INDEPENDENT EXPERT GROUP

SUPPORTING
NATO’S COMPREHENSIVE AND DEEP REFLECTION
PROCESS ON THE SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

FINAL REPORT
May 2024

The expert group consists of the following people:

Dr Katja Lindskov Jacobsen (Denmark); D. Elie Tenenbaum (France);
Dr. Isabelle Werenfels (Germany); Dr Thanos Dokos (Greece); Brigadier
General Alessio Nardi (Italy); Dr Aleksandra Bukowska-McCabe; (Poland);
Professor Ana Santos Pinto (Portugal); Mr Carlos Carnero González (Spain);
Ambassador Refik Ali Onaner (Türkiye); Ms. Jane Kinninmont (UK); and
Ambassador Richard B. Norland (United States).
 INDEPENDENT EXPERT GROUP SUPPORTING NATO’S COMPREHENSIVE AND DEEP
REFLECTION PROCESS ON THE SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

FINAL REPORT

Table of Contents
Preface .................................................................................................................................................... 2
Executive Summary................................................................................................................................. 5
Guiding Principles for NATO’s Approach to the Southern Neighbourhoods .......................................... 7
Regional Approach ................................................................................................................................ 10
Existing Partnerships ......................................................................................................................... 10
NATO’s Southern Neighbourhoods: Regions of Strategic Interest to NATO .................................... 12
North Africa................................................................................................................................... 12
Middle East ................................................................................................................................... 13
Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa ....................................................................................................... 15
Thematic Areas for Cooperation ........................................................................................................... 18
Human Security, Women, Peace and Security, and Good Governance ........................................... 18
Counter-Terrorism ............................................................................................................................ 19
Maritime Security ............................................................................................................................. 21
Resilience .......................................................................................................................................... 22
Climate Change and Security ............................................................................................................ 23
Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications ............................................................................ 25
Responding to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) .................................... 27
Cooperation with International and Regional Organisations ............................................................... 28
NATO – European Union ................................................................................................................... 29
NATO’s Internal Structures ................................................................................................................... 31
The Hub for the South....................................................................................................................... 32

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Preface
Peace and stability in NATO’s neighbourhoods are an important component of Euro-Atlantic
security. Threats, challenges and opportunities in NATO’s southern neighbourhoods1 matter
to Allied security and to NATO partners. They are also increasingly interlinked with those in
the east of the Alliance. Allies agreed, in the 2022 Strategic Concept, that they are committed
to enhancing NATO’s “global awareness and reach to deter, defend, contest and deny across
all domains and directions in line with our 360-degree approach”2 in order to respond to
security challenges, geopolitical developments and broader evolutions in the Euro-Atlantic
and international security context.

NATO’s engagement with its southern neighbourhoods is founded on the Allies’ long-time
understanding that their security is closely intertwined with that of North Africa and the
Middle East, the Sahel, and beyond. Thirty years after the establishment of NATO’s
Mediterranean Dialogue and two decades following the launch of the Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative, the Alliance’s cooperation and proximity with these regions has potential to grow
further: through new approaches, new ways, and outreach to additional regions.

NATO’s southern neighbourhoods face interconnected security, demographic, economic and

political challenges, exacerbated by the impact of climate change, fragile institutions, health
emergencies and food insecurity. Terrorist groups continue to be active in the region, posing
a threat to NATO Allies and partners alike. These pre-existing factors of insecurity are
converging with the rise of strategic competition in the region. The impact of pervasive
instability and recurrent shocks causes the displacement of vulnerable populations and
results in migratory pressures, both on the southern neighbourhoods and Europe. Finding
shared solutions is further complicated by strategic competition.

NATO is a defensive Alliance and Allies have agreed that “the Russian Federation is the most
significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic
area”.3 They have also agreed that “terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, is the most
direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and
prosperity”.4 Russia is fuelling and benefitting from regional tensions and instability, and has
a growing footprint in the southern neighbourhoods, from Syria to the Sahel, laying the
foundations for strategic challenges on NATO’s southern flank. Russia and Iran have expanded
their cooperation in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Pro-Iranian extremist
movements carry out attacks against NATO partners, Allied infrastructure and maritime
security. NATO must not underestimate common threats that the Alliance and its southern
partners are facing, including the destabilising impact of strategic competitors and the threat
posed by terrorism.

1 Given the significant diversity within the distinct regions in the south of the Alliance (which include the Middle East, North Africa, Sahel and
Sub-Saharan Africa regions), and the different security challenges that each region faces, this report will refer to southern neighborhoods, in
plural.
2 NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 20

3 NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 8

4 NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 10

2
China is seeking to further its geopolitical agenda and, as part of these efforts, is expanding
its influence in NATO’s southern neighbourhoods, including its military and naval presence,
as well as control of ports.

At the same time, the Alliance’s southern neighbourhoods should also be viewed as a source
of opportunities for NATO and Allies. It is at the crossroads of global trade and is among the
youngest regions of the world. Strengthening political dialogue about and with the region
through the language of partnerships, opportunities and concrete solutions to shared
interests and concerns — from counter-terrorism to climate change and maritime security —
matters. A clear political strategy, continued and consistent practical cooperation and
periodic impact assessment of cooperation and capacity building should be the pillars of
NATO’s approach to this region.

NATO can positively contribute to the stability of partners in the southern neighbourhoods,
helping to ensure the security of Allies, and in doing so, reinforcing common security. It can
build on existing work, as well as find new and creative ways to build a framework for stability
that would contribute to the institutional resilience of states and governments. To do so, it
should uphold its founding principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law;
promote good governance; and integrate climate change, human security and the Women,
Peace and Security agenda across its activities towards the southern neighbourhoods. NATO
should regularly monitor and assess the overall progress and political coherence of its
engagements and activities in its southern neighbourhoods.

For many countries in North Africa and the Middle East, NATO and Allies are important
partners. At the same time, NATO operates in a complex environment, and building reciprocal
confidence and trust is vital if the Alliance is to make further strides in NATO’s southern
neighbourhoods. The perception of NATO and Allies in the southern neighbourhoods is
somewhat negative. For many in the region, NATO is perceived as adopting double standards
in responding to crises and conflicts on the world stage and is perceived as using its military
assets to project power and interests from the ‘so-called’ “Global North” without fully taking
into account the needs and concerns of the South.

In a world that is increasingly interconnected, perceptions and narratives are at the core of
political relations. Accordingly, negative and misleading perceptions are used and amplified
in favour of NATO’s strategic competitors, who contribute to spreading selective
misinformation through southern societies, according to their own interests and by taking
advantage of their presence in region. To address these negative perceptions, NATO must
counter hostile messages and develop a new proactive narrative highlighting its long--
standing and multi-faceted engagement with the region and the added value of cooperation
in security and defence.

Recognising the crucial importance of NATO’s southern neighbourhoods, at the 2023 NATO
Summit in Vilnius, NATO Allies tasked the North Atlantic Council to launch a comprehensive
and deep reflection on existing and emerging threats and challenges, and opportunities for
engagements with partner nations, international organisations and other relevant actors in
the region.5 This exercise aims to agree concrete proposals to be presented to NATO Leaders

5 Vilnius Summit Communiqué, 11 July 2023, paragraph 22

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at the 2024 NATO Summit. To support this process, in October 2023, NATO Secretary General
Jens Stoltenberg appointed a group of independent experts to undertake a review of NATO’s
approach to its southern neighbourhood, and to provide him with concrete
recommendations. This process can be the beginning of a new chapter in NATO’s approach
to the southern neighbourhoods.

To fulfil this mandate, the group of experts engaged with Allies and NATO civilian and military
staffs. During their mandate, the experts learned from representatives from NATO’s southern
partners, institutional and civil society representatives from North Africa, the Middle East,
and Sahel countries. It also interacted with senior policymakers in the European Union
institutions, as well as governmental representatives and interlocutors from academia and
think-tanks.

