Filing # 203279875 E-Filed 07/24/2024 05:07:22 PM

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. ______________

FLORIDIANS PROTECTING
FREEDOM, INC., and SARA
LATSHAW,

Petitioners,

v.

PAUL RENNER, in his official

capacity as Speaker of the House
of Representatives; KATHLEEN
PASSIDOMO, in her official
capacity as President of the
Senate; FINANCIAL IMPACT
ESTIMATING CONFERENCE; and
CHRIS SPENCER, RACHEL
GRESZLER, AZHAR KHAN, and
AMY BAKER, in their official
capacities as Principals of the
Financial Impact Estimating
Conference,

Respondents.
__________________________________________________________________
TIME-SENSITIVE, NON-ROUTINE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO
__________________________________________________________________
Michelle Morton, FBN 81975 Margaret Good, FBN 97931
Daniel B. Tilley, FBN 102882 Margaret Good Law, PLLC
Samantha J. Past, FBN 1054519 P.O. Box 5083
ACLU Foundation of Florida Sarasota, FL 34277
4343 West Flagler St., Ste. 400 (941) 313-7485
Miami, FL 33134 [email protected]
(786) 363-2714
[email protected] Nicholas L.V. Warren,
[email protected] FBN 1019018
[email protected] ACLU Foundation of Florida
1809 Art Museum Dr., Ste. 203
Jacksonville, FL 32207
(786) 363-1769
[email protected]

ii
 Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ....................... 1

II. BASIS FOR INVOKING THIS COURT’S JURISDICTION ............ 7
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS .................................................. 9
A. The State drafts Amendment 4’s Financial Impact
Statement. ......................................................................10
B. The circuit court invalidates the Financial Impact
Statement. ......................................................................11
C. The State unlawfully drafts a revised Financial Impact
Statement. ......................................................................13
D. The First District dismisses the case as moot. .................16
IV. NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT ........................................17
V. ARGUMENT ...........................................................................17
A. There is no textual authority for a Financial Impact
Statement to be revised outside the judicial process. .......18
B. This Court should issue the writ. ....................................22
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................24
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .........................................................26

iii
 Table of Citations

Cases
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Authorizes Miami-Dade & Broward
Cnty. Voters to Approve Slot Machines in Parimutuel Facilities, 880
So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2004). ..............................................................18
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Limiting Gov’t Interference with
Abortion, 384 So. 3d 122 (Fla. 2024). .......................................... 1
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Raising Fla.’s Minimum Wage, 285 So.
3d 1273 (Fla. 2019). ...........................................................passim
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Repeal of High Speed Rail Amend., 880
So. 2d 628 (Fla. 2004) ...............................................................18
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Stds. for Estab. Legis. Dist. Boundaries,
2 So. 3d 161 (Fla. 2009). ............................................... 3, 4, 6, 17
Boan v. Fla. Fifth Dist. Ct. of Appeal Jud. Nominating Comm’n, 352
So. 3d 1249 (Fla. 2022). ............................................................. 9
Chiles v. Phelps, 714 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1998). ................................. 9
Fin. Impact Est. Conf. v. Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc., No.
1D2024-1485, 2024 WL 3491704 (Fla. 1st DCA July 22, 2024). . 5,
6, 19
Fla. Fin. Impact Est. Conf. v. All Voters Vote, Inc., 328 So. 3d 1149
(Fla. 1st DCA 2021). .................................................. 4, 14, 24, 26
In re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Pub. Prot. from Repeated Med.
Malpractice, 880 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2004)......................................18
In re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Referenda Required for Adoption &
Amend. of Loc. Gov’t Comprehensive Land Use Plans, 992 So. 2d
190 (Fla. 2008). .......................................................................... 6
Martinez v. Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 1989). ........................10
State ex rel. Bruce v. Kiesling, 632 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1994). ............10
W. Flagler Assocs., Ltd. v. DeSantis, 382 So. 3d 1284 (Fla. 2024). .. 9
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011). ....................................10

Statutes
§ 100.371(13), Fla. Stat. ........................................................passim

iv
Art. V, § 3, Fla. Const.................................................................... 9
Art. XI, § 5, Fla. Const. ............................................................ 2, 11

