JUDICIAL and AMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS order. They argued that under Zoning Ordinance No.
13, Series of
1978, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Resolution No. 705,
Case 1 Series of 2001, and Angeles City Council Resolution No. 3300, Series
Spirito vs. Del Rosario, G.R No. 204964, October 15, 2014 of 2001, the land holdings were classified as agricultural, not
industrial. They argued that as per certifications by the Housing and
“This case is about the petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set
Land Use Regulatory Board dated June 1, 2001, May 28, 2001, and
aside the decision dated September 28, 2012 and resolution3 dated
November 29, 2012 of the Court of Appeals” November 24, 2003, the landholdings were within the agricultural
zone, and there was no zoning ordinance passed that reclassified the
Facts of the Case: area into other land uses.
8. The motion was given due course by the Department of Agrarian
1. In 1978, the City Council of Angeles City, Pampanga, enacted Zoning Reform, this time headed by Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman
Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978, classifying areas in Barangay (Secretary Pangandaman). Hence, on June 15, 2006, then Secretary
Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City, as agricultural land; Pangandaman issued an order granting the motion for
2. Pursuant to this ordinance, Lutgarda Torres del Rosario (del Rosario) reconsideration and revoking the earlier order of then Secretary of
allegedly requested the City Zoning Administrator to exempt from the Agrarian Reform Pagdanganan;
zoning classification Lot Nos. 854 and 855 located in Barangay 9. Del Rosario contended that this order was sent to her through
Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City; Clarita Montgomery in Barangay Margot, Sapang Bato, Angeles City,
3. The request was allegedly approved on March 7, 1980 by Engineer and not at Asperilla’s address in Cubao, Quezon City, which was her
Roque L. Dungca, Angeles City Development Coordinator/Zoning address on record. Del Rosario alleged that she only came to know
Administrator, and the lots were allegedly reclassified as non- of the order on January 26, 2007, when the Provincial Agrarian
agricultural or industrial lots; Reform Officer of Pampanga handed her a copy of the order. She
4. On June 10, 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law then filed her motion for reconsideration of the order dated June 15,
(Republic Act No. 6657) was enacted. 2006. However said motion was denied;
5. On October 10, 2000, del Rosario, through her representative Sylvia 10. Del Rosario filed a notice of appeal before the Office of the
R. Asperilla (Asperilla), filed an application for exemption with the President on March 27, 2008.
Department of Agrarian Reform, seeking to exempt Lot Nos. 854 and 11. On May 7, 2009, the Office of the President, through then Deputy
855 from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite (Deputy
coverage; Executive Secretary Gaite), rendered the decision dismissing the
6. On February 19, 2004, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Roberto M. appeal for lack of merit;
Pagdanganan (Secretary Pagdanganan) issued an order granting the 12. Aggrieved, del Rosario filed a petition for review before the Court
application for exemption. Citing Department of Justice Opinion No. of Appeals arguing (1) that she was denied due process when the
44, Series of 1990, Secretary Pagdanganan stated that lands classified order of Secretary Pangandaman was "erroneously sent to another
as non agricultural before the enactment of CARP are beyond its address" and (2) that the decision of then Deputy Executive Secretary
coverage; Gaite was void since he had been appointed to the Securities and
7. On March 26, 2004, farmers in del Rosario’s landholdings, led by Exchange Commission two months prior to the rendering of the
Remigio Espiritu (Espiritu), filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision;
13. On September 28, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision When respondent filed her motion for reconsideration assailing
granting the petition. The Court of Appeals stated that del Rosario Secretary Pangandaman’s order, she was able to completely and
was indeed prevented from participating in the proceedings that led exhaustively present her arguments. The denial of her motion was on
to the issuance of Secretary Pangandaman’s order when the notices the basis of the merits of her arguments and any other evidence she
was able to present. She was given a fair and reasonable opportunity
were sent to her other address on record;
to present her side; hence, there was no deprivation of due process;
It was also erroneous to conclude that respondent was "denied her
Issue: Whether or not respondent was deprived of due process by reason day in the administrative proceedings below."39 Respondent was
that the order was erroneously sent to another address? able to actively participate not only in the proceedings before the
Department of Agrarian Reform, but also on appeal to the Office of
Ruling: The Court said that respondent was not deprived of due process the President and the Court of Appeals;
While it may be true that respondent was prevented from filing a
timely motion for reconsideration of Secretary Pangandaman’s Bilbao vs. People G.R No.175999,
order, it would be erroneous to conclude that she had been July 1 2015
completely denied her opportunity to be heard;
In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to “The right to due process of the petitioner had been denied to him by
explain one’s side suffices to meet the requirements of due process. Judge Elumba, the trial judge, by not disqualifying himself from sitting on
(Casimiro v. Tandog); and trying Criminal Case No. 17446 despite having participated in the trial
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic as the public prosecutor. Thus, it is necessary for the Court to first
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In determine if the non-disqualification of Judge Elumba prejudiced the
administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural petitioner's right to a fair and impartial trial.”
