Rueschemeyer Differentmethodscontradictoryresults

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Different Methods Contradictory Results? Research On Development and

Democracy
Article in International Journal of Comparative Sociology · January 1991

DOI: 10.1177/002071529103200102
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International Journal of Comparative Sociology XXXII, 1-2 (1991)
Different Methods
Contradictory Results?
Research On Development
and Democracy1
DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER *
ABSTRACT
During the past three decades, research on the conditions of democracy and its relation
to capitalist development has proceeded in two different methodological modes: quantitative
cross-national research stands side by side with qualitative comparative historical studies. The
results of these two modes of research diverge as much as their methods. This paper describes
the two research traditions, reflects on their methodological choices, and proposes ways in which
to reconcile them.
IN THE STUDY OF MACRO-SOCIAL phenomena, two radically dif

ferent research traditions coexist with each other-cross�national statistical
work and comparative historical studies. This may be-and is often-seen as
just another instance of the age-old opposition between quantitative and
qualitative inquiry or, more radically, between social science and humanistic .
scholarship.
A minority of scholars-among them Jeffery Paige (1975), John Stephens
(1979), and Charles Ragin (1987)-have long insisted that the two research
modes should complement and be integrated with each other rather than
treated as irreconcilable opposites. This paper seeks to make a contribution
along those lines. It examines the contradictions between the two modes of
work in one setting-in research on the relation between socioeconomic
development and democracy-and seeks to reconcile them.
This is an ideal setting for exploring and reconciling the methodological
oppositions because the two research traditions produced sharply different fin
dings on the relation between capitalist development and democracy. At the
same time, since the issue carries considerable weight, the methodological and
Department of Sociology and Center for the Comparative Study of Development, Brown
University, Providence, RI 02912, U.S.A.
10 DIETRICH RUESCH EM EYER
substantive differences cannot easily be dismissed as just an esoteric scholarly

dispute. Leaving them unresolved creates powerful cognitive dissonance.
The relationship between capitalist development and democracy has been
the object of political argument and broad analyses in political philosophy since
at least John Stuart Mill, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Marx. More recently, the
assertion that capitalism and democracy are so closely related as to be virtually
identical has become a commonplace of western political discourse. Ironically,
while this was a major theme of cold war rhetoric, a very similar proposition
has been central to the views of Lenin, though he gave it a very different slant:
Democracy, while proclaiming the rule of the many, in fact protects the
interests of capital owners. Therefore, democracy is the characteristic form
' of
capitalism.
A mere glance at the historical record suggests that the questions sur
rounding the relationship of capitalist development and democracy do not
allow for such simple answers. The twentieth century has made the problem
even more complex than it was already in the nineteenth. Our century offers
many examples of capitalist political economies that prospered without
democracy; many were in fact ruled by harshly authoritarian political regimes.
South Korea and Taiwan after the Second World War come to mind as well
as, in recent decades, such Latin American countries as Brazil and Chile. And
even Nazi Germany and the various fascist regimes in Europe between the two
Word Wars do not exhaust the list. On the other hand, virtually all full-fledged
democracies are associated with capitalist economies, and virtually all are
creatures of the twentieth century. This century of repressive regimes vastly
more burdensome than any known in history is also the century of democracy. 2
For several decades now, the conditions of democracy have been subjected
to careful and systematic empirical research in sociology, political science, and
history. After the Second World War, when Nazi Germany was defeated,
when Stalinist rule had conquered Eastern Europe, and when virtually all
former colonies became independent "new states", social scientists devoted
very considerable energies to identifying the conditions that make democracy
possible and likely. More recently, the return of democracy to such countries
as Spain, Portugal and Greece as well as advances of democratization in Latin
America gave this research a new impetus (see, e.g., O'Donnell, Schmitter
and Whitehead 1986). The results of these decades of research are in many
ways impressive. We can with confidence go beyond quite a few commonplace
views that still inform much of the public discussion on democracy and its
chances. But neither are the results of these nearly two generations of research
conclusive. In particular, the impact of capitalist development on the chances
of democracy is still controversial in social science.
Quantitative cross-national comparisons of many countries have found
consistently a positive correlation between development and democracy. They
thus come to relatively optimistic conclusions about the chances of democracy
in the developing countries of today. By contrast, comparative historical
studies that emphasize qualitative examination of complex sequences tend to
RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY 11
trace the rise of democracy to a favorable historical constellation of conditions

in early capitalism. Their conclusions are therefore far more pessimistic about
today's developing countries.
The contradictory results of the two research traditions represent a thorny
problem precisely because they derive from different methods. Given con
trasting methodologies, is it possible to find valid criteria for evaluating the
inconsistent findings? What are the avenues of research that promise to tran
scend the contradictions of qualitative and quantitative strategies? It is this
impasse and the questions it generates that I want to address in this paper.
First, I will offer a selective account of both research traditions.
Comparative Historical and Cross-National Quantitative Research On

Development and Democracy
Early Quantitative Cross-National Studies. Seymour Martin Lipset pub

lished in 1959 a now classic paper linking democracy to economic develop
ment. It opened a long line of increasingly sophisticated quantitative cross
national studies. Lipset's theoretical position derived from the nineteenth cen
tury classics of social theory, especially from Durkheim and Weber but also
from Marx, combining a systemic conception of society with a revised version
of social evolutionism. In many ways, his approach to the problems of develop
ment resembled that of modernization theory. At the same time, Lipset did not
subscribe to the value determinism and the equilibrium assumptions that came
to characterize especially later versions of modernization theory as well as his
own later work. He combined a systemic view of social change with a resolute
focus on divergent class interests and conflict.
Lipset begins with the observation that greater economic affluence in a
country has long been thought of as a condition favorable for democracy:
"The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustail)
democracy" (Lipset 1959/1980, p. 31). He then proceeds to put this idea to
the test by cross-national comparison. He compares European and Latin'
American countries on the interrelated dimensions of wealth, industrializa
tion, education, and urbanization and demonstrates that European stable
democracies scored on average higher in all of these dimensions than European
dictatorships. Examples of the indicators he uses are per capita income,
telephones per 1000 persons, percent of people employed in agriculture, per
cent literate, and percent living in cities of different sizes. A comparison of
democracies and unstable dictatorships with stable dictatorships in Latin
America comes to very similar results at a lower level of development.
In his theoretical account for these relationships, . Lipset focuses on
moderation and tolerance. Education, he contends, broadens one's outlook,
increases tolerant attitudes, restrains people from adopting extremist doc
trines, and increases their capacity for rational electoral choice. Increased
wealth moderates the lower classes and thus makes them more prone to accept
gradual change. Actually, it is the discrepancy in wealth rather than its overall
12 DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER
level that is decisive, but since there is generally more inequality in poorer
countries these two factors are closely related. In countries with great inequal
ity of wealth, the poor are more likely to be a threat to the privileged and the
established order. The rich in turn tend to be hostile to democracy, both
because they feel threatened and because they often view it even as morally
wrong to let the poor and the wretched participate in political decisions-an
arrogant attitude which in turn feeds the resentment of the poor. Thus, the
middle class emerges as the main pro-democratic force in Lipset's analysis,
and this class gains in size with socioeconomic development. In sum, Lipset
argues that industrialization leads to increases in wealth, education, communi
cation, and equality; these developments are associated with a more moderate
lower and upper class and a larger middle class, which is by nature moderate;
and this in turn increases the probability of stable democratic forms of politics.
Subsequent studies employed far more refined statistical techniques. But
they confirmed the positive relation between development and democracy.
While they explored alternative as well as complementary hypotheses and
sought to detail the causal mechanisms underlying the connection between
development and democracy, they added little to a more comprehensive inter
pretation of this relationship.
Phillips Cutright (1963) brought correlational-and more generally
multivariate-analysis to bear on these problems. He argued that averages of
different social and economic indicators are far too crude a measure of develop
ment, discarding the more precise information available. Furthermore, dif
ferences in the character of the political order must not be just crudely
classified because they then cannot be related with any precision to the quan
titative information on social and economic conditions: "It makes little dif
ference that in the verbal discussion of national political systems one talks
about shades of democracy if, in the statistical assessment, one cannot
distinguish among nations" (Cutright 1963, p. 254).
Cutright constructed scales of economic development, of "communica
tions development" as well as of "political development" or, in effect,
democracy, each combining several specific measures.3 He then subjected
these quantitative scores for 77 countries to a correlational analysis. The cor
relation between the indices of communication development and democracy
(or political development) was r . 81, while the correlation of democracy with
=
economic development was . 68, significantly lower. Cutright concluded that