On the basis of these engagements, the group developed a number of practical

recommendations on what NATO should do to strengthen its approach to, and engagement
with, its southern neighbourhoods in a way to make best use of the existing NATO
instruments. This report presents the group’s recommendations and the rationale behind
them. The recommendations are organised along geographic and thematic lines. Within each
recommendation section, it seeks to identify long-standing, current and future challenges, as
well as proposals for short, medium and long-term pragmatic options. Some of the
recommendations can be implemented immediately and aim to have a short-term effect.
Other recommendations may take time to implement, as they address more structural and
long-standing issues. Some recommendations suggest fundamentally revising the manner in
which NATO engages partners in its southern neighbourhoods, whereas others encourage
Allies to continue or expand existing practices.

According to its mandate, the group focused its analysis and recommendations on the Middle
East, North Africa and Sahel regions. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, while all three
regions are of strategic importance to NATO, their diversity and singularities argue for
differentiated levels of engagement.

Considering the evolving regional and international dynamics, other adjacent geostrategic
landscapes were also considered, for example by looking at Sub-Saharan Africa as a region of
growing importance for NATO.

The report reflects the viewpoint of the independent group of experts and not those of NATO,
the NATO Secretary General or any of the Allies or partners.

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Executive Summary
As instability grows on NATO’s southern neighbourhoods, the Alliance requires a renewed
strategic approach. This involves, first of all, a strengthening of NATO’s political dialogue
about and with the region, through the language of partnerships, concrete cooperative
solutions to shared interests and concerns, and a sustainable long-term commitment. An
effective approach must prioritise deeper understanding of partners’ needs and perceptions,
based on trust, credibility and clarity about NATO’s purpose. This entails embracing flexibility
without compromising NATO’s interests, principles and values or undermining Allies’ security.
It also requires better coordination within NATO and between Allies, to avoid duplication and
dispersal of efforts and resources.

The security of the southern neighbourhoods is closely interlinked with that of NATO Allies.
The diverse security challenges experienced across the region, either long-standing or
emerging, have a significant impact on regional stability and in the Euro-Atlantic security
environment, as well as increasingly come to merge with those that have materialised on
NATO's eastern flank. Conflicts with deep local roots are exacerbated by global strategic
competition, as well as by the threat multiplier of climate change. Tackling the root causes of
insecurity, terrorism and instability will require a range of international and local efforts.
NATO should therefore cooperate and coordinate with international and regional
organisations, partner countries and Allies to reduce and prevent conflicts and security
threats, based on a clear sense of where it adds value: a “gold standard” of security
capabilities, expertise and capacity-building, across all three of its core tasks, and including
non-traditional security challenges such as resilience, climate security, Women, Peace and
Security, and human security.

The report speaks of “southern neighbourhoods” in the plural because the south of the
Alliance encompasses a number of distinct regions and sub-regions: North Africa, the Middle
East, the Sahel and adjacent maritime regions. The Alliance needs to strengthen its situational
awareness of dynamics in each region, and more widely in sub-Saharan Africa. It also needs
to better communicate its purpose and capabilities, and to work patiently to build trust on
the basis of concrete and practical actions, recognising negative perceptions and a context of
polarisation. Overall, NATO must listen harder, better and more actively to partners, and
invest in skills and people to do this.

This report is structured along four main axes: regional approach to southern
neighbourhoods; priority thematic areas for cooperation; cooperation with international and
regional organisations; and NATO’s internal structures.

Key recommendations include:

 Appoint a Special Envoy for the Southern Neighbourhoods, to provide a clear focal point
for partners and to oversee and streamline NATO’s wide-ranging activities with the region,
ensuring consistency, progress and proximity.
 Conduct a review to periodically assess NATO’s relationship with the southern
neighbourhoods, which include an internal coordination mechanism that engages the
Alliance’s civil and military structures, as well as a regular report to the North Atlantic
Council to evaluate progress.

5
 Convene a special summit meeting of all NATO’s southern partners to discuss proposals
for further deepening regional cooperation, when conditions allow it.
 Propose a High-Level Regional Security and Stability Dialogue between relevant
international and regional organisations.
 Establish regular consultations on between the NATO Secretary General and the
leadership of the European Union on the southern neighbourhoods, as agreed by the
two organisations.
 Establish a political representation to the African Union, complementing the existing
military liaison office, to facilitate dialogue and cooperation.
 Based on NATO Mission Iraq’s success, explore the possibility of setting up a standing
NATO mission dedicated to training and capacity-building for partners, to be deployed
upon invitation of the latter.
 Explore new partnerships and expand the options for cooperation with interested
interlocutors from non-partner countries6 that are interested in engaging with NATO.
 Leverage the appointment of the Special Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism to give more
visibility to NATO’s role in counter-terrorism, particularly towards partner countries in
NATO’s southern neighbourhoods.
 Building on successful counter-piracy efforts, identify further areas for maritime security
cooperation in close consultation with partners, including the EU as agreed, as well as
regional actors whose maritime security priorities must be carefully attended to.
 Enhance cooperation on resilience including through thematic dialogues with multiple
partners and building on Resilience Advisory Support Teams.
 Explore with partner countries the possibility of setting up a centre for climate and
security in North Africa with a two-way exchange of expertise.
 Consider setting up a Counter- Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference
(FIMI) Centre of Excellence and encourage it to open up its activities to partners.
 Consider setting up a permanent standing “Facts for Peace” initiative to actively fight
disinformation by providing education, training and fellowships as well as support to
selected media outlets, journalists and social media influencers in the southern
neighbourhoods.
 Promote southern neighbourhoods’ youth engagement, leveraging the annual NATO
Youth Summit and NATO Partnerships 360 Symposium to reach out to new audiences and
foster the Youth, Peace and Security agenda.
 Review the NATO Strategic Direction-South Hub mandate and functions and streamline
the Hub into a joint civil-military entity, with a dual reporting to both military and civilian
authorities.

6The group defines new/potential interested interlocutors as countries and international organisations that are not currently NATO partners,
but that NATO should consider engaging and cooperating with in a flexible way, outside the parameters of a formal partnership. This does
not preclude these countries or organisations from becoming NATO partners in the future.

6
Guiding Principles for NATO’s Approach to the Southern
Neighbourhoods

The group’s recommendations are grounded in a set of guiding principles, which should set
the strategic direction for the Alliance’s approach to its southern neighbourhoods. Policy
initiatives and frameworks should reflect these principles:

360-degree approach: NATO must ensure that its approach to collective defence is fully based
on a 360-degree approach and is appropriate to deter and defend against all threats
emanating from both the East and the South. It is essential that the Alliance recognises the
deep and growing interlinkages between the two strategic directions. NATO needs to be agile
and capable to manage multiple threats and challenges – and potentially several crises
happening simultaneously in different parts of the world. This requires balancing and
ensuring that adequate attention and resources are allocated simultaneously to NATO’s
eastern and southern flanks, while retaining a global approach to security.

Values: NATO’s cooperation with southern partners should be based on mutual respect and
common interests, while recognising that there may not always be a convergence over the
understanding of values. This requires a delicate balancing. NATO is an alliance based on
common values, i.e. individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and these
values should continue to guide NATO’s work. According to its mandate and core tasks, as
well as to partners’ requests, NATO should assist partners in enhancing the democratic good
governance of their defence and security sectors. At the same time, the Alliance operates in
a world of strategic competition, with countries like Russia and China offering an alternative,
‘non-democratic’ and ‘non-accountable’ model. In this context, it is in the Alliance’s vital
interest to engage over how to solve concrete shared security concerns, by listening to and
understanding the partners’ particular needs and threat perceptions.

Navigating non-exclusivity: NATO should stress that cooperation and partnership with the
Alliance does not necessarily exclude cooperating with other actors, including strategic
competitors. A number of partners are concerned about the possible impact of global
strategic competition on regional conflicts and indicate that they want to maintain relations
with a number of external powers including some that are strategic competitors to NATO.
They are wary of being drawn into a geopolitical struggle. NATO should seek a broad
engagement and be open to cooperation, without compromising its values or undermining
the Alliance’s security. In interacting with partners, NATO should emphasise its commitment
to multilateralism, international law and cooperative, shared security.