due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or
the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling Facts of the Case:
complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where 1. The accused assails the affirmance of his conviction for homicide
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or through the assailed decision promulgated on May 27, 2005 by the
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due Court of Appeals (CA).1 The conviction had been handed down by
process. Judge Fernando R. Elumba of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42,
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been in Bacolod City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 17446 entitled People
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or of the Philippines v. Nelson Lai y Bilbao;
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may 2. The petitioner brought the issue that he was deprived of due process
affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard when this case was decided by the honorable presiding judge who
personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and acted as the public prosecutor in this case before he was appointed to
evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal the bench;
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a 3. On appeal, the petitioner focused the CA's attention to the denial of
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty due process to him by the non-disqualification of Judge Elumba, but
as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is the CA upheld Judge Elumba's justifications, stating: As to the fifth
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during assigned error, appellant claims that he was denied due process
the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties because the judge who rendered the assailed decision was also, at
affected;
one time, the public prosecutor of the instant case. First, the record This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold
of this case shows that when the judge, who was then a public neutrality of an impartial judge' as the indispensable imperative of
prosecutor, entered his appearance, the prosecution had already long due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge
rested its case, more specifically, he appeared therein only when the must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an
last witness for the defense was presented, not to mention the fact added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The
that it was a private prosecutor who cross-examined the last witness, litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that
Merlyn Rojo. Thus, it cannot be said that the presiding judge when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give
personally prosecuted the instant case, nor supervised the them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to
prosecution thereof when the same was still pending. Second, settled him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they
is the rule that a petition to disqualify a judge must be filed before will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be
rendition of judgment by the judge. Having failed to move for the no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
disqualification of the judge, appellant cannot thereafter, upon a Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring
judgment unfavorable to his cause, take a total turn about (sic.) and compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair
say that he was denied due process. 'One surely cannot have his cake play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice
and eat it too; where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other
party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be
Issue: Whether or not the accused was deprived of due process when this formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a
case was decided by the honorable presiding judge who acted as the public formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not
prosecutor in this case before he was appointed to the bench. orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script.
Rulings: There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
It is not disputed that the constitutional right to due process of law conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are
cannot be denied to any accused. The Constitution has expressly filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
ordained that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property ORDER OF THE SC: INSTRUCTS the new trial judge to resume
without due process of law." An essential part of the right is to be the trial in Criminal Case No. 17446 starting from the stage just
afforded a just and fair trial before his conviction for any crime. Any prior to the assumption of Judge Fernando R. Elumba as the trial
violation of the right cannot be condoned, for the impartiality of the judge, and to hear and decide Criminal Case No. 17446 with
judge who sits on and hears a case, and decides it is an indispensable reasonable dispatch;
requisite of procedural due process;
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge' as the indispensable imperative of
Bucal Vs Bucal
Gr. No. 206957 June 17, 2015
due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an
“The very essence of due process is "the sporting idea of fair play" which
added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The
forbids the grant of relief on matters where a party to the suit was not given
litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that
an opportunity to be heard”
when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give
them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to
Facts of the Case:
him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they
will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be
1. Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision
no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect;
dated October 16, 2012 and the Resolution dated April 15, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 117731, which
affirmed the Orders dated June 22, 20104 and November 23, 20105 of her RTC Petition in the records of the court, she noticed an
of the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City, Branch 23 unauthorized intercalation praying for visitation rights for Manny.
(RTC) in Protection Order No. PP0-002-10 granting visitation rights 8. After due hearing, the RTC, in an Order dated November 23, 2010
to respondent Manny P. Bucal (Manny). modified its June 22, 2010 Order, ordering Cherith to bring
2. Petitioner Cherith A. Bucal (Cherith) and Manny were married on Francheska to McDonald’s in Tanza at exactly 9:00 a.m. on Saturdays
July 29, 20056 and have a daughter named Francheska A. Bucal where she will be picked up by her father, Manny, and be returned in
(Francheska); the same place the following day, Sunday, at 5:00 p.m;
3. Cherith filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Protection Order (RTC 9. Cherith filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, arguing that it was
Petition) based on Republic Act No. (RA) 9262,9 otherwise known as beyond the RTC’s authority to grant visitation rights to Manny
the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004; because the trial court cannot grant a remedy that was not prayed for.