his main hypothesis-that political institutions are interdependent with the
level of social and economic development-was confirmed.
The theoretical account Cutright offered for these findings is simple and
not fully developed. More strongly than Lipset's it reflects the assumptions of
modernization theory-of evolutionism and functional system integration.
National societies are conceived as interdependent systems with strong
equilibrium tendencies. Greater division of labor and structural differentiation
in economy and society demand more complex and specialized political institu
tions, if the system as a whole is to be in equilibrium. He considers represen-
.i
tative democracy as the form of government sufficiently complex to dea with

a modern, increasingly heterogeneous social order. This identificatim of
representative democracy with political differentiation is also the reasm why
the title of his paper speaks of "political development" rather than demr.::racy.
In any less than perfect correlation, many countries will stand signifcantly
above or below the regression line. Relative to its level of social or economic
development a country may have "too much" or "too little" democracy.
Commenting on this, Cutright offered on the one hand a number of ad hoc
hypotheses explaining such "deviations" from a presumed equilibrium. For
instance, he speculated, democracy may have flourished in the Western
Hemisphere more than in Europe because of the absence of large-scale interna
tional conflict. And he suggested that case studies focus on deviant cases in
order to gain further insights into the particular conditions favoring or hinder
ing "political development".
On the other hand, he turned the mathematical equation representing the
overall relations between social, economic and political development in all 77
countries into a "prediction equation":
The concept of interdependence and the statistical method of this study (lead) us to con
sider the existence of hypothetical equilibrium points toward which each nation is moving.
It is possible for a nation to be politically overdeveloped or underdeveloped, and w: suggest
that either political or non-political changes will occur to put the nation into equibrium.
(Cutright 1963, p. 264)
This prediction presupposes an e� tremely tight integration of national systems.

It furthermore implies the assumption that the social and economic develop
ment indicators represent the structural conditions that in the long run are
decisive for the chances of democracy. However, these factors cannot explain
on their own why any d�viations-from the predicted configuration should exist
in the first place. Other conditions, such as those considered in the ld-hoc
hypotheses, become then by implication merely temporary obstdes to
representative democ;atic forrrls of government or passing favorale CIr-
cumstances. ."' ; .,
Six years later, ,c;utright,,'and Wiley (1969) published a study that
responded to a number of questions raised by critics. It constituted a signifi
cant advance in qu�ntitative ,comparative research on democracy. They
selected 40 countries that were self-governing throughout the period from 1927
to 1966, thus excluding the effects of foreign occupation and colonial rule on
the form of government. This�represents a small, but significant advance
toward the ideal of employing units of analysis that are independent of each
other-a technical presupposition of causal inference from correlational
analysis that can never be fully met for hu�an societies,
.
especially in the twen-
tieth century. "", "
With this sample of countries they studied democracy in relation to social
and economic development in four successive decades, 1927-1936, 1937-1946,
1947-1956, and 1957-1966. In this way they were able not only to examine the
same relationships in four different periods but also to subject the question of
14 DIETRICH RUESCH EM EYER
causal direction to a "cross-lagged" correlational test. Their conclusion: The

positive association between social and economic development and democracy
holds for all four decades, and the data suggest a causal priority especially for
economic development.
The analysis then turned to the conditions of change in political represen
tation over time. What accounts for stability of regime form in the face of social
and economic change? And which factors are associated with declines in
political representation, which occur in spite of the fact that literacy rates and
energy consumption, the indicators of social and economic development,
hardly show similar declines? Here a simple measure of social security provi
sions, based on the age and number of national social security programs,
proved illuminating.
Changes in political representation were virtually confined to nations that
rated low in the provision of social security and at the same time high in
literacy. This led Cutright and Wiley to a revision of Cutright's earlier
equilibrium theorem which predicted that countries with a political representa
tion "too high" or "too low" in view of their level of social and economic
development would decline or increase in political representation. Only
nations high in literacy and low in social security provisions conformed to this
expectation. Where literacy as well as social security were low, little or no
change was observed. Neither did any significant political change occur in
countries with high social security, whatever their levels of literacy.
The interpretation of these results given by Cutright and Wiley stayed as
close as possible to the original equilibrium model: Economic development
entails division of labor and social differentiation to which representative
democracy is the most adequate constitutional response. This functionalist
argument is now complemented by a causal hypothesis concerning social
development: increasing literacy and related aspects of social change foster a
population's interest and capability in political participation and thus
engender pressures for democratization.
The stabilizing effect of social security provisions, which constitutes the
main new finding, is explained by two ideas, the second of which is only obli
quely hinted at. First, satisfying maj or economic interests of the population
strengthens people's allegiance to the political status quo, independent of con
stitutional form. Demands for democracy, in this view, derive their strength
from unmet economic needs. The second explanation can be combined with
the first, but it is a sharply distinctive argument once fully developed. The
capacity of a government to deliver social security programs can be taken as
an indication of a strong and effective state apparatus, and-so I interpolate
the argument-such state apparatuses may be strong enough to maintain the
constitutional status quo: strong enough to defend itself against forces in
society demanding a voice in collective decision making, effective enough to
"bribe" them into quiescence, and even powerful enough to crush them.
Retreat from Comprehensive Theoretical Interpretations. Subsequent
studies changed and refined the indicators for democracy4 as well as the
measures of social and economic development, they analyzed different samples

of countries, and examined constitutional change over time. More important,
however, was a subtle but significant shift in the relation of these studies to
issues of theory. Typically, they explored propositions derived from alternative
theoretical views of the relation between development and democracy, con
sidering now in addition to modernization theory also the more conflict
oriented ideas of world-system and dependency theories. At the same time,
they tended to refrain from such broader theoretical interpretations as offered
by Lipset and Cutright and focused more and more on specific testable
hypotheses.
Ken Bollen's work, arguably the most careful of this type, brought further
methodological refinements together with confirmation of the basic empirical
generalizations. Bollen also responds to a wider range of theoretical
arguments. His paper on "Political Democracy and the Timing of Develop
ment" (Bollen 1979), takes off from the skepticism about any clear-cut rela
tionship between socioeconomic development and democracy that we will
encounter when we turn to the comparative-historical studies. To anticipate,
this view sees favorable conditions for democracy rooted in the particular
historical constellation of early capitalism, and it maintains that such favorable
conditions are not going to be repeated.
Bollen formulated this as the hypothesis that "the earlier a country begins
to develop, the higher its level of democracy", noting that one could well argue
the opposite by virtue of a diffusion of the democratic ideal over time which
would exert more pressures for democracy in late developing countries. Using
two different measures for the "beginning" of development, he found no
significant association between the timing of development and political
democracy. The interpretation of this negative finding is carefully left open.
It could, for instance, be the result of the opposite-and mutually canceling
effects of different factors associated with the timing of development. ,
His analysis demonstrates again a rather robust association between /
economic development and democracy. This is especially significant because '

he examines a very large sample of 99 countries and because he employs a dif
ferent set of indicators for political democracy. The association between
political democracy and economic development was fundamentally unaffected
by this different operationalization.
�. '
Bollen's study also throws light on the role of cultural factors and on the
impact of state strength on democracy. He found political democracy to be
positively associated with the proportion of Protestants in a country and
negatively with the fraction of domestic economic production used for govern
ment expenditures. Both of these results are simply reported as empirical fin�
dings; their theoretical interpretation is left open.
Quite a few cross-national statistical studies have dealt with specific condi
tions or consequences of democracy-such as its relation to economic ine
quality (Lip set 1959/80; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Muller 1988; 1989; Weede
1989; Bollen and Jackman 1989) or to a country's dependence on other coun-
tries in transnational economic relations (Thomas et al. 1979; Bollen 1983;

