to work flex-
ibly with unfamiliar information and find solutions (Gamaldo, Weatherbee, &
Allaire, 2008). The impact of elevated blood pressure on cognition is related
mainly to diastolic blood pressure (Tsivgoulis et al., 2009) and is particularly
salient in middle-aged individuals (40–59 years) (Madden et al., 2003).

Diabetes
It has long been observed that diabetes mellitus is associated with an increased
rate of cognitive decline (Allen, Frier, & Strachan, 2004), which was attrib-
uted to chronic hypoglycemia, vascular disease, cumulative effect of hypo-
glycemic events, and possible direct effects of insulin on the brain (Biessels
et al., 2002) as well as insulin dysregulation (Craft & Watson, 2004). The
broad range of cognitive functions that have been studied in individuals with
type 2 diabetes include memory, psychomotor speed, visuospatial functions,
frontal executive functions, processing speed, verbal fluency, attention, and
complex motor functions. A comprehensive review of literature on the asso-
ciation between impaired glucose tolerance, type 2 diabetes, and cognitive
function showed that the most consistently reported measures were impair-
ment in verbal memory and processing speed, with preservation of functions
in other areas including visuospatial function, attention, semantic memory,
and language (Awad, Gagnon, & Messier, 2004). The preservation of memory
and learning functions occurred mainly in subjects younger than 65 years of
age, in contrast to older subjects where impairments in those domains were
largely because of interaction between diabetes-related changes and the nor-
mal ageing changes in the brain (Ryan & Geckle, 2000). Younger subjects
with type 2 diabetes mellitus consistently showed impairment in psychomo-
tor efficiency, similar to subjects with type 1 diabetes. Impairments in work-
ing memory, frontal executive functions, learning, and complex psychomotor
abilities have also been found to be associated with a higher level of HbA1c
(Munshi et al., 2006). Further, it was shown that poor glucose control and a
rise in average blood sugar are strongly associated with poorer functioning
abilities, especially poorer memory function (Cukierman-Yaffe et al., 2009).
244 Kreitler, Weissler, & Barak

Gastrointestinal Disorders
Helicobacter pylori is a bacterium that can inhabit various areas of the stom-
ach and duodenum and causes a chronic low-level inflammation of the
stomach lining that is strongly linked to the development of duodenal and
gastric ulcers. It was found that the prevalence of this bacterium is higher
in individuals who exhibit symptoms of mild cognitive impairment than in
those who do not (Kountras et al., 2007). In individuals diagnosed with celiac
disease, cognitive impairment was found in the form of amnesia, acalculia,
confusion, and a score on the Short Test of Mental Status indicating moder-
ate impairment (Hu et al., 2006). Findings of a different order were reported
for individuals diagnosed with irritable bowel syndrome. They were found to
exhibit global hypersensitivity to a broad range of stimuli (Lawal et al., 2006),
manifested for example in a word-association task in which they recognized
words representing symptoms and affects, both positive and negative, more
quickly than others (Posserud et al., 2009).

Hematological Disorders
Anemia is a common hematological symptom, prevalent in a broad range
of physical disorders. There is a lot of evidence that anemia is related to cog-
nitive impairment. For example, elderly individuals (above 65) with anemia
score low (<7) on the Abbreviated Mental Test (Zamboni et al., 2006) or the
Mini Mental State Examination even with mild anemia (Argyriadou et al.,
2001). Cancer patients undergoing treatments depressing hemoglobin levels
were found to have serious cognitive deficits (Jacobsen et al., 2004).

Nephrology and Dialysis

A review of older studies of intellectual functioning in uremia and mainte-
nance hemodialysis for renal failure shows that the most frequently reported
deficits in neuropsychological functions have been in general intelligence,
memory, and attentional processes. Studies have consistently found lowered
performance IQ scores compared to verbal IQ scores in renal-failure patients
prior to dialysis onset, with significant improvement in short-term memory
and attentional functions after onset of maintenance dialysis (Osberg et al.,
1982). The reported deficits were attributed to neurochemical mechanisms
of the brain, which may be impaired in the abnormal chemical environment
imposed by renal failure (Ginn, 1975).
More recently, analysis of data from older adults in the Rush Memory and
Aging Project (mean age 81) showed that poor kidney function, assessed at
 Physical Health and Cognition 245

the beginning of the study, was linked with a more rapid rate of decline over
the next several years in episodic, semantic, and working memory, but not in
visuospatial ability or perceptual speed (Buchman, 2009). In younger indi-
viduals, findings indicated that individuals with kidney transplant or chronic
kidney disease demonstrated significantly worse verbal learning and memory
as well as lowered response inhibition and other executive functioning skills
in comparison to controls. Further, those with chronic kidney disease also
performed significantly worse on a set-shifting task (Gelb et al., 2008).

Respiratory Disorders
There are various disorders manifested in respiratory difficulties, including
apnea, asthma, and chronic lung diseases. Cognitive dysfunction has been
repeatedly reported in individuals suffering from obstructive sleep apnea,
characterized by repeated episodes of upper airway obstruction and lowered
blood oxygen levels during sleep (see review in Beebe et al., 2003). For exam-
ple, it was found that both snoring and breathing stoppage were associated
with low scores in tests requiring visual attention skills, the Trail Making Test,
and the Digit Symbol Substitution Test. These relationships were significant
only when either snoring or breathing stoppage was associated with daytime
sleepiness (Dealberto et al., 1996).
Allergic rhinitis, which also affects breathing, was found to be related to
difficulties in cognition and learning (Borres, 2009). Pollen-allergic young
people, tested on computer simulation of different learning situations, mani-
fested lower concentration ability than healthy controls (Vuurman et al.,
1993). Patients allergic to ragweed were shown to have impaired cognitive
learning during the pollen season and some also had memory impairment.
Individuals with allergic rhinitis symptoms take a longer time to make deci-
sions and have a slower psychomotor rate than healthy control subjects
(Marshall, O’Hara, & Steinberg, 2000). Students with allergic rhinitis tend to
get lower grades in school (Borres et al., 2007; Walker et al., 2007).
When individuals with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)
were compared with healthy controls, they were consistently found to be
impaired in verbal memory (Huppert, 1982; Incalzi et al., 1993; Stuss et al.,
1997), and to a lesser degree also in aspects of attention and working memory
(Berry et al., 1989; Della Sala et al., 1992). Further, studies showed that there
may be a pattern of cognitive dysfunction specific to COPD: the incidence
of cognitive dysfunction is higher in but hypoxaemia; hypoxaemia, hyper-
capnia, smoking, and comorbidities (such as vascular disease) are unlikely to
account for all of the cognitive dysfunction seen in COPD; and the observed
cognitive dysfunction were unrelated to mood, fatigue, or health (Dodd,
246 Kreitler, Weissler, & Barak

Getov, & Jones, 2010). Individuals with asthma or COPD were found to have
significantly lower oxygen saturation compared to the healthy controls, and
performed significantly poorer on tests of delayed word recall and serial sub-
tractions but not on other tasks of immediate word recall, word fluency, and
digit-symbol substitution (Moss et al., 2005).

Hormonal Disorders
There is a large body of studies reporting cognitive correlates of hormonal
disorders of various kinds. The thyroid gland is associated with several
hormones. Cognitive changes have frequently been detected in patients
with hypothyroidism, including defects ranging from minimal to severe in
general intelligence, psychomotor speed, visual-spatial skills, and memory
(Burmeister et al., 2001; Denicoff et al., 1990; Dugbartey, 1998). Several
recent studies have suggested that hypothyroid-related memory defects are
attributable to specific retrieval deficits rather than to an attentional deficit
(Dugbartey, 1998; Miller et al., 2007). Motor skills, language, inhibitory effi-
ciency, and sustained attention appear to be less affected by hypothyroidism
(Burmeister et al., 2001; Dugbartey, 1998). Thus, the memory deficit char-
acteristic of hypothyroidism seems to be distinct from that associated with
major depression, which affects broad executive difficulties (Miller et al.,
2007). Individuals with subclinical hypothyroidism performed poorer than
normal controls on neuropsychological tests including the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale, the Wechsler Memory scale, and verbal fluency (Baldini et
al., 1997). In subclinical hypothyroidism, most detected cognitive deficits are
minimal in severity and appear mainly in regard to working memory (Bauer
et al., 2008; del Ser Quijano et al., 2000).
Cushing disease is one of the pituitary disorders. Individuals with Cushing
disease were found to score significantly lower than controls on four of five
verbal IQ subtests, but only on one nonverbal performance IQ subtest (block
design). Their verbal, but not visual, learning and delayed recall at 30 min-
utes were significantly decreased. Despite the lower score on verbal delayed
recall, the retention index (percentage), which compares the amount of ini-
tially learned material to that recalled after the delay, was not significantly
decreased. The cognitive performance was not associated with depression,
but a higher degree of cortisol elevation was associated with poorer perfor-
mance on several subtests of learning, delayed recall, and visual-spatial ability
(Starkman et al., 2001).
Cortisol is a hormone that fulfills an important role in the context of the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis in promoting and maintaining arousal.
 Physical Health and Cognition 247

Its impact on cognition, however, is unclear (de Kloet, Oitzl, & Joels, 1999). A
body of studies has demonstrated a relationship between cortisol levels and
memory impairment (de Bruin et al., 2002). In a population-based study of
adults 50–70 years old, higher levels of pretest and mean cortisol were found
to be associated with worse performance in language, processing speed,
eye-hand coordination, executive functioning, verbal memory and learning,
and visual memory (Lee et al., 2007). On the other hand, there is also evi-
dence about the facilitatory effects of cortisol on cognitive activities where
working memory and attention are required (Annett et al., 2005; Koob &
Britton, 1990). It has been concluded that inhibiting effects of cortisol initially
influence neuropsychological processes such as learning in a positive manner
(Luine et al., 1996), although prolonged cortisol secretion can adversely affect
attention, memory, and learning processes (Lupien, Gillin, & Hauger, 1999;
Newcomer et al., 1994; Wolkowitz et al., 1990).
A growing literature shows that gonadal hormones influence cognition,
although these hormone-induced changes are fairly small. Positive effects
have been demonstrated in regard to specific kinds of memory, especially spa-
tial and learning visual memory (Luine, 2008). Efficacious effects on verbal
and working memory by both estrogen and testosterone were demonstrated
in young women who had undergone surgical menopause (i.e., ovarian
removal). Furthermore, the Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging provided
evidence of better maintenance of many aspects of cognition in normal aging
women on hormone replacement therapy (Sherwin & Henry, 2008).

Cancer
There is a lot of research concerning the impact of cancer on cognition, but
the overwhelming part of it refers to the effects of chemotherapy on cognitive
functioning (see following section) and a smaller part to the impact of cancer
types that directly involve the central nervous system (CNS) (Meyers & Perry,
2008). Yet, the few studies of individuals prior to undergoing cancer treatments
show that the disease as such also affects cognitive functioning. For example,
in a study of individuals about to undergo hematopoietic stem-cell transplan-
tation (HSCT), 26 percent were classified as impaired before as well as after
HSCT. Neuropsychological test results did not vary systematically accord-
ing to medical variables such as extent of pretreatment, graft-versus-host-
disease (GvHD), and kind of conditioning protocol (Schultz-Kindermann et
al., 2007). A comparison of mean neuropsychological test scores of individ-
uals with invasive and noninvasive breast cancer prior to treatment showed
that those with Stage 1–3 cancer scored significantly lower than healthy
248 Kreitler, Weissler, & Barak

controls on the Reaction Time domain and were significantly more likely to
be classified as having lower than expected overall cognitive performance (22
percent) as compared to Stage 0 patients (0 percent) and healthy controls
(4 percent) (Ahles et al., 2008).

Neurological Diseases
Neurological diseases are a controversial section in the present context
because it is likely that they include central nervous system (CNS) involve-
ment. Yet, we cite a few examples because CNS pathology may not be the sole
factor contributing to the observed cognitive deficits. Thus, in lyme disease,
cognitive impairment was found in attention span, memory retrieval, read-
ing comprehension, concentration, organizing and planning, and identifying
imagery (Edlow, 2003). In multiple sclerosis, cognitive disfunction occurs in
about 50 percent of the individuals (Rao et al., 1991). The consistently reported
neuropsychological profile includes deficits concerning learning and working
memory as well as reduced attentional and executive abilities, whereas lin-
guistical competence and global intellectual capacity remain relatively intact
(Brassington & Marsch, 1998; Rao et al., 1991; Rao, 1995). In adults with new-
onset epilepsy, cognitive deficits were detected with regard to delayed recall in
verbal memory, selective attention, and psychomotor performance (Rösche,
Uhlmann, & Fröscher, 2010).

Chronic Pain
The effects of pain on cognitive functioning have been studied quite exten-
sively, mainly because these effects are likely, first, to exacerbate the patients’
suffering and reduce their already compromised quality of life (Niv & Kreitler,
2001); secondly, to restrict the patients’ ability to communicate their pain
symptoms (Kreitler & Kreitler, 2007); and third, to limit the application of
cognitively based treatments of pain that are highly common. In addition, it
is expected that information about the cognitive impact of pain could shed
light on brain mechanisms that mediate both pain and cognition, thereby
pointing the way toward new treatment strategies of pain.
The summary of the findings is based on studies dealing directly with the
effects of chronic pain on cognitive processes (for all references, see Kreitler
& Niv, 2007). We focused on studies from about 1990 onward (n = 42), which
reported significant findings based on comparing at least one measure of a
cognitive function, assessed by means of a valid and reliable test, in chronic-
pain patients (with no cancer pain and who did not undergo traumatic brain
 Physical Health and Cognition 249

injury and had no neurological disorders) and controls (who had no chronic
or acute pain or psychiatric disorder). The chronic-pain patients suffered
mostly from musculoskeletal pain at mixed sites, including whiplash-injury
patients.
Cognitive complaints reported by chronic-pain patients (at least one by 54
percent of the responders) in one study included forgetfulness (23.4 percent),
minor accidents (23.1 percent), difficulty finishing tasks (20.5 percent), and
difficulty with attention (18.7 percent). In another study, complaints included
memory flaws referring to films and books (61 percent), forgetfulness (44
percent), handling of everyday things (38 percent), and flaws about conversa-
tions (38 percent). These and similar surveys indicate that the majority of the
cognitive problems is focused on memory and attention. Memory and atten-
tion deficits figure prominently also in objective findings about cognitive
impairments related to chronic pain. Thus, 88.2 percent of 34 relevant publi-
cations reported lower performance by chronic-pain patients on a varied set
of memory functions, including verbal and nonverbal memory, immediate
and delayed memory, long-term and short-term memory, and memory span.
On the whole, it seems justified to conclude that the most affected aspects of
memory are those that lean heavily on verbal materials, delayed memory, and
require new learning and the use of information previously acquired in the
framework of the task. There are indications that memory for figural mate-
rials, visual memory, spatial memory, and incidental memory tend on the
whole to be less affected by chronic pain.
Attention deficits of chronic-pain patients were reported in 69.2 percent of
13 relevant publications, which however did not include the common mea-
sures in the field – namely, the Stroop and the attention and concentration
indices based on the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-R). Verbal deficits of
chronic-pain patients were found in 88.9 percent of the 9 relevant studies,
including tests of vocabulary and word or category fluency.
Deficits of chronic-pain patients in varied measures of speed, ranging from
verbal tasks through information processing speed to psychomotor speed,
were reported in 82.3 percent of 17 relevant studies. Notably, in all three
applications of one speed test – the Number Connection Test –chronic-pain
patients did not differ from healthy controls.
Chronic-pain patients were found in most studies (72.7 percent of 11 stud-
ies) to have lower mental flexibility based mostly on requirements of switching
from one task or set of instructions to another. Further, lower performance
was found for chronic-pain patients in each of the following, tested mostly
by five or less studies: reasoning, construction ability, calculation, the tests of
block design and similarities, visual-motor coordination, abstract thinking,
250 Kreitler, Weissler, & Barak

problem solving, and decision making in an emotional risk-involving task.

Lower performance for chronic-pain patients was found also on the follow-
ing three basic measures of overall cognitive functioning: the Mini-Mental
State Examination, the Neurobehavioral Cognitive Status Examination, and
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS).
Further evidence about the effects of chronic pain on cognitive difficulties
is based on studies examining the correlation between the degree of cognitive
deficit and pain intensity. Pain intensity was correlated positively with the
number of subjective complaints about cognitive functioning (two studies),
and with the degree of objectively assessed cognitive impairment in regard to
mental flexibility (six studies), memory (one study), visual-motor coordina-
tion (one study), speed (two studies), emotional risk-bound decision mak-
ing (one study), and overall scores on the Repeatable Battery for Assessment
of Neurological Status (one study). However, no correlations were found
between pain intensity and attention and concentration (one study), memory
(two studies), word fluency (one study), and speed (one study).
In addition, there is evidence that reduction in pain intensity is followed
by some improvement in auditory vigilance, and in subjective evaluations of
cognitive functioning but not in objective assessments of cognition. Brain
research has provided some indications about the processes involved in the
negative effects of pain on cognition. It was shown that pain modulated activ-
ity in a positive sense in the brain areas involved directly in the cognitive task
as well as in other areas of the prefrontal cortex, and in a negative sense in
the perigenual cingulate cortex, insula, and medial thalamus. Another study
showed that pain-related brain activation in three cortical regions – primary
(S1) and secondary (S2) somatosensory cortices and anterior insula – was
attenuated by cognitive engagement induced by a cognitively demanding task
(viz. Stroop). Further, the evidence provided by human brain-imaging stud-
ies that brain regions critical for emotional decision making are also involved
in chronic pain led to the interesting discovery that pain affects detrimentally
precisely tasks of this kind.
In sum, the majority of chronic-pain patients complain of cognitive diffi-
culties, mainly in regard to memory and attention. Studies performed in this
domain show that cognitive deficits actually show up mainly in the domains
of memory, attention, speed, verbal ability, and mental flexibility. The evi-
dence concerning more complex cognitive functions is scarce, so that it is still
an open question whether chronic pain does not affect these, too.
There may be various explanations for the negative effects of pain on cogni-
tive performance. One approach attributes the cognitive deficits at least partly
to the patients’ depression and emotional distress (Hart, Wade, & Martelli,
 Physical Health and Cognition 251

2003). Some investigators argue for the attention-overload explanation. If

pain is considered as an attention-consuming stimulus and attention as a uni-
tary and limited resource, it may be expected that too few attentional reserves
may remain for cognitive functioning in chronic-pain patients (Eccleston &
Crombez, 1999; Grisart, Van der Linden, & Masculier, 2002). Another pos-
sible explanation may be decreased motivation and interest of chronic-pain
patients to do anything whatsoever, due to their persistent pain and constant
worrying. Further likely explanations are the effects of fatigue caused by sleep
disorders, and the consumption of analgesics as well as the previously noted
impact of pain-induced brain activation in the areas involved in cognitive
functioning.
A review of the effects of pain on cognition requires referring to fibromy-
algia, which is a special syndrome that includes chronic and widespread pain
and sensitivity to pressure. Individuals with fibromyalgia frequently complain
of cognitive problems or “fibrofog.” The existence of these symptoms has been
confirmed by the results of objective tests of metamemory, working memory,
semantic memory, everyday attention, task switching, and selective attention.
These tests showed that fibromyalgia patients have impairments in working,
episodic, and semantic memory, especially when tasks are complex and their
attention is divided (Glass, 2008).

Dermatological Diseases
The relations between skin disorders and cognition have not been studied
extensively. In a study on psoriasis, it was shown that individuals with pso-
riasis had an automatic attentional bias to specific classes of information
relative to controls. On a computer-based attentional interference task (the
modified Stroop task), they manifested a significant interference for disease-
specific, self-referent, and others’ behavior stimuli relative to controls. Recall
bias was limited to disease-specific stimuli only (Fortune et al., 2003). In
a sample of non-elderly persons without a psychiatric disorder evaluated
with the Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological
Status (RBANS) and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, serological evidence
of Herpes Simplex Virus type 1 (HSV-1) was significantly associated with a
lower RBANS total score independent of demographic factors and the cate-
chol-o-methyl transferase (COMT) Val158Met genotype, as well as a severe
impairment in the domain of delayed memory. The Val/Val genotype of the
COMT Val158Met polymorphism was also significantly associated with the
RBANS total score and a moderate decrease in the domain of attention.
Infections with HSV-1 and the COMT Val158Val genotype are risk factors
252 Kreitler, Weissler, & Barak

for cognitive deficits in non-elderly persons without a psychiatric disorder

(Dickerson et al., 2008).

Sensory Disabilities
Major sensory disabilities that may affect cognition include hearing, vision,
olfaction, and tactility. The relations between sensory disabilities and cogni-
tion are difficult to disentangle. The senses are an important, indeed essential
means of developing and functioning cognitively in a world shaped by and
for individuals with all senses intact. For an outside observer, it may seem
feasible to overcome the likely difficulties in the cognitive domain by diverse
compensatory means. The question is if that actually takes place.
For example, research has demonstrated cognitive differences between
deaf and hearing students at all levels, including visual perception, memory,
and problem solving, even in mathematics (Dye, Hauser, & Bavelier, 2008;
Hauser, Lukomski, & Hillman, 2008; Kelly, 2008). Memory impairment was
found to be associated with sound processing disorder and hearing loss (Gates
et al., 2008; Wingfield, Tun, & McCoy, 2005). These findings should not be
surprising in view of the important role of verbalization and language under-
standing in cognition. At the same time, there is a lot of evidence showing
that deaf and hearing students share many similarities in cognition. It is nec-
essary to consider the possibility that even small differences in learning abili-
ties and knowledge have significant cumulative effects over time (Marschark
& Hauser, 2008).
In blindness, the major issue is the difficulties or deficits in regard to con-
tacts with the environment. Orientation in space and the structure of space
provide two examples of difficulties that may affect a variety of cognitive
functions (Spencer et al., 1992). However, in addition, other functions such
as verbal fluency have also been found to be affected (Wakefield, Homewood,
& Taylor, 2006).
A study on age-related macular degeneration (AMD) showed that indi-
viduals who had more severe AMD had poorer average scores on cognitive
tests, regardless of factors such as age, sex, race, education, smoking, diabetes,
use of cholesterol-lowering medications, and high blood pressure. Average
scores also decreased as vision decreased (Clemons et al., 2006). A study of
more than 2,000 older adults (69–97 years) revealed an association between
early-stage AMD and cognitive impairment, as assessed by the Digit Symbol
Substitution Test (a test of attention and processing speed). There was no asso-
ciation with performance on the Modified Mini-Mental State Examination
(used to assess dementia) (Baker et al., 2009).
 Physical Health and Cognition 253

The olfactory sense is not often considered when studying cognition. Yet,
it is of interest to note that difficulty identifying odors predicts over five years
the development of mild cognitive impairment in elderly people who have
normal cognitive function at baseline. The finding is not changed by control-
ling for age, sex, education, and semantic memory (Wilson et al., 2007).
The involvement of haptic deficits in cognition was demonstrated by
studying groups with different degrees of dementia. The results show that
haptic tasks are sensitive to early perceptive-cognitive and functional deficits
in patients with minimal cognitive impairment (Grunwald et al., 2002).
Even sensory difficulties that do not represent deficits may affect cogni-
tion adversely. For example, individuals with chronic, moderate tinnitus
do more poorly on demanding working memory and attention tests than
those without tinnitus. However, they do not do more poorly on less com-
plex tasks involving involuntary automatic responses (Rossiter, Stevens, &
Walker, 2006).

Special Bodily States

In this section, we will discuss the effects on cognition of the following spe-
cial bodily states: pregnancy, menstruation, loss of sleep, and being over-
weight. These states have been selected because they are primarily physical
states, occur frequently, and are not usually identified as physical disorders.
In view of these criteria of selection the following states have been excluded
from the present discussion: stress, which could be mainly psychological; and
underweight and nutritional deficiencies, which could be manifestations of
psychopathology.
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in cognitive effects of the
state of pregnancy, which is characterized by dramatic hormonal fluctuations.
Subjective reports of cognitive difficulties during pregnancy include forget-
fulness, disorientation, confusion, and reading difficulties, unrelated to mood
fluctuations, age, and medical symptoms (Poser, Kassirer, & Peyser, 1986).
Objective testing showed difficulty in verbal learning, verbal memory, imme-
diate and delayed recall, discriminating relevant from irrelevant responses, and
tasks requiring speed of cognitive processing and conceptual tracking, unre-
lated to hormonal levels of E2, T, and DHEA during pregnancy (Buckwalter
et al., 2001; Keenan et al., 1998; Sharp et al., 1993). The major effects seem to
be related to memory, especially those types of memory that rely on executive
function resources (Henry & Rendell, 2007). Some cognitive deficits also per-
sist after pregnancy, which is in accord with the long-term hormonal effects of
pregnancy (Buckwalter et al., 1999, 2001). Improvements in word-list learning
254 Kreitler, Weissler, & Barak

and reaction time have been observed only 6 or 12 months after pregnancy
(Eidelman, Hoffman, & Katz, 1993; Silber et al., 1990).
Menstruation is another natural physical state whose effects on cognition
were explored. Both reaction time and error rate in a mental rotation task
were negatively impacted in menstruation and ovulation phases in women
(Kozaki & Yasukouchi, 2009). There is further evidence that menstruation
negatively impacts performance requiring spatial memory (Postma et al.
1999). Further, in the proximity of the estrogen, peak performance in autom-
atized tasks is facilitated and performance of perceptual-restructuring tasks
is impaired, compared with performance in the postovulatory phase when
progesterone is thought to counteract the action of estrogen (Broverman et
al., 1981). Several studies showed that verbal fluency, manual dexterity, and
speeded articulation were performed by women better and visuospatial tasks
worse when estrogen and progesterone levels were high than when they were
low (Kimura & Hampson, 1994). A slight deficit in memory in women with
premenstrual syndrome was found (Keenan et al., 1995).
Sleep plays an important role in learning, memory encoding, executive
function, and attention. Insufficient quantity or quality of sleep leads to neu-
rocognitive dysfunction in the short-term and possibly also in the long-term
(Durmer & Dinges, 2005). Sleep loss, whether because of poor sleep qual-
ity, restricted sleep opportunities, or prolonged sleep deprivation, has been
linked with cognitive slowing, increased attention lapses, memory impair-
ment, decreased vigilance, and reduced capacity for sustained attention
(Himashree, Banerjee, & Selvamiinhy, 2002). Sleep deprivation negatively
affects most notably decision making, flexibility, task switching, evaluating
complex situations, and tracking dynamically changing states (Harrison &
Home, 2000).
There is growing evidence of a possible association between being over-
weight and poor cognitive function. Increased body weight is independently
associated with decreased visuospatial organization and general mental
ability already among school-age children (Li et al., 2008). In adults, body
mass index was found to be inversely related to performance on all cogni-
tive tests (Elias et al., 2003; Gunstad et al., 2010; Jeong et al., 2005; Karnehed
et al., 2006; Sǿrensen & Sonne-Holm, 1985). Body mass index was inde-
pendently associated both with cognitive function (word-list learning and
Digit–Symbol Substitution Test) and changes in word-list learning in healthy,
nondemented, middle-aged men and women (Cournot et al., 2006). In one
study, after controlling for confounding variables such as age, gender, IQ, and
years of education, only impaired executive function significantly differenti-
ated overweight or obese subjects from those with normal weight (Gunstad et
 Physical Health and Cognition 255

al., 2008). Long-term mechanisms for this association include consequences

of hyperglycemia, dyslipidemia, or other factors comprising metabolic syn-
drome X as well as physiologic brain changes caused by being overweight,
such as subclinical inflammatory changes, vascular changes, or dysmyeliniza-
tion of white matter (Volkow et al., 2009).

Medical Treatments
Medical treatments may also have side effects that impact cognitive function-
ing. The examples that will be provided refer to surgery, chemotherapy, and
various drugs. The evidence about cognitive dysfunction following surgery
with general anesthesia has been accumulating steadily since the late nine-
ties, so that it came to earn the name of a distinct syndrome – post-operative
cognitive dysfunction. It involves difficulties in memory, learning, and con-
centration that may last for months following surgery.
In one study, it was found in 25.8 percent after one week and in 9.9 percent
after three months. The syndrome was not canceled by controlling for factors
such as age, duration of anesthesia, respiratory complications, and infectious
complications (Moller et al., 1998). In another study, memory and cognitive
function were tested in 1,000 adult patients of different ages prior to elective
noncardiac surgery, at the time of hospital discharge, and three months after
surgery. Cognitive dysfunction was detected at the time of discharge from the
hospital in 36.6 percent of young adults, 30.4 percent of the middle-aged, and
41.4 percent of the elderly. Three months later, the syndrome persisted, but
more in the elderly (12.7 percent) than the younger patients (6 percent) (Price,
Garvan, & Monk, 2008). The assumed etiology includes residual concentra-
tions of general anesthetics, a long-lasting effect of general anaesthestics on
cholinergic or glutaminergic neurotransmission, and possibly psychologi-
cal factors related to illness and environment during hospitalization (Bruce
et al., 2008).
The incidence of cognitive dysfunction following cardiac surgery has
attracted a lot of attention. It has been found to be 30–80 percent after one
week and still common (10–40 percent) after several months and later (Shaw
et al., 1987). Language, concentration, and motor control are most consis-
tently reported to be affected. Memory, attention, and executive function are
more variably affected (Bruce et al., 2008).
The occurrence of cognitive deficits related to treatments of cancer is one
of the most widely studied and discussed issues in regard to medicine and
psychological health. Major cognitive deficits have been detected follow-
ing chemotherapy and biological treatments (Wefel, Collins, & Kayl, 2008),
256 Kreitler, Weissler, & Barak

hormonal treatments (Schilder, Schagen, & van Dam, 2008), and radiation
therapy (Shaw, & Robbins, 2008). Best known are the effects of chemotherapy
(also known as chemo-brain or chemo fog), that occur in about 10–40 per-
cent of the patients, and may last even for more than 10 years. The functions
most often affected involve visual and semantic memory, attention and motor
coordination, and may be manifested in difficulties in regard to decision
making, multitasking, comprehending read material, following the thread of
a conversation, and retrieving words. The causes for the deficiencies are still
unclear and are attributed to toxic drugs that affect brain tissues (Vardy et al.,
2010).
In view of the mass of medical drugs and their potential effects on cogni-
tion, only a few examples will be mentioned. Thus, in regard to antihyperten-
sive medication it was shown that they are likely to increase the inefficiency
of the brain’s work during memory tasks (Astle et al., 2007), and that chronic
use of drugs with anticholinergic properties is associated with impairment
in verbal memory and the ability to perform daily-living tasks. The effect
was independent of age, education, morbidities, and severity of hyperten-
sion, and increased with amount of drug ingested (Han, Agostini, & Allore,
2008).
The cognitive effects of the use of statins are one of the most controversial
issues in the medical arena at present. Accordingly, the best one can do in
view of this situation is to quote support for all different claims: first, that the
use of statins does not affect cognition at all (Trompet et al., 2010); secondly,
that the use of statins is cognitively beneficial and reduces the extent and
rate of cognitive decline (Cramer et al., 2008); and thirdly, that the use of
statins is associated with deleterious effects on cognition (Elias et al., 2005).
The most unexpected and disturbing results are the later, which show a sig-
nificant positive linear association between total cholesterol and measures of
verbal fluency, attention/concentration, abstract reasoning, and a compos-
ite score measuring multiple cognitive domains. Individuals with so-called
desirable cholesterol levels (<200 mg/dL) performed more poorly than those
with borderline-high levels (200–239 mg/dL) or high levels (>240 mg/dL)
on cognitive tasks that place high demands on abstract reasoning, attention/
concentration, word fluency, and executive functioning.
Antihistamins are mentioned here because as an antiallergy treatment,
they are one of the most often-used drugs by individuals of all ages. It was
shown that subjects who were treated with the agent diphenhydramine had
significant performance deficits on tests of divided attention, working mem-
ory, vigilance, and speed (Kay, 2009).
 Physical Health and Cognition 257

Psychological Reactions to Diseases and Treatments

Common reactions to physical disorders and the associated treatments
include fear, anxiety, worry, preoccupation with the disease, depression,
and denial. These and similar reactions have been shown to affect cognitive
functioning in diverse domains (Kreitler, 2005). For example, anxiety tends
to affect mainly executive functions and visual memory (Castaneda et al.,
2008). Denial negatively affects executive function, verbal memory, visual
inference, and mental speed (Rinn et al., 2002). Worry was found to impair
cognitive processing, which is manifested in difficulties of categorization
and decision making (Metzger et al., 2006). According to a recent review
(Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), depression is characterized by increased elabo-
ration of negative information, difficulties disengaging from negative mate-
rial, and deficits in cognitive control when processing negative information.
Individuals with current depression but no previous depression tend to have
worse cognitive performance in all domains than healthy controls, especially
in the visuospatial/constructional and attention domains and the total score
(Baune et al., 2010). This latter group may resemble individuals reacting with
depression to physical disorders.

Some Conclusions
The material presented in this chapter demonstrates the extent of the impact
of physical disorders on cognitive functioning. Almost all of the major physi-
cal disorders have been mentioned. The omission of some does not indicate
that they do not affect cognition but rather that they have not been studied
or had to be deleted from our necessarily short review. There is no doubt that
the studies suffer from a fair number of shortcomings. Some of the major
ones are inadequate considerations of relevant confounding factors such as
age, comorbidity, phase of disease, and use of medication; the use of lim-
ited or inadequate control groups; and inadequate or incomplete selection
of variables or tasks for testing cognitive functioning. As a result, it is impos-
sible at present to compare the extent and severity of cognitive effects in the
various diseases. Neither is it possible to conclude that the assessed cognitive
variables are the major ones or those that are most affected in that particular
disease.
Yet, despite all the evident shortcomings, the amount, diversity, and nature
of the findings render it barely possible to avoid the conclusion that cogni-
tive functioning is affected by physical disorders and the physical state of the
258 Kreitler, Weissler, & Barak

individual. As such, this conclusion should not come as a surprise. It has long
been known that the mental state of the individual affects cognitive func-
tioning. Accordingly, regular samples in cognitive psychology that were not
designed to study psychopathological cognition did not include individuals
suffering from depression, paranoia, or schizophrenia, to mention just a few
examples. Yet, no consideration has been paid up to now to the effects of
physical disorders on cognitive functioning, despite the fact that physical
disorders are much more prevalent and possibly exert even more pervasive
effects on cognition than mental disorders.
However, it is precisely the prevalence and pervasiveness of the effects of
physical disorders on cognition that render it so difficult to discuss the impli-
cations of these findings in regard to the study of cognition. Should all indi-
viduals with any physical disorder be excluded from studies in cognition? Or
should it become practice that any individual who participates in a study of
cognition is to be asked to list in detail all one’s physical disorders in the pre-
sent or the past?
It is evident that recommendations along these lines are impractical and
unreasonable. Moreover, they would not be very helpful in promoting the
study of cognition because at present too little is known about the mecha-
nisms and processes involved in enabling the impact of physical states on
cognition. A great amount of research is still needed in order to specify which
physical diseases affect which cognitive functions negatively and perhaps
even positively and why.
The field is in dire need of models of a theoretical nature, grounded in
biopsychological data, that would specify the kind of mechanisms likely to be
involved in the mediation of the effects of diseases on cognition. These mech-
anism would include states and processes in the brain, in different body parts
and bodily systems (hormonal, hematological) as well as psychological pro-
cesses contributing directly or indirectly to the likelihood of the occurrence
of a disease and affecting its course and impact on the individual’s quality
of life and overall functioning. The outlined models may well constitute the
next phase of studies in health psychology. Before the evidence flows in, how-
ever, it seems reasonable to recommend that major physical diseases of the
individual participating in a study on cognition be at least listed for further
reference and future attempts to deepen the exploration and analysis of the
findings.

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 Part II

Domains of cognition in context

 13

Motivation, Goals, Thinking, and Problem Solving

Ken J. Gilhooly & Evridiki Fioratou

Introduction
Problem solving and motivation are closely intertwined, as is indicated by the
classic definition of a problem situation from Duncker (1945, p. 1), “A prob-
lem arises when a living organism has a goal but does not know how this goal
is to be reached.” Before proceeding further, we will briefly discuss some defi-
nitional issues and consider the relationships between goals and motives.
Austin and Vancouver (1996, p. 338) proposed that goals be defined as
“internal representations of desired states.” In a broad sense, a goal reflects
a preference for some proposition to be true versus not true (e.g., the goal
to have more money tomorrow than today reflects a preference for “having
more money tomorrow” to be true rather than false). According to one dic-
tionary definition (Chambers, 1962), “a motive is a consideration that excites
to action (from the Latin, movere, to move).” Motives and goals are clearly
very closely related concepts in that both involve representations of desired
states. Austin and Vancouver made the useful suggestion that goals can vary
in degree of specificity or abstractness and that more abstract goals, such as
Need for Cognition (Caccioppo et al., 1996) or Achievement Need (Atkinson,
1964), are usefully labelled as motives and more specific representations of
desired states should be labelled as goals. If a motive is to lead to action, it
would seem that it must ultimately lead to the activation of a specific goal
representation, which can then play a role in initiating and controlling behav-
iour. Research on problem solving tends to theorise at the level of goals rather
than at the level of very broad motives (which are dealt with largely in per-
sonality and motivational psychology).
Goals can be said to vary in terms of structure and content (Austin &
Vancouver, 1996). Content refers to what desired state is represented by
the goal, and can vary essentially infinitely in detail. Austin and Vancouver

273
274 Gilhooly & Fioratou

propose a taxonomy of goal content, which yields approximately 30 broad

categories of goals such as happiness, understanding, safety, material gain,
and so forth. Structurally, goals are generally seen as organised into hierar-
chies from more general to more specific, where the specific goals serve their
“supergoals” above them in the hierarchy and in turn have yet more specific
subgoals beneath them in the hierarchy. As we discuss later, a major category
of problem-solving processes, known as “problem reduction” processes, gen-
erate hierarchies of ever more-specific goals from starting goals in the light of
problem contents. Further, Austin and Vancouver pointed out that goals can
vary in terms of a number of structural dimensions including specificity (or
concreteness) as indicated above, difficulty, temporal range (next few seconds
v. years), whether conscious or not, and importance (how strongly desired
the goal state is).
Behaviourists in the early years of the twentieth century tended to down-
play the notion that goals were useful concepts because goals were regarded
as mentalistic concepts that suggested discredited teleological explanations
against preferred causal explanations. However, developments in cybernetics
(Wiener, 1948) and computer systems in the mid-twentieth century indicated
that goals could be incorporated into fully specified deterministic systems that
carried out complex information processing (from guiding missiles to playing
chess at a high level). These demonstrations were invoked by the pioneers of
the information-processing approach who launched the cognitive revolution
in psychology in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Key work in developing and
promoting computer models and analogies for human problem solving was
carried out by Simon and colleagues (e.g., Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958) with
their Logic Theorist and General Problem Solver programs (Newell & Simon,
1963), both of which instantiated goal processing during problem solving. The
general idea of higher-level cognition as goal-driven information processing
was further promoted by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram’s (1960) very influen-
tial monograph, Plans and the Structure of Behavior. In this book, the idea of
explaining behaviour by means of hierarchically organised goal-driven units
known as Test-Operate-Test-Exit (TOTE) units, such that the Operate stage
could itself be a TOTE unit and so on, was set out persuasively.
The Test phase was essentially a test to determine whether a particular goal
condition had been met. If the goal condition was not met, the associated
Operation (which could be composed of yet more TOTE units) would be
repeated and the results tested again for compliance with the goal condition.
When the goal condition for an active TOTE was met, then control would
pass to the next TOTE. In this way, complex hierarchically organised plans
could be built up from simple units.
 Motivation, Goals, Thinking, and Problem Solving 275

Simon (1967) addressed criticisms, particularly from Neisser (1963), regard-

ing the degree to which such information-processing models could deal with
multiple goals, and motivational and emotional aspects of cognition. Simon
proposed two central assumptions about the information processing system.
It is (a) organised in a serial fashion; and (b) regulated by a “tightly organized
hierarchy of goals.” Serial organisation means that “only a few things go on
at a time”. A hierarchical organisation is one in which, “More macroscopic
processes are synthesized from sequences of elementary processes” (Simon,
1967, p. 30), and these macroscopic processes can be thought of as akin to
programs, which can call other programs so that a large amount of nesting of
processes is possible. Simon argued that motivation was the mechanism by
which a tightly organised goal hierarchy is created and controlled. Motivation
controls attention, the ordering of the goal hierarchy, goal prioritisation,
and the criteria for determining when a goal is complete (e.g., satisficing or
impatience). Simon further proposed that emotion is an interrupt system
that causes the system to switch to highly time-pressing goals (e.g., escape a
source of fear that has suddenly arisen).
Simon pointed out that conditions are needed for programs to terminate
and return control to the next higher level. Possible mechanisms for terminat-
ing are: (a) aspiration achievement – the subgoal has been achieved; (b) satis-
ficing – the state reached is satisfactory, if not ideal; (c) impatience – enough
time has been expended; and (d) discouragement – the task is too difficult and
is to be abandoned.
So far, goals have been discussed in terms of single states to be reached.
However, often motives are mixed and multiple goals may be sought simul-
taneously (e.g., seeking a pleasant, affordable, convenient restaurant for
a three-course dinner with wine rather than just eating anything to sat-
isfy the goal of reducing a hunger state). Attention to multiple goals in
information-processing models can be achieved through at least two mecha-
nisms: (a) queuing of goals by priority ordering; and (b) use of multifaceted
criteria, in which two goals are combined so that Task A and Task B can be
collapsed under the single goal “Complete tasks A and B.”
In the remainder of this chapter, we will largely be reviewing work in
the cognitivist, information-processing tradition, as outlined above, which
has been dominant since the early 1960s. On this view, thinking is an inter-
nal symbolic exploration of possible representations of the world and can
be tightly directed by a specific pressing active goal or relatively undirected
when no current goal is active. Directed thinking aimed at problem solving
is driven by goals, and hence is clearly motivated. When no goals are cur-
rently active, then undirected thinking of the type often called daydreaming
276 Gilhooly & Fioratou

tends to arise. However, even undirected thinking is normally influenced by

motives and current concerns rather than being purely driven by associations
(Klinger, 1978). In the main part of this chapter, we will discuss the detailed
role of goals in problem solving, goals and motivation in expert and creative
thinking, and the roles of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in problem solv-
ing and creative thinking.

Goals in Problem-Solving Processes

Sometimes pre-learned or instinctive behaviours will be elicited by goal states
and no thinking or problem solving is required. Our focus is on situations
where there are no pre-learned or instinctive behaviours available to meet a
current active goal. Such cases match Duncker’s (1945) classic definition of
a problem arising when an organism has a goal but does not know how the
goal can be reached. In such a case, problem solving is an adaptive reaction
and involves a search for a suitable action or sequence of actions. We will now
discuss the role of goals in generation of possible actions and in evaluation of
possible actions against closeness of consequences to goal state. Our focus will
be on well-defined problems in which the starting state of the problem, the
goal state, and the possible actions are well specified. Most problem-solving
research has concerned this type of problem. Less well-defined problems
are common in the real world (e.g., how can one improve one’s quality of
life?). In such cases, the initial steps typically involve attempting to convert
the ill-defined problem into a well defined one and then proceeding from
the well-defined version (Kochen & Badre, 1974). In the example just given,
a first step would be to decide on how quality of life could be measured (e.g.,
by income, job satisfaction, health, relationships, and so on) and what restric-
tions there might be on possible actions (e.g., legal, physically possible, not
overly time-consuming, and so on). Thus, the study of search for solutions in
well-defined problems is also relevant to the search stage of ill-defined prob-
lems that follows the definition stage.
There are two broad approaches to searching for solutions in well-defined
problems: (1) forward search through possible sequences of actions and (2)
problem reduction, in which the overall goal is decomposed into ever more-
specific subgoals. The classic Hobbits and Orcs task (Thomas, 1974) is typ-
ically approached by means of a forward search. In this task, the goal is to
transport three hobbits and three orcs from one side of a river to the other
using a boat that can hold up to two creatures, without ever allowing hobbits
to be outnumbered by orcs on either side of the river. At least one creature
must be in the boat for it to cross the river. The number of legal moves at each
 Motivation, Goals, Thinking, and Problem Solving 277

state of the problem is very limited. Figure 13.1 lays out the possible states
and moves in this task. It appears that people generally choose which move
to execute at each choice point by assessing which move will lead to a state
closest to the goal state. The degree of looking ahead is typically just one step.
This type of procedure is sometimes known as hill-climbing, by analogy with
a method of climbing a hill in a thick fog by testing out one step in each of the
four principal directions and taking the step that leads to the highest ground.
To apply hill-climbing in well-defined tasks, an evaluation function is applied
to possible states in order to index closeness to the goal. A possible evalua-
tion function in the Hobbits and Orcs problem would be to count the number
of creatures on the target side and use the resulting score to indicate which
move to execute at each step (choose the move that leads to the highest scor-
ing state). A simple application of this type of approach can lead to difficulties
with problems that require a detour, in that the sequence of states leading to
solution do not yield monotonically increasing evaluations. The Hobbits and
Orcs problem is a detour problem because there is a state which has four crea-
tures on the target side, but the solution requires moving from that apparently
promising state to an apparently less promising state with only two creatures
on the target side. As would be predicted, if people are using forward search
guided by a simple evaluation function for this task, the state from which a
detour is needed for progress causes marked difficulties in terms of latencies
and error moves (Thomas, 1974). Many solvers initially go backwards from
the detour state and then must retrace their steps. To avoid perpetual loop-
ing, some memory for previous moves must be postulated, with extra rules
about avoiding previously visited states. This need for memory-guided search
is particularly strong in problems that permit a great deal of looping such as
Water Jars (Atwood, Masson, & Polson, 1980). More recently, forward search
guided by goal-based evaluation functions has been shown to be implicated
in the difficulties engendered by a number of classic insight tasks such as
the 9-dot problem (Chronicle, MacGregor, & Ormerod, 2004). In such tasks,
some redefinition of the problem is typically required, but initial attempts
within the normal “obvious” interpretation typically show a hill-climbing
pattern, and it is only after repeated failures of the hill-­climbing approach
that problem redefinition or restructuring is likely to occur.
Forward search guided by a goal-based evaluation function to assess
possible intermediate states seems most common when problems are well-
defined and few actions are possible at each state. In tasks where there are
many possible actions (which is often the case for ill-defined or only partially
well-defined tasks) or in which simple evaluation functions are not helpful,
a problem-reduction approach is often adopted. In this approach, the overall
278 Gilhooly & Fioratou

320

HHH O
OO Boat

10

331 000
HHH HHH
OOO OOO
Boat Boat

1H 10 20 1H 10 20

220 310 111 021

HHH H HHH H HH HHH
OO O O OC O OO OO O
Boat Boat Boat Boat

1H 10 1H 10

321 010
HHH HHH
OO O O OO
Boat Boat

20 20

300 031
HHH HHH
OOO OOO
Boat Boat

10 10

300 020
HHH HHH
O OO OO O
Boat Boat

2H 2H

110 221
1H 10
H HH HH H
O OO OO O
Boat Boat

Figure 13.1. Problem-space figure for the Hobbits and Orcs problem.
Note: The figure above sets out all the possible moves that can be made and resultant
states, given that the boat can only hold two creatures and Hobbits must never be out-
numbered by Orcs. The starting state of the problem is the second state down from the
top. The solver does not have the layout below, but rather sees only one state at a time
and must imagine possible moves and choose amongst such moves. When a move is
made the next state is displayed. The number Hs and Os on the left- and right-hand side
of each box indicate the number of Hobbits and Orcs on each side of the river at any
given time.
 Motivation, Goals, Thinking, and Problem Solving 279

goal is progressively specified into subgoals, which in turn are specified fur-
ther into still lower-level subgoals. In complex tasks, many alternative sub-
goals will often need exploration before solution. An everyday example of
problem reduction is that of making travel plans. The overall goal is to be at a
distant place. Means are sought to reduce the distance between where one is
and where one wishes to be, such as using a commercial flight. To apply such
a means, a new goal (subgoal) is established of meeting the conditions needed
to take a flight (be at airport, have valid ticket, etc). These subgoals in turn
generate new subgoals, until immediately actionable subgoals are generated
(e.g., logon to internet to make booking). The generation of subgoals proceeds
by a process of means-ends analysis. Goals or ends lead to subgoals (means),
which in turn act as ends to generate further subgoals. This approach was
instantiated in Newell and Simon’s (1963) General Problem Solver program,
and is evident in later programs such as Newell’s (1992) SOAR.
Duncker’s (1945) study of the X-ray task provides a laboratory example
of problem reduction in a task with some ill-defined elements (particularly
regarding possible actions). Participants are to find a way of using X-radiation
to destroy a tumour in the middle of a patient without destroying healthy tis-
sue around the tumour. Thinking-aloud records indicated a strong tendency
to use a problem-reduction approach. For example, a participant suggested
that the major goal of “treating the tumour by rays without destroying healthy
tissue” could be reached by means of the subgoal of “avoiding contact between
rays and healthy tissue” and this could perhaps be achieved via a subgoal of
“using a cannula” or a subgoal of “reaching tumour through the esophagus”.
The “avoiding contact” subgoal was unproductive and had to be abandoned
for the subgoal of “lowering intensity of rays on their way through the healthy
tissue”, which led to the solution “use a lens to concentrate a bundle of weak
rays on the tumour” (Figure 13.2).
The Tower of Hanoi provides an example of a well-defined problem in
which simple evaluation functions are not clearly available or helpful. In this
task (see Figure 13.3), one is presented with three vertical rods or pegs on
one of which are n discs assembled in order of size with the largest at the
bottom and the smallest on top. The goal is to move the entire assembly of
discs from the starting peg to a target peg, moving one disc at a time and
never putting a larger disc on top of a smaller disc. The non-target peg is to
be used for temporary storage. With n discs, the number of moves required
increases rapidly according to the function 2n – 1, so the 3-disc version in
Figure 13.3 requires 7 moves, a 4-disc version requires 15 moves, a 5-disc ver-
sion requires 31 moves, a 6-disc version 63 moves, and so on. Although naïve
solvers do often begin trying a hill-climbing approach (Anzai & Simon,
280 Gilhooly & Fioratou

Radiation
source

Body wall

Tumor

Figure 13.2. Solution of Duncker’s X-ray problem.

A B C

Figure 13.3. Three-disc Tower of Hanoi. Move all discs from peg A to peg C, one disc
at a time, and never put a larger disc on top of a smaller disc.

1979), this is generally superseded by a problem-reduction approach, proba-

bly because until very near the end obvious evaluation functions do not dis-
criminate between good and poor moves. A number of studies (Simon, 1975)
have found strong signs of problem reduction as the preferred approach in
this task. In the problem-reduction approach, the overall goal of the Tower
of Hanoi task is reduced to three major subgoals: first, move the pyramid
of n-1 discs to the holding peg; second, move the largest disc to the target;
third, move the pyramid of n-1 discs to the target. The first and last subgoal
are themselves Tower of Hanoi tasks that can be reduced again in the same
way . . . and so on. Simon (1975) labelled this type of procedure, in which
larger goals are reduced to smaller versions of the same goals, a “problem
 Motivation, Goals, Thinking, and Problem Solving 281

recursion” strategy. A process-tracing study by Luger (1976), which tracked

participants’ moves through the Tower of Hanoi problem space, found that
participants generally follow goal-directed paths in that successive steps
approach a goal or subgoal, and when a subgoal is reached the next steps
address a new subgoal.
In summary, goals play a crucial role in the course of problem-directed
thinking by guiding the selection of possible actions towards a solution in for-
ward search (e.g., by hill-climbing) or by the development of subgoal struc-
tures (in problem reduction) that lead to useful actions relevant to overall
goal achievement. In the next section, we consider the longer-term impact of
enduring motivations in the development of problem-solving skills in exper-
tise and creativity.

Expert Solving, Creativity, and Motivation

So far, we have considered the short-term role of goals in problem-solving
episodes, particularly in tasks that require little background knowledge
(knowledge-lean tasks). Since De Groot’s (1965) pioneering studies of chess
experts, there has been a growing interest in expert solving of knowledge-rich
problems. Short-term goals and subgoals that arise within a given episode are
important in expert as well as nonexpert problem solving, but accumulated
domain knowledge will permit better generation of subgoals and evaluations
of intermediate positions. The nature of expert problem solving involves appli-
cation of a large body of prior knowledge to perceive or structure the problem
differently than the beginner. De Groot (1965) developed the paradigm of
testing memory for briefly presented random versus meaningful materials
and showed, in the chess domain, that experts recalled meaningful patterns
much better than novices, but showed no advantage with random patterns.
This result indicates superior pattern identification by the experts, permitting
larger chunks to be rapidly stored in (long-term) working memory (Ericsson
& Kintsch, 1995). Similar results have been found in many different areas of
expertise such as the games of GO (Eisenstadt & Kareev, 1977) and Bridge
(Charness, 1979), programming (Adelson, 1981), and map-reading (Gilhooly
et al., 1988). Experts use their greater background knowledge to structure
tasks more effectively and explore possible solutions more efficiently. For
example, De Groot (1965) reported chess experts engaged in a similar amount
of mental search for good moves as less-skilled players, but with much better
final results in terms of the moves chosen.
Experts’ thinking is thus shaped by a large body of relevant knowledge that
is accumulated over a long period. It is commonly estimated that high-level
282 Gilhooly & Fioratou

expertise in chess (grand master level) requires at least 10 years of intensive

study and preparation. Similar estimates have been made in other fields such
as music and mathematics (Ericsson, 2003). To study and practice in an area
intensively for 10 or more years clearly requires high levels of motivation to
excel in that area. From interviews with experts (Bloom, 1985), it appears that
motivation typically begins with simple enjoyment of an activity undertaken
in a playful way, which is found to be intrinsically rewarding. Promising per-
formance then leads to support from parents who encourage and strengthen
existing motivation and seek out teachers, coaches, training facilities, and
suitable competitions. The time commitment for individuals in developing
expertise is indicated by the finding that expert (professional) musicians had
spent over 10,000 hours practicing by age 20, which was around 8,000 hours
more than amateur musicians by the same age (Ericsson, 2003).
Ericsson (2003) pointed out that developing expertise is in itself a
large-scale problem with the goal of ever-improving performance, which is
tackled through deliberate practice exercises that themselves comprise sub-
problems of improving particular aspects of the skill concerned. Sheer expe-
rience in itself, without deliberate targeted practice, does not lead to growth
in skills beyond plateaus. To progress, budding experts must engage in delib-
erate practice aimed at extending their current skill levels. In the case of
chess, experts have typically spent four to five hours per day analysing games
between masters from printed sources (Ericsson, 2003). They set themselves
the goal of predicting each move in a recorded game, and if they predict
wrongly, they then set the goal of understanding why the master’s move was
made. This process will help adjust the player’s representations of chess posi-
tions, for example, by adding in an aspect of a position that was previously
not noticed when making evaluations of possible moves. Thus, the general
motivation to improve skill level leads to specific goals in deliberate practice
such as understanding particular puzzling but masterly moves.
The pinnacle of real-life expert thinking is that involved in creative think-
ing that leads to major transformations in a given field. Creative thinking is
thinking that is both novel and useful. It is helpful to distinguish between
novel thoughts that arise from exploration of an established framework or
conceptual space and represent combinational creativity and novel thoughts
that lead to new conceptual spaces (i.e., exemplify transformational creativ-
ity) (Boden, 2004). New conceptual spaces can be generated by transform-
ing existing spaces. For example, non-Euclidean geometry arose by dropping
a particular axiom from Euclidean geometry; atonal music arose by drop-
ping the requirement of tonal music that a piece of music must have a “home
key” from which it starts and returns. Biographies of acknowledged creative
 Motivation, Goals, Thinking, and Problem Solving 283

contributors to the arts and sciences indicate extremely high levels of com-
mitment (motivation) and immersion in the field of work (Boden, 2004).
“Normal” expertise in the chosen domain must be developed initially (and
we have seen that normal expertise requires c. 10 years of devoted study and
deliberate practice) before the potential creative contributor can understand
a complex conceptual space (e.g., classical geometry or classical music) and
then transform it in a useful way. In Edison’s famous saying, creativity is “one
per cent inspiration and 99 per cent perspiration” (Rosanoff, 1932).

Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation in Problem

Solving and Creativity
Given that creative work requires exceptional levels of motivation, the ques-
tion remains about what leads to the very high levels of motivation required
for creative thinking. Early psychodynamic theories explained creative
activity as a sublimation of libidinal energy into a socially acceptable form
(Freud, 1959) or by using the amoral, aggressive, and destructive impulses
of the id to suggest creative ideas by means of regression in the service of
the ego (Kris, 1952). Other dynamic suggestions involve higher-order needs
such as effectance motivation (White, 1959) and need for mastery (Cangelosi
& Schaefer, 1992), which could motivate towards creativity. However, more
recent approaches have stressed the possible role of intrinsic motivation
arising from enjoyment and satisfaction experienced while engaged in the
creative activity (Collins & Amabile, 1999). Psychometric (Barron, 1988)
and longitudinal studies (Torrance, 1987) indicate that creative individuals
are highly absorbed by their work and continue to be so over many years,
and it is plausible that intrinsic motivation could maintain such persistence.
A specific hypothesis regarding intrinsic enjoyment has been proposed by
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) in terms of the “flow” experience that arises when a
person is working at tasks in which the challenges match their skill level. In
the flow state, there are heightened levels of enjoyment and absorption. By
contrast, if the challenges are too easy, boredom will be experienced; if the
challenges are too difficult, stress will be experienced. Seeking optimal flow
experiences that are rewarding in themselves would lead to ever-increasing
skill levels in a virtuous circle.
In contrast to intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation such as seeking
external approval and rewards is often seen as less important for creative
thinking work, and indeed, a general lack of concern with the opinions of
others does seem to emerge from biographical and psychometric studies of
eminent scientists and artists (Cattell, 1959), suggesting that such individuals
284 Gilhooly & Fioratou

are not motivated by a search for others’ approval. Intrinsic motivation is

often taken to be key and extrinsic motivation regarded as secondary or even
deleterious (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). For example, Amabile (1983, p. 91)
proposed that, “The intrinsically motivated state is conducive to creativity,
whereas the extrinsically motivated state is detrimental”.
Consistent with Amabile’s (1983) view, a number of early studies of the
effects of external incentives did find that external incentives seemed to
reduce intrinsic interest in tasks and reduce novelty and creativity (e.g.,
Amabile, 1989). Subsequent studies have produced more mixed results. A
meta-analysis by Cameron and Pierce (1994) of 96 studies involving experi-
mental groups receiving a reward and control groups that did not indicated
that intrinsic motivation (indexed by attitude scores and propensity to engage
in the task after the experimental manipulation) was boosted by external ver-
bal rewards and tangible rewards dependent on performance, but reduced
by tangible rewards that were not dependent on performance. Eisenberger
and Cameron (1996) interpret these results as indicating that the detrimental
effects of external incentives occur mainly under very restricted conditions
and external rewards are often beneficial. Eisenberger and Cameron’s behav-
iourist approach naturally stresses the positive role of reinforcement, and they
argue that reinforcement for effort in difficult tasks leads to a “learned indus-
triousness”, in which effort itself has acquired secondary reinforcing value.
They report some interesting results indicating that reinforcement of novelty
in divergent tasks generalises from one type of divergent task to another (e.g.,
from a verbal divergent task to a visuospatial divergent task involving pro-
duction of pictures using circles). They suggest that this result could reflect
learned industriousness, which as a general tendency to persistence would
benefit divergent production. Consistent with this view, recent work in our
laboratory has found that initial responses in the divergent Alternative Uses
task tend to be low in executive demands (retrieval of known uses) and later,
subjectively novel responses involve use of executively demanding strate-
gies that would require persistence (Gilhooly et al., 2007). A review paper by
Camerer and Hogarth (2004) of 74 studies reached a similar conclusion to
that of Eisenberger and Cameron – tasks with positive incentive effects were
those in which effort is increased by incentives and increased effort improves
performance. Wieth and Burns (2006) explored incentive effects with a view
to identifying differences between non-insight problems and insight prob-
lems. It was hypothesised that non-insight problems would respond posi-
tively to incentives, as incentives would lead to increases in persistence with
the initial approach, which in turn would speed solutions. On the other hand,
insight problems would be hampered by increased persistence with the initial
 Motivation, Goals, Thinking, and Problem Solving 285

approach. It was found that both types of problem responded positively to the
incentives, which suggests that insight and non-insight problems have more
in common than is sometimes suggested (Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005).
Overall, the current view is that both intrinsic and extrinsic sources of
motivation are important in creative problem solving, but that the effects
of extrinsic motivation are more variable and depend on the nature of the
incentive or reward and how it is dependent on quality of behaviour. If the
external reward is the same no matter what level of performance is reached,
this could induce “learned helplessness” (Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996) and
impair performance. External reward dependent on results has an informa-
tional aspect and is more likely to be helpful. In the light of recent research,
Amabile (1996, p. 119) has revised her earlier hypothesis and formulated the
Intrinsic Motivation Principle as follows: “ Intrinsic motivation is conducive
to creativity; controlling extrinsic motivation is detrimental to creativity, but
informational or enabling extrinsic motivation can be conducive, particularly
if initial levels of intrinsic motivation are high”.

Concluding Comments
It is clear that problem solving and motivation are closely intertwined. Without
unmet motives and active unsatisfied goals, there would be no problems to
solve. General motives lead to more specific goals, and goals play a crucial
role in problem-directed thinking by guiding the would-be solver towards
promising actions in searching a state-action space or useful developments
of subgoals and subsubgoals that in turn lead to suitable actions towards the
overall goal or goals.
Expert problem solving is based on extensive domain knowledge, which is
built-up slowly over many years (around 10 years being a common estimate
across domains) and results from continued motivation to develop the par-
ticular skill in question. Deliberate practice and guided training seem cru-
cial to developing expertise in all domains. Clearly, long-term motivation is
essential to develop expertise. Having acquired expert knowledge, leading
thinkers can then develop their domain further by creative thinking, which is
largely motivated by an intrinsic interest and enjoyment of the field.

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 14

Motivation and Heuristic Thinking

Dan Zakay & Dida Fleisig

Introduction
An advertisement was recently distributed among many Israeli families by
the Israeli National Lottery (Mifal Hapais) in which joining a subscription
program by purchasing a certain number was offered. According to the offer,
the number would participate weekly in the lottery, and the unique aspect of
it was its being a personal lucky number, especially chosen for each recipi-
ent. Furthermore, it was promised that this personal lucky number would
increase the chances of winning. Because the National Lottery is a profitable
organization, it seems logical to assume that the advertisement succeeded in
recruiting enough members that at least the costs of producing the campaign
were paid back.
A rational analysis of that advertisement readily reveals several nonrational
biases: (1) The idea that a fixed number increases the chances of winning; (2)
there are lucky numbers; and (3) a personal number augments the chances
of winning. Yet, there are people who fall into such traps. Furthermore,
most probably, some of those who do are aware of the misleading informa-
tion included in the advertisement. In a study conducted by Klar, Zakay,
and Sharvit (2002), it was found that many Israelis adopted unique behavior
­patterns in order to cope with the threat of terrorist attacks. Many of those
patterns (e.g., avoiding going to shopping centers at the same day and hour of
the week in which a terrorist attack previously occurred) might be considered
as reflecting superstitious behavior. In effect, many of those who adopted such
behaviors were aware of the fact that this did not really reduce their chances of
being involved in terrorist attacks; still, they could not give up these behaviors,
mainly because it gave them some feeling of control over the situation. Those
two examples raise questions about why people swallow intuitive nonrational
baits, on the one hand, but, on the other hand, can justify such behaviors from

289
290 Zakay & Fleisig

a utilitarian perspective of some sort. In the present chapter, an attempt will

be made to analyze those questions, but first, the topic of heuristics and the
impact of motivation on heuristic thinking will be reviewed.

Thinking, Heuristics, and Survival

A major problem facing any living organism is that of being able to internally
represent the environment in a manner that will enable adaptation and sur-
vival. Perception, language, and thinking are the major mental faculties that
have evolved for doing that job. Whereas many organisms possess perceptual
systems that are equal or even better in terms of sensitivity than those of
humans, the main advantage of the latter over other species is grounded in
better language and thinking abilities that enable reasoning, problem solving,
judgment, and decision making.
A question can be raised concerning the criteria by which the optimality
of a representation of the environment can be determined. Should the repre-
sentation be accurate, or is it enough that it will enable optimal survival and
adaptation? Several views concerning that question have been proffered by
different schools of thought. Only some of these will be reviewed here.
The rational view. Scholars representing the rational view (e.g., Lee, 1971)
argue that thinking processes had to be rational in order to enable the best
adaptation to the environment. To be rational is to reason in accordance with
principles of reasoning that are based on rules of logic, probability theory,
and so forth (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002; Stein, 1996). Accordingly, any devia-
tion from normative rationality should be considered as a cognitive bias lead-
ing to suboptimal behavior. Similar to perceptual illusions, cognitive biases
were also called “cognitive illusions.”
The human being as an “intuitive statistician.” As it started to become clear
that human thinking does not fully comply with the principles of normative
rationality, nor is the matching between human judgments and predictions
based on statistics and probability theory perfect, a view of the human being
as an “intuitive statistician” emerged (Peterson & Beach, 1967). According to
this view, humans do base their judgments on the rules of statistics and prob-
ability theory, but due to limited mental capacity that prevents accurate cal-
culations, the products of human judgment are, eventually, less accurate than
normative predictions. The deviations, however, reflect calculation errors
rather than systematic cognitive biases.
Bounded rationality. Evidence that started to accumulate (e.g., the allais
paradox; Allais, 1997) indicated that deviations of human thinking from
“normative rationality” are caused by fundamental processes rather than
 Motivation and Heuristic Thinking 291

computational limitations. Simon (1957) argued that the normative rational-

ity model was not compatible with the characteristics of the human cognitive
system. Acknowledging the limitation of the human mind, Simon introduced
the notion of “bounded rationality” to indicate that human reasoning and
judgment are based on simple heuristics that people could employ (Gilovich
& Griffin, 2002). Simon suggested that bounded rationality results from the
tendency to base judgment and decision making on partial knowledge about
the world, and from the motivation to “satisfice.” In contradistinction to the
normative-rational view, which assumes that humans have a basic motivation
to maximize utility, “satisficing” indicates the willingness of human beings to
invest as minimal a mental effort as possible and thereby accept alternatives
that provide that degree of utility that satisfies one’s achievement need.
Heuristics and biases view. The bounded rationality view triggered a stream
of comprehensive and systematic research, which culminated in the seminal
work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman and Tversky (1984).
The major theme of this view is that under certain conditions, mainly condi-
tions of uncertainty, intuitive rather than rational thinking dominates human
judgment processes. Intuitive thinking is performed by the employment of
certain heuristics. In many cases, the products of the utilization of heuristics
are good-enough judgments that enable satisfactory adaptation. However,
misapplication of heuristics to inappropriate situations leads to biased judg-
ments (Bazerman, 2006) when compared with respective predictions stem-
ming from normative-rational models. The claim is that similar to perceptual
illusions, such cognitive biases might, in several cases, lead to suboptimal
behavior.
The heuristics and biases view became a target of criticism, based on the
argument that the notion of biases is incorrect, as normative-rational models
are not necessarily a justified point of reference for judging the optimality of
adaptation and survival. Furthermore, the claim was made that heuristics are
efficient and useful thinking tools (e.g., Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). It is not a
main objective of this chapter to discuss and evaluate the opposing views, but
some further elaboration of them is required. However, before doing so, we
should first delve more deeply into the notion of heuristics.

The “Anatomy” of Heuristics

Heuristics can be defined as simplifying and time-saving rules of thumb that
people use to make judgments under uncertainty or in face of incomplete
and ambiguous information. Heuristics constitute the antithesis of extensive
algorithmic processing (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002). One drawback of heuristic
292 Zakay & Fleisig

thinking is that individuals are frequently unaware that they rely on it, a state
which poses an obstacle in regard to amending the suboptimality resulting
from it.
Heuristics base their claim to fame on the three general-purpose heuris-
tics identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) that underlie many intuitive
judgments under uncertainty: availability, representativeness, and anchor-
ing and adjustment. Since then, many more have been identified in the area
of judgments under uncertainty, but heuristics can be identified in various
thinking domains such as problem solving, planning, choice, metacognitive
processes, causality judgment, social judgment, and others. Some examples
are briefly presented here.
Problem solving. Several heuristics are associated with the problem-solving
process. The anti-looping (Davies, 2000) and the hill-climbing (Chronicle,
MacGregor, & Ormerod, 2004) heuristics can serve as examples. Both heu-
ristics are concerned with strategies of problem solving – avoiding previous
moves in the anti-looping heuristic or taking whichever next step brings one
closest to or least distant from the goal in the hill-climbing process.
Planning. The planning fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) exhibits the
tendency to estimate optimistically future task-completion times, so that pre-
dicted completion times are more optimistic than can be justified by actual
completion time.
Choice. The diversification heuristic (Simonson, 1990) is relevant in regard
to choice tasks, and is concerned with the degree of diversity in people’s
choices based on their need for variety. It was found that when asked to make
several choices at the same time, people tend to diversify, and they do so not
only for a simultaneous choice condition (i.e., choosing three courses in a
certain meal) but also for a sequential choice (i.e., choosing at a certain time
what to eat in sequential meals). It is clear that this heuristic is sensible under
the simultaneous condition, but less so under the sequential one. Ayal and
Zakay (2009) showed that people tend to choose the alternative that is per-
ceived to be more diversified, even when this actually reduces their chances
of maximizing utility.
Language. Some heuristics were defined even in the domain of language
comprehension. For example, instead of focusing on a mutual perspective
when communicating, people rely more on an egocentric interpretation,
which is fast and cheap in mental resources. Keysar et al. (2000) argued that
using such a process, which they called the egocentric heuristic, is successful
in reducing ambiguity, although it could lead to systematic errors.
Magical thinking. Some heuristics characterize magical thinking. One is the
contagion heuristic, which reflects the belief that when objects make physical
 Motivation and Heuristic Thinking 293

contact essences may be permanently transferred between them. The simi-

larity heuristic exhibits the belief that causes resemble their effects, or that
appearance equals reality (Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002).
In another domain, that of aesthetic judgments, according to the “bigger is
better heuristic” (Silvera, Josephs, & Giesler, 2002), the size of an object influ-
ences its aesthetic preference.
Causality judgments. One domain, which is of utmost importance for
understanding the environment and assigning meaning to it, is that of cau-
sality judgments. This process, too, relies on heuristic thinking. The basic
heuristic here is that of false causality, which is the tendency to conclude that
an event is caused by another event simply because it follows it in space and
time. Again, it should be emphasized that causality heuristics probably lead to
correct decisions in many cases (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), but under some con-
ditions illusionary causality can be perceived as a veridical one. Gilovich and
Griffin (2002) demonstrated how relying on representativeness might induce
false causality judgments, and they bring some striking examples for this in
the domain of health and medicine. Causality judgments are also important
in the domains of interpersonal and social relationships. People have a need
for understanding the reason underlying other people’s behavior and to pre-
dict their future behavior. In doing so, people also use heuristic thinking in
the form of stereotyping and attribution (Gilbert, 2002).
Juridical thinking is another domain in which rational thinking is expected
but heuristic thinking was found to be widely used. As legal issues are often
complex, lacking in coherent information, and limited in time, heuristics are
often utilized (Gigerenzer, 2006). Indeed, legal reasoning falls prey to biases,
and employs heuristic thinking as much as reasoning in any other domain
(Zakay & Fleisig, 2010). For example, judges and juries’ decisions are often
affected by anchoring (Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, 2007), availability,
and optimistic biases (Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, 2007).
Metacognition is the last domain in which the involvement of heuristics
will be illustrated. Metacognitive processes are used to monitor lower-level
cognitive functioning and are responsible for the emergence of feelings, such
as feeling of knowing (FOK) or feeling of confidence (FOC) in the correctness
of retrieved knowledge. Empirical evidence (e.g., Koriat, 1993) indicates that
the reliability of some metacognitive judgments is not high. A major reason
for this robust finding is the reliance of metacognitive processes on heuris-
tics. Koriat (1993) argued that FOK judgments are based on the accessibility
heuristic, namely, on the ease of retrieval of information, regardless of its cor-
rectness. Similarly, judgments of familiarity are influenced by heuristics such
as the “warm glow” heuristic (Monin, 2003), according to which liking leads
294 Zakay & Fleisig

to familiarity; namely, the positive valence of a stimulus increases its per-

ceived familiarity, even in the absence of prior exposure. As for FOC, Zakay
and Tuvia (1998) demonstrated that these feelings are partially influenced by
the latency heuristic, according to which the faster a piece of information is
retrieved from memory the higher the confidence that this information is
the one sought for. This heuristic can result in a reliable confidence judgment
when knowledge is stored in memory, but can lead to an unreliable sense of
confidence when the relevant knowledge does not exist and a fast retrieval
is due to other factors, such as those involved in the availability heuristic.
Fleisig and Zakay (2005) demonstrated that when judging the ratio of cor-
rect answers after completing a forced-choice test, people rely on a heuristic
process that reflects their naive theories about the actual number of correct
answers they can expect in each category of FOC. The reliance on this heuris-
tic leads in many cases to significant underestimations.
Several heuristics have been reviewed. Deliberately, the most important
and well-known judgmental heuristics were not included because the aim
was to demonstrate the huge variety of heuristics and the wide range of men-
tal domains in which heuristics play a role. Another aim was to demonstrate,
in some cases, how heuristics can lead to optimal outcomes under certain
conditions, but erroneous ones when other conditions prevail.

Affect and Heuristics

In recent years, the involvement and importance of affect in cognitive
­processes has started to be emphasized. Slovic et al. (2007) present the affect
heuristic. By “affect” they mean the specific quality of “goodness” or “bad-
ness” that arises automatically in association with a certain stimulus. Those
automatic affective responses guide judgments and decisions. A similar
choice heuristic based on affect was proposed by Schwarz and Clore (1988),
who named it “how do I feel about it” heuristic. Frederick (2002) proposed
two automated-choice heuristics – choosing by liking; that is, choosing on
the basis of the spontaneous affective evaluations elicited by the options and
choosing by default (the “status quo”); that is, choosing an option currently
possessed or customarily chosen, which is preferred over other options.
Various studies have demonstrated that affect is an important component
of human judgment and choice, when the cause of the particular affect is
consciously perceived or not (Slovic et al., 2007). Gigerenzer and Todd (1999,
p. 31) indicated that “emotions can also function as heuristic principles for
guiding and stopping information search.”
 Motivation and Heuristic Thinking 295

Cognitive and Motivational Heuristics and Biases

The distinction between cognitive and motivational biases is common and
well documented in the literature. A cognitive bias is assumed to be caused
by an erroneous cognitive process in the form of a heuristic that was utilized
when it was not appropriate to use it. However, no motivational benefit or
gain is thereby obtained; on the contrary, it can be assumed that one would
prefer to avoid the bias. For example, a physician who commits a diagnostic
error due to the base-rate fallacy would be much happier if that error had not
been committed.
A motivational bias, too, might be said to result from the utilization of
an inappropriate heuristic, but the one who is utilizing the heuristic obtains
some motivational gain – usually an ego-defending one – from the resulting
bias. It can be assumed that attaining the motivational gain was the reason
for utilizing the heuristic in the first place, and that he/she would not have
preferred an “unbiased” outcome. Bazerman (2006) defined the following
categories of motivational biases: 1) The motivation to reduce the tension
between doing what one wants and doing what one thinks one ought to do; 2)
positivity motivation (i.e., to view oneself and the world more positively than
reality suggests); 3) egocentrism (i.e., the motivation to interpret information
in a favorable way that defends one’s ego and boosts his/her self-esteem); and
4) the motivation to avoid regret.
Whereas other classifications of motivational biases are possible, it is clear
that there are several basic distinctions between cognitive and motivational
biases. As previously noted, the cognitive biases are an “accidental” outcome
of inappropriate heuristic processes; the motivational ones are, in a way,
intentional. Another distinction is that the cognitive biases always reflect an
error vis-à-vis the respective normative model, whereas this is not the case
regarding motivational biases. It is true that in some cases motivational biases
also reflect clear judgmental errors, but in other cases the error might be in
the internal judgment or belief of a person and does not necessarily lead to
a behavioral error. For example, the diversification heuristic might lead one
to choose an option that seems to him or her to be more diverse than other
options, but in reality the utility associated with each one of the alternatives
might be the same. Thus, the personal lucky number example presented ear-
lier reflects an error of internal belief, but as a matter of fact, the personal lucky
number has the same probability of winning as any other number that could
have been chosen. Another example is the illusion of control. It describes
people’s tendency to believe that they have greater control over outcomes than
296 Zakay & Fleisig

they actually have (Trope, Gervey, & Liberman, 1997). It was found that per-
ceived vulnerability to risk is heavily influenced by the perceived control over
the risk (Zakay, 1984), and that people generally overestimate their level of
control over many kinds of risks (Bronwell, 1991) as well as their relative con-
trol, compared to their peers (Harris, 1996). Klar, Zakay, and Sharvit (2002)
examined whether such illusions of control were extended to the domain of
terrorism during a period of intense terrorist threat in Israel. It was found
that no illusion of control and comparative control were manifested regard-
ing the risk of being a victim of terrorist attacks. Again, the one who prefers
to take a lottery ticket in his/her own hand rather than be handed the card
is making an internal mistake of judgment, but is actually not harming one’s
actual chances of winning. On the other hand, in all of these examples and in
contradistinction to the cognitive biases, the motivational heuristics lead to
an obvious motivational gain – a higher feeling of control, better self-esteem,
and so forth.
The distinction between cognitive and motivational biases suggests that
the criticism and debate about the legitimacy of the term “biases” should be
treated in the context of motivational and cognitive biases. It seems, how-
ever, that making a distinction between cognitive and motivational heuristics
without referring to the nature of their outcomes is almost impossible. Both
types of heuristics are actually similar in terms of process. The distinction
between the two types is sensible only when the motivation to utilize them
and the degree of motivational gain associated with their outcomes are con-
sidered. Examples of “pure” cognitive heuristics are the “classic” ones such
as anchoring and adjustment or availability. “Naive optimism” can serve as
an example of a pure motivational heuristic. Naive optimism is responsible
for the tendency of people to assign higher probabilities to the occurrence
of positive events to themselves and people who are socially close to them
than to unknown people who are socially distant (Zakay, 1985). These judg-
ments are biased in cases for which occurrence probabilities are objectively
equal to anyone who belongs to a certain population. The motivational gain
associated with the outcomes of the naive optimism heuristic can be classi-
fied as a possible gain enhancing one’s feeling of well-being and self-esteem,
which in most cases might help adaptation. However, in some cases, such as
in the case of a potential illness, this can delay treatment and might be dan-
gerous for survival. It is of interest to note that naive optimism is activated
when there is a motivational threat involved with an unfavorable outcome.
However, when such a threat does not exist, for example when one has to
judge his/her chances of winning the lottery in comparison with the chances
of some unknown person, people tend to judge their own chances as lower.
 Motivation and Heuristic Thinking 297

This might be due to the lack of any meaning that might threaten one’s ego or
self-esteem if he/she does not win the lottery. The outcome is still biased, but
this is a cognitive bias, most probably resulting from utilizing the availability
heuristic. Essentially, most people never win such a prize, but they read a lot
about unknown people who do win (Zakay, 1985). However, one cannot deny
the possibility that the motivation to avoid regret also plays some role in this
case. Therefore, it is plausible to think also about “mixed” biases, in which the
outcome is caused by an inappropriate cognitive process but also serves some
motivational goal.

The “Bias” Debate

Whereas a “heuristic” is a type of a thinking process, the term “bias” refers to
the evaluation of the mental product resulting from the application of a certain
heuristic. When this product systematically deviates in a predictable direc-
tion from some normatively expected result, this deviation is called a bias.
Thus, it is important to note that a heuristic process may result in an unbiased
as well as biased outcome. This distinction has not always been clear, and as a
result, some scholars who disagree with the term “bias” tend also to criticize
the heuristic approach, as if the two were synonyms. In our mind, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between the two terms. From a phenomenological point
of view, it is clear that heuristic thinking exists and is in wide use by humans,
as exhibited by the two examples presented in the introduction. Nevertheless,
it is justified to question the term “bias” and to ask whether, under certain
conditions, the products of heuristic thinking are indeed biased. A different
question is whether or not heuristics should be considered as adaptive strate-
gies or as maladaptive, from the very start.
The issue of whether or not the term “bias” is inappropriate has to do mainly
with the definition of a correct criterion, a deviation from which should be
considered as a bias. Some scholars argue that there is no reason to consider
normative theories such as probability theory as a “true” criterion (Cohen,
1979; Kruglansky, 1975). We will not elaborate here on this issue and turn
rather to the question of whether or not heuristics are adaptive.
As was said earlier, “It is important to note that a ‘heuristic’ is both a good
thing and a bad thing” (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2002, p. 11), whereby the
good thing is its fastness under conditions of limited time or cognitive capa-
bilities and its bad thing is the involved violation of logical principles. It is
clear, then, that being fast and able to produce judgment despite difficult
real-world situations indicates that heuristics are efficient processes. What
about the other side of the coin? As claimed above, the critical issue here is
298 Zakay & Fleisig

whether or not a judgment must be compatible with normative theories and

logic in order to support survival and adaptation or whether the heuristic
judgment as is can be considered as adaptive.
The evolutionary view. In recent years, evolutionary psychologists have
claimed that adaptationist considerations ought to play a central role in devel-
oping psychological hypotheses about behavior. The evolutionary school
maintains that the human mind and its cognitive architecture are designed
by processes of natural selection to be able to solve adaptive problems (Tooby
& Cosmides, 1995). In accordance with these lines of thought, Gigerenzer and
Todd (1999) suggested a different criterion against which the outcomes of
heuristic judgments should be evaluated. The essence of this criterion, which
may be labeled an “evolutionary” one, is that the evaluation should be based
on the degree to which decisions and judgments fare adaptively and reason-
ably in the real world (the correspondence criterion) (Gigerenzer & Todd,
1999). The correspondence criterion is an evolutionary one because it reflects
the need of organisms to adapt to environmental challenges, a need which
forces them to make “fast and frugal” inferences. Instead of speaking of nor-
mative rationality, Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) and their collaborators speak
about “ecological rationality,” which reflects the extent to which the structure
of heuristics and the environment match. The claim is that different environ-
mental domains may require different specific heuristics that take advantage
of the particulars of the environmental structure, thus enabling adaptive deci-
sions. Furthermore, those who adopt the evolutionary view argue that when
considering ecological rationality, the utilization of heuristics and intuition
often result in more useful judgments as compared with analytic judgments,
as “there is a point where too much information and too much information
processing can hurt” (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 21). A similar argument
is proffered by Wilson and Schooler (1991), who claim that “thinking too
much” can reduce the quality of preferences’ formation and decision-making
processes.
Samuels, Stich, and Faucher (2004) went even further by indicating that
studies show people lack the rational competence to perform a big part of
their reasoning tasks; therefore, they exploit various simple heuristics, which
do not obey the patterns of normative reasoning. The evolutionary view is
reflected in the notion of “the adaptive toolbox” (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999),
which is described as containing fast-and-frugal heuristics, composed of
building blocks that guide and stop search leading to ecologically rational
judgments and decisions. Some examples of fast-and-frugal heuristics are the
heuristics of “take the best,” “take the last,” and “take the first” (Goldstein
et al., 2000).
 Motivation and Heuristic Thinking 299

“Take the best” is a lexicographic procedure that uses a rank ordering of

cues to make inferences and predictions. Search is stopped as soon as the first
cue that favors one alternative is found. The decision is made on the basis of
the cue that stopped search, whereas other cues are ignored. “Take the last”
heuristic is applied when dealing with consecutive problems, so that starting
from the second problem onward, the cue that stopped search the last time is
used as the starting point. The “take the first” heuristic is found when experts
have to solve problems and choose the first course of action that comes to
mind (Goldstein et al., 2000).
Gigerenzer went even further (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991)
by claiming that cognitive biases are mostly artifacts caused by forcing respon-
dents to create judgments in face of nonrelevant situations that lack ecologi-
cal validity. The claim was that by presenting respondents with relevant and
ecologically valid problems that enable them to use adaptive heuristics that
are compatible with the structure of available information, cognitive biases
should disappear. Indeed, Gigerenzer demonstrated his claim in regard to
several cognitive biases (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). In replying to Gigerenzer
(and others), Kahneman and Tversky (1996) argue that just as in the case of
perceptual processes, under most conditions heuristics can produce adaptive
judgments; under certain conditions that might occur in reality, maladaptive
outcomes – similar to perceptual illusions – might appear. Indeed, it can be
claimed that the conditions under which Gigerenzer and his colleges made
cognitive biases disappear cannot be considered as a representative sam-
ple of all the conditions under which individuals have to make judgments
in real life. For example, in the case of overconfidence, it might be claimed
that the conditions under which respondents were found to be well cali-
brated (Gigerenzer et al., 1991) are simply conditions in which respondents
had to make easy choices. Thus, the calibration found can be explained by the
hard-easy effect (i.e., going systematically from overconfidence to undercon-
fidence as task difficulty decreases) without the necessity of reliance on evo-
lutionary assumptions. Furthermore, several studies (e.g., Fleisig & Zakay,
2005) showed that even when respondents were asked to answer “ecological
questions” constructed according to Gigerenzer’s criteria, significant over-
confidence was still found in some cases.
It seems that a balanced approach should be adopted to the question of
whether or not heuristics are adaptive. Gilovich and Griffin (2002) state that
although heuristics do not “obey” rational rules, and despite the fact that they
yield quick solutions, they are still sensible estimation procedures, which are by
no measure “irrational,” and admittedly they draw on highly sophisticated pro-
cesses (e.g., feature matching, memory retrieval). We agree that this represents
300 Zakay & Fleisig

one side of the coin, but on the other side, under many real-life conditions
the utilization of heuristics might yield maladaptive results, regardless of any
comparison to any “normative” criteria. Illustrations for this claim are pro-
vided by some metacognitive heuristics involved in the formation of the feel-
ing of knowing (Koriat, 1998) and the latency heuristic (Zakay & Tuvia, 1998)
involved in the emergence of the feeling of confidence (see previous section).
The criterion for the reliability of FOK is the existence of relevant knowl-
edge. This does not depend on any normative model, but simply reflects the
actual state of knowledge that one can retrieve from memory at a certain
point in time. The same holds for FOC, as feelings of overconfidence might
lead one to suboptimal behavior, as in the case of answering forced-choice
questions in examinations (Zakay & Glicksohn, 1992).

Motivation and Heuristics

Motivation can be defined as the psychological feature that causes organisms
to act toward a desired goal (Webster, 1961). This definition includes two inter-
connected aspects of motivation: the reason for the action and its direction or
purpose. Similarly, when speaking about the relationship between motivation
and the utilization of heuristics, two aspects should be discussed: 1) What is
the general motivation behind the utilization of any heuristic; and 2) are any
motivational gains obtained by applying heuristics.
As for the first question, it seems that the evolutionary view discussed
earlier provides a reasonable explanation in regard to the basic motivation
for utilizing heuristics. This motivation is rooted in the basic need to act in
an adaptive way and as fast as possible in face of an unstable and uncertain
world. Heuristics are the thinking tools that were evolved in order to cope
with such conditions as part of the “survival kit” that humans are equipped
with. This fundamental motivation (see Svenson, current book) can be
applied to any type of heuristics. However, the second issue concerning moti-
vational gains necessitates a categorization of heuristics into two types: cog-
nitive and motivational, as discussed earlier. The distinction between the two
types of heuristics is summarized again. Cognitive heuristics, in contradis-
tinction to motivational heuristics, do not provide any motivational gain. In
other words, the one who uses the heuristic does not have any a priori pref-
erence, conscious or unconscious, in regard to the value or direction of the
outcome of the judgment. An example of a cognitive heuristic is “anchoring
and adjustment” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The essence of this heuristic is
to be able to make a judgment under uncertainty about a certain property of
the world without having any a priori preference for the end-value that will
 Motivation and Heuristic Thinking 301

be obtained. “Motivational heuristics” are those that, in addition to enabling

fast and energy-saving judgments, are chosen in order to assure a certain out-
come in terms of its motivational value and avoid an outcome that threatens
the person from a motivational point of view. Thus, in contrast to cognitive
heuristics, an accurate outcome that represents the state of the world objec-
tively is not welcome in the case of motivational heuristics. The naive opti-
mism heuristic, which was discussed earlier, may serve as an example.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that fundamental motivation is
involved in the utilization of any kind of heuristics. In addition to that, spe-
cific motivations are associated with the utilization of motivational heuristics.
Thus, it seems that the link between motivation and heuristics is stronger
than has been assumed so far.

Motivation and the Activation of Heuristics

An interesting question, not yet discussed, concerns the manner in which
heuristic processes are activated. The question might be answered in terms
of several approaches. According to Tversky and Kahneman’s approach, heu-
ristic processes are activated in the same way as perceptual ones; namely, the
heuristic process is an automatic one, determined by the characteristics and
requirements of the situation. It is interesting to note that Gigerenzer and
Todd (1999) hold a similar approach regarding that point. Yet, a profound
examination reveals that the perceptual approach is problematic when moti-
vational heuristics are involved. Because these heuristics require a prelimi-
nary analysis that identifies the motivational threat, a distinction between the
activation of pure cognitive heuristics and motivational heuristics is needed.
In addition, some approaches view the activation of heuristic processes as
activation of regular cognitive processes. Yet, the heuristic model reflects the
“cognitive miser” metaphor, according to which a partial cognitive process is
utilized due to the lack of sufficient mental resources. A possible reason for
this might be the existence of a low level of epistemic motivation regarding a
specific required judgment (Kruglansky, 1975).
Other approaches also bind the motivational system with the activa-
tion of heuristics. The heuristic-systematic model of persuasion (Chaiken,
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) defines three different underlying types of pro-
cessing motivations: defense motivation; impression motivation; and accu-
racy motivation. Defense motivation is the desire to hold attitudes and beliefs
that are congruent with existing ones, especially those that are critical to the
self. Impression motivation is the desire to express attitudes that will satisfy
interpersonal goals. Accuracy motivation is defined as a person’s need of an
302 Zakay & Fleisig

accurate judgment. Kunda’s (1990) “case for Motivated Reasoning” suggests

two kinds of motivations affecting cognitive processes: the motivation to be
accurate that leads to the use of strategies that are considered most appropri-
ate; and the motivation to arrive at particular conclusions that enhances the
use of strategies that are considered the most likely to yield those conclusions.
The motivations are responsible for the choice of strategies amongst the vari-
ous cognitive strategies available that will provide the motivation’s goal.
The argument that the activation of motivational heuristics necessitates an
initial phase of analysis for identifying a motivational threat can be supported
by theories of denial. Freud (1956) introduced denial as an unconscious intra-
psychic mechanism designed to expel anxiety and negative feelings from the
human mind. Following this view, most studies defined denial as the nega-
tion of something in word or act (Lazarus, 1983). Denial was perceived as a
specific primitive mechanism (one of many) at the lower levels of adaptation.
A similar approach is presented by Breznitz (1983).
According to psychoanalytic theories, within the process of denial the
threatening information may not access the system, or it may get in and get
out before it has been deeply processed. The information may be partially
registered (Spence, 1983) or partially processed, but then processing stops
and attention is shifted (Dorpat, 1985). Psychoanalytic theories propose that
this is an unconscious process. In contrast, avoidance strategies, which offer a
cognitive mechanism, do not necessarily require unconscious processes. On
the contrary, avoidance cognitive mechanisms such as daydreaming or sleep
necessitate functions of control.
Thus, both the psychoanalytic theories and the avoidance strategies require,
although implicitly, a dual-stage processing mode, as an initial registration
or examination is crucial for identifying target information to be excluded
from further processing. It seems that similar processes might explain the
first phase that precedes the activation of motivational heuristics.
A different approach was recently introduced in the literature proposing the
existence of two different systems, one responsible for analytic rational think-
ing and the other for intuitive heuristic thinking. Epstein (1994) claims that a
person has two cognitive modes of thought: a rational mode and an experien-
tial mode. The experiential mode, similar to Freud’s idea of the unconscious,
is emotionally driven; the rational mode is analytically and logically oriented.
The experiential mode uses direct motivation to attain immediate gratifica-
tion, and the rational mode uses either direct or indirect motivation to attain
either immediate or delayed goals.
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) suggest a dual-system process. System
1 represents rapid and automatic intuitive responses to arising judgmental
 Motivation and Heuristic Thinking 303

problems. System 2 monitors System 1’s products in a controlled, effortful,

slow, and rule-based manner. Due to that monitoring, the initial judgment
may be endorsed, corrected, or overridden. In order for the finally expressed
judgments to be called intuitive, they have to preserve, unmodified, the initial
proposal. Thus, a heuristic process may be automatic (as in System 1) and may
be deliberate (in System 2).
The notion of System 2 monitoring and controlling System 1 seems prob-
lematic to us, because the basic motivation for activating heuristics actually
reflects the need for rapid and resource-saving processes. Activating both sys-
tems means, in fact, consuming resources in an economizing system, which
generates a kind of internal contradiction.
It seems to us more appropriate to suggest the following process. According
to dual-stage models (such as in the process of denial), an initial analysis
of the situation always occurs in order to identify the potential existence of
motivational threats. When such threats do not exist, the level of epistemic
motivation, the need for accuracy, and the situational conditions will either
activate System 1 heuristic processes or System 2. In any case, the metacogni-
tive processes, which control and monitor the cognitive processes, are those
that control and monitor both systems. In some instances, such as in pro-
cesses of correction, the initial judgment produced in stage one of the process
will be modified in the second stage (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; Fleisig &
Zakay, 2005). However, if a motivational threat in the first stage is recognized,
particular ego-defensive and self-esteem guarding motivations cause the acti-
vation of specific heuristic processes that also belong to System 1.
An interesting question is whether the metacognitive control system can, in
those cases as well, cause a correction in the initial judgment. Muramatsu and
Hanoch (2005) indicate how emotions can be embedded into the bounded
rationality theory. Yun Dai and Sternberg (2004) propose an approach that
integrates motivation, emotion, and cognition. They argue that “an exclu-
sive emphasis on cognition misses some essential components of intellectual
functioning and development” (p. xi). The analysis in the present chapter
concurs with the aforementioned argument in regard to heuristic thinking,
which demonstrates the complex and deep involvement of the motivational
system in the activation process of heuristics. This notion requires further
research.

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 15

Motivation, Decision Theory, and Human

Decision Making

Ola Svenson

Introduction
Human decision-making researchers investigate people who make choices
between two or more alternatives, how the choices are made, and how they
deviate from predictions of normative models of rational behavior. Although
decisions are made in response to a decision maker’s needs reflected in her or
his motivation, discussions of motivation are rare in the mainstream decision
research literature; needs and motivation seem to be taken for granted with-
out any presentation or discussion of them.
To illustrate, two volumes summarizing the most important research
of judgment and decision making at the time (Arkes & Hammond, 1986;
Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002) do not have a single reference to moti-
vation or even goal in their subject indices. Goldstein and Hogarth’s (1997)
edited volume includes 2 chapters out of 24 that briefly mention the con-
cept of motivation, and of the remaining 22 chapters only 1 has a reference
to goal – the other chapters do not treat either motivation or goal. However,
Schneider and Shanteau (2003) edited a volume with a whole chapter on
motivation, and several chapters including the concepts of motivation and
goal. Textbooks on psychology and decision making follow the main trend,
and they typically do not have motivation in their subject indices (e.g., Baron,
2008; Plous, 1993).
To be able to understand the role played by motivation in earlier traditional
mainstream behavioral decision-making research, it is necessary to uncover
hidden assumptions related to motivation. In process approaches to decision
making, the researchers are often more explicit about what motivates the pro-
cesses than in mainstream decision research.

The author wishes to thank Torun Lindholm, Ellen Peters, and Ilkka Salo for valuable comments
on an earlier version of this chapter.

307
308 Svenson

In this chapter, I shall present some concepts related to motivation and

of relevance for decision research. The starting point will be the needs of a
decision maker. Needs are referred to when a decision maker identifies goal
states. A person’s value system (norms, etc.) may also be used for identifying
goal states. A goal state that is not yet realized leads to motivation to approach
that particular goal state (e.g., to start eating if the goal relates to the need of
food, get more money if the need is money). In other words, human needs are
behind goals, and the goals motivate a decision maker to make a choice, which
she or he believes leads to the best fulfillment of her or his goals. Motivation
also leads to the identification of subgoals and mental mapping of the alter-
natives in relation to the goals. The mental mapping includes attractiveness
mapping, meaning that each alternative is represented by a number of more
or less attractive aspects (e.g., the color, price, age of a car) or cues in support
of or against an alternative. Sometimes there is a holistic, sometimes intuitive
impression of the attractiveness of an alternative.
Two kinds of needs and motivations can be related to human
decision-making research. The first kind includes basic needs and motiva-
tions of a decision maker – what she or he needs and wants to achieve, what
motivates a decision, and so forth. These needs will be called fundamental
needs in this chapter (although many of them may be derived needs in other
contexts). The second kind of needs relates to decision processes – how they
should be carried through to solve conflicts, what final representations of deci-
sion alternatives a decision maker needs to make a final decision, and so on.
This kind of needs and motives will be called process and representation needs
and motivation. To illustrate the second kind of needs, Beach asserts there is
a general motivation to “expend the least possible amount of time, effort and
money while still meeting the demands of the decision task” (Beach, 1990,
p. 134). The distinction between procedural justice and outcome (Kwong &
Leung, 2002) corresponds to process and fundamental motivation.
If a decision maker is interested in a decision problem, she or he may get
involved, which means that she or he is willing to spend energetic resources
on the process of solving that decision problem. There are different kinds
of involvement depending on what needs and interests are activated. Some
kinds of involvement may originate from a need to please others, and other
kinds of involvement from a need of money or from process-related needs.
When performing laboratory studies of decision making, it is important that
the participants become involved in the task to secure valid results.
Johnson and Eagly (1989) discussed involvement in terms of self-relevance,
and defined involvement as “the motivational state induced by an association
between an activated attitude and some aspect of the self-concept” (Johnson
 Human Decision Making 309

& Eagly, 1989, p. 293). Janis and Mann (1977) listed some major categories of
needs related to personal involvement that can activate goals and motivation.
They differentiated between the needs of (1) own utilitarian gains; (2) utili-
tarian gains for significant others; (3) need of self-approval; and (4) need for
social approval. All four types of needs are relevant to some extent in the most
important decisions that a person makes.
Svenson (1992) differentiated between four different kinds of decisions. He
ordered them on levels. Level 1 contains repeated, quick automatic decisions,
habits, and all decisions, which – when they are made – have no direct refer-
ence to values, needs, or goals. Most of the decisions in human lives belong
to this category, and many of them are not even experienced as decisions.
However, these decisions were once related to needs, values, and goals before
they became automated. That is, when the first of the repeated decisions were
made, they were made on higher levels and related to needs and goals.
Level 2 includes decisions with direct couplings to a dominating need,
value, or goal. The decisions on this level are motivated by a wish to approach
one particular goal state (e.g., to find the cheapest flight). Here, the decisions
may also be quick, as for example, when a positive or emotional reaction
with its origin in a need is elicited by one or several alternatives. Decisions on
this level may also take longer, and depend on more elaborate processing to
approach the goal.
On level 3, one finds decisions activating different needs, with different and
conflicting motivational forces as a result. There is not one alternative that
is better on all significant attributes. Most decision research has treated this
kind of decisions, which invite trade-offs between goals, resulting in deci-
sions depending on the relative strengths of different motivations to reach
these goals.
Level 4 decision making includes decisions with alternatives that are
actively created by the decision-makers themselves. This is sometimes a pos-
sible solution for a decision maker who is presented with a decision problem
that does not seem to offer any satisfactory solution at all.

Traditional Decision Theory

Traditional behavioral decision theory was introduced by authors such as
Edwards (1954). He used the Expected Value (EV) theory as a foundation
when he elaborated the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model for describ-
ing human decision making. In the former theory, the (long-run) expected
value is computed for each alternative. This is done through multiplying the
value of each of the alternatives’ possible outcomes with its probability of
310 Svenson

occurrence. The alternative with the greatest long-run expected value should
be preferred even if there was only one decision to be made.
Equation (15.1) describes the expected value (EV) of one alternative with
two possible outcomes with probabilities p1 and (1–p1). The values of the out-
comes are denoted V1 and V2:
EV = p1 ⋅ V1 + (1–p1) ⋅ V2 (15.1)
This equation, originating from economic statistical theory, was translated
into a theory for human decision making by inserting U (subjective value or
utility) for V and ψ for p. The result was a theory that has dominated human
decision research for 50 years. Instead of EV, the subjective expected utility
(SEU) was used:
SEU = ψ1 ⋅ U1 + ψ2 ⋅ U2 (15.2)
SEU theory assumes that a decision maker can and is motivated to order
aspects characterizing the alternatives on a continuum of utility. Equation
(15.2) shows that a decision maker who makes even one single choice would
be motivated to calculate and decide according to a normative rule that was
developed to maximize the gain from repeated decisions. Thus, SEU theory
assumes that decision makers share the goal of maximizing their own utility
only, and that this motivates them to estimate the expected utility for each
alternative.
However, people do not follow SEU theory in most situations, and later
research has shown, for example, that ψ1 and ψ2 do not necessarily add to 1
and that the relation between value (e.g., money) and utility is not linear and
changes from one function to another when it passes from losses to gains
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In many situations, decision makers satisfice
(select the first alternative that is good enough – satisficing) and do not
maximize (Simon, 1955). Although the facts against the SEU theory are over-
whelming, the model, empirical data deviating from it, and its relatives have
dominated behavioral decision research for half a century.
In multiattribute utility theory (MAUT), an alternative is represented by
aspects (e.g., SEK 35,000 a month, 40 km from home) on attributes (e.g.,
salary, distance to work). The model is an extension of the SEU model to the
multidimensional case with independent attributes. This kind of representa-
tion of decision alternatives is also used in most process theories.
SEU theory and variations of the fundamental theory model human deci-
sion making without any description of the psychological processes leading
to a decision. It only takes into account the decision problem and describes
the outcome of the decision. Such an approach to behavioral decision theory
 Human Decision Making 311

has been called structural. There has been no explicit room for motivation in
this context. Instead, one may say that the empirical results have been used to
find out about the decision makers’ motivation (e.g., to maximize or satisfice)
even if motivation was not the focus of the research. When the results from
structural decision studies have been reported in terms of interindividual dif-
ferences, needs and motivation may be inferred hypothetically even if they
are not treated as such in the original work. To illustrate, a need of security
can be assumed to motivate decision makers who avoid taking risks. Risk
avoidance, risk taking, and conservatism have been explained as reflecting
personal strategies, and in general no elaborated analyses have been made
in terms of motivation. However, Cacioppo and Petty (1982) explain differ-
ences in decision making in terms of need for cognition motivating different
decision-making strategies. Webster and Kruglanski also address individual
differences and explain them in terms of need of cognitive closure (Webster
& Kruglanski, 1994).
There are different techniques for aiding and supporting decisions. Most
decision-aiding techniques use the MAUT model as the theoretical founda-
tion, and start the aiding process with an exploration of fundamental needs,
goals, and motivations of a client. The aim of this process is to find a common
utility scale on which all the different motives can be mapped.

Process-Oriented Decision Research

In contrast to structural theories, process theories do not only aim at predicting
the final decision but their primary goal is to model the processes leading to
a decision. A number of process decision theories also model processes after
a decision. In 1957, Festinger published his Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, a
theory with great influence on later process approaches to human decision
making. Festinger postulates that an individual strives toward consistence
within herself or himself. If there is an inconsistency of cognitions, in the
theory called dissonance, there is psychological discomfort. Festinger defined
dissonance in the following way: “Two elements are in a dissonant relation if,
considering these two alone, the obverse of one element would follow from
the other” (1957, p. 13). Festinger introduced his basic hypotheses early in his
book:

1. The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will moti-

vate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance.
2. When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person
will actively avoid situations and information which would likely increase the
312 Svenson

dissonance. . . . Cognitive dissonance can be seen as an antecedent condition

which leads to activity oriented toward dissonance reduction just as hunger leads
to activity oriented toward hunger reduction (Festinger, 1957, p. 3).

Thus, Festinger identified the need of reducing cognitive dissonance and the
goal of cognitive consonance. The magnitude of dissonance determines the
strength of the motivation to reduce the dissonance. The magnitude of dis-
sonance depends on the importance of the elements that are dissonant and
the relative attractiveness of the non-chosen alternative to the chosen one. The
more important the elements and the greater the relative attractiveness of the
non-chosen alternative in comparison to the chosen alternative are, the stron-
ger the motivation to reduce cognitive dissonance. Festinger was only interested
in what happens after a decision, and paid no attention to what was happening
before a decision. So, contemporary SEU theory treated antecedents to a deci-
sion and the decision itself, but the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance only cov-
ered postdecision processes. This was also the case in the volume by Festinger
and collaborators who presented a number of empirical studies about a decade
after the first presentation of the theory (Festinger, 1964).
Festinger’s approach to studying postdecision processes was largely
ignored by mainstream decision researchers who concentrated their efforts
on investigating antecedents of a decision and the ensuing decision and not
the consequences of decisions. Furthermore, Svenson’s (1979) review of the
few process studies of decision making in the 1960s and 1970s did not have
one single reference to Festinger or any of the studies based on his theoretical
concepts.
In most process studies of decision making there is an assumption of a
process need to spend as little energetic effort as possible in a decision pro-
cess. This motivates a decision maker to use simplifying rules requiring less
information search and processing if this will not affect the decision qual-
ity in a serious way. In other situations, there may be a conflict between the
needs of spending as little energetic effort and of finding the best solution of
a decision problem, in turn leading to a trade-off between the corresponding
motivations.
Janis and Mann (1977) followed in the Festinger tradition, but they did not
agree with the focus on postdecision processes only. Instead, they claimed on
empirical grounds that even before a decision, processes such as bolstering
(selecting and interpreting information so that it supports the chosen alter-
native) take place. Janis and Mann concentrated their research on level-three
decisions and focused on the effects of motivational conflicts on decision
processes.
 Human Decision Making 313

They used the term “psychological stress” “as a generic term to designate
unpleasant emotional states evoked by threatening environmental events or
stimuli” (Janis & Mann, 1977, p. 50).
There is always a need to avoid or decrease psychological stress, and this
motivates decision processes that are able to relieve the decision maker from
stress. Janis and Mann presented a number of ways in which the decision pro-
cess can be affected as a result of different ways of solving decision conflicts
under different conditions, activating other kinds of needs and motivations.
It is interesting to note that according to Janis and Mann, predecision reac-
tions to decision conflict, such as bolstering, are motivated by anticipatory
imagination of postdecision conditions. “We regard bolstering as one of the
most common forms of defensive avoidance, and we assume that it is moti-
vated primarily by a need to ward off the stress of postdecisional conflict
rather than by an invariable tendency to reduce cognitive dissonance” (Janis
& Mann, 1977, p. 85). This corresponds to the later concept of anticipated
postdecision regret (Zeelenberg, 1999), which is a fundamental motive mod-
eled as a negative cognitively based emotion experienced when imagining (or
realizing) that the outcome of a decision would have been better after another
choice.
According to Svenson (1992, 2003, 2006), who continued the process tra-
dition with his Differentiation and Consolidation (Diff Con) theory, one goal
of a decision process is a chosen alternative that is sufficiently superior in
comparison to its closest competitor. If this is not the case from the begin-
ning, a “winning alternative” has to be created in different kinds of differen-
tiation processes. These processes start before the decision in differentiation
and continue beyond the decision and its implementation in consolidation
processes using different decision rules and changing mental representations
of evaluations and facts to arrive at a superior alternative.
There are at least two groups of process and representation needs motivating
differentiation and consolidation processes in Diff Con theory. The first group
relates to cognitive prototype “gestalt” factors. “This set of driving factors can be
related to predominantly cognitively driven explanations [Bem, 1967], to attribu-
tion theory [Kelley, 1967], and to self-serving biases [Greenwald, 1980]” (Svenson,
2003 p. 317). Also belonging to this set of factors is the need of dissonance reduc-
tion (Festinger, 1957), specified in terms of both predecision differentiation and
postdecision consolidation in Diff Con. The stability and safety motive belongs
to the second group of these needs-motivating differentiation and consolidation
processes: [It] is related to a safety or stability motive and refers more clearly to a
decision maker’s predictions of aspects, images, or scenarios in the postdecision
phase. This set of (motivating) components drives predecision differentiation in
314 Svenson

a process that is explicitly related to the future much more than the first set of
(motivating) factors. After a decision the same set of components drives consoli-
dation, so that in spite of adverse events and regret, the chosen alternative appears
or becomes sufficiently superior to its competitors (Svenson, 2003, p. 318).

Montgomery was less explicit about motivation when he presented his

Dominance structuring theory. However, striving for a decision with one
alternative dominating the others can be perceived as the response to a pro-
cess and representation need motivating the dominance structuring process
(Montgomery, 1998). The trade-off between the goals of effort and accuracy
(here interpreted as fundamental goal fulfillment) illustrates how process
and fundamental motivation have been treated in process studies of decision
making (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Weber & Johnson, 2009).
Process approaches have been concerned with process and representation
motivation. In contrast, decision-aiding techniques focus on fundamental
needs and motives and the trade off functions between different motives.
These techniques typically impose the decision process on a client through
eliciting evaluations concerning fundamental motives and mechanically inte-
grating this information according to some model in interaction with the cli-
ent. Traditional SEU-related research typically has had little to say explicitly
about either fundamental or process and structural motivation.

Structural Decision Research

Decision research founded on SEU theory or its relatives postulates that a
decision maker has two kinds of motives. First, a decision maker has a funda-
mental motive to maximize her or his own utility. Second, a decision maker
has a process motive to use logically and statistically correct procedures when
integrating the information about available alternatives. In empirical research,
the theory is often so strong that when decision makers do not follow the
theory, this is called biased behavior instead of evidence against the theory.
Sometimes, the biases are explained by drawing on existing general knowl-
edge and facts about human cognition and behavior. However, an approach
to study behavior that discards disconfirmations of a theory of human behav-
ior as human biases instead of a shortcoming of the theory seems very odd.
Fortunately, there are other approaches now emerging in structural decision
research.
Some researchers started to differentiate between different kinds of util-
ity as motivating decisions. To exemplify, Frisch and Jones (1993) used the
terms decision utility (when the decision was made) and experienced utility
 Human Decision Making 315

(when the outcome was evaluated). Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997)
distinguished between instantaneous utility (ongoing via sensory input),
remembered utility, predicted utility, and decision utility (at the time of the
decision). These interdependent utilities may create interacting motives at the
time of a decision. Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov (1999) developed and tested
a theory that was centered around anticipated emotions as motivating deci-
sions. The decision affect theory by Schneider and Barnes (2003) went further
and investigated fundamental goals of decision makers, identifying eight dif-
ferent areas that were experienced as motivating their participants’ decisions.
Goals in these areas were elaborated and set into a context of essential motives
according to evolutionary and motivational theories. Krantz and Kunreuther
(2007) reintroduced goals and plans (Miller, Glanter, & Pribram, 1960) and
multiple goal-based models, and used it in their decision research in a very
fruitful way. They point out that one plan and its associated decision(s) may
satisfy several goals (and not just maximize a common value function) at the
same time, and that this is important when people make decisions.
For more than a decade, a number of structural-decision investigators have
shown an interest in fundamental motivation related to emotion. Affect and
emotion have been contrasted with cognitive evaluations and utility as moti-
vating decisions. Zajonc’s (1980) brought attention to the fact that affective
and emotional reactions can be extremely quick, and that they do not have to
be transmitted via elaborate cognitions. Zajonc’s 1980 paper was important
for decision researchers who started to include basic needs and motivations
in structural approaches. Another important influence for these researchers
was dual-process theories, in which a cognitive rational system and an emo-
tional affective system are assumed to work in parallel. An example of this is
Epstein (1994), who models an individual’s interaction with the environment
as transmitted by two different and parallel systems. The rational system is
a deliberative analytic cognitive system following rules of logic. The experi-
ential system perceives reality in an affective emotional way using feeling as
an important component. Although the systems work in parallel they also
interact.
As found by a number of decision researchers (e.g., Isen, 2000; Luce,
Bettman, & Payne, 1997), affect and emotion may influence process and rep-
resentation motivation (e.g., positive affect and mood are coupled with moti-
vation to search less information) and fundamental motivation (e.g., decision
makers in a positive affect and mood are motivated to recall and search more
information that is positive in relation to fundamental goals). Affect and emo-
tion can also influence fundamental motivations and the trade-offs between
them (e.g., under some conditions, security becomes a weaker motive and
316 Svenson

predictive utility a stronger motive). Loewenstein and Schkade (1996) also

pointed out that visceral motivation (e.g., addictions) totally dominates some
decisions.
Anticipated postdecision regret (when the wrong choice was made) and
disappointment (an unfortunate outcome of a “correct” choice) have been
regarded as anticipatory emotional factors motivating decision makers
(Connolly, Ordonez, & Coughlan, 1997). Loewenstein et al. (2001) distin-
guished between anticipated emotions and anticipatory emotions. The former
are largely cognitively represented predictions of future emotional states; the
latter are emotional reactions in the present when thinking of what may hap-
pen after a decision. Both kinds of emotions motivate decision makers.
Empirically, it is very difficult to differentiate between cognitive motives
and emotional affect motives in a decision process (Svenson, 2003). Emotional
reactions are often very fast, and faster than many cognitive reactions, but this
does not lead to the conclusion that a quicker response is always only emotional
and not cognitive. One should remember that the fastest perceptual-cognitive
motor feedback loops require only about 250 ms. Slovic and colleagues cir-
cumvented the problem of differentiating emotion and cognition and defined
affect in a new way, as will be shown in the next paragraph.
The most general and developed theoretical framework including affect as
motivating decision makers has probably been presented by Slovic and his
collaborators (Finucane, Peters, & Slovic, 2003). The meaning of affect is not
well defined in the research literature and varies a lot. Slovic and colleagues
used this uncertainty and provided their own definition of the concept. “We
see affect as ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ (1) experienced as a feeling state . . . (2)
demarcating a positive or negative quality of a specific stimulus. . . . Unlike
emotion, we view affect as having the capacity to be subtle and to be without
elaborate appraisal properties; unlike mood, we view affect as having a direct
(rather than indirect) motivational effect” (Finucane et al., 2003 p. 328). This
kind of affect is distinct from emotion but not from feeling in this framework.
Thus, affect is not used in its more conventional way (most often including
emotion and excluding cognition) by Slovic and his colleagues. There is an
affective conditioning history of each individual, so identical decision prob-
lems can elicit different affects in different persons. This means that cognitive,
emotion-free judgments in the past may have created an affective reaction to
an alternative in a later decision. The affective heuristic is a name for deci-
sions that are at least in part motivated by affect. Affect and more deliberate
cognitive processes typically interact and motivate most decisions, accord-
ing to Slovic and coworkers. Loewenstein and Schkade (1999) have presented
(the maximization of) predicted (positive) feelings as a fundamental motive
 Human Decision Making 317

in decision making. In particular, they were interested in mispredictions of

future feelings and how to debias decision makers in this respect, if possible.
From a social psychological perspective, Tetlock has drawn attention to
accountability, both external and internal, as motivating decisions (Tetlock,
1992). He sees accountability as serving a critical rule-and-norm–enforce-
ment mechanism. According to Tetlock, decisions are motivated by their jus-
tifiability. Tetlock is special because he is one of the few researchers of social
psychology who has had an impact on mainstream decision research. There
are also other related social psychological motives: a need of making the same
decision as a group; to make the same decision as a significant other would; to
follow habits; and so forth. However, there are not so many direct links from
most structural decision research to social psychology, so one rarely finds this
kind of fundamental motives in structural decision research with an excep-
tion of the justification motive. However, “A focus on goals may provide a
natural way of further integrating social and cognitive psychological insights
(with decision research)” (Weber & Johnson, 2009, p. 76).

Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, fundamental motives have been distinguished from process
and representation motives. Other authors have presented similar distinc-
tions. To illustrate, Weinberger and McClelland (1990) differentiate between
cognitive motivation and more primitive motivation models. Samsone and
Harackiewicz (1996) present an overview of different motivation models and
differentiate between process and outcome motivation. For a long time, the
fundamental motives of a decision maker were considered to be self-evident
and never discussed in traditional decision theory and research. All funda-
mental motivations were assumed to be possible to evaluate in money or util-
ity and to be integrated into a general motivation to get as much money or
utility as possible in the long run, even if only a single decision was made.
Process and representation motivation was assumed to coincide with the laws
of logic and statistics. Empirical results showing that decision makers did not
follow these laws were described as human biases and heuristics. However,
quite early, individual differences in terms of risk aversive or risk prone
behavior were included as motivating decisions.
In contrast, process-oriented decision researchers had a lot to say explicitly
about motivation, but most of their interest concerned process and repre-
sentation motivation and not much was said about fundamental motivation.
Much of the process-oriented research was focused on the solution of con-
flicts between different motives in a decision situation.
318 Svenson

Around 1990, the roles played by affect and motivation regarding decision
making were brought into focus by structural decision researchers; thereaf-
ter, it became an important topic for many researchers. However, it is easier
to differentiate affect and emotion from cognitive processes in theory than
in empirical research, and there is yet much work to be done concerning this
issue. Generally speaking, decision research has emphasized the creation of
cognitive congruence between motives and decisions (Simon, Snow, & Read,
2004), postulated maximization of expected personal utility, acknowledged
the effect of emotional and affective motivation in parallel with motivation
grounded in cognitive processes, and pointed out the trade-off between
needs of high-quality decisions and resource preservation (e.g., time, effort).
At present, it seems as if decision research is slowly leaving the prison of a
too-strong theory and moving into theoretical and empirical research driven
by decision makers’ motives, their own realities and psychological decision
processes, and not by a theory that cannot be refuted. This is a promising
trend for future developments of decision research.

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 16

Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management

Reflecting the Limits of Decision Making

Rainer P. Born & Eva Gatarik

Introduction
Knowledge Management suffers in some way from the fact that economic
decisions in many cases rest upon incomplete information. Far too often one
believes in the correctness of decision calculi, for example, Decision Support
Systems (DSS), and is at a loss if one needs experience in order to evaluate
consequences and correct the actions (considered to be meaningful because
they are supported by calculations or computations). What is missing is addi-
tional knowledge stemming from expertise; that is, an understanding of the
signals (or the meaning of those signals) that come from experience – signals
that help select good solutions and eliminate bad ones, insofar as we consider
our expectations. These signals provide constraints to generate solutions that
are acceptable both on a personal as well as societal (i.e., ethical and cultural)
levels. As will be seen, one can argue for an interesting parallel to Jerome
Bruner’s (1990, p. 4) ideas concerning the need for a second cognitive revolu-
tion. Bruner seems to be very unhappy about the replacement in psychology
of the “construction of meaning” by the algorithmic/computational “process-
ing of information” in the first cognitive revolution.
The developments in Knowledge Management took a similar course.
Instead of constructing meaning (for details, see following information) in
psychology, it was, and in Knowledge Management it still is, important to
construct the inherent/intrinsic knowledge (based on information and exper-
tise in use) in order to explain, for example, the competitive advantages of
enterprises. In Knowledge Management, knowledge is therefore considered
to be essential in order to explain the economic success of an enterprise. It is
understood that the missing knowledge could not be brought about simply
by the monetary means to organize a firm.

321
322 Born & Gatarik

So, in cognitive psychology, it is evident that meaning (constructed to

explain behavior and make the “black box” of behaviorism translucent)
cannot be established by information-processing techniques alone, leading
to proper decisions to react to other people and adjust oneself to society.
Similarly, in Knowledge Management we find it is not enough to admin-
istrate information (corresponding to processing information) to build up
or generate the relevant knowledge in order to explain the economic suc-
cess. Bureaucratizing expertise in an enterprise is not enough to ensure
success. Instead, technical expert systems, for example, should take up the
routines of actions and help us gain time for concentrating on creative and
innovative solutions and establishing flexibility. They should not, however,
replace creativity by some sort of algorithm to produce interpretable signs
within whatever we already know. Bruner replaces the processing of infor-
mation – if we understood him correctly – by a new cultural psychology.
In Knowledge Management, however, we suggest that sharing expertise can
take up this mission in comprising not only cognition but also both emotion
and motivation.
The really important point now is the following one: Although one has
recognized, in the context of Management and Administration, that knowl-
edge by content – namely, constructed knowledge – is important, one still
seems to think that management based solely on monetary control will work
well. Looking carefully, one can see that merely providing information is not
enough. We also need a technique to be able to use knowledge properly.
In Knowledge Management, one has not yet seen the point Bruner really
wants to make – to see the necessity for a second revolution in cognitive
approaches. The second revolution should take up (just as Bruner does) in
some sense the pragmatic aspect of semiotics, the use of information, and
therefore an understanding of the limits of syntax and semantics. Just providing
well-processed information is definitely not enough. We need to improve on
change and enable some learning concerning the knowledge of the users (e.g.,
managers). In the sequel, we shall do this within the framework of Language-
Information-Reality (LIR), analyzing the relation between language, informa-
tion, and reality in connection with the cognitive and emotional reflection,
based on motivation and drive according to Antonio R. Damasio.
It seems that more or less implicitly we did assume that the reconstruc-
tion of knowledge by way of administrating information (without provid-
ing a correct understanding of meaning) might be sufficient, but it is not.
The research by Damasio shows that signals from emotional evaluations of
experience (so-called somatic markers) are necessary to establish those con-
straints that are essential to produce acceptable solutions, especially in busi-
ness administration.
 Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management 323

According to Damasio, the emotional knowledge residing in experience

and expertise based upon motivations and drives produces those socially
anchored linguistic categories, which enable us to use reflective knowledge
for correction. They can thus help us identify the limits of the applicability of
those algorithms, which we consider to be essential for producing meaningful
or useful information in the context of decisions. By providing constraints,
these signals should help us reduce the set of computable solutions and thus
produce a set of meaningful, creative, innovative, and especially acceptable
solutions depending on the concrete situation.
The technical means to achieve this are – as already mentioned – the
scheme LIR and the influence of the “scissors of knowledge and life” on
meaning. Besides the insights of Jerome Bruner, the work of Damasio is espe-
cially important because it highlights the influence of drives and motivations
on emotions and feelings in the context of cognition and decision making.
Errors and mistakes in decision making cannot be explained by the lack of
cognition – for example, missing knowledge. On the contrary, in real life,
cognition alone would provide too many possible solutions, which need to
be reduced by an emotional estimation of similar experienced situations.
Emotions/motivations are thus not a luxury, but an essential part in our suc-
cessful adjustment to the world. Therefore, we need to differentiate between
sharing knowledge, which concerns primarily cognition, and sharing exper-
tise, which includes emotion as well as motivation to achieve a shared real
aim. It thus links up to Bruner’s cultural psychology.
In classical Knowledge Management, only the cognitive part of knowl-
edge is provided for decision making, and there is a lack of emotional and
motivational reflection of means and ends. In this context, decisions are built
upon a cognitive processing of explicated information. Other problem solu-
tions incorporating feelings, emotions, and motivations based on experience/
expertise are not really admissible. The technical means to produce decisions
are, however, much too weak; thus, an extension is necessary. The problems
arising from applying Cognitive Science to Knowledge Management and its
actualization in decision-making processes, based on the influence of cog-
nition and motivation, pave the way to understanding the limits of the tech-
niques for decision making and the necessity to improve on knowledge by a
new learning (Robinson, 2001, 2009) in order to permit creativity, innovation,
and flexibility in decisions attuned to a world in change.

Setting up the Scene

Bruner, together with and influenced by Egon Brunswik (Hammond, 1966),
can be considered as one of the founding fathers of cognitive psychology,
324 Born & Gatarik

which in the sequel had a strong influence on the development of cognitive

science in general. In Acts of Meaning, Bruner (1990, p. 2) emphasizes that we
should try to “recapture the original momentum of [what he calls] the first
cognitive revolution.”1 According to Bruner, the aim of this first revolution was
to bring mind back into the human sciences (today, perhaps, especially into
behavioristically orientated economics), “after a long cold winter of objectiv-
ism,” not necessarily mindlessness, promoted especially by behaviorism.
As we shall see, however, this kind of revolution was not really successful
in reintroducing mind and mindfulness into psychology as an explanation of
and guide to handling human behavior. So Bruner (1990, p. 2) opts for what
he calls a renewed, or second cognitive revolution, which should be “a more
interpretive approach to cognition,” an approach concerned especially with
meaning-making.
The aim or approach of the first revolution was “to discover and to describe
formally the meanings that human beings created out of their encounters
with the world, and then to propose hypotheses about what meaning-making
processes were implicated” (Bruner, 1990, p. 2). What was it that could be
explained by those meanings, and in which way are those meanings consid-
ered to be necessary to “understand, explain and predict” and thus adjust/
attune ourselves to the behavior of others?
Bruner (1990, p. 4) declares that from very early on, to render the black
box of behaviorism translucent in the cognitive movement, “emphasis began
shifting from meaning to information, from construction of meaning to
the processing of information.” What seemed to be essential was to find
“mechanical2 or other procedures” to be able to identify/produce/simulate/
imitate meaning-making processes including cognition, and on a lower level,
of emotion and motivations (Damasio, 2003), and to stimulate them.
Thus – Bruner (1990, p. 4) insists – very soon “computing became3 the
model of the mind, and in place of the concept of meaning there emerged the
concept of computability.” This concept was amplified by the idea of “com-
putabilism,” considered as the thesis that “the brain and the mind function
basically like a computer” (see the discussions in Gödel, 1990; Wang, 1974).
In formal terms, computationalism might thus be considered or used as an
explanatory approach concerning mental phenomena/processes. According
to Wang (1974), Gödel was interested in the question of whether all thinking
is computational, with special emphasis on mathematical thinking. Gödel’s
main interest, however, was to show that not all mathematical thinking is
computational in the normal sense of the word (i.e., is based on some kind
of calculation).
 Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management 325

In trying to establish the connection between computations in com-

puter simulation/informatics and the cognitive sciences, it may be helpful to
understand the way in which we might try to grasp the so-called content of
thoughts, especially by using formal systems (Frege, 1918). Gödel, for exam-
ple, insisted that the concept of “Turing machines” (the abstract concept of
computation that is then assumed to be the model of the mind) is an explica-
tion of what formal systems amount to. Throughout his life, he turned repeat-
edly to the issue of investigating the limits of formal systems in trying to grasp
in which way the mind goes beyond usual conceptions of computation. Gödel
even claims that Turing disregarded completely “the fact that mind, in its use,
is not static, but constantly developing.” Furthermore, he emphasizes “that we
understand abstract terms more and more precisely as we go on using them,
and that more and more abstract terms enter the sphere of our understand-
ing” (Gödel, 1990, p. 306).
Bruner, on the other hand, claimed that there must be something wrong
in taking the concept of computing too literally; that is, considering the for-
mation of meaning (considered to be essential for explaining the reaction of
human beings to signs as information bearers) as the result of some computa-
tional process concerning the processing of information (in the sense of some
“inference engine,” as implemented later in experts’ systems).
Let us therefore start with the application of the computational paradigm
within cognitive science. Why is it assumed that we cannot build up or pro-
duce meaning solely with the help of algorithms, and why are rules (in this
context, usually considered as human instantiations of algorithms for han-
dling information) insufficient for constructing meaning in order to be able
to act properly upon information turning up in some situation? Maybe the
following picture of understanding how to study the mind with the methods
of natural sciences would be helpful to give a different flavor to the problem.
Consider we are observing some biological system – for example, a human
being in a certain well-specified situation. A situation of this kind may be
considered as reproducible in its essentials and therefore can turn up again,
as we want to adjust ourselves to that person or attune ourselves to the world.
Now, if we want to explain or predict behavior in that situation – and under
the assumption that a person is reacting to some well understood and there-
fore as meaningfully interpreted information and is drawing conclusions in
order to react properly – then we may well consider that this is a process
going on in the mind of that person.
In formal logic, means have been developed to justify the validity of cer-
tain inferences. This technique can be programmed and the results can finally
be computed. What we learn in practice – taking up some of Quine’s (1990)
326 Born & Gatarik

ideas – is to argue and draw conclusions in such a way that the validity of the
inference can be justified. The point here is that those means of justifying the
validity of an inference are not necessarily literally descriptive of the causal
mechanisms governing our brain-states and their transitions as far as the
logical/formal side of thinking is studied. Why does this matter in our con-
text? The question is of particular significance in view of Gödel’s insistence
that the mind can do more than a computer, at least in abstract mathematical
thinking, or, as Hilary Putnam (1981) claimed: reason can transcend whatever
reason can formalize.
As far as cognition is concerned, let us consider the fact (see the drum-
mer’s example, 9.3) that we think we were successful in calculating some of
the information that an individual may have available in the situation, and
that we know how it is encoded in the sign system/language in use at the
level of that individual. In that case, we might be able to test our hypotheses
by presenting to that individual meaningful signs (although calculated with
formal means). We may test our hypotheses with respect to expected or pre-
dicted reactions. We may be able to predict reactions, reactions that could not
be explained just mechanically, but as we think presuppose the working of a
mind. Bruner (1990, p. 5) argued that a normal, mechanical, or plainly algo-
rithmically working system cannot deal for example with “vagueness, with
polysemy, with metaphoric or connotative connections” and other essential
matters in daily life. Therefore, the construction of meaning/processing of
knowledge or information need the “extra kick” of a mind, just as semantics
is more than syntax. However, the essential point of the picture has not yet
emerged. What is essential is that our means to calculate meaningful signs
are a technical or reconstructive means to reproduce the meaningfulness
of those signs (i.e., the cognitive part of formal/syntactical means). Those
means, however, are not necessarily literally descriptive as the “reality guys
seem to assume,” according to Bruner,4 just as logic when applied to a mathe-
matical proof reproduces the validity of a mathematical theorem with respect
to the mathematical/structural presuppositions.
So, the means to reproduce the meaningfulness (but not an understand-
ing of the message per se) will not necessarily be the means employed by an
individual to produce the information encoded in those signs in order to
behave properly in the situation under investigation. The last and ­perhaps
most important point, however, seems to be the following (see Figure 16.1):
Even if we are successful in making good predictions of the behavior of
some individual, we have to consider the pre-experience of that individ-
ual, the soil upon which the seeds of information fall that gives meaning to
those calculated items of information. Wittgenstein (1953, p. 38) insists that
 Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management 327

+ ==>
Reactions/
(Special) Information/signs
behaviour
situation (s) (knowledge)
(predictions)

Possible situation Consequences

Background-knowledge/experience New experiences

Figure 16.1. The importance of background knowledge.

we need “a greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning,

and thinking.” He goes on to remark that “it will then also become clear,
what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence
and means or understands it [s]he is operating a calculus according to def-
inite rules.” This will lead us to the central topic of new ways of computa-
tion and some kind of solution and practical consequences, which we shall
provide with the help of the semantico-pragmatic scheme LIR (language/
information/reality)5 from Born. So, this is not just a sophisticated critique;
it is essential for explaining the success and danger, for example, of Deep
Blue (the chess program that beat Kasparov) and similar devices (the iron-
ical drummer’s example, 9.3).
Any successful test presupposes such pre-experience. If we take the lat-
ter as fixed, we can consider our formal system to calculate information as
complete with respect to our aims and let evolution or the Lord take care of
changing those pre-experiences. We do not interfere. If we think we do not
have to care, we seem to be justified to use algorithms to reproduce mean-
ingful signs in order to teach individuals to produce meaningful signs. We
learn rules to process information. The building up of meaning or under-
standing of those signs as meaningful are supposed to be achieved with the
same means. Meaning is studied as a means to come to terms with reality, but
is it really the case that meaning/experience (in the sense of knowing how
to apply information) can be built up in that way? Would our predictions
about the behavior of individuals being tested in situations where there was
another pre-experience available still be correct? Is the pre-experience really
built up in the way suggested? Maybe this is not a topic of science. At least
in physics, for example, we are not conscious of it, and it does not change
our theoretico-explanatory ideas. Gödel (1990, p. 306), on the other hand,
328 Born & Gatarik

seems to have been well aware of the problem and addressed it (as mentioned
above) in the following way: “We understand abstract terms more and more
precisely as we go on using them.” This use of the abstract terms belongs to the
building up of experiences, the construction of meaning in Bruner’s terms,
which cannot be achieved simply by “following the rules” (Wittgenstein, 1952,
§ 190a) in the sense of instantiating algorithms to produce meaningful signs
and sentences.
To our mind, Gödel’s message can be reformulated as trying to become
intimate with some mental matters (e.g., abstract concepts), and this will lead
to some kind of new insights that can guide our behavior (e.g., the applica-
tion of information in the light of those experiences), our use of the signs,
and will also produce a new use according to some agreed-upon shorthand.
Winterson (1995, pp. 79–80) expresses the same idea in the following way:
“Communication between you and me relies on assumptions, associations,
communalities and the kind of agreed shorthand, which no-one could pre-
cisely define but which everyone would admit exists. It would seem that for
most of us, most of the time, communication depends on more than words.”
In other words, the signs are abbreviations for some new practices that can-
not simply be built up in following rules but that need to be established by
some kind of intimacy6 with a topic that essentially rests upon what may be
described as the possibility of “reflective correction.” Taking up the quote from
Winterson, one could say the agreed-upon shorthand establishes a new prac-
tice, a new tie, a new form of life, in the sense of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations.
This kind of practical knowledge need not be computational; it cannot be
reproduced with formal/syntactical means alone. It will become to be pos-
sible to see this only in pragmatical ways, however, taking into account the
application, context, and use of processed information. On the other hand,
it may well be possible to use it in many cases in everyday life, reducing the
application of knowledge to rules and taking into account what all people
have in common insofar as epistemic presuppositions are considered.
Thus, the problem is how can we build up knowledge, how can we com-
municate information in such a way that successful applications of knowl-
edge are guaranteed? Needless to say, responsibility comes in here, and ethics
in a more general way, as well. The technique to convey information in the
sense that it has to rest upon experience is essential, however (and not only
for being able to deal with abstract mathematical concepts). One chance to
build up meaning differently might be found in the technology of virtual
reality, but the direction of development in connection with information
 Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management 329

processing and diagrammatical reasoning may be interesting. In building up

new experiences, one can see new consequences (i.e., new ways of process-
ing information may be at hand). Further, a new character of persuasion for
accepting conclusions will be established, as they rest much more on visu-
alization and other means of experiencing than before. We would feel more
compelled to see (accept) a consequence rather than just on the basis of a log-
ical derivation. Thus, there will be a new quality of accepting consequences of
given information in well-defined situations as meaningful. It rests upon the
well-established semantic techniques called semantic tableaus developed by
Evereth Beth (1965) and is also applied in Beth’s physical semantics, which in
philosophy of science lead to the state-space approach concerning theories,
surviving in the model-theoretic approach.
The final practical consequence of this view of the matter would be to
see some of the faults in daily life i.e., the inability to see the twofold role of
background knowledge or in many cases the need to give it up, as argued by
Putnam [1992, p. 14] in connection with the possibility of an unimaginative
or algorithmic artificial intelligence.

Bruner’s Proposal
Bruner’s (1990, p. 11) proposal for a sort of reassessing of the cognitive revolu-
tion is to “return to the question of how to construct a mental science around
the concept of meaning and the processes by which meanings are created and
negotiated within the community.” One of Bruner’s critical remarks is that:
Information processing [especially in the context of preparing for and provid-
ing material for decision making etc.] cannot deal with anything beyond well-
defined and arbitrary entries that can enter into specific relationships that are
strictly governed by a program of elementary operations. Such a system can-
not cope with vagueness, with polysemy, with metaphoric or connotative con-
nections. . . . Information processing needs advance planning and precise rules
(Bruner, 1990, p. 5).

In the sequel, we will try to produce solutions or at least a better understand-

ing of those problems with the semantico-pragmatic scheme LIR,7 a scheme
both for understanding as well as doing something about building up mean-
ing and seeing the influence of cognition, emotion, and motivations.
The aim of our own considerations in this context, therefore, is twofold:
We want to come to terms with Bruner’s suggestion as well as to find a
new or rather more adequate understanding of calculation/computation/
330 Born & Gatarik

computationalism that can do justice both to Bruner’s qualms and produce a

better handling of some of the problems we may be up to in the cognitive sci-
ences. The latter refer to the explanation of the mind, especially with respect
to developments in Knowledge Management. Why do meanings seem to be so
important? What can they be used for to explain or predict? How can they help
us adjust to the world? The real problem or question might be: Why are compu-
tations not enough? What is missing if we just stick to “computing” (processing)
information? If we “enact” those computations, could we produce meaning and
how would we know?
If we assume that a person has understood the meaning of some kind of
information, we can consider the acceptance of this information as a conse-
quence in more than one respect. We can think that the acceptance is mani-
fested or even generalized by the fact that the linguistic signs that codify that
information can be derived from some other already accepted information.
On the other hand, we may have already experienced that the adding of back-
ground knowledge (or learning more about the topic in question) can help to
accept something that hitherto has not been accepted. In this case, we do not
say that the information is literally derived, but we may say that there is no way
of supplementing the original information such that the originally given infor-
mation is fulfilled in that realm of experience or that set of models. However,
what may be considered as new or consequence is not fulfilled. We could con-
sider this idea or formulation as a formal criterion for accepting something as
a consequence. (cf. the idea of Beth’s [1962] “semantic tableaus”)

Why the Formal “Incompleteness” (of some

Means of Expression, e.g., some Language)
May Matter to the Mind
Incompleteness as the result of some informal decision being not decidable for-
mally comes into the picture whenever we try to formalize experience or knowl-
edge of content in the sense of trying to reformulate it syntactically. However,
if we wonder how the knowledge – which is conveyed with our syntactic or
even model-theoretic means – is applied, we sometimes say that somebody has
not understood what was intended as meaning to be conveyed, or we use some
stronger expressions or else she/he would not act, given certain information, in
a way we can observe. This is a gross and rough description of the situation, but
it depicts some of our feelings, and we may now analyze where they stem from.
We suggest that the problems of misapplication (if they depend on the use of
information or knowledge) stem from a pragmatic incompleteness. Thus, if
meaning matters to the mind, incomplete knowledge definitely does, as well.8
 Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management 331

Starting up with Bruner once More

What we want to find out is where exactly (logically speaking and not just
historically) computationalism came into the picture as a means to study the
mind. Where eventually did it happen that the construction of meaning got
replaced by the processing of information, in the sense of manipulating mean-
ingful signs to produce further meaningful signs? Maybe the manipulation of
signs was not considered a description of processes in the brain but rather as
a paradigm for producing good programs to produce meaningful signs?
Bruner (1990, p. 33), however, insists that, “The central concept of a human
psychology is meaning and the processes and transactions involved in the
construction of meanings.” Furthermore, “One must understand how his
experiences and his acts are shaped by his intentional states . . . the form of
these intentional states is realized only through participation in the symbolic
systems of the culture.” This is Bruner’s way of going “back to his roots,” or in
other words, it is his motivation to overcome the incompleteness of a compu-
tational approach when it is being taken too literally.
The question concerning the development positively as well as negatively
of cognitive science we want to pose here, however, goes much further, pre-
supposing the direction in which we are looking for a sort of solution. Can we
understand how models, say, of the mind come to be turned into reality, are
used to replace reality, or are even projected onto reality? How does it come
about that one studies a phenomenon such as the mind with the help of a
computational model, but eventually ends up by identifying the model with
the world, or for that matter, the means with its ends or the territory with the
map (Houellebecq, 2010), and draws conclusions from the model or chart to
orient oneself in the world? Thinking that there are many useful charts of the
world does not turn the (three-dimensional) world into a two-dimensional
object or chart.
Now of course we all know that folk-psychological concepts such as atti-
tudes or the assumptions about other peoples’ minds are practical, although
some want us to believe they are not real and we should find new corre-
sponding concepts if we take cognitive science seriously. Will they be as cute,
however? In physics we know that the earth is approximately a revolving,
moving sphere, but we still talk about a rising sun, as though the earth were
at rest. The question is rather when it is essential to switch to other pictures as
­behavior- and action-guiding insights. The mind produces pictures, but how
can we compute them, predict them, predict their efficiency, and use them
in solving certain tasks? This concerns our own actions to reach our goals.
What could motivate us to turn the tables on those action-guiding pictures?
332 Born & Gatarik

Why should we be motivated to understand the limits of cognitive decision

­making? Are there rules with no exceptions?

Building up (Constructing) Meaning out of

Cognition and Emotion/Motivation
The main point that we really want to investigate is that we have to give up – in
order to avoid consequences that are not in our interest – the idea of provid-
ing meaning simply by computing signs (i.e., in a context-free manner such
that the results can be multiply instantiated). How can we build up meaning
by computing signs as meaning bearers? As will be shown later, the technique
of virtual reality (VR) could be a first step in this direction for studying the
phenomena properly (i.e., using the technique to convey meaning and com-
municate meaning in providing experiences that could help build up new
meanings).
Thus, the problem is how to convey meaning, and furthermore how to
build up knowledge. Notably, we no longer live in the age of information
processing but in the age of creating knowledge that allows us to make use of
data and information in an appropriate way so that we can take into account
ethical evaluations, as well.

Projecting Concepts: Knowledge as Cognition?

How can we reach anything of that sort? In order to not just project concepts
but to use them with everyday connotations, we have to understand how we
apply computations, or rather how we grasp in a logical way what we think is
essential, for example, in and about thinking.
Way back in Aristotelian logic, what was essential was the kind of classifi-
cations or categorizations in the linguistic sense that were created by the use
of verbal representations or concepts. In that field and way, one could identify
the causal if-then (in the world) with the logical if-then (in language) (see
the relation between causes and reasons in Figure 16.7) – in some sense, one
could identify reasons with causes. Drawing conclusions in the sense of pro-
cessing information would at the same time be descriptive of what is going
on causally in the world, so that one could watch time sequences literally as
causal connections of events. In a similar manner, nowadays we would like
to watch a program stepwise to produce the desired results (i.e., taking the
recursive functions underlying the topic to be descriptive of causal connec-
tions). Within the refined area of application of logic, there was no need to
distinguish between logic and what nowadays is called effective causality.
 Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management 333

Figure 16.2. GEO example.

The classes that did correspond to some concepts had to consist of elements
that had to have something in common all by themselves.9 Later on, with the
advent of modern science, it became clear that they did not need to literally
correspond to reality and have something in common all by themselves.
Can we find new concepts or maps/charts/models to fulfill our urge for
mixing causality and logic effectively, providing us with a new computation-
alism? Or are those concepts due to some research programs in cognitive
science just a gleam in Paul Churchland’s eyes, as Hilary Putnam (1992) once
put it? Or can we find a compromise, something such as Dennett’s “inten-
tional stance” in a different guise? Sometimes we know that we are caught by
perceptual deceptions, but the perceptions stay on – we cannot easily change
our way of seeing the world.
If one looks at the graphic in Figure 16.2 as a plane and is told that the
straight line from Madrid to New York is longer than the curved one just
above it in the figure, one might easily mistrust this statement. One “sees”
immediately that this cannot be correct if one looks at the map as a bidimen-
sional object, which metaphorically speaking is governed by the grammar
of Euclidean geometry in our modern understanding. If, on the other hand,
the description of one line as above the other refers to the globe, one can
easily see that Madrid and New York are approximately on the same circle of
latitude and that another geodesic indicates a shorter distance if you want,
for example, to fly. Your decision to follow the route of the straight line on a
334 Born & Gatarik

Figure 16.3. Nine-points example.

long-distance flight may prove to be disastrous if you run out of gas, the
amount of which might have been calculated by someone else who thought
you would fly along the geodesic. So the inference from the map to guide
your actions using everyday imagination might be wrong with respect to
your aims. Could you really provide an argument within everyday language
to convey both the meaning and the validity of Figure 16.2, an argument that
is not dependent on visualization, extra knowledge, and experience and still
helps us survive in the situation above? There would then be a host of argu-
mentative gaps to be filled up by intuition or common experiential and men-
tal background knowledge. In any case, we do have to step out of the picture
just as in the case of the solution of linking the 9 points (in Figure 16.3) by 4
lines without lifting the pencil.10

Philosophy in the Flesh

Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 3) listed several assumptions characterizing the
cognitive sciences. We will concentrate only on one, namely, “Abstract con-
cepts are largely metaphorical” (because they are explanatory and not literally
descriptive).
If one considers the history of philosophy and Aristotelian logic and the
latter’s influence on modern thought, one can only agree with this claim.
However, the problem concerns the conclusions to be drawn. The accep-
tance of conclusions is influenced by cognition and emotion. Furthermore,
 Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management 335

motivation and desires direct us to select appropriate simplifications to reach

a goal (e.g., select the best chart or map).
Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pp. 373–391, especially pp. 381–382) rightly insist
that classification was an important enterprise for Aristotle, because “Putting
things in the right categories allows one to apply syllogistic logic to produce
new causal knowledge. . . . For Aristotle logic was not a projection of the mind
onto the world, but the opposite: a direct grasping by the mind of the rational
causal structure of the world.” In modern terms, however, this idea presup-
poses the world is such that the way our mind works is successful within that
enterprise or that there is a mapping onto the resolution level of the mind that
is at least a homomorphism. Yet, modern experience in processing knowl-
edge shows that we cannot be so sure about that. If we circle the earth in a
space shuttle and want to meet another object in the same orbit, we cannot
simply accelerate to get closer, as we might expect from our experience in the
everyday world. We would swerve off into another orbit!
Hence, the concepts in our mind should definitely not be projected liter-
ally onto the world. On the other hand, we should also not be too sure that
there will be easygoing real and embodied concepts that can do the job. In that
case, effective procedures, as, for example, computer programs, may also not
be of much help if misunderstood all too literally or descriptively as ways to
process information. We cannot expect all concepts to be literally applicable;
that would drastically reduce our flexibility and richness of possible solutions.
There is no complete description of the world that could use solely embodied
concepts. The real problem is not to look where, how, and why sometimes-
successful concepts are projected in an all-too literal way to understand the
success but to look for compatible instantiations, instead. The real point, there-
fore, is to understand why and how it happens that people tend to use explan-
atory abstract concepts literally as action-guiding descriptions in the sense of
producing action-guiding ideas through acts of meaning (Bruner, 1990).

The Scissors of Knowledge and Life: Understanding

the Dependence of Decision Making upon Expertise
as Embodied Knowledge (i.e., upon Cognition
and Emotion/Motivation)
1. The Basic Model (to Understand the Misguided Transformation of
the Construction of Meaning into the Processing of Information)
Let us start from the observation that some people have successfully provided
results or solutions either to some of their daily problems P or certain tasks Q
336 Born & Gatarik

P Q

Figure 16.4. The background knowledge E applied to the problem P yields a solution Q.

(e.g., building a car or a technical machine). Retrospectively, they may have

been asked how those solutions/results Q came about or were brought about,
and essentially whether they could reproduce their success in a controlled
nonarbitrary manner or have them copied by other people.
In this case, we presuppose that the solutions were sought in an intuitively
given but not exactly described sort of solution-space (see Figures 16.4 and
16.5, where we use a “cloud” to describe possible solutions). The concrete
solution/result11 Q could then be understood to have manifested itself as some
concrete Q*. We might explain this kind of success in using the assump-
tion that there was some experiential special knowledge E available, which
was applied to the given problem P and eventually did lead to the concrete
­solution Q*.
So, we might assume that some concrete solution Q* as such did not come
about by chance. Therefore, we believe that it is possible to reproduce that
solution Q* in a controlled manner which, however, is dependent on the spe-
cial knowledge E. Very often, it is the case that we are in need of the experi-
ence of other people, especially if there are mistakes and irregularities. In this
case, we need trust and the possibility to correct deviations.
We assume that other people with experiential knowledge E by themselves
are also interested to repeat their own success (i.e., to reproduce their own
solutions). In the case of Henry Ford, these other people were the engineers
who could produce a car from certain ingredients. If one asked them, “How
did you do it?” however, they became rather insecure and could not exactly tell
 Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management 337

P Q* Q

Figure 16.5. The rule system K applied to the problem P under the presupposition of
the background knowledge E yields the solution Q*.

you how they did it. Now, there is a standard technique to ask for an exact doc-
umentation: One expects that with the help of this documentation one could
reproduce the given results. Looking at the matter superficially this sounds
correct. The problem, however, is that in many cases this kind of documenta-
tion is produced by the experts themselves, that is, from within the world of
their experience. On the other hand, we are quite often unaware how docu-
mentations really work. In many cases, they consist of signs whose meaning
or interpretation presuppose the existence of some experience E – the latter
produces reference to reality (i.e., it is constitutive for meaning and practically
relevant and therefore action-guiding). This can be understood in such a way
that the experts – and in many areas of our daily life we are all experts with
respect to our own personal experiences – in some sense establish rules that
enable them to reproduce their positive results in a controlled manner.
Reflecting on and explaining success has led to the construction of a set of
rules K with whose help one can explain the coming about of [Q*] and even-
tually reproduce the set [Q*] (presupposing that the conditions of production
remain constant). In Figure 16.6, we depicted the situation visually by using
the arrow from E → P for describing the original application of knowledge E
to produce a concrete solution Q* (or a possible one Q), but now by way of a
detour via K, i.e., we replaced the original path from E → P by a detour via K,
i.e., E → K → P → Q or <K|E> (P) → Q [K under the condition of E applied to
P to produce Q].
338 Born & Gatarik

Experience/
E
Knowledge-Roles

Keep:
constructions/rules/routines Commonsensical
automations/calculi/ background
documentations knowledge

K F Users

P Q* Q

Figure 16.6. Implicitly, this graphic rests upon the following assumption: First-person
experiential E-Knowledge can be used by every individual F and by every computer with
the same logic K to produce the same results Q*. E contains the implicit first-person
knowledge of experts and in the classical case it is fostered implicitly. Such that one can
then talk about “implicit knowledge management.”

The transitions from P to some concrete Q* (in general: P → Q) depend

on using the rules K under the condition of knowledge E (in sign: <K|E>;
E comprises cognition and personal experience/expertise as well as motiva-
tion/emotion). The set [Q] in Figure 16.7 is depicted as an ellipse, where Q is a
possible result of the application of K under the condition or use of the expe-
rience E to the problem P (in sign: <K|E> (P) → Q). That is, the set of rules/
routines K applied under the condition of background knowledge E applied
to P (under the presupposition of a specified context) yields either a concrete
Q* or a possible/acceptable solution Q.
Notably, the actual meaning of the set of rules K (routines, checklists) in
connection with the knowledge E is not identical with an exact description
for the generation of a concrete solution Q*. Actually, it is used by an expert E
to remember how to produce the results in a way which can be understood by
him/her and by persons with similar background knowledge H (comprising all
knowledge components K, F, E, and M in Figure 16.7). Thus, experts’ knowl-
edge E contains personal motives (first person), common sense knowledge F
containing culturally accepted (collective) motives, meta/model knowledge
M containing explanatory or assumed motives to predict behavior.12
The case is exemplified by Henry Ford, who – influenced by Frederic
Taylor – trained laymen to reproduce acceptable results Q* by using some
 Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management 339

DIGITALIZATION
evaluation
Reasons ; H & S computation R EFFECTIVE
EXPLANATIONs KNOWLEGDE

M E
The Scissors

Common Sense
of

Dialogue
Knowledge Life C

K F

Q??
[Q*]
Q?

causation
Causes ; P Q* Q
action
[Q]

Figure 16.7. [Q*] denotes the (equivalence) class of the predetermined concrete/actual
results Q*.

rules/routines K (provided most probably by experts). This method (or

belief) works and is applicable in regard to a middle realm of experience,
which is a more or less constant culture (studied in cultural psychology), but
it would not work if the rules K were used in an inconsiderate way. One of
the main or essential views for knowledge, such as in management, has been
ignored: the need and possibility of correcting the results by individual expe-
riences E (“tacit knowledge”13). Nonaka and Takeuchi (1997) discussed it by
explaining the success of Japanese enterprises. The importance of the issue
was originally recognized by Polanyi (1966), and even earlier its major role
in mathematics and analytical philosophy was discussed in the philosophy
of the “Vienna Circle” (Schlick, 1979, pp. 54–56) in the context of “implicit
definitions” (Hilbert, 1913).

2. The Final “Picture”

In Figure 16.7, the ellipse can be seen as a symbol of the accepted and poten-
tial results14 [Q], produced by people with expertise (sometimes experts, if
340 Born & Gatarik

they have not lost sight of the limits of their expertise!), experts who are using
experiential knowledge E and rules K. The rectangle in Figure 16.7 is a sym-
bol for the amount of concrete solutions [Q*] under the knowledge condition
F. This set [Q*] symbolizes the equivalence class of predetermined possible
concrete results Q*, insofar as the latter are brought about by F background
knowledge by using the routines K.
As one can see from Figure 16.7, there can be cases of accepted results
(in sign: Q?), which cannot be reproduced with rules and routines K and
background knowledge F alone. Still, they are accepted as meaningful by the
experts E, (i.e., E-acceptable and therefore elements of the ellipse [Q]). There
are also cases (in sign: Q??), however, which can be produced by stubbornly
and mechanically (i.e., by instantiating some algorithm) following the rules/
routines with the help of F, but which are not accepted by the original experts
E (but later on and occasionally they may be reconstructed via K and E plus
some extra knowledge F* or even E* and motivation).
In order to explain the possible difference between the sets [Q] and [Q*],
eventually, the term “implicit knowledge” (available in E) was introduced.
Originally, Michael Polanyi used it in some more or less general scientific
context. Later on, the idea was reintroduced by Nonaka and Takeuchi as “tacit
knowledge” in the context of administrative business to explain the economic
success of certain Japanese enterprises. Their use of the term seemed to imply
that tacit knowledge could be explicated completely, and led knowledge man-
agement of the first generation astray into a technical information-processing
system (also Bruner’s qualms about cognitive science in the first place).
However, motivation (in F) can change common-sense knowledge F in
such a way (toward an enriched F*) that solutions Q*, which are brought
about by applying F* to the rules K, can be incorporated into [Q], but not
necessarily into [Q*]. As we can learn from Damasio and his brain research,
we can find out that F* is more than a cognitive enrichment of pre-given
common-sense knowledge F. F* (and furthermore, also E* as an enrichment
of E) also depends on feelings/emotions based on experience.
In Figure 16.7, one can also see how the difference between the extension
of the sets [Q] and [Q*] can be explained with the help of using different
components of background knowledge (i.e., either E or F). In explanatory
terms, we call this matter the “scissors of knowledge,”15 and in operational
terms, the “scissors of life (expertise).”16 Such an explanation must not rest
solely upon the inner (plainly cognitive) understanding of E (reconstructed
in M), however. In many cases, E corresponds to something such as spe-
cial and intensive experiences of a first person E (an ego) with a very spe-
cial epistemic resolution level (based on an inseparable interplay of cognition
 Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management 341

and motivation, which is therefore in need of an interdisciplinary approach

forged by the semantico-pragmatic schema LIR). In modern semantics, this
kind of background knowledge is viewed as being essential for the effective
reference of language to some selection of reality (i.e., especially for the selec-
tive and action-guiding relation of science to reality). The point of the scis-
sors of knowledge and life is also to argue that just a set of rules K and/or a
decontextualized cognitive part of knowledge M (a theory) cannot shape an
expertise E to establish the action-guiding connection between language and
reality. What we need, therefore, is an effective dialogue between E and F, not
in order to sift the cognitive knowledge down to F but in order to enrich both
and take care of an emotional change in the interplay between F and E. The
difference between [Q] and [Q*] cannot be explained by cognition alone (i.e.,
solely on the basis of some explanatory knowledge M and just cognitively
reflected expertise E). As Damasio points out, emotions and feelings and thus
social experiences are essential in the process of making decisions. Studies in
brain-damaged individuals showed that impairment of emotional-related sig-
nal transmission in order to activate emotion-related (social!) memory (con-
cerning experience accumulated in a lifetime) lead to problems in decision
making because categories of social situations are not taken into account. In
this context, the work of Umberto Eco in semiotics is also relevant as well as
that of the modern, more semantically oriented logic, linguistics, and analyt-
ical philosophy from Alfred Tarski to Hilary Putnam.
It should perhaps be added that the technical background for the presented
approach and understanding is the semantic approach in logic explicated
and turned into the computer-program Hyperproof, which uses Evert Beth’s
semantic tableau’s in addition to the ideas of Gentzen (1969) concerning rea-
soning in natural logic. Furthermore, the reflective versions of Hempel (1965)
and non-static generalizations of explanations in science have also been
essential. Already Hempel brought up the idea of knowledge situations and
Barwise and Perry (1998) developed situation semantics (referring to Frege).
In the present context, the idea is that information processing must be under-
stood as dependent upon knowledge situations and must be investigated via
acceptance and use, namely, “S → R” (S implies R), if there is no situation or
model that makes true or fulfils “S” (on interpretation in some set of situa-
tions) but does not fulfill “R.” (Intuition: The construction of a counterexam-
ple can be shown to be impossible!)
F the communal or folkloristic knowledge relevant in everyday life action
and use corresponds to the grammatical second person, to the “you” (“I
and Thou” in Martin Buber’s notation, 2004). In this context, especially the
work of David Bohm (2004) in general and especially Dan Isaacs (1999) in
342 Born & Gatarik

knowledge management are important, as well as Eugene Gendlin’s (1997)

approach, but from a different perspective. The grammatical second person,
the knowledge component F, is important for communication and therefore
uses a weaker background knowledge.
The first possibility of some view from outside (a “View from Nowhere,”
Nagel, 1989) in the grammatical sense of a third-person singular corresponds
to the knowledge component K (i.e., to rules and routines that can lead to
different results, depending on the respective background knowledge in use,
which is either E or F).
In order to be able to explain the difference between [Q] und [Q*] and
the mistakes in decision making that can turn up in practice, we therefore
need an external explanatory or meta-point of view M. We call this view
theoretico-explanatory. It should make visible the cognitive part of implicit
knowledge, which is there in E, but in many cases not directly explicable. To
make it visible means to constructively model it in an explanatory meta-model
M (i.e., we need some kind of sense-making, meaning stipulating reflection).
We still, however, need to explain the significance of M, which essentially
expresses the advantage of multicultural approaches because it concerns an
extra–epistemic resolution level and expressive power with regard to H (rep-
resentation devices and background knowledge K, F, E, and M). One there-
fore has to differentiate between an “explanatory knowledge (M)” and an
“operative knowledge (E)” in a more profound way. This differentiation goes
beyond the usual difference between declarative and procedural knowledge
as it is used in psychology as well as beyond the difference between explicit
and implicit knowledge, but comprises both in a more general way.

How Meaning may Matter to the Mind – The Limits of

Cognitive Science with Respect to Decision Making
(if Depending on Cognition Alone)
1. The Relation between Theory/Model and Reality – The Scheme
Language/Information/Reality (LIR) as a Sort of Multidimensional
Semantics and a Tool for the “Forging of an Interdisciplinary
Perspective” for Linking Cognition and Motivation
Thus, what we propose is a graphical analysis or description of the situa-
tion that gives us an idea of how we might go on in trying to understand
the relation between theory or model and reality, and how both of them in
theoretico-explanatory terms grasp meaning in order to explain the mind,
or rather, the behavior of human beings under the assumption of processing
 Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management 343

information/knowledge in their mind and acting upon this knowledge. If we

want to understand those processes as computational, however, we have to
dig a little bit deeper and try to find out how or in which way computations
can grasp causal connections in reality at all, what it really means, and how it
could be applied properly.
The scheme Language-Information-Reality is an older version of the more
general problem of the relation between representation, knowledge, and the
world. It should lead to just that – an understanding of the relation between
representation, knowledge, and the world.

2. The Abstract Foundations: Language, Information, and

Reality – Ideas Concerning the Possibilities of Communicating
Facts, Knowledge, and “Expertise”
The scheme in Figure 16.8 is a simplified meta-representation of communi-
cation unifying linguistic and nonlinguistic elements. Above all, it takes into
account the coming about of an understanding through the interpretation
of signs via different components of background knowledge and considers
the dynamics of conveying knowledge and changes of meaning. Knowledge
(e.g., implicit knowledge) results from the mutual relationships of the differ-
ent components of background knowledge. Knowledge reveals itself in the
handling of information. Knowledge emerges through the relations of things
to each other. Knowledge mediates between language and reality, defines the
handling of linguistically encoded information, and determines the relations
of language with regard to reality.
If we want to communicate knowledge, we have to consider the back-
ground knowledge of the recipient in its multiplicity (all the components E,
F, K, M in the scheme). If we want to communicate the transition of a state
P into a new state Q in the world, an attitude, understanding, knowledge, or
if we want to make it explicit or even create it in the recipient, we have to be
clear about the means of representation (e.g., language) used. We also have
to clarify through which components of background knowledge the signs in
the representation space are related to sections of the world. The transition
from P to Q is reflected linguistically, and therefore also in communicat-
ing the acceptance of the transition of S to R; it is reflected in the admission
of the relationship of those signs that are assigned to the more or less real
state-transitions from P to Q and shifted to the realm of representation. This
acceptance of S → R in the realm of representation can be strengthened by
a deliberate change of relevant components of the background knowledge
responsible, in the last resort, for approval and the endowment with meaning.
344 Born & Gatarik

Reasons structur (es)

THINKING General scheme of analysis
Back-Ground-Knowledge
inferring from Language(s)
(K/F/E/M)+
(BGK) Aims and Solutions
S R
symptoms / signs / symbols evaluations

M Meta- / Model-knowledge experience / E

theories / structures
expertise
(explanantory knowledge) (effective)
(abstract / final) [1st person] / singular & plural

A C
[3rd person] / singular
(formal) [2nd person] (material/concret)
check-Lists / routines /
rules / documentations user- /& action-guiding-
K knowledge of rules knowledge F
everyday knowledge,
ideologies, CULTURE
Causality
Causes P Q
A CT I N G
State-Transistions
Problems Results / solutions
[quest]

Figure 16.8. The basic scheme for LIR (Language-Information-Reality): E = feelings,

emotions, and personal motivations and drives; K = heuristics, technical solutions,
bureaucratizing (in combination with F); F = cultural motivations and drives; M = cog-
nition, explanatory assumptions about motivations; H = optionally E, F, K, M as knowl-
edge roles/components.

Whether we actually accept and therefore successfully communicate knowl-

edge, especially when dealing with creating and conveying new views, frames
of reference, and so forth, depends on the interplay of the respective compo-
nents of our background knowledge. Here, the relationship between theoret-
ical knowledge (selected general knowledge A; the left side of Figure 16.8) and
vernacular knowledge (common-sense knowledge C; the right side of Figure
16.8) is decisive. The reason is that it determines the fine-tuning of new and
old knowledge in the concretely chosen area as a section of world/reality (see
lower part of Figure 16.8) and the representation as especially chosen repre-
sentation (see upper part of Figure 16.8). Value judgments or general ethi-
cal considerations, human values, and aims in handling new knowledge are
accepted and influence the handling of knowledge and information via the
background knowledge components. Let us now illustrate this scheme with
the help of some ironic comments.

3. Computer Poetry and the Drummers’ Example versus Deep

Blue – Or: Causes and Symptoms Mixed Up
The scheme LIR can be assumed to describe a sort of multidimensional
semantics because it is based on at least four components of meaning that
 Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management 345

ought to be considered in their complexity but need not be taken into account
all of the time. When we first introduced the basics of LIR, we invented a
surrealistic example concerning the production of poetry with the help of
computer programs and what would be needed to fake an understanding of
the meaning of poems. At the time, the example was well ahead of technical
practice, but Max Black thought it well described the reality of the refereeing
system in poetry journals. The essential point with respect to the scheme LIR
in Figure 16.8 was an evaluation function from K to M such that structure
models in M – in the classical way of Tarskian Semantics (Bridge, 1977) –
could be used to evaluate the meaningfulness of poems in a strictly technical
way. Namely, that meaning would not literally be expressed but only some-
how coded. This would be in contrast to the real-flesh referees in a journal
who have to evaluate poems by understanding their content, so to speak, and
express their ideas about the meaning of those poems. The point was: What
would happen if the referees were replaced by some evaluation program in
M? In which way would the explanatory encoding of meaning be used to
freeze a certain fashion of the time, and when would a revolution by the next
generation of poets occur? A careful analysis shows that in the last count, the
same strategy was successful in programming the chess program Deep Blue,
but the point is that meaning or the evaluation of situations in a game of chess
is frozen, which further links up with Gödel’s point against Turing (i.e., that
meanings can evolve). In Gödel’s case, the intimateness with abstract math-
ematical terms and their application lead to a new understanding essential
for proper application. In the case of Deep Blue, we do not even know what
it really is that has been grasped by an evaluation function. What would hap-
pen if we used Deep Blue as an experts’ system to train chess students? In a
medical-experts system this is quite clear. If students are trained just by the
system and have no chance to learn corrective experience from outside, even-
tually they will be just as good as the program. If the medical-experts system
has, say, a success rate of 80 percent, the remaining 20 percent will somehow
get lost “in real life.”
There is, however, another even more ironic illustration of the scheme that
may somehow be considered as a “reductio ad absurdum” of the picture of
simply transferring natural science to studying the mind, especially meaning
in this case. A parallel idea is the following: Could we find out the meaning of
messages sent by drums without having contact with the people or being able
to communicate with them in another way except by drums? The only tech-
nical means allowed would be video cameras and special microphones as well
as loudspeakers to fake the noise of drums and watch the reaction behavior of
the addressees. Essential would be the difference between meaning as expli-
cated with the help of M and the meaning of the drumming noises as given to
346 Born & Gatarik

the sound by the experts E who use the drums. When do we think we would
be justified to say that some model in M has grasped the meaning of those
noises? Grasping can be used in a theoretico-explanatory manner as well as
literally in a descriptive way. It is essential to take into account the interplay of
the two – of both the theoretical and vernacular (background) knowledge –
which does not really happen in cognitive science nor in classical knowledge
management when dealing only with the administration of information (or
indirectly, of knowledge).

Meaning and Culture: From the Processing

of Information to Conveying Knowledge
(Constructing Meaning)
Bruner clearly insists on the meaning stipulating processes of culture. Let
us finally reflect on that, but in only one respect: Could we invent rules to
calculate or compute meaning (i.e., generate meaning out of the mechanical
instantiation of rules in some culture or society)?17 If we compare biological
and cultural evolution, the decisive difference is that in biology the genetic –
the internal transmission of information about the environment – in which
an organism lives and to which it has adapted is, in general, fairly slow. From
the point of view of population genetics, for an individual, it might even be
detrimental.
In contrast to this, cultural evolution produces an essential speeding up
of the transmission of information relevant for survival. The trick here is to
externalize information; that is, to use signs that in certain situations repre-
sent/possess a useable content of information. The meaning of a word is its
use within some language (in many but not all cases and not necessarily liter-
ally, Wittgenstein18). In the course of cultural evolution, various techniques
for the transmission of information were developed that are based upon
individual experiences and motivations, and to a different extent on different
cultures, which reflect individual developments. Different cultures have dif-
ferent sign systems, ranging from the acoustic system of communication or
the breaking of branches as a means of giving directions to the rock paintings
of Australian aborigines or the small talk of the Internet community. In a
way, what has been created are external information genes. Viewed from the
outside and talking about the matter, each member of the culture has to learn
how to handle these signs, how to react, how to use the information encoded
in those signs in order to build up and understand the relevant knowledge.
If we look at the potential of the Internet as a means to pragmatically under-
stand the limits of the underlying concepts for communicating knowledge or
 Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management 347

deconstruct those conceptions, one can test the Internet as a possible means
of extending cultural evolution.
We have to take care that the ideas to be transmitted fall onto a soil that has
already been prepared. We need to have prior knowledge; we already have to
have made experiences of our own in order to understand the signs of oth-
ers. When knowledge is passed on through learning, it is reassembled from
knowledge bricks.
The question now is what an evolutionist point of view is able to contrib-
ute to an understanding of the role of the Internet in further developing and
improving our cultural evolution, for instance, in view of initiating a new
phase of evolution. What, if anything, can be better understood, described,
and predicted insofar as the development of a global information network
through the Internet is concerned?
In cultural evolution, ideas are passed on for a better adaptation to the
environment. Yet, they are not so much concrete ideas that can be passed on
in a narrative but rather a kind of concept kernels. In analogy to the concept
of the gene, Dawkins (2006) introduces the term “meme” to denote elements
of cultural evolution, which are supposed to function in a way similar to the
transmission of genetic material in a gene.
Concept kernels/cores (and meaning environments) have the advantage
of enabling us to grasp different situations under one common aspect or one
function and thus to adjust quickly to similar situations. We are able to rec-
ognize a wheel and we have certain expectations about its functioning. Yet in
a different situation we can replace it with casters and move a heavy ward-
robe that way. We have grasped the essence of the concept “wheel.” Yet what
is responsible for a successful conveyance of the meaning of concepts that
denote environments and core competencies?
The real problem of cultural evolution is the passing on of experience/
expertise (not the passing away, as it may sometimes seem). Knowledge has
to be conveyed in a way that makes it useful in decisive decision situations.
Genetic knowledge can only be corrected in the long run, through muta-
tion or the dying out of a species. In contrast, external knowledge should be
open for correction. It should be possible to avoid mistakes in the replica-
tion of knowledge by individuals, collective or artistic reflection, or those due
to accidental mistakes. We consider this to be essential because nowadays
we think a lot about how knowledge may get conveyed with the help of the
Internet. However, knowledge in most cases gets transferred as texts. Hence,
the medium is primarily a syntactic means to convey knowledge. Could we
go as far as to say, metaphorically speaking, that knowledge is computed in
the Net and thus conveyed? Where are the real limits? What is really going
348 Born & Gatarik

on and how does it work? These are the questions that need to be resolved if
humans are to play the role of active agents rather than that of victims.