4. Cherith prayed that the RTC issue in her favor a Temporary 10. In a Decision dated October 16, 2012, the CA dismissed Cherith’s
Protection Order (TPO): (a) prohibiting Manny from harassing, petition for certiorari and affirmed the RTC Orders dated June 22,
annoying, telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating 2010 and November 23, 2010;
with her, directly or indirectly; (b) ordering a law enforcement
officer and court personnel to accompany her to the residence of Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court’s order giving Manny’s
Manny to supervise the removal of her personal belongings in order visitation rights, a relief not sought for, constitutes grave abuse of discretion
to ensure her personal safety; (c) directing Manny and/or any of his by reason of lack of due process?
family members to stay away from her and any of her designated
family or household member at a distance specified by the court, The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner.
and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment,
or any specified place frequented by her and any of her designated Rulings:
family or household member; (d) enjoining Manny from
threatening to commit or committing further acts of violence It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in
against her and any of her family and household member; (e) the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by a party to a
granting her custody and charge of Francheska, until further case. The rationale for the rule was explained in Development Bank
orders from the court; (f) ordering Manny to absolutely desist and of the Philippines v. Teston,47 viz.:
refrain from imposing any restraint on her personal liberty and Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to
from taking from her custody or charge of Francheska; and (g) enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the
directing Manny to provide support to her and Francheska. Cherith pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an
also prayed that after hearing, the TPO be converted into a opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The
Permanent Protection Order (PPO); fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a
5. The RTC, in an Order dated May 14, 2010, issued a TPO granting complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise
the above-mentioned reliefs, effective for a period of thirty (30) to the defendant.48
days. However, Manny was given visitation rights every Saturday For the same reason, this protection against surprises granted to
from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with instruction that Francheska be defendants should also be available to petitioners. Verily, both parties
brought to his residence by Cherith’s relatives; to a suit are entitled to due process against unforeseen and arbitrary
6. Anticipating the expiration of the TPO, Cherith filed an Ex-Parte judgments. The very essence of due process is "the sporting idea of
Motion for Extension and/or Renewal of the Temporary Restraining fair play" which forbids the grant of relief on matters where a party to
Order14 (Motion) on June 10, 2010, which further sought a the suit was not given an opportunity to be heard;
clarification of the visitation rights granted to Manny; The records of the case do not show that Manny prayed for visitation
7. Cherith filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Amend Order, seeking the rights. While he was present during the hearing for the issuance of the
reversal of the grant of visitation rights. She alleged that upon perusal
TPO and PPO, he neither manifested nor filed any pleading which Permit to Sell Securities to the Public should not be suspended for
would indicate that he was seeking for such relief; failure to submit the said requirements;
6. The company has been allowed a non-extendible period until May 31,
2004 within which to file its 2003 Annual Report but to date the said
report has not been submitted;
7. Considering the inadequate information available to the public, the
SEC vs. Universal Right field Property Holding corporation is hereby directed to show cause why the Registration of
G.R No. 181381 July 20, 2015 its Securities and Certificate of Permit to Sell Securities should not be
suspended; and warning that failure of the company to appear,
“The Court has consistently held that the essence of due process is simply through its representative, at the said hearing shall be deemed a
an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an waiver on its part to be heard with regard to the suspension of its
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration Certificate of Permit to Sell Securities to the Public;
of the action or ruling complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance 8. On the scheduled hearing, URPHI, through its Chief Accountant,
is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration, and denial of due Rhodora Lahaylahay, informed the SEC why it failed to submit the
process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the reportorial requirements;
opportunity to be heard on such motion.24 What the law prohibits is not the 9. The SEC suspended URPHI's Registration of Securities and Permit to
absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of Sell Securities to the Public for failure to submit its reportorial
opportunity to be heard” requirements despite the lapse of the extension period, and due to lack
of sufficient justification for its inability to comply with the said
Facts of the Case: requirements;
10. In a letter dated September 28, 2004, URPHI requested for a final
1. This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which extension, or until November 15, 2004, within which to submit its
seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision dated January 21, 2008 of reportorial requirements; Pertinent portions of the letter read:
the Court of Appeals; i. We refer to your Order dated 27 July 2004, wherein the
Commission resolved to SUSPEND the Corporation's Registration
2. Respondent Universal Right field Property Holdings, Inc. (URPHI) is
of Securities and Permit to Sell Securities to the Public due to non-
a corporation duly registered and existing under the Philippine Laws, filing of the Corporation's reportorial requirements under SRC Rule
and is engaged in the business of providing residential and leisure- 17 effective for sixty (60) days or until the reporting requirements
related needs and wants of the middle and upper middle-income are complied with; otherwise, the Commission shall proceed with
market; the revocation of the Corporation's registration [of] securities. To
3. Petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), through its date, the Corporation has not filed with the Commission its 2003
Corporate Finance Department, issued an Order revoking URPHI's Annual Report in SEC Form 17-A and 2004 1st and 2nd Quarterly
Registration of Securities and Permit to Sell Securities to the Public reports in SEC Form 17-Q. The non-submission of these reportorial
for its failure to timely file its Year 2001 Annual Report and Year requirements, as we have already disclosed to you per our letter
2002 1st, 2nd and 3rd Quarterly Reports pursuant to Section 173 of dated 13 September 2004, was due to the non-finalization of the
the Securities Regulation Code (SRC), Republic Act No. 8799; Corporation's audited financial statement for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2003.