Muller 1985). The details of these complex and often contradictory research
findings need not detain us here.
A last quantitative study to be reviewed here departs from the cross
sectional mode of analysis of earlier work. Hannan and Carroll ( 1981) seek to
identify social and economic correlates of transitions from one formal political
structure to another. This "event-history method" partially confirms, par
tially modifies and complements the findings of cross-sectional research. Han
nan and Carroll found that in the 90 countries studied for the period from 1950
to 1975, only a few of the variables examined had significant effects on the
transitions from one of four political forms to another. High levels of economic
production were negatively, ethnic diversity positively associated with overall
rates of change in political form. The most stable political structure were multi
party systems: Of the 39 countries with multi-party political structures in 1950,
28 had such a system still (or again) in 1975. In line with what one would
expect from cross-sectional analyses, Hannan and Carroll's event-history
analysis showed that richer countries are less likely to move from multi-party
politics to political centralism, but the same holds for transitions away from
centralized political forms: "Stated loosely, successful countries retain their
political strategies. " (Hannan and Carroll 1981, pp. 30-31). Ethnic diversity
was not only found to destabilize formal political structures in general, but had
a particularly negative effect on democracy: It was especially associated with
transitions out of multi-party systems and with changes into one-party
regImes.
The whole gamut of quantitative cross-national research was dismissed by
many and attacked as inadequate by a few. Its empirical conclusions as well
as its-generally sparse-theoretical grounding, primarily in modernization
theory, were sharply contradicted by investigations that focused on the
histories of a few countries and analyzed them in the light of more complex
theoretical arguments. These studies were critical of the ahistorical quasi
evolutionary generalizations that informed modernization theories. Their own
common ground in theoretical conception has been characterized by a focus
on long-term effects of past conflicts and historical structures, by a search for
the critical collective actors in historical change, and by an emphasis on the
changing world historical environment of national histories. I offer a sketch of
some of these comparative historical works before turning to an evaluation of
both strands of research.
Early Comparative Historical Investigations. Karl de Schweinitz ( 1964)
formulated a theoretical position that sharply contradicts the notion that
today's advanced capitalist countries represent the future state toward which
less developed countries will travel on roads roughly similar to the paths taken
by the "early developers" . Democracy as known in the west was in his view
the privilege of the original capitalist countries. Here economic development
was slow. Its decentralized character encouraged liberal political conceptions
and ideals. The working class was not yet mobilized. There was no demonstra-
tion effect from neighboring more advanced countries that would have
stimulated individual and collective consumption demands. Thus, it was far
easier than in today's developing nations to impose the disciplines of con
sumption, of work, and of public order that are necessary for economic
development.
Later developing countries need a stronger state also for a numbel of
other reasons-among them a very different international economic envion
ment, which is likely to trap the less advanced countries in unfavorable psi
tions in the transnational division of labor, and new technological options hat
can be exploited only with larger lumps of investment than private savngs
can sustain. The pressures toward more state power go beyond economic Oll
siderations and necessities. States in late developing countries also have mre
reason to intervene repressively because their rapidly changing societieSlre
more mobilized. At the same time, they have more effective means-militry
and police technology, modern systems of communication and transportatin,
as well as better forms of organization-to impose the three disciplines of cn
sumption, work and public order. If that imposition succeeds, democrac is
not very likely since democratization now depends largely on the values ad
intentions of the ruling groups. If it does not succeed, neither developrent
nor democracy have good prospects. de Schweinitz concludes (1964, p.
10-11) :
"The development of democracy in the nineteenth century was a function of an unsual

configuration of historical circumstances which cannot be repeated. The Euro-Amei.can
route to democracy is closed. Other means must now be devised for building new
democratic states."
The remainder of the book makes clear that he sees the possibilities of
developing democratic political structures as limited indeed.
Two generations earlier, in 1906, Max Weber voiced an opinion on the
chances of bourgeois democracy in Russia that is similarly skeptical md
roughly akin in its reasoning. While his passionate sympathies lay witl the
struggle of the liberal democrats in Russia, his analysis of the impat of
capitalism on the Russian economy and especially on the Russian agrrrian
structure led him to a rather negative prognosis.
True, the bureaucracy of the autocratic regime of the Tsar would hardly
survive the tensions and conflicts of capitalist transformation: "As far as the
negative side of the problem is concerned, the view of the 'developmental
theorists' will be right. The Russian autocracy of the past has ... by any human
estimate no choice but to dig its own grave" (Weber 1906, p. 350). But that
does not mean that it will be replaced by a democratic regime. The project of
democratization would have to rely primarily on the power of western ideas,
while it faces overwhelming structural obstacles. These obstacles are in Weber's
view firstly grounded in the conditions of the Russian political economy, partic
ularly in its agrarian problems. But the progress of democratization is also not
favored by the character of advanced capitalism itself, which begins to penetrate
- -
------- - ----�------------------------- ----
the Russian economy. Capitalism in the twentieth century represents in

Weber's judgement an increasingly hostile environment for freedom and
democracy: "It is completely ridiculous to attribute to today's advanced
capitalism an elective affinity with 'democracy' not to mention 'freedom' (in
any meaning of the word)." Successful democratization in Russia now has to
overcome obstacles that derive from the political and economic problems of
late and uneven capitalist development as well as from the changed character
of capitalism anywhere. Its only hope are in Weber's view the ideals of
bourgeois liberal reform-a slender reed to lean on.5
An even more skeptical view of the relation between capitalism and
democracy that applies to early capitalism as well, can be inferred from his
analysis of the role of law and bureaucracy in the rise of capitalism. Here
Weber (1922/1968) argues for a functional correspondence or "elective
affinity" between early, competitive capitalism and the predictability of for
mally rational law and bureaucratic administration. Formal rationality and
thus predictability are compromised by substantive demands of justice.
Democracy, however, is in Weber's view precisely the institutional arrange
ment through which such substantive demands are invading and transforming
the pure formalism of law. In critical ways, then, democracy and even early
capitalism were at odds with each other.
More Recent Comparative Historical Work. Guillermo O'Donnell (1979)
sought to explain authoritarian developments in South America during the
1960s and 1970s that seemed at odds with the optimism implied in moderniza
tion theory. Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and other countries turned away from
democratic constitutional forms at fairly high levels of development and, he
argued, for reasons precisely related to their comparatively advanced stage of
development. O'Donnell's analysis was based on a political economy
framework, roughly comparable to that of Max Weber and de Schweinitz. He
gave particular attention to the economic and political dependence of a late
developing country on the developed core of the capitalist world economy and
to the responses of the state and of class-based politics to the problems
engendered by this dependency.
Import substitution industrialization (lSI) had expanded the urban middle
and working classes and brought to power populist coalitions which
deliberately activated popular forces, particularly through labor organization,
and included them in the political process. Economic growth underwrote the
costs of social welfare policies. However, the progress of "easy", or "horizon
tal" (i. e., consumer goods) import substitution behind high tariff walls
depended on growing imports of capital goods, paid for by exports of primary
goods. This development strategy ran into trouble when the foreign exchange
reserves accumulated during World War II were exhausted, and both prices
and demand for Latin America's primary exports declined in the 1950s. The
severe balance of payments problems caused domestic inflation. Attempts to
impose stabilization policies hurt the popular sectors, divided the populist
coalitions, and created political crises.
The growth of lSI had also enlarged the number and range of technocratic
roles in the public and private sectors. Prominent on the minds of these
technocrats was the "deepening" of industrialization, i.e., the creation of a
capital goods industry. However, successful pursuit of this strategy entailed
reduction of popular consumption in order to generate higher domestic invest
ment levels (as taxation of the wealthier sectors was not even considered as a
realistic alternative) and attraction of foreign capital. The crucial obstacles in
this path were militant labor movements and populist politicians. This con
stellation led to the formation of a coup coalition among civilian and military
technocrats and the big bourgeoisie. They discarded democracy as incompati
ble with further economic development and installed bureaucratic
authoritarian regimes. These regimes insulated economic policy makers from
popular pressures and deactivated unions and left-wing political parties, by
force if necessary. Thus, it was exactly in the more advanced of the Latin
American countries that particularly harsh authoritarian rule was imposed in
the 1960s and 1970s.
O'Donnell asserted on the basis of these findings an "elective affinity"
between advanced capitalist development in dependent political economies
and bureaucratic authoritarian rule. Though the wider and longer-term
significance of such developments is treated with caution, his perspective is
radically different from the optimism of much of modernization theory:
It is impossible to say, without systematic comparative research, but it is a disquieting

possibility that such authoritarianisms might be a more likely outcome than political
democracy as other countries achieve or approach high modernization. (O'Donne11 1979,
p.90)
O'Donnell places great emphasis on a country's dependent position in the

international economic system. Dependency theory-as well as its close
cousin, world system theory (see Wallerstein 1974 and 1976)-generally tend /
to see economic dependence as creating pressures toward authoritarian rule

