SOSC 1470 The Economic and

Political Development of
Modern Japan
Prof. Wenkai He
[email protected]
Division of Social Science, HKUST
What do we know about Japan?
• The first Asian country to achieve modernization and the status of big
power in world politics (after the First World War).
• The case of soccer
• Nobel laureates in science; Fields Medalists in mathematics
• The first constitutional monarchy in Asia; universal male suffrage in 1925

• An aggressive power between 1931-1945:

• Mixed memories of Japan’s invasion among Asian countries: as liberator from
western colonists vs. as brutal occupier

• High-speed economic growth in the post-war period in a democratic

regime.
• Japan remained the second largest economy until 2014, bypassed by China
Why do we want to know about the
economic and political development of Japan
• Japan’s success in modernization is attributed to Japan’s efforts to learn from the
west, but such learning seems to be self-selective:
• Japan learned from western experience of industrialization, but Japan developed its own
institution: zaibatsu (財閥), the business conglomerate after the 1920s.

• Japan learned from western country the model of constitutional monarchism, yet Japan
adopted the Prussian model of Constitution rather than a British liberal one.

• Japan seemed to learn western democracies in extending the rights to vote and attained
universal male suffrage in 1925 and Japanese women were fighting for the rights to vote.

• But a seeming democratizing Japan turned into a military fascism after 1931 which first
invaded Asian countries and then had a total war with the USA.

• Is there any lesson that we can learn from studying the political and economic development
of Japan?
The Japanese empire in 1931
How to explain Japan’s success and how to
understand Japan’s past?
• How to explain Japan’s success?
• We cannot explain Japan’s success by learning from the west selectively: intellectually simply
wrong.

• What made Japan selectively learn from various western experiences: active learner vs.
passive imitator?

• How to understand Japan’s own tradition?

• We would not really understand Japan’s success without examining its own history and
cultural tradition.

• Knowing Japan’s past for a better understanding of today’s Japan and the
relationship between Japan and China in the future?
• Would China repeat what Japan’s mistake or not?
China and Japan: a relation of love and hate
• Before Tokugawa regime: before 1603
• China’s tribute country and learning from Chinese civilization

• Tokugawa Japan: 1603-1868

• Independent from the tribute system of China
• Sustained efforts of Japan to import Chinese books when foreign relations were strictly
supervised by the Shogun

• Japan’s influence on China after 1895 and 1900:

• Chinese students to Japan and Chinese translation of Japanese books.

• Japan’s stimulation of China’s nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiments after

1919 (the May Fourth Movement).
• Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the total war between Japan and China in 1937.
Japan: from late Tokugawa era to the
outbreak of the Pacific War: 1858-1937
• The Tokugawa Japan: the Great Domestic Peace
• Closure to the world, yet great political, economic, and cultural developments

• The late Tokugawa Japan after the coming of western powers in 1853 (the black
ships in 1853):
• Various ideas of how to reform Japan’s political system based on different knowledge of
western political systems.

• To cast the Meiji Restoration in 1868 in different perspectives.

• The turning point in Japan’s development: the military victories over China in
1894-5 and over Russia in 1905:
• Rapid social and economic development between 1905 and 1937

• Increasing political participation and democratization before 1931

Course design
• Why do I want to teach you about Japan?

• Why do you want to learn about Japan?

• Why do we learn about Japan in English?

• Japanese studies vs. Chinese studies in major American universities

• Japanese studies in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan

• What are the lessons that I hope you take after the semester?
Social science and history: democratization as
the central theme of this course
• What is a social scientific approach to history?
• We apply concepts and methods in modern social science to understand historical
phenomena: state formation, the rise of bureaucracy, inter-regional trade and market
integration, the change of political system due to socio-economic transformation, etc.

• General causal explanation based upon one specific case-study of Japan between
1858-1937:
• Why did Japan move onto the path of foreign aggression after 1895?

• Why did Japan invade Manchuria in 1931, neither earlier nor later?

• The central theme of this course is democratization: why did universal male suffrage and
party government appear in Japan before 1931 yet did not turn Japan into a fully-grown
democracy?
Grading
• Mid-term exam 50 percent and final exam 50 percent.

• There is only one condition that you may propose to write a term
paper in the lieu of the two exams.
• You must demonstrate the ability to read academic Japanese.

