Chapter 9

Rationalizing Evil
There are those tvha think God cotlld have done bettei:

Well into the seventeenth century, most Westerners 1ool;ed to the

Bible, tradition, and reason as guides for lcnowledge. Reason usually
played the role of explicator of the other two, especially the first. No one
could really use reason completely on its own because Scripture came
with divine inspiration, and human reason corrupted by original sin
might err but the ~ i b i could
e not. Science changed all of that because it
dealt with matters on which the Bible and tradition had little to say. The
condemnation of Galileo in 1633 was less a setback to science than a
manifestation of how desperate his opponents had become. By rhe end
of the seventeenth century virtually all major scientists had abandoned
the Medieval world view in favor of the new one created by scieilce.
Many scientists,, including Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton, were per-
sonally religious. Newton routinely investigated theological quesrions
and wrote a conlmentary on the book of Revelation. But when they did
their scientific work, scientists relied upon reason.
The rise of science completely changed how the West viewed the world.
It taught people io consider probleins first with reason and only later via
authority or tradition. Its awesome impact had economic, social, and
political consequences as well as religious ones because the use of rea-
son cut across all boundaries. In ~ r a n c ebrilliant middle-class strivers
lilce Voltaire and Rousseau had more influence than aristocrats with an-
tique titles, while the sharp-minded eiltrepreneurs who created the In-
dustrial Revolution in England made that counrry more powerful than
 120 The Problem of Evil in the Western Traditzon Rationalizing Evil 12 1

any monarch could have dreamt. Inevitably reason, independent of Later religious thinkers would recognize the latent threat in this ap-
revelation, also came to bear on the problem of evil. proach, that they would have to constantly fine tune their interpre-
The Briton Isaac Newton (1642-1727) made science triumphantlbe- tations to keep up with new scientific discoveries, but the natural
1 cause of the completeness of his system, both physical and mathemati- theologians saw no difficulty. They recognized the inadequacies of the
cal. Since his day, scientists have challenged many of his conclusions, literal interpretation. Preferring scientific and rationalist approaches,
but in his day his impact was as great as Aristotle's had been in the they wanted to work without revealed religion whenever they could, to
twelfth and thirteenth centuries. All of a sudden, the world looked dif- tone down the miraculous, and to outlaw the superstitious. They be-
ferent, but it made more sense. His impact can best be gauged by a cou- lieved they could make religion rational, at least to the educated for
plet written by a n admirer, the British poet Alexander Pope: "Nature whom that was necessary. (The natural theologians patronizingly as-
and Nature's laws lay hid in night: /God said, Let Newton be! and all sumed that the uneducated would continue to rely upon religious
was light." Except for his apocalyptic speculations, Newton did not authority rather than upon reason.) The more one knew about the
write about evil, but philosophically he accepted the argument from de- complexity of the cosmos, the more one had to recognize the hand of a
sign, that the universe could not have become an ordered whole with- creator behind it.
out a creator. "This most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and But if the cosmos reflected the creator, what role did evil play? It clearly
comets could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelli- did not reflect the creator, but it was as much a part of creation as the or-
gent and powerful Being," he once wrote. Occasionally he speculated derly revolution of planets and moons. Was evil the fly in the ointment?
that divine power lay behind some forces he could not explain, but he No, said Gottfried Wilhelm, Baron von Leibniz (1646-1716), German
did not use the deity only to fill in the scientific blanks. He truly be- aristocrat, diplomat,'philosopher, scientist, and believing Protestant. For
lieved that only an intelligent creator could have produced a Newtonian Leibniz, how God and evil could coexist became a major question be-
cosmos. Significantly, he also believed the converse. If the cosmos cause it challenged God's righteousness, so he wrote a book about the
needed God, the deity needed the cosmos: "and a god without domin- problem in 1710. Combining the Greek words for God, theos, and right-

