Hotel New Japan, Chiyoda ward, Tokyo

1. Characteristics of the fire

This fire completely destroyed the 9th and 10th floors of a large hotel in the center of Tokyo,
where 33 people died and 34 were injured. The severity of the fire was properly portrayed to the public,
where it was reported that flames were coming out of guest rooms, the guests were attempting to escape
via the balconies, and the firefighters were taking desperate measures to rescue them. It was pointed out
that the hotel was in violation of fire prevention laws, and the fire in this hotel highlighted various social
problems.

2. Overview of fire outbreak

(1) Time and date of emergence
Around 03:24 on February 8, 1982 (Monday)
(2) Time and date of detection (detection method)
03:39 on February 8, 1982 (Monday) (119 call placed)
(3) Time and date of extinguishment
12:36 on February 8, 1982 (Monday)

3. Overview of fire origin

(1) Location
2-13-8 Nagata-cho, Chiyoda ward, Tokyo
(2) Name of building where the fire emerged
Hotel New Japan, Ltd.
(3) Structure and configuration of building where the fire emerged
① Date of construction
March 1960
② Status of structural extension and alteration
November 1961 20m2 added to 2nd floor
August 1964 22 m2 added to 2nd floor
December 1975 A dining room on the 1st floor was converted into a store
③ Target use of the building
Hotel (Article 5a)
④ Structure
Fire-retardant, steel-reinforced concrete structure, 2 stories below ground and 10 stories
above ground
⑤ Area (building area, total floor area)
(a) Building area 5,287.0 m2
(b) Total floor area 46,697.0 m2
⑥ Number of accommodated people
(a) Accommodated people 2,946 Guest rooms: 420
(b) Number of occupants at the time of the incident
Guests 352 (251 male, 101 female)
Staff 21 (18 male, 3 female)
Guards 5 (5 male)
⑦ Number of workers
31, 5 guards
⑧ Tenants
26 stores
⑨ Floor area and target use per floor of the building

Floor Area Use

6-10 3.485.0 m2 Guest rooms
Dining room, Banquet
4-5 3.593.0 m2 hall, Wedding hall, Guest
rooms
3 3.817.0 m2 Guest rooms
2 4.712.0 m2 Banquet hall, Kitchen
Offices, Dining room,
1 4.438.0 m2
Shops, Parking
Dining room, Shops,
B1 3.159.0 m2
Offices
Switch room, Mechanical
B2 3.707.0 m2
room
Total 46.697.0 m2 (PH 1-4, 2.253 m2)
(4) Status of installed fire extinguishment and prevention facilities
Extinguishment facilities
Fire hydrants inside rooms, sprinklers (partial coverage), fire extinguishers, carbon dioxide-based
fire extinguishment facilities
Alarm systems
Automatic fire alarm systems, emergency announcement system
Evacuation facilities
Evacuation equipment, guiding lights
(5) Status of fire prevention management
Fire prevention manager
Notification of selection October 3, 1979
Fire prevention plans
Notification April 10, 1963
Amendment October 23, 1976
Evacuation drills
(a) In 1979 Partial drill: once; Basic drill: once
(b) In 1980 No notification of drills
(c) In 1981 Partial drill: once

4. Weather conditions
(1) Weather
Clear
(2) Wind direction, speed
NNW, speed 3.1 m/s
(3) Temperature, humidity
Temperature: -0.7ºC, humidity: 40%
(4) Weather warnings, bulletins, etc.
None

5. Causes of the emergence of fire

(1) Ignition source
Cigarette (assumed)
(2) Route
Emerging from a discarded cigarette end
(3) Ignited substances
Bed mattress or blanket

6. Fire damage
(1) People
Fatalities 33 (22 male, 11 female)
Injured 34 (28 male, 6 female)
 (2) Property
Building where the fire emerged
(a) Degree of burning: 4,186 m2 out of 46.697 m2 completely burned
(b) Burned area: 4,186 m2 between the 7th and 10th floors, including rooftop structures
Breakdown
・7th floor 21 m2
・9th floor 1,870 m2
・10th floor 2.201 m2
・Rooftop structures 94 m2
Total 4,186 m2

Others: Some walls on the 5th and 6th floors, 8 m2 of the ceiling, and 7 m2 of walls on the 8th floor
(c) Cost of damage: 1,726,126,000 yen
Structures to which the fire spread
None