Notes
1. Emphasizes in quotes are ours, if not stated differently.
2. Today, we would say “algorithmic.”
3. Thus, computing became the means to produce meaningful signs and was consid-
ered to be the means to build up meaning (especially expertise).
4. Personal communication by Jerome Bruner to Rainer P. Born at the conference
“Reassessing the Cognitive Revolution”, Glendon College, York University, Toronto,
October 22–24, 1993. The reality guys are the ones who take the mechanical or other
procedures to stimulate meaning-making processes for real or rather descriptively.
5. http://www.iwp.jku.at/born/mpwfst/06/LIR_engl_230607.ppt.
6. A. de Saint-Exupéry (1991). The Little Prince, pp. 63–64: “I cannot play with you,”
the fox said. “I am not tamed.” . . . “What does that mean – tame?” “It is an act too
often neglected,” said the fox. “It means to establish ties.” . . . “Just that,” said the fox.
“To me, you are still nothing more than a little boy who is just like a hundred thou-
sand other little boys. And I have no need of you. And you, on your part, have no
need of me. To you, I am nothing more than a fox like a hundred thousand other
foxes. But if you tame me, then we shall need each other. To me, you will be unique
in all the world. To you, I shall be unique in all the world.”
7. Cf. the scissors of knowledge in chapter 8 and the scheme LIR in chapter 9.
8. We consider three postulates: 1. Our concepts are (with respect to reality) somehow
fuzzy (according to an extensional cutting up of the world). 2. Our charts, mod-
els, theories are usually incomplete (in the reality, there may turn up cases that are
accepted but neither justified nor predicted by theory). 3. Our theories are neither
literally descriptive nor definitely action-guiding.
9. Think about the term “game.” What do all games have in common (Wittgenstein)
and how can language game produce “meaning”?
10. Usually, people search for the solution just within the set of 9 points. The way, in
which we drew the graphic, shows that those 9 points are embedded in the 16 points.
These can be considered as a solution space, where one can see the solution con-
cerning the connection of the 9 points without lifting the pencil. In this case, one
stays within the solution space!
11. Q stands for quest (e.g., in quest of the holy grail, still being searched for).
12. M (explanatory knowledge) ← E (expertise, emotion/motivation)
13. “Sense-making” concerns models to orientate ourselves in the world.
14. [Q] is defined as the set of “possible” solutions (sometimes possible according to
assumptions/presuppositions).
15. The “Scissors of Knowledge” in the scheme LIR roughly concern the different influ-
ence of the knowledge components K (rules) and M (explanatory meta-knowledge/
principles) on the coming about and acceptance of problem solutions [Q] and [Q*].
After splitting up expertise E into a cognitive/explanatory knowledge component
M and the action-guiding part of the original expertise E based upon emotion and
motivation, one can thus explain the difference between the sets [Q] and [Q*] by
 Cognitive Science and Knowledge Management 349

using M to identify/construct the relevant cognitive part of knowledge in E, which

is not available in F.
16. The “Scissors of Life” in the scheme LIR concern – roughly speaking – the different
influence of the knowledge components E (personal experience and expertise) and
F (common sense) on the coming about and acceptance of problem solutions [Q]
and [Q*].
17. Motivation together with F leads to constructing some K in order to understand
and reproduce the influence of E on the use and application of K.
18. Cf. Wittgenstein, L.: Philosophical Investigations. 1953, PI 43: For a large class of
cases – although not for all – in which we employ the word “meaning,” it can be
defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language, and the meaning of a
name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

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 17

Interest, Cognition, and the Case of L- and Science

K. Ann Renninger & Kathryn R. Riley

In her most recent interview, 15-year-old L – comments: “Every year they ask
me, do I want to be a scientist? And, every year I tell them no, I don’t want to
be a scientist. I don’t like science. It’s not for me.” Yet participant observation
notes indicate that L – has been staying after the workshop every day to work
on her lab notebook and to help get materials ready for the next day. She also
uses this time to engage in discussions and to ask questions. She seems to like
thinking about connections between the day’s focus and those of previous days.
She appears to want to understand how the experiments they have been doing fit
together. (Interview, Year 5)

Interest is a cognitive and affective motivational variable that is dependent

on cognition. A learner typically has four to six reasonably well-developed
interests and can develop new interests at any age – although the types of
supports that are likely to be needed may vary based on age and experience
(Renninger, 2009).
In order to engage, a learner needs to perceive the features of particular con-
tent such as science as something to which to attend. Although interest may be
supported to develop through use of metacognitive strategies such as question-
ing and prompted reflection, it is often an unreflective state or process. When
engaged due to interest, a person is not necessarily thinking about his or her
interest but rather about the particulars of the activity or content of interest.
Interest can be triggered without a learner being aware of its occurring, and
interest is not always something that learners (especially younger learners) can
simply will themselves to experience (Renninger, Sansone, & Smith, 2004).
However, when the learner is aware of his or her interest, this can support inter-
est to develop (Sansone & Thoman, 2005a, 2005b; Renninger & Su, 2012).
It is now generally accepted that when interest is present, learner attention,
goal setting, and strategy use are positively influenced (Hidi & Renninger,
2006): interest, as James (1890) wrote, “schools attention.” In her model of

352
 Interest and Cognition 353

domain learning, Alexander (2004) described interest as linked to knowl-

edge and strategic efforts, and suggested that competence can be nurtured by
immersing learners in meaningful learning experiences. Thus, for example,
calling learners’ attention to the meaning that a writing task holds for them
has been found to improve learners’ connections to tasks and yield improved
performance (Hulleman et al., 2008). Type of activity (e.g., group work,
computers, and novel tasks) has been shown to have an influence on learner
engagement (Mitchell, 1993; Palmer, 2009). Inserting interest into tasks in
reading or math has also been shown to affect the depth of learners’ process-
ing (Renninger, Ewen, & Lasher, 2002; Schiefele & Krapp, 1996). It appears
that interest is not only dependent on cognition but that it also influences the
“what” of cognition: to what the learner attends and how he or she engages.
Yet until relatively recently, interest was often described and studied as if it
were dichotomous – a learner either has or does not have interest – suggest-
ing to some (sometimes including the learner) that interest does not and is
not likely to develop. This is not the case, however. There is now research evi-
dence to confirm that interest in its earliest phases needs to be supported by
other persons and requires ongoing support if it is to develop, placing respon-
sibility for whether interest develops on other people and the types of oppor-
tunities that are available to the learner (Gisbert, 1998; Renninger & Hidi,
2002; Tsai et al., 2008). In the neuroscientific literature, interest-based activ-
ities are referred to as “seeking behavior” (Panksepp, 1998; see discussion in
Hidi, 2006). Brain reactions have been found to differ when a learner is and is
not engaged with content (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Hidi & Ainley, 2008).
Learner attention is triggered and sustained depending on (a) what a per-
son perceives when presented with disciplinary content (see Renninger, 1990,
2000, 2009; Renninger & Lipstein, 2006); (b) his or her interactions with
others; and/or (c) the conditions of the environment (Azevedo, 2006, 2011;
Barron, 2006; Cobb & Hodge, 2004; Sansone & Thoman, 2005a; 2005b).
The present chapter describes research that bears on the relation between
the development of interest and cognition. As such, although interest is else-
where conceptualized as an attitude, belief, reward, or vocational pursuit,
interest is here discussed as both a psychological state and a predisposition to
return to engagement with particular disciplinary content (e.g., music, soft-
ball, science; Hidi & Renninger, 2006; see also discussions in Ainley, 2006;
Alexander, 2004; Barron, 2006; Renninger & Hidi, 2011; Sansone, 2009; Silvia,
2006). Based on the empirical literature, phases in the development of interest
have been identified as ranging from an initial triggered situational interest
that may only last for a few moments to a well-developed individual interest
that is relatively long-lasting (Hidi & Renninger, 2006; see Table 17.1).
 Table 17.1. Learner Characteristics and Needs in Interest Development

Phases of Interest Development

Triggered Situational Maintained Situational Emerging Individual Well-Developed Individual
Learner • Attend to content, if only • Re-engage content that • Are likely to • Independently re-engage
Characteristics fleetingly previously triggered independently re-engage content
• Need support to engage attention content • Have curiosity questions
• From others • Are supported by others • Have curiosity questions • Self-regulate easily to reframe
• Through instructional design to find connections that lead them to seek questions and seek answers
• May experience either positive between their skills, answers • Have positive feelings
or negative feelings knowledge, and prior • Have positive feelings • Can persevere through
• May or may not be reflectively experience • Have stored knowledge frustration and challenge in
aware of the experience • Have positive feelings and stored value order to meet goals

354
• Are developing • Are very focused on • Recognize others’
knowledge of the their own questions contributions to the discipline
content • Actively seek feedback
• Are developing a sense
of the content’s value
Needs/More • To have their ideas respected • To have their ideas • To have their ideas • To have their ideas respected
Closed Learning • To feel genuinely appreciated respected respected • Information and feedback
Environment for their efforts • To feel genuinely • To feel genuinely • To balance their personal
• To have others understand how appreciated for their appreciated for their standards with more widely
hard work with this content is efforts efforts accepted standards in the
• Limited concrete suggestions • Support to explore their • To feel that their ideas discipline
own ideas and goals are understood • To feel that their ideas have
been heard and understood
 Phases of Interest Development
Triggered Situational Maintained Situational Emerging Individual Well-Developed Individual
• Feedback that enables • Constructive feedback
them to see how their • Challenge
goals can be more
effectively met
Needs/More Open • To have their ideas respected • To have their ideas • To have their ideas • To have their ideas respected
Learning • To feel genuinely appreciated respected respected • Information and feedback
Environment for the efforts they have made • To feel genuinely • To express their ideas • To balance their personal
• To know that they understand appreciated for the • Not to be told to revise standards with more widely
the content efforts they have made present efforts accepted standards in the
• To know what they have • To feel that their ideas discipline

355
learned and what they and goals are understood • To feel that their ideas have
still want to learn • To feel genuinely been heard and understood
appreciated for their • Constructive feedback
efforts • Challenge
• Feedback that enables
them to see how their
goals were met
356 Renninger & Riley

Interest develops through a process of triggering: interactions or

c­ ircumstances that result in the reorganization of learner thinking and activ-
ity (Alexander, 2004; Renninger & Hidi, 2002). Triggers for interest have
been described as promoting uncertainty, surprise, novelty, complexity, or
incongruity (Berlyne, 1960; see also Durik & Harackiewicz, 2007; Renninger,
Bachrach, & Posey, 2008). For example, in earlier phases of interest these
might include group work in the classroom or content that is personally
meaningful (Hidi et al., 1998; Mitchell, 1993); in later phases, triggers could
stem from instructional conversations (Yamuchi, Wyatt, & Carroll, 2005),
content-informed scaffolding (Renninger et al., 2005), or self-generated curi-
osity questions (Renninger, 1990, 2010).
As interest develops, the learner’s evolving knowledge about, valuing of,
and feelings for content change. The earliest phase of interest may be easily
identified by positive or negative affect, but the development of principled
knowledge about the discipline and the accompanying recognition of value
account for changes in the learner’s phase of interest (Nolen, 2007; Renninger,
Bachrach, & Posey, 2008). In later phases of interest, the learner’s commit-
ment to, skills with, and identification with content are readily distinguished
from those in earlier phases of interest (Azevedo, 2006, 2011; Barron, 2006;
Renninger, 1990, 2009, 2010; Renninger et al., 2002; Renninger & Hidi, 2002).
In later phases, the learner generates, reflects on, and pursues his or her curi-
osity questions – questions that are novel to the learner but not necessarily
new to those who have more information (Renninger 2000, 2010; Renninger
& Su, 2012).
The case of L – illustrates the process of interest development and presents
a context for its further examination. L – was 10 years old when we first began
studying her cohort of 8 (5 girls, 3 boys) participants in the Science-for-Kids
Workshop, an out-of-school, inquiry-oriented science workshop for at-risk
youth.
She was a child who appeared extremely moody and presented as a disengaged
learner; she alternately seemed to enjoy and resist workshop activities. Her engage-
ment seemed linked to whatever she wanted to know more about. (Notes, Year 1)

The participant observation notes and her interviews indicated that she
thought about science the way she would think about anything else; she was
more philosophical than scientific.1 For example, her questions during the
week she and her workshop group learned about worms included: “What do
worms die from?” “What kind of culture do they have?”
Five years later, L – asked to be a teaching assistant in the Chemistry
Workshop, a position that had not previously existed.
 Interest and Cognition 357

She was now aware that science was fun for her. After some deliberation, the
workshop programming was adjusted to allow her to help out with the younger
children as a peer tutor. She worked with the younger children alongside a col-
lege student. Even before the workshop addressed acid-base neutralization, and
only two weeks into the workshop, she asked to take an experiment further by
combining an acid and base and observing the resulting solution. The instructors
suggested that she share this idea with the group of children to whom she was
assigned. She did and engaged them all in thinking with her about each of the
trials (and, as it turned out, all of the other children’s groups decided to explore
this issue as well). (Notes, Year 5)

L – ’s thinking about science had clearly changed, as had that of her peers. She
had a broader perspective. She now focused on patterns in phenomena and
how they could provide explanation. She was willing to think about content
generally and to explore new materials.
The studies in which L – and her peers were participants focused on what
needs to be in place in order for children with little to no background knowl-
edge in a discipline to seriously engage and learn. Data from L – ’s partici-
pation in the workshops are congruent with those of her peers, and allow
consideration of the interplay between interest development and cognition.
For the first few summers of workshop participation, L – had a triggered situ-
ational interest in the scientific material. Her affect could be heightened; she
clearly was attending and had some questions, but it was not until the fourth
year that her phase of interest began to shift, signaled by her independent
efforts to understand.
Although L – was aware and engaging in the workshop during the first
several years, she had not yet made the kind of connection to science content
that leads to asking curiosity questions and wanting to seek out, reflect on,
and raise more questions. Thus, although L – and her peers engaged excitedly
at times in the inquiry-informed workshop activities (e.g., group work to dis-
sect a mink) during their first years, five weeks following the workshop they
only retained an impression that science could be fun, with little if any sci-
ence-related content (Renninger et al., 2008). It was not until L – shifted from
simply engaging with the activities of the workshop to focusing on think-
ing about and wanting to explore their content that her interest changed; her
interest shifted in relation to its shifting focus, her cognition.

Interest and Cognition

With few exceptions, the relation between interest and cognition has received
little explicit attention in the recent theoretical or empirical literature. In early
358 Renninger & Riley

theorizing, the relation between interest and cognition concerned the devel-
opment of attention. James (1890), for example, described interest in terms
of the organization of experience. He suggested that interest improved the
ability to discriminate, and noted that interest, along with practice, improved
attention. Baldwin (1911), on the other hand, described interest in terms of the
activities in which a learner engaged. He focused on the cognitive structures
that the learner brings to activity, the competence that is experienced, and its
accompanying affect. Dewey (1913) elaborated on this relation by suggesting
that interest was in the content itself, suggesting that the interest value of
activities was related to whether they led to continuous engagement. Finally,
Piaget (1968) linked interest to both cognition and motivation, suggesting
that, “Interest is the proper orientation for every act of mental assimilation”
(p. 34). Taken together, the early theorists suggested that interest organizes
experience and channels attention, and they highlighted the roles of both
knowledge and value as components of interest.
The differing (and complementary) foci of the early theorists on the rela-
tion between interest and cognition also characterize the discussions and
studies that followed. The research has focused on the role of interest in cog-
nitive processing; the text, task, or people who contribute to the generation of
interest; and the relation of knowledge and value as components of interest.
Findings from each are reviewed briefly.

Interest and Cognitive Processing

Research that addresses both interest and cognitive processing has focused
on the same issues, albeit in different contexts: free play in the nursery and
work with text, math problems, or representational design. Building on the
findings of early theorists whose work suggested that interest had a recipro-
cal relation with attention (e.g, Arnold, 1910; Bartlett, 1932), Renninger and
Wozniak (1985) studied the effects of interest on young children’s attentional
shifts, recognition, and recall memory. They identified play objects (e.g.,
trains, dolls) of high and low interest for each child based on naturalistic
observation of interest similar to that used in the study of L –, and inserted
these into experimental tasks in order to assess the effect of interest across
cognitive processing. Their findings revealed that interest exerted a strong
influence on shifts in focal attention; interest was found to influence the like-
lihood that an item would be correctly recognized and recalled, and that the
item would be recognized and recalled first. Renninger (1990) further dem-
onstrated that patterns in the children’s naturally occurring free play mir-
rored those of the experimental tasks; with identified objects of interest, the
 Interest and Cognition 359

children were more likely to play longer, use more types of play, shift between
types of play, employ more types of action, and repeat particular sequences
of action than with other objects that were familiar and of less interest. Krapp
and Fink (1992) replicated these findings, and in discussing them, pointed to
the differentiation of interest based on experience. They reported data show-
ing that two children engaged in interest with the same play object would not
necessarily engage the object similarly. They and Neitzel and her colleagues
(Neitzel, Alexander, & Johnson, 2008) also documented that the interest
object could serve as a transition object as children moved from one learning
context to another (e.g., from the preschool to kindergarten).
Another line of research on interest and attention focused more specifi-
cally on text. During the 1980s, two hypotheses emerged in studies of text: (a)
that increased interest might increase attention and lead to better memory
(Anderson, 1982); and (b) that increased interest might require fewer cogni-
tive resources for basic text processing, freeing up resources for higher-order
processing (Hidi & Baird, 1988; see Hidi 1990, 1995). In order to test these
hypotheses, McDaniel et al. (2000) conducted studies of undergraduates
reading stories that they rated as being of higher or lower interest. Their find-
ings confirmed that more interesting text requires fewer cognitive resources
than less interesting text, and that text-based interest results in qualitative dif-
ferences in the kind of information that is processed and encoded. In conclu-
sion, they suggested that optimal learning of text might require assignment
of study strategies aligned with the particular level of interest for text. As
with the studies of young children’s play, it appears that what was of interest
for one person was not necessarily of interest to another. This then indicated
that although interest might free up resources for higher-level processing,
the expectation that one topic, for example, would be of similar interest to all
students was not appropriate.
Renninger et al.’s (2002) findings corroborate the conclusions of McDaniel
et al. (2000) regarding likely processing differences and instructional needs
introduced by the presence of interest. Renninger et al. (2002) studied
within-student differences in both the reading of text and work with math-
ematics problems, using interviews, think-alouds, and artifact analysis.
Passages and problems presented to middle-school–aged students were indi-
vidualized with contexts of interest and adjusted for level of difficulty. Their
findings suggested that well-developed interest served as a scaffold for work-
ing with assigned tasks. It allowed students to focus on meaning and task
demands. Well-developed interest also appeared to mask the level of passage
and/or problem difficulty, enabling the students to persevere to work with
difficult tasks.
360 Renninger & Riley

Similarly, in a qualitative analysis of high school students’ engagement,

Azevedo (2006) reported that opportunities to explore and prioritize activ-
ities resulted in distinctively different and enhanced problem solving. He
pointed to four findings from this work that provided support for interest:
students’ feelings of competence, task features that promote feelings of com-
petence, time to explore, and a flexible learning environment.

The Generation of Interest

Studies that have addressed the features of text or sources of interest in class-
room activity do not typically reference the role of cognition or problem solv-
ing in the generation of interest. Rather, they point to the impact of interest
on engagement, where engagement refers to some form of connection to the
task, including, for example, a grade that has been assigned, a positive atti-
tude, achievement goals, feelings of competence, or specificity of writing. In
these studies, learners have been assessed as having more or less interest for
the feature or task. Thus, for example, in a high school math class, group
work, puzzles, and computers have been identified as triggers for interest,
and the presence of meaningfulness or personal relevance and involvement
of students may result in sustained engagement (Mitchell, 1993; see also
Laukenmann et al., 2003; Palmer, 2009).
Based on Laukenmann et al.’s (2003) suggestion that situational interest
promotes learning, Palmer (2009) interpreted his high school science stu-
dents’ spontaneous reporting of “learning” as a source or trigger for inter-
est. He described the novelty of the information they were referencing as the
trigger for their interest. Novelty, one of the collative variables that Berlyne
(1960) originally identified, has been repeatedly identified as a feature of text
and tasks that generate interest (Silvia, 2005a, 2005b; Turner & Silvia, 2006).
However, that Palmer’s (2009) high school students mentioned learning as
the source of their interest is also consistent with Arnold’s (1910) suggestion
that interest is reciprocally related to attention and learning; that in addition
to situational interest promoting learning, learning may promote situational
interest. This line of analysis is also consistent with findings reported by Chen
and Darst (1999, 2001), who found that increased cognitive demand (based
on a comparison of activities) was related to learners’ experiencing novelty,
challenge, attention, and increased situational interest.
Harackiewicz and her colleagues (Harackiewicz et al., 2002; Harackiewicz
et al., 2008) have similarly suggested that mastery goals have a reciprocal
relation to later and earlier phases of interest. They also report that mastery
goals may provide conditions through which interest can be triggered (Senko
 Interest and Cognition 361

& Harackiewicz, 2005) and demonstrate that when participants are asked to
write out an explanation of the importance of a task they are assigned, this
triggers interest for the task (Hulleman et al., 2008). Their work on achieve-
ment goals and interest is complemented by studies demonstrating that when
participants are provided with goals such as trying to become experts (Hidi
et al., 1998) or participating in a community (Cobb & Hodge, 2004; Nolen,
2007), that this, too, results in increased interest.
Research has also indicated that the quality of social interactions (eye con-
tact, verbalization) influences the experience of interest and whether interest
is generated (Thoman, Sansone, & Pasupathi, 2006). Talking together after an
activity, for example, was found to increase interest, and the responsiveness
of a listener was more powerful than differences in interest in determining
interest in the activity (Thoman et al., 2006). Findings such as these further
extend those from both studies of talent development, in which changes in
the teacher and music-student relationship have been documented, and those
pointing to a reciprocal relation between interest and identity development
(Krapp, 2007; Renninger, 2009).
Based on retrospective interviews with accomplished musicians, for exam-
ple, Sloboda (1996; see also Sosniak, 1990) reports that the musicians’ first
experiences included having fun with music without being pushed to be sys-
tematic or to have specific skills. The first teacher was ideally friendly and
enthusiastic, able to communicate well, and to share a love of music. The
teachers could be said to be triggering and helping to maintain their students’
interest. As the prospective musicians were ready to focus on skill acqui-
sition, Sloboda notes that they also required more support from others to
sustain their skill development and positive feelings. During this phase of
instruction, many of their peers decided not to continue to study music. This
was a time when Sloboda observes that both teachers and parents encounter
difficulty knowing how to provide music students with support. In terms of
interest theory, they could be said to have difficulty helping music students
maintain their situational interest for music. Those who continue to study
music reportedly came to identify with music, and eventually studied with
a master teacher who enabled them to become artists. In other words, their
interest had developed to the point that they identified as musicians. With
interest, they were better able to self-regulate and needed less oversight than
they had in earlier phases of interest.
In describing the interest experience, Sansone and Thoman (2005a,
2005b) suggest that motivation and interest fluctuate in relation to the value
a person places on the goals of particular activities and any expectations
about attaining those goals. They suggest that interest can be regulated both
362 Renninger & Riley

intra-individually and interpersonally. In earlier phases of interest develop-

ment, learners may self-regulate activity in order to productively engage
content that is of little interest, or they may need to have the learning con-
text adjusted so they can connect to it, just as the first music teachers made
music fun and something to which those who eventually became musicians
could connect. In later phases of interest development, on the other hand,
learners who have their own identification with curiosity questions and the
questions of the domain generally are more likely to self-regulate, to seek
out and reflect on answers that then lead to other questions. Interpersonal
support in later phases of interest is not necessarily about engaging with the
activity per se, but rather with the specifics and challenges of the content
of the activity (Renninger, 2009, 2010). In both earlier and later phases of
interest development, the generation and regulation of interest is a function
of both the individual (his or her goals or lack of goals) and the learning
context.

Knowledge and Value

As noted earlier, interest has been and can be conceptualized in a number
of different ways. When it is conceptualized as a variable that develops over
time, it has three components: stored knowledge, stored value, and feelings
(Renninger & Su, 2012; see also Häussler & Hoffmann, 2002; Hidi & Renninger,
2006; Renninger, 1990, 2000). This conceptualization of interest has been
explored in studies that have assessed the impact of earlier and later phases
of interest, revealing an impact of differing levels of stored knowledge, stored
value, and feelings on participation and learning (Durik & Harackiewicz,
2007; Frenzel et al., 2010; Katz et al., 2006; Lipstein & Renninger, 2007; Tsai
et al., 2008).
In earlier phases of interest development, it appears that knowledge and
value may be limited to recognition, and affect may be either positive or nega-
tive. With interest development, knowledge provides a basis for reflecting and
questioning that in turn supports the development and deepening of inter-
est (Hidi & Renninger, 2006). Thus, the development of knowledge is also
understood to contribute to the development of value for and feelings about
engaging with content (Renninger, 2000; Renninger & Su, 2012).
Before the four phases of interest were identified, however, affect had been
the focus of some conceptualizations of interest, and was used to assess inter-
est (Alexander, Jetton, & Kulikowich, 1995; Alexander, Kulikowich, & Jetton,
1994; Tobias, 1994). In these studies, interest was examined in relation to
knowledge and/or value (Schiefele & Krapp, 1996). Tobias (1994), for example,
 Interest and Cognition 363

suggested that there was a linear relation between interest (defined as positive
affect) and prior knowledge. He concluded that interest made more of a con-
tribution to comprehension and emotional associations than prior knowl-
edge, but also observed that as students develop familiarity, the development
of knowledge could be assumed. In an investigation of undergraduates in sta-
tistics and psychology classes, Lawless and Kulikowich (2006) examined this
premise and reported that interest (defined as affect) and knowledge were
correlated with each other regardless of domain. They also found that the
relation between interest and domain knowledge changed based on academic
level and preparation. Consistent with these findings, Alexander (1997, 2004)
described interest development in terms of developing expertise. Although
she described the relation of affect and cognition as distinct across each of the
stages of developing expertise, she and her colleagues began to use liking and
participation (which requires knowledge) to make distinctions between types
of interest (Alexander, 2004).
Schiefele and Krapp’s (1996; see also Krapp, 2003, 2007; Krapp & Prenzel,
2011; Schiefele, 2009) work has increasingly centered on feelings and value in
their discussion and assessment of interest, although they, too, have begun
to acknowledge the role of experience or knowledge in the development of
interest. Feelings and value are considered essential to personal significance:
“Positive evaluation results from the degree of identification with the object
of interest” (Krapp, 2003, p. 63). Krapp (2003) explains that although a per-
son may learn something new without being aware of this growth (and, as
such, knowledge), they are aware of personal significance. For this reason,
he argued that emphasis on feelings and value in interest development is
needed.

Summary
The relation between interest and cognition has been examined in terms of
attention and cognitive processing, characteristics of the learning environ-
ment, and the components of knowledge and value. Each of these foci points
to the impact of differences in interest. The work on attention and cogni-
tive processing suggests individual variation in the types of questions and/or
topic interest of the learner. The work on the characteristics of the learning
environment calls attention to the role of others and objects as supports for
engagement and likely differences in learners’ needs for support in their inter-
est development. The work on knowledge and value as components of inter-
est underscores potential differences in the contributions of each to interest
and also to their coordination as interest develops.
364 Renninger & Riley

How interest develops within individuals and how interest can be supported
to develop are critical questions for interest research. Although research on
interest generation or sources of interest has pointed to one or another poten-
tial triggers for interest, these studies have largely been descriptions of par-
ticular phases without consideration of what learners need in order to shift
from one phase of interest to another and begin asking curiosity questions,
seeking resources, and making use of feedback. As a result, learners such as
L –, who initially have little to no interest for learning content such as sci-
ence, pose a challenge for educators as well as researchers. Their interest can
be triggered, but little interest means little affect and/or knowledge. As they
age, they develop greater awareness that others have more developed skills
with respect to particular content than they do, making it even more difficult
for them to persevere to master that content even though it is possible for
them to do so (see discussion in Renninger, 2009). There is the possibility
that their attention, and as a result interest, can be triggered by some external
event (e.g., the excitement created by burning marshmallows and other foods
to see which burns faster), but it is also recognized that this type of triggering
may result in only momentary attention (Renninger et al., 2008). Sustaining
interest for unknown content and supporting engagement is difficult, because
there is too little knowledge to set goals or to know what questions to ask.
Happily engaging in an activity is not the same as reflecting on the content
of the activity, asking questions, exploring, and reorganizing understanding
(Flum & Kaplan, 2006).

Interest Development
Interest always refers to one or another of four phases in a learner or group
of learners’ cognitive and motivational engagement with particular con-
tent: triggered situational, maintained situational, emerging individual, and
well-developed individual interest (Hidi & Renninger, 2006; see Table 1).
Interest may reference a domain such as science or a more focused topic such
as structure and function, and always co-exists with a number of other inter-
ests and potential interests.
People typically think of the most developed phase – well-developed indi-
vidual interest – when they reference interest. Learners with a well-developed
individual interest for science, for example, can be expected to be attentive,
goal-oriented, and strategic (Renninger, 2000). Their feelings or affect are
generally positive (Ainley, 2006); they have a sense of possibility (Markus
& Nurius, 1986); and they know that they can be successful (Bandura, 1997).
Learners with developed interest have enough knowledge about their subject
 Interest and Cognition 365

of interest to make effective choices (Flowerday & Schraw, 2003), and they
need little prodding to take advantage of opportunity and make use of the
feedback they receive (Lipstein & Renninger, 2007). When faced with the
need to revise a plan or practice, they persevere (Prenzel, 1992). As their
interest continues to develop, they are increasingly likely to self-identify with
the discipline – to think of themselves as someone who can do science, and as
someone who could be a scientist (Renninger, 2009). In the classroom, how-
ever, learners in this phase of interest are exceptions. For example, in a study
of 178 academically oriented middle school students, only 4 students were
identified as having a well-developed individual interest for writing (Lipstein
& Renninger, 2007). The other students were almost equally likely to be in
one of the three earlier phases of interest development.
Lipstein and Renninger (2007) used structured in-depth interviews and
questionnaires to compile representative descriptions or portraits of students
in each phase of interest development for writing. Here, these characteris-
tics are compared to those of L – and to data chronicling her engagement
in the science workshops.2 Comparison of the writing students’ experiences
with those of L – and her peers in the science workshops provides further
insight into the relation between interest development and cognition. The
experiences:

(a) confirm that in each phase of interest, learner perceptions influence

what learners are able to connect to, whether they pick up on concepts
and are led to ask questions, or whether they do tasks just to get them
done even if they do not really understand why they are doing what
they have been asked to do;
(b) highlight the amount of time that a learner might be in the earliest
phases of interest development, even though the learning environment
is rich with possibilities;
(c) underscore the impact of the learning environment on interest devel-
opment, here revealed in the comparison of data from studies of stu-
dents’ phases of interest both in and out of school; and
(d) point to the critical role of others (instructors, peers) as supports for
engaging potential triggers for interest and developing confidence and
a sense of possibility about engagement.

Triggered Situational Interest

Students with a triggered situational interest for writing were likely to have
their interest captured in the moment by, say, the assignment to write about
366 Renninger & Riley

a topic of interest (e.g., basketball), but their interest was also likely to extend
only to completing the task. They did not identify as writers and would not
revise what they wrote, and for the most part they wanted to be told what to
do. They did not want to have to think about or work with feedback. Although
they might have heightened affect when their interest was triggered – when
working to write about basketball, for example – they were not aware that
their interest had been triggered, and did not seem to have enough knowl-
edge about writing to make choices about how to effectively provide details
and organize the information that they included about basketball.
Over the first three years of the workshop, L – is identified as having only
a triggered situational interest:
One day, for example, she and the other participants are looking at worms under
the microscope. At the end of the session, they put their worms back and as
everyone is packing up and preparing to leave, L – suddenly turns, runs back and
picks up a worm and takes it into the corner to look at it. Told that it is time to put
the worm back, she obliges but does not want to leave and sits on the steps of the
science building pouting. (Notes, June Year 1)

Similar to the student writer who had only a triggered situational interest
for writing but was momentarily excited to focus on an assignment to write
about basketball – a well-developed individual interest – L – experiences
heightened affect in the session focusing on worms and then does not follow
through to re-examine the worms in subsequent workshop sessions.
A few weeks later, during the week in the biology workshop on skulls, notes
on L – suggest that she chooses not to look at skulls or what animals they
must have come from based on size and teeth. Rather, she wanted to know if
“these [skulls] are real”; “how the skull fits with the rest of the animal”; and
“how it could move around.”
She had difficulty asking her questions though. She began to ask a question several
times, beginning with: “Not to be retarded or anything. . .” but had some difficulty
making herself clear and was seemingly frustrated by the other children talking. By
the time it was quiet enough for her to ask her first question, she initially forgot what
she was trying to ask but then remembered. Although the purpose of the activity
was identification of species, L – wanted to know about structure and function, and
how this one part of the animal fits with the other parts. (Notes, July, Year 1)

L – does not think of herself as a scientist and really only wants information
specific to her questions. Although her and her peers’ interest is triggered by
the worms and the skulls, she has difficulty learning with her peers. She has
trouble listening to others’ questions and issues and making her own connec-
tions to these as a member of the group.
 Interest and Cognition 367

In terms of interest development and its relation to cognition, the learner’s

relation to a triggered situational interest is idiosyncratic and tentative, espe-
cially when the content of the triggering interest is a more developed interest
(e.g., basketball) that is being used as a scaffold for working with content
that is not of interest and challenging (e.g., writing). Data from L – and the
other workshop participants’ case material suggest that being encouraged to
personalize content is critical to the ability to make connections to it, and that
connections are essential to both interest development and cognition.

Maintained Situational Interest

Similar to the students with a triggered situational interest, students with a
maintained situational interest for writing were primarily dependent on oth-
ers to tell them to write. Their interest for writing was sustained in the sense
that the students would return to class and the activities of the class feel-
ing positive about their engagement and confident that they could do well.
They felt this way because of the instructional activities (e.g., group work)
(Hidi et al., 1998; Mitchell, 1993) and personally meaningful topics (Mitchell,
1993) that their teacher employed. They did little writing outside of class, yet
they self-identified as writers. Because they sought to please the teacher, this
meant that they were receiving good grades. From their perspective, their
grades indicated that they were successful and that writing was an identity,
even though they only did writing when it was assigned in class. However, it
was difficult for the writing students to ask and pursue questions of their own
in their writing (e.g., to try out different voices, to experiment with words),
and they were not comfortable with choice; they preferred learning the rules
for writing and being told what to do. They used feedback as a set of rules, not
as a resource for thinking about writing.
Unlike the writing students, by the fourth year, L – had ideas about what
she wanted to know, although these topics were not always linked directly to
the plan for the day.
During the fourth year of the workshop, following the “celery experiment,” in
which a stalk of celery is placed in water dyed with food color, L – interrupts dis-
cussion of why the leaves change color to focus on the stalk: “Excuse me, isn’t that
decent?” She points to the red coloring of the “veins” in the stem and breaks open
the stem to look at how the inside of the stalk was affected. (Notes, July, Year 4)

L – and her peers are not dependent on others in order to engage with the
content to be learned, but rather for making this content available to them
and supporting them to engage with it, even if what they engage with is not
necessarily what the instructors had anticipated as the focus of the activity.
368 Renninger & Riley

By this point, L – was increasingly comfortable asking questions in the

group, and seemed more able to think about her peers’ questions, especially if
they informed her understanding of the phenomena with which she and the
others were working. She did not yet really understand the scientific process,
as her question about whether they could collect data and then predict what
would happen suggests.
By the second day of this workshop, L – chose to hang around after each work-
shop session, helping to clean up and do lab set-ups for the next day. She also
would question and think with the instructors about the day’s experimentation.
(Notes, June, Year 4)
Unlike the writers with a maintained situational interest, L – did not have a
need to please the instructor in order to receive better grades. She and her
peers were not in school and were not being graded (see Brophy, 1999). The
opportunity to log more time alongside the instructor was her choice, and
this (together with the structure and facilitation of the workshops) appeared
to enable L – to further solidify her connections to science. Within a few days
during the fourth year, she shifted into and out of the phase of maintained
situational interest and into the phase of emerging individual interest.
There were at least three features of the fourth-year workshop that may
have contributed to the development of L – ’s interest. Modeled on Springer’s
(2006) description of a democratic classroom, fourth-year participants helped
build the curriculum for the workshop by identifying questions to which they
wanted answers. They kept records of what they understood (responses to
ICAN probes3) in their lab notebooks. They were also engaged in tutoring
the younger children of the first-year workshop. Thus, in addition to triggers
for engaging science implicit in inquiry-oriented project-based learning, the
curricular structure included multiple opportunities for L – and her peers to
both make connections to and then reflect on these triggers (CTGV, 1997).
For L –, generating questions to help build the curriculum was not a diffi-
culty. Documenting what she understood in her lab notebook was something
on which she often worked in the time that she remained after the workshop ses-
sions were over. The tutoring component of the workshop did pose a challenge
for her, however. In order to prepare for tutoring, L – and her peers practiced
talking about how they would introduce the properties of Oobleck (a mixture
of cornstarch, water, and green food coloring). L – seemed to enjoy squishing
the goo and the prospect of sharing the activity with the younger children, but
the next day, she did not engage with the younger children at all.
She looks on, sitting at the side of the table, leaving any “tutoring” to her teach-
ing partner. Her affect suggests that she is not comfortable with the tutoring role.
(Notes, June, Year 4)
 Interest and Cognition 369

The course of L – ’s interest development suggests that a person who is

supported to have questions early in the triggering process may transition
through the phase of maintained situational interest quickly because his or
her interest does not continue to need another person to facilitate it. In other
words, when the perceived learning environment offers opportunities to
attend and engage, is not over-specified, and has rich content, it appears that
knowledge and value develop, and that the learner may easily engage in a pro-
cess of pursuing his or her own curiosity questions. Such questions are not
novel to those who have more information, but are novel for the learner and
allow the learner to build knowledge (Renninger, 2000). On the other hand,
as L – ’s case suggests, the ability to engage in asking curiosity questions may
not extend to sharing these with others – at least initially.

Emerging Individual Interest

The students with an emerging individual interest for writing had curios-
ity questions. They had their own ideas about writing and expression, and
had developed some facility in using writing for communication. They had
begun to identify themselves as writers presumably because they invested free
time in writing and liked it (not because they received good grades for their
work). In school, they enjoyed having choices about assignments, but they
often posed and sought answers to their own questions that could lead them
to deviate substantially from their assignments. They were not particularly
interested in the canon of the discipline or in receiving feedback that required
revision. They were self-assured about their work and its quality.
By the third week of the fourth-year workshop, L – ’s interest had shifted
to an emerging individual interest. Because the curricular structure of the
workshop focused on the participants’ questions, there was little oppositional
behavior like that characterizing the students with an emerging individual
interest for writing. Instead, L – re-engaged the questions she had raised in
other contexts, appeared to feel positive about her work with others in her
group, and seemed responsive to feedback that allowed her to understand
how she and her group were addressing their goals.
One of the questions that L – ’s group decides to study is, What is in lip gloss?
L – ’s group makes vanilla-scented lip gloss, following a set of procedures that
include combining several components (coconut oil, petroleum jelly, aloe vera
gel) and heating the mixture in order to facilitate mixing, as it was easier to com-
bine in a liquid state. They decide to use food coloring to add color and try adding
food coloring to the already prepared mixture. However, because the food color-
ing is water-based and the lip gloss contains oil, the two do not mix. There are
small beads of food coloring in the lip gloss. Following this discovery, discussion
370 Renninger & Riley

focuses on hypothesizing about what went wrong and experimental design. L – ’s

group decides to revise their procedure by adding the food coloring before melt-
ing the components. This revision works and produces pink lip gloss. It does not
matter that the science in which they are engaging is more about chemistry than
biology. (Notes, June, Year 4)

L – appeared able to refocus and explore her questions along with those of
the others in the hypothesis-generating and testing of their work to produce
colored lip gloss.
Differences between L – and the others are also evident. In addressing a ques-
tion about how sleep affects the amount of energy a person has, L – and her
peers decide that they should keep a sleep log over a long weekend, detailing the
times they go to sleep, wake up, and how they feel at each time point. No one
remembers to do this except L –, possibly because she thinks of the assignment
as an experiment, and the others think that it is work (like school). (Notes, July,
Year 4)

With the development of interest, L – appeared to have a broader range of top-

ics in which she was interested. She was increasingly willing to explore novel
content and, unlike her peers, did not appear to think about workshop-related
content as work, even if it did extend into the weekend. In turn, it also seemed
that she was more able to be open to her peers’ ideas, and was more confident
about her ability to work with the younger children.
Despite more willingness to work with the younger children, L – continued
to be anxious about this part of the workshop.
In the second week, they are working on measurement, documenting the length
of each person’s leg and then the length of their jump to answer the question:
“How do our legs affect the height and distance of a jump?” She forgets that they
are to use centimeters. In disgust, she exclaims, “Man, I took the measurements in
inches. My first day as a teacher and I ruined the experiment.” The others in her
group tell her that she can convert them; but she is so frustrated that she withdraws
from the group for almost 10 minutes, repeating, “I feel so stupid, so stupid.” When
one of the younger children approaches for help calculating the average distance
jumped, she is able to help. She seems to regain her self-confidence as she helps a
group of the younger children to graph their data. (Notes, June, Year 4)

The participation observation notes provide a number of instances in which

it is L – who helped the younger children to think in terms of their predic-
tions and why they think their prediction “came through,” or who reached
out to help one of the younger girls to spell “calculator,” saying, “I mess up
spelling that all the time.”
 Interest and Cognition 371

Lipstein and Renninger (2007) reported that it was only those with devel-
oped interest for writing who liked to work in groups. In earlier phases of
interest, the students in the writing classrooms primarily wanted to be told
what to do and were not interested in engaging in conversations about
options. They also had little interest for learning the canon, and little oppor-
tunity to generate the questions on which their writing would focus. They
were given opportunities to do “free writes” or choose the topic on which
they would write, but not only was the structure and the form of their writ-
ing specified, there were also expectations about format, development, and
content. The students who were in the phase of emerging individual interest
were described as wanting to establish autonomy so they could work on the
kind of writing that they themselves defined.
In the workshop context, L – not only helped develop the curriculum,
but was also free to refocus it with her questions. This type of context was
enabling (see related discussion in Cobb & Hodge, 2004). She generated curi-
osity questions based on her knowledge, the other things she knew and val-
ued, and her developing knowledge for this new content. This meant that
she needed less direct support to participate and engage than she did in the
earlier workshops, and less than the writing students needed. She also further
developed her willingness and ability to work with others, but she was con-
cerned about how she engaged with others in relation to the content of this
work and felt anxious about doing it correctly.
L – and her group were not constrained by the canon in science. They were
asked to generate questions and were encouraged to understand the science
in them. L – ’s approach to working with the younger children did suggest
that she had formed some sense of the way in which this work could unfold,
however. Presumably, her understanding was modeled on the way in which
her instructors had worked with her. 4

Well-Developed Individual Interest

Students with a well-developed interest for writing sought feedback that would
allow them to continue to develop their understanding of writing. For them,
the feedback process was an opportunity to deepen their interest (Azevedo,
2006; Barron, 2006; Hidi & Ainley, 2008; Lipstein & Renninger, 2007). These
students had identified as writers and had positive feelings about writing that
appeared to sustain them even when writing posed difficulties for them. They
spent time outside of school writing, and appreciated having choices about
assignments.
372 Renninger & Riley

Neither L – nor the others in her group had yet reached the phase of well-
developed individual interest in her last year of workshops.
By the fifth year, when L – volunteers to work as a teaching assistant in the
Chemistry Workshop, she has a good understanding of what it means to do sci-
ence and its process and likes taking experiments one step further by testing addi-
tional substances or mixing chemicals. Moreover, she is able to help the younger
students to fill in the ICAN statements in their lab notebooks even though she is
not doing the experiments herself. (Notes, June, Year 5)

L – was not yet independently pursuing her own questions. Nor did she seem
aware that there were generally accepted disciplinary standards for science
beyond those of the workshop context. She appeared to need the support
of the workshop environment that provided resources and opportunities for
learning in order to know how her goals were met.

Summary and Discussion

L – and the others in her group did not bring any formal experience with
science to the workshops. The curricular structure of the workshop sessions
was explicitly inquiry, and the instructors’ goals for them centered on under-
standing that they could do science and that science is fun. They wanted
L – and her peers to feel that they are capable of doing and enjoying science
and worked to ground the activities in L – and her peers’ prior experience.
The instructors provided time and opportunities for them to question and
reflect, and all questions were taken seriously. The science workshop as a
learning environment is a contrast to that of the writing students. The writing
students’ classes included open-ended opportunities (e.g., free writes), but
they also included instruction in the cannon of the five-paragraph essay and
analysis, content to which only those with well-developed individual interest
were receptive. The learning environments of each varied; the workshop was
more open and the writing classes were more closed. Comparison of the par-
ticipants in each suggests that the phase of learner interest influences to what
and also how he or she attends (see Table 17.1).
The data from L – ’s case provide further details about the nature of the
questions with which a learner engages and the shift in such questions over
time. Although her questioning appears to have focused on structure and
function, there was a shift from wanting to understand how the skull con-
nects to the body of the animal (a question that was not in the workshop
plans) in year one to wanting to use experimentation to explore the acid-base
relation (a question that anticipated upcoming workshop plans) in year five.
 Interest and Cognition 373

Not only do these data document a particular focus in her questioning over
the years, they reveal an increasing capacity to think and do science.5 They
also call attention to the time that this type of development can take, even
when the conditions of the learning environment include rich content, sup-
portive others, and opportunities to self-structure questions and engage. It
was four years before L – ’s interest began to shift from a triggered situational
interest to a maintained situational interest. It then took three weeks for her
interest to shift from a maintained situational interest to an emerging indi-
vidual interest.
The data from L – ’s case also highlight differences between learning envi-
ronments and the way in which learners engage content in each environ-
ment, and their needs in this process. As summarized in Table 17.1, L – and
her group seemed to benefit from and need additional information from
others, whereas in earlier phases of interest the student writers wanted to be
told only what they needed to know and no more – unless this information
acknowledged what they did. Only those student writers identified as hav-
ing a well-developed individual interest sought out and seemed positioned to
work with feedback.
There were differences in the participants’ perceptions of these learning
environments, in the goals and roles of the teachers and the instructors,
and in the backgrounds of the participants. Whereas the writing classrooms
focused on supporting the students to learn the rules of academic writing,
the science workshop environment was open-ended and did not have grades;
it was designed to promote fun and engagement with science. Although the
writing students’ teachers thought of themselves as supporting their students
in the same way that the instructors supported L – and her peers, this was not
the way that the writing students understood the expectations of their teach-
ers. The goals and roles of the workshop instructors changed, depending on
the activity and L – and her group’s responses; they provided information and
resources, asked and answered questions, stood back and allowed L – and her
group to explore, make mistakes, and reason.
The two groups of participants varied, as well. The writing students had
had instruction in writing throughout their schooling and came from fam-
ilies that valued education and had placed them in an academically ori-
ented school. L – and her group were learners new to science; only in the
last two years of the workshops had there been science instruction in their
schools; they came from families and a community with few or no scientists.
Although it is inappropriate to simply point to one or another feature of these
environments as accounting for differences, it is possible to note that the two
participant groups engaged content differently and that their perceptions
374 Renninger & Riley

influenced their engagement. It also appears that differences in their percep-

tions informed what they needed from others who were supporting them to
learn.

Conclusions and Questions

Current research suggests that a learner can be supported to develop an inter-
est for any content, through interactions with others and the texts, tasks, and
opportunities in the environment (Renninger, 2010). However, this same
research suggests that due to the nature of a person’s interactions with the
environment and, by implication, the quality of these interactions, interest
may or may not develop or deepen, and may instead regress or disappear alto-
gether (Bergin, 1999; Renninger, 2000). In other words, although interest can
be supported to develop, the phases of its development are termed “phases”
rather than “stages” because interest develops in relation to the environment
and can fall off if support is not available (Hidi & Renninger, 2006).
Findings from existing research on interest indicate that it is the opportu-
nities and experiences available to learners early in their work with a subject
that affect the kinds of connections they make to that subject, and, as a result,
their readiness to begin to engage it independently (Nolen, 2007). The others
with whom learners come into contact contribute to the connections that are
made – by providing feedback and supporting learners early in their work to
have fun and enjoy the content in ways that also build knowledge and enable
them to know that they know. Later in the development of interest, the needs
of learners in the out-of-school environment continue to include support, but
also include opportunities to explore and work with knowledge, know what
they have learned and what they have still to learn, and provide feedback that
enables them to know when goals have been met.
Based on the data from L – ’s case, it appears that shifts in the develop-
ment of interest can be expected but are not likely to be immediately obvious
to an interviewer, although patterns of engagement – such as the kinds of
questions asked and the extent to which these questions map onto the ques-
tions of the discipline – and behaviors can be tracked. The quote from L – ’s
interview at the opening of this chapter in which she says that she does not
like science came from her year-five interview. In contrast to what she said to
the interviewer, she has just requested and been granted a role as a teaching
assistant for a younger group in the Chemistry Workshop. Her response to
the interviewer (a familiar adult) reflects the same attitude that L – presents
during the first days of the first year of the workshop; it suggests that she
is uncomfortable talking about herself. It is possible that L – has difficulty
 Interest and Cognition 375

reconciling her successes in this out-of-school workshop with her experience

of school science. She may not believe that a summer workshop can result in
change, although her workshop instructors can see otherwise.
Prior findings have suggested that with the development of interest, learn-
ers need less direct support to participate and engage and more opportunities
to stretch what they know. The presence of the ability to ask and seek answers
to curiosity questions coupled with learners’ apparent resistance to informa-
tion in the academic context seemed to suggest that indirect methods of sup-
port might be most useful (e.g., instructional conversations, resources, and
opportunities to work with others) (see Lipstein & Renninger, 2007; Mitchell,
1993; Palmer, 2009). Findings from L – ’s case qualify this understanding by
suggesting that learners with more developed interest might be more respon-
sive to receiving the kind of information that could help them further develop
their interest were the learning environment more open, the learner feeling
sure of him or herself, the need to master particular forms of information
unspecified and untimed (Azevedo, 2006; Springer, 2006), and the environ-
ment responsive (Thoman et al., 2006).
With the development of interest, it appears likely that L – and her peers
have attentional resources that are freed up. L –, for example, began thinking
about science with her peers and the younger children. Before this, it appears
that her own questions took so much of her energy that she did not have the
capacity to fully benefit from her peers, although it is in the workshops with
them that she continues to grow.
The workshops and their content were new to L – and her peers. Their
design involved full participation, no explicit comparisons among the par-
ticipants, and no specific expectations about content to be mastered.6 L –
learned through her participation. It appears that autonomy, per se, is not
what L – needed. Learners such as the writing students may need to strive
for autonomy because they are responding to academic demands or pres-
sure. The questions and engagements of L – and her peers, on the other hand,
appear to be increasingly aligned with the disciplinary goals and skills of sci-
ence over the course of the workshops.
Comparing the data from the writing students and those of L – and her
peers underscores the complexity of the interest development and cognition
relation. It seems that the more open yet structured form of inquiry in the
workshop context led L – to build her knowledge, and this in turn was moti-
vating. Of importance is the fact that L – determined the “what” of the con-
tent with which she engaged. Her peers were not focused on structure and
function in their questions, although they, too, could be said to have been
consistent in the framing of the questions that they held.
376 Renninger & Riley

Data from the writing students and those of L – and her peers also raise
questions about the interplay between interest development and cognition in
the learning environment. Is the interest of L – and her peers subject to the
kind of regression and possible change as that of the writing students? Is it
possible that L – and her peers have grown into thinking and doing science in
such a way that they internalize the questioning, predicting, experimenting,
modeling, applying, and identifying additional questions, and that these expe-
riences and the enjoyment of the process of engaging them cannot fall off?
Does what triggers interest vary if learners are free to respond to the oppor-
tunities and resources that are available to them, rather than feeling that their
engagement is controlled? Is it possible that in more open learning environ-
ments, learning does serve as a trigger for interest?
What are the differences in the nature of goals that learners set for them-
selves as opposed to those that are set for them? Could L – have developed
her interest for science without the group of peers who also participated in
the workshop – other learners who not only shared the experience but talked
with her about the workshop and listened to her?
When did L – start to realize that she was indeed learning science? What
were the supports that were in place for her that made a difference? How dif-
ferent would the experience of the writing students have been had they been
participants in a more open learning environment – and would it have made
a difference if they had been in an earlier phase of interest for writing?
How do knowledge and feelings work together to provide a basis for deep-
ening value? How do affect and value change as interest develops? What does
L – perceive science to be? What types of interactions would be needed in
order for L – to claim that she enjoys science or that she might want to be a
scientist?
L – ’s case and the experiences of her peers together with data from the writ-
ing students indicate that the phase of learner interest and his or her percep-
tions of the learning environment are likely to affect whether one or another
content is something to which to attend – how he or she engages and whether
interest is likely to develop. They also underscore the importance of knowledge
building and reflection as supports for and outcomes of interest development,
an interaction that is as critical for education as it is for theory and research.

Acknowledgements
We would like to acknowledge the role of many in the data reported in this chap-
ter and our thinking about it. We appreciate: the ongoing encouragement and
involvement of Elizabeth Vallen and the participants of the Science-for-Kids
 Interest and Cognition 377

workshops over the years; the help of Jessica Bachrach, Robin Collin, Melissa
Emerson, and Alicia Niwagaba, who collected interview data and participant
observation notes that provided the basis of the data reported in this chapter;
editorial support from Nadine Kolowrat and Melissa Running; student fel-
lowship support from the Howard Hughes Medical Institute to Swarthmore
College; and for work on this chapter from the Swarthmore College Faculty
Research Fund.

Notes
1. Participant observation notes were collected continuously throughout the five
weeks of the workshop each summer; these were continuous anecdotal observa-
tional records (Carini, 1975) that were collected by one researcher who was blind to
study questions. The records chronicled instructors’ and participants’ conversations
and observable behaviors.
Interviews were conducted with workshop participants at three points during
each of the summers: before the workshop began, at the end of the workshop, and
five weeks following workshop completion. The interviews were used to identify
participant interest, feelings of self-efficacy, experience of the workshop, and abili-
ties to work with adaptations of established science tasks.
2. Data on L – ’s workshop participation included participant observation notes and
interviews before and after each of the workshops. The participant observation notes
consisted of running records of all classroom activities on each day of the workshop.
They chronicled instructor and participants’ conversations and behaviors. To the
extent possible, individual participation was systematically tracked. Following each
workshop session, the instructor(s) and the observer reviewed each day’s session,
at which time the observer adjusted the records to clarify confusion and/or record
additional information (e.g., things that happened on the other side of the room).
Identification of L – ‘s and her group’s phase of interest was informed by both the
interviews, whose questions were an adaptation of the questionnaire items com-
pleted by Lipstein and Renninger’s (2007) writing students, and by an adaptation
of Renninger and Wozniak’s (1985) analysis of young children’s behavioral records –
the likelihood of their voluntary reengagement, engagement overall, independent
engagement, and complexity of engagement.
3. ICANs (adapted from Chaconas; see Renninger & Nekoba, 2010) are a lab notebook
activity that involves reflecting on the concepts and skills of the day’s instructional
objectives in relation to those that have preceded. The day that the celery experi-
ment was set up, the ICAN probes in the lab books were:– I CAN use simple obser-
vations about light to explain why we see rainbows and why the sky is blue.
– I CAN use chromatography to find out what is in markers.
4. In other discussions, the workshop participants drew clear lines between school-
work and the workshops, along lines of the tasks, discipline, and interactions with
instructors.
5. Control data were collected and no such shifts were identified.
6. The workshop instructors were professors and their students in the particular field
of science (biology, chemistry).
378 Renninger & Riley

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 18

Metacognition, Motivation, and Affect

in the School Context

Metacognitive Experiences in the Regulation of Learning

Anastasia Efklides

Introduction
The perspective in this chapter is on the relations of metacognition with cog-
nition, affect, and motivation in the context of school learning. The framework
within which these relations will be explored is that of self-regulated learning
(SRL; Boekaerts, 1999; Winne, 2004; Zimmerman, 1998). Extant SRL theories
posit various phases in SRL starting with the thoughts, motivation, and activ-
ities preceding the execution of a task to those during and, finally, to those
following the execution of the task (e.g., Zimmerman, 1998). In this concep-
tualization of SRL, person characteristics at the trait level (that is, motivation
and person characteristics that influence the person’s involvement in SRL),
metacognition (mainly in the form of strategies for the control of cognition)
as well as self-reflection and self-evaluation process are advocated.
However, the theoretical approach adopted here, namely the Metacognitive
and Affective model of Self-Regulated Learning (the MASRL model, Efklides,
2011), differs from other approaches because it draws attention to the meta-
cognitive and affective aspects of the person’s interaction with the task at
hand (Task x Person), that is, the subjective experiences the person has in
relation to learning tasks as cognitive processing takes place. Subjective expe-
riences during cognitive processing are influenced by and in their turn influ-
ence person characteristics and motivation as well as control decisions. Such
an approach to SRL brings together the person’s situational, momentary, and
changing experiences that are associated to a specific learning task and its
processing with the relatively stable and general person characteristics imply-
ing that cognition, metacognition, affect, and motivation act in synergy in the
person’s short- and long-term SRL.
The learning situations to which the MASRL model applies can be shown
through the following examples: (1) A student is working on a mathematical

383
384 Efklides

problem, solves it, and feels confident that the solution produced was the
proper one; (2) a student feels difficulty during mathematical problem solv-
ing, solves the problem correctly (or incorrectly), and feels uncertain about
the correctness of the solution; (3) a student refuses or avoids getting involved
in problem solving because the problem is unfamiliar or novel; and (4) a stu-
dent produces a solution to a mathematical problem but avoids reflection
on the feelings experienced during problem solving. In all these examples,
the following questions are raised: Which is the nature of the feelings stu-
dents experience in relation to the task at hand? How are task-related expe-
riences and reactions formed? Are they related to motivation and affect or
only to cognitive processing? Do such task-specific subjective experiences
and reactions influence the person’s short- and long-term SRL? The position
taken here is that these subjective experiences are metacognitive in nature
(i.e., metacognitive experiences) and inform the person on the progress
that is being (or has been) made toward achieving the learning goal posed.
Moreover, it is posited that metacognitive experiences are related to both
motivation/affect and cognition, and form an indispensable part of both the
short- and long-term SRL.
This claim is based on the idea that metacognition (i.e., monitoring and
control of cognition) cannot be effective unless it is guided by the goal(s)
the person pursues. Monitoring of cognitive processing – that is, monitor-
ing whether processing is fluent and leads to the attainment of one’s goal –
is crucial for both effort regulation and strategy use to achieve the goal(s)
set (Efklides, 2006). Effort regulation is determined by cognitive processing
demands as well as by metacognitive awareness of these demands. It is also
determined by motivation and affect – that is, the drive that gives direction and
energizes behavior and action (Efklides, 2007). Thus, in the self-regulation of
behavior and action (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Kuhl, 1985; Kuhl & Fuhrmann,
1998), both the metacognitive and affective regulatory loops are contributing.
Usually, each regulatory loop is studied by researchers on its own, without
considering the links between them; metacognitive experiences, however,
provide such a link (Efklides, 2006, 2011).
To sum up, the MASRL model (Efklides, 2011) serves two goals: to high-
light the interrelations of person characteristics as traits (including moti-
vation), functioning at what is called the Person level with metacognitive
experiences – that is, metacognition functioning at what is called the Person
× Task level; and to highlight the interrelations of metacognitive experiences
with affect and their impact on short- and long-term SRL. In what follows, I
shall briefly refer to SRL and then to the various facets of metacognition, one
of which is metacognitive experiences. The role of metacognitive experiences
 Metacognition and Affect in School Context 385

in SRL will then be pointed out and, particularly, their interaction with moti-
vation and affect. Finally, the implications of the proposed MASRL model for
the conceptualization of the role of metacognition in SRL will be discussed.