' ion, providence, and final causes is nothing else but Fate and Nature." eousness, dike, he created a neologism, theodicy.
Both quotations come not from one of Newton's religious works but Like Newton, Leibniz wished to preserve what he could of traditional
from the second edition (1713) of his scientific masterpiece, the Prin- Christianity. In his Theodic3 he quoted the Bible, made a brief reference to
I
I cipia Mathematics (Book 111) (quoted in Newton 9 Philosophy of Nature, ed.
H . S. Thayer, 42,44).
the devil and, like Newton, suggested that the Bible was written so that
uneducated people could understand God's teaching. Leibniz defended
Such views made natural theology possible. The natural theologians the traditional Lutheran understanding of grace, free will, and predesti-
did not abandon the Bible, but they acknowledged its deficiencies when nation, although he investigated all of those concepts. He also demon-
it discussed the physical world, at least in comparison to the new scien- strated the openness that characterized natural theology. Leibniz cited
tific views. Newton himself recognized this. He accepted Moses' author- and occasionally praised the Medieval scholastic theologians, long de-
ship of Genesis. He did not want to question the truth of the Bible, but spised by Protestants for being both outdated and Roman Catholic. He
he disagreed with the inspired author in several places. He concluded also cited contemporary Catholic authors and acknowledged a personal
that Moses did indeed know the correct science, but he could not write acquaintance with some Jesuits, whoin many Protestants demonized.
about it because simple believers would reject his views. On the surface, Leibniz started with a simple but fundamental premise: God exists
this argument sounds specious, a n unworthy attempt to save the au- and is a perfectly good being. Therefore, he always does what is best, in-
thority of the Bible, but Newton has made a considerable advance here. cluding creating the world. In spite of evil, this world is the best one
He was wrong to believe that Moses knew the correct science, but he God could have created-the best of all possible worlds. This is a famil-
anticipated a fundamental principle of modern biblical study when he iar phrase because the French writer Voltaire parodied it mercilessly in
acknowledged that the scriptural writing style reflected the historical his book Candide, in which Dr. pangloss (from the Greek pan, meaning
situation of the writer and audience. Even more importantly, he sub- "all," andglossa, meaning "tongue") fatuously writes off every disaster
jected the text of the Bible to the findings of modern science. He did not as unimportant because this is the best of all possible worlds and thus
allow the literal interpretation of the Genesis creation account to take nothing really can go wrong. But parody is only parody, and Leibniz's
precedence over what science told him the world was like. theory deserves consideration on its own.
 Yet even people who want to be open-minded recoil at that celebrated we simply cannot understand why God does what he does. If humans
(infamous?) phrase. How can a world contaminated by so many evils be could see the whole-which we cannot-we would understand the role
the best of all possible worlds? All humans have suffered from evil and which natural disasters play in the universe, "the general plan of the
can easily conceive of a better world than this one. Leibniz did not say universe, chosen by God for superior reasons," that is, reasons superior
that this is the best of all conceivable worlds, but rather the best of all PO;- to our understanding (Tkeodicy 105; 180). Leibniz sadly recognized that
sible ones. Like Newton, he saw God as a creator, and he saw in the co,m- the average person "feels an inclination to believe that what is the best
plexity of the cosmos a proof of God's existence. But deity could not do in the whole is also the best possible in each part" (Tkeodicy 2 12; 260).
anything he wanted. God has to follow his nature. He used this ap- Leibniz realized how hard his teaching sounded. He acknowledged
proach extensively to establish an explanation for evil. that there were those who thought that God could have done better, but
God created the human race in his image and likeness, which means he insisted that just because humans can conceive of a better world,
he gave humans intelligence and free will. God must respect his own that does not mean God has to create it. Why not? One answer centers
handiwork. To make humans any less than what he did would be to de- on limited human knowledge: How do we know what we conceive of 1s
mean his own creation. But since only the deity can be infallible, there indeed a better world? Many myths and folktales deal with people like
1 is the chance that a fallible creature with intelligence and free will
might choose something other than the good.
Midas of the golden touch, who regretted that his wish was fulfilled. A
second, more Leibnizian answer, centers on the nature of God. Flood
But could not God have created humans so that we would always freely victims may conceive a world without floods which seems to be a better
choose not to sin? Theoretically yes, but factually no, because, if he could place, but, if they can, so can God. If he chose not to create such a world,
have, he would have. That he created us as we are was proof to Leibniz then he must have had a reason, one which the flood victims cannot
that God could not simultaneously respect his creation and produce be- comprehend. God always does the good, so if he created this world, he
ings who were incapable of sin. This is hardly a consoling argument. After knew that it was the best possible one, if not the best conceivable one.
all, what good is free will if we use it to sin our way into damnation? This world contained evil but no more than was consistent with i t s
Would it not have been preferable for God to make us to be automatons or being the best of all possible ones.
moral robots if that way we could avoid damnation? Again, the answer is But if this world is the best possible one, why, critics asked, has God
theoretically yes but factually no, because automatons would not be in "interfered" in its operations with miracles? Leibniz replied that when
the divine image. God has to be God; he has to give us the free choice. God envisioned the creation of the cosmos, he included miracles among
Moral evil resulted from our free choice. As Leibniz observed, "To wish the infinite possibilities which could occur in that world. Miracles do
that God should not give free will to rational creatures is to wish that not interfere with the order of creation because that order existed first
there be none of those creatures" (Tkeodicy 119.i~;192). in the divine mind, which allowed for miracles.
I
Along with moral evil, Leibniz recognized metaphysical and natural For the first time since Augustine someone had produced a theory of
evil. He interpreted metaphysical evil not in the usual spirit-over-matter evil which related to the understanding of the cosmos as a whole. The be-
I
form but rather as imperfectability of the cosmos. This imperfectability lief in the best of all possible worlds earned for this theory the name "op-
resulted from the cosmos' being a creation and thus incapable of the per- timism," an appropriate name since Leibniz insisted that God's justice
fection of the deity. He considered metaphysical evil theoretically and ac- does indeed prevail. The theory was easy to mock (as Cai~didedid) or to
tually unavoidable because he could not conceive of a perfect cosmos. cheapen (by allowing theists to retreat behind "it's ~ o d ' swill" whenever
Natural evil represented a different sort of problem. People had tradi- evil occurred), and its completeness did not guarantee its correctness. But
tionally pictured God as the lord of creation, but science had firmly Leibniz had updated the theist approach to evil to meet the needs of the
placed him within the workings of the cosmos. So how could these new world created by science and reason. The questions he raised per-
smoothly functioning natural laws produce earthquakes, floods, and sist-for theists, at least-into the modein world. After all, if one believes
hurricanes, which harm so many people? Leibniz replied that God can in a good God who acts in this world, does he not always act for the best?
only do what is best, and so if he permits a natural disaster to occur, this One of optimisnl's most fervent supporters was the British poet
cannot mean that he is acting evilly toward us. Following Augustine, Alexander Pope (1688-1744), who presented his views most clearly in
Leibniz belleved that God could bring good out of evil, that every act was the philosophic poem "An Essay on Man," written in 1733-34. Whereas
part of a divine plan. He matched this with the book of Job, arguing that Leibniz had derived his views of evil from the nature of God, Pope
124 The Problem of Evil in the Western Tradition Rationalizing Evil 125