7. Fire route (progression)

1) Overview of outbreak location
Room 938 on the 9th floor (a guest from the UK)
(2) Situation up until the outbreak
It is considered that the fire emerged in the vicinity of the bed in room 938 due to an unattended lit
cigarette
(3) Progression up to fire detection
Staff A, who was working at the front desk, was going to the 9th floor to sleep. While in the
elevator, Staff A smelled smoke, and after getting off the elevator on the 9th floor, noticed fire in
room 938 through a gap in the door.
(4) Notification of fire department
Staff A, who detected the fire, returned to the 1st floor and gave instructions to 2 other staff
members working at the front desk. One of them informed the fire department by subscription
telephone.
(5) Initial firefighting attempts
Room service staff were informed by Staff A that there was a fire on the 9th floor. They then went
to the 9th floor, took the fire extinguishers installed in the elevator hall and entered room 938.
Although they used the extinguishers around the wardrobe and bed, they were unsuccessful at
extinguishing the fire.
After returning to the front desk on the 1st floor and returning again to the 9th floor, Staff A
opened the door to the internal fire hydrant, pressed the start button and extended the hose.
However, they were unable to use the hydrant.
(6) Fatalities
As the corridor in the building formed a trident, the location of the staircases was unclear, which
obstructed the evacuation process.
There were a large number of foreigners and guests who were unfamiliar with the internal
configuration of the building.
Since there was no partitioning in the shafts of the building, the smoke spread rapidly and the fire
quickly propagated to the upper floors.
(7) Evacuation
At the time when the fire emerged, there were 27 persons on the 10th floor, 76 on the 9th floor
and 249 on the 8th floor. Regarding the evacuation guidance for guests on the 9th floor, Staff A
instructed several of the guests who had gathered in the corridor around the room with the fire to
evacuate themselves via the elevator. Also, a guard who then arrived at the site guided several
guests who had gathered in front of the service area to the evacuation staircase. On the 10th floor,
another guard instructed several guests to evacuate via the stairs, and staff members working at
the front desk guided 2 people to the stairs.
(8) Firefighting group activities
Evacuation guidance was performed as mentioned above
After the initial attempts to extinguish the fire with fire extinguishers and internal fire hydrants
failed, there were no further additional systematic efforts.
(9) Propagation of the fire
The fire expanded rapidly due to the following reasons:
There was no sprinkler system
Fire-retardant partitioning was incomplete
Doors of guest rooms were made of wood
There were gaps in the partitioning walls between rooms above the ceiling
Parts of the partitioning walls between rooms (area 32cm × 140 cm around the windows) was
made of wood
In guest bathrooms, backfilling of ventilation ducts and pipes leading to pipe and duct shafts
was incomplete
Backfilling of part of the fire-retardant partitions in pipe and duct shafts was incomplete
Partitioning of the upper parts of the elevator frame was incomplete
Combustible materials were widely used for a large portion of the internal construction (rooms,
walls in the corridors, and foundations)
Even though the thermal fuses of the fire prevention doors installed for area partitioning (1500
m2 ) had melted, the doors were still open

8. Firefighting activities undertaken by the fire department

Dispatched units
Pump cars from fire stations and fire groups 48
Hook-and-ladder trucks 12
Rescue trucks 8
Ambulances 22
Air supply truck 6
Others 27
(Including 2 helicopters)
Total 123
Dispatched personnel
Firefighters 627
Firefighting group members 22
Total 649
(2) Firefighting and rescue activities
When the fire department arrived, the 9th floor was engulfed in flames. Several guests from the
9th floor were rescued via the windows, etc.
The first priority for the fire department was rescue operations with the aid of ladder trucks and
specialized rescue teams. As a result, a total of 63 persons were rescued

Rescued people Rescue method

To the
To the
To the rooftop of
By floor ground via
ground
3rd floor
To the rooftop To the 3rd
Internal
Total Male Female via a 3- with a rescue floor with a
a ladder via a 3- staircases
strand rope rescue rope
truck strand
ladder
ladder
Rooftop
of 2nd 9 7 2 4 1 4
floor
Rooftop
of 3rd 9 7 2 4 5
floor

8th floor 4 2 2 4

9th floor 41 30 11 12 1 2 6 20

9. Problems, lessons learned

(1) Fire prevention management
The managing director had limited awareness of fire prevention, did not provide education and
training related to fire prevention to the employees, and did not establish any notification and initial
fire extinguishment systems.
(2) Fire extinguishment facilities
Virtually no sprinklers were installed. Curtains, carpets, and other furnishings parts of the building
were not fire-resistant.
TA failure in the emergency announcement system was neglected, and no inspections were
performed on the fire extinguishment facilities.
(3) Building structure
The fire-retardant partitioning (especially the backfilling of shaft partitioning) was incomplete,
which caused the fire to spread rapidly.
Combustible materials were widely used in the foundations as well as in the construction of rooms
and corridors.
The fire-retardant doors were poorly managed, and some did not close.
Regarding hotels with a large number of foreign guests, it is necessary to investigate appropriate
methods for announcing information at times of emergency.