Rules
Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(3).............................................................. 9
Fla. R. of App. P. 9.310(b)(2). ........................................................15

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 I. INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioners are Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc. (“FPF”), and

its chair, Florida citizen and taxpayer Sara Latshaw. FPF is the

Sponsor of a proposed citizen initiative, the Amendment to Limit

Government Interference with Abortion, known as Amendment 4,

which this Court has approved for placement on the November

general election ballot. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Limiting Gov’t

Interference with Abortion, 384 So. 3d 122 (Fla. 2024). Since this

Court’s decision, the Sponsor has been fighting to protect its

constitutional and statutory rights to a clear and accurate

presentation of this amendment to voters—rights this Court upheld—

against the State’s efforts to undermine Amendment 4 by appending

a misleading “Financial Impact Statement” to it on the ballot. This

Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto challenges the State’s actions in

unilaterally revising the Financial Impact Statement to circumvent

judicial review.

Historically, this Court provided an advisory opinion on the

legality of the accompanying Financial Impact Statement. See Art. XI,

§ 5(c), Fla. Const. (“The legislature shall provide by general law, prior

to the holding of an election pursuant to this section, for the provision

of a statement to the public regarding the probable financial impact

1
of any amendment proposed by initiative[.]”); Advisory Op. to Att’y

Gen. re Raising Fla.’s Minimum Wage (Minimum Wage), 285 So. 3d

1273, 1280-81 (Fla. 2019) (“The Legislature has arranged for the

provision of financial impact statements to the public within section

100.371(13).”). But in 2019, this Court ruled in Minimum Wage that

its original jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion deciding the

validity of initiative petitions did not extend to deciding whether a

Financial Impact Statement was also lawful. See 285 So. 3d at 1280-

81. Still, because the statutory scheme enacted by the Legislature for

promulgating and reviewing Financial Impact Statements

contemplated judicial involvement, this Court stated that its decision

in Minimum Wage “[o]bviously” did not “preclude a challenge to a

financial impact statement in circuit or county court, by declaratory

judgment action under current law.” Id. at 1281 n.4.

This began as one such case. Mere days after this Court

approved its initiative, the Sponsor sought a declaration from the

circuit court that the accompanying Financial Impact Statement

violated section 100.371(13). (App’x at 24). This lawsuit was

important, not just to the Sponsor’s right to a fair presentation of

Amendment 4 on the ballot, but to the right of every Floridian to

decide for themselves, without a thumb on the scale in favor of any

2
one outcome, whether to support or oppose an amendment to their

governing charter. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Stds. for Estab.

Legis. Dist. Boundaries, 2 So. 3d 161, 165 (Fla. 2009) (noting that

Financial Impact Statements may not be used to “manipulate the

public based solely upon whether the entity empowered and

entrusted with preparing the statements favors or disfavors a

proposal”). Indeed, as this Court has recognized, “[b]ecause the

financial impact statement will be printed on the ballot, the same due

process concerns that inure to the title and summary of a proposed

amendment are also applicable to the financial impact statement.”

Legis. Dist. Boundaries, 2 So. 3d at 164.

But since Minimum Wage, the State has sought to remove the

judiciary entirely from determining the legality of Financial Impact

Statements. See Fla. Fin. Impact Est. Conf. v. All Voters Vote, Inc., 328

So. 3d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (dismissing a challenge to a

Financial Impact Statement as moot because this Court had not

issued an advisory opinion on its validity by the 75th day before the

election, so the statement was “automatically” approved for the ballot

under language in the statute predating Minimum Wage). So here,

although the State did not contest that Amendment 4’s Statement

was unlawful, it based its defense on justiciability grounds. (App’x at

3
62). When the circuit court rejected the State’s extreme position as

inconsistent with Minimum Wage and section 100.371(13),

invalidated the Statement on an expedited basis, and remanded it to

the Financial Impact Estimating Conference for redrafting in

accordance with the statute, the State appealed, obtained a stay from

the First District, and filed briefs arguing that the judiciary is

powerless to review Financial Impact Statements. (App’x at 217, 236-

255). That issue was quickly and fully briefed and then awaited

decision in the First District for more than two weeks. (App’x at 272,

343).