4. URPHI (Respondent) filed with the SEC (Petitioner) a
ii. The Corporation intends to comply with its reportorial
Manifestation/Urgent Motion to Set Aside Revocation Order and requirements. However, due to the foregoing circumstances, the
Reinstate Registration after complying with its reportorial finalization of our financial statement has again been delayed. In
requirements. And On October 24, 2003, said motion is granted; this regard, may we request for the last time until November 15,
5. In a Notice of Hearing dated June 25, 2004, the SEC directed URPHI 2004 within which to submit said reportorial requirements;
to show cause why its Registration of Securities and Certificate of
11. On December 1, 2004, URPHI filed with the SEC its 2003 Annual be heard. Upon receipt of the SEC Order dated July 27, 2004, URPHI
Report; filed the letters dated September 13 and 28, 2004, seeking a final
12. In an Order of Revocation dated December 8, 2004, the SEC revoked extension to submit the reportorial requirements, and admitting that its
URPHI's Registration of Securities and Permit to Sell Securities to the failure to submit its 2nd Quarterly Report for 2004 was due to the
Public for its failure to submit its reportorial requirements within the same reasons that it was unable to submit its 2003 Annual Report and
final extension period; 1st Quarterly Report for 2004;
13. URPHI appealed the SEC Order of Revocation dated December 8, In A.Z. Arnaiz, Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President, the Court held
2004 by filing a Notice of Appeal and a Memorandum both dated that due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always, and in
January 3, 2005, however denied by SEC; all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard
14. Aggrieved, URPHI filed a petition for review with the CA. through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda
15. The CA ruled that based on how Sections 5.1 (m)9 and 13.110 of the or oral arguments. The standard of due process that must be met in
SRC are worded, suspension and revocation of URPHI's registration administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as
of securities each requires separate notices and hearings. It also held fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for
that the ruling11 in Globe Telecom, Inc. v. The National being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve
Telecommunications Commission12 (Globe Telecom, Inc.) applies a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary
squarely to this case since the Section 13.1 of the SRC itself provides evidence submitted by the parties. Guided by the foregoing principle,
that due notice and hearing are required before revocation may be the Court rules that URPHI was afforded opportunity to be heard
ordered by the SEC. In view of such specific mandate of the SRC in when the SEC took into account in its Order of Revocation URPHI's
cases of revocation, the CA rejected the SEC's argument that the September 13 and 28, 2004 letters, explaining its failure to submit the
hearing conducted for the suspension of URPHI's registration can reportorial requirements, as well as its request for final extension
already be considered as the hearing for revocation; within which to comply;
16. Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, the SEC filed the instant petition URPHI was given the opportunity to be heard before the Order of
for review on certiorari; Revocation was issued, as well as the opportunity to seek the
reconsideration of such order;
ISSUE: Whether or not URPHI was afforded due process because it was WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
already given the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the Order of
Revocation by filing its Notice of Appeal and Memorandum?
Ruling: Acampado vs. Sps. Comilla
The Court has consistently held that the essence of due process is G.R No. 198531. September 25, 2015
simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to “It bears stressing that a motion without notice and hearing, is pro forma, a
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Any mere scrap of paper that cannot be acted by the court. It presents no
seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for question that the court can decide. The court has no reason to consider it
reconsideration, and denial of due process cannot be successfully and the clerk has no right to receive it. Indisputably, any motion that does
invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on such not contain proof of service and notice to the adverse party is not entitled to
motion. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, judicial cognizance.”
but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be
heard. Facts of the case:
The Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process when URPHI was given opportunity to
1. The instant Petition is for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioners The Motion for Reconsideration is a contentious motion that needs to
seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions of the Court of comply with the required notice and hearing and service to the
Appeals; adverse party as mandated by provisions of the Revised Rules of
2. The assailed resolutions reversed the Order of the Regional Trial Court;
Court (RTC) which denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondents for being pro forma; Notice of hearing
3. The present petition stems from the Petition for the Declaration of the
Nullity of Document filed by respondents against petitioners before Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the
the RTC; hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
4. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 31 March receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of
2005 dismissing the complaint of the respondents for failure to prove hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
by preponderance of evidence; notice;
5. Aggrieved, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 6 May Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the
2005 seeking for the reversal of the earlier RTC Decision; hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
6. For failure of the respondents, however, to comply with the receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of
requirement of notice of hearing as required under Sections 4 and 5 of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, the court a quo denied the notice;
Motion for Reconsideration in Order; The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and
7. Respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by filing a shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion;
Preliminary Injunction and TRO seeking to annul and set aside the
RTC Order; Proof of service
8. For lack of merit, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition filed by
the respondents; No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court
9. On Motion for Reconsideration by Respondents, however, the Court without proof of service thereof;
of Appeals reversed its earlier Resolution and allowed the relaxation The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state
of the procedural in a Resolution dated 28 June 2007. Hence, the the time and place for the hearing of the motion are mandatory, and if
appellate court vacated the 16 May 2005 Order of the RTC directed not religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro forma.
the court a quo to thresh out the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4
the respondents on the merits;
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper
10. The petitioner filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by the
which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court
Court of Appeals;
has no authority to act upon.