(see, e. g., Chirot 1977; Thomas 1984).
Seven years before O'Donnell's book, Barrington Moore, Jr., had pub
lished The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966). This was no doubt
the most important comparative historical research on development and
political form, and it achieved paradigmatic influence in the field.
Through historical case studies of six countries-England, France, the
United States, Japan, India, and China-and extensive research on two more,
Germany and Russia, Moore identifies three distinct paths to political moder
·
nity, each characterized by specific conditions: the path to parliamentary
democracy, the path to fascist dictatorship, and the path to communist dic
tatorship. These three routes, he argues, are not alternatives that are in princi
ple open to any society. Rather, they are tied to specific conditions
characteristic of successive phases of world history. Thus he sees the conditions
favorable for democracy-like Weber and de Schweinitz-bound up with the
historical constellation of early capitalism: "the route that ended up in
capitalist democracy was itself a part of history that almost certainly will
not be repeated" (Moore 1966, p. 5).
A strong concern with historical particularity and process leads Moore to
a principle that informs all of his interpretations and explanations: Past con
flicts and institutional structures have long-term effects and are of critical
importance for later developments. Any attempt to explain current change
without attention to these' continuing effects of past history-any "presentist"
analysis-is doomed to fail.
Moore's specific analyses proceed in the by now familiar political economy
framework: Economic change, state structures and state actions, and social
classes are the central categories. The study focuses on peasants and lords,
though the bourgeoisie is given a critical role as well. Moore's emphasis on the
role of the rural classes derives, of course, from the principle of long-term
effects of past history.
In his conceptions of rural class conflict, the distinction between labor
repressive and market-dominated modes of labor control plays a crucial role.
This has found striking support in a study of agrarian social movements in
contemporary developing countries by Jeffery Paige (1975). Paige found that
the most radical agrarian movements emerged when a landlord class relied on
coercive labor policies while facing a cultivating class that derived its income
primarily from wages rather than directly from the land and that was able to
organize for collective action.
Moore asks of his cases a number of central questions, and it is these ques
tions that constitute the core of his theoretical framework. The analysis focuses
(1) on the strength of the state in relation to the power of landlords and
bourgeoisie, (2) on the incidence of repressive agriculture for which the
landlords need the help of the state, (3) on the relative strength of the rural and
the urban dominant classes, (4) on the alliances of domination among the
crown and the dominant classes, alliances shaped by the relative strength and
the interests of these partners in power, and (5) on the chances of the peasantry
to come to collective action depending on the presence or absence of solidary
village and work structures.
The conditions for the route to communist revolution can now be listed in
skeletal fashion: a highly centralized state, a weak bourgeoisie, a land-owning
class that relies on political means of labor repression, and a peasantry with
good chances of collective action that are due to solidary village communities
and weak ties to the-often absent-landlords. This picture bears a striking
similarity to the sketch of the factors Weber considered relevant in the early
stages of the Russian revolution. The communist take-over occurred in Russia
only after the system of domination broke down in the revolution at the end
of World War I, which was fueled by peasant discontent.
Moore's view of the conditions for the reactionary revolution from above
that ends in fascist dictatorship can be put in similarly apodictic form as
follows: A coalition led by a strong state and powerful landowning classes
includes a bourgeoisie that is not without some strength but depends on the
support of the state through trade protectionism, favorable labor legislation and
other measures that in different combinations characterize top-down, state
sponsored industrialization. Agricultural labor remains significantly controlled
by repressive means rather than primarily through the market. Due to village
and work structures that do not favor solidarity, the peasant revolutionary
potential is low. The internal tensions and contradictions of industrialization
under reactionary sponsorship lead to experiments with democracy that do not,
however, yield results acceptable to the dominant classes. Fascist repression is
the final outcome. The similarity of this path to the developments in Argentina
and Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s did not escape the notice of O'Donnell. In
fact, he explores the broader theoretical implications of his own analysis
precisely by linking it to Moore's work and by extending Moore's ideas beyond
the cases of Japan and Germany (O'Donnell 1979, pp. 88-90).
The emergence of parliamentary democracy represents the oldest route to
modernity. The picture Moore offers here is more complex than in the case of
the other two routes. Conflict and a fairly even balance of power between the
lords and the crown are a first condition. A strong bourgeoisie, at odds in its
interests with the rural dominant class and even able to entice landlords into
commercial pursuits, is of critical importance: "No bourgeoisie, no
democracy" (Moore 1966, p. 418). Moore also notes that in all three cases of
democratic development studied there was a revolutionary, violent break with
the past, unsettling the established domination of landlords and crown. Other
conditions that emerged as significant in the rise of communist revolution and
fascist dictatorship show, however, no clear-cut pattern in the histories
representing the democratic route: While labor-repressive agriculture was pres
ent in France and the United States, English agriculture relied rather
exclusively on the market. The capacity of rural labor for collective action-the
revolutionary potential of the peasantry-was high in France but low in
England and the United States.
On the case of India, Moore takes a�imilar position as de Schweinitz:
There are complex conditions that allow the institutional legacy of post-colonial
democracy to survive. But due to the limited compatibility of freewm and effi
ciency under current conditions, Indian leaders have to face cuel choices
between effective democracy and effective development.
Moore's analysis is open to a number of quite important criticisms (see, for
instance, SkocpoI1973). One takes off from the apparently innocuous fact that
the time periods taken into account for the different countries vary considerably
in length. While the cases of democratization are pursued over very long time
periods, the discussion of Japan and Germany breaks off with the establishment
of fascism. This can be defended only by arguing that post-war democratization
in these two countries was exclusively a res�lt of foreign imposition, which in
turn is-like all questions of international context in Moore's analysis
excluded from the explanatory framework.
If this exclusive focus on domestic developments is modified and if the time
periods considered are adjusted in" theoretically meaningful ways, it is possible
�'"
to argue that the reactionary path to political modernity has some potential for
leading-by tortuous detours-to democratic political forms. This argument
goes far beyond the cases of Japan and Germany. France came at various points
in the nineteenth century quite close to the reactionary path model, yet it rightly
figures as one of the main cases of democratization.6 Spain, Portugal and
Greece as well as Argentina and Brazil may well be seen as instances of a similar
development toward democracy in the twentieth century (Rueschemeyer 1980).
Yet, these as well as other critiques notwithstanding, Moore's book
represents a towering achievement. It helped transform the social sciences by
reestablishing the comparative historical mode of research as the most
appropriate way of analyzing macro-social structures and developments.
Two Modes of Research-Contradictory Results
Our review of quantitative cross-national and comparative historical

studies on the relation between capitalist development and democracy has
shown us results that rather consistently contradict each other. We are faced
with a serious dilemma because the two research traditions are separated by two
things at once: by opposite findings and by different methods.
The first research tradition covers many countries, takes for each country
only a minimum of standardized, aggregate, but not always reliable informa
tion into account, and translates that information-on occasion not with great
delicacy-into numerical expressions in order to subject it to complex
mathematical operations. It sees the quantitative analysis of a large number of
cases as the only viable substitute for the experimental approach that is impos
sible in macro-social analysis.
The other tradition studies only a few countries at a time, and while the
complexity of their analyses far exceeds the possibility of testing the explanatory
propositions with so small a number of cases, these works are attentive to many
factors suggested as relevant by common sense and theoretical argument; they
treat historical particularity with care; they give weight to the historical genesis
of social and political structures and developments; and they betray an attrac
tive awareness of long-term historical developments in different parts of the
world.
The gulf between these methodological conceptions was-and is-so deep
that the work of the other side was often easily dismissed if it was noticed at all.
There is little justification for this. Both sides grapple with difficult, yet fun
damental methodological issues that are hard to do justice to at the same time;
and each side makes different strategic decisions on which issues are to be given
the most attention and which are to be treated with relative neglect.
The quantitative cross-national research, which we respect for its breadth
of coverage, the objectivization of analysis, and the quantitative testing of
specific hypotheses, has come to a number of consistent results. The outstand
ing finding is that there exists a stable positive relationship between
socioeconomic development and democracy.
The comparative historical tradition of research, which we respect for its

analyses of historical process and for the sophistication of theoretical argu
ment, is by contrast extremely skeptical of the chances of democracy in con
temporary developing countries. These authors not only deny that there exists
a consistent and theoretically plausible relationship between democracy and
development, capitalist or otherwise, but they also see the odds of democracy
especially in developing countries as extremely unfavorable. They find the
main reasons for this world historical change since the first rise of capitalism
in the different and more powerful role of states (including the expansion and
transformation of the military forces) in both less developed and advanced
industrial countries, in the different balance of power between dominant and
subordinate classes and different patterns of class alliance in less developed
countries, and in the different transnational environment in which late-coming
nations have to advance their projects of development.
How can this dilemma-created by contradictory results of different
research methods-be resolved? Before that question is approached, one point
should be made clear. This is not a conflict between divergent quasi
philosophical, "meta-theoretical" positions, as was argued for different
theories of the state by Alford and Friedland (1985). In that case the conflicting
analyses would simply talk past each other. The contradictory results at issue
here can in our view be confronted with each other much more directly; they
are in principle open to resolution on the basis of empirical evidence. This,
too, is the way in which they have been treated in the past-by Max Weber
no less than by Ken Bollen. I will first turn to some methodological arguments
and reflections, giving emphasis to those that challenge the widely accepted
monopoly of the quantitative cross-national methodology, and then seek to
arrive at a judgement about the best foundations of a strategy of resolving the
contradictions.
Methodological Reflections
Critique and Counter-critique. A convenient starting point for examining'