Cooperative spirit: NATO’s approach to the region should emphasise shared interests,
focusing on both opportunities as well as threats and challenges. It should stress its
willingness to learn from, and actively listen to, partners, on a regular and enduring basis, and
engage them as active security-contributors through political dialogue and multi-level
consultations, a desire that partners’ representatives repeatedly expressed during
engagements with the group. Building a common sense of purpose and ownership should
drive how NATO engages with partners in its southern neighbourhoods. Beyond this point,
NATO should ensure its partnerships follow a “Do no harm” principle – linking defence and

7
security cooperation to good governance and human security, being informed by a thorough
understanding of the local context, and thereby assessing the impacts of activities in the
specific context, culture and society, with a focus on what is pragmatically achievable in the
given context. Policies and instruments aimed at adaptation and institutional resilience, as
well as with a concrete impact on populations, must be seen as a priority. In many cases, this
requires more sustained political dialogue with a medium and long-term perspective. Finally,
partners should be able to outline how much or little public visibility they want to give to
cooperation with NATO.

Enhanced representation: Partners in the South express a desire for more interaction and a
stronger engagement, more efficient representation and tailored visibility of NATO in the
southern neighbourhoods. With the NATO-ICI Regional Centre in Kuwait and the future NATO
liaison office in Jordan, as well as NATO Mission Iraq (NMI), the Alliance already maintains a
presence in the Middle East. NATO Mission Iraq shows that proximity, in-country presence
and long-term commitments matter, as they allow for a more profound understanding and
the building of trusted relations and lasting security cooperation. Based on this lesson, NATO
should consider how to enhance its representation and in-country engagements in other
regions of the southern neighbourhoods, such as North Africa.

Credibility: NATO must match its level of ambition with the appropriate level of resources,
from deterrence and defence to partnership and practical cooperation activities. Importantly,
NATO should not promise more than it can deliver, and must follow up by delivering, in a
transparent and accountable manner, on what has already been agreed. This principle entails
managing expectations from partners on NATO’s purpose and resources, as part of clear
communications and dialogue. It also entails ensuring the appropriate level of resources are
provided to deliver on Allied commitments in the southern neighbourhoods. The Alliance
should ensure the efficient use of existing resources and capabilities before seeking to
develop new ones. Priorities for both partners and other interested interlocutors should set
clear goals for engagement and deepening cooperation, including ways of measuring and
assessing results. It is important to recognise that maintaining and building relationships
requires investment, time and long-term engagement.

NATO’s added value: NATO must not lose sight of its core purpose: to ensure the collective
defence of Allies. It must equally be mindful that, as a politico-military Alliance, its key added
value and expertise lies in the broader defence and security field, where it is regarded as the
”gold standard”. At the same time, this needs to be conveyed in a way that is appealing to
partners. For many partners, the Alliance’s emphasis on crisis prevention and management
and cooperative security will resonate with their own security concerns and interests. The
Alliance should hence stress its interest in strengthening partner countries through training
and capacity-building. NATO should further emphasise the importance of non-traditional
security (including resilience, understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on
security, cyber security, human security and the Women, Peace and Security agenda) and
work efficiently with international and regional organisations to see how these issues can be
addressed while adhering to its own added value. Explaining why NATO wants to engage with
partners will help demystify anti-NATO propaganda and enhance interest in cooperation.
Presenting its comprehensive approach to security will also help to differentiate its offer from
that of NATO’s potential adversaries and competitors.

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Synergies: NATO must seek synergies and cooperation with other international organisations
active in the region (the United Nations, African Union, Gulf Cooperation Council, League of
Arab States) and seek a deeper cooperation, coordination and complementarity within the
context of its existing partnership with the European Union. NATO should emphasise its
interest in supporting and complementing activities of other institutions, in line with the
principle of ‘added value’.

Inclusivity: when engaging in its southern neighbourhoods, NATO should seek to listen to and
interact with a wide range of stakeholders in addition to its official governmental
interlocutors. It should do so in a context-sensitive manner. Continuous outreach and
dialogue with, among others, civil society, parliamentarians, academia, think tanks and
independent media can enrich the Alliance’s understanding of local dynamics and contribute
to building stronger and more sustainable relationships with partner countries.

Accessibility and flexibility: The southern neighbourhoods are not a monolith and levels of
interest in cooperation and favourability towards NATO vary within the region. From the
Alliance’s perspective, it is important to understand partners’ own interests and tailor its level
of engagement and cooperation appropriately. This entails a tailored and flexible approach
to partners, both states and international organisations, and other interested interlocutors.
To that end, NATO must maintain its regional frameworks, e.g. by revitalising the
Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, while also ensuring flexible,
tailored approaches that are appropriate for each country or sub-region, since different actors
have different interest in cooperation with NATO. Beyond the immediate partners and
neighbourhood, NATO can slowly build up its dialogue with African states including by
observing relevant regional fora.

Streamlining: NATO’s approach must be simple and understandable from the perspective of
existing or potential partners and interlocutors. This entails an external dimension (such as a
clear and comprehensible interface for outside actors, easy access to partnership activities
and plain communication of available cooperation mechanisms and instruments) and an
internal component (streamlining various work strands within NATO’s structure, ensuring
efficient internal communications and complementarity, making better and more effective
use of existing tools and programmes, through regular assessment and adaptation when
needed).

9
Regional Approach

NATO’s southern neighbourhoods encompass a number of distinct regions and sub-regions

such as North Africa, the Middle East, the Gulf and the Sahel, and the adjacent maritime
regions. NATO should strengthen its representation and engagement in these regions, when
needed and requested by partners, to improve NATO’s bilateral cooperation. This section
provides an overview of actionable recommendations, tailored to both existing partnership
frameworks and relevant regions of strategic importance to NATO. The Alliance should
regularly monitor and assess the overall progress and political coherence of its engagements
and activities in its southern neighbourhoods.

Existing Partnerships
NATO’s partnership frameworks – the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative (ICI) – are useful to build NATO’s approach to the southern
neighbourhoods. Complex regional dynamics, conflict and tensions can freeze the convening
of meetings in these formats. This should not limit NATO's ability to move forward by
complementing the existing frameworks with flexible formats.

Moreover, because each partner is different, the introduction of Individually Tailored

Partnership Programmes (ITPPs) reinforces the importance of individual partnership and
bilateral relations between NATO and one given partner. This flexibility allows NATO to
accommodate the different levels of ambition each regional partner has with respect to
political dialogue and practical cooperation with NATO.

NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, which celebrates its 30th anniversary in 2024, is one of the
few formats in which Mediterranean countries come together. Bilateral tensions between MD
partners as well as differences in needs, capacity and level of ambition towards NATO have
prevented the Alliance from fully leveraging this format.

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was launched in 2004, in a challenging context. ICI
countries indicate they are keen to deepen partnerships with NATO, upgrade political
dialogue and engage in public diplomacy. Other interlocutors such as Saudi Arabia, Oman and
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have participated in selected ICI activities. There might be
opportunities to extend ICI membership or activities to other eligible and interested
countries.

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Recommendations:7

In the short term

1. NATO Leaders publicly recognise the interlinked importance of the southern

neighbourhoods to NATO and endorse the adoption of a new narrative affirming that a
closer relationship with southern neighbourhoods is mutually beneficial.

2. Encourage the Secretary General to visit southern partner countries periodically and
enhance the frequency of high-level political dialogue.

3. Convene a special summit meeting of all NATO southern partners to discuss ideas and
proposals for further deepening regional cooperation, when conditions allow it.

4. Propose a High-Level Regional Security and Stability Dialogue between relevant

international and regional organisations.

5. Enhance existing efforts for partner contributions to the NATO decision-making process
through political dialogue and consultations;

6. Involve southern neighbourhoods’ partners in the conceptualisation and preparation of

NATO partnership events and ensure adequate representation on panels.

7. Deepen thematic dialogues and consider establishing sub-regional working groups within
the MD and ICI for practical cooperation, complementing the bilateral dialogues in the
ITTPs.