Self-Regulated Learning
There is no doubt that school learning involves acquisition of content knowl-
edge as well as skills that form a very significant part of cognition. However,
learning is an effortful, long-lasting process in which previous acquisitions
form the building blocks for new higher-order and more-demanding learning
to be achieved. Moreover, learning requires awareness of thinking and its reg-
ulation, so that learning goals are attained. Consequently, learning requires
not only knowledge acquisition and knowledge restructuring but also per-
sistence and effort expenditure in face of adversity. For this to occur, motiva-
tion and positive affect are required (Aspinwall, 1998; Efklides, 2007; Efklides
et al., 2006) as well as metacognition and volition (i.e., self-regulation) to
secure action against distracters or obstacles (Kuhl, 1985; Kuhl & Fuhrmann,
1998). However, in the SRL process, we need to distinguish a Person level
that involves person characteristics functioning at a more general level and
determines what the person brings into various learning situations (long-
term SRL) and a Task x Person level; that is, what the person actually does
and feels during specific task processing (short-term SRL). These two levels
are depicted in Figure 18.1.
Before looking at the specific features of the MASRL model, some basic
components of SRL will be pointed out based on extant research. These com-
ponents will be presented from the perspective of the MASRL model, partic-
ularly in connection to its levels. Specifically, motivation in learning contexts
may take various forms, ranging from basic needs such as autonomy, com-
petence, and relatedness (Ryan & Deci, 2000) to expectancy-value beliefs
(Wigfield & Eccles, 2000) and achievement goal orientations (Nicholls, 1984;
Thrash & Elliot, 2001). Motivational needs or traits are task-independent;
thus, they function at the Person level and are setting the direction of one’s
action as well as the general policy on how much effort is to be invested in
the pursuit of one’s goal(s) (Kahneman, 1973). The actual effort, however, is a
function of both the task-specific motivation and the task difficulty (Brehm
& Self, 1989; Efklides, 2007; Efklides et al., 2006). Therefore, motivation at the
Person level is involved in the estimation of the effort to be exerted on a learn-
ing task at the Task x Person level, but this estimation (and actual effort) would
change as cognitive (task) processing takes place and more accurate monitor-
ing (e.g., in the form of feeling of difficulty) of task demands is made.
386 Efklides

Person level
Self-concept Affect
TASK Motivation

Ability MK − MS Control beliefs

Task x Person level

Cognition Metacognition and Affect Self-regulation of affect /effort

Task representation Monitoring and ME (prospective) Task-related Monitoring and Regulation of affect
control and MS control

Cognitive processing Monitoring and ME (during) and MS Activity-related Monitoring and Regulation of effort
control control

Performance Monitoring, ME (retrospective) Outcome-related Monitoring, Regulation of affect

control, and self- and MS control, and self-
observation observation

Figure 18.1. The MASRL model. Adopted from Efklides (2011). Interactions of meta-
cognition with motivation and affect in self-regulated learning: The MASRL model.
Educational Psychologist, 46(1), 6–25.
Note: ME = metacognitive experiences; MK = metacognitive knowledge; MS = meta-
cognitive skills.

At the Task x Person level, affect (e.g., mood) can also influence effort
exertion (Efklides & Petkaki, 2005; Gendolla & Brinkmann, 2005), and so do
achievement-related emotions such as interest (Hidi, 2006; Hidi & Ainley,
2007; Renninger, Sansone, & Smith, 2004; Sansone & Thoman, 2005). The
latter influence the extent to which students will engage in learning tasks
and will persist on them. Other emotions such as fear, anger, anxiety, pride,
or shame are also experienced before, during, or after working on learn-
ing tasks (Pekrun, Elliot, & Maier, 2006; Pekrun et al., 2002) and have an
impact on or interfere with learning behaviors or the regulation of learning.
These emotions can be related to the task itself, to the activity related to the
task, or to the outcome of one’s performance on the task. Emotions, unlike
motivation that functions at the Person level, are associated with the par-
ticular task or learning situation; that is, they are functioning at the Task x
Person level. Yet, some emotions can also function at the Person level. For
example, anxiety-trait (Spielberger, 1980) or interest in a particular knowl-
edge domain as disposition (Hidi & Renninger, 2006) can be more general
in scope and independent of the specific task at hand. If triggered by situ-
ational cues, then anxiety-trait and dispositional interest can influence the
decision to go on with task processing and effort exertion. Thus, although
emotions are critical for short-term task-specific SRL, they can also influ-
ence long-term SRL if they come to function at the Person level as disposi-
tional characteristics.
 Metacognition and Affect in School Context 387

Another person characteristic that is crucial for SRL is self-concept.

Academic self-concept, including self-esteem and self-efficacy in specific
school subjects or knowledge domains (Byrne, 1996; Dermitzaki & Efklides,
2000; Harter, 1986), is important for SRL. For instance, the higher a student’s
self-concept in a school subject the higher the attainment in this subject and
the more positive the feelings experienced during processing of similar learn-
ing tasks (Efklides & Tsiora, 2002). Thus, self-concept represents a person
characteristic that motivates the student in broader domains and impacts
SRL at the Task x Person level.
On the other hand, one cannot self-regulate learning behaviors unless she/
he has control and agency beliefs (Skinner, 1995); that is, beliefs about one’s
ability to exert control on the self and others or the environment using partic-
ular means (strategies) in different situations. Such control and agency beliefs
are crucial for the self-regulation of learning-related behaviors and the exer-
cise of volitional control.
It has to be pointed out, however, that none of the person characteristics
as traits by itself suffices to explain how task or situational characteristics
come in to determine cognitive processing of learning tasks. Task process-
ing requires, first of all, task-related cognition, knowledge, and abilities as
well as metacognition. Cognition and metacognition represent the cognitive
resources the person brings along when faced with a task; hence, they func-
tion at both a general level (Person level) and a specific level (Task x Person
level).
To sum up, SRL stresses autonomy and personal control over learning, with
the students monitoring, directing, and regulating their behavior and actions
in order to achieve, acquire knowledge, expand expertise, or improve them-
selves (Paris & Paris, 2001). For monitoring, directing, and regulating cogni-
tive processing, metacognition along with motivation and affect is needed.
However, the interaction of trait-like person characteristics (at the Person
level) with task-specific characteristics and demands as well as with the task-
specific cognitive processing at the Task x Person level is not well understood.
To be able to delimit how metacognition interacts with motivation and affect,
the facets of metacognition need to be pointed out.

Metacognition
Metacognition is defined as cognition of cognition; that is, monitoring and
control of cognition (Flavell, 1979; Nelson, 1996). It is associated with con-
scious awareness (but not only; see Efklides, 2008) and regulation of cogni-
tion, whereas cognition is functioning mainly at a nonconscious, non-explicit
388 Efklides

level, as in automatic (or automatized) processing. What makes metacognition

particularly important is that it monitors and consciously controls cognition
when automatic (or automatized) processing fails. However, metacognition
has many different facets and each of them contributes differently to SRL.
Monitoring of cognition is continuous and can be online, synchronous
to cognitive processing, or offline based on reflection, observation, and
­communication with others. One facet of metacognition related to online
monitoring is metacognitive experiences (ME), and particularly metacognitive
feelings, metacognitive judgments/estimates, and online task-specific knowl-
edge (Efklides, 2001, 2006; Flavell, 1979). Metacognitive feelings comprise,
among others, feeling of familiarity, difficulty, confidence, and satisfaction.
Metacognitive judgments/estimates comprise judgment of learning, estimate
of effort expenditure, estimate of time needed or spent, and estimate of solu-
tion correctness. Finally, online task-specific knowledge is task information
that we are attending to; for example, the words used in a problem and their
meaning and/or implications for problem solving as well as ideas or thoughts
regarding the task and others similar to it that we are aware of during task
processing, such as procedures we are applying (Efklides, 2001, 2006).
Another facet of metacognition is metacognitive knowledge (MK) that rep-
resents offline monitoring and comprises knowledge, beliefs, or theories about
cognition and the persons as cognitive beings; it is not bound to here and now,
although it can include information coming from online monitoring, as well.
More specifically, MK is declarative knowledge stored in memory (Flavell,
1979) and comprises models of cognitive processes such as language, memory,
and so forth (Fabricius & Schwanenflugel, 1994). It also encompasses informa-
tion regarding persons – the self and the others as cognitive beings; that is, how
we or other people process various tasks, how well we do on them, what we
felt during processing specific tasks as well as information about tasks, strate-
gies, and goals (Flavell, 1979). More specifically, metacognitive task knowledge
involves task categories and their features and relations between tasks as well
as the ways they are processed. Metacognitive strategy knowledge involves
knowledge of strategies as well as of the conditions for their use – when and
how a strategy should be used. Metacognitive goal knowledge, on the other
hand, involves knowledge of what types of goals people pursue when dealing
with specific tasks. Also, MK is involved in epistemic beliefs (Kitchener, 1983;
Kuhn, 2000) – beliefs about knowledge and knowing – and is related to theory
of mind (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Lockl & Schneider, 2007).
In general, MK, being based on the person’s self-awareness as well as on
reflection and socially shared theories of cognition (Nelson, Kruglanski, &
Jost, 1998), is continuously updated and used to guide the representation and
 Metacognition and Affect in School Context 389

control of cognition at a conscious level. However, unlike ME that function at

the Task x Person level, MK in the form of beliefs and theories is functioning
at the Person level.
Besides monitoring, metacognition is also involved in the control of cog-
nition. Control of cognition takes two forms. The first regards the deliberate
use of cognitive strategies that are initiated, terminated, or sequenced when
automatic processing fails (Nelson & Narens, 1994; Reder & Schunn, 1996),
whereas the other regards the deliberate regulation of cognition. Deliberate
regulation of cognition is based on metacognitive skills (Efklides, 2001, 2006;
Veenman & Elshout, 1999), another facet of metacognition. Metacognitive
skills comprise strategies of orientation, planning, and regulation of cog-
nitive processing and effort as well as strategies for monitoring the execu-
tion of planned action and the evaluation of the outcome of task processing
(Veenman & Elshout, 1999). They are called in when online monitoring of
task processing, namely ME (e.g., feeling of difficulty) denote that conscious
control of cognition is needed; MK is then activated along with metacogni-
tive skills (Efklides, Samara, & Petropoulou, 1999) in order to guide the reg-
ulation of cognitive processing according to one’s goal and the situational
characteristics and demands.

Metacognition, Affect, and Motivation

Metacognition is basically a cognitive phenomenon. However, as already
mentioned, one of the facets of metacognition – namely ME – can take the
form of metacognitive feelings that have a cognitive and experiential charac-
ter (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; Efklides, 2006); that is, they provide infor-
mation about features of the cognitive processing (e.g., fluency) and, at the
same time, have a feeling state that can have a positive or negative quality.
For example, ease of processing “puts a smile on the face” (Winkielman &
Cacioppo, 2001). The affective character of ME can be explained by two feed-
back loops (see Carver, 2003; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Efklides, 2006). The first
one is related to the outcome of cognitive processing and detects the discrep-
ancy from the goal set. Estimate of solution correctness, feeling of confidence,
and feeling of satisfaction are outcome-related ME based on this feedback
loop (Efklides, 2002a, 2002b). The higher the discrepancy from the goal the
more the negative affect experienced. On the contrary, the closer the persons
come to their goals the more satisfied they feel; this is a positive affective state
(Efklides, 2002b; Efklides & Petkaki, 2005).
The second feedback loop, which is called meta-loop, monitors the rate of
discrepancy reduction – the rate at which one progresses toward one’s goal.
390 Efklides

The meta-loop gives rise to affect (positive or negative) and a hazy expectancy
about the effect of the rate of progress on one’s goal (Carver & Scheier, 1998).
Presumably, feeling of difficulty is a processing-related ME that draws from
this feedback loop (Efklides, 2002a). Specifically, an indicator of the rate of
progress in task processing is fluency. Fluency is a powerful cue for both feel-
ing of knowing and feeling of familiarity (Koriat, 1997, 2007). However, feeling
of difficulty denotes lack of processing fluency (Efklides, 2002a), possibly due
to task complexity and increased processing demands on working memory
resources. Lack of fluency is also due to processing interruption or conflict of
response (Touroutoglou & Efklides, 2010; van Veen & Carter, 2002) as well as
error detection (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000). In all these cases,
negative affect arises because error probability increases (see also Efklides &
Petkaki, 2005 for association of feeling of difficulty with negative affect).
However, fluency or the lack of it also has implications for outcome-related
ME, such as feeling of confidence. For example, if feeling of difficulty is expe-
rienced, uncertainty also increases, even if the outcome of processing is objec-
tively correct (Efklides, 2002a, 2002b). In contrast, the person can feel high
confidence (overconfidence), even if the outcome of cognitive processing is
not correct, just because the response was produced fluently. This is particu-
larly true for cases in which the person is not aware of the task demands and
of his/her ignorance (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). In such a case, she/he has
the illusion that the task is easy and the response correct (Efklides, 2002a).
What needs, therefore, to be stressed is that metacognitive feelings, through
their cognitive and affective quality, are making the person aware of qualities
of cognitive processing (e.g., interruption of processing, conflict, etc.) as well
as about the impact of cognitive processing on the attainment of one’s per-
sonal goal.
Metacognitive judgments/estimates, on the other hand, are cognitive in
nature (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999). They may refer to the probability to learn
something (e.g., judgment of learning) that is crucial for the regulation of
effort (e.g., study time). They may also refer to one’s and others’ cognition.
For example, one may use normative information to judge the probability
to remember something or individualized information regarding one’s self
or other persons in similar situations (Lories, Dardenne, & Yzerbyt, 1998;
Salonen, Vauras, & Efklides, 2005). Social comparison processes or stereo-
typic knowledge can also be used to make judgments/estimates about one’s
own or others’ cognition (Salonen et al., 2005). Thus, metacognitive judg-
ments are interwined with social cognition and serve not only self-regulation
but also co- and other-regulation in peer collaborative learning or teacher/
parent regulation of a child’s cognitive processing.
 Metacognition and Affect in School Context 391

Most importantly, people make attributions about their ability depending

on the negative or positive judgments/estimates they make about their cog-
nition and/or the negative or positive metacognitive feelings they experience
(Metallidou & Efklides, 2001). Therefore, awareness of ME does not only pro-
vide input and motivation for cognitive and metacognitive control but also
for attributions about the self.
Having outlined the facets of metacognition, it is evident that at least at the
Task x Person level, metacognition can be related to affect and is crucial for
motivation and online self-regulation of cognition and effort. Moreover, ME
trigger causal attributions about the outcomes of cognitive processing that
have implications for long-term motivation. The relations of cognition, meta-
cognition, affect, and motivation in the process of self-regulation are depicted
in the MASRL model.

The MASRL Model

The MASRL model (Efklides, 2011; see Figure 18.1) emphasizes the interac-
tion of two levels of functioning of the person: the Person level, comprising
person characteristics as traits; and the Task x Person level, which comprises
cognition as well as affect along with their respective regulatory systems –
metacognition and self-regulation of affect. The assumption is that cognitive
task processing can be either conscious/analytic or nonconscious/automatic;
however, the ME and emotions arising in response to task processing are part
of the person’s conscious awareness and provide the self-awareness needed
for short-term SRL of both cognition and affect. Moreover, ME and affect as
well as conscious regulatory activities that function at the Task x Person level
contribute to long-term SRL because they feed back onto the Person level,
shaping the more stable person characteristics.
The basic tenets of the MASRL model are the following:

1. The task by itself has its own features; namely domain-specificity

(in terms of representational and processing demands), complexity,
capacity demands, novelty, attractiveness, and so forth. Moreover, it
is embedded in a specific situation/context that also contributes to the
representation of the task and its demands.
2. The person (Person level) has representation of his/her competences
(self-concept), motivational needs, beliefs, and tendencies (e.g.,
expectancy-value beliefs, achievement goal orientations) as well as
attitudes (i.e., affective, cognitive, and behavioral tendencies) and
affective dispositions such as interest or emotions as traits. The person
392 Efklides

also has domain-specific knowledge, cognitive ability and skills as well

as metacognitive knowledge and skills. Moreover, the person has con-
trol and agency beliefs related to his/her ability to exert control (i.e.,
volition).
3. The interaction of the person with the task (Person × Task level) refers to
the task-specific cognitive processing and its concomitants. It involves
the following constituents: (a) Cognition – task and goal representa-
tion, cognitive processing, and the outcome of cognitive processing as
manifested in cognitive performance; (b) metacognition – task-related
ME (e.g., feeling of familiarity), processing-related ME (e.g., feeling
of difficulty, estimate of effort needed, estimate of time needed), and
outcome-related ME (e.g., feeling of confidence, feeling of satisfaction).
It also involves metacognitive skills (e.g., planning, use of strategies)
called in by ME and MK; (c) affect – one’s mood state when entering
task processing and emotions related to the task (e.g., interest, anxiety),
to the processing of the task (e.g., joy, boredom, anger) as well as to the
outcome of task processing (e.g., pride, shame); and (d) self-regulation
of affect and effort, depending on the ME and emotions experienced.
4. There are also interrelations between the Person and the Task x Person
level. Information coming from the online task-specific self-regulation
processes feeds back onto the Person level and updates its constituents,
and the updated person information influences the subsequent policy
decisions and self-regulation at the Task x Person level. Evidence that
supports the interrelations of the Person level, particularly of motiva-
tion, with the Task x Person level as well as the relations of ME with
affect is presented below.

Metacognitive Experiences and Motivation

The effects of cognitive ability on ME have been shown in several of our stud-
ies (Dermitzaki & Efklides, 2001; Efklides et al., 1997, 1998 ; Efklides & Tsiora,
2002). This effect is understandable considering that both cognitive ability
and ME are related to cognitive processing. What is less predictable is the
relation of self-concept with ME (Dermitzaki & Efklides, 2001; Efklides &
Tsiora, 2002). The relations of self-concept with ME suggest that monitoring
is not simply a reflection of cognitive processing; rather, one’s perceived com-
petence and self-efficacy interact with information coming from the moni-
toring of cognitive processing to guide the self-regulation process. Feeling
of difficulty, confidence, and estimate of effort expenditure are ME that
are influenced by self-concept (Efklides & Tsiora, 2002). In their turn, ME
 Metacognition and Affect in School Context 393

feed back onto self-concept and trigger attributions about one’s competence
(Metallidou & Efklides, 2001).
However, the association of ME with self-concept is a complex process
because often the person has no analytic awareness of the factors that affect his/
her ME. For example, in the case of feeling of difficulty, the factors range from
task features (e.g., complexity; see Efklides, 2002a) to cognitive processing fea-
tures (such as cognitive interruption or response conflict; see Touroutoglou
& Efklides, 2010; van Veen & Carter, 2002) and to mood (Efklides & Petkaki,
2005) – for example, negative mood increases the reported feeling of difficulty.
Thus, for understanding the source of one’s feeling of difficulty, the person has
to make inferences based on online task-specific knowledge as well as MK
regarding tasks. In all these cases, the person attributes his/her feeling of dif-
ficulty to the task or to the situation; thus, attribution to ability is minimized.
Yet, in other cases the person may attribute the source of feeling of dif-
ficulty to one’s lack of knowledge or skills. This attribution is based on one’s
self-concept, because self-concept summarizes the person’s self-representation
of competence as well as self-efficacy in specific domains (Dermitzaki &
Efklides, 2000, 2001). When dealing with academic tasks, domain-specific
academic self-concept is activated, leading to expectancies of success/fail-
ure as well as to attributions about the difficulties to be experienced and the
outcome of cognitive processing. Feeling of confidence is directly related
to self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986) and in its turn triggers attributions of abil-
ity (Metallidou & Efklides, 2001). Estimate of effort also feeds back on the
self-concept in the sense that the higher the estimated effort the less the per-
ceived ability (Efklides & Tsiora, 2002; Nicholls, 1984). Thus, self-concept,
ME, and attributions are interrelated in a loop that connects metacognition
and motivation at the Task x Person level with motivation at the Person level,
where the general representation of the self lies. This loop gives coherence and
continuity to one’s self-regulatory behaviors and is getting updated through
intrinsic feedback about one’s competence coming from ME (Efklides &
Tsiora, 2002; Metallidou & Efklides, 2001) as well as by significant others’
external feedback that affects ME (Efklides & Dina, 2004, 2007) and, through
them, the self-concept.
Our research on ME and motivation has also shown that students’ achieve-
ment goal orientations are differentially related to students’ ME (Efklides
& Dina, 2007). The effects of achievement goal orientations are not on the
intensity of ME but on their calibration. Specifically, students with mastery
and performance-approach goal orientations have better calibrated ME than
students with performance-avoidance goal orientations. Mastery-oriented
students seem to closely monitor all their ME, even if ME convey negative
394 Efklides

information about one’s self as feeling of difficulty and estimate of effort do.
On the other hand, performance-approach oriented students mainly monitor
their outcome-related ME (e.g., estimate of solution correctness, feeling of
confidence, and feeling of satisfaction), particularly when negative external
feedback is provided. This finding suggests that these students are interested
in their performance outcome and use their ME as a basis to evaluate external
feedback. On the contrary, performance-avoidance oriented students do not
show any calibration of their ME in relation to their performance, indicat-
ing that they are unwilling to engage in a self-reflection process or that they
base the self-reports of their ME on cues (e.g., social comparison) other than
those emanating from the monitoring of cognitive processing and its out-
come. This lack of calibration, however, has adverse effects on SRL, because
neither effort regulation nor strategy use is adapted to task demands. As we
found in another of our studies (Efklides, 2002a; Efklides et al., 1999), stu-
dents who right from the beginning of task processing turned to others for
help did not show any change in their strategy use during problem solving,
and their reports of strategy use were not related to their task performance.
For students who changed strategy during task processing, however, their
reports on strategy use correlated with their task performance. Considering
that strategy use was also related to the reported feeling of difficulty, it is evi-
dent that the latter students monitored task-processing demands and adapted
their strategy use to the demands of task processing.
Taken together, our findings suggest that achievement goal orientations
may not directly impact the effort exerted on a task, as Efklides et al. (2006)
showed. They can do so, however, indirectly through their impact on the cali-
bration of the monitoring of task processing. Performance-avoidance goals,
by driving the person’s attention away from task processing, do not allow
effective monitoring and control of cognitive processing and therefore under-
mine SRL and achievement. This issue, however, merits further research
because students often have multiple goals as well as emotional dispositions,
such as interest, and attitudes toward knowledge domains that have motiva-
tional power. Attitudes, for instance, affect ME (Dina & Efklides, 2009) and
may lead to differentiation of SRL. If we look at ME in light of these findings,
then it is clear that ME are connected to motivation in multiple ways that can
be understood if we accept that the Person and the Task x Person levels have
their own functioning as well as interrelations between them.

Metacognitive Experiences and Affect

The MASRL model posits that, along with ME, both positive and nega-
tive affect and emotions can be experienced in learning situations from the
 Metacognition and Affect in School Context 395

beginning of the learning task to its end. Affect and emotions are not equated
to ME because they are triggered by various stimuli that are not necessarily
related to features of cognitive processing as it happens with ME. Positive
affect can arise from interest as dispositional or situational characteristics
(Hidi, 2006), expectancies for successful learning based on self-efficacy
beliefs (Bandura, 1986), fluency in cognitive processing (Efklides & Petkaki,
2005), positive feedback on the outcome of cognitive processing (Efklides &
Dina, 2004), social interaction (Salonen et al., 2005), or a positive mood state
that is independent from the learning situation (e.g., remembering a pleasant
event; Efklides & Petkaki, 2005).
How, then, do affect and emotions impact SRL and what are the relations
of affect and emotions with ME? Positive affect is a resource (Fredrickson,
2001) that can support SRL through its effect on goal selection as well as on
effort and persistence (Ainley, Hidi, & Berndorff, 2002). Positive affect arising
during task processing due to fluency of processing or the monitoring of the
outcome of task-processing as captured in ME is also input that informs the
person on the progress towards one’s goal (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Efklides,
2006), thus raising expectations for success (Aspinwall, 1998). Moreover, pos-
itive affect interacts with cognition, making the person more willing to take
risks, more flexible, and open to creative approaches. Yet, positive affect is
also associated with more holistic and less analytic thinking (Kuhl, 2001),
and this can have adverse effects on performance in cases that require critical
evaluation of the situation or the outcome of one’s efforts.
Positive affect also makes the person more willing to accept negative feed-
back about himself/herself (Trope, Hassin, & Gervey, 2001). With respect to
SRL, this finding implies that positive affect filters the impact of ME with
negative valence, such as feeling of difficulty, uncertainty, or lack of confi-
dence as well as of corrective external feedback so that these ME and exter-
nal feedback can be integrated into the self system without threatening one’s
self-concept. In this way, negative feedback makes self-concept more realistic
vis-à-vis learning tasks and outcomes.
Another implication of positive affect for SRL is coasting. Coasting is a
by-product of positive affect due to a fast progress toward one’s goal (Carver
& Scheier, 1998). Coasting entails that the person engages in activities not
directly related to one’s goal. This is helpful because it broadens one’s interests
and perspectives but has the risk for the student to give up the main goal, par-
ticularly if coasting starts early, before the student accomplishes his/her main
goal. One condition that can foster coasting is when the student is ill-informed
by his/her ME – for example, overconfidence that decreases effort although
the task is demanding. In such cases, coasting increases potential distracters
and endangers the learning process.
396 Efklides

All of the above considerations make clear that bringing metacognition and
affect at the forefront of the Task x Person level and in immediate connection
with cognition can accommodate findings that refer to a direct relationship of
cognition with metacognition and affect – with each one of them separately.
It can also allow testing of hypotheses regarding mediational effects of ME
in the relation of affect with cognition as well as of cognition and affect with
person characteristics, functioning at a more general level. For example, as
Touroutoglou and Efklides (2010) found, the same underlying feature of task
processing (e.g., cognitive interruption) leads to the formation of ME (e.g.,
feeling of difficulty) and emotions (e.g., surprise). On the other hand, one
may expect to do well on a task when she/he starts task processing and this
expectation triggers positive affect; if later on, during cognitive processing,
she/he feels difficulty, then this feeling might trigger an emotion such as sur-
prise, anger, and so forth. The same can happen when starting task processing
with negative affect ends up with less than expected difficulty and a success-
ful outcome of processing; then, an emotion such as joy is triggered. In such
cases, ME provide the cues for the change of affect.
On the other hand, negative affect can be due to situational characteris-
tics that give rise to fear, anxiety, boredom, anger (Pekrun et al., 2006); ME
regarding task processing and/or its outcome such as lack of fluency or unde-
sired outcomes (e.g., feeling of difficulty, high estimate of effort, low feeling of
confidence); low expectations for success because of a negative self-concept
(Bandura, 1986) as well as social rejection (Hubbard, 2001); negative external
feedback that affects ME and through them state anxiety (Dina & Efklides,
2009); and factors unrelated to the learning task or situation. Negative affect
constrains students’ self-regulation efforts because it turns their attention to
potentially harmful stimuli or undesirable outcomes and away from task fea-
tures that can facilitate processing (Ellis et al., 1997). It also lowers expectations
for performance (Cervone et al., 1994) and reduces effort and persistence,
thus facilitating disengagement and goal abandonment (Carver, 2003).
Despite its potential threats for self-regulation, negative affect is associated
with more critical, analytic, and systematic processing that can be beneficial
for performance depending on task requirements (Kuhl, 2001). Moreover,
negative affect can be beneficial for self-regulation if it focuses the person’s
attention on the task (e.g., monitoring of solution correctness) rather than
on emotional stimuli (Basso, Schefft, & Hoffmann, 1994; Martin & Davies,
1998). These findings imply that the effects of affect on cognition can be direct
(e.g., triggering analytic or holistic processing) or indirect via ME and the
cognitive regulatory loop. Increased negative mood, for example, increases
feeling of difficulty (Efklides & Petkaki, 2005) and, through it, the control
 Metacognition and Affect in School Context 397

decisions – namely, change of strategy use (Efklides et al., 1999). If the strategy
is successful, then positive affect is experienced, thus changing the person’s
mood state. An alternative route could be the following: one starts cognitive
processing with negative mood, the negative mood triggers analytic process-
ing, and engagement with the task is leading to mood absorption (Erber &
Erber, 1994). This change of mood state may then impact the intensity of feel-
ing of difficulty. Which of the two patterns of interaction of affect with cogni-
tion, and under what conditions, is actually taking place has to be determined
by future research.
Nevertheless, the dynamic interplay between positive and negative affect is
important for understanding the interrelations of cognition and metacogni-
tion with affect in SRL, rather than the positive or negative affect by them-
selves. This dynamic interplay is also evident in ME; for example, a student
may start with negative mood when processing a task, but as she/he is get-
ting involved in it and processing is fluent, positive affect is restored (Efklides
& Petkaki, 2005). Moreover, progressing toward the goal makes the student
more confident and willing to get engaged in similar tasks again. Therefore,
the change of ME and the affect that goes with them can have an impact
on cognitive processing as well as on SRL because a change from negative
to positive affect can reinforce the activities that brought about that change.
Moreover, a change toward positive affect can moderate the impact of ME
on the self-concept, directing the control decisions in a self-congruent way.
Depending on a student’s affective state, feedback from ME can be integrated
to the self system and guide the control processes efficiently or aggravate the
student’s already negative affect and lead to disengagement from the task or
maladaptive SRL (Efklides & Dina, 2007).
On the other hand, the person can self-regulate his/her affective state
based on the awareness of his/her ME and emotions. Such self-regulation
of affect can be successful or unsuccessful. This might have implications for
both cognition and metacognition. For example, if students experience dif-
ficulty and make negative self-evaluations for their academic competence
based on attributions of lack of ability but at the same time they value school
achievement (Paris, 2002), then negative affect and self-focus increase, par-
ticularly in ruminative and depressed individuals as well as in females (Mor &
Winquist, 2002); this decreases the efficiency of SRL. Social rejection can also
lead to negative affect and negative self-evaluations (Rudolph, Caldwell, &
Conley, 2005), possibly aggravating mood, and through it, ME regarding task
processing. Emotional distress then leads to decreased perceptions of compe-
tence over time (Pomerantz & Rudolph, 2003) and devaluation of academic
learning (Jacobs et al., 2002). Negative self-concept and ME then strengthen
398 Efklides

avoidance goals, making students unwilling to reflect on their ME and inte-

grate feedback from them in SRL (Efklides & Dina, 2007).
Summing up the relations of metacognitive experiences, affect, and SRL, it
becomes clear that metacognition informs and is informed not only by cogni-
tion but by affect and self-concept. Because of the relations of ME with affect
and self-concept, metacognition can impact students’ performance and well-
being both in the short- and long-term. A positive outcome in the interplay
of positive-negative affect is a condition for successful SRL.

Toward a Broader Conceptualization

of Metacognition
Placing ME and metacognition, in general, in the service of self-regulation,
co-regulation, or other-regulation of learning makes it obvious that their role
is much broader than the usual conceptions of metacognition admit. In what
follows, an overview of what metacognition can (or cannot) do in the context
of SRL is presented.

The role of Metacognition in SRL

(a) Metacognition is instrumental for self-representation and self-awareness
vis-à-vis reality, the object world (e.g., cognition), and the other per-
sons as agents and carriers of mental states that may differ from our
own (see also Bartsch & Wellman, 1995);
(b) it is crucial for awareness of knowledge states and their constraints offering
the substratum for epistemological thinking, rational knowledge, and the
negotiation of knowledge at a social level (Kuhn, 2000; Newell, 1990);
(c) it supports conscious and analytic knowledge and skills acquisition when
there is no previous knowledge or the automatic (or automatized) rou-
tines need to be decomposed in order to be reorganized and sequenced
in a novel way (Paris, 2002);
(d) it facilitates trouble-shooting when controlled action is needed to restore
a failed system or course of action (Paris, 2002);
(e) it provides the subjective basis for self-regulation of online cognitive
processing, effort, and affect so that there is efficient use of resources
(affective, cognitive, social, time, etc.) for goal attainment. Judgment of
learning and study time (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992) is such an example
as well as feeling of difficulty (Efklides et al., 2006);
(f) it is necessary for co-regulation and other-regulation of cognition in
cases in which people have to monitor their own as well as the other
 Metacognition and Affect in School Context 399

person’s thinking in order to control their joint action (Iiskala, Vauras,

& Lehtinen, 2004; Salonen et al., 2005). It is even more important for
learning, both in school and family, because teachers, peers, and par-
ents monitor students’ thinking and affect – as observed in students’
behavior and ME – and the feedback they provide is based on this
monitoring and/or on their own MK of what might be the factors that
could have impacted students’ thinking and affect.

The Effectiveness of Metacognition in SRL

Being part of the self-regulation, co-regulation, and other-regulation system
does not entail that metacognition is always effective in guiding the regula-
tion process. As we have already mentioned, metacognition can be flawed
(e.g., illusions of familiarity, knowing, understanding, difficulty) and can be
inaccurate or deficient as regards MK and MS. As a consequence, people can
make faulty control decisions or inefficient strategy use. Moreover, metacog-
nition in the form of MK and ME may have no impact on cognition if there
is no connection to and triggering of control processes. This may happen, for
example, in thinking-aloud situations or post hoc conjectures about think-
ing processes of which we were not aware during task processing or when
involved in wishful thinking (Paris, 2002).

The Interaction of Metacognition with Person

Characteristics and Affect
The interaction of metacognition with self-concept, motivation, and affect is
often overlooked. However, because of this interaction, SRL can be in con-
gruence with one’s self as the MASRL model depicts. Moreover, because
affect has its own functioning and regulation, there can be a crossover of the
metacognitive control (i.e., the cognitive regulatory loop) to the affective con-
trol (i.e., affective regulatory loop), and vice versa. The conditions that pro-
mote this crossover and when this crossover is effective for SRL are not yet
studied.

Metacognition in Collaborative Learning

In the co-regulation of cognition in collaborative learning situations, the
representation of the other person’s cognition and affect is based on attri-
butions and extrapolations that emanate from one’s own ME and MK. This
entails that the feedback provided to the other person may (or may not)
400 Efklides

correspond to what the other person is actually thinking, feeling, and doing,
and may (or may not) lead to successful control decisions at the individual or
interpersonal level. The situation becomes even more complicated if inter-
personal relations and dynamics enter the co-regulation process (Salonen
et al., 2005), particularly because emotions are also triggered by situational
characteristics and ME as well as by the others’ responses (e.g., feedback)
to our learning outcomes (Dina & Efklides, 2009). Consequently, the co-
regulation of learning cannot be successful if metacognition makes use of
only the cognitive regulatory loop; it should be orchestrated with affect and
regulation of affect.

Conclusion
In this chapter, the relations of metacognition with motivation and affect in
the context of SRL were pointed out. The MASRL model was the theoretical
framework that allowed the delimitation of interrelations between these com-
ponents of SRL. Moreover, self-regulation, co-regulation, or other-regulation
is a dynamic process, and understanding it is a challenge for future research.
By focusing on ME and their relations with person characteristics on the one
hand and affect at the Task x Person level on the other, a link between ME and
both the short- and long-term SRL was established. Motivation, self-concept,
and affect at the Person level can have an impact on ME, and ME on them,
thus enhancing (or impeding) students’ SRL. Moreover, the interplay between
affect (positive or negative), cognition, and metacognition at the Task x Person
level is important for efficient online self-regulation. More research is needed
in order to reveal whether metacognition exerts a direct effect on affect and
motivation or mediates the relations of cognition with affect and motivation.
Also, research is needed in order to understand the potential role of ME,
through self-awareness, to the functioning of the affective regulatory loop.
The MASRL model entails that all students, successful or not, self-regulate
their learning continuously but do it differently, because they pursue differ-
ent goals, have different ME, and use different regulatory strategies that lead
to different learning outcomes. An implicit assumption in SRL theory is that
SRL leads to successful learning outcomes because students autonomously
select their learning goals and strategies, enjoy learning activities, and take
pride in their achievements (Ryan & Deci, 2000). This assumption, however,
cannot be generalized to all students, because not all students self-regulate
successfully, nor all learning outcomes – even successful ones – give joy and
pride, as research on attribution theory has shown (Weiner, 1985). Anxiety,
shame, and boredom can be experienced as well as joy and pride, depending
 Metacognition and Affect in School Context 401

on how (e.g., with how much effort) success was achieved and to what it was
attributed (Nicholls, 1984; Pekrun et al., 2006). Metacognition is a crucial
constituent of this process because ME provide the intrinsic feedback that the
person is using during self-reflection and self-evaluation. Intrinsic feedback
through ME can be congruent or incongruent, with external feedback com-
ing from others. The interaction of ME with external feedback (e.g., Dina &
Efklides, 2009) is a field that merits further research if we are to understand
the development of self-regulation/co-regulation/other-regulation of learn-
ing. Finally, the interaction of ME with affect can provide a theoretical basis
for describing different patterns of SRL so that more targeted and differenti-
ated interventions can be undertaken to change ineffective SRL.

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 19

Motivation in Language
Klaus-Uwe Panther

Introduction
Whether natural language is motivated by extralinguistic (e.g., cognitive) fac-
tors has been a controversial topic since antiquity; it is much older than the
emergence of linguistics as a scientific discipline in the nineteenth century.
In Plato’s dialogue Cratylus, Socrates is asked by Hermogenes and Cratylus to
act as an umpire on the problem of “truth” or “correctness” in “names”, where
the last category is rather vague, including proper names, common names,
and adjectives (Sedley, 2003, p. 4). Cratylus’s position is usually referred to
as “naturalism”, in contrast to Hermogenes’s “conventionalism” (Sedley, 2003,
p. 4). Hermogenes describes Cratylus’s view, as opposed to his own, in the
­following terms:
I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus has been arguing about
names; he says that they are natural and not conventional; not a portion of the
human voice which men agree to use; but that there is a truth or correctness in
them, which is the same for Hellenes as for barbarians. . . . I have often talked over
this matter, both with Cratylus and others, and cannot convince myself that there
is any principle of correctness in names other than convention and agreement.
(Hamilton & Cairns, 1961, p. 422)

In modern linguistic terminology, the apparently opposing conceptions of

the nature of linguistic signs can be rephrased as follows: Naturalists main-
tain that the relation between the form of linguistic signs and their content is
motivated, whereas conventionalists contend that this relation is purely con-
ventional and arbitrary.1
The term “arbitrary” as a property of linguistic signs was probably first
coined, or at least widely spread, by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure,
who is credited with being the founder of structuralist linguistics in Europe.
Saussure regards the linguistic sign as a mental entity (entité psychique)

407
408 Panther

linking a content (signifié or “signified”) with an “acoustic image” (signifiant

or “signifier”) (Saussure, 1995, p. 99). The relation between signifier (form)
and signified (content) is considered to be arbitrary (ibid., p. 100). The term
arbitraire is somewhat misleading because it suggests that language users
are free to select any signifier for any signified they intend to express. What
Saussure really has in mind can be illustrated with a simple example from his
Cours de linguistique générale: the association of the content “female sibling”
with the linguistic form sœur is a convention of the French language, just as
it is an arbitrary convention to express the same concept as “sister” in English
and sorella in Italian. The term “arbitrary” (arbitraire) is thus understood as
the opposite of “motivated” (motivé).
The principle of arbitrariness is certainly part and parcel of Saussure’s
semiotic theory, but it does not represent everything that the Swiss linguist
had to say about the nature of linguistic signs. Importantly, Saussure differen-
tiates explicitly between various degrees of arbitrariness/motivation. That is,
he recognizes that language can and even must be “relatively motivated”:
Le principe fondamental de l’arbitraire du signe n’empêche pas de distinguer dans
chaque langue ce qui est radicalement arbitraire, c’est-à-dire immotivé, de ce qui ne
l’est que relativement. Une partie seulement des signes est absolument arbitraire;
chez d’autres intervient un phénomène qui permet de reconnaître des degrés dans
l’arbitraire sans le supprimer : le signe peut être relativement motivé. (Saussure,
1995, pp. 181–182)

Which translated means: “The fundamental principle of the arbitrariness of

the sign does not prevent our singling out in each language what is radically
arbitrary, i.e., unmotivated, and what is only relatively arbitrary. Some signs
are absolutely arbitrary: in others we note, not its complete absence, but the
presence of degrees of arbitrariness: the sign may be relatively motivated”
(Saussure, 1968, p. 131; translated by Wade Baskin).
Saussure realizes that the notion of (relative) motivation is relevant in the
formal and conceptual analysis of complex linguistic expressions (see Radden
& Panther, 2004, pp. 1–2). He observes, for example, that the French words
for the cardinal numbers “ten” and “nine” – dix and neuf, respectively – are
both arbitrary and conventional. Furthermore, the French language con-
ventionally codes the number concept “nineteen” as dix-neuf (literally,
“ten-nine”). In German, the same concept is expressed as neunzehn (literally,
“nine-ten”). Although it is not predictable from the concept nineteen how it
should be coded in natural language, both codings – ten-nine and nine-ten –
are motivated. Dix-neuf and neunzehn are thus partially arbitrary, because
the individual words in the compound expression are arbitrary; but they are
 Motivation in Language 409

Linguistic signs

Conventional Non-conventional

Motivated Unmotivated Motivated

Figure 19.1. The conventionality and motivation scales (adapted from Panther,
2008, p. 8).

also partially motivated because it is “natural” to represent the concept nine-

teen by means of the concatenation of the words for nine and ten. Finally,
there is again some language-specific arbitrariness in how the elementary
meaning-bearing building blocks (morphemes) nine and ten are ordered.
French chooses the order double digit + single digit, whereas German selects
the reverse order. This example demonstrates that there exist degrees of arbi-
trariness/motivation (i.e., the contrast between arbitrariness and motivation
is polar, rather than binary).
In this chapter, I take a theoretical perspective that integrates Saussure’s
insights with an aim to demonstrate that grammatical structure is (relatively)
motivated. In what follows, I assume that linguistic signs are distinguished
along two dimensions: conventionality and motivation. Conventional signs
(simple and complex) range from unmotivated to motivated, but non-
­conventionally used signs must always be motivated to some extent; other-
wise they would be uninterpretable. Figure 19.1 diagrams the relationship
between motivation and conventionality.
The assumption that grammar is motivated is called into question in for-
malist theories of language (e.g., generative grammar). In this framework, it
is commonly held that grammatical generalizations are purely formal; they
are not shaped in any way by conceptual content, communicative function,
economy of coding, and so forth (see Borsley & Newmeyer, 2009; Newmeyer,
1983, 2000).2 However, functionalist and cognitive linguists have accumu-
lated an impressive array of data in support of the claim that grammar is at
least partially motivated. Nevertheless, some principled explanation must be
given why, as Saussure already observed, not every grammatical structure is
motivated. In the conclusion to this chapter, an attempt is made to provide a
provisional solution to this problem.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: A working defini-
tion of motivation is proposed, followed by an interlude about the theoreti-
cal status of motivation as an explanatory concept in linguistics. The section
410 Panther

concludes with a brief characterization of extralinguistic factors that argu-

ably have an impact on the form and/or content of linguistic signs. Next,
I consider basic semiotic relations and language-independent parameters
that constitute motivating factors. Then, a classical example of a motivated
relation between content and form (iconicity) is presented. The section that
constitutes the core of this chapter is concerned with motivation in grammar.
I focus on a typical phenomenon of English, the meaning and distribution
of question tags, showing that these tags are sanctioned and constrained by
a variety of language-independent factors. The final section reflects on why
grammar is not fully but only partially motivated.

Motivation in Contemporary Linguistics

The notion of linguistic motivation assumed in this chapter is based on the
one proposed in Radden and Panther (2004, p. 4) and Panther (2008, p. 6):
(1) i. Motivation is an unidirectional relation between a linguistic source
and a linguistic target.
ii. A linguistic target is motivated if and only if at least some its proper-
ties are caused by the linguistic source, i.e. its form and/or content)
and language-independent factors (see also Heine, 1997, p. 3).
Henceforth, I use the terms “form” and “content” instead of Saussure’s terms
“signifier” and “signified,” respectively. I understand “content” in a rather
broad sense as covering both conceptual (semantic) content and pragmatic
(communicative) function. The term “form” is, for my purposes, a conve-
nient blend of components that are usually kept apart in linguistics: syn-
tax (i.e., rules and principles of sentence construction), morphology (i.e.,
the syntax of words), and phonology (i.e., sound and prosodic structure).3
The semiotic relation between content and form can be diagrammed as in
Figure 19.2.
The term “language-independent factors” in (1ii) is meant to express the
assumption that the kinds of motivating forces that shape linguistic signs are
found not only in language but in other semiotic and communicative systems
such as gestures, traffic signs, the visual arts, and so forth, as well. In this
sense, these motivating factors are not specifically linguistic, and might be
called translinguistic. Such translinguistic motivational parameters include
perceptual factors, such as iconicity, economy of coding, and cognitive fac-
tors, such as creative thinking, reasoning (e.g., conceptual metaphor, meton-
ymy, and non-monotonic inferencing) (see Radden & Panther, 2004 for
extensive discussion).
 Motivation in Language 411

CONTENT

Pragmatic function

Conceptual content

SYMBOLIC RELATION

FORM

Syntax

Morphology

Phonology

Figure 19.2. The symbolic relation between content and form of the linguistic sign.

Possibly under the influence of a partial misunderstanding of Saussure’s

conception of the linguistic sign, but especially with the advent of the for-
malist framework of generative grammar, the idea of motivation as an
explanatory concept has been met with skepticism if not outright dismissal
(e.g., Newmeyer, 1983, 2000).
One reason for the skepticism that motivational explanations have faced is
that they have no predictive power. This is readily admitted, or at least implic-
itly assumed, by many functionalist and cognitive linguists (e.g., Haiman,
1985; Heine, 1997; Lakoff, 1987; Langacker, 2008). For example, with regard
to the form and meaning of grammatical constructions, Goldberg (2006,
p. 217) emphasizes that the motivation of some aspect of the form or con-
tent of a construction does not imply that “the construction must exist.” The
motivational link between a linguistic source and a target is “contingent, not
deterministic”. Goldberg emphasizes that this situation is not uncommon in
other sciences (e.g., in evolutionary biology). In the humanities, including
412 Panther

for example historical linguistics, non-predictive explanations of linguistic

change are common.
For the reason given above, generative linguists have qualms about moti-
vation as an explanatory concept; that which counts as an explanation in
linguistics is, however, highly theory-dependent. According to generative
grammar, humans are equipped with a genetically implemented language
faculty, metaphorically called a Universal Grammar (UG), which is consid-
ered a precondition for the acquisition of a human language. One important
goal of generative grammar is to uncover the properties of the presumed UG
and seek explanatory adequacy by answering the question: “Why do natural
languages have the properties they do?” (Radford, 1997, p. 5). One of the uni-
versal properties of grammar, in particular of syntax, is its putative autonomy.
Thus, Radford (1988, p. 31), among others, stipulates that syntactic rules “can-
not make reference to pragmatic, phonological, or semantic information”.
With regard to the supposed autonomy and non-motivated nature of syn-
tax, the cognitive linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 481) make an important point. For them syntax is
“the study of generalizations over the distributions of . . . syntactic elements.”
Despite this somewhat unfortunate (circular) characterization of syntax, the
authors have a good point in arguing that it is “an empirical question whether
semantic and pragmatic considerations enter into . . . distributional general-
izations” (p. 482). In other words, the autonomy or non-autonomy of syntax
cannot be stipulated by fiat. To date, a large number of grammatical (e.g.,
syntactic) phenomena have been discovered, some of which have been ana-
lyzed insightfully by Lakoff (1987) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999). Their case
studies and those of many other functionalist and cognitive linguists (e.g.,
Goldberg, 2006, 2009; Haiman, 1985; Langacker, 2008) strongly suggest that
syntactic generalizations often can be formulated adequately only if concep-
tual and pragmatic information is incorporated into their descriptions.
Since the nineteenth century, in historical linguistics, motivational expla-
nations have proved their worth in unraveling tendencies of linguistic change.
Consider the well-documented development of grammatical morphemes/
words from lexical units, a subtype of the historical process known as gram-
maticalization. For example, in their World Lexicon of Grammaticalization,
Heine and Kuteva (2002, pp. 149–157) list myriad grammatical markers that
have evolved from lexical concepts. A telling example is the grammatical-
ization of the concept of “giving” in various languages. Give has developed
grammatical functions (e.g., affixes, prepositions, conjunctions, complemen-
tizers) with meanings, such as “benefactive” (e.g., Thai, Mandarin Chinese),
 Motivation in Language 413

“causative” (e.g., Vietnamese, Khmer), “concern” (e.g., Zande), “dative” (e.g.,

Ewe), and “purpose” (e.g., Acholi).
At least for some of these changes, a motivational explanation is natural.
Consider the conceptual link between the concept of giving and the gram-
matical category benefactive.4 The action of giving implies a giver and a recip-
ient, the latter usually benefiting from the action. It is this semantic aspect of
“give” that becomes part of the grammar in a number of languages. A similar
analysis applies to the development of the dative case from verbs of giving.
The dative typically coincides with the recipient of an action and wears the
etymological motivation of its name on its sleeve (dative “case of giving”). In
Southeast Asian languages such as Vietnamese and Khmer, the verb denot-
ing give has developed a causative meaning. One might add here that the
verb give in present-day English is also attested with a causative meaning:
in sentences such as “This constant noise gives me a headache,” the original
meaning of transfer has “bleached” into a meaning that is more abstract (i.e.,
more grammatical than the basic sense).
The above-mentioned linguistic changes do not occur by necessity; it is not
possible to prognosticate that every language that has a verb with the meaning
“give” in its lexicon will develop a grammatical category “dative”. However, for
those languages where the route of grammaticalization from “give” to “dative”,
for example, has been taken, an “explanation” in terms of conceptual moti-
vation seems natural. In conclusion, despite the non-predictability of gram-
maticalization processes and other types of semantic and formal change, it is
hard to imagine how language change could be accounted for without some
notion of motivation.
Grammaticalizations and other types of motivated linguistic change may
extend beyond the lifespan of language users, so that they are often unaware
of what has initially motivated shifts from lexical to more grammatical func-
tions of linguistic units. However, motivated signs and sign complexes are
also recognizable on the synchronic level, where they very well may be inter-
nalized as part of the linguistic competence of native speakers.5 I turn to this
topic in the following section.

The many Facets of Motivation

There are four basic combinatorial possibilities of how the content and form
of signs may be motivationally related, which are diagrammed in Figure
19.3b–e. These are the elementary building blocks from which more complex
motivational relations are assembled (see Radden & Panther, 2004, p. 15). The
414 Panther

(a) (b) (c)

SOURCE TARGET

CONTENT CONTENT CONTENT

FORM FORM FORM

symbolic relation TARGET SOURCE

content motivating form form motivating content

(d) (e)

SOURCE TARGET

CONTENT1 CONTENT2 CONTENT CONTENT

FORM FORM FORM1 FORM2

content1 motivating content2 SOURCE TARGET

form1 motivating form2

Figure 19.3. Basic semiotic relations (adapted from Radden & Panther, 2004, p. 15).

directionality of the motivation is indicated by means of an arrow. A simple

line connecting content and form, as in Figure 19.3a, notates an unmarked
symbolic relation (i.e., there is no specification as to whether it is motivated
or not). Linguistic phenomena usually exhibit combinations of motivated
and unmotivated semiotic relations.
Figure 19.4 provides a (non-exhaustive) list of motivating factors that,
together with an adequate linguistic source, might trigger a motivated pro-
cess. Recall that these factors operate not only in language but in other semi-
otic systems, as well, which is why I have termed them translinguistic. In
Figure 19.4, motivating factors already mentioned and to be discussed in this
chapter appear in bold.
In the following two sections some motivating factors are illustrated and dis-
cussed in more detail. I begin with a relatively straightforward example of moti-
vation from content to form (i.e., iconicity – similarity of content and form),
and then move on to more complex examples of interacting motivating factors
such as economy, communicative motivation, metonymy, and inference.

Onomatopoeic Words
A reasonable assumption – in line with Saussure’s semiotics6 – is that
simple signs (i.e., signs that [roughly] cannot be analyzed into smaller
meaning-bearing units [morphemes]) are typically unmotivated in the sense
 Motivation in Language 415

Experiential motivation LINGUISTIC UNIT:

Perceptual motivation
(e.g., embodiment, word, construction
(e.g., viewpoint,similarity,
image schema) salience)
CONTENT
Cognitive motivation
Geneticmotivation
(e.g., inference,
(e.g., grammaticalization)
metonymy,metaphor)
FORM
Communicative motivation
Ecological motivation
(e.g., maxims,economy,speech
(e.g., ecological niche)
actfunction,expressivity)

Isomophormism
(one form one
meaning)
Figure 19.4. Types of motivating factors (adapted from Radden & Panther, 2004, p. 24).

that no natural connection between content and form can be established.

There are, however, some notable exceptions where the form of simple signs
seems to be at least relatively motivated by their denotata. One such case is
briefly presented below.
This phenomenon has been known for a long time as onomatopoeia, words
that are a subclass of iconic signs. Such words exemplify perceptual motiva-
tion (see Figure 19.4). Onomatopoeia is the (more or less) accurate linguis-
tic imitation of sounds and noises in the extralinguistic world. Examples are
English verbs such as neigh, meow, moo, roar, crack, clang, swish, whoosh,
gurgle, and plop. Strictly speaking, these words are not perfect replicas of the
natural sounds and noises that they denote. Cows do not really go “moo”
(see Katamba 2005: 45), nor do cats go “meow,” (i.e., these animals do not
pronounce the initial sound [m] followed by the respective vowels and diph-
thongs of “moo” and “meow”). These words represent the animal sounds by
means of the phonological (and graphemic) system available in a particu-
lar human language (here English). Despite this “alienation” from the origi-
nal acoustic shape, there is sufficient resemblance between the original and
reproduction: it is certainly more adequate to represent the sounds produced
by cows as “moo,” rather than, for example, “tick-tock.” There is, however,
some cross-linguistic variation in how natural sounds are coded, as Table 19.1
illustrates for the verbs with the meaning “meow” as well as the conventional
interjections that imitate laughter, in 10 European languages:
Table 19.1 illustrates the point made above that the language-specific pho-
nological and graphemic systems play a role in how natural sounds are coded.
This is clearly the case with verbs denoting meowing, where one finds some
formal variation across the 10 languages. There is more uniformity in how
the interjection that imitates laughter is coded, but again some language-
 416 Panther

Table 19.1. Graphemic coding of the act of meowing and the interjection
for laughter in ten European languages

English German Dutch French Spanish Italian Portuguese Swedish Finnish Polish
meow miauen miauwen miauler Maullar miagolare miar jama naukua miaucze
miaow
ha! ha! haha! Ha! ha! ah! ah! Ja ah! ah! ah! ah! haha! ha ha Ha! Ha!
ha! ha!