Then things took a turn. “While [the] appeal was pending”—and

the circuit court’s order stayed at the State’s request—“the President

of the Florida Senate and the Speaker of the House directed the

[Financial Impact Estimating Conference] to consider revisions to the

[Statement].” Fin. Impact Est. Conf. v. Floridians Protecting Freedom,

Inc., No. 1D2024-1485, 2024 WL 3491704, at *1 (Fla. 1st DCA July

22, 2024). The State, and later the First District, characterized those

meetings as “voluntary, not pursuant to the circuit court’s order,”

id.—even though they were convened only after the circuit court had

invalidated the Statement and ordered the State to redraft it.

4
 At the meetings, the Conference speculated broadly about the

nonbudgetary effects of Amendment 4 and ultimately included items

in its revised Statement that, as the Conference’s longest serving

member put it, have “nothing to do” with financial impact. (App’x at

425). The revised Statement on its face violates this Court’s

precedent, in part by its inclusion of speculation about the effect of

future litigation. See, e.g., Legis. Dist. Boundaries, 2 So. 3d at 166; In

re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Referenda Required for Adoption &

Amend. of Loc. Gov’t Comprehensive Land Use Plans, 992 So. 2d 190,

192–93 (Fla. 2008). The revised Statement also plainly fails to

conform to the circuit court’s order.

Because the Conference adopted a new Statement while the

appeal was pending and the circuit court’s order stayed, the First

District dismissed—over the objection of both parties—the appeal as

moot. See Floridians Protecting Freedom, 2024 WL 3491704, at *2.1

The result is that, absent this Court's intervention, the State intends

to place a Financial Impact Statement on the ballot that is plainly

misleading in contravention of Minimum Wage, section 100.371(13),

1 The Sponsor believes that the First District’s decision creates

conflict in the law regarding mootness and a circuit court’s ongoing
jurisdiction to enforce its orders. That conflict may form a companion
basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction here.

5
and the circuit court order.

But here’s the thing. This Court need not—and should not—

sanction this unlawful outcome, for one very simple reason: the State

never had the power to reconvene the Conference and revise the

Statement outside the parameters established by the circuit court.

While the Constitution vests the Legislature with the duty to provide

Financial Impact Statements “by general law,” the Legislature has

“arranged for the provision of financial impact statements to the

public within section 100.371(13).” Minimum Wage, 285 So. 3d at

1279. Section 100.371(13) is “the scheme the Legislature enacted for

the preparation and publication of financial impact statements.” Id.

And nowhere in the text of the Legislature’s duly enacted

“scheme” does the Legislature vest the Senate President or House

Speaker with freewheeling authority to sua sponte reconvene the

Conference at any time, outside the process the statute establishes,

to revise a Financial Impact Statement that has already been

submitted to the Secretary of State, published to the public, and

invalidated by a circuit court. Rather, the statute meticulously sets

forth a specific process for the drafting of Financial Impact

Statements and contemplates revisions solely when a court, like the

circuit court here, declares the Statement invalid. See

6
§ 100.371(13)(c), Fla. Stat. (“Any financial impact statement that a

court finds not to be in accordance with this section shall be

remanded solely to the Financial Impact Estimating Conference for

redrafting. The Financial Impact Estimating Conference shall redraft

the financial impact statement within 15 days.”).

Thus, because the Statement here was adopted through a

process unmoored from section 100.371(13)’s text, the Sponsor and

its chair petition this Court to issue a writ of quo warranto to require

the State—the Legislature, its principals, the Conference, its

principals—to explain “by what authority” they have revised

Amendment 4’s Financial Impact Statement. And because the State

will be unable to identify any textual authority within section

100.371(13) for revising the Statement in this way, this Court should

invalidate the Statement as the fruit of an unlawful process.

II. BASIS FOR INVOKING THIS COURT’S JURISDICTION

This Court has original jurisdiction to issue writs of quo

warranto to state officers and state agencies. Art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla.

Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(3). Though limited in scope, quo

warranto is the proper vehicle for challenging whether a state officer

or state agency has exercised a power they do not possess. See W.