started with cosmology of his hero Newton. The complex universe cre- . Pope did not deny the reality of evil but insisted that it has a place in
ated by God and described by the great scientist could only be good. the divine scheme and that God can somehow bring goodness out of it.
"Whatever is, is right" he wrote in the "Essay" (i.294). He envisioned a He reached through Leibniz and Augustine back to Job. We cannot al-
universe filled with beings, all occupying their appointed places, a "Vast ways understand what God is doing, but we must trust'that ~ o isddoing
chain of being!" (i.237), "Amighty maze! but not without a plan" (i,:6). what is good for the creation as a whole, no matter how much individ-
As God's work, this is the best of all possible worlds: "Of systems pos-
sible, if 'tis confessed /That wisdom infinite must form the best" (i.43-4).
And it functions well: "The general order, since the whole began, / IS All Nature is but art, unknown to thee;
All chance, direction, which thou canst not see;
kept by Nature, and is kept by man" (i.171-2).
AU discord, harmony not understood;
Humans, in their pride, resent their place in the cosmos. Like their All' partial evil, universal good (i.289-92).
first parents, they want more, but they do not understand the. divine
plan. They consider themselves the wonders of creation, yet they para-
doxically know-theyare fallible-they sin, become ill, and die. They see ~ e w t o nLeibniz,
, and Pope were not alone in trying tp relate evil to the
only themselves and believe they deserve better. Wrong, said Pope.