The logic for such requirement is simple: a motion invariably
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AS IT
contains a prayer which the movant makes to the court which is
SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose. The notice of
WHICH DENIED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY REASON
hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of due process ; it
OF NOT INCOMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE OF
gives the other party the opportunity to properly vent his opposition
HEARING?
to the prayer of the movant. In keeping with the principles of due
process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the adverse party a
Rulings:
chance to oppose should simply be disregarded. Principles of natural
justice demand that a right of a party should not be affected without 4. Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to
giving it an opportunity to be heard; Dismiss13 dated 2 April 2001. They contended therein that they
did not make any false or untruthful statements in their
application for registration;
5. On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal,
COMELEC Investigating Officer, issued a Resolution,
Romualdez vs. Comelec recommending to the COMELEC Law Department (Investigation
and Prosecution Division), the filing of the appropriate
573 SRA 639, 2008 Information against petitioners;
6. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon, however,
“Petitioners were reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the acting on the Motion, the COMELEC found no cogent reason to
charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary disturb the assailed En Banc Resolution;
investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the 7. Law Department of the COMELEC filed with the RTC, Burauen,
complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They were given the Leyte, separate Informations against petitioner Carlos S.
opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their defense” Romualdez for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section
45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, and against petitioner Erlinda
Facts of the case R. Romualdez20 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to
Section (j) of Republic Act No. 8189, subsequently docketed as
1. The Petition for Review on Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4185 and Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 4183, respectively. Moreover, separate Informations for violation
filed by petitioners Spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No.
Romualdez seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions, dated 11 8189 were filed against petitioners;
June 20041 and 27 January 20052 of the Commission on Elections 8. petitioners filed a Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ
(COMELEC) in E.O. Case No. 2000-36. In the Resolution of 11 June of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt,
2004, the COMELEC En Banc directed the Law Department to file alleging that two separate Informations, both dated 12 January
the appropriate Information with the proper court against petitioners 2006, were filed with the RTC by the COMELEC against
Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for violation of Section petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for violation of Section 10(j), in
10(g) and (j)3 in relation to Section 45(j)4 of Republic Act No. 8189; relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal
2. Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal Case No. BN-06-03-9184; and for violation of Section 10(g), in
ages and residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal
Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City; on 9 May 2000 and 11 May 2000, Case No. BN-06-03-9185. Similarly, the Motion alleged that the
petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez, applied COMELEC filed with the RTC, two separate Informations, both
for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of dated 12 January 2006, against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez,
Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. charging her with the same offenses as those charged against
42454095 and 07902952, respectively; in their sworn applications, petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez, and thereafter, docketed as
petitioners made false and untruthful representations in violation of Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9182, and No. BN-06-03-9183.
Section 1011 of Republic Act Nos. 8189;
3. The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary
investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so
warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS BE SAID TO HAVE
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS BY REASON OF THE
same; INFORMATIONS DIRECTED TO BE FILED BY THE COMELEC
AGAINST PETITIONERS, AND WHICH WERE, IN FACT, FILED sexual harassment law, and instead, filed an Information charging
WITH THE RTC, WERE BASED ON THE SAME SET OF FACTS AS therein petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. On a claim that there
ORIGINALLY ALLEGED IN THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S was deprivation of due process, therein petitioner argued that the
COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT.? Information for acts of lasciviousness was void as the preliminary
investigation conducted was for sexual harassment. The court held
Ruling: The Court ruled that the petitioner have not been denied due process. that the designation by the police officer of the offense is not
conclusive as it is within the competence of the prosecutor to assess
The elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the evidence submitted and determine therefrom the appropriate
the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the offense to be charged.
evidence presented by the parties at the trial; Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained all
The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the the allegations to support the charge of acts of lasciviousness under
caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the Revised Penal Code; hence, the conduct of another preliminary
the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness would be a futile
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint exercise because the complainant would only be presenting the same
or Information; facts and evidence which have already been studied by the
The Court finds that the charges contained in private respondent’s prosecutor.32 The court frowns upon such superfluity which only
Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to serves to delay the prosecution and disposition of the criminal
be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the complaint.
criminal charges in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that
of the charges contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, Placido vs. NLRC
pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same;
Such that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or
600 SCRA 697, 2009
submit documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC
“A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because
essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the
they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit;
the controversy”
The petitioners were able to oppose the allegation when filed a Joint
Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department
Fact of the Case:
of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before the
said body;
1. Petitioners Rolando Placido (Placido) and Edgardo Caragay (Caragay)
Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the had been employed since January 22, 1981 and June 1, 1983,
circumstances in the case at bar, the Court agrees with the stance of respectively, both as cable splicers by respondent Philippine Long
the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably Distance Telephone Company, Incorporated (PLDT);
apprised of the nature and description of the charges against them. It 2. PLDT had been receiving reports of theft and destruction of its cables.
likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations were
Responding to a report that cables were being stripped and burned in
conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of
one of the residences along Alley 2 Street, Project 6, Quezon City,
the evidence submitted against them. They were given the
proceeded to the said area where they saw petitioners’ service vehicle
opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their defense.