Flagler Assocs., Ltd. v. DeSantis, 382 So. 3d 1284, 1286 (Fla. 2024)

7
(quo warranto historically used to test a person’s right to “exercise

some right or privilege the peculiar powers of which are derived from

the state.”); Boan v. Fla. Fifth Dist. Ct. of Appeal Jud. Nominating

Comm’n, 352 So. 3d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 2022) (quo warranto proper to

challenge judicial nominating commissions’ certification of

nonresident nominees).

The Respondents here are all state officers or state agencies,

against whom a writ of quo warranto is properly directed. See Chiles

v. Phelps, 714 So. 2d 453, 457 (Fla. 1998) (presiding legislative

officers subject to quo warranto); cf. State ex rel. Bruce v. Kiesling,

632 So. 2d 601, 602 (Fla. 1994) (appointees of statutorily created

Public Service Commission subject to quo warranto). The Petitioners

here, the Sponsor of Amendment 4 and its chair—a Florida citizen

and taxpayer—are directly affected and have standing to seek the

writ. See Martinez v. Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. 1989).

And the writ is properly sought directly in this Court because the

issue is of statewide importance, because, despite moving as

expeditiously as possible, the time for the courts to remedy the

State’s unlawful actions is limited, and because there are no

substantial facts in material dispute. See Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d

at 708 (Fla. 2011); (App’x at 404) (State acknowledging impending

8
election deadlines and that it is “unclear if there will otherwise be

adequate time for these issues to be fully resolved”).

III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

When a citizen initiative like Amendment 4 is proposed to the

public, the Florida Constitution requires the Legislature to provide,

by general law, for “a statement to the public regarding the probable

financial impact” of the amendment. Art. XI, § 5(c), Fla. Const. By

enacting section 100.371(13), the Legislature has by general law

created a process for the provision of Financial Impact Statements to

the public. As this Court has recently summarized it:

Section 100.371(13) creates the FIEC and

requires it to analyze the financial impact of a
proposed amendment and prepare a statement
of that financial impact within a certain time
frame of receipt of the proposed amendment
from the Secretary of State. § 100.371(13)(a),
(c). The statute contemplates that the financial
impact statement will be placed on the ballot
with the related proposed amendment unless it
is not judicially approved. § 100.371(13)(a), (c)
3. The statute dictates the length and content
of the financial impact statement and requires
the FIEC to submit the financial impact
statement to the Attorney General.
§ 100.371(13)(a), (c). The statement must be
“clear and unambiguous,” no more than 150
words, and address “the estimated increase or
decrease in any revenues or costs to state or
local governments, estimated economic impact
on the state and local economy, and the overall

9
 impact to the state budget resulting from the
proposed initiative.” § 100.371(13)(a), (c).

Minimum Wage, 285 So. 3d at 1278–79.

A. The State drafts Amendment 4’s Financial Impact

Statement.
In accordance with section 100.371(13), on September 7, 2023,

the Secretary of State submitted Amendment 4 to the Attorney

General and the Financial Impact Estimating Conference. (App’x at

5). After grappling with the uncertainty of what the state of the law

would be at the time of the 2024 election—given a newly adopted ban

on abortions past six weeks gestation, contingent on the outcome of

pending litigation challenging a ban on abortions past 15 weeks

gestation—the Conference crafted a Statement not of Amendment 4’s

probable financial impact, but of why such impact could not be

determined. (App’x at 10).

The Conference ultimately adopted a Financial Impact

Statement during a November 16 meeting and transmitted it to the

Secretary of State in accordance with section 100.371(13). (App’x at

8-23). The Statement read:

The proposed amendment was analyzed late in

the 2023 calendar year. At that time, litigation
was pending before the Florida Supreme Court
challenging the Legislature’s 2022 enactment of
a prohibition on most abortions being

10
 performed if the gestational age of the fetus is
more than 15 weeks. If the Court upholds the
2022 law, a 2023 law further reducing the 15
weeks to 6 weeks will take effect 30 days later.
This could lead to additional litigation. In order
to measure the proposed amendment’s impact
on state and local government revenues and
costs, a reasonable expectation of what the
state of the law will be at the time of the election
is required. Because there are several possible
outcomes related to this litigation that differ
widely in their effects, the impact of the
proposed amendment on state and local
government revenues and costs, if any, cannot
be determined.