Source: Online multilingual dictionary Mot 3.1.

SOURCE MOTIVATING
FACTOR

CONTENT

ICONICITY

FORM

TARGET

Directionality of motivation
Impact of motivational factors
Figure 19.5. Onomatopoeic signs.

specific idiosyncrasies are noticeable. In Germanic languages such as English,

German, Dutch, and Swedish, the letter <h> is articulated as [h], but in the
Romance languages such as French and Italian, this letter is not pronounced,
as these languages lack the phoneme /h/. The motivational structure of ono-
matopoeic words is diagrammed in Figure 19.5.

A Case of Motivated Grammar

As pointed out in Section 4, motivation on the level of elementary linguistic
signs exists and is not in dispute. More intriguing and challenging are cases
of motivation on abstract levels of linguistic organization, such as grammat-
ical form.

Motivated Grammar: Question-Tagged Declarative

and Imperative Sentences
Two case studies on question tags in declarative and imperative sentences are
presented to provide evidence for the following claims7:
 Motivation in Language 417

(2) i. The content/function and form of question tags in declaratives and

imperatives are motivated by factors, such as economy of coding,
metonymy, inference, and speech act function.
ii. Idiosyncrasies (i.e., unmotivated distributional patterns) occur, but
they are relatively rare.
Question tags are, I contend, an excellent testing ground for the
Saussurean thesis that grammar is relatively motivated. Sentences 3 and
4 are typical instances of the phenomena to be analyzed:
(3) Mary left, didn’t she?
(4) Hand me that book, will you?

Henceforth, I refer to the declarative and the imperative clauses proper as the
host clause, and to the italicized constituents in 3 and 4 as the tag. Tags have
a variety of communicative functions in English, and Bolinger (1989, p. 115)
notes that their use is “a typically English device” (quoted in Wong 2008, p. 89).
I will not try to develop a detailed taxonomy of the different communicative
functions of individual tags (see Huddleston & Pullum, 2002, pp. 851–945,
942–943). I also neglect the (crucial) role of intonation in the interpretation of
question tags. My aim is more modest: I intend to show how tags are related to
and motivated by the conceptual content and pragmatic function of the host
clause. I also address the important question of why some expressions that are
functionally and semantically compatible with the host do not appear as tags.
I begin with some possible and impossible tagged declaratives and impera-
tives that an adequate account in terms of motivation has to come to grips
with (unacceptable tags and only marginally acceptable ones are marked with
an asterisk and a superscripted question mark, respectively):
(5) Gore won the Nobel Prize,
a. did(n’t) he?
b. right?
c. or?
d. *do(n’t) I believe it?
(6) You are fired,
a. *are(n’t) you?
b. *right?
(7) Pour me some wine,
a. *do(n’t) you?
b. would you?
c. why don’t you?
d. *why do you?
f. shouldn’t you?
e. *must you?
418 Panther

The first observation about tags is that they are relatively short. This property
appears to be motivated by considerations of economy or brevity (see Figure
19.3).8 The same kind of communicative effect as with a question tag could,
in principle, be achieved by means of a full interrogative clause attached to
the host sentence. However, it would be highly uneconomical to render, for
example, 3 as 8:

(8) ?Mary left; didn’t Mary/she leave?

Analogously, the maxim of brevity will bar 4 from being rendered as 9:

(9) ?Hand me the book; will you hand me the book/hand it to me?

Brevity, is however only one feature of acceptable tags. A glance at sentences

5–7 reveals that certain tags do not pair very well with their respective host
clauses. The solution to the question of why certain tags appear and others are
blocked is found in the conceptual content and pragmatic function of their
respective host clauses. The conceptual content and standard pragmatic func-
tion of declaratives and imperatives can be described by speech acts scenarios
(for this notion, see, for example, Panther & Thornburg, 1998, 1999, 2003,
2007; Thornburg & Panther, 1997). The scenarios for declaratives and impera-
tives are presented in the following two sections.

Tagged Declaratives
Before delving into the semantics and pragmatics of tagged declarative sen-
tences, it is crucial to review the formal properties of what one could call
“canonical tags,” as exemplified by “Mary left, didn’t she?” in sentence 3
above:

(11) i. There is referential identity between the host clause subject and the
tag subject, realized as an anaphoric pronoun: Mary is coreferential
with she.
ii. The host clause predicate (verb phrase) is anaphorically resumed in
the tag by an auxiliary verb: left is resumed by didn’t.
iii. The positions of the tag subject and the auxiliary are inverted: the aux-
iliary verb didn’t is positioned before the subject she.
iv. The polarity of the host clause is typically reversed from affirmative to
negative, or negative to affirmative, as the case may be: in 3, the host
clause is positive, the tag is negative.
v. The host clause and the tag are tightly linked: the tag functions as a
“sentence clitic.”
 Motivation in Language 419

vi. The tag is short.

vii. The tag is “unclause-like.”

Tags such as “right?” and “or?” come very close to canonical tags. They fulfill
the requirement of being short, but they are syntactically less tightly linked
to the host clause than “do”-tags described in 11. In the case of “right?”, the
content expressed by the host clause is ellipted, but easily recoverable. In the
case of “or?”, alternatives to what is asserted in the host clause are evoked, but
there are no elements in the tag that are coreferential with elements in the
host clause.
The standard communicative function of declaratives is to perform
assertive speech acts, or more technically, assertive illocutionary acts.9 The
semantics and pragmatics of illocutionary acts can be represented by means
of conceptual frames. The notion of conceptual frame is based on the idea
that the meaning of a word “can only be properly understood and described
against the background of a particular body of knowledge and assumptions”
(Cruse, 2006, pp. 66–67). I assume that the frame semantic approach can
be applied to the analysis of speech acts, as well, and henceforth I refer to
the conceptual frames for speech acts as “scenarios.” A speech-act scenario
includes information about the context in which a speech act is felicitously
performed (in the sense of Austin, 1962, and Searle, 1969). In Figure 19.6, a
scenario for assertive speech acts is proposed.
In Figure 19.6, the assertive speech act itself is referred to as “core” (shaded
in grey), the background conditions for its felicitous performance as “before,”
and the consequences of the performance of the speech act as “result” and
“after.” The lines connecting conceptual components symbolize what Linda
Thornburg and I term (potential) metonymic links. These connections can
be called metonymic because one component in a speech-act scenario may
evoke other components or the whole scenario.
Depending on the components selected by the speaker, an assertive speech
act can be performed more or less directly or indirectly (see Searle, 1975 for the
notions of direct and indirect speech act):
(12) a. I claim that Auster wrote The Brooklyn Follies. (direct: sentence
addresses core)
b. I believe Auster wrote The Brooklyn Follies. (indirect: addresses a
before component)
c. Did you know that Auster wrote The Brooklyn Follies? (indirect:
addresses a before (component)
d. Do you now believe me that Auster wrote The Brooklyn Follies?
(indirect: addresses the after)
420 Panther

THERE ARE GOOD REASONS

FOR BELIEVING P

H DOES NOT S BELIEVES P P IS RELEVANT BEFORE

KNOW P TO H

S ASSERTS P CORE:
ILL ACT

S IS REGARDED AS BEING COMMITTED TO P RESULT

H BELIEVES P AFTER

S Speaker
H Hearer
P Proposition
Potentialmetonymic links
Figure 19.6. Scenario for assertive speech acts.

Question tags, exactly as the full sentences in 12, address components of

speech-act scenarios, but they do so in a shorthand and hence economical
way. The main purpose of a declarative sentence is to represent a proposition
P as true. Intuitively, one would thus expect truth-related tags to be attached
to declaratives, given that the corresponding speech acts, assertives, are essen-
tially about what the world is like. It does therefore not come as a surprise that
in utterances (5a, 5b), repeated here as (13a, 13b), the tag explicitly addresses
the truthfulness of the before component P:
(13) a. Gore won the Novel Prize, didn’t/did he?
b. Gore won the Nobel Prize, right/or?
However, it is also possible to address some other components of the speech-
act scenario; for example, the knowledge state of the hearer:
(14) a. Gore won the Nobel, doncha know?
b. Gore won the Nobel Peace Prize, did you hear? [hear stands met-
onymically for “know”]
Note that in this case, the tags that refer to the hearer’s knowledge are for-
mally not as tightly integrated into the host clause as in the case of tags that
 Motivation in Language 421

address the veracity of the proposition P. The verbs in the tags of (14a, 14b),
“know” and “hear,” are not verbatim resumptions of the host clause verbs;
nevertheless, they address an important before component of the assertive
scenario and their appearance is thus motivated.
Much longer and less felicitous are tags that evoke the relevance of the
asserted proposition for the hearer:
(15) a. ?Gore won the Nobel Peace Prize, do you care?
b. ?Gore won the Nobel Peace Prize, are you interested?
c. Gore won the Nobel Peace Prize, if you’re interested.
The appended expressions in 15 are increasingly clause-like (in comparison
with 13 and 14). Moreover, in 15c, the tag is conditional, not interrogative.
Conditionality is conceptually related to interrogativity (English if, which is
a cognate form of German ob, “whether,” can be used in indirect questions),
but the conditional clause in 15c does certainly not constitute a canonical tag.
Finally, the tag expressions in 15 are also syntactically less tightly connected
to their host clauses than in the canonical cases in 13. There are no anaphoric
ties at all between the host clause subject and predicate and the elements in
the tag.
The acceptability and canonicity of tags decreases even more drastically
when the before component “S believes P” and “there are good reasons for
believing P,” and the core component “S asserts P,” the result component “S is
regarded as being committed to P (as an effect of asserting P),” and the after
component “H believes P” are addressed. The tags become both longer and
more clause-like, and most of them are downright unacceptable.
(16) a. *Gore won the Nobel, do(n’t) I believe/think/assume so?
b. *Gore won the Nobel, are there good reasons for this claim?
c. *Gore won the Nobel, do(n’t) I claim/assert/say so?
d. *Gore won the Nobel, aren’t/am I committed to the truth of this?
e. Gore won the Nobel, (or) don’t you believe me?
There are good reasons for the unacceptability of 16a–d. Utterance 16a is com-
municatively (although not logically) inconsistent. Speakers are supposed
to have privileged access to their beliefs; to seek confirmation for what one
believes to be true is therefore pragmatically odd. As to 16b, there is a com-
municative principle that requires people to assert only propositions whose
truth they can back up with good arguments. To pose the question in the tag
whether such good reasons exist undermines the communicative function
of the host clause. Utterance 16c is unacceptable because it is pragmatically
paradoxical to assert something and at the same time question whether one’s
own act of assertion has actually been performed. Similarly, the utterance
422 Panther

of 16d is infelicitous because the assertion of the content of the host clause
creates the effect that the speaker is seriously committed to the truth of the
asserted proposition, but it is exactly this pragmatic effect that is challenged
in the tag. The only tag that is acceptable refers to the after component of the
speech act. The speaker’s goal in asserting something is usually to make the
hearer believe that the asserted proposition is true. This aim is, however, not
always achieved, and it is therefore quite natural for speakers to address the
after component. Nevertheless, despite the acceptability of 16e, the tag is for-
mally not canonical. First, it is rather long (clause-like), and, second, it is not
anaphorically linked to the preceding host; neither the subject of the tag nor
its verb anaphorically resumes formal elements of the host clause.
To conclude this section, a set of sentences is worth mentioning that seems
to behave erratically in not admitting canonical declarative question tags:
(17) a. *I promise to be on time, don’t I?
b. *I apologize for keeping you waiting, don’t I?
c. *Passengers are requested to board immediately, aren’t they?
(request to board a plane)
d. *I pronounce you man and wife, don’t I? (priest performing mar-
riage ceremony)
e. *You’re fired, aren’t you? (speaker fires hearer from job)
f. ?I believe Gore won the Nobel Prize, don’t I?
e. *I am glad you came to my party, aren’t I?
In grammatical terms, all of the above utterances are declarative sentences,
but they do not allow a tag that addresses the truth value of the proposi-
tion expressed in the host clause. The host clauses in 17a–d typically serve
as what Austin (1962) terms “explicit performative utterances.” The verb in
the superordinate clause self-referentially describes the speech act that the
speaker actually performs in uttering the sentence. In these cases, the host
clauses are not to be categorized in terms of truth but in terms of felicity (see
Austin, 1962). The utterances 17a–c constitute a promise, an apology, and a
request, respectively; the speaker cannot, in the same breath, question the
performance of these explicitly named illocutionary acts.
Utterances 17d and 17e are examples of linguistic acts that are grounded in
institutions. Institutionally legitimized speakers create new social, judicial,
and religious “facts” as a result of performing them. The utterance of the cor-
rect words, in the right circumstances, by the right speaker has the effect that
proposition P becomes “reality.” It is this feature that distinguishes what Searle
(1976) calls “declarations” from ordinary assertive declarative sentences,
which are descriptively either true or false. Similarly, explicit performative
 Motivation in Language 423

utterances are conventionalized social practices in a speech community. The

act named by the performative verb becomes a noncontestable fact; therefore,
its reality status cannot be mitigated or hedged by question tags. It there-
fore makes pragmatic sense that declarative tags are barred from appearing
in performative utterances and declarations.
Finally, there are good reasons why tags are not felicitously used with host
clauses that refer to the speaker’s mental or emotional attitude, as in 17f and
17g, respectively. Speakers have privileged access to their own mental states
and emotions. Therefore, it is strange to question or seek confirmation of the
existence of those mind states from others.

Tagged imperatives
The number of tags that can be attached felicitously to imperative sentences is
much larger than those that co-occur with declarative clauses. Tagged imper-
atives have the canonical structure Modal Auxiliary (n’t) + you. Here are some
examples:
(18) a. Hand me that book, will/won’t/would you?
b. Open that door for me, can/can’t/could you?
The imperative tags in 18 are syntactically not as tightly linked with their host
clauses as canonical declarative tags are with their hosts. First, the subject of
an imperative tag (you) has no explicitly named antecedent in the host clause,
although it refers back to an understood addressee of the imperative sen-
tence. Second, imperative tags are not “pro-forms” for the verb phrase in the
host clause in the sense that the auxiliaries do/did are “pro-verb” forms for the
predicates in declaratives are. However, despite their looser syntactic ties to
the host clause, the appearance of modals such as can, could, will, and would
is, as argued below, are highly motivated by conceptual factors.
The standard function of imperative sentences is to perform directive
speech acts (i.e., they are used to perform orders, instructions, requests, rec-
ommendations, etc.). In order to understand what licenses or constrains the
appearance of imperative tags, it is necessary to consider the scenario for
directive speech acts. I consider a subtype of this scenario (viz. a conceptual
frame that represents requests for the transfer of an object from the hearer to
the speaker) (see Figure 19.7).
A glance at Figure 19.7 reveals that the tags in sentences 18a and 18b index
components of the directive speech-act scenario. Tagged imperatives com-
bine a direct speech act (the host clause) with a compacted indirect speech
act (the tag). For example, “can you?” in 18b is a condensed form of the
424 Panther

SUB-TYPE:
X EXISTS/IS AVAILABLE REQUEST THAT H GIVE X TO S

H HAS X S WANTS X

H CAN GIVE X TO S

NO GOOD REASONS FOR H NOT TO GIVE X TO S S WANTS H TO GIVE X TO S BEFORE

S ASKS H TO GIVE X TO S CORE:

ILL ACT

H IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO GIVE X TO S RESULTANT

OBLIGATION

H IS WILLING TO GIVE X TO S RESULTANT

WILLINGNESS

H WILL GIVE X TO S AFTER

S Speaker
H Hearer
potential metonymic links
Figure 19.7. Scenario for directive speech acts.

full-fledged indirect request “Can you open that door for me?” The latter is
called indirect because it can be used to achieve the same purpose as the cor-
responding direct request “Open that door for me.” A second important fea-
ture of well-formed imperative tags is that they are metonymically linked in
a part-whole relationship to the directive speech-act scenario. The tag selects
one aspect (component) of the speech-act scenario, which then metonymi-
cally evokes other parts of the speech-act scenario or the whole scenario.
It has often been observed that indirect speech acts are politer than direct
speech acts (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Searle, 1975), and many of the imper-
ative tags (although not all) serve the purpose of mitigating the impositive
force of the host clause.
The task remains to check which parts of the scenario can be verbalized as
imperative tags and why.
Before: availability, possession of x
(19) a. ?Pour me some Rioja, is there any?
b. ?Pour me some Rioja, do you have any?
The components “availability of x” and “possession of x” are not exploit-
able as “ideal” tags because they are clause-like (i.e., similar to interrogative
 Motivation in Language 425

sentences). Furthermore, questioning the availability of Rioja in the tag is

pragmatically not consistent with the assumption conveyed in the host clause
that Rioja is available.
Before: H can give X to S
(20) a. Pour me some Rioja, can/can’t you?
b. Pour me some Rioja, could/couldn’t you?
c. *Pour me some Rioja, are you able to/do you have the ability to?
The addressee’s ability to perform the requested action is a central condition
of felicitous requests. Asking someone to pour some Rioja is pointless if, for
some reason, the hearer is unable to carry out this action. Conveniently, in
English, a short modal – can – is available so that the tag can be economically
coded. There is an interesting pragmatic difference between the affirmative
and the negative form of the tag, the latter having a more demanding and
aggressive effect. The interpretation of negative tags requires some pragmatic
inferencing on the part of the hearer. The tag “can’t you?” like the correspond-
ing full-fledged sentence “Can’t you pour me some Rioja?” is typically used in
situations in which it is crystal clear that the hearer can carry out the requested
action; hence, the challenging overtone of “Pour me some Rioja, can’t you?”
The puzzling occurrence of negated can is thus highly motivated, a kind of
motivation that might be called inferential motivation. The term “inferential”
is not supposed to suggest that inferential work has to be carried out every
time a hearer encounters a negative modal tag. It means that the original
motivation of the negative tag is inferential even though the interpretation of
such tags is spontaneous and effortless for the native speaker.
My last observation in connection with the ability component concerns
the impossibility of using tags such as “are you able to?” or “do you have the
ability to?” which are rough paraphrases of “can you?” Why they do not occur
is readily explained by the economy principle or the Gricean maxim of man-
ner “Be brief.”10
Before: no good reasons for H not to give X to S
(21) a. Pour me some Rioja, why don’t you?
b. *Pour me some Rioja, why do you?
The tag “why don’t you?” in 21a is perfectly good, although it is longer and
more clause-like than canonical tags. The tag is appropriate in a context where
it is clear to the speaker that there are in fact no reasons why the request
should not be complied with. It is thus not expected (and pragmatically odd)
for the hearer to come up with negative reasons why she cannot carry out the
desired action. In contrast to “why don’t you?” the tag “why do you?” is very
426 Panther

bizarre, given the goal of the speaker (compliance with the request). For com-
municative reasons, such a tag is completely unmotivated and will therefore
not appear.
Before: S wants H to give X to S
(22) *Pour me some Rioja, do I want you to/would I like you to?
The tags in 22 refer to what in speech act theory is known as a sincerity con-
dition. To question this component is pragmatically odd because speakers
should know their own wishes. An analogous constraint holds for assertive
tags that question the speaker’s belief in the proposition P (see Section 5.2).
Core: S asks H to give X to S
(23) *Pour me some Rioja, do(n’t) I ask you to?
As in the case of assertive tags (see Section 5.2), the illocutionary act, more
precisely, reference to the speaker and act of asking, cannot be compacted
into a well-formed tag. The reason is clear: such a tag creates an illocutionary
paradox because the speech act is accomplished in uttering the host clause,
and at the same time, questioned in the tag.
Resultant obligation: H is under an obligation to give X to S
(24) a. *Pour me some Rioja, must you?
b. *Pour me some Rioja, should you?
c. *Pour me some Rioja, mustn’t you?
d. Pour me some Rioja, shouldn’t you?
The positive tags in 24a and 24b are pragmatically odd because they create –
similar to the illocutionary tag in 23 – a paradoxical situation. In uttering
the host clause, the speaker introduces an obligation for the hearer, but the
immediately adjacent tag suspends this obligation. In contrast, utterance 24d
is felicitous. Here, the negative tag pragmatically implies the existence of a
host’s normally willingly undertaken social commitment (cf. “Shouldn’t you
pour me some Rioja” [as you’re the host]?). The negative form of the tag is
thus inferentially motivated. Yet 24c, with the negative tag “mustn’t you?”
seems less felicitous, if not infelicitous. The reason might be that, unlike
should, must often implies an externally imposed obligation complied with
only reluctantly, if not unwillingly.
Resultant willingness: H is willing to give X to S
(25) Pour me some Rioja, would you like to/be willing to/mind?
The tags in 25 are acceptable (but not canonical) because they are more clause-
like and thus do not abide by the principle of economical coding.
 Motivation in Language 427

After: H will give X to S

(26) Pour me some Rioja, will/won’t/would/wouldn’t you?
The tags in 26 are perfect in all respects. They are conveniently short, they are
tightly linked to the host clause (cf. the tags referring the hearer’s ability in
20a and 20b), and they metonymically access a central aspect of the directive
scenario: the compliance with the request. As noted above, there are inferen-
tially derived pragmatic effects associated with negative tags. The tag “won’t
you?” just as its full-fledged counterpart, “Won’t you pour me some Rioja,”
evokes a context in which the corresponding affirmative proposition “You
will pour me some Rioja” is already established. Hence, as in the case of “can’t
you?” a connotation of aggressiveness is conveyed.
In summary, the functions of imperative tags are as follows:
(27) i. Imperative tags usually serve the function of mitigating the impos-
itive force of the host.
ii. They achieve this mitigating function in metonymically accessing
components of the directive scenario to perform condensed indi-
rect speech acts.
iii. The most systematically exploited imperative tags are those that
refer to the hearer’s ability to carry out the desired action (before)
and those that refer to the performance of the requested action
(after).
Among the constraints on the use of imperative tags, the following appear to
be the most significant:
(28) i. Tags that are pragmatically incompatible with the meaning of the
host clause are avoided.
ii. Speaker-referring tags are avoided.
iii. Hearer-addressed tags are preferred.
These results are tabulated in Table 19.2, which ranks the conceptual com-
ponents of directive speech-act scenarios according to their suitability to be
coded as tags. In addition, the components are classified as to whether they
are speaker-oriented, hearer-oriented, or exhibit no specific orientation.
The Motivated Structure of Tagged Declaratives and Imperatives
The overall results of the two case studies on tagged declarative and impera-
tive sentences are diagrammed in Figure 19.8.
The content and form of question tags involve content-to-content and
form-to-form motivation. The translinguistic factors that guide these pro-
cesses include speech act function, metonymy, inferences, and economy of
428 Panther

Table 19.2. Availability and acceptability of components in directive speech-act

scenarios for tag formation

Directive Scenario COMPONENT ORIENTATION TAG

H can give X to S H-oriented +++
H will give X to S H-oriented +++
No good reasons for H not to give X to S H-oriented ++
H is under obligation to give X to S H-oriented ++
H is willing to give X to S H-oriented ++
X exists/is available neutral +
H has X H-oriented +
S wants H to give X to S S-oriented *
S asks H to give X to S S-oriented *
+++ fully acceptable and natural.
++ acceptable.
+ barely acceptability.
* unacceptable.

SOURCE TARGET MOTIVATING

FACTORS
Host Tag
SPEECH ACT FUNCTION

CONTENT1 CONTENT2 METONYMY

INFERENCES

FORM1 FORM2 ECONOMY OF CODING

Directionality of motivation

Impact of motivational factors

Figure 19.8. Motivated structure of tagged declaratives and imperatives.

coding.11 The content of the host clause has an impact on the content of the
tag in that the tag metonymically selects one suitable conceptual compo-
nent from the speech-act scenario of the preceding host. The tag functions
as a condensed indirect speech act in imperative tags, and it focuses on the
truth of the proposition in declarative tags. Routinized inferential processes
are involved in the interpretation of, for example, negative tags such as “can’t
you?” and “won’t you?” The tags are preferably coded as economically as
possible.
 Motivation in Language 429

Conclusions
In this chapter, I hope to have made the case for motivation as a key concept
in linguistic theorizing. In particular, I have tried to substantiate Saussure’s
claim that although elementary linguistic signs are – with notable excep-
tions – arbitrary, language as an instrument of expressing thoughts and per-
forming communicative acts must, to a certain extent, be motivated. I have
shown that grammatical phenomena – question tags attached to declara-
tive and imperative sentences – are licensed and constrained by a variety of
motivating factors. Tags are found in many other languages, but what kinds
of tags appear in a specific language cannot be predicted. It is a fact about
English that it has motivated canonical tags such as “did she?” “can you?” or
“will your?” and their negated counterparts. It is also a fact that German and
French lack literal equivalents of these English tags.
A final problem remains to be addressed very briefly. Why are linguistic
structures often only partially, or in Saussurean terms, relatively motivated?
Ariel (2008, p. 123) proposes an interesting answer. She points out that moti-
vation is, in logical terms, not a transitive relation. If some source x motivates
a target y, and y serves in turn as a source for motivating z, the result of this
chaining is not necessarily a recognizable motivational relationship between
x and z. Motivated chains of this sort are very common in the history of lan-
guages, and the results of such diachronic processes often, from a synchronic
perspective, appear to be unmotivated linguistic phenomena.

Notes
1. The conventionalist theory of linguistic signs is also propounded by Aristotle in
his treatise De Interpretatione. Aristotle holds that the relation between a linguistic
expression and its content is conventional; that is, “no name exists by nature, but
only by becoming a symbol” (quoted in Crystal, 1997, p. 408).
2. For example, in a recent discussion of Adele Goldberg’s book Constructions at Work
(2006), which explicitly embraces the thesis that grammatical constructions are
partially motivated, Borsley and Newmeyer (2009) argue that purely formal syntac-
tic generalizations exist, one of them being the rule of “Auxiliary–Subject Inversion.”
The authors argue that the constructions that undergo this rule are semantically
heterogeneous (e.g., interrogatives, exclamative sentences, counterfactual condi-
tionals) but they all fall formally under the same generalization (i.e., the auxiliary is
placed before the subject).
3. Langacker (e.g., 2008), the leading figure in the branch of cognitive linguistics
referred to as Cognitive Grammar, assumes throughout his work that linguistic
signs (simple and complex) exhibit a symbolic relationship between the semantic
pole and the phonological pole. Syntax and morphology are not considered to be
independent levels of linguistic organization.
430 Panther

4. Radden and Panther (2004, p. 10) suggest that the use of “give” as a grammati-
cal category “benefactive” in Ewe can be accounted for as the result of abductive
reasoning.
5. The Saussurean term synchronic refers to the linguistic system “at one point in time”
and is opposed to diachronic – “the evolution of language through time.”
6. Throughout the Cours de linguistique générale Saussure uses the term sémiologie,
whereas in English the term semiotics (introduced by the American philosopher C.
S. Peirce) is preferred.
7. Parts of this section originated in talks that were prepared and delivered with Linda
Thornburg at conferences at Josip Strossmayer University in Osijek, Croatia, and the
University of Bielsko-Biała, Poland, in September 2007 and October 2008, respec-
tively. My sincere thanks go to Professors Mario Brdar and Bogusław Bierwiaczonek
for their kind invitations and hospitality. Suggestions and constructive criticism
from the audiences at these conferences are gratefully acknowledged.
8. Grice (1975) lists “Be brief ” as one of the conversational maxims subsumed under
the Cooperative Principle that guides rational communication.
9. The term “illocutionary act” (what is done “in speaking”) was coined by the Oxford
philosopher John L. Austin in the 1960s, and further developed by the American
philosopher John Searle (1969). It is the latter’s notion of illocutionary act that is
assumed here. In what follows, I use the terms “speech act” and “illocutionary act”
interchangeably.
10. See Panther and Thornburg (2006) for the motivated behavior of manner scales
such as <can, be able to, have the ability>.
11. On the role of metonymy as a motivating factor of grammar, see the collection of
articles in Panther, Thornburg, and Barcelona (2009).

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 20

Intelligence and Cognitive Exceptionality

The Motivational Perspective

Edward F. Zigler

Intelligence – Its Nature and Assessment

There is no commonly accepted definition of intelligence. However, there is
some kind of prevalent agreement that intelligence refers to a set of cogni-
tive abilities that are related to success in the prevailing academic and social
frameworks. The list often includes problem solving, memory, learning abil-
ity, induction, deduction, mathematics, and other similar skills. Many of
these skills are assessed by the so-called intelligence tests, of which the IQ
is the outcome score. However, although the IQ measure provides an easy
operational definition of intelligence, its application has been accompanied
by uneasiness for a long time. Some of the reasons are its lack of sensitivity to
ethnic and cultural differences and the fact that it is not grounded in any the-
ory. There have been several attempts to ground intelligence in some kind of
theory, such as information processing, neurological, or genetic. So far none
has led to definite results that could account at least for the selection of cog-
nitive skills that supposedly make up intelligence.
Thus, although the arguments about the nature and meaning of intelligence
still go on, let us recall the criterion that has originally directed the selection
of cognitive skills to be considered as intelligence: successful performance in
accepted social frameworks, such as school or work. It becomes immediately
clear that regardless of how one conceptualizes and measures intelligence, the
performance of individuals, young or older, could not be a function only of
how intelligent they are. Many other factors contribute to the performance
and behavior that are usually erroneously attributed exclusively to the level or
amount of intellect (Zigler, 1986). This is what this chapter is all about.
This chapter focuses on individuals manifesting cognitive exceptional-
ity. In terms of IQ measures, there are two such groups, each at one of the
extremes of the normal curve of IQ distribution. Terms often used in the

433
434 Zigler

past or present for referring to individuals at the lower end include “mental
retardation,” “mental deficiency,” “mental challenge,” “intellectual disabil-
ity,” “developmental disability,” or “developmental delay.” Terms of this kind
represent the attempt to describe a phenomenon without falling into the
trap of using pejorative descriptors. Currently, mental retardation is defined
as intelligence test performance two or more standard deviations below the
mean, namely, below the score of 70, accompanied by limitations in adap-
tive functioning (Robinson, Zigler, & Gallagher, 2000), with onset prior to
the age of 18 years (APA, 1980). Thus, IQ in the range of 50–69 is sometimes
viewed as mild mental retardation, IQ in the range of 35–49 as moderate
mental retardation, and lower than 35 as severe. It should, however, be evi-
dent that mental retardation is largely a matter of definition. The arbitrary
nature of the diagnostic criteria is clear from the fact that in recent years
the cutoff IQ score for mental retardation has fluctuated between 85 (APA,
1966) and 70 (APA, 1980). Furthermore, as emphasized by Zigler (1986), the
important point may not be the precise IQ but the divergence between the
chronological age and the mental age, whereby in the retarded the former is
higher than the latter. Whatever the cutoff point of the IQ is, it disregards
another highly important distinction among individuals in this domain of
disability, which is that between cultural-familial (nonorganic) etiologies
and organic etiologies that has been emphasized and studied by Zigler and
his students (Burack, 1990).
The situation is not much simpler in regard to the higher end of the IQ
curve. Usual terms that are used include “giftedness,” “talent,” “high ability,”
“excellence in performance,” or “high levels of accomplishment when com-
pared with others of their age, experience or environment” (Ross, 1993, p.
26). Here again there do not exist any accepted definitions or consensual
IQ cutoff points. Common distinctions refer to children scoring 115–129 as
bright, those scoring 130–144 as moderately gifted, 145–159 as highly gifted,
160–174 as exceptionally gifted, and those scoring above 175 as profoundly
gifted (Gross, 2004, p. 7; Newman, 2008). However, it is widely accepted that
most IQ tests are not very sensitive in distinguishing between degrees of gift-
edness at the higher levels (Pfeiffer & Blei, 2008). Furthermore, similar to the
asynchrony between age and mental age in the retarded, in the gifted there
is a parallel “asynchrony gap” between the chronological age and the men-
tal age, whereby the former is lower than the latter. In fact, giftedness has
been defined as “asynchronous development” resulting in advanced cognitive
abilities coupled with performance and inner experiences and awareness that
are qualitatively different from the norm characterizing the chronological age
(Morelock, 1992).
 Intelligence and Cognitive Exceptionality 435

Here again the general undifferentiated approach to high ability as such

competes with the differentiated approach that emphasizes superior intellec-
tual ability (e.g., two standard deviations above the mean of IQ) plus creativ-
ity or evidence for specific talent in particular domains, such as mathematics
or the arts (Gagné, 1991; Renzulli, 1978).

Factors Influencing Performance at the

Lower End of the IQ Curve
A large body of data accumulated over the last half century by Zigler and his
students has demonstrated the impact of extra-intelligence factors on cogni-
tive performance. The evidence supporting this view has been continuously
increasing, starting with the first study (Zigler, 1958). The bulk of the evi-
dence focuses on motivational factors that have been shown to have a sig-
nificant impact on the functioning of mentally retarded individuals. Because
this material has been widely published and often summarized (e.g., Hodapp,
Burack, & Zigler, 1990; Zigler & Bennett-Gates, 1999), the present review will
focus on the major concepts and highlights, organized around three foci: the
external environmental factors, personality and behavioral factors, amplified
by cognitive motivational factors.
This organization of the material is based on several assumptions. The first
is that environmental factors external to the retarded individual contribute
to the shaping of specific personality tendencies and behavioral traits in the
child. A second assumption is that the specific tendencies and traits consti-
tute a motivational disposition depressing the performance of the children.
The environmental variables could be considered as distal factors separate
from the personality and behavioral tendencies that would be considered
as the proximal factors determining motivation. A third assumption is that
the environmental factors in concert with the behavioral and personality
tendencies generate in the children a set of beliefs that enhance the per-
sonality and behavioral tendencies, thus perpetuating their low level of per-
formance. Hence, a cycle of self-confirming prophesy is formed wherein the
cognitive-motivational beliefs function as the motor and rationale for low
performance, inhibiting any change, even if the environmental circumstances
or other factors change.
External environmental factors. Major environmental factors that contrib-
ute to the shaping of the personality and impact the performance of low-ability
children are social deprivation, amplified by parenting style and environmen-
tal stimulation. Social deprivation is defined as including the following fac-
tors: “lack of continuity of care by parents or caretakers, an excessive desire
436 Zigler

by parents to separate from or institutionalize their child, impoverished eco-

nomic circumstances, and/or a family history of marital discord, mental ill-
ness, abuse, or neglect” (Merighi, Edison, & Zigler, 1990, p. 16). This complex
of variables, assessed by the Social Deprivation Scale (Butterfield & Zigler,
1970), has been shown to adversely affect the behavior of retarded children;
for example, their dependence and wariness (Balla, Butterfield, & Zigler, 1974;
Zigler & Hodapp, 1986). It should be noted that adverse social experiences
may also occur outside the family, in institutions and other frameworks for
the mentally retarded (Zigler, 1971).
In addition, a negative effect on motivation can be attributed to the
increased frequency of failures that retarded children experience (Raber &
Weisz, 1981). It may enhance their readiness to anticipate failure and pro-
mote the conception that failure is due to low ability, as a stable and uncon-
trollable cause (Dweck et al., 1978). An affiliated factor is exposure to the
“mentally retarded” label that was shown to promote frustration and help-
lessness in low-ability children (Bromfield, Weisz, & Messer, 1986; Weisz,
1981a). Maternal directiveness is a further environmental factor with a poten-
tially broad range of effects. It is considered as an overly didactic, pressuring,
and intrusive style of parenting that focuses on solving the child’s problems
and improving the child’s intellectual performance at the expense of attaining
other goals (Hodapp & Fidler, 1999).
Finally, the extent of environmental stimulation may also be an important
issue. Clinical experience and developmental research reveal the importance
of environmental stimulation on children’s social, emotional, physical, and
cognitive development (Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000). There is evidence that
extremely low levels of stimulation (e.g., children raised in orphanages) neg-
atively impact the rate and extent of development. Inadequate stimulation
may have adverse effects, for example, on verbal behavior (Schlanger, 1954).
However, Hodapp and Fidler (1999, p. 231) note that “children with mental
retardation may have difficulties in handling too much stimulation.” For these
children, the line between satisfying stimulation and overstimulation can be
thin, requiring particular consideration of type, pace, timing, and nature of
provided stimulation, so as to avoid reactions such as withdrawal or loss of
control on the part of the children (Zigler & Hodapp, 1986).
Personality and behavioral factors. A large body of data accumulated over
four decades has resulted in identifying a set of behaviors and personality
tendencies in retarded individuals that was shown to adversely impact their
level of performance. Although each of these tendencies may also appear
in individuals who are not retarded, it is characteristic of retarded children
that they mostly have all or most of these tendencies, and each of them to a
 Intelligence and Cognitive Exceptionality 437

heightened degree. Hence, these tendencies may be considered as constitut-

ing the motivational disposition of retarded individuals.
The set of personality tendencies include first and foremost the follow-
ing: (a) the positive reaction tendency, which is manifested in an enhanced
motivation to interact with and be dependent on an adult providing support
(Balla & Zigler, 1975; Harter, 1967); (b) the negative reaction tendency, which
is manifested in wariness and withdrawal shown initially by the children
when they are expected to interact with unfamiliar adults (Zigler, Balla, &
Butterfield, 1968); (c) low expectancy of success manifested by the children
when confronted with a new task, amplified by a high expectancy of fail-
ure, low-degree of risk taking, and weak tendency to delay gratification
(Bennett-Gates & Kreitler, 1999; Kreitler & Zigler, 1990); (d) outerdirect-
edness, defined as the tendency to look to others for solutions and guide-
lines in regard to cognitive tasks that seem difficult or ambiguous (Bybee &
Zigler, 1999); and (e) low effectance motivation that entails the tendency not
to derive any pleasure from coping with difficult problems (Bennett-Gates
& Zigler, 1999).
This set of tendencies is amplified by further tendencies, most of which are
related to the mentioned ones or represent their variants: (g) rigidity or the
tendency to persevere in manifesting the same responses even when they are
wrong or difficulty in switching to other responses (Kounin, 1941a, 1941b); (h)
learned helplessness, defined as deficits in response initiation and perseverance
due to the feeling that one has no control over certain outcomes (Reynolds
& Miller, 1985; Weisz, 1981b); (i) task-extrinsic motivation – that is, motiva-
tion to do a task that depends on external rewards or circumstances rather
than on characteristics inherent to the task itself, such as creativity or chal-
lenge (Switzky, 1997); (j) the reinforcer hierarchy, which designates the child’s
degree of responsiveness or interest in rewards of different kinds, whereby
retarded children are more responsive to tangible rewards (e.g., candy) than
to intangible ones (e.g., praise for being correct) (Harter & Zigler, 1974; Zigler
& Unell, 1962); (k) low self-image or self-concept, which particularly reflects a
sense of inferiority, lower readiness to rely on oneself, and only small dispar-
ity between the images of the self and the ideal self (Glick, 1999).
Each of the mentioned personality tendencies was shown to be mani-
fested to an increased degree in retarded individuals and to account for
cognitively lower-level performance. These personality tendencies account
for a significant portion of the variance differentiating between retarded
and non-retarded children, especially in regard to mentally retarded chil-
dren of the cultural-familial etiology and those diagnosed with only mild
retardation.
438 Zigler

Cognitive-motivational factors. The cognitive performance of retarded chil-

dren was shown to depend in varying degrees on personality and behavioral
tendencies that could be accounted for largely by the environmental cir-
cumstances characteristic for these children. In addition, there is evidence –
based on studies done in the framework of the cognitive orientation theory
(Kreitler & Kreitler, 1988) – that the personality and behavioral tendencies
are also supported by motivationally relevant cognitions. The cognitions that
have a motivational function in regard to behavior are characterized in terms
of form and contents (Kreitler, 2004). From the point of view of form, the
cognitions are of four types of beliefs: (a) beliefs about self that refer to infor-
mations and other facts about oneself in the present or past (e.g., I am lazy, I
am not intelligent, I hate being ordered around); (b) general beliefs that refer
to informations and other facts about others and reality (e.g., trying hard
can sometimes help, some teachers help you when you ask them); (c) norm
beliefs that refer to rules and standards concerning ethical, social, behavioral,
and other acts or events (e.g., at school one should do what the teacher says, if
asked a question one ought to answer); and (d) goal beliefs that refer to goals
and wishes in different domains (e.g., I want to have many friends, I wish to
be loved by everyone).
From the point of view of contents, the beliefs that play a role in regard to
motivation represent underlying meanings relevant for the behavior in ques-
tion, detected in a series of pretest interviews. The cognitive orientation ques-
tionnaires for the retarded children were constructed so that each kind of
studied behavior was represented by a focal situation, and the child was asked
questions about different meanings related to that behavior that referred sep-
arately to the four belief types. The studied behaviors were rigidity, respon-
siveness to tangible and intangible rewards, and responses to success and
failure (increase or decrease in performance after each). For example, ques-
tions concerning rigidity referred to fear of punishment, limited possibilities
for doing things, trying harder when a task gets difficult, and keeping track of
one’s responses. A low score in the cognitive orientation of rigidity was given
to a child whose responses showed that he/she believed that there was no
need to be afraid of punishment, that there were many different ways of doing
things, that trying harder could be helpful when a task gets difficult, and that
it is necessary to keep track of one’s previous responses in order to be able to
comply with the instructions for a task.
The results showed that the cognitive orientation scores significantly pre-
dicted the children’s behaviors in the studied domains. This indicates that
the children’s performance in different cognitive tasks matched the beliefs
that reflect specific motivational orientations. Hence, for example, rigidity
 Intelligence and Cognitive Exceptionality 439

of retarded children in cognitive tasks is as much a function of motivational

tendencies as a cognitive behavior. The same holds in regard to the other
studied behaviors.
Thus, the motivational tendencies that affect the retarded children’s cog-
nitive performance are manifested both on the behavioral level and on the
cognitive level. This indicates that the motivational tendencies are indeed
deeply ingrained. On the other hand, it also provides a venue for affecting
the children’s behavior by changing their motivationally orienting beliefs.
In some cases, changing beliefs may be a more straightforward and simpler
way of changing the children’s behaviors than changing them by means of
rewards and training or by changing the long-term environmental conditions
responsible for many of these behaviors. Changing, in playful discussions, the
children’s beliefs about the themes relevant for rigidity brought about a sig-
nificant decline in the children’s behavioral rigidity (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1988,
pp. 109–111).
Concluding remarks. A large body of data shows that motivation plays an
important role in determining the cognitive performance of children at the
lower end of the IQ curve. The motivational factors are manifest in the behav-
ior of the children, in their personality, and in the motivationally orienting
beliefs they have. The evidence about the impact of motivation is of great
importance in regard to the interactions of cognition and motivation, espe-
cially because of the nature of the studied population. As it is obvious that in
retarded children the etiology, including sometimes the genetic background,
plays a definite role, the evidence that motivation is a factor of such great
importance in determining cognitive performance indicates that considering
cognition without motivation is not the advisable or productive approach.

Factors Influencing Performance at the

Higher End of the IQ Curve
Robinson et al. (2000) argue that gifted individuals should be considered in
terms of parameters similar to those applied in regard to retarded individuals,
although the precise concepts and results will differ. Thus, for example, the
mismatch between chronological age and mental age is evident at both ends
of the IQ curve as well as divergence from the norm and possible difficul-
ties of functioning in standard academic frameworks, although for different
reasons.
Notably, “the differentiated model of giftedness and talent” (Gagné, 2000),
which is one of the better-known approaches in this field, lists six compo-
nents that need to be considered in handling giftedness: the natural abilities
440 Zigler

(giftedness as such), chance, the environmental catalyst, the intrapersonal

catalyst, learning or practice, and talent, considered as outcome. Natural abil-
ities may be considered as paralleling the etiology and learning/training are
the behaviors that enable cognitive performance, while chance as well as the
environmental and intrapersonal catalysts are the environmental and per-
sonality factors that can facilitate or hinder the learning or training necessary
for becoming talented. This approach clearly reflects the conception that the
manifestation of giftedness is a function of multiple factors, including moti-
vation. This assumption is shared by most investigators in the field. According
to Renzulli (1978), gifted behavior consists of behaviors that reflect an inter-
action among three basic clusters of human traits – above-average ability,
high levels of task commitment, and high levels of creativity. Sternberg and
Davidson (1986), in their review of conceptions of giftedness, have shown that
most investigators define giftedness in terms of multiple qualities. In addition
to IQ scores, they include qualities that are not intellectual – mainly motiva-
tion, high self-concept, and creativity. These examples provide the theoretical
justification in the present chapter for discussing giftedness or high ability in
terms of the same three headings used for the individuals at the lower end of
the curve.
External environmental factors. Important environmental factors in regard
to giftedness include the socioeconomic circumstances, family atmosphere,
support provided by the family, schooling, and the treatment of the child as
“divergent” by the community at school as well as at large. A major determi-
nant of the development of talent in the gifted is the opportunities for learn-
ing and training that the gifted individual can get. The environment plays
a major role in the nurturance of higher intelligence or giftedness (Lens &
Rand, 2008; Tannenbaum, 1986). Giftedness and talent require a special envi-
ronment, just as lower intelligence does. The environment must be enrich-
ing and encouraging, considerate of the extra-high developmental levels of
the children (Sakar-DeLeeuw, 1999). Adequate educational frameworks are
a necessity in order to enable an appropriate cognitive development as well
as to prevent boredom and frustration and take care of the so-called asyn-
chrony gap that may lead gifted children to the extreme of unconsciously
developing deficits (Grobman, 2006). Educational opportunities may vary
in appropriateness, the stimulation they provide, and the degree and nature
of achievement for the student that they enable. Runco (2007, pp. 177–212)
has reviewed a broad set of studies showing what teaching and adequate
classroom organization can do for promoting creativity or inversely depress-
ing it. Educational programs geared for the gifted have not always existed
in most countries or schools, and even nowadays are not a commodity that
 Intelligence and Cognitive Exceptionality 441

may be expected to exist in most educational frameworks. Furthermore, the

educational means should be available continuously from the initial level of
preschool through elementary school and secondary schools to the univer-
sity. Often, education for the gifted exists only up to a certain level, say, the
end of elementary school, leaving the gifted individual stranded after that
(Feldhusen, 1985).
Another important factor in providing good educational opportunities for
the gifted are the socioeconomic circumstances of the parents and the sup-
port they can or are ready to provide. Sometimes parents are not aware of the
giftedness of their child or of their role in promoting the child’s development.
Beyond that, parents may be too engrossed in economic difficulties or family
problems to be able to devote enough attention to the gifted child at home
and mobilize the financial and emotional resources necessary for promoting
the child’s development (Olszewski-Kubilius, 2008). Thus, the educational
development of the gifted individuals depends, on the one hand, on the avail-
ability and accessibility of the adequate educational programs and, on the
other hand, on family status and support (Gagné, 1991; Tannenbaum, 1986).
In addition, the fact that gifted individuals are exceptional and may often
differ from others in many characteristics may also create a problem that is
not dissimilar from that of labeling in regard to the mentally retarded. Plucker
and Levy (2001, p. 75) have noted that, “in this culture, there appears to be
a great pressure for people to be ‘normal’ with a considerable stigma associ-
ated with giftedness or talent.” As a consequence, gifted individuals tend to
suffer from isolation, especially those with no social network of gifted peers.
In order to gain popularity, they may try to hide their abilities, for example,
by means of underachievement or the use of less sophisticated vocabulary
(Swiatek, 1995). Notably, isolation may be eased by being able to function in
social frameworks with similarly gifted children.
In sum, environmental conditions, including adequate educational frame-
works and social settings, are of prime importance for promoting the full
manifestation of the cognitive abilities of gifted children. However, envi-
ronment plays a role in regard to giftedness beyond educational possibili-
ties. In the workplace, the prevailing atmosphere and available incentives
play an important role in determining the extent of original and creative
outputs of the gifted individuals. Studies show that the performance of the
gifted in the workplace depends largely on factors, such as challenge, auton-
omy in choosing means for attaining goals, matching people with the right
assignments, sufficient resources, supportive teams where members share the
excitement and readiness to help and recognize each other’s talents, informa-
tion sharing, readiness to accept new ideas, collaboration, and organizational
442 Zigler

encouragement in the form of praise and rewards (Amabile, 1998; Dorst &
Cross, 2001; Nonaka, 1991; Sullivan & Harper, 2009).
Personality and behavioral factors. A large body of data presents informa-
tion about personality tendencies and behaviors characteristic of the gifted.
We will briefly describe some of the major ones, mentioned in multiple stud-
ies, grouped into clusters (Coleman & Cross, 2008; Friedman-Nimz & Skyba,
2009; Jackson, Moyle, & Piechowski, 2009; Lens & Rand, 2008; Sekowski,
Siekanska, & Klinkosz, 2009).
(a) curiosity, inquisitiveness, childlike sense of wonder, desire to know,
openness to experience and a broad range of interests; perceptiveness,
good sense of observation, sensitivity to small changes in the environ-
ment, awareness of things that others do not perceive, and perceiving
the world differently than others; heightened sensory awareness that
may take the form of overexcitabilities or supersensitivities in one
or more of the following domains: psychomotor, sensual, emotional,
intellectual, and imaginational;
(b) tolerance for ambiguity and complexity, considering situations from
many points of view;
(c) independence, nonconformity, autonomy, questioning rules or
authority;
(d) perfectionism, setting high standards for self and others, high achieve-
ment drive, being critical of oneself;
(e) feeling different from others, sometimes out of step with others, but
compassionate and interested in others and their problems;.
(f) passionate, having intense feelings;
(g) tendency for risk-taking;
(h) need sometimes to withdraw, need for solitude and periods of
contemplation;
(i) having high moral standards, being disturbed by inequity, exploitation,
corruption, and needless human suffering.
This list, even though it is partial, shows that the personality tendencies char-
acteristic for the gifted serve to enhance the likelihood of exceptional products
by the gifted. Their curiosity, attentiveness to the environment, achievement
motivation, independence, and moral standards are guarantees that the gift-
edness will be manifested in original, creative, and useful outputs.
However, it has been noted that some of the personality tendencies of the
gifted may be manifested in forms that will not be conducive to excellence
or may even hinder it. For example, the broad range of interests may lead to
losing focus and dealing with too many projects; the nonconformism may
 Intelligence and Cognitive Exceptionality 443

lead to stubbornness, rejection of authority, poor collaboration with others,

and difficulties of functioning in social frameworks; the tendency for over-
excitabilities may lead to overload of stimulation and withdrawal from oth-
ers; the high achievement drive coupled with perfectionism and exaggerated
self-criticism may result in withdrawing from action and giving up too soon
when the high standards set for oneself cannot be attained (Reis & McCoach,
2002; Schuler, 2002).
Some of the personality tendencies seem likely to create problems in the
domain of interacting with others. For example, feeling different and sensing
one’s intellectual superiority may lead to a feeling of isolation, of not being
understood, and of general frustration. One result could be underachieve-
ment (Rimm, 2008). Some investigators noted more extreme manifestations
in the gifted that appear to be similar to symptoms of hyperactivity, bipolar
disorder, ADHD, autism spectrum conditions, and other psychological dis-
orders that undoubtedly depress intellectual performance (Friedman-Nimz
& Skyba, 2009; Jackson et al., 2009). Hence, in the gifted, personality and
behavioral tendencies were shown to function either for promoting cognitive
performance or hindering it.
Cognitive-motivational factors. As in the case of individuals at the lower
end of the IQ curve, at the higher end of the curve there are also correlates of
motivation on the cognitive level. In terms of the cognitive orientation the-
ory, the cognitive-motivational correlates of creativity consist of beliefs in the
form of four belief types (about oneself, reality and others, rules and norms,
and goals and wishes) referring to the following 11 groupings of themes: 1.
Self-development (investing, promoting, and guarding oneself); 2. emphasis
on the inner world (identifying, knowing, developing, and expressing one’s
thinking, feeling, and imagination); 3. inner-directedness (emphasis on one’s
desires, will, and decision, self-confidence in one’s ability to succeed); 4. con-
tribution to society (concern with contributing something meaningful to the
community or society even if it does not involve personal advancement); 5.
awareness of one’s own uniqueness as an individual (emphasis on oneself as
an individual unique in one’s talents and way of perceiving, behaving, and
being, not necessarily due to nonconformity); 6. freedom in acting (need to
act in line with rules and regulations set by oneself rather than by others); 7.
restricted openness to the environment (readiness and need to absorb from
the environment knowledge and inspiration coupled with resistance to being
overwhelmed and harmed by too much openness); 8. acting under conditions
of uncertainty (readiness to act under conditions of uncertainty concerning
the results, with no control over the circumstances, a tendency which may
resemble risk-taking); 9. demanding from oneself (demanding from oneself
444 Zigler

effort, perseverance, giving up comfort and readiness for total investment

despite difficulties and even failures); 10. self-expression (concern with using
one’s talents and expressing oneself with authenticity and characteristically);
11. nonfunctionality (readiness to act even if functionality is not clearly evi-
dent from the start).
These groupings form two factors, in line with the results of confirmatory
factor analysis. The first and main factor is saturated mainly on the following
groupings: self-development; emphasizing one’s uniqueness; self-expression
as well as demanding from oneself; contributing to society; and emphasis on
one’s inner world. The emphasis seems to be mainly on the self – its unique-
ness, development, and expression. The second factor is saturated mainly on
the following groupings: freedom in functioning; being receptive to the envi-
ronment; absorbing from the environment; functioning under conditions
of uncertainty; nonfunctionality; as well as inner directedness. The differ-
ent groupings deal with the relations between the self and the environment,
whereby, on the one hand, there is emphasis on receptiveness and absorption
from the environment and, on the other hand, there is emphasis on keeping
inner directness and freedom from potential restrictions such as uncertainty
and functionality. Hence, the second factor was labeled as maintaining open-
ness to the environment without endangering inner directness.
The questionnaire scores of the cognitive orientation of creativity were
related to manifestations of creativity in various domains, including teach-
ing, designing, and engineering, assessed by a variety of objective measures
(Casakin & Kreitler, 2008, 2010; Kreitler & Casakin, 2009; Kreitler & Kreitler,
1990; Margaliot, 2005; Richter, 2003). Notably, the same two factors of the
cognitive orientation of creativity were identified in different samples. This
confirms the validity and structure of the cognitive orientation question-
naire. The questionnaire is also being applied for identifying differences in
cognitive-motivational correlates of creativity in different samples. For exam-
ple, in engineers the second factor is loaded on pro-functionality and is stron-
ger than the first (Casakin & Kreitler, 2010, 2011; Kreitler & Casakin, 2009).
Concluding remarks. The findings of studies in regard to the gifted dem-
onstrate the important role that motivational factors play in regard to the
manifestations and flourishing of giftedness. Environmental circumstances,
personality tendencies, and cognitive-motivational correlates need to be con-
sidered in order to understand why, in the case of a certain gifted individual,
the high ability and intellect became manifested and led to extraordinary out-
puts but in the case of other similarly endowed individuals the outputs were
at best mediocre.
 Intelligence and Cognitive Exceptionality 445

General Conclusions
This chapter dealt with the effects of motivation on cognitive functioning in
two groups of individuals extreme in regard to intellectual ability. The reason
for focusing on these two groups is the common assumption that in view of
the evident status of intelligence in the retarded and in the gifted, motivation
appears to be of little consequence, if at all. The evidence provided in this
chapter about the role of motivation precisely in regard to these two groups
provides a strong argument in support of the dependence of cognitive func-
tioning on motivation.
Notably, the factors that were reviewed as impacting motivation were
of three kinds: environmental circumstances, personality tendencies, and
cognitive-motivational correlates. It was found that the same groups of
factors influence cognitive performance in the two groups of individuals.
Furthermore, in some cases, it became evident that motivational factors
depressing performance in the retarded or promoting it in the gifted were
contrasts, such as outerdirectedness in the former and innerdirectedness in
the latter group.
Observations of this kind indicate that one of the next steps in the study
of the interactions of cognition and motivation could be the development of
a theory of motivation that would be comprehensive both in its structure –
including environmental, personality, and cognitive factors – and its applica-
tion – to individuals at all levels of ability.