parked in front of the house at No. 162. They likewise saw petitioners
Citing the case of Orquinaza v. People, wherein the concerned police stripping and burning cables inside the compound of the house which
officer therein designated the offense charged as sexual harassment; turned out to belong to Caragay’s mother;
but, the prosecutor found that there was no transgression of the anti-
3. The incident spawned the filing, on complaint of PLDT, of an 12. The petitioners aver that they were denied due process when PLDT
Information for Qualified Theft against petitioners before the refused to furnish them a copy of the Investigation Report and grant
Regional Trial Court (RTC); them a formal hearing in which they could be represented by counsel
4. PLDT required petitioners to explain within 72 hours why no severe of their choice.
disciplinary action should be taken against them for Serious
Misconduct and Dishonesty.2 After several requests for extension to Issue: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE DENIED DUE
submit their explanations, petitioners submitted a joint explanation3
PROCESS WHEN PLDT REFUSED TO FURNISH THEM A COPY OF
on June 11, 2001 denying the charges against them;
THE INVESTIGATION REPORT AND GRANT THEM A FORMAL
5. On petitioners’ request, a formal hearing was scheduled. Their request
HEARING IN WHICH THEY COULD BE REPRESENTED BY
for a copy of the Security Investigation was denied, however, on the
COUNSEL OF THEIR CHOICE?
ground that they are only entitled to "be informed of the charges, and
they cannot demand for the report as it is still on the confidential
Ruling: the Court finds that petitioners were not denied due process.
stage;
6. During the June 25, 2001 formal hearing scheduled by PLDT,
In all cases of termination of employment, standards of due process
representatives from petitioners’ union Manggagawa ng
shall be substantially observed ,hence, hearing or conference during
Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP) were present. As petitioners’
which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so
counsel could not attend the hearing due to a previously scheduled
desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his
hearing at the RTC Makati, petitioners requested for another setting4
evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him;
but it was denied. Petitioners were, however, given a non-extendible
period of three days to submit their evidence; The said due process standard should not be taken to mean, however,
7. Petitioners’ counsel later reiterated the request for a setting of a that holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition sine qua
hearing and an audiotape of the June 25, 2001 hearing, but the same non for compliance with the due process requirement in case of
was denied. A third time request for another hearing was likewise termination of employment;
denied; For the test for the fair procedure guaranteed under the said due
8. On May 17, 2002, PLDT sent notices of termination8 to petitioners, process standard is not whether there has been a formal pretermination
prompting them to file on May 24, 2002 a complaint9 for illegal confrontation between the employer and the employee. The "ample
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter; opportunity to be heard" standard is neither synonymous nor similar to
9. By Decision of January 12, 2004, Labor Arbiter Catalino R. Laderas a formal hearing. To confine the employee’s right to be heard to a
held that petitioners were illegally dismissed, there being no provision solitary form narrows down that right;
in PLDT’s rules and regulations that stripping and burning of PLDT The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
cables and wires constitute Serious Misconduct and Dishonesty; that applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
PLDT’s seeming lack of urgency in taking any disciplinary action side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
against petitioners negates the charges;10 and that dismissal is too complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the
harsh, given petitioners’ years of service and lack of previous opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due
derogatory record; process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his
10. On appeal,11 the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), by side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all
Decision dated February 28, 2005, reversed the Labor Arbiter’s instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are
Decision and dismissed petitioners’ complaint for lack of merit,12 it satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
holding that they were validly dismissed for just cause ─ "theft of opportunity to explain their side of the controversy;
company property; In the present case, petitioners were, among other things, given
11. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, but CA affirmed the several written invitations to submit themselves to PLDT’s
decision of the NLRC; Investigation Unit to explain their side, but they failed to heed them.
A hearing, which petitioners attended along with their union MKP
representatives, was conducted on June 25, 2001 during which the Rulings: The petitioners afforded due process.
principal witnesses to the incident were presented. Petitioners were
thus afforded the opportunity to confront those witnesses and present The essence of procedural due process is the right to be heard. The
evidence in their behalf, but they failed to do so. procedural due process requirements in an eminent domain case
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. are satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to present
their evidence before the commissioners whose findings (together
with the pleadings, evidence of the parties, and the entire record
Republic vs, Mupas of the case) are reviewed and considered by the expropriation
G.R No. 181892 court. It is the parties' total failure to present evidence on just
September 8, 2015 compensation that renders the trial court's ruling void. The
“The essence of procedural due process is the right to be heard.172 The opportunity to present evidence during the trial remains to be the
procedural due process requirements in an eminent domain case are vital requirement in the observance of due process.
satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to present their evidence The record will show that the parties exhaustively discussed their
before the commissioners whose findings (together with the pleadings, positions in this case before the BOC, the trial court, the appellate
evidence of the parties, and the entire record of the case) are reviewed and court, and this Court;
considered by the expropriation court”
They had ample opportunity to refute and respond to each other's
positions with the aid of their own appraisers and experts. Each party,
Fact s of the case:
in fact, submitted countervailing evidence on the valuation of the
NAIA-IPT III. They also filed numerous and voluminous pleadings
1. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Executive
and motions before the lower courts and before this Court;
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the DEPARTMENT OF
The mere failure of the RTC's clerk of court to send the parties copies
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, AND MANILA
of the BOC Final Report is not substantial enough under the attendant
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY;
circumstances to affect and nullify the whole proceedings. Litigation
2. HON. JESUS M. MUPAS, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge
is not a game of technicalities. Strong public interests require that this
of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
Court judiciously and decisively settle the amount of just
117, Pasay City, AND PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR
compensation in the expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III. We cannot
TERMINALS CO., INC., Respondents.
further delay this more-than a-decade case and let interests accrue on
3. PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan challenge the validity of the
just compensation by remanding the case once more to the trial court;
RTC's decision for alleged violation of their right to due process. They
point out that the RTC promulgated its decision in Civil Case No. 04-
0876 on May 23, 2011, immediately after the release of the Board of Office of the Court Administrator vs. Indar
Commissioner BOC's Final Report on March 31, 2011. They 669 24 (2012)
complain that since the RTC's clerk of court did not furnish the parties
copies of the Final Report, the trial court violated Sections 7 and 8, Facts of the case:
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court as they failed to object to the Final
Report's contents; 1. This is an administrative complaint for gross misconduct and
dishonesty against respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj (Judge
Indar), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14,
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT
Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 15,
AFFORDED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE CLERK OF COURT DID NOT Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao;
FURNISH THE PARTIES COPIES OF THE FINAL REPORT?
2. This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the Court Administrator judicial sense." It is enough that the party is given the chance to be
(OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions, heard before the case against him is decided. Otherwise stated, in the
resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
issued by Judge Indar; safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the
3. It appears that there is no showing that a docket fee has been paid for opportunity to be heard;
each corresponding cases. There is also no showing that the parties The Court emphasized in Cornejo, the Constitutional precept that
public office is a public trust, which is the underlying principle for the
were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared. There is also no
relaxation of the requirements of due process of law in administrative
record that a hearing was conducted. No stenographic notes of the proceedings;
actual proceedings were also made. He could not also determine when Petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be
the said cases were submitted for decision as it was not calendared for necessary to consider an office as "property." It is, however, well
that purpose; settled in the United States, that a public office is not property within
4. In the course of the investigation, there was no proof that Judge Indar the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is
personally and actually received any of the notices sent to him, except a public trust or agency;
the fact that respondent being suspended; In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert
the charges against him. While there is no proof that Judge Indar
ISSUE: WHETHER THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS HAD personally received the notices of hearing issued by the Investigating
BEEN COMPLIED WITH SINCE THERE WAS NO PROOF THAT JUDGE Justices, the first two notices of hearing were received by one
INDAR PERSONALLY AND ACTUALLY RECEIVED ANY OF THE Mustapha Randang of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of
NOTICES SENT TO HIM IN THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION? the notices was received by a certain Mrs. Asok, who were
presumably authorized and capable to receive notices on behalf of
Ruling: Due process is afforded. Judge Indar.
Further, Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the administrative
In Cornejo v. Gabriel, the Court held that notice and hearing are not investigation against him because aside from the fact that the Court’s
indispensable in administrative investigations, thus: Resolution suspending him was mailed to him, his preventive
The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an suspension was reported in major national newspapers.18 Moreover,
administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Indar was repeatedly sent notices of hearings to his known
Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on constitutional Law, has addresses. Thus, there was due notice on Judge Indar of the charges
well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much against him. However, Judge Indar still failed to file his explanation
of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and and appear at the scheduled hearings. Consequently, the investigation
the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, proceeded ex parte in accordance with Section 4, Rule 140 of the
which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a Rules of Court.
day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in
administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon
different principles. In certain proceedings, therefore, of an
Jamsani- Rodriguez vs. Ong
628 SCRA 626(2010)
administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of
contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to
The Fact of the case:
due process of law.