(Id.)

B. The circuit court invalidates the Financial Impact

Statement.
On April 5, 2024—four days after this Court’s opinions settling

the legality of abortion and approving Amendment 4 for ballot

placement—Petitioners sued in Leon County Circuit Court, asserting

that the Financial Impact Statement violated section 100.371 and

article XI, section 5 of the Florida Constitution. (App’x at 62). On

June 5—the earliest date the circuit court felt it could hold a

summary-judgment hearing under the rules (the State refused to

waive any deadlines)—the circuit court held such a hearing. (Id.) On

June 10, the circuit court granted the Sponsor’s motion for summary

judgment, finding that the Statement violated the constitutional and

11
statutory accuracy and clarity requirements. (Id.) As contemplated by

section 100.371(13)(c), the circuit court ordered the Conference to

redraft the Statement within 15 days, retaining jurisdiction to review

the legality of the revised Statement. (Id.)2

That same day, the State noticed an appeal to the First District.

(App’x at 69). The sole issues on appeal were justiciability issues, and

in particular whether the court had jurisdiction under Minimum

Wage and All Voters Vote, to review the Statement at all. (App’x at

237–257) (“But the statutes relating to financial impact statements

do not give any court other than the Florida Supreme Court the

authority to review a financial impact statement, much less to

remand one to the FIEC.” App’x. at 244.). The State did not challenge

the merits of the circuit court’s order. (Id.)

2 Specifically, the court found that the Statement (1) was inaccurate
and presented outdated information; (2) was not limited to
summarizing Amendment 4’s probable impact to state and local
government revenues or costs and to the state budget, as required by
law; and (3) was inaccurate, ambiguous, misleading, unclear, and
confusing, in violation of section 100.371. (App’x at 66). The court
took special issue with the inclusion of speculation about future
litigation and that the Statement “[did] not clearly announce its
purpose.” (App’x at 67). And the court said that “if the [Conference’s]
redrafted [Statement] does not reflect [the] analysis that it already
completed [finding a probable cost savings under a six-week ban], it
must justify to this Court the departure from its prior determination.”
(Id.).

12
 The circuit court then vacated the automatic stay imposed by

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(2), but the First District

immediately reimposed it. (App’x at 210). The First District also

declined the Petitioners’ suggestion that it pass the appeal through

to this Court, but it did expedite the briefing. (App’x at 214). The

briefs were filed in less than two weeks, and the case was ready for

resolution as of 9 a.m. on July 1. (App’x at 214, 343).

C. The State unlawfully drafts a revised Financial Impact

Statement.
On June 10, the same day the State appealed the circuit court’s

order, and while it was seeking a stay of it, the Conference noticed a

“series of conference meetings” to “consider potential revisions to the

financial impact statement to be placed on the ballot that shows the

estimated increase or decrease in any revenues or costs to state and

local governments resulting from [Amendment 4].” (App’x at 83). In

its appellate brief below, the State claimed that “[a]ny revision

adopted pursuant to that voluntary process would supersede the

statement at issue.” (App’x at 224). The State did not explain what

authority it had for revising the Statement outside the process

mandated by the circuit court. (Id.) The State did not explain what

authority it had for revising the Statement outside the process

13
mandated by the circuit court. (Id.) For the July meetings, two

principals had been substituted: staff director of the House Ways and

Means Committee Vince Aldridge was replaced with Rachel Greszler,

a senior research fellow of the Heritage Foundation who is listed on

the transmission letter as a senior economist with the House, and

health and human services policy coordinator of the Executive Office

of the Governor Brea Gelin had been replaced with the executive

director of the State Board of Administration, Chris Spencer. App’x

at 8–9, 379–380.