8. On the ICI framework, reaffirm commitment to regional peace and security, reflecting and
updating the 2004 political narrative and deepening dialogue with Gulf countries, through
the ICI, through the GCC and bilaterally.

9. Provide the NATO-ICI Regional Centre with the appropriate human and financial resources,
and provide clear political guidance for its enhanced role in deepening partnerships,
sharing expertise and building capacity with all ICI partners and other GCC countries.

10. Engage more with parliaments, media, civil society and youth in the region and invite
scholars and think-tankers from the regions to expert briefings at NATO Headquarters.

In the medium term

11. Systematically review which additional NATO activities and centres can be made available
to interested MD and ICI partners.

12. Consider inviting interested countries to become partners within the MD and ICI format
once there is agreement and conditions allow it.

7 Recommendations are organised into three temporal categories for implementation: short term (18 months); medium term (up to 5 years);
long term (beyond 5 years).

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13. Exploit the NATO-ICI Regional Centre to reach out to the Arabic media in GCC countries,
including with local think-tanks and academic institutions.

In the long term

14. Coordinate with other frameworks that have strongly overlapping participation, such as
the Union for the Mediterranean, to identify topics where NATO has added value and
where there could be synergies.

15. Consider a NATO role in efforts to promote a Mediterranean framework of security and
cooperation, including by deepening cooperation with the European Union as agreed by
the two organisations.

NATO’s Southern Neighbourhoods: Regions of Strategic Interest to NATO

North Africa

North Africa’s stability is of strategic interest to NATO as it is both a direct neighbourhood for
some Allies and borders on the unstable Sahel region. Governments and state institutions in
the region struggle to deliver services, while militaries are key players, and in some cases,
highly trusted institutions. Strategic competitors seek to expand their influence in North
Africa. Disinformation campaigns have been on the rise in the context of Russia’s war against
Ukraine, and Wagner’s activities have contributed to destabilising the region. Moreover, anti-
Western sentiment among populations has been growing in the context of the war in Gaza.
Tensions among some states remain high, while regional cooperation is low.

Cooperation between regional actors and NATO Allies functions well through bilateral,
informal and flexible formats. At the same time, North Africa could benefit from a NATO
liaison office or similar representation, as proximity and long-term engagement matters.

Within North Africa, Libya deserves particular attention. Allied interests in resisting
aggression in NATO’s East, while at the same time addressing challenges in the South,
intersect in Libya, where Russia’s deployment of Wagner forces fuelled turmoil in the country
and turned it into a platform for destabilising the Sahel and beyond. This trend not only
undermines Allied security, but also hinders the sovereignty of the countries in the South. The
Wagner presence in Libya was long overlooked and Russia is actively pursuing efforts to re-
brand its Wagner presence (i.e. Africa Corps) in order to continue to project influence.

12
Recommendations:

In the short term

16. Intensify political engagement and build on the strong demand for practical cooperation,
such as defence capacity building (DCB) and demining, and engage in targeted messaging
for the different specific contexts.

17. Continue to support the political process in Libya and the efforts of the United Nations
Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Libya, since the principal path to reversing
the instability trend is for Libya to unify its political institutions, form a unified military
force, and regain sovereign control of its southern borders.

18. Highlight concrete ways in which NATO contributes to regional security, such as resilience,
crisis prevention and disaster relief, as well as the protection of critical infrastructure.

In the medium term

19. Intensify political engagement and practical cooperation as well as targeted messaging
for the different specific contexts.

20. Establish a permanent liaison office in North Africa, when requested, to allow for better
situational awareness and building long-term trusted relations.

21. Reaffirm NATO’s commitment to providing advice to Libya, upon its request, in the area
of defence and security institution building, taking into account political and security
conditions in the country.

In the long term

22. Seek to leverage the Mediterranean Dialogue as a de-escalation tool in times of tensions
through enhanced frequency of exchanges on all levels.

23. Consider inviting Libya to the Mediterranean Dialogue once an elected government is in
place.

Middle East

Stability in the Middle East is of strategic interest to NATO, and crises, conflicts and fragility in
the region can have direct consequences for Allies’ security.

The current war in Gaza has become the most acute crisis in the immediate southern
neighbourhoods of NATO. The consequences of this war on Euro-Atlantic security cannot be
ignored and need to be assessed. Addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is more important
than ever, allowing Israel to ensure its security while guaranteeing Palestinians their right to
their own independent state. NATO has a strategic interest in averting the further spread of
conflict in the eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf and the Red Sea.

13
Future peace and security arrangements for Israel and Palestine are likely to require the
provision of a variety of international security commitments. If approached to support
potential security arrangements, NATO could consider offering expertise, sharing experience
and, potentially, training and capacity-building to future multinational initiatives.

Iran’s destabilising and contested role in the region is part of a complex of regional conflicts
that reflect significant political struggles that should be addressed not only by security
measures and deterrence, but also through wider international and local political efforts.
While the GCC countries are close partners of the United States and most are partners of
NATO, they also are seeking to develop better relations both with Iran and with Israel over
time.

Tensions between Iran and most NATO countries have intensified, as Iran has become a key
supplier of weapons to Russia in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine. Iran has
shown its ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. Iran-backed
groups are now attacking Allied assets in the Middle East.

NATO sees stability in Iraq as a cornerstone of regional security and supports Iraqis’ efforts to
stabilise their country, fight terrorism and prevent the return of ISIS/Daesh. NATO Mission
Iraq has positive elements that could inspire future approaches in the southern
neighbourhoods – in particular, the model of mutually agreed security and defence capacity
building.

Syria must remain among the priorities of NATO’s policy for the South, since the
developments in that country have a direct impact on the security of NATO, its Allies as well
as partners.

Recommendations

In the short term

24. Reaffirm the previously stated commitment to a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace through
a two-state solution and support the international peace efforts of Allies to implement
the two-state solution.

25. Consider the Alliance’s potential contribution to humanitarian and disaster relief actions
led by the UN and others through NATO’s logistic assets.

26. Continue to assess increased or new security threats linked to the war in Gaza, including
a deteriorated security environment for NATO Mission Iraq and attacks in the Red Sea sub-
region.

27. Reaffirm the importance of addressing the threats emanating from all terrorist groups
and their affiliates in Syria and Iraq.

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28. Support international efforts towards finding a political solution to the Syrian conflict,
consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254, including measures for
a voluntary, safe and dignified return of Syrians.

In the medium term

29. Harmonise and streamline NATO’s existing instruments and promote an enhanced
collaborative interaction between the multiple entities in NATO’s ecosystem in order to
enhance NATO’s capacity to monitor, assess and address the threats and challenges to
the security of the Allies stemming from instability in the Middle East.

30. Enhance awareness and training in non-proliferation normative and institutional

frameworks for interested partners, through tailor-made courses, encouraging partners
to use their voice to uphold an international non-proliferation regime.

In the long term

31. The existing regional frameworks – the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative – should be used as complementary tools for promoting enhanced
regional dialogue and cooperation in security and defence.

32. Once conditions are in place, invite the Palestinian Authority to observe or participate in
Mediterranean Dialogue activities, in accordance with existing practices.

Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa

Security in the Sahel has dramatically deteriorated over recent years, with severe
consequences for populations in the region and for NATO Allies’ and NATO partners’ interests.
This degradation is the result of a combination of multiple long-standing challenges that have
intensified: terrorism and violent extremism, fed by communal and political violence,
organised crime, irregular migration and human trafficking, all of them worsened by poor
governance, demographic growth, and environmental stress under accelerated climate
change. Russia has exploited and fuelled these negative trends.

Growing instability in the Sahel region already has negative spill-over effects on Euro-Atlantic
security. Terrorist groups have been expanding their presence and influence in the Sahel, at
times through cooperation with criminal organisations and other destabilising actors.

Furthermore, democracy has been receding, and many military coups have taken place in the
Sahel since 2020. Russia has taken advantage of this trend, deepening diplomatic and military
partnerships in the region, deploying private military companies and carrying out
disinformation campaigns. Apart from a partnership with Mauritania, NATO is not well-known
and understood in the region: this challenges its ability to deepen cooperation and
successfully address shared security challenges.