"
the contradictions between the two research traditions is O'Donnell's critique

of cross-national statistical research, one of the rare responses from a com
parative historical scholar to the other side. O'Donnell argues, first, that causal
inferences from quantitative cross-national evidence imply the assumption that
the causal conditions which affect the chances of democracy today are the same
as those which shaped democratic developments during the early rise of
capitalism, an assumption that may well be wrong. This argument, of course,
invokes the fundamental claim made by all the comparative historical analysts
we reviewed-that democratic developments were rooted in a historical con
stellation not likely to be repeated. However, quantitative research results
make it difficult to sustain the lines of argument that have been advanced so
far. Bollen (1979), as we have seen, found no consistent relationship between
the timing of development and democracy or, more precisely, none that over-
. >l.�"
'>;i>,
rides the association between democracy and level of development. Further

more, the statistical association between democracy and level of development
holds even if the most advanced industrial countries are excluded from the
analysis (see, e.g. , Cutright 1963, p. 258; Marsh 1979, p. 238). That means
it cannot be "explained away" by a strong association between democracy and
the highest levels of development achieved by the early modernizers. 7
Next O'Donnell charges that if "deviations" from the central tendency
identified by multivariate analysis are dismissed as due to idiosyncratic
obstacles, "the basic paradigm is rendered immune to empirical falsification"
(O'Donnell 1979, p. 5). This objection seems rooted in the comprehensive
interest in each case characteristic of comparative historical research; rather
than dismissal, the deviant case deserves special attention. The objection is
plausible in the context of comparative historical analysis. It is not convincing
as a critique of the statistical approach, which focuses on a number of variables
while randomizing as much as possible the effects of others. True, in the early
work of Cutright (1963) we encountered interpretive arguments, wedded to the
neo-evolutionism and the equilibrium assumptions of modernization theory,
that fit O'Donnell's charge rather exactly. However, Cutright himself adduced
the evidence for very important modifications of the assumed equilibrium
tendency (Cutright and Wiley 1969). And later studies no longer viewed the
statistical associations as confirming complex macro-trends, but used them
rather to test specific hypotheses.
O'Donnell also charges the quantitative studies with what he calls the
"universalistic fallacy" -the assumption that since in a set of all or most con
temporary countries "some positive correlation between socio-economic
development and political democracy can be found, it may be concluded that
this relationship holds for all the units (say, regions) included in that set"
(O'Donnell 1979, p. 6). This raises the same question about uniform condi
tions of democracy across different regions as we just considered for different
periods of time. The argument is central to O'Donnell's view of South
America, where it seemed at the time that "political authoritarianism-not
political democracy-is the more likely concomitant of the highest levels of
modernization" (O'Donnell 1979, p. 8). Though nothing is wrong with this
idea of regionally variant conditions in logic or theoretical principle, it is con
tradicted by the evidence of quantitative studies that varied in regional
inclusiveness but not in the dominant result of a positive association between
level of development and democracy. Given our present knowledge, it may be
more reasonable to warn regionally specialized scholarship-such as Latin
American studies-against the "particularist fallacy" of disregarding the
results of more comprehensive analyses than to press the dangers of a univer
salist fallacy against the claims of quantitative cross-national research.
O'Donnell makes a quite valid point when he argues that variations within
a country are not taken into account when cross-national analyses are based
on average per capita figures for domestic production, educational attainment
etc. It is quite true, for instance, that the growing wealth of some segments of
;2,1:RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY 25
the population affects national averages quite strongly even though nothing
may have changed in the economic condition of the vast majority; in fact, such
a development renders the groups that do not participate in the higher
standard of living even less-rather than more -capable of making their
interests count in political decisions.
However, one may see such inattentiveness to intra-country variation as
a discrepancy between the indicators used and the theoretically relevant
variables-an error in measurement. And it is well known that measurement
error, unless it systematically favors the hypothesis under review, has the
counter-intuitive effect of deflating correlations. This also applies to the-often
quite debatable-indicators of social and economic development and political
democracy. Bad measures make it harder, not easier to confirm a hypothesis.
Another argument of O'Donnell constitutes, however, a powerful critique
with far-reaching consequences: It is highly problematic to draw diachronic con
clusions about changes over time and thus about causation from cross-sectional
analyses. The same idea-that genetic, causal questions require historical
information about processes rather than cross-sectional data on a given point
(or short period) of time-was the starting point of a seminal paper by
Dankwart Rustow (1970) that developed a simple process model of
democratization whose phases moved from prolonged and inconclusive strug
gle through elite compromise to habituation. The systematic exploration of
causal conditions through comparative analysis of historical sequences is a cor
nerstone of the reconciliation of approach here advocated.
It is true that several quantitative cross-national studies did take the
historical dimension into account, however minimally and crudely (Cutright
and Wiley 1969; Bollen 1979; Hannan and Carroll 1981). The findings of
these studies are suggestive for further analyses that search for genetic, pro
cessual explanations. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that causal explana
tions cannot be tested directly with cross-sectional studies and that it is
diachronic propositions and studies of historical sequence that are needed for
settling the issues of a causal interpretation of cross-sectional findings.
Where, then, do these rather complex arguments leave what we may take
as established conclusions of the quantitative cross-national studies? One
massive result of these studies still stands: There is a stable positive association
between social and economic development and political democracy. This can
not be explained away by problems of operationalization. A whole array of dif
ferent measures of development and democracy were used in the studies under
review, and this did not substantially affect the results.
This result cannot be invalidated either by arguing that it may not apply
to certain regions of the world. Nor can it be explained by diffusion from a
single center of democratic creativity, though some associations of democracy
with former British colonial status as well as the proportion of Protestants were
found by Bollen (1979). It also cannot be explained by a particularly close cor
relation between development and democracy at the highest levels of develop
ment, because samples consisting only of less developed countries exhibited
substantially the same patterns. Finally, the close concatenation of level of

development and democracy cannot be accounted for by a special association
between early modernization and democracy since the explicit inclusion of
measures of the timing of development did not significantly affect the relation
ship between level of development and democracy.
Yet as the tale of storks and babies often told by statisticians suggests, any
correlation-however reliably replicated-depends for its meaning on the con
text supplied by theory and accepted knowledge. The relation between
statistical finding and theoretical account is decidedly asymmetrical. The
theoretical explanations we encounter in the cross-national studies do not gain
any particular credibility from the sturdiness of the findings for which they give
an account. They are, to put it most starkly, pure conjecture. This is so by
logical necessity, though it also finds support in well-founded reservations
about the theoretical models most often used. In sum, the quantitative findings
are compatible with a wide range of explanatory accounts.
The causal forces that stand behind the relationship between development
and democracy remain, in effect, in a black box.B The explanations offered in
the early quantitative research adopted the then prevailing assumptions of
modernization theory. But nobody can maintain that this in any way followed
from the statistical results. The correlations between development and
democracy constitute an empirical generalization-not more and not less. In
regard to the theoretical account of the conditions of democracy, this empirical
generalization plays a role that is critically important and at the same time
strictly limited: It has a veto power over certain explanations-those that are
at odds with it, but it does not determine the choice between various theoretical
accounts that are compatible with it.
Quantitative cross-national research also has yielded a number of results
that have less definite and often quite ambiguous implications. These concern,
for instance, the possible negative impact of state strength on the chances of
democracy, the role of cultural tradition and diffusion or the effects of
economic dependency. We can best treat these as important suggestions for
further analysis, because the relationships emerged only in one or a few studies
and were contradicted by others or because it is not clear what exactly is
measured by the empirical indicators used.
There are no similarly explicit and refined critiques of the comparative
historical approach as O'Donnell mounts against the cross-national quan
titative work. That does not mean that comparative historical research is
generally held to stand above such criticism. To the contrary, the very self
understanding of many quantitative social scientists is built on a dismissal of
qualitative evidence as merely anecdotal-interesting for illustration and
perhaps inspiration, but worthless when it comes to establishing results. The
critical claims about comparative historical research implied by this view are
easily listed. Comparative historical research, while theoretically often very
complex, covers too few cases to come to any definitive results about these
theoretical arguments. The choice of cases is often arbitrary, and there is no
protection against a case selection that favors the author' s line of theoretical
argument. In fact, theories are rarely tested in any meaningful sense, because
they are typically developed from facts known in advance. Finally, the lack of
methodological self-consciousness in much comparative historical research is
taken as the symptom not only of a profound unconcern but also of fatal
substantive flaws.
We will take up some of the specifics of this critique in our discussion
below. Here it is sufficient to make only a few fundamental points. The first,
already made earlier, is excellently developed in Ragin's recent examination
of comparative methods, both quantitative and qualitative (Ragin 1987): both
comparative historical case studies and variable-oriented quantitative research
must answer to the same fundamental standards, and both meet them-imper
fectly-in different ways and with different strengths. The second is that the
near-consensus of the comparative historical studies on the extremely limited
chances of democracy after a favorable phase in the course of world history is
at odds with the most robust finding of cross-national quantitative research.
That consensus opinion must be dismissed, and the contrary result of the
quantitative studies must be considered an established empirical generalization
with which all accounts of democratization have to come to terms. This does
not, however, follow from inherent flaws of comparative historical research;
rather, it is our considered judgement after comparing the two traditions of
research. Our third and final claim is that in principle comparative historical
research is equally able to come to similarly pivotal results.
The Comparative Advantage of Historical Analyses
How are we going to develop an empirical theory about development and