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 21

How Conscious Thought, Imagination, and Fantasy May

Relate to Cognition and Motivation

Jerome L. Singer & Dorothy G. Singer

When William James laid out a vast agenda for a scientific discipline in his
grand two-volume Principles of Psychology of 1890 (James, 1950), he placed
chapters on consciousness and the self (Decartes’s je pense and je suis) toward
the very beginning of this work. Since then there have been several waves
of influence that have tended to cast consciousness or direct experience of
selfhood somewhat in the shadows. Freud and his clinical followers in psy-
choanalysis brought unconsciousness or thought and motivation without
awareness to the fore. Behaviorism, through developing highly sophisti-
cated experimental procedures for assessing learning and observable action
sequences, in effect ostracized consciousness and imagery for half a cen-
tury (Holt, 1964). Attention to consciousness began to re-emerge with the
“cognitive revolution” of the 1960s and opened avenues to studying human
awareness, ongoing thought, and private cognitive processing. The qualia of
experience now intrigue philosophers of the mind as well as behavioral sci-
entists and neurophysiologists (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008;
Ciba Foundation Symposium, 1993; J. L. Singer & Salovey, 1999; J. L. Singer &
Bonanno, 1990). Although new research in social cognition has also opened
the way for studying out-of-awareness attitude phenomena (Hassin, Uleman,
& Bargh, 2005), the importance of research on conscious thought is no longer
denied.

Defining Consciousness and Imagination

What are the phenomena that characterize consciousness and the forms taken
by our human imagination? We greet them earliest in the biblical accounts
of dreams or waking fantasies of Jacob, Joseph, and Ezekiel. Later, we expe-
rience a shock of recognition in the imaginative narrations of Socrates and
Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium, in the powerful interior monologues and

450
 Conscious Thought, Imagination, and Fantasy 451

visions of the characters presented so effectively in Shakespeare’s plays, and

in the past century, in the stream-of-consciousness novels of Virginia Woolf,
James Joyce, and Saul Bellow, among many others. In the cinema and on tele-
vision, the combination of visual imagery and “voice-over” interior mono-
logues capture our experiences of ongoing consciousness most tellingly.
However compelling these literary examples may be, we need to move
beyond intuitive anecdotal accounts of private experience to formulate scien-
tific models of the processes and functions of consciousness (Baars, 1997; J. L.
Singer & Salovey, 1999). We propose first that consciousness is reflected along
three major dimensions.

1. Physical Consciousness versus Unconsciousness

Here we refer to the situation of loss of sensory awareness of one’s environ-
ment or one’s memories or thoughts as the result of a gross physical impact
(a knock-out punch) or a psychological trauma (a terrible fright). Sleep, of
course, is our more normal instance, but, as Hamlet anticipated in “To Sleep,
perchance to dream /Aye, there’s the rub,” we know now from laboratory
studies that dreaming occurs regularly to us all through these nightly periods
of somnolence. For our purposes, the sheer physical manifestation of con-
sciousness, however important for brain research and definitions of life and
bodily health, is not central to our chapter.

2. Perceptual and Information Processing Consciousness

This form of consciousness is perhaps the one most extensively studied now
by neurophysiologists and philosophers of the mind as well as by psycholo-
gists interested in attention; perception; the encoding, retention, and retrieval
of properties of memory; and effortful learning. Although it is clearly the
basis for the processes of ongoing thought and imagination, it is dealt with
more extensively elsewhere in this volume, more generally in studies of cog-
nition and information processing.

3. Reflective Thought and Self-Sware, Self-Directed Consciousness

Attentive, perceptual cognitive processes establish one’s orientation in the
physical environment and, to some extent, the social milieu, but we can
identify a third dimension of consciousness designated by Johnson (1997)
in her analysis of memory as “reflective processing,” and even earlier by H.
Kreitler and S. Kreitler (1976) as “cognitive orientation and the assignment of
452 Singer & Singer

meaning.” As Johnson notes, “Reflection allows one to go beyond the imme-

diate consequences (both direct and associative) of stimulus-evoked activa-
tion . . . [in contrast with perception] reflection is endogenously generated
cognition” (Johnson 1997, p. 137). The Kreitlers’ cognitive orientation system
may begin operation in pure perceptual consciousness. The “noting, refresh-
ing and reaction” and the “discovering, retrieving and rehearsing” features
of Johnson’s levels of reflective processing open the way for more complex
meaning assignments that we experience as self-directed control and aware-
ness of our memories, intentions, and wishes. It is this third level of con-
sciousness that we will emphasize here.
Baars (1997) has provided a detailed model of the domain of consciousness
we are addressing. He terms it a “theater model,” in which “working memory”
(comparable to reflective processes) is like the stage on which anything from
rehearsing memories to repeating and reshaping our life narratives can occur.
This working memory is manifest through “inner speech” and “visual imag-
ery.” There is a kind of competition between which “actors” or different mem-
ories, wishes, intentions, or reconstructions of life experiences can compete
for the limited access to the “stage of consciousness.” We say limited access
because, considering the vast accumulation of information we are storing and
reprocessing, consciousness – like a stage or, in an earlier metaphor of Baars,
a computer workspace – has a restricted channel capacity.
We are inclined to modify Baars’s focus on external stimulation by adding to
his use of “outer senses” a person’s awareness of “body mechanism operation”
such as stomach gurglings, aches and pains, or muscles twitches. For his refer-
ence to “inner sense” we would add other imagery modalities besides the visual.
As Spurgeon’s (1961) research on Shakespeare has shown, the Bard’s great range
of references to smell, touch, taste, and auditory images distinguishes him from
his contemporary poets and playwrights. These rich images very likely reso-
nate so well with our own recollections of sensory experience that we are more
strongly attracted to his poetry, prose, and vivid characterizations.
We propose, in contrast with psychoanalytic theorizing, that a great deal
of what may seem unconscious may have been “on stage” from time to time
as part of the nearly endless rehearsing and retrieving that characterizes our
stream of consciousness. Unless we participate in thought-sampling meth-
ods, we often do not notice how many times we have remembered past
events, anticipated future events, or playfully created a range of fantasies
(Singer, 2006). What may seem to be intuitive discoveries, surprising unin-
tended thoughts, or the smoothly run off organized mental structures such
as schemas and scripts may well be automatized, overlearned materials that
were often consciously rehearsed (Singer & Salovey, 1991).
 Conscious Thought, Imagination, and Fantasy 453

Imagination may best be regarded as a facet of ongoing consciousness

that reflects what Bruner (1986) has called “narrative thought” in contrast to
“paradigmatic thought,” and what Epstein (1999) designated the “experien-
tial” side of his Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory. The experiential mode,
as Epstein stresses, is more closely linked to emotionality. The rational form
of thought in Bruner and Epstein’s systems is characterized by deliberateness
and greater effort. It operates through abstraction and verbal or mathemat-
ical thought. As Bruner suggests, it strives for “truth,” correct, convergent
answers. The narrative or experiential mode involves the more spontaneous
accumulation of concrete experiences or what cognitive researchers called
“episodic memories” aiming toward what Bruner calls “verisimilitude” or the
elaboration of story-like, emotionally laden skeins of conscious sequences.
Both forms of thought are potentially adaptive and may work in concert as a
feature of creative work in the sciences as well as in business or the arts.

Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation

Let us now attempt to set our human imaginative processes within an inte-
grated framework linking cognition to emotion and motivation. We propose
that the overarching motivational structure for our genus is cognitive. We
seek from birth to organize and give meaning to experience (H. Kreitler &
S. Kreitler, 1976). This cognitive striving incorporates the range from bodily
needs of satisfying hunger, thirst, sexual arousal, and pain avoidance to more
global motives of attachment and affiliation, (“community”), as against auton-
omy and self-realization (“agency”) (Bakan, 1966), or in Blatt’s (2008) recent
massive research review, relationship and self- representation. The labeling,
encoding, and periodic mental rehearsal or anticipation of our motives make
up a considerable proportion of the variability of our stream of conscious-
ness, as Klinger (1999) has shown in his research on “current concerns.”
In our processing of information, we must not only organize it into logical
structures but also examine the alternative and future possibilities or even
consider the darker alternatives that appear in any new human experience.
Indeed, we store information, as is increasingly clear in memory research, by
organized verbal schemas, on the one hand, and narrative episodes or pos-
sibilities in the form of fantasies and daydreams on the other (Singer, 1985;
Singer & Salovey, 1991). Narrative thought and subjunctive structure reflect
the human capacity for what the great neurologist Kurt Goldstein (1940)
called “taking an attitude toward the possible.” He believed this capacity
reflected the optimal functioning of a healthy and intact brain. Through this
orientation to the possible, one becomes capable of potential futures or – in
454 Singer & Singer

effect – a virtual relit of traveling through time and space to a different or

“better” childhood or maturity.
This capacity for reconstructing one’s past or for planning for one’s daily
activities through mental rehearsal or simply daydreaming about future vaca-
tions, sexual opportunities, or fantastic space adventures also serves a broader
function. Our imagination liberates us from the tyranny of this place, of these
particular duties and obligations, of these particular people in our social
milieu. We accomplish these metamorphoses not only through the abstrac-
tion of high-level logical or mathematical processes but through our capacity
for creating narrative and using our skills at imagery to provide us with alter-
native temporary environments that we can manipulate for self-help and ulti-
mately put into service of orderly living or simply sustaining hope and effort
(Singer, 1974a; Singer, 2006; Singer & Bonnano, 1990; Taylor, 1989).
We can now conceive a new model of the human being. Even babies and
children are information-seeking organisms striving to organize and inte-
grate novelty and complexity. They are curious and exploratory, but also more
likely to feel comfortable and smile once they can experience control over
novelty and assimilate new information into prior concepts and scripts about
the sequence of events. The signs of positive emotion (smiling and laugh-
ter associated with familiarity in adults) suggest that although cognition and
emotion may be different systems in terms of bodily structure, they are closely
related in actual human response (Demos, 1995; Izard, 1977; H. Kreitler & S.
Kreitler, 1976; Mandler, 1984; Tomkins, 1962).
Theoretical analyses initiated by Silvan Tomkins have contributed greatly
to the paradigm shift toward the cognitive-affective view of the human organ-
ism. Tomkins’s work has succeeded in putting emotions back at the center
of active research in personality and social psychology. The fact that human
beings are continuously assigning meaning and organizing their experience in
schemas and scripts does not preclude a significant motivational role for affect
or emotion. With the support of increasing empirical research carried out
both on children and adults by investigators such as Carroll Izard (1977), Paul
Ekman (1973), Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth (1982), and many others, we
can now regard human beings as showing differentiated emotional response
patterns that are closely intertwined with responses to the novelty, complexity,
and other structural properties of information confronted from moment to
moment (Demos, 1995; Shapiro & Emde, 1992; Singer & Singer, 2005).
The cognitive-affective perspective broadens our conception of human
motivation considerably. Rather than reducing all human motivation to some
symbolic reflection of infantile sexuality or aggression, one can propose that
 Conscious Thought, Imagination, and Fantasy 455

the basic emotions that have now been shown to exist across human species
in the research of Ekman and Izard are motivating human beings in doz-
ens of different situations independent of presumed drive pressures. Human
beings seek – as Tomkins has proposed – to reconstruct, in overt action or in
thought, situations that evoke the positive emotions of interest-excitement or
joy. They seek to avoid in action or thought those situations that have evoked
specific negative emotions of anger, fear-terror, sadness-distress (weeping),
or the complexes of shame-humiliation-guilt. Human beings are further
“wired-up” to express emotions as fully as possible and finally to control
emotional expression where social experience suggests such control is nec-
essary, either for safety or to avoid humiliation. Situations that permit expe-
rience and expression of positive emotions or that allow appropriate control
of negative emotion are intrinsically positively reinforcing. Those situations
that are more likely to evoke negative emotions – such as fear, anger, distress,
or shame – or that have blocked the expression of socially adaptive control of
emotions may be experienced as inherently punishing or negatively reinforc-
ing (Singer, 1974b; Tomkins, 1962, 1981).
Memory and anticipation become central features related to emotional
experience. Identifying, labeling, and gradually organizing new information
into mental representations that are technically labeled as schemas accom-
plishes this. These structures include schemas about persons or physical
objects, schemas about self and others, and scripts about action sequence
or prototypes that become means for encapsulating a variety of common
features of situations and persons into one fuzzy concept (Mandler, 1984;
Mandler, 1988; J. L. Singer & Salovey, 1991).
The avoidance of negative affects, seeking to maximize the positive effects
of joy and excitement-curiosity, expressing of emotions and yet also manag-
ing to control emotions may reflect the overarching link of affects to cogni-
tion. We must, however, also call attention to the two major human polarities
of community and agency because these, in varied expressions, form much of
the content of our conscious thought. A wide range of research of psychopa-
thology, healthy behaviors, and interpersonal interactions support the notion
that humans throughout life are seeking a balance between personal inti-
macy and group affiliation, on the one hand, and autonomy or self-actualized
individuality, on the other (Blatt, 2008; Bonanno & Singer, 1990). Whether
expressed as memories (Singer & Salovey 1993), intrusive thoughts about
self and others (Singer, 2006), or current concerns and wishes (Klinger 1999,
Singer, 2002), our conscious mentation largely represents content involving
our affiliative or agency needs.
456 Singer & Singer

The Emergence of Conscious Thought from

Children’s Play
We propose that the major foundation for the development of a complex
and relatively self-directed consciousness is laid in the period between two
and six years of age, when the child initiates and elaborates make-believe
or pretend play. Such play is characterized by the child’s mimicking adult
behavior by feeding herself with an empty coffee cup, then moving on to the
more advanced concept of feeding a toy animal or doll with an empty cup
and admonishing her plaything to “Drink it all up!” Soon, a few blocks can
become a pretend village, peopled with toy figures or even invisible ones in
which, as the child grows older, a relatively lengthy narrative may unfold.
Consider the cognitive-affective dilemma of the preschool child. He or she
must make sense of a complex world by gradually assimilating the bigness
and strangeness of people, animals, and objects such as cars, airplanes, or
trucks into a limited range of schemas and scripts. A child may react with
fear when first faced with extreme novelty that cannot at once be assimilated
into established structures. The child may respond with a smile of pleasure
once a match can be made between new information and some well-known
schema, and the novelty or ambiguity of the environmental situation can be
assimilated. When the new situation is only moderately complex and some
overriding schema is still available, the child may move to explore the novelty
in the situation, and this evokes the positive affects of interest and excite-
ment. Children and adults live in a situation of perennially delicate balance
between the potential for fear or anxiety evoked by new situations and the
excitement of exploring such situations. By such exploration, one can assim-
ilate incongruity into established schemas, enrich such schemas, or start to
form new ones. The persistence over time of large amounts of unexpected or
ambiguous information evokes the negative effects of anger or distress and
sadness (Singer & Singer, 2005; Tomkins, 1962). We all learn to bring sets
of expectations of what may occur to each new situation. We practice such
expectations through brief anticipatory fantasies, some more realistic than
others depending on our maturity, the complexity of our schema structure,
and our social development. Our task in each new situation is to examine
new information and determine whether it confirms or disconfirms some of
our anticipations.
What seems to be the intrinsic unmotivated character of play to an adult
represents the child’s continuing effort to create new meaning structures and
provide itself with a sense of control and power by reducing large-scale set-
tings, persons, or social interactions to meaningful structures that can be
 Conscious Thought, Imagination, and Fantasy 457

assimilated into the as-yet limited number of schemas the child has at its
command. The startle responses or terror evoked in a toddler by the size and
noise of a huge passing truck may be gradually transformed into curiosity
and interest as the child attempts to reproduce the noises and movements of
the truck through creating its own sound effects and manipulating blocks or
toy trucks. Imaginative play may thus be understood as a means by which
the uncontrollable qualities and complexity of one’s physical and social envi-
ronment can be gradually miniaturized and manipulated. In effect, we can
see that much of human thought involves a similar effort to create, at least
temporarily, a world one can control through replaying memories or antic-
ipation and fantasy. Indeed, it can be argued that the very act of rehearsal
and anticipation or even of elaborating possible future events in somewhat
more bizarre fantasies may gradually approximate possible situations we do
encounter. Such mental rehearsal may leave us better prepared to handle
these, or at least be less frightened by them when they do occur (Singer &
Singer, 2005).
With the conceptual framework of the agency-autonomy or Blatt’s rela-
tional versus self-representation dialectic, the child’s make-believe world is
one that represents a continuous working out of the tension between the
need for closeness and affiliation and the need for privacy with its concom-
itant experience of personal power and individuality. Indeed, the very act of
beginning to form individualized images, memories, and anticipatory fanta-
sies becomes, in our crowded and sensory-bombarded world, the last refuge
for an experience of individuality and personal privacy. For the developing
child seeking the “story line,” it can simulate sustained relationships with par-
ents and others. It can also create private games by floor play or enacting a
relationship with a personally possessed stuffed animal or even an invisible
playmate, thus establishing that experience of individuation that also seems
so necessary in our human condition.
In view of this persistent human attachment-individuation tension, the
emergence of an increasingly complex imaginative dimension subject to
reasonable control (a kind of cognitive skill in itself) sustains the need for
self-definition, a sense of uniqueness, and private power. The child must learn
gradually to establish priorities in the direction of attention, whether toward
the environment or material recurring from memory or forming itself into
fantasies. Our practical survival may well demand that we assign a some-
what higher priority to the processing of externally generated stimulation.
Our affective development must also involve reflection, introspection, the
capacity to enjoy private experiences, gradually shape and direct them, to
plan and also create stories, and mentally to manipulate the range of future
458 Singer & Singer

possibilities. For young children with limited motor and linguistic capacities
and a smaller and less differentiated range of stored schemas and scripts, the
balancing of such priorities may be reflected in the varying amounts of physi-
cal, rule-oriented, or social and imaginative play in which they engage.
Of special importance is the conception of transformation or the emer-
gence through play of what Alan Leslie (1987) in a fine paper has called a
metarepresentational mode of thought. Leslie’s argument is that a major step
in development involves the “decoupling” of the direct representations we
sustain of objects, persons, or situations from their perceptual images into a
new set of metarepresentations that are symbolic or mental representations
of the same original set of objects, but now treated as part of an entire sys-
tem of thought that one can modify, manipulate, analogize, or transform to
metaphor. With the help to some extent of adults, but also on the basis of an
inherent capacity in the child, the ability merges to create a frame in which
otherwise very stable objects can be transformed into representations that
bear only a tenuous link with their original shapes.
Leslie’s conception of the theory of mind implies that human beings have
available a domain of metarepresentations they can manipulate to make
inferences about causes, predictions about future events, recognize the conse-
quences of ignorance, distinguish reality from fantasy, acquire a language of
words and phrases depicting mental experiences or states, and infer motiva-
tions. As Leslie puts it, “Pretend play is thus one of the earliest manifestations
of the ability to characterize and manipulate one’s own and other’s cognitive
relations to information” (Leslie, 1987, p. 422).
It may well be the case that preschool children practicing imaginative play
may also be more likely to move naturally into adopting a metarepresen-
tational orientation. They may show an ability to demonstrate a “theory of
mind”; that is, an ability to be aware of their own thoughts as distinct from
others. In a series of studies under our direction (Rosen, Schwebel, & Singer,
1997; Schwebel, Rosen, & Singer, 1999), it has been demonstrated that pre-
school children who play more imaginatively (on observation by raters on
several occasions) may actually perform better on the reality-fantasy and
false-belief measures used as estimates of theory of mind. As a matter of fact,
even when age and other factors are taken out in multiple regression analyses,
the scores on make-believe play still predict theory of mind results.
What we are proposing, then, is that imaginative play in childhood emerges
almost necessarily as the child’s cognitive capacities unfold through height-
ened brain development and inevitable social experiences. At the same time,
this metarepresentational mode makes it possible for increasing complexity
of play to occur. Such play provides pleasures for the children by allowing
 Conscious Thought, Imagination, and Fantasy 459

them to miniaturize complex events and objects as well as to seem to gain

power over the objects and people around them through manipulating them
in original story lines.
During the “high season of make-believe play,” children basically talk aloud
their thoughts. At the earlier ages, they may engage in collective monologues,
each child, even when side by side with another, simply describing a unique
plot. Later, as our research shows, the children who engage in a great deal of
such behavior are often leaders in groups, and they interact in role-playing
and directing others (Singer & Singer, 1990). By ages six and seven, however,
we see a transition toward internalizing play and its verbal concomitants. Just
exactly how this happens is still something of a mystery. We have as yet no
detailed, systematic experimental or longitudinal studies to demonstrate how
overt play becomes covert and is transformed into private thought and the
self-reflective consciousness of our definition. It does appear to be the case,
from follow-up research, that preschool children who engage in more pretend
play are likely to show more signs of general imaginativeness and creativity by
middle childhood (Root-Bernstein, 2009; Russ, 2004; Singer & Singer, 1990;
Taylor, 1999). How exactly this occurs for the average child is uncertain.
In summary, it is evident that conscious thought may well take its origin in
the symbolic floor play of preschoolers. It seems very likely that such play is
adaptive and that it enhances verbal fluency, imagery, empathy, self-control,
and the capacity for self-entertainment, as research demonstrates (Singer &
Singer, 2005). The ability of preschoolers to miniaturize the big, confusing
world around them and thereby gain some sense of power and control is car-
ried over into our adult thought. We can privately relive memories on the
“small stage” of our own mind’s eyes or ears and also anticipate a range of
possible futures or even create the novel scenarios we call fantasies.

Brain-Imaging Research on Mind Wandering

and Stimulus-Independent Thought
Our earlier work using electroencephalography (EEG) and other psycho-
physiological measurements had suggested ways that daydreaming and
forms of stimulus-independent thoughts (SITs) or Task-Unrelated Images
and Thoughts (TUITs) were linked to brain activities when active sensory or
motor responses to external stimulation were not demanded by some tasks.
We, however, lacked the tools for intensive systematic brain research. The past
two decades have provided the methods of positron emission tomography
(PET) scanning or functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which
can locate specific brain areas that become active when a person’s attention
460 Singer & Singer

shifts from looking or listening to environmental signals toward reminiscing

about past events of one’s experience or thinking about one’s own personal
goals or activities.
A fine summary of a large body of research on mind wandering by
Smallwood and Schooler (2006) has shown how such shifts of attention can
actually have goal-driven, executive functions even when they are diversions
from focusing on an ongoing chore. The experimental studies of Mason et al.
(2007) using new imaging techniques have shown that mind wandering and
stimulus independent thought can indeed be tied to a specific brain system
that becomes active when the brain is presumably “at rest.” This system has
been identified as the Brain Default Network, and it “lights up” on fMRI or
PET scans in situations, as their studies show, during passive sensory process-
ing, but it is “attenuated” when persons confront a demanding, novel task.
Thought-sampling supported this finding, and individual differences in par-
ticipants’ prior self-reports on our daydreaming questionnaire also related to
greater engagement of Default Network brain regions along with more verbal
reports of stimulus independent thoughts.
The most recent and extensive review presentation of the anatomy and
functional role of this cerebral system has further supported the important
executive or goal-related significance of the Brain Default Network (Buckner
et al., 2008). These authors review the anatomical features of the network in
both monkeys and humans. They conclude that the default network is indeed
likely to become activated when individuals are focusing their attention on
personal memories, attempts at adopting the perspectives of other people (a
form of theory of mind or empathic thought), and when anticipating or pre-
sumably daydreaming about future events or interactions.
Their review of the anatomical and brain-functional evidence from imag-
ing research leads them to the description of the Default Network as involv-
ing two systems, with the medial temporal lobe serving as the provider of
the memories and associative connections upon which imagery and related
mental constructions of events lead to a sort of replay of situations. They
found that then the medial prefrontal subsystem is active to facilitate the
dynamic and flexible use of this information during the construction of men-
tal simulations, in particular when these are self-relevant. They trace how the
two subsystems converge on various “hubs” such as the posterior cingulate
cortex that serve as integrating centers. In the course of their review, they
also point to developmental evidence that the interactions between default
network areas are first seen in toddlers and older children, the same period
as the emergence of imaginative play just discussed above. Such processes
may often be disrupted in advanced aging. Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, and
 Conscious Thought, Imagination, and Fantasy 461

Schacter go on to insightful speculations about links of deficits, disruptions,

or even over-activities of the brain’s default system in pathological conditions
such as autism, schizophrenia, and Alzheimer’s.
If we now review these brain findings in relation to the research on day-
dreaming and the stream of thought described above, we find considerable
convergence. One of the first findings from the questionnaire studies was that
most people reported that their daydreaming was most frequent just before
falling asleep at bedtime, when eyes were closed and when one was presum-
ably attempting to shut out external stimulation. The experimental studies of
signal detection provide extensive evidence that daydreams or reminiscences
occur most often when the cognitive demands of the task or the stimulus
novelty from the immediate environmental surround is relatively reduced.
The studies directed by Antrobus on dreams or mentation during the sleep
cycle show that the more frequent accounts and seemingly more elaborate
dreams in the EEG-Stage 1 and REM sleep phases occur because there is a
convergence of motor paralysis, reduced external awareness, and greater
brain activation in contrast with what occurs during Sleep EEG Stages 2, 3, or
4 (Antrobus, 1993, 1999).
The identification by Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, and Schacter of a link to
self-focus and the brain default network regions is also found in behavioral stud-
ies of self-defining memories and self-relevant material in thought-sampling
and emotionality (Garfinkle, 1994; Hart et al., 1997; S. Kreitler & Singer, 1991;
Singer & Salovey, 1993; J. A. Singer, 2005; J. L. Singer, 2006). The research
on the beginnings of brain default network functioning in toddler-aged and
older children (Fransson et al., 2007) meshes with studies of the beginnings
of pretend play in childhood and the relation of such play to theory of mind,
reality-fantasy distinction, and other perspective-taking (D. G. Singer & J. L.
Singer, 1990, 2005; Schwebel et al., 1999). It is exciting to think that we may
be entering a period in which we can begin to integrate phenomenal private
experiences and experimentally or psychometrically assessed behaviors in a
systematic fashion with the voiceless, nonverbal electrochemical activation of
neuronal networks in the brain.

Consciousness and Motivation

What specific role does conscious thought play in human motivation? We
mentioned early on the waves of influence that led to an underplaying con-
scious mentation in favor of strong unconscious influences on human motives
and actions. The power of psychoanalytic models of out-of-awareness drives
and thought processes has been greatly eroded in recent decades because of
462 Singer & Singer

dubious evidence and relative untestability. At the same time, cognitive sci-
ence has provided support for the present view that much of our information
processing and our uses of schemas, scripts, prototypes, or attitudes operates
relatively automatically or without conscious awareness (Banaji, 2001; Hassin
et al., 2005; Kihlstrom, 1987; J. L. Singer & Salovey, 1991). Is the theater of con-
sciousness simply an epiphenomenon or does it contribute a special potency
to our intentions toward action?
The position we are proposing is that the brain (except when traumati-
cally disabled as in our first definition of consciousness) is almost contin-
uously active. Materials from long-term memory recur sometimes almost
randomly (as may be especially the case in night dreaming), but also as a
function of recurrent, unfinished tasks, unfulfilled intentions, or current
concerns (Klinger, 1999). These current concerns may be aroused by asso-
ciations to environmental signals such as pictures of food, odors from food
vendor’s stands, or erotic images on TV and in magazines. Antrobus (1999)
has outlined with precision these circumstances from controlled research
that identify the likely awareness of TUITS (Giambra, 1995). Recent brain
imaging (MRI) research seems consistent with the laboratory evidence that
during those intervals when individuals are not processing externally gener-
ated task information (with parietal and occipital areas activated), they revert
to frontal-lobe activity, which may well reflect recurrent working memory or
future-oriented mentation (Antrobus, 1993, 1999; Courtney, 1997). As Klinger
summarizes recent research, “It is now clear that up to perhaps one half of
waking thought takes one form or another of daydreaming . . . thoughts are,
like more overt behavior, organized entities that . . . pertain to the goals to
which people commit themselves and are steered by emotional response to
goal related cues” (Klinger, 1999, p. 46). We concur with Klinger’s conclusion
that such mentation may well play a role in all cognitive processing from
simpler stimulus responses (see Johnson, 1997) to more complex forms of
problem-solving and creative thinking. Our human ability to project images,
self-representations, or even to carry on internal monologues or imagined
dialogues establishes a meaningful (S. Kreitler, 1999) stage or workspace
(Baars, 1997) that often motivates us to action much in the same manner as
sight or smell from the food vendor’s stand.
The research support for our position derives from a variety of experimen-
tal, psychometric, and clinical sources (J. L. Singer & Bonanno, 1990; J. A.
Singer & Salovey, 1999). For example, direct inquiry through questionnaires
makes clear the ubiquity of daydreaming and related ongoing conscious activ-
ities and their extensive personality correlates. Laboratory research, in which
participants engaging in vigilance or signal-detection tasks are periodically
 Conscious Thought, Imagination, and Fantasy 463

interrupted to report on the occurrence of TUITs, point to the frequency of

such processes and their current concerns or motivational role. More natural-
istic research of thought-sampling by the use of paging devices that interrupt
people during their daily activities extend the laboratory findings further.
Such research also indicates how self-representations and images of ideal
or socially desirable self-roles may actually moderate emotions or ongoing
mood states (J. L. Singer, 2006). Clinical uses of imagery and daydream-like
procedures in therapies as diverse as psychoanalysis, waking dream therapies,
and cognitive-behavioral treatments (J. L. Singer & Pope, 1978; J. L. Singer,
2006) also exemplify the affect-arousing and motivational role of conscious
processing.

Self-Representation
An awareness of self as reflected in interior monologues (Hamlet’s “O what
a rogue and peasant slave am I”) or images of oneself in future interactions
(Hamlet’s “The play’s the thing/wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the king!”)
is a recurrent feature of ongoing conscious thought. Beliefs about oneself in
relation to significant others such as parents and authorities or about one’s
“actual self ” as compared to one’s “ideal,” “ought,” or “dreaded self ” have
increasingly been carefully and extensively studied (Higgins, 1987; Hart et al.,
1997; J. L. Singer, 2006).
The valuable work by Higgins and his various collaborators has outlined
with strong experimental evidence how discrepancies between Actual and
Ideal or Actual and Ought self-beliefs may be associated with depressive or
agitated-anxious moods, respectively. We have carried this work further to
show that such self-beliefs are related not only to self-esteem measures and
mood or emotional states but are reflected in participants’ ongoing thought
as sampled by pager interruptions seven times a day over a week’s time.
Arousing participants’ awareness of actual-ideal or actual-ought discrepan-
cies increased conscious recurrence of self-thought and heightened negative
affects (J. L. Singer, 2006). The examination of samples of ongoing waking
thought about self may be a fruitful field, not only for further research but
also for clinical application.
In summary, we have sought to show that although a great deal of human
information may well run off out-of-awareness, there remains a narrower but
vivid stage of conscious thought, on which we re-enact memories, reshape
schemas, play out scripts for alternative futures, and even try out relatively
bizarre or fantastic adventures. Recent research on the Brain’s Default System
supports the findings from purely psychological studies to suggest that when
464 Singer & Singer

attention shifts away from processing external, sensory-focused tasks, areas

of cortical activity drawing on long-term memories, unfulfilled current con-
cerns, and future plans become active. Such conscious experience has its own
stimulus value that forges motivational possibilities as well as contributing to
information processing. In its more playful or “abandoned” forms, our con-
scious imagery may not only entertain but lead us on to creative experience
and expression.

References
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 22

Creativity and Motivation

Mark A. Runco & David J. McGarva

Theories of Creativity and Motivation

For Freud (1966), creative behavior was one way of sublimating libidinal
energy. Creativity was rooted in wish fulfillment; writers, for example, would
create worlds of their own, taking the result very seriously and expending a
great deal of emotion on it. Although Freud’s theory is no longer given uni-
versal respect, in part because so little of it can be tested empirically, the view
that creativity is tied to disturbance and sometimes even psychopathology is
widely held. Indeed, research frequently supports the link between creativity
and psychological illness. Richards (1999) described how that link may assume
different forms: pathology may lead directly or indirectly to creative behavior;
creativity may be a direct or indirect cause of illness; or both may result from
some third factor. Motivational tendencies may account for that third factor.
Barron (1972, 1995) found that in a group of 66 writers (56 professionals and
10 students), the average writer was in the upper 15 percent of the general pop-
ulation on every measure of psychopathology in the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory. However, the creative writers also scored significantly
above average on a test of ego strength, which is more usually negatively cor-
related with psychopathology. Barron suggested that writers “are much more
troubled psychologically, but they also have far greater resources to deal with
their troubles” (1961, p. II-8).
Ludwig (1995) statistically analyzed biographical data from 1,028
­individuals. Writers and other creative workers showed significantly more
psychopathology – including depression, anxiety, and psychosis – than other
groups. Fiction writers were significantly more likely than most groups to
undergo psychotherapy or voluntary hospitalization.
Andreasen (1997) interviewed 30 eminent creative writers and determined
that 80 percent had histories of major mood disorders. This was considerably

468
 Creativity and Motivation 469

higher than her figure of 30 percent for a matched control group from other
occupations. The finding is so remarkable that it is important to note that
Andreasen’s diagnostic methods were more rigorous than in any previous
study.
Jamison (1997) questioned 47 award-winning British, Irish, or Common­
wealth writers. Thirty-eight percent reported having sought treatment for
mood disorders, as compared to 6 percent in the general population.
Piirto (1998) examined the lives of 80 women writers using questionnaires
and published material. She found one of the themes was the incidence of
self-destructive acts and depression. The exact prevalence of this characteris-
tic is not clear; presumably, it was observed mostly in the confidential ques-
tionnaires because Piirto recorded only six writers for whom it was identified
by literature analysis.
Rivers-Norton (2002) noted that although studies of eminent writers
emphasized their distress, dysfunction, and mood disorders, they did not
focus primarily on the effects of childhood abuse. Analyzing autobiographi-
cal and biographical material as well as literary narratives by four randomly
selected eminent writers who had reported such abuse, she evaluated inter
alia whether these writers created narratives to acknowledge, engage, inte-
grate, and transcend their lived experiencing of this abuse. In all cases, she
found that early abuse led to existential crises that were reflected in literary
content and form.
Kaufman and Baer (2002) pointed out that most studies in this area have
focused predominantly, or even exclusively, on male writers, and that this
may limit the generalizability of the findings. There is, however, evidence that
mental illness is prevalent among successful women writers. In a historio-
metric study of 1,629 writers, Kaufman (2001) found that female poets were
significantly more likely to suffer mental illness than female fiction writers
or male writers of any type. A subsequent study of 520 eminent American
women found that poets were more likely to have mental illnesses and to
experience personal tragedy than journalists, visual artists, politicians, and
actresses (Kaufman, 2001).
The relationship between creativity and psychopathology may reflect the
fact that disturbances can be motivating. That is one way to interpret Freud’s
theory. Simplifying some, an individual may have a problem and use creative
work to explore or even relieve the disturbance. An alternative is suggested by
the findings of an association of creativity with alcohol and other substance
use. Ludwig’s (1995) study, mentioned previously, showed that creative writ-
ers were more likely than members of less creative professions to have alcohol
and drug problems. One explanation for this was offered by the novelist John
470 Runco & McGarva

Cheever. He suggested that his capacity to tap uncensored material led him
to drink – and gave him creative insight.

Humanistic Views
The motive to creative does not always originate in disturbance. This is
especially clear in the framework of what is often labeled the Humanistic
perspective. It posits that creativity can be motivated by the drive for
self-actualization and the fulfillment of potential. Note here that creativity
can therefore be tied to psychological health and well-being. Rogers (1961),
for instance, felt that creativity can flourish only when motivation comes
from within the creator and not when there is an expectation of being eval-
uated. Maslow (1968) viewed creative behavior as part of self-actualization,
and therefore placed it at the top of his hierarchy of needs, to be addressed
only when the more basic needs were met. A questionnaire-based study has
confirmed the relationship between creativity and self-actualization (Runco,
Ebersole, & Mraz, 1997).
Maslow (1968) acknowledged that self-actualizing creativity (which he dis-
tinguished from special-talent creativity), rather than conforming fully to the
hierarchical model, might be observed in innately creative people even when
they were unsatisfied, unhappy, or hungry. Rhodes (1961) pointed out that
creative behavior may result from either “deficiency” or “being” needs, in the
same way in which Maslow (1968) described two kinds of love: “D-love” and
“B-love.” When creative behavior is successful as a response to deficiencies
in one’s basic needs in an emotionally repressive or deprived environment, it
may allow subsequent access to higher levels of creativity. The deliberate and
conscious working through of underlying conflicts has also been shown to
have health benefits (Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1997).
One interesting part of the Humanistic perspective is the claim that cre-
ativity originates from within the individual. This is interesting because a
parallel view is very apparent in creative studies. We are referring to the
emphasis placed on intrinsic motivation in studies of creativity (Amabile,
1990; Eisenberger & Shanock, 2003; Runco, 1993). Intrinsic motivation
was tied to creative talent in some of the very first empirical investigations
reported at the Institute for Personality Assessment and Research (IPAR)
(Barron, 1963, 1972; MacKinnon, 1965, 1970, 1983). Intrinsic motivation was,
at that point, a core characteristic and viewed much more as a general ten-
dency, much as a personality trait. Other core characteristics included wide
interests (which is itself a reflection of motivation), unconventionality, and,
of course, originality.
 Creativity and Motivation 471

More recent work on intrinsic motivation has become highly rigorous.

This research has also included a very wide range of subjects, whereas earlier
studies at IPAR mostly tested unambiguously creative groups (e.g., architects
and writers). Dudek and Hall (1991) have published a follow-up of the IPAR
architects’ studies.
Amabile (1990) defined intrinsic motivation as “the motivation to do an
activity for its’ own sake, because it was intrinsically interesting, enjoyable,
or satisfying. In contrast, extrinsic motivation was defined as the moti-
vation to do an activity primarily to achieve some extrinsic goal, such as a
reward” (p. 62). In one experimental study of intrinsic motivation, Amabile
(1983) asked a group of female psychology students to make collages. Those
who were led to expect that their work would not be evaluated performed
more creatively (as assessed by a panel of experienced art students) than oth-
ers. This was true whether or not they were instructed to be creative. Thus,
Amabile showed that a salient extrinsic constraint leads, in general, to lower
creativity. Many subsequent studies have confirmed this finding (summa-
rized in Amabile, 1990). In one study, Amabile asked 72 self-identified cre-
ative writers to write two Haiku-style poems. Between the two poems, one
group completed a questionnaire on reasons for writing, designed to draw
their attention to the intrinsic reasons; a second group completed a ques-
tionnaire focused on extrinsic reasons; and a control group completed no
questionnaire. The poems subsequently written by the first group were signif-
icantly more creative (as rated by poets) than the others. Amabile suggested
that people who generally approach their work with an intrinsic orientation
may be more consistently creative.
One simple view is that intrinsic motivation is sometimes conducive to
creativity and that extrinsic motivation is detrimental. This simple view is
consistent with a number of observations and with the idea that sometimes
creative efforts are stopped because the person is squelched (Davis, 1999).
Squelchers may be interpersonal. They may take the form of evaluation and
criticism offered by parents, teachers, or supervisors at work.
Yet it is not as simple as “intrinsic motives are good, extrinsic are bad.”
Eisenberger and Shanock (2003) pointed out that there are underlying fac-
tors, including self-determination, and that these are critical determinants of
behavior. Rubenson and Runco (1992, 1995) also looked beneath the simple
intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy and outlined a psychoeconomic explanation
using the ideas of costs and benefits. One of the interesting implications of
psychoeconomic theory is that sometimes, people are motivated to do things
that then preclude originality and creativity. This is especially clear in the case
of large investments, which have the possibility of depreciation.
472 Runco & McGarva

Individuals who have invested a large amount into one style or perspective (e.g., a
scientist who has spent years developing one theory or model) will be motivated
to justify its usage. If his or her pet model was replaced, the scientist’s investment
(temporal and psychic) would depreciate. Note that it is essentially linear: the
more of an investment, the higher the motivation to avoid depreciation. Experts
would thus be highly motivated in a particular fashion, as would anyone who has
devoted years to a topic or model or perspective. (Runco, 2003)

Amabile (1996) described how extrinsic motivation can have a positive influ-
ence if it is synergistic – informational or enabling – rather than controlling.
The positive effect is especially likely when high intrinsic motivation is already
present. Thus, her theory allows for internal and external motivations to
co-occur. To test this, Ruscio, Whitney, and Amabile (1998) asked 151 univer-
sity students to write Haiku meeting stated requirements of form and content.
They had previously tested the participants’ stable, domain-specific motiva-
tion. The poems were rated for creativity and other qualities by English grad-
uate students. Stable intrinsic motivation significantly predicted creativity.
In a collage experiment with elementary school students in the United
States and Saudi Arabia, Hennessey (2000) found that, as usual, subsequent
reported interest in the task was undermined by the promise of a reward.
However, the Saudi children showed a smaller, in fact insignificant, effect.
Explaining this in terms of cultural differences, she went on to suggest that
Deci and Ryan’s (1995) self-determination theory may be of wider application
than a simplistic intrinsic motivation principle.
Heinzen (1994) has also divided creative behaviors into the intrinsically and
extrinsically motivated, associating the former with positive affect and spread-
ing cognitive activation, in which multiple ideas, consequences, and benefits are
quickly surveyed and assessed. This theoretical approach accounts for the supe-
rior creativity of intrinsically motivated behaviors. Clearly, speed is not essen-
tial to creativity. Another effect of personal interest in a project may be that the
creator is willing to work on it over a longer period, and it may be allowed to
mature in an unconscious “incubation” (Wallas, 1926) phase where unexpected
associations can occur. More exactly, it may be that equally good associations
are made both consciously and unconsciously, but that the latter are more
accessible when needed later (Zhong, Dijksterhuis, & Galinsky, 2008).
Ochse (1990) argued that the intrinsic motivation principle may apply
better in the laboratory than in the real world. Extrinsic rewards offered by
experimenters are merely short-term satisfactions such as praise and privi-
leges, and the subjects are usually unexceptional people who engage in the
research for extrinsic reasons. Ochse cautions that one should be wary of
using the conclusions to explain the stubborn labor of habitual creators.
 Creativity and Motivation 473

Csikszentmihalyi (1996) recognized the role of both intrinsic and extrin-

sic factors. He described “exotelic” and “autotelic” creative activities in terms
that clearly identified them with extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. “Most
things in life are exotelic. We do them not because we enjoy them but in
order to get at some later goal” (1996, p. 113). Autotelic activities are those
performed for their own sake, and are characteristic of the “flow” state. Some
activities can be both exotelic and autotelic, such as the behavior of people
who earn their living by activities they can perform in flow. Some creative
workers report achieving the flow state frequently (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996;
Perry, 1999).
Keller and Bless (2008) proposed that flow is a subclass of the “regulatory
compatibility” experience. A balance between personal characteristics (such
as, skill and habitual goal orientation) and structural and environmental influ-
ences (such as, task demands, incentives, and availability of distinct means)
results in regulatory compatibility. This is an enjoyable experience to which
individuals are willing to devote time and that they are inclined to repeat.

Operant and Behavioral Views

Creativity is not always inhibited by extrinsic factors such as rewards.
Behavioral and operant views demonstrate that creativity and its correlates
can in fact benefit from extrinsic incentive and reward. The behavioral view
often rejects creativity as a legitimate topic and refers to the lack of opera-
tional definition (Epstein, 1990; Skinner, 1939). Yet, it also describes extrinsic
ways of motivating operant behaviors that are related to creativity. For exam-
ple, people display unusual behaviors from time to time, and the environ-
ment rewards those that are desirable. This happens with creative actions in
the same way as with any other behaviors. For Skinner, the creator’s behavior
comes to be shaped toward producing things of beauty, and creative thinking
is largely concerned with the production of desirable behavioral “mutations”
(Skinner, 1972, p. 114). Others have looked to the basis of creative behavior,
including novel behavior (Pryor, Hoag, & O’Reilly, 1969; Stokes, in press) or
insight (Epstein, 1990). This is quite interesting because it demonstrates that
even though original behaviors are by definition unpredictable and new, they
can be shaped and controlled by contingencies. What is shaped is actually the
tendency to do something that has never been done before (Ryan & Winson,
1978; Stokes, 2003; Stokes & Balsam, 2003). The individual is shaped and
receives reinforcement when she or he displays a specific operant behavior
that has not been emitted previously. This is the operant view of originality–
novelty (Goetz & Baer, 1973; Holman, Goetz, & Baer, 1977).
474 Runco & McGarva

The operant approach is in direct contrast to the view that there is an innate
talent. It also has difficulty explaining how people create their first works with
minimal encouragement (Abra, 1988). Skinner himself suggested that there
may be a reinforcement history that can explain why a “starving artist” con-
tinues to create even when rewards are seemingly absent. Skinner (1972) also
acknowledged that individuals can give themselves intrinsic reinforcement
(such as by thinking approving thoughts), provided that this itself is a trained
response.
Epstein (1990) investigated the possibility that reinforcement can restrict
one’s range of behavior rather than foster variation. He attempted to explain
how mutations occur. His Generativity Theory suggests that new behav-
iors always emerge from the interconnection or integration of old ones, in
ways which can be predicted, manipulated, and taught (Epstein, 1991). In a
recent study (Epstein, Schmidt, & Warfel, 2008), training such competencies
improved test scores and led to a significant increase in creative output.

Personal Creativity
Much of the research cited above examined creative products. This is actu-
ally true of the entire field of creative studies; as of late, there is a tendency to
focus on products and relegate creative processes. When college students are
employed in research, products such as poems or collages are assessed. When
unambiguously creative persons are studied, their productivity (e.g., inven-
tions, paintings, publications) are counted. This all makes for highly objective
research, but it means that findings – including those concerning motivation
and creativity – may not apply to everyday creativity and creative efforts that
do not lead to a product.
There is good reason to postulate a strong tie between the creative process
and intrinsic motivation. This follows most recently from Runco’s (1995, 1996,
2011a) theory of personal creativity and older theories of cognitive develop-
ment (Piaget, 1970). The theory of personal creativity was in fact proposed in
response to the same product bias that was just described. It posits that cre-
ative products, be they everyday insights and solutions or world class break-
throughs, must begin with an original interpretation of experience. This is
something each of us can do, and we do it regularly. We do not, however,
construct original interpretations unless we need to do so. It is easier, and
often entirely effective, to rely on experience, assumption, and routine, and
thus to use the same old solution or interpretation we always have. We can,
however, if motivated to do so, put the effort into constructing a new inter-
pretation. In fact, it may be that this is a critical individual difference that
 Creativity and Motivation 475

might predict creative accomplishment; some people may be more likely than
others to construct original interpretations.
Two of the claims above are quite important. The first is that everyone
shares the capacity to construct original interpretations. This in turn implies
that the capacity for personal creativity is widely distributed; it is not some-
thing only the highly talented possess. The second claim is that the capacity
for creativity – again, the capacity to construct original interpretations – is
not used unless the individual is motivated to do so. This is where cognitive
developmental theory comes in. Piaget (1970), for example, put great weight
on the importance of assimilation. It works along with accommodation when
an individual adapts to his or her environment. Assimilation occurs when
information is altered, as needed, in order to fit with existing structures and
understandings. Accommodation, on the other hand, occurs when structures
change in order to take new information into account. Accommodation may
be at work when there is an a-ha moment or insight; as such, it may play a role
in some creative accomplishment (Gruber, 1981). Assimilation, on the other
hand, plays a large role in imagination. It allows the person to transcend real-
ity, even if briefly. It is also a synonym for personal interpretation.
What is most relevant is Piaget’s idea (1976, 1981) that humans are biolog-
ically predisposed to understand their experiences – to develop and adapt.
His theory was best labeled genetic epistemology precisely for this reason.
Further, he argued that we are motivated to adapt, to understand. For Piaget,
intrinsic motivation is a natural by-product or interaction with the environ-
ment. Whenever an individual encounters something he or she does not
understand, there is an interest in assimilating, then accommodating, and in
developing a new understanding.
What we have, then, is an explanation for why individuals person might be
intrinsically interested in constructing new interpretations. They are simply
reacting to situations that allow or even call for adaptation. That adaptation
may benefit from assimilation – that is, interpretation – and the interpreta-
tion may be original.
Creativity is not synonymous with adaptability. I touched on this elsewhere:
Many human behaviors–and especially those of older and mature individuals – are
directed towards the conservation of resources (e.g., energy), and thus towards effi-
ciency. We develop routines, for example, to make our lives easier. Creative behav-
ior is typically very different. Frequently creative inventions make our lives easier,
but the discovery of the necessary technologies may require a huge amount of effort
and avoidance of routine. Creative behavior is not necessarily efficient behavior, nor
even always adaptive . . . and the motivations to act in a creative fashion or develop
competencies for creative work are similarly unique. (Runco, 2005b)
476 Runco & McGarva

Indeed, sometimes it is most adaptive to conform and sit into some social situ-
ation, rather than impose an original action. Further, creative behavior is some-
times clearly maladaptive, at least for the individual. Consider in this regard the
costs to creativity, health, or social acceptance. (Ludwig, 1995)

A second point to underscore is that originality does not work in isolation.

Creative things are more than simply original. They are also useful, effec-
tive, or somehow fitting. These two may require motivation, especially in the
case where the original insight requires refinement or revision. These, too,
may require time and effort, in which case motivation is required. No won-
der so many theories of creative accomplishment point to determination and
persistence.
The theory of personal creativity also emphasizes the intentions for cre-
ative effort. These are indicatives of creative motivation. Personal creativity
was defined such that three things are involved: original interpretations, dis-
cretion (knowing when to be creative and when to conform), and intentions.
The last of these are named, rather than motivation, in order to emphasize
the conscious control they assume. Sometimes our motivation results from
things beyond our immediate awareness, but intentions are under our con-
trol. They fit nicely with the large body of research demonstrating that crea-
tive persons are frequently very tactical and strategic (Mumford, Baughman,
& Sager, 2003; Root-Bernstein, 1988; Runco, 2011b) for the creative acts are
by definition intentional. Creative accomplishment is often designed, inten-
tional, a result of strategic effort.
Not all creative behavior is strategic and by design, however. Some result
from playfulness, and thus indirectly; some is accidental, as evidenced by the
role of serendipity (Díaz de Chumaceiro, 2004; Hofstadter, 1986). The creativ-
ity that results from disturbance, cited previously, would fit under the unin-
tentional category, as well. For reasons such as this, one conclusion about
motivation and creativity is that there are different paths to creative perfor-
mance. With that in mind, we turn to the summary and conclusions.
In fact, it could be concluded that creativity is embedded within a rich moti-
vational network. Nevertheless, as was shown in my earlier extensive review
of motivation and creativity (Runco, 2007), the motivation for creativity is
very specific. A high level of motivation for competency or achievement, for
example, will not necessarily lead the person to develop creative skills and do
high-level creative work. This point was supported by at least one fairly recent
empirical study, which also assumed that motivation was a reflection of per-
sonality. Earlier in this chapter we mentioned that some of the earliest stud-
ies of creativity, at IPAR, used a personality approach, then we turned to the
 Creativity and Motivation 477

more rigorous experimental studies of intrinsic motivation. There are recent

personality studies of creativity, however. In one of them, Albert and Runco
(2006) found a clear separation of individual achievement motives and social
achievement motives. They had administered the California Psychological
Inventory (CPI) to exceptionally gifted boys and their parents. The CPI has
a scale labeled “achievement through independence.” The participants in this
research had much higher scores than the norms on the achievement through
independence scale of the CPI. At least as important, the participants had sig-
nificantly lower scores than the normative groups on the “achievement via
conformity” scale! This says something about the motivation specifically for
creative work, and it makes perfect sense that the focus is on achievement
through independence. We say that because independence is one of the core
characteristics of creative persons. It is seen in their personality but also in
their thinking (its divergence and uniqueness) and their actions. Also, it is
implied by any originality. Runco (2007) put it this way: “It is difficult to be
creative without being independent. That is because creativity requires origi-
nality, and originality can be found through independent thoughts and actions.
Originality cannot be found through conformity. As a matter of fact, original-
ity is just about the opposite from normative” (p. 609). Gough and Bradley
(1996) also pointed specifically to the Achievement Through Independence
scale of the CPI as related to creativity. They found it to be correlated with
performances on the Barron Welsh Art Scale.

Summary and Conclusions

Creativity is a theme that has sparked the interest of psychologists and other
behavioral scientists for many decades. There is barely a discipline in psychol-
ogy, including dynamic approaches and the behaviorist schools, that has not
tried to answer the question “Why do people create?” This chapter has shown
that creativity has multiple links with motivation in a variety of forms, rang-
ing from drives, needs on various levels, emotions, attitudes, and cognitions
down to personality traits or predispositions and specific learned behaviors.
There certainly are diverse perspectives on the relationship of motivation
and creativity. That is especially true if we recognize that creativity is related
to independence, originality, and insight, and moreover, is always distinct
from conformity, conventionality, and the like. Someone highly motivated to
get along with others will have greater difficulty being creative than someone
who is interested in being a unique person. Yet being a contrarian does not
guarantee creativity, either.
478 Runco & McGarva

One thing may not have jumped out of the review presented above: moti-
vation is not simply an affective influence on creativity. It is more than emo-
tion. It is also related to thinking and cognition. This may be clearest in the
theory of personal creativity. Recall that the intrinsic motivation to construct
original interpretations resulted from the inborn drive to understand as well
as the lack of understanding. Ideas and insights, in this light, are constructed
to facilitate adaptation. Some of them might be elaborated and eventually
creative. What is most relevant here is that the motivation is a result of the
cognitive predicament. There is, in that light, a process that requires both
affect and cognition. Admittedly, there is some debate over which comes first,
the affect or the cognition (Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b; Zajonc, 1980), but to us it
seems most realistic to accept the fact that humans are complicated; we have
emotions and thoughts. We might attempt to delineate them and argue which
is first, but in fact they work together. They are both a part of what it means
to be human, and they both play a role in creative efforts.