15
From the Sahel, terrorist groups have expanded their presence and activities towards coastal
states in the Gulf of Guinea. Terrorist groups are also making inroads in East and Central
Africa. They still pledge to target Allies’ and partners’ security interests.

A number of states in Sub-Saharan Africa, including some that have experienced coups, have
turned away from existing international organisations. This has affected NATO Allies and
partner organisations such as the EU and the UN. In this context, Russia has increased its
influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, while China has also been gaining influence through
economic investment in strategic infrastructure, such as ports. NATO is not well-known and
understood in the region and suffers from negative preconceptions.

The Horn of Africa is a region of growing strategic competition given its location at the
crossroads of South-South trade. Regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa also provide an entry
point for illegal arms transfers and illicit networks. NATO has previously carried out effective
operations in this area, for instance by providing airlift support to African Union peacekeepers
in Darfur and by undertaking a successful anti-piracy mission.

Although NATO is likely to focus on the regions of Africa that are closest to the Euro-Atlantic,
it also has an interest in engaging more broadly with regional organisations, namely the
African Union (see section on Cooperation with International Organisations), and with
governments in the wider continent, especially those that play a positive role in regional
peace and security. Building these relations will take time and long-term engagement, and
NATO should clearly state its interest in identifying future opportunities for cooperation,
rather than in establishing a military presence.

Recommendations:

In the short term

33. Coordinate closely with the potential interlocutors on the visibility and outreach of
engagements with NATO.

34. Continue to monitor security risks emerging from the region and consider reviewing
whether renewed maritime security efforts may be warranted.

35. Support a comprehensive mapping of existing aid and support packages provided by
Allies, international and regional organisations, and partner countries to the Sahel region.
This exercise should aim to identify blind spots and room for cooperation or opportunities
to join efforts with existing initiatives or potential new ones to be created.

36. Consider to be present locally in high-level policy fora to listen and engage with actors
from the region.

In the medium term

37. Explore new partnerships in the wider region around the Sahel.

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38. Designate, when possible, Contact Point Embassies (CPEs) in non-partner countries.

39. Open its training, scholarships grants and media literacy efforts to third countries from
the region – including journalists and social media influencers in their fight against
disinformation.

40. Build from existing partnerships, like the one with Mauritania, and seek to open
additional cooperation activities to third countries from Sub-Saharan Africa.

In the long term

41. NATO should be guided by local demand when it comes to long-term objectives for
establishing partnerships and developing relations with new interlocutors. NATO should
be patient and gradual in building its understanding and relationships.

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Thematic Areas for Cooperation
NATO’s key purpose is to ensure Allied collective defence, based on a 360-degree approach.
To realise its key purpose, NATO carries out three core tasks: deterrence and defence; crisis
prevention and management; and cooperative security. NATO’s southern neighbourhoods
are important to all three core tasks.

When it comes to the 360-degree approach, NATO must ensure credible deterrence and
defence from the threats coming from all directions. Russia’s influence and destabilising role
in the southern neighbourhoods poses significant risks to Allied security. Crises and conflicts
in key strategic arenas, from the Red Sea to the Sahel, can also have second and third order
effects on Allies’ security. Moreover, ensuring freedom of navigation is essential for the
interests of Allies, as well as for partners and potential interlocutors.

NATO also has a shared interest with its partners in the South to contribute to crisis
prevention and management. Investing in crisis prevention, including by supporting partners
and building their capacity to counter terrorism and address shared security challenges,
should be a key priority for the Alliance. NATO has an interest in reaching a broader audience
within the political and military structures of partner countries. NATO should also harness its
expertise to ramp up support for disaster relief assistance and resilience to climate-related
shocks.

Cooperative security through political dialogue and practical cooperation with partners
benefits the security of both Allies and partners. Building a positive agenda for cooperation,
based on addressing shared security needs and preventing conflict should be at the core of
NATO’s cooperative security agenda. Among the areas where NATO can help are arms control
and non-proliferation, including assisting with efforts to tackle small arms and light weapons
trafficking, and demining. Opportunities for mutual learning should be highlighted.

Thematic areas offer both opportunities for political dialogue and practical cooperation and
are assessed as highly promising and valuable to advance NATO’s three core tasks and meet
partners’ security needs. These include human security, Women Peace and Security and good
governance; counter-terrorism; maritime security; resilience; climate change and security; as
well as public diplomacy, strategic communications and countering Foreign Information
Manipulation and Interference. Looking to the future, the Alliance should invest in these areas
as a way to scale, deepen and broaden existing cooperation as well as a potential avenue to
reach out to new interlocutors.

Human Security, Women, Peace and Security, and Good Governance

In the 2022 Strategic Concept, Allies agree on the importance of streamlining three cross-
cutting issues across its core tasks: human security; the Women, Peace and Security (WPS)
Agenda; and good governance in security and defence sectors. These topics are highly
relevant for security and defence engagements with all partners in the southern
neighbourhoods. They can contribute to sustainable institution-building and help to
strengthen capacities to prevent, manage and reduce conflict.

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NATO’s human security policy is based on five pillars: protection of civilians; children in armed
conflict; conflict-related sexual violence; cultural property protection; and combatting
trafficking in human beings. All pillars are founded on international humanitarian law and
gender perspectives are applied across the pillars.

Recommendations:

In the short term

42. Seek a “lead by example” approach to WPS, by encouraging Allies to prioritise sending
women military personnel to NATO activities with its southern partners. The same holds
for diversity in a broader sense.

43. Encourage partners to promote the WPS agenda throughout their defence and security
sectors.

44. Encourage partners and Allies to ensure women officers are included in training and in
NATO Defense College courses. Consider establishing an alumni network specifically for
women who have graduated from these courses.

In the medium term

44. Broaden and deepen NATO’s work on human security, WPS and democratic good
governance, building on programmes like ‘Building Integrity’ with interested partner
countries and other interlocutors in the southern neighbourhoods.

45. Building on the Civil Society Advisory Panel on Women, Peace and Security model,
establish a similar mechanism to engage with civil society from Allies and partners on
human security and good governance.

In the long term

46. Develop a mechanism to assess lessons from previous NATO missions and operations to
further understand the impact of conflict on local communities and particularly on
vulnerable groups, with a view to ensuring strengthening civilian harm mitigation
measures and the application of the ‘do no harm’ principle.

Counter-Terrorism
NATO identifies terrorism as “the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens
and to international peace and prosperity”. It stressed that countering terrorism is essential
to collective defence, contributes to all core tasks and is integral to its 360-degree approach
to deterrence and defence. NATO’s efforts to counter terrorism include working to enhance
Allies’ capacity to tackle the terrorist threat and manage the consequences of terrorist
attacks.

Working with partners is essential to NATO’s approach to countering terrorism. NATO focuses
on enhancing partners’ capacity to counter terrorism and address shared security concerns.
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This is achieved both by providing assistance to partners (in areas such as Counter-Improvised
Explosive Devices, Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems, Battlefield Evidence, etc.), where
NATO has developed counter-terrorism expertise, and by tailoring such assistance to partners’
specific needs and requests. Therefore, contributing to fighting terrorism through training and
capacity-building is and will remain a key priority for NATO’s approach to its southern
neighbourhoods.

NATO contributes to countering terrorist threats through advise-and-assist missions/capacity-

building efforts aimed to enable and empower local partners in their own security
endeavours. NATO Mission Iraq is one example of that, but Defence Capacity Building
Packages in Jordan, Tunisia and Mauritania are other examples of such varied contribution.

Recommendations:

In the short term

47. Leverage the appointment of the Special Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism to give more
visibility to NATO’s role in counter-terrorism, particularly towards NATO’s partner
countries in southern neighbourhoods.

48. Develop a process for the systematic analysis of lessons learned at the political and
strategic levels, taking into account partners’ best practices and experience on counter-
terrorism.

49. Continue to contribute to international efforts in fighting terrorism, including through the
Global Coalition against Daesh.

50. While addressing the threat of terrorism, NATO should avoid language that can be
misperceived as stigmatising by southern partners.