• If so, then you can write a research paper (12-14pages double-spaced), and
you must submit a proposal at least one week before the mid-term (by Week
7)
The battle of Sekigahara関ヶ原 in 1600: just
a one-day battle
Categories of daimyo in the Tokugawa era
• kamon 家門daimyo: members of branches of the Tokugawa family
• Gosanke: With the surname of Tokugawa: the domains of Owari 尾張, Kii 紀伊, and Mito 水戸

• Or with the surname of Matsudaira 松平(Tokugawa Ieyasu’s previous surname): the domains of
Takamatsu 高松 and Kuwana 桑名

• fudai daimyo 譜代大名: coming from Tokugawa vassals who were rewarded for their
services, particularly in the battle of Sekigahara in 1600
• Below the level of daimyo, there were shogunal retainers called hatamoto 旗本 (bannermen) and
officials in the bakufu bureaucracy mainly came from this category

• tozama daimyo 外様大名: daimyo originated before the rise of Tokugawa Ieyasu and
some of them were neutral or even hostile to the Tokugawa side in the battle of
Sekigahara
• Never served in the shogun government, including Satsuma, Chōshū, Saga, and Tosa
Percentages of koku in Japan in 1698
• The Tokugawa shogun and its vassals: 26 percent

• fudai and kamon daimyo: 35 percent

• tozama daimyo: 37 percent

• Why did not the shogun use force to further unify Japan?

• Could the major tozama daimyo be completely independent from the

Tokugawa Shogun?
Tokugawa shogun regulations over the court
and daimyo, 1615-1638
• The emperor was made nominal figure only giving era names (年号) and
the court and court nobles were put under close supervision of the shogun
and did not have any connections to daimyo.

• The daimyo were allowed to have only one castle in one province and even
the repair of castle needed to be approved by the shogun

• The inter-marriage among daimyo must be sanctioned by the shogun and

the alliance among daimyo were strictly prohibited.

• But some 40 major tozama daimyo were highly autonomous in governing

their respective territories
What were the relationships between
shogun, daimyo, and the court
• The shogun was often addressed as the “public authority (公儀)” over daimyo
• The shogun as a military chief-leader over daimyo

• The term “emperor” (mikato) was rarely used

• The term used “kinri 禁裏” or “kinchū 禁中”: literally, the inner circle being forbidden (to
enter or to contact with outsiders)

• Daimyo: having significant autonomy: 大名家 (kuni 国, but not han or domain 藩)

• The new terms came to be used frequently around and after the 1800s
• The governing house of the shogun was called the Bakufu 幕府, which meant its authority
was under the imperial court and the emperor

• A new concept of an “imperial state” 皇国, but no such term “Tenno 天皇”
Three stages in political development of
Tokugawa Japan
• In the early Tokugawa time: 1615-1638: a garrison state
• The shogun was the military overlord over the daimyo and the political system was alike a
military mobilization system

• 1638-1750: institutionalization of both daimyo and the shogun governance

• Both the shogun and daimyo consolidated their governing institutions in their respective
territories in domestic peace.

• 1750-1868: a new theory of “governing Japan as entrusted by the emperor” 大政

委任論
• A clear hierarchy of the court (emperor), the bakufu, and daimyo as han (domain): han meant
the outer defense of the core area.

• The implication of the “theory of delegation of power”: if the shogunate misgoverned, then
the emperor would have the right to demand return of sovereign power.
The ideology of benevolent governance (jinsei 仁政)
after 1640
• Depopulation caused by famine and peasants’ collective flee from repressive
daimyo
• Who would contribute land taxes in rice to feed the unproductive warriors living in the castle
town?

• The ideology of benevolent ruler was to show compassion and benevolence to

the subordinates by reducing their tax burden, enabling them to reproduce and
providing necessary aids when they faced subsistence crisis.
• fudai daimyo who received land from shogun, such benevolent governance (jinsei 仁政)
represented their loyalty and service to the shogun.

• For more autonomous daimyo such as the outside daimyo, they considered the benevolent
governance as their obligations from the heaven (tendō 天道) as a “wise lord”.
The changing relationships between a daimyo
and his vassals
• The relationship between a daimyo and his retainers/vassals originally 家臣as
personal: patron-clients.
• The loyalty and service of the client (samurais) to his lord (daimyo) rested upon the awards
that the lord could offer to the client.

• An incompetent daimyo (lord) would be eliminated by the war and the masterless samurai
would be called rōnin 浪人

• In domestic peace of Tokugawa Japan, the stipends of samurais depended upon

the land taxes collected in rice from peasants.
• The fates of daimyo and his vassals were tied together as if they were the member of the
same family (ie 家)

• An incompetent daimyo or a daimyo with extravagant consumption which caused low

productivity of rice in his territory would threaten the livelihoods of vassals and their family
members
The people as the foundation of the “state”
• In 1785 Uesugi Harunori 上杉治憲(also know as 上杉鷹山), the daimyo of
Yonezawa, wrote for his heir, Norihiro: how should a daimyo rule?
• “The state (kokka) is inherited from one’s ancestors and passed on to one’s descendants: it
should not be administered selfishly.”