democracy that is credible in the light of general sociological knowledge,
capable of accounting for the central relationship between development and
democracy established by the cross-national quantitative research, and promis
ing for further research into the conditions of democracy and for the inter
pretation of ambiguous and opaque findings? It is our conviction that we must
turn to the richer theoretical reasoning of the comparative historical tradition
if we want to lay the groundwork for an adequate theory of the conditions of
democracy. We take this position in spite of the fact that so many of the
qualitative historical works came to conclusions about the relation of
democracy to development in today's world that are at odds with the quan
titative empirical evidence. That their conclusions went' far beyond the
evidence actually examined in these studies may or may not be taken as an
indictment; it does point to the problem inherent in theory-oriented com- '
parative history just mentioned: the number of cases is too small for the
number of variables considered. The contrast between intellectual complexity
and the limited number of cases is indeed a basic dilemma of the comparative
historical search for explanation and theory. , .
There are several reasons why nevertheless the comparative historical

tradition of research on democracy appears to offer the best foundation for con
structing a satisfactory theoretical account of the conditions of democracy.
First, it is far richer in theoretical argument and analysis than the macro
quantitative studies. This is true whether we compare it with the quantitative
studies that-like Cutright's-seek to support a broad systemic interpretation
or with the later res�arch trying to test specific hypotheses. This theoretical
richness is not an accident: "One of the most valuable features of the case
oriented approach . . . is the fact that it engenders an extensive dialogue
between the investigator's ideas and the data" (Ragin 1987, p. 49). Second,
and more specifically, the political economy orientation of the works reviewed
has proven fruitful in a number of similar areas of inquiry-for instance in
comparative work on inequality, on socioeconomic development, and on state
intervention in civil society. Finally, these studies developed their explanatory
ideas grappling with historical sequences, and we are convinced that it is in
sequences of change that we will find the key to the black box that mediates
the relation between development and democracy. Historical sequence studies
are generally best attuned to the necessities of a genetic, causal explanation.
This claim will appear to many social scientists at first sight counter-intuitive.
Further reflection will perhaps make it more plausible.
What are the specific chances of insight, which the particular blind spots
of the two modes of research? My basic position on the methodological side
of the impasse between them was already stated: Neither side has an obvious
superiority in principle, and neither can be dismissed. Rather, each has made
choices when confronted with a situation that did not allow obedience to all
mandates of methodology-not even to all major mandates-at the same time.
Each side had to pay for its peculiar strengths with equally characteristic
weaknesses.
Further reflection may usefully begin with the theoretical implications of
a single case pursued over time. All too often it is taken for granted that the
theoretical utility of studying one single case is extremely limited. It can inspire
hypotheses, this argument says, but so can sheer imagination. It can perhaps
force a reconsideration of those propositions contradicted by this singular set
of unique facts, but it cannot go beyond that. This view overlooks that a par
ticular sequence of historical development may rule out a whole host of possible
theoretical accounts, because over time it typically encompasses a number of
different relevant constellations. The continuity of a particular system of rule
can for instance invalidate-by its very persistence under substantially chang
ing conditions-quite a few claims about the conditions of stable domination.
Such an effect presupposes, of course, that there are reasoned expectations,
that the interrogation of the historical record is theoretically informed. This
impact of a single case analysis is strengthened by the fact that for one (or a
few) cases it is possible to match analytic intent and empirical observations
much more precisely than in an analysis covering many cases with the help of
standardized indicators. Case-centered research can examine the particular
"
'
context of seemingly si�ple facts and take into account that their analytic
meaning often depends on that historic context. It is these two features of
historical analysis that led E. P. Thompson to insist on the " epistemological
legitimacy of historical knowledge . . , as knowledge of causation" and to
speak-somewhat obliquely and perhaps extravagantly-of "history as a pro
cess inscribed with its own causation" (Thompson 1978, pp. 225,226).
Yet if the theoretical utility of the narration and analysis of even a single
case must not be dismissed, a focus on historical lines of change does carry its
own problems. Studying change within the same society implicitly holds cons
tant those structural features of the situation that do not actually change during
the period of observation. It is for this reason that process-oriented historical
studies-even if they transcend sheer narrative and are conducted with
theoretical, explanatory intent-often emphasize the role of voluntary d�cision
and tend to play down-by taking them as givens-structural constrairts that
limit some options of historical actors and encourage others.
If O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p. 19) claim that in recent tralsitions
from authoritarian rule ' 'what actors do and do not do seems much les tightly
determined by 'macro' structural factors during the transitions we stuly h ere
than during breakdowns of democratic regimes" , they may indeed ofer us a
fascinating empirical generalization. But the fact that their conclusiOl to the
studies of "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule" (O'Donnell, Schmiter and
Whitehead 1986) emphasizes themes congenial with a volmtarist
perspective-such as political divisions within the authoritarian regim� pacts
of "soft-liners" in government with parts of the opposition, and the se!llences
and turns of liberalization that could have taken a different course-nay also
derive from the design of this project, which had at its center a series of ountry
monographs covering a relatively short period of time.
Ragin claims that comparative historical case studies are generally
inhospitable to struCtural explanations while " wide-ranging cross-national
studies, by contrast, are biased in favor of structural explanations" (Ragin
1987, p. 70). There is little doubt about the latter assertion. In fact, cross
national statistical research has no choice but to be structurally oriented.9 The
former, however, truly holds only for single-case historical accounts. The
voluntaristic bias of case oriented research is counterbalanced by comparison.
Even in single-case studies comparative awareness and especially a longer time
span of investig�don can�logically analogous to cross-country
comparisons-make )he structural conditions " of different event sequences
more visible. �·
It is, however, actual compa�ison of 2;ses featuring different structural
conditions that really turns things around. Even a few ' comparisons have a
dramatic effect of di�ciplining explanatory accounts. Moore's (1966) classic
study does not stana alone as a case-oriented comparative inquiry that
illuminates the role of structural constraints. In fact, most of the comparative
historical studies we h�ve revie�ed share a strong focus on structural condi
tions. Clearly the strategy of case selectio� acquires critical importance here,
·
because the range of cases examined determines which outcomes and which
potential causal conditions can be comparatively studied. 1 0 Case selection is a
more important concern in comparative historical research than in quan
titative cross-national studies because the latter typically reach for the largest
number of cases for which the relevant information is available. Rational case
selection depends primarily on a sound theoretical framing of the issues.
Ragin (1987) sees the special strength of comparative historical research
in its particular aptitude to deal with two phenomena-multiple causal paths
leading to the same outcome, and different results arising from the same factor
or factor combination, depending on the context in which the latter operates.
He sees this as a powerful advantage because he considers multiple and "con
junctural" causation as the major reasons for the peculiar complexity of social
phenomena and especially of large-scale social phenomena.
Why should the comparative case strategy have a special strength in deal
ing with this causal complexity? Since each case is viewed both on its own
terms and in comparison, alternative causal conditions for the same or similar
outcomes stand out with special clarity in comparative historical work, while
macro-quantitative studies tend to view their cases as a causally homogeneous
population of units. This is closely related to what we observed about the rela
tion between indicator and analytical concept. The case-oriented approach has
a strong comparative advantage in taking context into account-both in assess
ing the character of an event-say an insurgent social movement-and in
evaluating its causal impact within a historical situation. Again, it is clear that
good, theoretically guided case selection is critical for making full use of these
advantages.
Finally, the comparative historical method allows the exploration of
sequence and this, as claimed earlier, is indispensable for causal analysis. The
claim deserves more comment. While a causal condition obviously has to
precede its result in time, historical depth is not so obviously required. It is
logically quite conceivable that the outcomes we wish to explain result from
conditions located in the most immediate past. However, macro-social
research has taught us two lessons, which make it problematic to take this
logical possibility for granted. We have learned that (1) sequence often matters
and (2) structural conditions, once settled, often resist transformation. It may,
for instance, matter a great deal for the outlook and the organization of the
working class whether universal suffrage came early or late in the process of
industrialization (Katznelson and Zolberg 1986), and-once set-different
patterns of class consciousness and readiness to organize may be hard to
change.
Neither sequence effects nor historical persistence can be counted on a
priori. We need to know much more about the conditions under which lasting
patterns form, change, and break down before we can use historical persistence
as an explanatory principle; and the same goes for sequence effects. We do, how
ever, have sufficient knowledge to treat them as heuristic principles. As heuristic
principles they privilege certain research strategies and cast doubt on others.
What we know about sequence effects and structural persistencies in large scale
social change make ' 'presentist" explanations profoundly problematic. There
fore causal exploration in macro-social analysis requires the study of fairly long
time periods, it requires comparative historical work. ! !
Our insistence on the importance of comparative historical sequence
studies for developing and testing genetic and causal theories will not go
unchallenged. There is not only the argument of "too few cases, too many
variables" . There are also arguments presenting cross-sectional quantitative
studies as particularly suitable for causal inference. These consider the factors
that in a large cross-sectional set of cases are associated with a dependent
variable as those most important in the longer run (see Bollen 1979, p. 583;
also Bollen and Jackman 1989). If the number of cases is large enough for
"accidental" variations to balance each other out, this argument maintains,
it is precisely a cross-sectional analysis that will best reveal the major structural
determinants of variation in the dependent variable-here democracy.
It is clear that this assertion presupposes a causal homogeneity of the
universe of cases as well as long-run equilibrium tendencies. It also assumes
a close correspondence of diachronic and synchronic relations among
variables. Without such premises, which make the sharp differentiation
between short-run and long-run, "accidental" and "major" causal factors
possible, the goal of ' 'reading off" the major causal factors from cross-sectional
statistical patterns is logically impossible. Even with these presuppositions,
that project remains deeply problematic. If there is more than one way to
account for the same results, we encounter again the black box character of
these findings. Quantitative research can sometimes help to adjudicate
between competing theories (which more often than not were developed and
given credible standing in qualitative research), but often this hypothesis
testing runs into tremendous difficulties because such research must work with
crude and ambiguous indicators the context of which is necessarily excluded
from the analysis.
All this is not to deny the very considerable value of quantitative research
results. It is certainly true-and bears repetition-that established cross
sectional results represent limits with which any genetic, causal explanation
has to be reconcilable. This must be added to the obvious and powerful argu
ment that cross-sectional studies-the prime case of available large-scale quan
titative work-reduce even if they do not fully avoid the perennial problem of
macro-social research that the number of cases is small and the number of
potentially relevant variables large. This remains a major difficulty of the com
parative historical strategy, a difficulty put into perspective but not eliminated
by the arguments just developed.
A Methodological Strategy Outlined
What is the upshot of these considerations? Fundamentally, I want to