In the medium term

51. Boost Allied situational awareness of NATO’s southern neighbourhoods, including by

further developing NATO’s intelligence capabilities.

52. Expand NATO’s partnerships and explore opportunities for further cooperation with
regional partners on countering terrorism. Attention should be given to building partners’
capacity to address the terrorist threat and to areas where NATO can enhance civil-
military capabilities.

53. Invest in NATO’s role in understanding and responding to terrorist misuse of technology,
including by stepping up work on countering drones and investing in chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear defence.

In the long term

54. Enhance and streamline cooperation with international and regional institutions, such as
the UN, African Union and GCC.

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55. Strengthen coordination with the European Union on counter-terrorism. Both
organisations should continue to hold regular staff-to-staff exchanges and cooperate to
deliver concrete projects, creating synergies whenever possible.

Maritime Security
Maritime domains are spaces of economic opportunities, but also marked by security
challenges and great power competition around the globe as well as across the Euro-Atlantic,
Indo-Pacific, and Middle East and North Africa regions. The growing role and maritime
presence of strategic competitors and adversaries in NATO’s neighbourhood also serves to
stress the links between NATO’s eastern and southern flanks.

Numerous shared challenges that confront NATO Allies and partners in the southern
neighbourhoods have maritime dimensions. This includes long-standing challenges such as
irregular migration, terrorism, drugs smuggling, piracy and organised crime. Shared
challenges also include new and recently exacerbated issues: be it the current situation in the
Red Sea; external risks to Allied security in the eastern Mediterranean; geopolitical tensions
with maritime dimensions; or the protection of undersea infrastructure. These challenges are
often overlapping.

According to the 2022 Strategic Concept, maritime security is key to Allied peace and
prosperity. To ensure it, Allies focus on enhancing situational awareness to deter and defend
against all threats in the maritime domain, uphold freedom of navigation, secure maritime
trade routes and protect the main sea lines of communications. NATO is also actively involved
in protecting critical undersea infrastructure from hostile hybrid attacks. NATO and southern
partners share an interest in addressing these maritime security challenges.

Recommendations:

In the short term

56. Participate in relevant global and regional fora, such as the G7++ Friend of the Gulf of
Guinea, to engage with relevant actors, understand southern partners’ perceptions of
maritime security and maritime threats, and identify areas of potential cooperation as
well as NATO’s contribution.

57. Map existing maritime domain awareness efforts to identify NATO’s added value in
collecting, processing and disseminating maritime data and building situational
awareness as assets to support the international community and partner countries.

58. Enhance its understanding of interlinkages between maritime security, security of critical
infrastructure, including ports, and countering terrorism, smuggling and trafficking,
including the impact of geopolitical dynamics on these issues. To this end, explore the
possibility of enhancing cooperation with southern neighbourhoods’ partners to protect

21
 critical infrastructure of common interest (notably oil and gas pipelines and undersea
cables).

In the medium term

59. Build on its legacy of successful counter-piracy with Operation Ocean Shield as a backdrop
for identifying opportunities elsewhere, particularly where NATO is best placed to be the
first responder, also in providing security for food corridors. This should be done in close
consultation with regional partners and by de-conflicting with existing operations in the
maritime domain.

60. Identify opportunities for training, exercises and capacity building with a specific maritime
focus for partners. Interdiction training could, for example, be as useful for combatting
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing as for counter-piracy.

61. NATO should pay special attention to the maritime security priorities of coastal states in
the regions where NATO wishes to deepen collaboration on maritime security. These
priorities go beyond counter-piracy to include issues such as Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated (IUU) fishing.

In the long term

62. Engage at appropriate level with the European Union on their maritime security
instruments towards southern seascapes, to identify NATO’s added value, in areas such
as protecting blue economies.

Resilience
In the 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO states that national and collective resilience is essential
and underpins each of NATO’s core tasks. NATO has several instruments in its toolkit to
bolster resilience, including the capacity to undertake regular assessments of NATO’s overall
collective resilience based on baseline requirements,8 as well as the ability to inform and
advise on national resilience planning and deploy subject-matter experts through Resilience
Advisory Support Teams. Many of these tools can also be leveraged to support partners in
strengthening their own capacity to prepare for, resist, respond to and quickly recover from
strategic shocks and disruptions.

Resilience challenges in the southern neighbourhoods are broad, ranging from those linked
to climate change and extreme weather events, to food insecurity, vulnerable critical
infrastructure, and impact of conflict on civilians, among others. It is in NATO’s interest to
work with partners and new interlocutors in NATO’s southern neighbourhoods in managing
natural and human-made disasters and shocks ranging from floods, lack of water supply and
interruption in food supply chains to mass displacements.

8The seven baseline requirements for resilience are: assured continuity of government and critical government services; resilient energy
supplies; ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people; resilient food and water resources; ability to deal with mass
casualties and disruptive health crises; resilient civil communications systems; and resilient civil transportation systems.

22
Recommendations:

In the short term

63. Involve partners from the southern neighbourhoods in the Alliance’s consultations and
dialogue on building resilience, including by inviting them to relevant NATO Committees
as well as to attend NATO events such as the annual NATO Resilience Symposium.

64. Build on and invest in the visibility of Resilience Advisory Support Team missions to
provide advice on improving national resilience to interested partners in the southern
neighbourhoods.

65. Consider holding resilience-focused thematic dialogues with partners in the southern
neighbourhoods.

66. Seek to incorporate resilience goals as requested by partners and by building on the seven
baseline requirements, in Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes (ITPP) with
southern neighbours and in Defence Capacity Building Packages. Work in this area should
also include evaluations of progress as part of the periodic assessment.

67. Make more visible to partners the work of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response
Coordination Centre, which works with Allies and partners to respond to natural and
human-caused disasters.

In the medium term

68. Enhance the role of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) in
supporting partners in the southern neighbourhoods, ensuring both adequate resources
and robust coordination with relevant NATO and Allied entities, such as the NATO Support
and Procurement Agency’s Southern Operational Centre in Taranto, Italy, as well with
external actors, including relevant international organisations.

69. Enhance opportunities for partners to take part in resilience-related exercises (CORE and
EADRCC) and training in order to enhance local capacity, for instance in emergency
management.

In the long term

70. Consider including, on a case-by-case basis, interested interlocutors in NATO’s resilience-

building activities, such as training and capacity building as well as exchanges of best
practices.

Climate Change and Security

The Strategic Concept defines climate change as a “defining challenge of our time”. It can
exacerbate conflict, fragility and geopolitical competition, and affects the way in which armed
forces operate. NATO has expressed its ambition to become the “leading international
organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change
23
on security”. The Alliance has committed to integrating climate change considerations across
NATO’s core tasks and has developed an agenda focused on enhancing awareness,
adaptation, mitigation and outreach (through dialogue and cooperation with partners) as key
priorities to tackle the impact of climate change on security.

Partners in NATO’s southern neighbourhoods have a clear interest in this topic, as it directly
affects their security. The nexus between climate change and security threats is increasingly
evident around the globe, and particularly in the southern neighbourhoods. Effects of climate
change have exacerbated conflicts from the Middle East to the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and
beyond, and are an additional trigger for mass displacement of people, with a direct impact
on the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO’s southern partners are among the most exposed to climate
change worldwide, suffering from water shortages and related effects on food production and
social stability.

NATO has a unique expertise when it comes to assessing and adapting to the impact of climate
change on security and on the defence and security sectors writ large. NATO’s 2023 Climate
and Security Impact Assessment Report points out how climate change affects operational
capabilities, military equipment, infrastructure, supply chains and logistics in NATO and it
points to specific climate-related security challenges in the Alliance’s southern
neighbourhoods. Energy transitions are a further climate change-related challenge for
militaries, including questions of coherence in transitions and interoperability. NATO
possesses a comparative advantage on the climate change-security nexus compared to
strategic competitors, which can be very useful to partners.

On the other hand, some partners are becoming leaders in the field of adaptation to climate
change. NATO can thus also draw on partners’ experience and expertise on working in an
operational environment that is particularly exposed to climate change. Working with
partners on climate-related security issues is a two-way street.