On July 15, after three meetings and 32 days since the circuit

court’s order, the Conference adopted a revised Financial Impact

Statement. (App’x at 379-381). This is the revised Statement adopted

over the dissent of longtime Conference member Amy Baker:

The proposed amendment would result in

significantly more abortions and fewer live
births per year in Florida. The increase in
abortions could be even greater if the
amendment invalidates laws requiring parental
consent before minors undergo abortions and
those ensuring only licensed physicians
perform abortions. There is also uncertainty
about whether the amendment will require the
state to subsidize abortions with public funds.
Litigation to resolve those and other
uncertainties will result in additional costs to
the state government and state courts that will
negatively impact the state budget. An increase
in abortions may negatively affect the growth of

14
 state and local revenues over time. Because the
fiscal impact of increased abortions on state
and local revenues and costs cannot be
estimated with precision, the total impact of the
proposed amendment is indeterminate.

(App’x at 382).

Because the State claimed not to be revising the Statement

pursuant to the circuit court’s order, it made no effort to comply with

it. (App’x at 224). On its face, the revised Statement violates both the

order and precedent of this Court. For example, the revised

Statement is devoted in large measure not to the required probable

fiscal impact, but to speculative prognostication on the impact of

potential future litigation on reproductive care, in what is a rather

obvious attempt to put a thumb on the scale in precisely the way the

court's precedent forecloses. See, e.g., Legis. Dist. Boundaries, 2 So.

3d at 165–66 (prohibiting speculation about future litigation);

Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Repeal of High Speed Rail Amend., 880

So. 2d 628, 629 (Fla. 2004) (“Due to the use of the word ‘could’ in the

first sentence, the financial impact of the amendment is not

expressed in terms of the ‘probable financial impact.’”); In re Advisory

Op. to Att’y Gen. re Pub. Prot. from Repeated Med. Malpractice, 880

So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting statement including contingent

phrasing); In re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Authorizes Miami-Dade

15
& Broward Cnty. Voters to Approve Slot Machines in Parimutuel

Facilities, 880 So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting statement

including contingent phrasing).

D. The First District dismisses the case as moot.

The day after the Conference adopted the revised Statement, the

First District ordered the parties to show cause why the appeal was

not moot. (App’x at 401). The State argued that the case was not moot

and the question of the justiciability of Financial Impact Statements

should be resolved because “[t]here is precious little time for a new

lawsuit to proceed through the courts, the central issue in which

would continue to be whether there is authority to review a financial

impact statement in the first place.” (App’x at 409).

While the parties agreed that the appeal was not moot because

the question of the circuit court’s authority to enter and enforce the

order was still at issue, and because the matter was of great public

importance and likely to recur, the First District dismissed the

appeal, holding: “Here, the order on review is based on a financial

impact statement that is no longer operative. No judicial

determination or action remains for the circuit court based on the

complaint before it.” Floridians Protecting Freedom, 2024 WL

3491704, at *2.

16
 This ruling’s effect is that the State can moot any court order,

and evade judicial review, simply by reconvening the Conference and

adopting a new Statement—no matter how minor the revision, how

long it takes, or how unlawful the revised Statement.

As explained below, this is not the law. The State’s unilateral

revision of the Financial Impact Statement violates the text of section

100.371(13), which contemplates judicial review of Financial Impact

Statements and provides for the revision of those Statements only

when ordered by a court.

IV. NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT

The Petitioners ask this Court for the issuance of a writ of quo

warranto invalidating the revised Financial Impact Statement for

Amendment 4 as unlawful because the Respondents lacked legal

authority to adopt it.

V. ARGUMENT

Quo warranto is warranted because section 100.371(13) does

not authorize the House Speaker and Senate President to sua sponte

reconvene the Financial Impact Estimating Conference, nor for the

Conference to revise a Financial Impact Statement outside the

judicial process. Because the State lacks authority to unilaterally

17
revise a Financial Impact Statement and avoid the judicial oversight

contemplated by law, this Court should invalidate the unlawfully

revised Statement.

A. There is no textual authority for a Financial Impact

Statement to be revised outside the judicial process.
Under section 100.371(13)(c)(1) of the Florida Statutes, the

House Speaker and Senate President each have the authority to

appoint a person from their respective “professional staff” to the

Financial Impact Estimating Conference. They also have the

authority to interpret, implement, and enforce public-notice

requirements for Conference meetings. § 100.371(13)(c), Fla. Stat.