• “The people belong to the state: they should not be administered selfishly”

• “The lord exists for the sake of the state and the people; the state and the people do not
exist for the sake of the lord.”

• The legitimacy of a daimyo was thus put on the peace and prosperity of his subjects and the
prosperity of his subjects contributed to the state

• Similar ideology of benevolence was also applied to the shogun:

• The bakufu/domainal house vs. the shogun/daimyo
The administration of the domain
government (藩政)
• What should the vassals do when they facing an incompetent or abusing or
wayward daimyo (lord)?
• Disturbances caused by samurai-retainers tried to have an incompetent or abusing daimyo
replaced by a competent one in early Tokugawa (1615-1650) (下剋上 gekokujō?)

• In the late 17th century, the shogun allowed the adopted son to be the legitimate
heir of daimyo (succession of adopted son based mainly upon capability 能力主
義)

• Vassal-samurais viewed the domain house (ie 家) or domain government as the

object of their loyalty, not the personal loyalty to the daimyo
• Vassals could even put a wayward daimyo in house confinement to discipline him: but on the
surface he was still the daimyo or lord.
Institutionalization of the governing house of
the shogun and daimyo
• When governing a large territory with large population in peaceful times, a
daimyo could no longer rely upon the personal relationship of his vassals to have
good governance.
• Personal relationship could not support a large army either

• A common interest or common good of the territory as the object of loyalty of

samurai
• The common good to both the daimyo and his vassals: the survival and prosperity of the
daimyo house (ie).

• The common good of the daimyo house was tied to the welfare of the common people living
in the territory

• The shogun/daimyo vs. the shogunal and domainal houses as civil governments
The meaning of “the state kokka 国家”
• When daimyo, especially tozama daimyo, and their advisors discussed about how
to implement the benevolent governance in their respective territories, they
frequently used the term 国家 to refer to their own polity.
• 名君: the daimyo, not shogun, not the emperor

• 国民: the subjects directly governed by daimyo

• 国益: the interest of the domain-state

• Should we take some 40 tozama daimyo as rulers of independent states (国家)?

• The succession of daimyo could be a serious political problem disturbing the order of a
particular domain

• The relationship between vassals (samurai warriors) to their daimyo: feudal or personal
rather than impersonal and institutional?
The autonomy of tozama daimyo in legal
affairs
• The sovereign power of the state in legal aspects:
• Death penalty and the judicial review of the supreme court

• Major tozama daimyos had their own laws within their own territories
• To mete out of death penalty could be different from those in the ’s law

• The shogunal court was not the highest judicial review court for tozama daimyo

• Commoners in the territory of a tozama daimyo could not make petition to the
shogun, instead, he could only submit petition to the daimyo compound in Edo or
to the domain government in the castle.
• Comparing the capital appeal in the late imperial China: a poor peasant in any province could
bring an appeal to Beijing to submit to the emperor if he/she did not accept the adjudication
made by provincial governments.
The state or states in Tokugawa Japan?
• The state is a governing institution which monopolizes the use of legitimate
use of violence over a delimited boundary.
• The modern concept of the state: impersonal governing institution rather than the
king or emperor as a person.

• State-building among major daimyo, especially those tozama daimyo, and

the shogun in the eighteenth century (1638-1780).
• Satsuma, Chōshū, Saga, and Tosa were governed by all tozama daimyo

• If major daimyo and the shogun all had their independent states, the
Tokugawa Japan cannot be called as one state but at best a conglomeration
of independent states.
The definition of the state, nation, and
nation-state
• The state is a governing institution which monopolizes the use of legitimate use
of violence over a delimited boundary.
• Sovereign power: the highest political authority within the territory

• Monopoly of legitimate use of violence: why legitimacy matters?

• The nation:
• The people, including both the ruling class and the ruled, shared the same written and
speaking language and culture

• The modern nation-state and nationalism:

• What is the political basis that Tokugawa Japan had prepared for Japan

• The Tokugawa era: a state or a proto nation-state, or a decentralized feudal system consisting
independent fief lords (daimyos) governing their respective territories?
Was the bakufu a kind of central government
in Tokugawa Japan?
• It regulated Japan’s foreign trade and prevented the outflows of gold, silver, and
even copper to protect the “interest of Japan”

• It conducted regular census of population and map-making of the entire Japan.

• It set up the so-called “high board” 高札not only in shogunal territory but also in
the territory of daimyos to publicize the most important laws to the commoners
• The strict prohibition on Christianity which no individual daimyo would or could ignore.