Recommendations:

In the short term

71. Establish the thematic group on climate change and security agreed in the “Action Plan
to Increase Dialogue” within the MD and ICI countries.

72. Enhance dialogue and cooperation with partners and new interlocutors in the southern
neighbourhoods on the impact of climate change on security and defence sectors,
notably on maritime security, making full use of relevant NATO standards and technical
expertise.

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In the medium term

73. Explore with relevant partner countries the possibility of setting up a centre in North
Africa for climate and security. Building on existing NATO tools and initiatives9 as well as
on the experiences and contributions from partner countries, the centre should:

i. Develop tools for Allies and partners to mitigate security implications of climate
change, namely on security and defence sectors;

ii. Promote coherence and interoperability in energy transitions of Allied and

partner armed forces;

iii. Develop early-warning mechanisms for climate risks, in cooperation with think-
tanks and civil societies in partner states;

iv. Carry out outreach activities to new interlocutors in Sahel and Sub-Saharan
Africa.

74. Encourage cooperation between partners from different regions that are particularly
affected by climate risks such as the Indo-Pacific and southern partners, and/or that are
leading adaption efforts.

In the long term

75. Open thematic activities to potential partners and new interlocutors, particularly from
Sahel countries.

Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications

Public perceptions of the Alliance in the southern neighbourhoods are somewhat negative.
This stems from a number of reasons, including: poor knowledge-based information about
what NATO is and what it does; conflating the Alliance with national foreign and security
policies of individual Allies; the aftermath of the 2011 Libya campaign; the termination of
NATO’s operation in Afghanistan; long-standing perceptions of “double standards”, made
more acute in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and amplified over
the war in Gaza; as well as perceptions of instrumentality, expansionism and lack of genuine
attention to partners’ concerns. Misperceptions also play a role, fuelled by disinformation and
propaganda (as discussed in the section on counter-FIMI).

Unfavourable attitudes and lack of trust can become obstacles to strengthening cooperation
in certain areas and could make some governments less prone to cooperating with NATO. The
Alliance tends to be viewed more positively by defence and security sectors in partner
countries with a history of close cooperation with the Alliance or Allied militaries.

9Including the Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence, the Science for Peace and Security Programme, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster
Response Coordination Centre.

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In this context, NATO needs to significantly improve its strategic communications vis-à-vis the
southern neighbourhoods to address these issues and convey a more positive image of the
Alliance. The fundamental basis upon which to tackle existing mistrust is to build closer and
trusting relations with partners, and to showcase what NATO has to offer to partners in terms
of concrete actions.

Recommendations:

In the short term

76. NATO’s public diplomacy efforts should give the same priority to the southern
neighbourhoods as to the eastern neighbourhood, investing in being more visible and
proactive.

77. Update NATO’s communication strategy for the southern neighbourhoods. The strategy
should focus on explaining NATO, its diverse and multilateral nature, mandate and
functions as well as the concrete benefits of cooperation, building on practical examples
of what NATO has done – from providing logistics and airlift support to peacekeeping
missions, to deploying field hospitals to support the COVID-19 response, as well as
delivering training and building capacity in areas such as countering IEDs and enhancing
cyber defence.

78. Boost the Alliance’s understanding of the information space in the southern
neighbourhoods, including by enhancing relevant cultural and linguistic skills at NATO,
conducting regular polling and assessments of partners’ perceptions of NATO, ensuring
frequent interactions with experts on and from these regions, and using NATO’s existing
regional presence as well as Contact Point Embassies to gather regular feedback from
partners.

79. Strengthen NATO’s voice in the region, including by better utilising the Contact Point
Embassies, the NATO-ICI Regional Centre, Hub for the South and other NATO activities in
the southern neighbourhoods, as well as by increasing engagement with Arabic-language
broadcast media and by working more through local actors and partners.

80. Improve cooperation with partners on public diplomacy by involving them more in the
conceptualisation of relevant NATO public engagements and by including information and
communication elements in all Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes (ITPP)
pending partners’ agreements.

In the medium term

81. Consider inviting partners from the southern neighbourhoods regularly to NATO summits
and other high-level events.

82. Promote a new NATO-led recurrent event on the southern neighbourhoods, inviting
Allies, partners, international and regional organisations.

26
83. Scale context-sensitive youth engagement, drawing on the “do no harm” approach.
Leverage the annual NATO Youth Summit and NATO Partnerships 360 Symposium to reach
out to youth audiences in the southern neighbourhoods.

84. Set up a network of southern neighbourhoods’ partners experts to contribute to

increased Allied understanding and ability to communicate and engage effectively.

Responding to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI)

NATO faces a highly contested information environment in the South, where there is a
growing ‘battle of narratives’. Strategic competitors are able to make inroads into public
opinion, while engaging in destabilising activities. They are also able to manipulate, distort or
fabricate information to discredit NATO and NATO Allies. In the immediate future, therefore,
public views against NATO could worsen, hindering the Alliance’s ability to fulfil its core tasks
vis-à-vis the southern neighbourhoods. A successful Counter-FIMI strategy should be based
on an increased and sustained tempo of well-targeted proactive strategic communications
based on the recommendations in the previous section.

Recommendations:

In the short term

85. Adopt a proactive strategy by recognising the importance of building resilience to

disinformation, for instance through media literacy, rather than try to rebut every item of
fake news. As local populations inform themselves through local or regional means, NATO
should work to empower local news and informational actors.

In the medium term

86. Consider setting up a “Facts for Peace” initiative along the lines of NATO’s Science for
Peace and Security Programme, as a common-funded, permanent standing feature
providing education, training, fellowships and various forms of support to a selected line
of media outlets, journalists and social media influencers in partner countries that are
actively fighting disinformation.

87. Consider setting up a Counter-FIMI Centre of Excellence (or nest it within the European
Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats) and encourage it to open up its
activities to partners.

In the long term

88. Strengthen NATO’s credibility and trust through concrete activities, presence and
regular interaction with partners, while being mindful of many partners’ uneasiness with
being engaged through the framework of great power competition, rather than as
valuable actors in their own right.

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Cooperation with International and Regional Organisations
Allies have a shared interest in contributing together to stability and to conflict and crisis
prevention through NATO. However, NATO is not always the most appropriate forum to
address the core issues underpinning instability. This is why it is important for the Alliance to
cooperate with other international and regional organisations – such as the UN, the EU, the
OSCE, the GCC, the Arab League and the AU – to address the broader conditions fuelling crises
and pervasive instability and contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction. An example could
be through the proposed High-Level Regional Security and Stability Dialogue (see
Recommendation 4).

In this context, NATO supports the United Nations in crisis prevention and management,
offering assistance when requested and feasible. NATO is already supporting the United
Nations through multi-year training, capacity building and logistics support. These efforts
contribute to strengthening the UN’s capacity to manage and sustain peacekeeping
operations. In its engagement with southern partners, NATO can build on existing
cooperation and further deepen it on issues such as climate change and security, maritime
security, counter-terrorism, Women, Peace and Security, and human security.

The African Union is responding to various crises by promoting African solutions.

Comparatively to UN missions, there is a growing number of African-led peacekeeping and
security missions, as well as African-led mediation efforts, across the African continent. These
developments reflect the ambition to increasingly rely on local leadership and solutions. A
key framework for these efforts is the AU’s ‘Silencing the Guns’ initiative to resolve conflicts,
genocide and gender-based violence across the continent as part of its Agenda 2063. This is
an enormous task. NATO has previously supported the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur
with strategic airlift. It also cooperates with the African Center for the Study and Research on
Terrorism. Building on these examples, there could be opportunities to further cooperate
with the AU upon request.

Leaders in the Middle East also express an ambition to have more regional mechanisms for
resolving conflicts and providing security. This will be a key dynamic to watch.

Recommendations

In the short term

89. Engage in a conversation with the UN regarding its efforts around human security and
Youth, Peace and Security, possibly in the context of the 2024 Summit of the Future.