plead for taking comparative historical work more seriously in the search for
adequate causal accounts. Careful comparative historical investigations are

necessary to go beyond the black box character of quantitative analyses based
on correlations among variables. Even if this point is accepted, a wide range
of strategies remain reasonable and fruitful. For instance, it is possible to com
plement cross-national statistical research with carefully chosen historical
studies of critical cases. And there are quite a few other options. I want to close
with a plea for a strategy that gives much more weight to comparative
historical research. I do think that the results of the cross-national quantitative
studies of the correlates of democracy must play a role in any adequate account
of the conditions of democracy. But it appears that better returns can now be
expected from shifting the emphasis in future work decisively toward com
parative historical analysis.
The strategy may be called a strategy of "analytic induction", a mode of
research that can be observed in practical use in several of the comparative
historical works reviewed. 1 2 It breaks with the conventional view that research
based on one or a few cases can at best stimulate some hypotheses, while only
research on a large number of cases can test them. On this view, case
studies-even careful comparative case studies-are irrelevant for the valida
tion of theoretical ideas. They belong to the " context of discovery" rather than
the "context of validation" -along with anything else that might stimulate
intelligent ideas, from reading novels and philosophical treatises to the enjoy
ment of food, wine and bright conversation. Yet this radical separation of
validation from an essentially arbitrary process of " discovery" is manifestly at
odds with the ways we come to reasonably reliable knowledge in everyday life
or to historical knowledge that transcends the single case at hand and can be
used in historical explanation.
Analytic induction employs in a self-conscious and disciplined way the
same strategies we see used in everyday life and in sophisticated historical
explanation. Yet it has a more explicitly analytic orientation. It begins with
thoroughly reflected analytic concerns and then seeks to move from the under
standing of one or a few cases to potentially generalizable theoretical insights
capable of explaining the problematic features of each case. These theoretical
generalizations are then tested and retested in other detailed case analyses.
Committed to theoretical explanation and generalization, analytic induc
tion builds its arguments from the understanding of individual histories. The
complex features of successive cases--with each factor remaining embedded in
its historical context and therefore more adequately interpretable-serve as
empirical "road blocks" that obstruct arbitrary speculative theorizing. In the
overall process of theory building, they are the logical equivalent of the stand
ardized coefficients relating a few selected variables in large scale quantitative
research.
The speculative element, and even arbitrariness, can never be fully
eliminated from such case-based theory building. But neither does the opposite
strategy, quantitative cross-national research, ever really lose its black box
character when it seeks to account for its findings. Ideally, such inductive com-
parative historical research should include a large number of cases, both to

reduce the dilemma of many variables and few cases and to counteract the
inclination, quite frequently found in case-oriented work, to make a strong and
counter-intuitive point from one particular investigation.
A critical feature of successful analytically inductive research is the initial
theoretical reflection. This may take the form of an explicitly developed
theoretical framework of concepts, questions, guiding ideas, and hypotheses.
Yet even if the theoretical foundation is not announced with special fanfare,
we can usually identify it with little difficulty. Barrington Moore, for instance,
clearly worked with a consistent conceptual grid centered around economic
change, the state, and social classes (and especially rural social classes); he used
such ideas as the long-term consequences of past conflicts and developments
as orientations for all his case analyses; he asked of each case a set of
theoretically grounded questions about the relative strength of the major
historical actors and about their pacts and conflicts; and he deployed certain
hypotheses-for instance about the chances of revolutionary collective action
of peasants-repeatedly as he then turned to the main task: the case-by-case
analyses from which he arrived at the three models of political routes into the
modern world.
Theda Skocpol, a student and critic of Moore, made in her justly famous
critique of "Origins" these intellectual structures visible and subjected them
to a searching evaluation. Her own book on social revolutions (SkocpoI1979)
opens with a critical assessment of alternative theoretical approaches and in
effect constructs a full-scale theoretical framework that insists on a structural
rather than voluntarist explanation of revolutions, on the salience of interna
tional and world-historical contexts, and on the potentially autonomous role of
the state. It is with this set of concepts and theoretical premises that she then
enters the analysis of the French, the Russian and the Chinese revolutions as
well the non-revolutionary developments in Britain, Prussia/Germany ,and
Japan.
Such a theoretical foundation of analytically inductive research has not
only the function of stating explicitly which questions are asked, how they are
framed conceptually, and what the theoretical premises of the analysis are. By
giving reasons-preferably empirically grounded reasons-for these decisions
and premises, it establishes continuity with earlier scholarship. It is critical to
fully appreciate this point, because here lies one reason why the credibility of
analytic induction is far greater than one could possibly justify with the often
only few cases studied. As in everyday life we can gain powerful insights from
a few encounters because these are assessed against the experience of a lifetime,
so the theoretical framework-when informed by previous thought and
research-provides the background against which the picture of the cases
studied yields more telling results. To put it slightly differently, a carefully
developed theoretical foundation also eases the thorny problems of any
macro social analysis that derive from the small number of cases; for it taps the
results of earlier inquiries. 13
Substantively, such a framework for the analysis of development and

democracy would include the major empirical generalizations that emerged
from past quantitative research. Its conceptual and theoretical structure, how
ever, should benefit tremendously from past comparative historical work.
Especially promising seem the political economy approaches that have
informed the work of Weber as well as Moore and O'Donnell. Above all,
democracy must be conceived as first and foremost a matter of power. There
fore the power balance in society, its institutional interrelations with the
apparatuses of the state, and the impact on both of the international distribu
tion of power are critical components of any theoretical framework adequate
to the task.
A theoretical framework of this kind does not represent unchangeable
assumptions. It does not constitute a "metatheory" in the sense of a set of
premises upon which the validity of any finding is contingent. True, any
theoretical framework, whether explicitly recognized or not,., structures
analytic attention and thus is more open to some findings than others. But even
a carefully developed framework must not be given a privileged status by
which the subsequent findings would be protected from criticism that is based
on other premises. Developing a theoretical framework in self-conscious detail
should in fact make it easier to identify possible blind spots in the subsequent
analyses.
The theoretical framework, once developed on the basis of earlier research
and argument, then informs the comparative case investigations, and it will in
turn be specified and modified through these analyses. The result is, on the
one hand, a set of historical cases accounted for with a coherent theory and,
on the other, a set of propositions about the conditions of democracy that have
been progressively modified and are consistent with the facts of the cases
examined as well as with the preceding research taken into account.
NOTES
This is an adapted version of a chapter in D. Rueschemeyer, K Stephens and]. Stephens,