• It maintained the major transportation road and facilities of Japan, and made
travelling for pleasure a popular way of life for even commoners in Japan in the
late 18th century, including the most popular pilgrimage to the Ise Shrine or
Zenkōji Temple
Was the bakufu really a central government?
• It did not intervene into the domestic governance of daimyos in general.
• Variations in economic policies in different domain governments

• It did not deal directly with retainers of a daimyo, let alone dealing with
commoners governed by a daimyo.
• No retainers nor commoners could bring a suit against their daimyo to the court of bakufu

• When the bakufu provided relief grain or relief fund to domains suffered from calamities, it
gave to daimyo and let them distributed to their subjects

• It did not tax the territory of daimyo

• How could the Shogun exercise his authority over daimyo in domestic peace?
The authority of the shogun over daimyo
• The shogun called himself as the “public authority (公儀)” over daimyo
• To coordinate and to protect their common interest or common good

• The shogun had the authority over daimyo in diplomatic relations

• The shogun’s order to prohibit Christianity and to order Buddhist temples to register the
population (shūmon aratame chō) applied to all daimyo

• After 1686, the making of firearms by a daimyo was under the supervision of the shogun

• The shogun ordered each daimyo to draw map of their territory (kuniezu 国絵図)
for the shogunal officials to make a map of Japan
• Several efforts to make a map of Japan based upon map of province after 1702 onward

• Shogunal officials even surveyed the whole coast of Japan in 1800

The map of the province of Sagami (相模)
finished in 1838
The map of the province of Satsuma (薩摩国)
finished in 1838
Changes to the military obligations of daimyo
to shogun in the Great Peace
• Sankin kōtai 参勤交代:
• A daimyo was to take up residence in Edo every alternate year.

• Their immediate family (children and wife) living permanent in Edo as hostage.

• Sankin kōtai which first started with fudai daimyo and bannerman was extended to
all daimyo in 1636

• Daimyo must shoulder expense of major public works in infrastructural

facilities, particularly hydraulic projects, as well as the building and
repairing of major temples, and major cities of Edo, Kyoto, and Osaka
directly administered by the shogun
Sankin kōtai 参勤交代: The alternate
attendance system
• From 1635 onward, the third shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu implemented the sankin kōtai system to
daimyo nation-wide: daimyo were required to take up residence in Edo every alternate year.
• Their immediate family (children and wife) living permanent in Edo as hostage.

• Rapid increase of the size and population in Edo

• The expense in journey to and from Edo and the living cost in Edo became a huge financial burden
to daimyo
• Large number of retainers in the journey and rivalry of consumption among daimyos and their family
members in Edo according to their ranks

• Between 600 and 1,000 daimyo compounds in Edo

• Exceptions: Saga 佐賀and Fukuoka 福岡domains guarding Nagasaki 長崎and Matsuma 松前

defending Ezo (today’s Hokkaido)
Sankin kōtai processions
Effects of sankin kōtai
• tozama daimyo and their retainers did not have much duty to do when they
resided in Edo
• Regular exchange of information, cultures and scholarship among the large number of
samurai from various domains living in Edo

• Speaking language (dialect manuals) and written language

• Travelling experience across Japan of daimyo and their retainers to and from Edo

• A sense of belonging to the same country among political elites

• A pressure to force domain governments to try means to increase their cash

income
• Economic policies within their respective territories
Financial burdens of hydraulic projects on
daimyo
• The convergence of Kiso river, Nagara river, and Ibi river caused frequent floods in the Nōbi plain,
the shogunate decided to implement a project to separate the flows of these three rivers so as to
reduce the pressure on defending dike.

• The shogual officials estimated the budget of this project around 150,000 ryō. In 1753, the
shogunate ordered Satsuma to manage this project.

• Satsuma sent 300 samurai retainers and 500 foot-soldiers to the site of project to supervise the
construction. When the project was finished in 1755, the actual cost was as high as 300, 000 ryō,
among which the shogunate covered 9,892 ryō and the rest 220,298 ryō was met by the loans
that Satsuma domain borrowed from Osaka merchants.

• How should the bakufu justify levying this huge financial burden on Satsuma in Kyushu, which
could not benefit in any sense from this project.
木曽三川（きそさんせん）
The debt problems of daimyo
• Sankin kōtai and the bakufu’s demand for funds of infrastructure building and
maintenance forced daimyo to borrow from financiers in Osaka, Edo, Kyoto, and later
even from local merchants in their own countries.
• Tosa domain by 1688 spent 34 percent of its annual budget on repaying loans

• Okayama domain by 1829: the interest payment was the largest single item in its annual budget

• How should the daimyo resolve the chronic debt problem and fiscal deficit in 1648-1853?
• To reject the demands from the shogun?

• To cut expenditure of the daimyo house, including to reduce the stipend to its samurai-retainers?

• Or to increase revenue income by developing domain economy: daimyo’s mercantilist economic

policies