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 Index

abilities, 62–63, 71–72, 132 brain activation, 105

cognitive abilities, 70, 72 central executive, 106
self attribution of ability, 65 EEG desynchronisation, 102
spatial abilities, 65 effects on performance effectiveness, 102
abstract language. 20. See also abstract terms; inhibition function, 105
abstractness performance effectiveness, 106
academic performance, 100 prefrontal activity, 103
achievement, 52, 63, 96 processing efficiency, 103, 106
action plans, 125 shifting function, 104–106
action programs, 115 updating and monitoring function, 106
addiction. See psychopathology worry, 99
adolescence, 65 appetitive reactions, 143
adulthood, 65, 70 arousal, 18, 68, 112, 116, 123, 137
affect, 76, 78, 152, 316, 356. See also emotion global state of arousal, 120
Task x person level, 386 art, 71
Affective Neuroscience, 112, 127 Asians, 161
affectively laden stimuli, 69 attention, 68–69
affordances, 130 pain, 250
age, 33 attentional control, 102
aggregation, 63 anxiety, 98
aggression, 148 attitudes, 79, 394
AI research, 141 attributions, 166
analogy, 51 group attributions, 165, 167
anger or distress individual attributions, 165, 167
ambiguous information, 456 Australian aborigines, 346
animals autocracy. See autocratic group structure
cats, 148 autocratic group structure, 24
finches. See mammals aversive reactions. See appetitive reactions
inner world, 186–187
invertebrates, 145, 181 bees, 124
monkeys. See mammals behavior, 78
anthropomorphism, 116, 129 animal behavior, 150
antisaccade task, 104 appetitive behavior, 118, 124, 146, 148.
anxiety, 63 See appetitive reactions
adverse effects on performance, 100 autonomous activity, 185
attentional control, 103 behavior programs, 125

483
484 Index

behavior (cont.) organismic biology, 173, 179

behavioral flexibility, 145 reafference, 183
behavioral schemes, 140 bodily homeostasis, 124
biased behavior, 314 body maps, 120
concrete motor behavior, 150 brain, 77, 215
fight or flight, 148 ability, 219
goal directed behavior, 77, 82, 88, 142 amygdala, 78
instinctive behaviors, 276 anxiety, 227
kinesis behavior, 141 apathic mesial frontal syndrome, 88
meternal behavior, 122 brain activating systems, 109
motor activities, 147 brain activation, 102–103
multi purpose activities, 147 brain activity, 219–220
play, 148 brain functioning, 217
prototypic behaviors, 160 brain injury, 81–82, 84
public speaking, 203 cell assembly, 224. See Hebb synapse
sensorimotor action, 150 central nervous system, 215
smoking habit, 203 centromedial cortical regions, 120
superstitious behavior, 289 cingular opercular component, 77
survival oriented behaviors, 115 cortical neurons, 215
survival promoting behaviors, 110 Default Network, 460
behavioral programs, 138, 146 dysexecutive dorsal convexity syndrome, 88
behaviorism, 111, 115, 129 EEG, 102, 218
belief, 162 electrical brain stimulation, 112
belief in progress, 162 electroencephalography (EEG), 216
changes, 162 emotional brains, 129
cyclical changes, 162 episodic memory, 217
yin and yang, 162 Extended Reticular Activating System, 119
beliefs, 15 fMRI, 219, 459
control and agency beliefs, 387 frontal lobe injury, 82
meanings, 438 fronto parietal component, 77
system of beliefs, 167 Functional magnetic resonance imaging
bias, 289, 297 (fMRI), 218
cognitive bias, 290, 295–296, 299 giftedness, 222
motivational bias, 295 hippocampus, 146
bicultural individuals, 166 hypothalamic corridor, 118
biological organization, 140 hypothalamus, 118–119, 122
biology, 173–174 impulsiveness, 227
autonomous rhythmicity, 182 information processing, 217
chemical mechanisms, 180 insula, 78
chemical processes. See chemical intelligence, 220
mechanisms mammalian limbic system, 124
compensatory reactions, 183 mesocortical innervation, 123
Darwinian biology, 178–179 mind wandering, 460
diffusion and dissolution, 180 MRI, 218
energy conversion, 183 muskuloskeletal body, 120
evolutionary biology, 411 near infrared spectroscopy (NIRS), 219
gene expression, 177 neocortex, 215–216
locomotor apparatus, 181 neocortical layers, 130
mechanistic interpretation, 176 neocortical neurons, 216
molecular biology, 182 neural efficiency theory, 221
molecules, 178 neuroaxis, 115
morphogenesis, 178 NIRS, 219
 Index 485

nucleus accumbens and ventral central coordinating part

pallidum, 119 fluctuating central state, 146
orbitofrontal cortex, 78 central nervous system
orbitofrontal injury, 82 sleep, 239
pain circuits, 114 change
parietal structures, 80 confuscian theory of change, 163
periaqueductal gray (PAG), 120 phylogenetic change, 179
personality traits, 219 trajectory of change, 162
PET, 218–219 unexpected events, 162
PET scanning, 459 chess, 345
prefrontal component, 77 DEEP BLUE, 345
prefrontal cortex, 78, 102–103 representations of chess positions, 282
prefrontal injury, 81 childhood, 67
prefrontal structures, 80, 84, 86 chinese undergraduates, 162
semantic memory, 217 chronic pain
social brains, 132 attention deficits, 249
stimulus independent thought, 460 memory, 249
striatum, 80 speed, 249
subcortical cortical network, 78 CO approach. See cognitive orientation
subcortical regions, 113 CO of creativity
temporal lobe, 78 themes of CO of creativity, 47
thalamus, 118 CO theory. See meaning
the behavioral activation system cognition, xii–1, 32, 72, 76–77, 79, 129, 131–132,
(BAS), 227 134, 141, 173–174, 192, 202
the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), 227 abstract concepts, 334
triune brain, 124 abstract or concrete approach, 54
ventral pallidum, 80 accomodation, 475
ventral tegmental area (VTA), 119 acute pain, 241
ventral tegmental area to the nucleus acute states of disease, 241
accubens, 118 aerobic health and exercise, 238
visceral body, 120 affect. See emotions
visual cortex, 78 algorithms, 325
brain activation applying knowledge, 192
memory retrieval, 229 assimilation, 475
brain activity attention, 77, 79–80, 83–85, 87, 123, 146,
attention processes, 229 152, 203
brain arousal, 225 attentional bias, 98
computer game, 225 attentional control, 101–103
diabetes, 241 attentional control theory, 97, 105
effects of pain, 250 attentional networks, 77
episodic memory, 225 autobiographical memory, 82
learning, 224 autoregulative processes, 138
Mozart’s music, 224 avoidance cognitive mechanisms, 302
pattern of ERD/ERS, 221 brain, 32
personality traits, 225 causal judgements, 167
spatial memory, 225 causal mechanisms, 326
brain efficiency theory central executive, 98
brain ability relationship, 230 CO cluster, 54
brain function cognition and emotion, 85–86
creativity, 222 cognition subserves emotion, 84
BrainMind. See MindBrain cognitions, 151
BrainMindBody. See BrainMind; MindBrain cognitive act, 33–34
486 Index

cognition (cont.) dual system process, 302

cognitive activities, 143, 146, 150 effective causality, 332
cognitive acts, 35 embodied cognition, 240
cognitive appraisals, 112 embodied concepts, 335
cognitive associations, 147 emotion, 454
cognitive complaints, 249 emotional cognition, 78
cognitive contents, 34 ephemeral aspects, 210
cognitive deficits, 253. See also cognitive episodic memory, 453
impairments episodic working memory, 124, 128
cognitive deliberation, 159 evaluating preferences, 192
cognitive determinants, 53 evaluations, 152
cognitive developmental theory, 475 evolution of the cognition apparatus, 176
cognitive effort, 70 evolutionary origins, 131
cognitive flexibility, 80 executive functioning, 100
cognitive functioning, 64 executive functions, 77, 83, 106
cognitive functions, 137, 243 expertise, 339
cognitive impairment, 81, 87, 241 fantasies, 453
cognitive linguistics, 411 fear logic, 152
cognitive load, 166, 220 flexibility, 148, 322
cognitive performance, 54, 83 folk psychological concepts, 331
cognitive processes, 34, 152 formal system, 327
cognitive processing, 69, 72, 80, 124, 127, 450 future oriented mentation, 462
cognitive programs, 54 gain of information, 141
cognitive programs of curiosity, 52 gain of knowledge, 139
cognitive representations, 158 gender based differences, 227
cognitive revolution, 274, 321, 329, 450 gene expression, 193
cognitive science, 1, 330–331 gene identification, 212
cognitive styles, 72 genetic differences drive the experiences, 211
cognitive system, 53–54, 77, 127 genetic influences, 192, 205, 211
cognitive tasks, 77 good health in adulthood, 238
combinational creativity, 282 group differences, 158
complex information processing, 274 heritability, 192
comprehension of affective sentences, 82 if, then, 332
computer models, 274 imagery, 450
conceptual metaphor, 410 imagination, 146, 454
concrete senso motor processes. imaginative dimension, 457
See development impact of the disease, 240
conscious deliberations, 152 impaired mental health, 239
consciousness, 117–118, 123, 125, 138–139 inferences, 160, 326
constituent of motivation, 33 information, 142
coronary health in middle age, 238 information processing, 332
creating narrative, 454 information processing system, 275
creative thinking, 276, 282, 410, 462 inhibition function, 98, 104
cultural cognition, 158, 168 intellectually stimulating activities, 206
cultural differences, 158 intelligence, 130, 205, 208
curiosity, 148, 207 intuition, 298, 334
daydreaming, 275, 454, 461–462 intuitive thinking, 291
daydreams, 453 judgment, 165, 290
decision making, 77, 79, 113, 129, 144, 290, judgments about severity of situations, 54
298, 307, 329, 342 level of organic processes, 139
decision processes, 152 medical treatments, 240
dreams, 461 memory, 77, 79, 106, 122, 341
 Index 487

memory programs, 124 stereotyping, 293

mental activity, 186 symbolic behavior, 149
mental mapping, 308 symbolic memory, 127
mental rehearsal, 457 symbols, 138, 149–151
mental representations, 151 the phonological loop, 97
mental retardation, 212 theory of mind, 458, 460–461
metacognition, 396 thinking, 124, 130, 174, 275
metonymy, 410 thinking and cognizing, 132
modern evolutionary theory, 176 thought sampling, 460, 463
monotonic inferencing, 410 transformational creativity, 282
motivation, 33, 335 updating function, 98
motivations, 137, 323 verbal memory, 87
nonconscious non explicit level, 388 verbal working memory, 100
normative rational models, 291 visual images, 131
normative reasoning, 298 well defined problems, 276
nutrition, 239 working memory, 97, 99–101, 126
organized verbal schemas, 453 cognitive act
orientation to the possible, 453 motivation, 56
patterns of cognition, 204 cognitive acts. See also mental action
performance effectiveness, 97, 101–102 CO clusters, 58
personal experience/expertise, 338 predicting cognitive acts, 45
perspective taking, 461 themes, 45
phonological loop, 100 cognitive complaints
physical effects, 240 chronic pain patients, 249
planning, 33, 43, 124 cognitive deficits
playing chess, 274 after pregnancy, 253
Polygenic traits, 210 cognitive functioning
pre cognitive operations, 131 anxiety, 257
precision of measurement, 210 bio psychological data, 258
predicting cognitive acts, 42 cortisol, 246
problem solving, 130–131, 150, 220, 273, denial, 257
290, 462 depression, 257
processing capacity, 101 estrogen and progesterone levels, 254
processing efficiency, 97, 101–102 facilitatory effects of cortisol, 247
processing efficiency theory, 97, 100 gonadal hormones, 247
processing information, 192, 331 health psychology, 258
programs, 275 homone replacement therapy, 247
psychopathological cognition, 258 inhibiting effects of cortisol, 247
rational system, 315 menstruation, 254
rational thinking, 291 mental state, 258
rationality, 149, 152 physical disorders, 257
reason, 326 preoccupation with the disease, 257
reasoning, 71, 290 sleep, 254
reasoning ability, 56 states and processes in the brain, 258
schemas, 452, 455, 458 worry, 257
scripts, 452 cognitive functions
shifting function, 98, 104 type 2, diabetes. See diabetes
sleep, 239 cognitive heuristics
social cognition, 78, 450 anchoring and adjustment, 300
social intelligence, 132 cognitive impairment
spatial working memory, 100 age related macular degeneration, 252
states of consciousness, 54–55, 57 allergic rhinitis, 245
488 Index

cognitive impairment (cont.) pregnancy, 253

Alzheimer’s disease, 241 psoriasis, 251
anemia, 244 renal failure, 244
antihistamins, 256 risk factors or correlates of cardiovascular
antihypertensive medication, 256 disorders, 242
asthma, 245 sensory disabilities, 252
blindness, 252 statins, 256
brain tumors, 241 stemcell transplantation, 247
breast cancer, 247 stroke, 241
cancer types that directly involve subclinical hypothyroidism, 246
the CNS, 247 surgery with general anesthesia, 255
cardiac surgery, 255 tinnitus, 253
cardiovascular disease, 242 treatments of cancer, 255
celiac disease, 244 cognitive motivational factors
chemotherapy, 247, 256 four belief types. See also giftedness
cholesterol, 242 cognitive or intellectual abilities, 63
chronic lung disease, 245 cognitive orientation. 35. See also CO model;
chronic pain, 249. See also pain CO theory; CO approach
COPD, 245 behavioral intent, 39
coronary heart disease, 242 behavioral program, 35, 40, 43
cushing disease, 246 beliefs, 39–40, 45, 52
decresed motivation and interest of chronic beliefs about goals, 39, 41, 43
pain patients, 251 beliefs about norms, 39, 41, 43
dementia, 241 beliefs about others and reality. See general
diabetes mellitus, 243 beliefs
diseases that affect the brain, 241 beliefs about self, 39, 41, 43
drugs with anticholinergic properties, 256 changing beliefs, 439
elevated blood pressure, 243 CO cluster for cognition, 42
epilepsy, 241, 248 CO clusters, 39, 52, 55–58
fibromyalgia, 251 CO clusters for cognitive functions, 57
haptic deficits, 253 CO clusters for different kinds of thinking, 57
hearing loss, 252 CO clusters for specific cognitive
heart failure, 242 functions, 42
Helicobacter pylori, 244 CO clusters for specific domains of
Huntington disease, 241 thinking, 42
hypothyroidism, 246 CO for a specific cognitive act, 57
infections with HSV-1 and the COMT CO for cognition, 57
Val158Val genotype, 251 CO for specific domains of contents, 57
irritable bowel syndrome, 244 CO model, 38
lyme disease, 248 CO model of cognitive functioning, 58
major depression, 246 CO of analytical thinking, 55
medical treatments, 255 CO of chaotic thinking, 50
multiple sclerosis, 248 CO of chess playing, 49
obstructive pulmonary disease, 245 CO of clinical or experimental
olfactory sense, 253 psychology, 49
overweight, 254 CO of clinical psychology, 49
pain, 248 CO of creativity, 47–48, 55
pain intensity, 250 CO of curiosity, 46
Parkinson’s disease, 241 CO of experimental psychology, 49
pollen allergic people, 245 CO of intolerance of ambiguity, 50
poor kidney function. See renal failure CO of intuitive thinking, 48, 55
post operative cognitive dysfunction, 255 CO of inventiveness, 48
 Index 489

CO of mathematics, 49 cognitive processing

CO of memory, 47 abilities, 387
CO of ordered thinking, 55 knowledge, 387
CO of planning, 49 metacognition, 387
CO of rigidity, 50 cognitive sciences, 137, 323, 325
CO of specific cognitive acts, 49 cognitive styles, 52, 56
CO questionnaire, 43–45, 58 cognitive traits
CO questionnaire of cognition, 46 cognitive engagement, 63
CO questionnaires for cognitive styles, 50 cognitive/intellectual abilities, 65
CO questionnaires of specific domains of cogniton
contents, 48 cognitive processes, 131
cognitive acts, 35, 41 cognitive revolution, 137
cognitive orientation model of cognitive collative variables, 360
acts, 57 collectivism, 168
cognitive programs, 42, 51, 55–58 command emotional systems
four stages, 37 SEEKING. See SEEKING
general beliefs, 39, 43 SEEKING system, 119. See SEEKING
input identification, 41 communication, 328, 343, 369
motivational disposition, 35, 38, 40, 42–43, acoustic system of communication, 346
50, 52, 55–57 communicative systems, 410
orientativeness of the beliefs, 39 semiotic systems, 414
predicting a cognitive act, 57 computationalism, 324, 331, 333
predicting behaviors, 42 conditioned response, 39
prediction procedure, 44 conflict, 27
program conflict, 41 conflict situations
programs for implementing cognitive acts, 52 reconciliation of contradictions, 163
programs in the cognitive sphere, 50 confucian societies, 161
self development, 443 consciousness, 34, 144, 174, 176, 450
themes, 43 affective consciousness, 119, 128
themes for cognitive acts, 45 assignment of meaning, 452
themes of CO of cognition, 46 autonoetic consciousness, 128
cognitive orientation (CO), 35 body mechanism operation, 452
cognitive orientation of giftedness channel capacity, 452
acting under uncertainty, 443 cognition, 451
contribution to society, 443 cognitive orientation, 451
demanding from oneself, 443 cognitive orientation system, 452
freedom in acting, 443 conscious awareness, 130, 462
inner directedness, 443 conscious imagery, 464
inner world, 443 conscious sequences, 453
non functionality, 444 dreams, 450
one’s own uniqueness, 443 global state of consciousness, 119
restricted openness to the environment, 443 higher order consciousness, 127
self expression, 444 imagery modalities, 452
cognitive orientation theory information processing, 451
beliefs about self, 438 inner speech, 452
general beliefs, 438 ongoing consciousness, 451
goal beliefs, 438 perceptual consciousness, 452
motivationally relevant cognitions, 438 physical manifestation, 451
norm beliefs, 438 primary consciousness, 127
cognitive processes reflective processing, 451
emotional motivational bases, 137 self directed consciousness, 456
neocortical functions, 137 stream of consciousness, 451–452
490 Index

consciousness (cont.) existential crises, 469

theater model, 452 exotelic and autotelic, 473
unconscious processes, 130 extrinsic constraint, 471
unconsciousness, 451 extrinsic incentive and reward, 473
visual imagery, 452 flow, 473
working memory, 452 generativity theory, 474
consensus implies correctness heuristic, 23 humanistic perspective, 470
constructive realism, 173 inborn drive to understand, 478
contrast effects, 166 independence, 477
control of cognition insight, 475
deliberate regulation of cognition, 389 intentions for creative effort, 476
deliberate use of cognitive strategies, 389 intrinsic motivation, 470
coping strategies, 85 intrinsic orientation, 471
creative thinking intrinsic reinforcement, 474
Alternative Uses task, 284 mood disorders, 469
external incentives, 284 motivation for creativity is very specific, 476
extrinsic motivation, 283, 285 motivational tendencies, 468
incentive effects, 284 multiple links with motivation, 477
insight problems, 284 needs, 477
intrinsic motivation, 283, 285 original interpretation of experience, 474
regression in the service of the ego, 283 original interpretations, 476
reinforcement, 284 originality, 470, 476–477
creativity, 57 personal creativity, 474
achievement through conformity, 477 personality approach, 476
achievement through independence, 477 personality traits, 477
adaptability, 475 playfulness, 476
aha moment, 475 psychoeconomic theory, 471
alcohol, 469 psychological health, 470
anxiety, 468 psychopathology, 468–469
attitudes, 477 psychosis, 468
behavioral view, 473 right hemispheric process, 222
being needs, 470 self destructive acts, 469
brain correlates, 223 self determination, 471
childhood abuse, 469 self determination theory, 472
cognition, 478 serendipidity, 476
cognitive orientation, 444 speed, 472
cognitive orientation question of stable intrinsic motivation, 472
creativity, 444 strategic effort, 476
combining unrelated structures, 222 substance use, 469
controlled by contingencies, 473 the operant view, 473
conventionality, 477 unconscious incubation, 472
deficiency, 470 unconventionality, 470
depression, 468–469 underlying conflicts, 470
determination and persistence, 476 wide interests, 470
discretion, 476 wish fulfillment, 468
drive for self actualization, 470 culture, 151–152, 158–159, 339
drives, 477 American culture, 165
EEG, 223 Chinese culture, 165
ego strength, 468 cognitive consequences, 168
emotions, 477–478 cognitive effects, 158–159
everyday creativity, 474 cognitive traits, 158, 168
 Index 491

cultural context, 173 regret, 313

cultural development, 188 risk avoidance, 311
cultural differences, 472 SEU theory, 314
cultural evolution, 346–347 social psychological motives, 317
cultural factors, 175 structural theories, 311
cultural frames, 165 Subjective Expected utility (SEU)
cultural icons, 165 model, 309
cultural identities, 166 Subjective Expected Utility (SEU)
cultural psychology, 322 theory, 310
cultural worldviews, 167–168 Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, 311–312
culture priming, 166 declarative knowledge, 51
different norms, 163 deep underlying meanings. See deeper layer
home culture, 167 meanings
host culture, 167 Default Network
Indonesian culture, 168 self focus, 461
knowledge items, 164 self relevant stimuli, 460
motivational structure, 163 temporal lobe, 460
cybernetics, 274 Default Network system
longterm memories, 464
DA. 125. See dopamine defined problems
DA activity. See dopamine forward search, 276
daydreaming, 40 denial, 302
personality correlates, 462 depression
decision making frontal lobe dysfunction, 83
acceptable solutions, 323 development, 64, 79
anticipated emotions, 316 affective development, 457
bolstering, 313 brain development, 458
cognitive dissonance, 312 intelligence, 207
cognitive prototype gestalt factors, 313 neural development, 122
decision conflict, 313 ontogenetical development, 182
Decision Support Systems (DSS), 321 ontogeny, 149, 152
Diff Con theory, 313 phylogenetic and ontogenetic
Expected Value (EV) theory, 309 development, 141
four different kinds of decisions, 309 phylogenetic development, 148
goals, 315 sensorimotor period, 150
level 1, 309 social development, 456
level 2, 309 development of interest
level 3, 309 phase of emerging individual interest, 371
level 4, 309 diseases
MAUT model, 311 akinesias, 123
motivating differentiation and consolidation Alzheimer’s, 461
processes, 313 autism, 461
motivations, 311, 315 coping mechanisms, 240
multiattribute utility theory (MAUT), 310 emotional reactions, 240
need for cognition, 311 Huntington’s Disease. See also genetics
need for cognitive closure, 311 life style changes, 240
personal involvement, 309 mental diseases, 211
plan, 315 mental illness, 469
post decision processes, 312 Parkinson’s disease, 122
process theories, 311 schizophrenia, 461
psychological stress, 313 distraction, 103
492 Index

dopamine, 109, 118–119, 121, 126, 133 emotional experience, 455

anticipation of rewards, 124 emotional impairments, 83
DA pathways, 121 emotional motor expression, 115
DA receptors, 121 emotional stimuli, 78, 82
excitatory and inhibitory functions, 122 experience, 127
mesocortical mesolimbic (MLMC) facial expression, 104
pathways, 123 fear terror, 455
mesocortical pathway, 123–124 feeling tone, 145
mesocortical system, 126 homeostasis, 142
mesolimbic pathway, 124 interest excitement, 455
movement. See movements joy, 455
Nigrostriatal Pathway, 122 motivational role, 454
planning, 123 negative emotions, 55, 78
receptor sites, 121 overconfidence, 299–300
reward, 122 pleasure, 147
temporal organization, 123 positive affect, 55, 116
Turberoinfundibular pathway, 122 sadness-distress, 455
drive pressures, 455 setting production function, 55
dual task co-ordination, 107 shame humiliation-guilt, 455
dual task design, 100 social feeling, 123
dual task paradigm, 99 emotion command systems
psychobehavioral integrative system, 124
ecology, 177 SEEKING, 122, 124–126
economic success, 322 emotion motivation cognition enteractions
Edelma, Gerald, 127–128 kinesis reaction, 141
education, 132 emotion motivation cognition
cognitive education, 131 interactions, 141
emotional education, 132 instincts and related primary emotions, 141
EEG taxis reaction, 141
DCM, 218 emotional command systems, 112.
ERP, 218 See also emotions; emotional
effort motivational command systems
cognitive effort, 70 CARE system, 114
electroencephalography FEAR system, 114
binding phenomenon, 217 LUST system, 114
event related desynchronization, 217 motor subroutines, 112
event related potentials (ERP), 217 neural systems criteria, 112
low resolution brain electromagnetic PANIC system, 114
tomography (LORETA), 217 PLAY, 113, 133
emotion, 1, 76–77, 79–80, 88, 115, 134, 141, 220, PLAY system, 114
316, See also affect RAGE system, 113
affective action state, 110 SEEKING, 113, 115–117, 120–122, 132–133
affective experience, 125 emotional intelligence
affective experiential states, 133 pattern of ERD/ERS, 222
anger, 455 emotional motivational command systems.
anticipatory affect, 122 See also emotion
anxiety, 56, 100, 102 SEEKING system, 109
control emotional expression, 455 emotionality, 453
effect of anxiety on processing efficiency, 97 emotions, 32, 33, 35, 37, 55, 113, 116, 143, 149–151,
emotion processing, 84 153, 163, 303, 341, See also emotional
emotional control, 78, 85 tendencies
emotional dysfunction, 81 adjunctive evaluative function, 55
 Index 493

affective experiences, 129 evolution of mental and cognitive

affective qualities, 151 abilities, 187
affective states, 68, 121 genotypes, 201
anxiety, 68, 114, 240 natural selection, 194
basic affects, 147 phenotypes, 201
core emotional feelings, 112 phenotypic changes, 202
emotional behaviors, 112 Evolutionary Epistemology, 138
emotional command systems, 127 evolutionary theories
emotional evaluations, 322 adaptation, 175
emotional experiences, 152 biological adaptation, 176
emotional networks, 112 competition, 175
emotive circuits, 144 Darwinian evolutionary theory, 175–176
emotive systems, 144 environmental pressures, 176
evaluation, 145 evolutionary changes, 178
executive systems, 144 genetic changes, 176
existential terror, 158, 167 natural selection, 175
fear of death, 167–168 selection by the environment, 177
feeling of confidence, 293 synthetic theory, 176–177
feeling of knowing, 293 techniques of breeders, 175
hope, 454 the fittest, 175
instinctual emotional behaviors, 129 the theory of organismic constructions, 179,
mood states, 69, 79 183–184
perception of emotions, 78 The Theory of Organismic
pleasure/pain spectrum, 120 Constructions, 178
primary emotions, 143–144 expertise
relative hierarchy of moods, 148 deliberate practise, 282
social emotions, 114, 118 sharing expertise, 323
states of consciousness, 55 explicit performative utterances
Task x Person level, 386 declarative tags, 423
trait anxiety, 386 exploration, 52
empathic civilization, 133 extraversion
empathy, 21 cortical arousal, 226
encephalography EEG, 226
dynamic causal modeling (DCM), 217 seeking or avoiding stimulation, 226
endocrine variables, 86
endogenous opioids, 119 facial expressions, 84
environment, 183–185, 192 fear
environmental press, 63, 71–73. extreme novelty, 456
See also situational press feedback, 401
epistemic motivation, 16 feelings, 63, 149, 151, 153, 340. See also emotions
epistemology, 174, 187 FFM
evolutionary epistemology, 177, 184 delta and theta band, 227
genetic epistemology, 475 flexibility, 64
ethics, 328 flow
ethology, 140, 144, 146, 148 regulatory compatibility experience, 473
innate releasing mechanisms, 140 freezing. See seizing and freezing
Euclidean geometry, 333 functional neuroimaging, 103
European Americans, 161
evaluation, 79 gender based differences
event related potentials, 103 brain activity, 228
evolution, 110, 122, 138, 140, 182, 199 emotional intelligence, 228
adaptationist view, 187 ERP latencies, 229
494 Index

gender based differences (cont.) monozygotic and dyzygotic twins, 196

event related gamma responses, 230 mutations, 195
intelligence, 228 natural selection, 194
NIRS, 230 population genetics, 194, 346
physiological parameters of cortical population variance, 201
activation, 229 recessive genes, 194
spatial ability, 228 SES parents, 207
verbal ability, 228 shared environmental influences, 205
visually and auditory evoked potentials, 229 statistical analysis, 199
visuo spatial ability, 228 twins, 204
General Systems Theory, 139 zygote, 196
dynamic equilibrium, 139 giftedness
regulative processes. See regulative activities achievement motivation, 442
genes, 193 asynchrony gap, 434
biological functions, 193 available incentives, 441
low activity MAOA allele, 200 chance, 440
short allele of the serotonin transporter, 200 chess music and mathematics, 223
Genetic Epistemology, 138 child as divergent, 440
genetics, 193 cognitive motivational correlates, 444
additive genetic affects, 197 cognitive motivational factors, 443
adoptees, 207 cognitive orientation of giftedness, 443
biological relatedness, 196 curiosity, 442
chromosomal heterozygotes, 200 educational opportunities, 440
chromosomes, 195 educational programs, 441
DNA, 195, 197 environmental catalyst, 440
dormant genetic variance, 202 environmental circumstances, 444
environmental control of genetic external environmental factors, 440
expression, 200 family atmosphere, 440
environmental influences, 204 feeling different, 442
environmental variance, 197 high moral standards, 442
epistatic affects, 196 independence, 442
fruit flies, 200 inner directedness, 445
gene alleles, 198 interests, 442
gene environment interactions, 201, 203 intrapersonal catalyst, 440
genes, 195, 197, 206, 208, 211–212 IQ, 434, 440
genetic diversity, 194 learning, 440
genetic influences, 204 mental age, 439
genetic loci, 194 motivation, 440
genetic polymorphisms, 210 motivational factors, 444
genetic variance, 196–197 natural abilities, 439
genetic variation, 199, 202 need for solitude, 442
heritability, 195–198, 202, 204, 211 non conformism, 442
heritability of viability, 200 openness to the environment and inner
heritable variations, 195 directedness, 444
individual differences, 200, 202, 211 organizational encouragement, 442
intelligence, 212 overload of stimulation, 443
law of independent assortment, 194 perfectionism, 442
law of segregation, 194 personality tendencies, 442–444
laws of inheritance, 194 psychological disorders, 443
measurement error, 198, 204 right hemisphere, 223
mendelian genetics, 194 risk taking, 442
molecular genetics, 210 self, 444
 Index 495

socioeconomic circumstances, 440–441 representativeness, 292–293

stigma, 441 take the first heuristic, 299
support provided by the family, 440 the evolutionary school, 298
talent, 440 warm glow heuristic, 293
tolerance for ambiguity, 442 homeostatic code, 142
underachievement, 441 host clause
goals, 34 communicative function, 421
goal hierarchy, 275 host clause verbs, 421
multiple goals, 275 humor. See also laughter
structural dimensions, 274 hypothalamic pituitary adrenocortical
supergoals, 274 system, 87
Test Operate Test Exit (TOTE) units, 274
grammatical functions imperative tags
benefactive, 412 condensed indirect speech act, 428
dative case, 413 metonymically linked, 424
meanings, 412 mitigating function, 427
group in group behaviors. 21. See in group
in group, 168 in group favoritism, 27
group norms, 25 individual differences, 62–64, 66, 71–72,
79–80, 96
habitual behavior, 33 individualism, 168
health, 71 industrial revolution, 162
health care, 70 information
heritability complexity, 454
narrow sense heritability, 197 contextual information, 160
trait, 210 pragmatic information, 412
heuristic, 51, 290–291, 294, 297, 300, 317 transmission of information, 346
activation of heuristics, 301 instinct, 144, 153. See also emotions
affect heuristic, 294 behavioral part, 147
affective heuristic, 316 central coordinating part, 145
anchoring, 292 innate releasing mechanism, 144
anti looping, 292 perceptive component, 144
availability, 292 intellectual activities, 70
bigger is better heuristic, 293 intelligence, 33, 62, 433, 445
choice tasks, 292 artificial intelligence, 329
choosing by default, 294 childhood, 209
choosing by liking, 294 cognitive habits and skills and
contagion heuristic, 292 knowledge, 207
diversification, 292 cognitive processes, 220
diversification heuristic, 295 cognitive skills, 433
efficient processes, 297 emotional intelligence, 220–221
epistemic motivation, 301 exceptionality, 433
hill climbing, 292 exploration, 208
illusion of control, 295 family environment, 209
juridical thinking, 293 genetic and shared environmental
language comprehension, 292 influences, 208
latency heuristic, 294 genetic influences, 205, 209
maladaptive results, 300 giftedness, 434
metacognitive processes, 293 heritability, 208
motivational heuristics, 296, 301–302 High ability, 220
planning, 292 information processing, 433
problem solving, 292 intelligence tests, 209, 433
496 Index

intelligence (cont.) sexual interest, 69

IQ, 433 shifts in focal attention, 358
IQ points, 207 situational interest, 353, 357, 360
learning ability, 433 skill development, 361
memory, 433 social interactions, 361
mental retardation, 434 stored knowledge, 362
parieto frontal integration (P-FIT) stored value, 362
model, 221 sustained engagement, 360
problem solving, 433 sustaining interest, 364
shared environmental influences, 209 talent development, 361
superior intellectual ability, 435 triggers of interest, 356
interest, 1, 67, 70, 116, 127, 352, 394 types of interest, 363
achievement goals, 361 uncertainty, 356
affect, 362 value, 358, 363
attention, 360 interest and excitement
cognition, 353, 357 explore the novelty, 456
cognitive processing, 358, 363 interest development
curiosity, 362 a well developed individual interest, 373
development of attention, 358 affect, 376
development of interest, 353, 370, 375 cognition, 357, 365, 367
dispositional interest, 386 curiosity questions, 369, 375
feelings, 362 developing expertise, 363
feelings of competence, 360 emerging individual, 364
fewer cognitive resources, 359 emerging individual interest, 369, 373
goal oriented, 364 four phases, 364
identity development, 361 heightened affect, 366
inquiry oriented science workshop, 356 interactions with others, 374
interest development, 356, 362, 365, 367, 369, interactions with the environment, 374
374–375 knowledge building, 376
interest generation, 364 learning environments, 372–373
interest object, 359 learning environmentss, 375–376
knowledge, 353, 358, 363 maintained situational, 364
learner attention, 352 maintained situational interest, 367–369, 373
learners processing, 353 personally meaningful topics, 367
learning environment, 363 support, 374
mastery goals, 360 triggered situational interest, 364–366, 373
meaning, 353 well developed individual interest, 364, 372
meaningfulness, 360 well developed interest, 371
metacognitive strategies, 352 interests, 62
motivation, 358, 361 internal state, 145
musicians, 361 internal states, 143
patterns in phenomena, 357 internal organismic state, 143
persevere to work, 359 interpersonal interactions, 71
personal significance, 363 introverts
play, 359 higher levels of arousal, 226
prior knowledge, 363 intuitive thinking, 57. See also CO of intuitive
problem solving, 360 thinking
reading of text, 359 investment theories, 67
recall memory, 358 isomorphism, 174
role of experience, 363
science, 356 job demands. See job requirements
seeking behavior, 353 job performance, 72
self generated curiosity, 356 job requirements, 70
 Index 497

job satisfaction, 70 scissors of knowledge and life. See scissors

judgments of knowledge
adaptive judgments, 299 sharing knowledge, 323
aesthetic judgments, 293 social knowledge, 114, 163
biased judgments, 291 tacit knowledge, 339–340
causality judgment, 293 temporal accessibility, 165
judgments under uncertainty, 291 vernacular (background) knowledge, 346
knowledge formation, 15, 17, 27
kinesis, 142–143 inference rules, 15
knowledge, 159, 173, 184, 321, 332 new knowledge, 15
a constructivist view, 188
accessible knowledge, 164 language, 131, 138, 151, 326, 458
background knowledge, 329–330, 334, 338, conceptual motivation, 413
340–344, 357 discursive modes. See symbols
body of knowledge, 203 French language, 408
causal knowledge, 335 German, 408
cognitive knowledge, 341 Germanic languages, 416
common sense knowledge, 338, 340 grammatical functions, 413
constructed knowledge, 322 metaphoric or connotative connections, 326
cultural knowledge, 158, 165–168 morphemes, 409
declarative knowledge, 158–160 natural languages, 408, 412
emotional knowledge, 133, 323 natural sounds, 415
epistemic presuppositions, 328 phonetic cues, 151
experiential knowledge, 336, 340 phonologic dimension, 151
experiential special knowledge, 336 Romance languages, 416
expert knowledge, 285 semantic dimension, 151
expertise, 321 semantics, 322
experts knowledge, 338 signs, 326, 343
experts system, 345 symbol, 149
explanatory knowledge, 341–342 syntax, 322
external knowledge, 347 word. See also symbols
folkloristic knowledge, 341 laughter. 114. See also humor
genetic knowledge, 347 lay epistemic theory, 20
implicit knowledge, 340 learning, 123, 126, 133, 145, 383
knowledge activation, 166 achievement goal orientations, 385
knowledge management, 321–323 autonomy, 385
knowledge situations, 341 cognitive processing, 387
knowledge structures, 71, 159 competence, 385
language and reality, 343 co-regulation, 400
meta/model knowledge, 338 emotions, 386, 394
neocortical origins, 131 expectancy value beliefs, 385
new and old knowledge, 344 feelings, 384
operative knowledge, 342 inborn teaching mechanisms, 147
partial knowledge, 291 knowledge acquisition, 385
practical knowledge, 328 learning processes, 152
pragmatic incompleteness, 330 metacognition, 385
principle of applicability, 165 motivation, 384–385
prior knowledge, 347 persistence, 385
procedural knowledge, 158–159, 164 self motivated learners, 132
reflective knowledge, 323 self regulated learning (SRL), 383
relevant knowledge, 346 task related experiences, 384
replication of knowledge, 347 volition, 385
scissors of knowledge, 340 linguistic intergroup bias, 20
498 Index

linguistic signs semiotic relations, 410, 414

conventionality, 409 sentence clitic, 418
extralinguistic factors, 410 speech act function, 417
motivation, 409 structuralist linguistics, 407
linguistics, 341, 407 synchronic level, 413
anaphoric pronoun, 418 syntax, 410, 412
cognitive linguistics, 409 tag, 417
communicative motivation, 414 tagged declarative sentences, 418
conceptual (semantic) content, 410 translinguistic factors, 410, 414, 427
content and form, 414 Universal Grammar, 412
conventionalists, 407 vowels and diphthongs, 415
cross linguistic variation, 415 LIR
declarative and imperative clauses, 417 (language/information/reality), 327
declarative sentences, 422 logic, 332
declaratives and imperatives. See declarative Aristotelian logic, 332, 334
and imperative clauses formal logic, 325
diachronic processes, 429 natural logic, 341
economy of coding, 409–410, 417 syllogistic logic, 335
generative grammar, 409, 411–412
grammatical form, 416 mammalian species, 115
grammatical functions, 412 mammals, 120, 125. See mammalian species
grammatical markers, 412 manipulatory exploration, 52
grammatical structure, 409 MARL model
historical linguistics, 412 basic tenets, 391
host clause, 417 metacognition, 392
iconicity, 410, 414 person x task level, 392
inference, 414, 417 self regulation of affect and effort, 392
interjection, 415 the person, 391
interrogative clause, 418 the task, 391
intonation, 417 MASRL model
language independent factors, 410 Person level, 384, 391
lexical concepts, 412 Person x Task level, 384
linguistic change, 412 Task x Person level, 391
linguistic competence, 413 math. See mathematics
linguistic source, 410–411 mathematical thinking
linguistic target, 410 mathematical/structural presuppositions, 326
meaning bearing units, 414 mathematics, 57, 67. See also CO of
metonymy, 414, 417 mathematics
modals, 423 maximal performance, 63–64, 66, 73
morphemes, 414 meaning, 35, 153, 293, 297, 322, 324, 327–328,
morphology, 410 330–332, 335, 337–338, 342–343, 345–346,
motivating factors, 410 409–410, 419, 453–454
motivation, 409, 429 affective meaning, 113
motivational relations, 413 causative meaning, 413
naturalists, 407 components of meaning, 344
perceptual motivation, 415 conceptual frames, 419
phonology, 410 construction of meaning, 321, 324, 326
pragmatic (communicative) function, 410 deep underlying meanings, 39
pragmatic function, 418 egocentric interpretation, 292
principle of arbitrariness, 408 emotional significance, 78
question tags, 410, 417 emotional state, 54
referential identity, 418 exemplifying illustrative, 53
 Index 499

explanatory encoding of meaning, 345 cognitive orientation of rigidity, 438

formation of meaning, 325 cognitive orientation questionnaires, 438
implicit meaning, 149 cognitive performance, 435
initial meaning, 38 cultural familial, 434
interpersonally shared meaning, 35, 39 cultural familial etiology, 437
interpersonally shared mode of meaning, 53, decline in behavioral rigidity, 439
55. See also interpersonal meaning environmental factors, 435
interviewing about meanings, 43 environmental stimulation, 435–436
meaning assignment, 35 external environmental factors, 435
meaning environments, 347 frequency of failures, 436
meaning generation, 39 high expectancy of failure, 437
meaning making, 324 interactions of cognition and motivation, 439
meaning of a word, 346 IQ, 434
meaning of messages sent by drums, 345 learned helplessness, 437
meaning of the identified input, 41 low degree of risk taking, 437
meaning structures, 456 low effectance motivation, 437
Meaning test, 51 low expectancy of success, 437
meaning units, 35, 53 maternal directiveness, 436
meaning value, 53 mental age, 434
meaning variables, 35–36, 53–54 mentally retarded label, 436
meanings can evolve, 345 motivational disposition, 435
metaphoric symbolic, 53 motivational factors, 435
modes of meaning, 53 motivational tendencies, 439
personal subjective meaning, 37, 39, 53 motivationally orienting beliefs, 439
personal subjective mode of meaning, 55. negative reaction tendency, 437
See personal subjective meaning organic etiologies, 434
profile of cognitive processes of planning, 51 outer directedness, 445
referent, 53 outerdirectedness, 437
significance, 77 overstimulation, 436
signs, 332 parenting style, 435
states of consciousness, 54, 58 personality tendencies, 435–437
the referent, 160 positive reaction tendency, 437
meanings, 330 reinforcer hierarchy, 437
measurement precision rigidity, 437–438
aggregation, 210 self concept, 437
memory social deprivation, 435
affective memory, 146 task extrinsic motivation, 437
cultural memory, 152 weak tendency of delay gratification, 437
long term memory, 462 mental states, 110, 115
pain, 250 mesocosmos, 177
physical exercise, 239 metacognition, 293, 384
mental events, 112 affect, 385, 387, 398–399
mental illness analytical knowledge, 398
writers, 469 attributions, 397
mental retardation attributions about ability, 391
adverse social experiences, 436 causal attributions, 391
behavioral traits, 435 cognition, 399
beliefs, 435 cognitive processing, 398
cognitive orientation of responses to success collaborative learning, 399
and failure, 438 conscious awareness, 387
cognitive orientation of responsiveness to control of cognition, 389
tangible and intangible rewards, 438 effort, 398
500 Index

metacognition (cont.) motivation, xii–1, 17, 34, 62–63, 76–77, 79–80,

epistemic beliefs, 388 83, 85, 88, 106, 110–112, 118, 121, 123, 130,
feeling of difficulty, 390 140, 142, 144, 168, 192, 275, 300, 307, 322,
fluency, 390 340–341, 383
goal, 384 accountability, 317
interpersonal relations, 400 accuracy motivation, 301
knowledge states, 398 achievement goals, 360
learning, 399 activation states, 125
metacognitive experiences, 388 affect, 316
metacognitive feelings, 388–390 affect system, 142
metacognitive goal knowledge, 388 affective motivation, 318
metacognitive judgments/estimates, 388, 390 affiliation, 453
metacognitive knowledge, 388 aggression, 454
metacognitive skills, 389 analysis of complex linguistic
metacognitive strategy knowledge, 388 expressions, 408
metacognitive task knowledge, 388 Anticipated post decision regret, 316
metaloop, 389 appetitive motivational system, 113
motivation, 385, 387, 394, 400 attachment, 453
negative affect, 390 autonomy, 453, 455
normative information, 390 body wide activations of motivation, 130
online task specific knowledge, 388 cognitive acts, 34
person characteristics, 399 cognitive functioning, 445
regulation of cognition, 398 cognitive motivation, 317
self concept, 393 cognitive orientation theory, 438
self representation, 398 cognitive performance, 439
social cognition, 390 cognitive predicament, 478
trouble shooting, 398 conflict situations, 162
metacognitive experiences conflicting goals and motivations, 203
achievement goal orientations, 393 conscious processing, 463
affect, 396 construct original interpretations, 475
effort regulation, 394 creative thinking, 283
feeling of difficulty, 393, 397 culturally accepted (collective) motives, 338
negative affect, 396 curiosity, 457
outcome related metacognitive defence motivation, 301
experiences, 389 deliberate practise, 282
performance avoidance goal orientations, 393 drive theories, 34
performance avoidance goals, 394 drives, 110
person level, 400 effectance motivation, 283
positive affect, 395, 397 emotion, 315
self concept, 392, 396–397 emotional motives, 71
self system, 397 endogenous build up excitability, 146
task processing, 396 enduring motivations, 281
task x person level, 400 epistemic motivation, 303
metacognitive knowledge epistemic needs, 169
declarative knowledge, 388 existential needs, 169
socially shared theories of cognition, 388 expert thinking, 281
metaphors. See also symbols expertise, 282
mind/brains, 133 expertise in the chosen domain, 283
MindBrain, 110–111 explanatory or assumed motives to predict
mindfulness, 324 behavior, 338
molar behavior, 42 extrinsic motivation, 80, 471
mortality salience, 167–168 feedback theories, 35
 Index 501

feelings, 316 organize and integrate novelty, 454

flow experience, 283 person level, 385
fundamental motivation, 315 personal intimacy, 455
fundamental needs, 308 personal motives, 338
genetic influences, 192 problem directed thinking, 285
goal, 308 process and fundamental motivation, 314
goal theories, 35 process and outcome motivation, 317
goals, 158, 160, 273 Process and representation motivation, 317
group affiliation, 455 process and representation needs and
habit formation theories, 35 motivation, 308
heritability, 193 process and structural motivation, 314
heuristic thinking. See heuristics processing motivations, 301
impression motivation, 301 punishment, 147
initiating an action, 123 regulative activities. See regulative processes
instinct theories, 35 regulative processes, 140
internal needs, 185 reinforcement, 111, 115, 119, 147
internally motivated processes, 130 representation motivation, 315
intrinsic motivation, 80, 470 representation need, 314
learned industriousness, 284 reward, 126, 147
linguistic motivation, 410 reward and punishment systems, 147
locomotor activity, 142 self actualized individuality, 455
mammalian motivations, 132 self realization, 453
maximize or satisfice, 311 self representation, 453
maximize utility, 291 sense of control, 456
motivated to adapt, 475 sexuality, 454
motivated to understand, 475 social needs, 169
motivation for cognition, 33 spend as little energetic effort as possible, 312
motivation to avoid depreciation, 472 survival needs, 111
motivation to explore, 122, 132 task x person level, 385
motivation to reduce the dissonance, 312 to act in an adaptive way, 300
motivation to satisfice, 291 transitive relation, 429
motivational effects, 33 uncertainty, 158
motivational forces, 153 utility, 314
motivational gains, 296, 300 visceral motivation, 316
motivational processes, 150 motivational factors
motivational states of the body, 128 question tags in declaratives and
motivational systems, 124 imperatives, 417
motivational threat, 303 motivational heuristic
motivational urges, 125 naive optimism, 296
motive, 273 motives, 143
motor acts, 34 motor system, 122
music, 282
need for affect, 79 N back task, 105
need for belongingness, 158 need for closure, 17–22, 24–27
need for closeness, 457 accountability variable, 18
need for cognition, 79–80, 273 group centrism, 23
need for firm answers, 167 group decision making, 23
need for mastery, 283 quest for uniformity, 24
need for privacy, 457 scale for assessing need for closure, 18
need for self definition, 457 specific closure, 17
need to belong, 168 time pressure, 18
need to please others, 308 transference effect, 19
502 Index

need for cognitive closure. 16. See also need for object constancy, 150–151
closure; closure motivation perceptual illusions, 291
negotiation behavior, 22, See negotiation perceptual systems, 290
nervous system, 140, 145, 183 signal detection, 461
central nervous system, 181, 215 social perception, 161
neurons, 182 three dimensional construction of
plasticity, 225 space, 184
nervous systems, 181, 187 perceptual defense, 69
neural networks, 87 period of enlightment, 175
neural systems, 77, 113 person representations
neurobiology, 137 relative accessibility, 161
neurochemistries, 120 personality, 1, 33, 35, 50, 62, 64, 70, 96
neurological disorders, 85 anxious and explosive personality, 203
neurophysiology, 137 dispositions, 161
nigrostriatal pathways extraversion, 225
movements, 122 five factor model of personality (FFM), 227
norm representation individual differences, 311
norm of cooperation, 165 introverts, 225
norms, 63 neuroticism, 226
personal attributes, 161
octopamine, 124 self esteem, 297
onomatopoeia, 415 sense of SELF, 121
ontogeny, 138, 141 the self, 160
optimism, 162 traits, 203
organisms, 174–176, 178–179, 182, 184–186, 188 value system, 308
autonomous organisms, 188 personality cognition overlap, 66
biological organisms, 174 personality disorders, 64
constructional constraints, 180 personality traits, 56–57, 62–66, 68, 70–73,
emancipation, 187 79, 85
energy converters, 179 agreeableness, 65
excitations and irritations, 183 conscientiousness, 65
head capsules, 187 introversion/extroversion, 65
hydraulic systems, 180 meaning variables, 56
inner spaces, 187 neuroticism, 65
locomotor apparatus, 183 P-FIT model
machines, 175 processing of sensory information, 221
motorium, 181 solutions to a given problem, 221
musculature, 181 structural symbolism, 221
organismic autonomy, 186 philosophy, 173
organismic complexity, 187 analytical philosophy, 339
organismic constructions, 181–182, 184 constructivism, 187
rhythmical activity, 180, 183 natural philosophy, 188
sensorium, 181 polarity, 175
sensory organs, 184 Whitehead’s concepts, 188
vertebrate eyes, 183 phylogenetic approach, 138, 141
orienting response, 39 phylogenetic perspective, 138
out group behaviors, 21 phylogeny. See phylogenetic approach
physical health, 33, 198
perception, 78, 80, 142–143 physics, 111, 327, 331
background, 159 physiological homeostasis, 141
focal objects, 159–160 physiological processes, 138
network of perceptions, 186 plants, 130–131
 Index 503

play search for solutions, 276

capacity for self entertainment, 459 SOAR, 279
creativity, 459 solution space, 336
imaginative play, 458 subgoals, 279
make believe or pretend play, 456, 459 Tower of Hanoi, 279
make believe world, 457 Water Jars, 277
private games, 457 X ray tasks, 279
role playing, 459 procedural knowledge, 51
verbal fluency, 459 country differences, 159
political attitudes, 25 environmental affordances, 164
anti immigration attitudes, 25 motivational environment, 160
conservatism, 26 programs
right wing, 25 aspiration achievement, 275
right wing authoritarianism, 25 behaving programs, 146
positive affect discouragement, 275
coasting, 395 mechanisms for terminating, 275
precision measurement satisficing, 275
reliability, 210 prolactin, 122
probability theory prosaccade tasks. See also antisaccade tasks
intuitive statistician, 290 prosody, 82
probe technique, 101 psychoevolutionary theory, 143
problem solving psychopathology, 64, 79, 86–87, 203
chess, 281 anxiety disorders, 86
chess experts, 281 attention dificit hyperactivity
complex conceptual space, 283 disorders, 115
detour, 277 depression, 81–85, 87, 123
epistemic resolution level, 340 depressive symptoms. See depression
evaluation functions, 279 DSM-IV, 87
expert problem solving, 281, 285 hallucinations, 123
expertise, 281 ICD-10, 87
extrinsic motivation, 276 obsessive compulsive disorder, 86
feelings, 384 psychiatric disorders, 86
forward search, 277 schizophrenia, 86, 123
General Problem Solver, 274 psychosis. See also psychopathology
General Problem Solver program, 279 psycopathological behavior, 33
goal processing, 274
goals, 276 quality of life, 276
hill climbing, 277
Hobbits and orcs task, 277 rationality, 290
ill defined problem, 276 algorithmic processing, 291
insight tasks, 277 allais paradox, 290
knowledge lean tasks, 281 bounded rationality, 291, 303
means ends analysis, 279 cognitive illusions, 290
memory guided search, 277 ecological rationality, 298
novices, 281 normative rationality, 291
plans, 274 probability theory, 290
possible/acceptable solution, 338 rules of logic, 290
problem directed thinking, 281 reaction times, 101
problem recursion strategy, 281 re-afference, 147
problem reduction, 279–280 reality sharing, 23
problem reduction processes, 274 receptor organs, 146
rules, 340 reductionism, 111, 138
504 Index

regulative activities emotional states, 463

cognitive regulations, 140 ideal self, 463
endocrine system, 139 idiographic selves, 128
functional integration, 140 ought self, 463
functional regulations, 140 personal self, 128
structural regulations, 139 self esteem, 463
religion, 167 social identity, 168
christian religion, 175 self concept, 65, 67, 71, 387
representation, 290, 343 self efficacy, 387
authority over behavior, 163 self esteem, 387
goal representation, 273 task x person level, 387
metarepresentations, 458 self regulation, 148, 396
representations, 160, 174, 184, 273 affect, 397
accessibility, 161 negative affect, 396
associative features, 160 self thoughts, 106
cognitive unit, 161 semantics
cultural norms, 163 multidimensional semantics, 344
event representations, 161 semantic tableaus, 329
group as a causal agent, 161 situation semantics, 341
mental representations, 458 Tarskian semantics, 345
norm representations, 163–164 semiotics, 322, 341
person representations, 160–161, 164 Saussure’s semiotics, 414
representation of the self, 164 sensory systems, 112
self-as-a-causal-agent, 161 shared reality, 25–26
resolving conflicts signs. See also symbols
negotiation game, 163 linguistic signs, 407
retrograde amnesia, 82 meaningful signs, 327–328, 331
reward, 82 situational press. 63–64, 67, 70.
reward predicting stimuli, 126 See environmental press
Ritalin, 132 skepticism, 117
Rorschach, 54 skill acquisition, 66–67
skills, 51, 62
science, 71 sleep, 86
sciences, 174 sleep apnea, 245
empirical sciences, 174 social cognition, 76
mechanistic science, 175 social isolation, 160
natural sciences, 179 social judgments, 26
physics, 179 social relationships, 293
SEEKING social signals, 89
dopamine, 121 social situations, 82
neurobiology of SEEKING, 118 socio cultural atmosphere, 53
SEEKING system sociology, 152
exploration, 116 space, 184
seizing and freezing phenomena, 18 speech act, 419
self, 128, 450 assertive illocutionary acts, 419
actual ideal discrepancy, 463 assertive scenario, 421
actual ought discrepancy, 463 assertive speech act, 419
actual self, 463 conceptual frames, 419
causal agent, 161 condensed indirect speech acts, 427
conscious thought, 463 declarations, 422
depressive or agitated anxious moods, 463 direct and indirect speech act, 419
dreaded self, 463 direct request, 424
 Index 505

directive scenario, 427 symbolic forms, 186

directive speech acts, 423 symbolic system, 186
explicit performative utterances, 422–423 symbolic systems, 150, 152
illocutionary acts, 422 symmetry, 182
illocutionary paradox, 426 bilateral symmetry, 184
inferential motivation, 425 syntax
metonymic links, 419 syntactic generalizations, 412
obligation, 426
question tags, 420 tag
sincerity condition, 426 acceptability and canonicity, 421
speech act scenario, 419 affirmative and negative form, 425
speech acts scenarios, 418 assertive tags, 426
truth related tags, 420 canonical tags, 418–419, 425
SRL, 398 conditionality, 421
affect, 397 content to content, 427
cognitive processing, 383 economically coded, 425
effort regulation, 384 economy or brevity, 418
learning, 400 economy principle, 425
learning situations, 383 English tags, 429
metacognition, 383 form to form, 427
Metacognitive and Affective model of hearer addressed tags, 427
Self Regulated Learning (the MASRL illocutionary tag, 426
model, 383 imperative tag, 423
metacognitive and affective regulatory mental or emotional attitude, 423
loops, 384 negative tag, 426
metacognitive experiences, 384 pragmatic inferencing, 425
motivation, 383, 400 speaker referring tags, 427
person characteristics, 383 tagged declarative sentences, 427
Person level, 385 tagged imperatives, 423
positive affect, 395 target person, 16, 18–19
role of metacognition, 398 task irrelevant thoughts, 98
short and long term SRL, 383 taxis, 142–143
Task x Person level, 385 phototaxis, 142
states of consciousness, 35 technical training, 70
stimulation theory, 144 test performance, 96
stimuli the circle of functions, 186
external stimuli, 185 The MASRL model, 400
olfactory stimulation, 143 theories, 162
releasing stimuli, 151 behaviorism, 450
tactual sensations, 147 behaviorists, 274
stop signal paradigm, 102 biological evolution, 162
strategies for coping, 88. See also coping constructive realism, 179, 187
strategies Darwinism, 177
stress, 97 evolutionary theories, 174–175, 199
supernatural clockmaker, 188 Frankfurt Evolutionary Theory, 179
survival, 110, 114, 125, 129–130, 143, 145, 175, 290 mechanical theories, 175
survival demands, 120 method of strangification, 178
survival needs. 124. See also motivation models of nature, 174
susceptibility to persuasion, 21 Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, 193, 195,
symbols, 186. See also signs 197–198, 211
discursive symbols, 149 organismic constructions, 187–188
presentational symbols, 149 psychoanalytic models, 461
506 Index

theories (cont.) conative or volitional traits, 62

psychoanalytic theories, 302 conative traits, 65, 68
strangification, 188 conscientiousness, 67, 70–71
synergetics, 178 impulsives, 68
terror management theory, 167 intellectual/cultural trait complex, 65
theory of organismic constructions, 179 introversion/extroversion, 64
therapies, 463 motivational traits, 66
cognitive behavioral treatments, 463 neuroticism, 67–68, 85
psychoanalysis, 463 openness to experience, 67, 71
waking dream therapies, 463 science/math trait complex, 66
thinking social trait complex, 65, 70
conscious thought, 455 test anxiety, 69, 96
current concerns and wishes, 455 trait anxiety, 96
directed thinking, 275 trait anxiety and performance, 97
experiential mode, 302, 453 trait complexes, 66
intrusive thoughts, 455 trait markers, 88
magical thinking, 292 trait anxiety
mathematical thinking, 324 working memory resources, 99
metarepresentational mode, 458 translinguistic factors
metarepresentational mode of economy of coding, 428
thought, 458 inferences, 427
narrative thought, 453 metonymy, 427
paradigmatic thought, 453 speech act function, 427
rational form, 453 triggers for interest
rational mode, 302 novelty of the information, 360
stimulus independent thoughts, 459 Turing machines, 325
task unrelated images and thoughts, 459 typical behaviors, 62, 67, 73
undirected thinking, 275
threat related stimuli, 104 unicellular organisms, 141
time. See also time course
affective present, 128 values, 71
cognitive present, 128 virtual reality, 328
durational present, 128 vocational choice, 67
present, 128 vocational interest, 65
psychological time, 127 vocational training, 70
remembered present, 127 volitional control, 387
Tower of Hanoi
problem reduction, 280 well defined problems
trait, 16, 35, 50, 62 problem reduction, 276
ability traits, 66 work, 70
affective traits, 62, 65 working memory
clerical/conventional trait complex, 66 attentional resources, 99
cognitive traits, 62–63, 67 writers, 469