90. Enhance cooperation with the UN in areas such as logistics support to humanitarian
missions and climate change and security.

91. Establish a political representation to the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
complementing the existing military liaison office, to facilitate dialogue and create new
mechanisms for cooperation.

28
92. Promote regular dialogue between the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative
for WPS and the AU’s Special Envoy for WPS.

93. Ensure Mediterranean Partners to Cooperation and Security are part of the agenda for
discussion when staff talks are held with the OSCE.

In the medium term

94. Enhance cooperation with the UN on Youth, Peace and Security, including by promoting
a regular side event at NATO summits on the topic with representation of partners and
non-partner representatives.

95. Explore new areas for NATO-AU cooperation, using as a potential model the range of
support offered to UN missions, such as logistics assistance to peacekeeping and disaster-
relief operations, airlift support, delivery of military hospitals, as well as training and
capacity-building in areas such as countering IEDs and medical care.

96. Promote climate change and security, and Women, Peace and Security as shared priorities
and key domains of active cooperation with all interlocutors.

97. Assess, in consultation with the AU, if NATO could potentially contribute to the progress
of the AU’s “Silencing the Guns” initiative.

In the long term

98. Enhance NATO’s support to international and regional organisations through advice to
those engaged in stabilisation and peacekeeping, promoting the visibility of such
activities, when possible, but doing so discretely when the context requires it.

NATO – European Union

The European Union is a unique and essential partner for NATO, and Allies and EU members
share the same values. NATO and the EU play complementary, coherent and mutually
reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security, including in the southern
neighbourhoods.

Any obstacles to cooperation need to be overcome given the strategic common interests that
the organisations have. Further coordination can be developed making the most of each
organisation's distinct advantages to the benefit of NATO Allies and EU members.

The EU has a clear and comprehensive strategy towards its southern neighbourhoods and an
array of relevant tools. Its goal of helping to ensure the southern neighbourhoods as a region
of peace, security and cooperation is fully compatible and consistent with NATO’s goal of
contributing to peace, security and stability as a way of strengthening Allied and global
security.

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Recommendations:

In the short term

99. Establish regular consultations between the NATO Secretary General and the leadership
of the European Union on the southern neighbourhoods.

100.Enhance and broaden staff level exchanges between NATO and the EU to assess
developments in the southern neighbourhoods, keep each other informed of activities.

In the medium term

101.Invest in closer cooperation and promoting synergies between NATO and EU public
diplomacy in the southern neighbourhoods.

102.Intensify exchanges between the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and European Parliament
on the southern neighbourhoods.

In the long term

103.Develop NATO-EU cooperation, as agreed by the two organisations, by making the most
of each organisation's advantages for the benefit of the efficiency of their policies and
activities in the region.

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NATO’s Internal Structures
NATO and NATO Allies already carry out a wide array of engagements towards the southern
neighbourhoods. However, these activities are often dispersed across various NATO entities,
as well as across Allied bilateral and mini-lateral efforts. Dispersion reduces coordination and
increases the risk of duplication. It also makes it difficult for partners and interested
interlocutors to engage with the Alliance. This is further complicated by the absence of a clear
focal point that partners and interested interlocutors can reach out to. Addressing these
issues would enhance NATO’s attractiveness to partners in the southern neighbourhoods.

If NATO wants more active and beneficial engagement with its southern neighbourhoods, this
needs to be reflected in its internal structure. This encompasses a broad range of measures,
ranging from consensus-building within the Alliance, over ensuring adequate structures,
coordination and funding mechanisms, to investing in messaging.

NATO needs robust situational awareness of the complex set of crises that Allies and partners
in the southern neighbourhoods face. This requires more dialogue and cooperation with
partners, in line with NATO’s partner countries’ clearly stated desire, as well as strong
coordination with all relevant stakeholders.

Recommendations:

104. Appoint a Special Envoy for the Southern Neighbourhoods, duly supported by a
structure that can collect and synthesise the interactions with the broader network of
counterparts in the southern neighbourhoods. This senior officer should oversee and
streamline NATO’s various work strands and activities towards the southern
neighbourhoods, ensuring consistency and progress, and avoiding duplication and
dispersion of efforts. This person should also be a permanent point of contact for
partners and interested interlocutors willing to approach NATO, in a region where
building trust and confidence through personal relations is key.

105. Improve awareness and understanding by:

i. Exploring the possibility of establishing a standing NATO mission dedicated to

training and capacity-building for partners, to be deployed upon invitation of the
latter.

ii. Enhancing NATO’s proximity to partners on the ground. This could come in the form
of additional NATO liaison offices or training centres.

iii. Creating a review process to periodically assess NATO’s relationship with the
southern neighbourhoods, from an internal and external point of view. This process
could include tasking external experts to evaluate selected partnerships through
dialogue with a range of stakeholders in partner countries.

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106. Enhance coordination by:

i. Developing an internal coordination mechanism – as part of the periodic review –

that includes civil and military structures to strengthen internal consultation and
communications and regularly assess the advancement of objectives and outcomes
achieved in partnerships with the southern neighbourhoods. A report should be
regularly presented to the North Atlantic Council to evaluate progress and provide
any necessary adjustments.

ii. Strengthening information exchanges between Allies on existing bilateral

cooperation with partners in the regions to avoid duplication, ensuring
complementarity, providing support to ongoing efforts and promoting a cohesive
approach to the region.

iii. Assessing the role of Contact Point Embassies (CPE) to improve their visibility and
efficiency, including in consultation with the CPE Allies. Selection of CPEs should be
strategic to maximise an effective relationship with the host country.

iv. Leveraging the wide range of Centres of Excellence, particularly in engaging new
interlocutors.

107. Appropriately resource its efforts by:

i. Swiftly and fully implementing the decision to fund Defence Capacity Building
Packages through common funding and reduce the need for extra-budgetary
contributions, including Trust Funds. Ensure that NATO has the necessary resources
to deliver on cooperation with and support to partners through common funding in
order to increase the sustainability of programmes.

The Hub for the South

The NATO Strategic Direction-South Hub (NSD-S HUB) was established to increase NATO’s
understanding of the regional dynamics of North Africa, the Middle East, the Sahel, Sub-
Saharan Africa and adjacent areas. The Hub’s activities consist of an “understanding” pillar
and an “engagement” pillar. To fulfil its mandate, the Hub interacts with think tanks,
academia and civil society organisations both in partner countries as well as with additional
actors. The Hub has been able to engage with a wide range of interlocutors in the southern
neighbourhoods, creating a valuable and diverse network.

However, the Hub’s activities have remained disconnected from the rest of the NATO
ecosystem and, therefore, its potential has not been fully achieved. This is due to a number
of factors, including its limited mandate, its placement within the NATO structure and its lack
of linkages with NATO Headquarters. It is therefore paramount for NATO to better integrate
the Hub within the NATO structure and increase its link with the political leadership, to best
leverage the network that the Hub has developed with partners and interested interlocutors
in the southern neighbourhoods through its “engagement” pillar.

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Recommendations:

108. Review the Hub’s mandate and function to allow relying on the Hub to contribute to
training and capacity-building activities for partners, including through Mobile Training
Teams and secondment to NATO offices and training centres in the southern
neighbourhoods.

109. Integrate the work of the Hub within the Alliance’s political outreach efforts towards
the southern neighbourhoods.

110. Restructure the Hub for the South into a joint civil-military entity, with a dual reporting
line to both military authorities and civilian ones, such as the proposed Special Envoy,
and establish a liaison for the Hub at NATO Headquarters to improve coordination and
synergies.

111. Develop systems for coordination, communication and collaboration between the NATO
Defense College and Hub for the South, maximising synergies and ensuring
complementarity.

112. Strengthen the role of the Hub in supporting public diplomacy and strategic
communications, under the guidance of the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, to ensure
coherence across the Alliance.

113. Encourage Allies to prioritise sending profiles with relevant linguistic and regional
expertise to the Hub, to strengthen the Hub’s outreach function to new interlocutors.

114. Rotate Hub personnel to/from NATO Headquarters to enhance their understanding of
NATO’s structure and activities.

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