Capitalist Development and Democracy . Cambridge: Polity Press forthcoming. The ideas
presented benefitted greatly from discussion with students i n graduate and undergraduate
seminars at Brown, with Charles Ragin and especially, of course, with my coauthors. I also
enjoyed, and acknowledge with deep gratitude, the hospitalit y of th e Center for Advanced
Study Berlin and the stimulating company of its fellows in 1 987-1988.
2 The concept of democracy emp loyed here and in most of the research reviewed below is
a conventional one. Eschewing conceptions based on the most far-reaching ideals of
democratic thought-of a government thoroughly and equally responsive to the
preferences of all its citizens (Dahl 1971) or of a p olity in which human beings fulfill them
selves through equal and active participation in collective self-rule (Macpherson 1973)-it
focuses on the state' s responsi bility to elected representatives, on regular free and fair elec
tions based on comprehensi ve suffrage, and on the freedom of expression and association.
3 The index of political development, to illustrate, is the sum of points given a country for
each of the 21 years from 1940 to 1960 according to the following rules: two points for a
parliament with more than one p arty, in which one minorit y p arty had at least 30 percent
of the seats; one point for a multi-party parliament that violated the 30 percent rule; no
points for parliaments without the above characteristics (including non-party parliaments),
for parliaments that do no exercise self-rule (for instance in colonies), and for systems with
out a parliament; one point for a chief executive elected directly or indirectly under conditions
satisfying the 30 percent rule, half a point for a chief executive selected by other methods,
including colonial appointment; no point for hereditary rulers and chief executives who
abolished a multi- party parliament.
4 Cutright' s index of political development was primarily determined by the length of time
a country had an elected parliament and an elected head of the executive. Cutright and
Wiley (1969) did not change this emphasis on longevity. This was criticized by Deanne
Neubauer (1967). Others have made the more general point that both Lipset and Cutright
- by focusing on stable democracies-confounded the democratic character of a political
order and its stability, so that their results could very well tell us as much about the stability
of any regime as about the conditions of democratic government (see, e. g. , Bollen 1979).
For a discussion of different measures of democracy and their empirical interrelations see
B ollen (1980) and B ollen and Grandjean (1981).
5 For the preceding see Weber (1906 , p.34 7). Weber' s position on the relation between
democracy and capitalist development is rather misrepresented when Lipset (195 9/1980,
p. 28) writes, referring to the same essay on democracy in Russia: " Weber . . . suggested that
modern democracy in its clearest form can occur only under capitalist industrialization. "
At best, this characterization fits Weber' s view of the consequences of early capitalism,
which he saw-together with Europe' s overseas expansion, the ascendance of scientific
rationalism as the hegemonic world view, and cultural ideals derived from Protestantism
as fostering freedom and democracy (Weber 1906, p.348).
6 It is, however, a case with a very different historical development than we find in England
or the United States. Theda Skocpol (1973) has pointed out that M oore' s three instances
of democratization really represent three profoundly different paths, rather than one com
mon route toward democracy.
7 While this point is critical for our overall assessment of the merits and accomplishments of
the two research traditions, it out not to be understood as a rej ection of O'Donnell' s argu
ment in principle. It is logically and theoretically quite possible that the mix of causal condi
tions changes over time. The specific claim that democracy becomes less and less likely is
indeed at odds with B ollen' s findings; but it is q uite possible that a different mix of causal
conditions has similar outcomes in the twentieth as in the nineteenth century.
8 We are aware that we use this appealing metaphor somewhat more loosely than is done in
physics.
9 As Ragin explains: "Not only is human agency obscured in studies of many cases, but the
methods themselves tend to disaggregate cases into variables, distributions, and correla
tions. There is little room left for historical process-that is, for the active constructi� n by
humans of their history" (Ragin 198 7, p. 70).
10 Certain case selections and choices of time horizon can also favor a focus on process and
agency. This is demonstrated by O'D onnell and Schmitter' s (1986) work on redemocratiza
tion and Linz ' s (1978) work on breakdown of democracy. Linz' s extended essay compares
cases in which the democratic regime collapsed and focuses on the events which led up to
the demise of the regime. H is emphasis on process (e. g. "the constriction of the political
arena" ) and agency (e.g. mistakes made by the supporters of the democratic regime) are
direct results of the short time horizon and the case selection. H ad he compared breakdown
cases with those in which democracy survived and/or selected a longer time horizon, for
example comparing the breakdown with later returns to democracy, structural differences
would have appeared as much more important in the analysis. Precisely the same observa
tions could be made about O'Donnell and Schmitter' s essay on redemocratization.
11 See Rueschemeyer (1984, pp.154-156 ) for a discussion of some theoretical treatment of
historical persistencies in the work of Reinhard B endix, another pioneer of the renaissance
of historical sociology in recent decades.
12 The term "analytic induction" goes back to Florian Z aniecki who together with W . I.
Thomas used similar strategies of building and testing theories in smaller scale, social psy-
chological research (Zaniecki 1934). Their conception, however, was narrower than is
intended here, restricted to the method of agreement. The concept was revived in broader
and more i nclusive form i n recent discussions of how macro-historical work relates to
theory building (see for instance Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985, pp. 348-350).
Skocpol and Somers (1 980) and Skocpol (1 984) speak about the same strategy when they
refer to comparative history as " macro-causal analysis" or to p rocedures " analyzing
causal regularities in history. " Ragin (198 7) refers to it as "qualitative comparative
analysis. " Common to all these labels is the point that qualitative comparative analysis can
be a powerful instrument for causal inferences, which j ustifies perhaps broadening the
meaning of the term "analytic i nduction. "
13 This argument does not simply refer to earlier i nvestigations of the same kind. Equally
important is the use of studies on other p roblems that are theoretically related to the issues
at hand. These often concern smaller units of which there are far more cases. In research
on democracy these may concern smaller, and often far more frequent, social units than
countries or nations-unions for example, and other voluntary organizations (see, for
instance, the classic study by Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 195 6). And they may concern
subthemes that constitute only one link in the larger chain of argument. The validity of
such transfers of i nsight and understanding from one context or level of analysis to another
is, of course, not unproblematic; but it can always i tself be made the object of i nvestigation.
Surely it is precisely one of the major raisons d' etre of theory to establish such connections
between different areas of inquiry-to build canals linking the different stores of our
knowledge, as G. Ch. Lichtenberg p ut it in the eighteenth century.
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Different Methods Contradictory Results? Research On Development and

Article in International Journal of Comparative Sociology · January 1991

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IN THE STUDY OF MACRO-SOCIAL phenomena, two radically dif­

substantive differences cannot easily be dismissed as just an esoteric scholarly

trace the rise of democracy to a favorable historical constellation of conditions

Comparative Historical and Cross-National Quantitative Research On

Early Quantitative Cross-National Studies. Seymour Martin Lipset pub­

economic development was . 68, significantly lower. Cutright concluded that

tative democracy as the form of government sufficiently complex to dea with

This prediction presupposes an e� tremely tight integration of national systems.

causal direction to a "cross-lagged" correlational test. Their conclusion: The

measures of social and economic development, they analyzed different samples

economic development and democracy. This is especially significant because '

tries in transnational economic relations (Thomas et al. 1979; Bollen 1983;

"The development of democracy in the nineteenth century was a function of an unsual

the Russian economy. Capitalism in the twentieth century represents in

It is impossible to say, without systematic comparative research, but it is a disquieting

O'Donnell places great emphasis on a country's dependent position in the

to see economic dependence as creating pressures toward authoritarian rule

Two Modes of Research-Contradictory Results

Our review of quantitative cross-national and comparative historical

The comparative historical tradition of research, which we respect for its

Critique and Counter-critique. A convenient starting point for examining'

the contradictions between the two research traditions is O'Donnell's critique

rides the association between democracy and level of development. Further­

substantially the same patterns. Finally, the close concatenation of level of

The Comparative Advantage of Historical Analyses

How are we going to develop an empirical theory about development and

There are several reasons why nevertheless the comparative historical

A Methodological Strategy Outlined

What is the upshot of these considerations? Fundamentally, I want to

adequate causal accounts. Careful comparative historical investigations are

parative historical research should include a large number of cases, both to

Substantively, such a framework for the analysis of development and

This is an adapted version of a chapter in D. Rueschemeyer, K Stephens and]. Stephens,

ALFORD, Robert R. and Roger FRIEDLAND

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IN THE STUDY OF MACRO-SOCIAL phenomena, two radically dif

Early Quantitative Cross-National Studies. Seymour Martin Lipset pub

rides the association between democracy and level of development. Further