They do not have any textual authority to order a Conference to

convene, reconvene, or consider revisions to an adopted Financial

Impact Statement. Yet that is what they did here. (App’x at 83).

Similarly, the work of the Conference itself is circumscribed by

the text of section 100.371(13). The Conference’s task is triggered by

its “receipt of a proposed revision or amendment to the State

Constitution by initiative petition from the Secretary of State.”

§ 100.371(13)(a), Fla. Stat. Within 75 days, it must “complete an

analysis and financial impact statement to be placed on the ballot of

the estimated increase or decrease in any revenues or costs to state

18
or local governments and the overall impact to the state budget

resulting from the proposed initiative.” Id. Once the Financial Impact

Estimating Conference has adopted a financial impact statement, it

must submit the statement to the Attorney General and Secretary of

State—which it did here. Id.; App’x at 8-9.

While the Constitution is silent on whether the Financial Impact

Statement appears on the ballot, “[t]he statute contemplates that the

financial impact statement will be placed on the ballot with the

related proposed amendment unless it is not judicially approved.”

Minimum Wage, 285 So. 3d at 1278. Section 100.371(13) provides

that “[a]ny financial impact statement that a court finds not to be in

accordance with this section shall be remanded solely to the

Financial Impact Estimating Conference for redrafting.” It also

provides the process for doing so: “The Financial Impact Estimating

Conference shall redraft the financial impact statement within 15

days.” Id.

The Conference thus has the authority to initially adopt a

Financial Impact Statement in exactly one scenario: when the

Secretary of State notifies the Conference that a citizen-initiative

petition has met the criteria for review. And the Conference has the

authority to revise a Financial Impact Statement in exactly one

19
scenario: when ordered to do so by a court of original jurisdiction.

One scours the Florida Statutes in vain for any language purporting

to authorize what the State did here.

Simply put, no provision in either the Florida Constitution or

the Florida Statutes authorizes the Conference to reconvene except

by court order. Thus, other than provisions related to this Court’s

review of Financial Impact Statements—which no longer apply in

light of Minimum Wage—the only avenue set forth in the statute for a

Financial Impact Statement to be revised is after remand following a

challenge in a court of original jurisdiction. Indeed, this is how the

State itself understood its authority before this case.3

Although the Legislature may be able to provide, by general law,

for a different process, it did not do so here. Rather, the Senate

President and House Speaker simply sua sponte reconvened the

3 See, e.g., Financial Impact Estimating Conference (10/19/23),

https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/10-19-23-financial-impact-
estimating-conference-public-workshop-amendment-to-limit-
government-interference-with-abortion/ at 2:13:48 (“[Amy Baker:]
[the Supreme Court] can [give the Financial Impact Estimating
Conference the opportunity to revise a financial impact statement]
and we can’t . . . [W]e could proceed ahead saying there’s no way for
us to get to reasonable numbers at this point, and see if the Supreme
Court sent it back to us and said do you guys want another
opportunity to review it. [Supreme Court advisory review of financial
impact statements] is no longer the case, so I don’t know if they would
feel that they could even do that at this point.”).

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Conference, and the Conference unilaterally adopted a new

Statement. Nothing in the text of section 100.371(13) allowed them

to do so.

Ironically, it has been the State’s approach in this litigation to

selectively ignore some statutory provisions, while demanding that

other provisions be followed to the letter, even to illogical results.

That is the whole (albeit flawed) logic behind the First District’s

decision in All Voters Vote, which the State has taken to its extreme.

All Voters Vote relies on outdated language in the statute outlining

the process that used to apply to the approval of Financial Impact

Statements when reviewed by this Court (if this Court did not issue

an advisory opinion by the 75th day before the election, the statute

deemed the Statement automatically approved). All Voters Vote, 328

So. 3d at 1150. Despite this Court’s discussion in Minimum Wage

about the availability of declaratory relief, the State has read All

Voters Vote to mean that every Financial Impact Statement is now

automatically approved, with no judicial review allowed. If the State’s

position is that the statute strictly applies no matter what, then it is

hard to see how the State can argue that it has authority under the

statute to do something the statute does not authorize.