1. The complainant, then an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the
It is settled that "technical rules of procedure and evidence are not Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed an affidavit-complaint dated
strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative October 23, 2008 charging Justice Ong, Justice Hernandez and Justice
Ponferrada, as the Members of the Fourth Division of the rulings on oral motions made or objections raised in the course of the
Sandiganbayan with: (a) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a trial proceedings or hearings are be made by the Chairman of the
Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service Division. Obviously, the rule cannot be complied with because Justice
(grounded on their failing to hear cases as a collegial body during the Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in the hearing of the cases heard by the
scheduled sessions of the Fourth Division held in Davao City on April other respondents. Neither could the other respondents properly and
24-28, 2006, with Justice Ong hearing cases by himself and Justice promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings
Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada hearing other cases together; and before him;
on their having unreasonably flexed their judicial muscle when she Moreover, the respondents’ non-observance of collegiality
objected to the procedure); (b) falsification of public documents contravened the very purpose of trying criminal cases cognizable by
(grounded on their issuance of orders relative to the hearings in Davao Sandiganbayan before a Division of all three Justices. Although there
City, signed by all three of them, that made it appear as if all of them are criminal cases involving public officials and employees triable
had been present during the particular hearing acting as a collegial before single-judge courts, PD 1606, as amended, has always required
body, when in truth they were not); a Division of three Justices (not one or two) to try the criminal cases
2. The explanations they have offered herein revealed that they strove to cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in view of the accused in such
maintain their collegiality by holding their separate cases holding higher rank or office than those charged in the former
hearings within sight and hearing distance of one another; cases. The three Justices of a Division, rather than a single judge, are
naturally expected to exert keener judiciousness and to apply broader
3. The respondent insist that they adopted said procedure in order to
circumspection in trying and deciding such cases;
expedite the hearing of provincial cases
In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc., the Court
ISSUE: Whether or not due process is afforded when said respondent delved on the nature of a collegial body, and how the act of a single
maintain their collegiality by holding their separate hearing within the sight? member, though he may be its head, done without the participation of
the others, cannot be considered the act of the collegial body itself;
Ruling: Due process is not afforded. It is of no consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt motive
Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all impelled respondent Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As
of them to sit together as members of the Fourth Division "in the trial responsible judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware of
and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto." The the indispensability of collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial
information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would base proceedings;
any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must The exercise of his powers as Chairman of the Fourth Division,
be made directly available to each and every one of its members Justice Ong exuded an unexpectedly dismissive attitude towards the
during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full valid objections of the complainant, and steered his Division into the
participation of each member in the trial and adjudication of their path of procedural irregularity; and wittingly failed to guarantee that
cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three members of the proceedings of the Division that he chaired came within the bounds of
Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of substantive and procedural rules.
one another at the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight,
because even in those circumstances not all of them sat together in Ang Tibay vs. CIR
session; 69 Phil 1940
Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial
body became impossible when not all of the members sat together Facts of the case:
during the trial proceedings. The internal rules of the Sandiganbayan
spotlight an instance of such impossibility. Section 2, Rule VII of the 1. Respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly requires that the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of this Court
and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S.
a new trial; 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this
2. The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to
for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part
3. The have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously
the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and the court has found futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is
no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken (3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from
evidentiary value. the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited
4. The record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon
upon which to predicate; power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844,
RELATION AFFORDED DUE PROCESS TO PARTIES BY ITS promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but
DECISION BASED ON THE CONTRADICTORY AND CONFLICTING the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and
STATEMENTS OF OPPOSING COUNSEL, WITH SPORADIC Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301
CONCLUSION DRAWN TO SUIT THEIR OWN VIEWS? U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
Rulings: adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric
Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson
to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting
not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758,
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence
in trials and investigations of an administrative character; prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.'
There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
of this character: administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules
1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v.
language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860;
S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville
the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431;
of fair play. United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220,
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable
his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The
v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)" conferred upon it.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented After considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given
to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his
L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence involved.
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
right to know and meet the case against them. It should not,
however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
Brown Madonna Press vs. Casas
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal G.R No. 200898, June 15 2015
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry Fact of the Case:
may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and 1. the petition for review on certiorari,1 filed by petitioners Brown
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and Madonna Press, Inc. (BMPI), Thaddeus Anthony Cabangon
decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act (Cabangon), Fortune Life Insurance Company (now Fortune General
No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any Insurance Corporation) and/or Anthony Cabangon Chua (Cabangon
industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its Chua), to challenge the decision and resolution of the Court of
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116539;
provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official 2. The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC's ruling, and held that it did
in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding that Casas had
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public been illegally dismissed. The CA cited with approval the NLRC's
official such powers and functions as the said Court of ruling that Casas' dismissal was without cause and failed to comply
Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation with the procedural requirements of the law;
shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its 3. The petitioner asserts that Casas voluntarily left the company to
powers. (Section 10, ibid.) preempt an administrative investigation against her, and to be able to
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, jumpstart a new career, however said assertion still not able to comply
therefore, must act on its or his own independent the procedure requirement of due process;
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a ISSUE: whether the dismissal violated his right to substantial and procedural
decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is due process.
literally Relations personally to decide all controversies
coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is Ruling:
solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing An employee's right not to be dismissed without just or authorized
examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with cause as provided by law, is covered by his right to substantial due
the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case process. Compliance with procedure provided in the Labor Code, on
there is no such statutory authority. the other hand, constitutes the procedural due process right of an
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all employee;
controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner The violation of either the substantial due process right or the
procedural due process right of an employee produces different
results. Termination without a just or authorized cause renders the
dismissal invalid, and entitles the employee to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up
to the time of actual reinstatement.
An employee's removal for just or authorized cause but without
complying with the proper procedure, on the other hand, does not
invalidate the dismissal. It obligates the erring employer to pay
nominal damages to the employee, as penalty for not complying with
the procedural requirements of due process.