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 The State’s lack of authority to unilaterally revise a Financial

Impact Statement does make good sense. Consider the chaos caused

by the alternative: the State could change Financial Impact

Statements on a whim, at any time, for any reason—providing

sponsors, litigants, and the public little or no time to digest the

Statements or to challenge them before they are irrevocably placed

on the ballot. This is not the “scheme” the Legislature enacted for the

preparation and publication of Financial Impact Statements.

Minimum Wage, 285 So. 3d at 1279.

Regardless, the policy implications are not for this Court to sort

out. If the Legislature wants to allow for unilateral revisions to

Financial Impact Statements (assuming the constitutionality of any

such law), it must do so through a duly enacted general law. The

State currently has no authority under section 100.371(13) to

unilaterally revise a Statement. For the simple reason that the statute

does not allow the State to do what it did, quo warranto is warranted.

B. This Court should issue the writ.

Revising the Financial Impact Statement outside the oversight

of the circuit court allowed the State to disregard this Court’s

precedent as well as specific directions in the circuit court’s order (1)

not to include speculative references to litigation that dominate the

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revised Statement; (2) to announce the Statement’s purpose, which

is never made clear; and (3) to justify any departures from the

Conference’s original analysis—which the revised Statement

completely reverses. (App’x at 60-68). Because the Conference and

its principals improperly convened and adopted a revised Financial

Impact Statement without any statutory authorization, each of these

actions was invalid.

And the effects are dire. Despite Petitioners’ diligent efforts to

expeditiously resolve the issues with the financial impact

statement—Petitioners simply want a fair and accurate presentation

of Amendment 4 on the ballot—precious little time remains for

effective relief before the election. Petitioners immediately filed suit.

They sought summary judgment as soon as possible. They asked the

First District to pass the appeal through to this Court. They agreed

to expedited resolution of the State’s appeal and filed their brief

within 5 days (over a weekend).

And yet. Ballot printing deadlines are beginning to approach.

Even beyond this practical problem, the State has imposed an

artificial deadline, under All Voters Vote, at which time whatever

Financial Impact Statement they choose is “deemed approved” by

statute, rendering any pending challenges moot. 328 So. 3d at 1150;

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App’x at 237 (“Here, the circuit court could not grant any effectual

relief for a very simple reason: Florida law provides that, if

‘the Supreme Court has not issued an advisory opinion on the initial

financial impact statement” by the 75-day deadline, ‘the financial

impact statement shall be deemed approved for placement on the

ballot.’ § 100.371(13)(e)2., Fla. Stat.”).

The State thus claims unfettered authority to—at any time, and

to any degree that suits it—revise Financial Impact Statements, moot

legal challenges, and have such sua sponte revisions automatically

considered approved for placement on the ballot. This contradicts the

Sponsor’s constitutional right to an accurate ballot presentation,

voters’ rights to clear and accurate ballot language, and the

judiciary’s constitutional and statutory authority to review Financial

Impact Statements. The State’s extratextual revision of the Financial

Impact Statement was not authorized by law and should therefore

not appear on the ballot.

VI. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, this Court should grant this Petition.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9.045

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 I certify that this petition complies with the font (Bookman Old

Style 14-point) and word-count requirements. This filing contains

5,859 words, which is within the 13,000 word-limit prescribed in Fla.

R. App. P. 9.100(g).

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Michelle Morton

Margaret Good
Michelle Morton FBN 81975 FBN 97931
Daniel B. Tilley FBN 102882 Margaret Good Law, PLLC
Samantha J. Past FBN 1054519 P.O. Box 5083
ACLU Foundation of Florida Sarasota, FL 34277
4343 West Flagler Street, Suite 400 (941) 313-7485
Miami, FL 33134 [email protected]
(786) 363-2714
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]

Nicholas L.V. Warren

FBN 1019018
ACLU Foundation of Florida
1809 Art Museum Drive, Suite 203
Jacksonville, FL 32207
(786) 363-1769
[email protected]
Counsel for Petitioners

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has

been furnished to counsel for all parties by email this 24th day of July,

2024.

/s/Michelle Morton
Michelle Morton
Counsel for Petitioners

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