~ r e s u m ~ t u o man!
u s the reason wouldst thou find eate something as perfect as himself.
Why formed so weak, so little and so blind? g (1650-1729) tried to explain evil ra-
First, if thou canst, the hard reason guess, ant pierre Bayle (1647-1706) took a
Why formed.no weaker, blinder, and no less (i.35-8).
skeptical approach to revealed religion. The tendency was unmistakable.
Pope is right on target: humans wonder why they are not better, but
in their limited view they do not wonder why they are not worse. those who kept him did so because of his presence in the Bible. Yet as
But is it not intrinsically good to strive for more? No, said Pope, be- more and more intellectuals preferred the supposed clarity of science
cause that would mean that God had failed us. "Then say not man's im- ty of the Bible, the devil was doomed,
perfect, Heaven in fault; / Say rather, man's as perfect as h e ought." and, if that trend persisted, the Bible would not be far behind hinl. The
:
"The bliis of man (could pride that blessing find) / I s not to think or act
beyond mankind." Besides, if we assert our right to push higher, we will
upset the balance of nature and could pay a price ourselves, something
which we in our pride do not realize. "On superior powers / Were'we to seemed less and less relevant and more and more necessary of explana-
press, inferior might on ours." The consequences? "In the full creation tion. Most problematic was the intervention of God in.human affairs,
leave a void, / Where, one step broken, the great scale's destroyed" particularly miracles. The smoothly-flowing Newtonian cosn~osdid not
(i.69-70,. 189, 241-4). In Paradise Lost, Adam and Eve did not care about need such intervention or at least not nearly on the scale presented by
the effect of their sin on the natural world, but people living in an age of the Bible. But while natural theology or natural religion as it was often
science had to consider it. called, had difficulty with the Bible, a second intellectual movement,
Then w h y in this so well-ordered world, does evil exist? Since Pope deism, simply abandoned it.
'-.
had put his emphasis on the Newtonian harmony of the physical world, Deists believed in a deity who had created the world but who then
he did not deal with moral evil but instead with natural evil. withdrew and now had little to do with it. They differed from natural
But errs not Nature from this gracious end,
theologians who saw the Newtonian cosmos as a proof of God's exist-
From burning suns when livid deaths descend, ed to liinit divine intervention in
When earthquakes swallow, or when tempests sweep human affairs,.and who hoped to reconcile the Bible to the new scien-
owns to one grave, whole nations to the deep? tific views. The deists, by contrast, gave n o authority to supernatural
"No" ('tis replied) "the first Almighty Cause revelation, considered dogma to be obfuscation, and said that prayer or
~ c t s n oby
t partial, but by general laws" (i.1414). any other attempt to contact the deity was fruitless. While the natural
126 Tlze Problem of Evil ilz the Western Tradition ~ a t i o n a l i z i nEvil
~ 127

theologians could explain the existence of evil as part of a divine plan, against injustice. He personified the French and European Enlighten-
the deists did not feel comfortable with a divine plan since they could not ment, the intellectual movement which claimed to abolish superstition
accept its ultimate biblical base. The Irishman John Toland ( 1670-1722) and harmful, unquestioned traditions, and to replace them with the
was an early deist; his book Christianity Not Mysterious (1696) claimed clarity of reason. In France, the Enlightenment intellectuals called them-
that Christianity was a perfectly logical religion and its mysterious ele- selves les philosophes, literally, "the philosophers," but they did not con-
ments resulted from the influence of paganism and "priestcraft;' He sider themselves philosophers in the formal sense. The term rather
accepted no communication with the supernatural, including divine referred to their love of wisdom and the works of the intellect. They be-
revelation. Another deist, the Englishman Matthew Tindal ( 1655-1733), lieved the enemy of reason was organized religion, and they feared that
believed that the religion of nature was all anyone needed since it was optimism, technically a philosophy, gave it aid and comfort.
available to all, perfect and unchangeable. The best Scripture could do In spite of a Jesuit education, Voltaire loathed organized religion be-
was to reinforce this teaching. cause he found it irrational and believed it fostered superstition on the
The deists found less and less to learn from the Bible, which soon be- people to keep them under control of both Church and state. He feared
came a pale source of ethical teaching, provided, of course, it met the that religious authorities who could make people believe absurdities
ethical standards, of the deists. The most prominent American deist, had the power to get people to commit atrocities. Anticipating Marx, he
Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), went through the Gospels, chose the considered religion the opiate of the people. Voltaire rejected optimism
passages he considered most reasonable, and then created a personal as a support for Christianity because optimism could be used to justify
gospel which he called "The Philosophy of Jesus" (1804); he later went any evil, human or, natural, and this attitude of it's-all-part-of-God's-
over the material again and produced "The Life and Morals of Jesus" plan would rob people of a just indignation at their oppression and suf-
( 1819). The Bible could not indefinitely sustain such patronizing and fering. Yet it was not human evil but a natural one which engendered
still retain any of its authority. his most scathing attack on optimism.
Deists could accept the "doctrine" of creation only because they consid- On November 1, 1755, a tremendous earthquake shook the Portuguese
ered it rational, but they rejected a deity who was active in the world. In- city of Lisbon, and between thirty and forty thousand people lost their
stead they favored the image of the divine clockmaker: God created the lives. A believer in God, Voltaire reacted against the facile, optimist ex-
world, which now runs on its own, but on very rare occasions he has to planations for the earthquake, and so he wrote a poem about it: "The Lis-
step in to keep it working properly. As time went on, the deists found that bon Earthquake," subtitled "An Inquiry into the Maxim 'Whatever Is,
they not only needed the biblical creator less and less, but also they needed Is Right."' In spite of disclaimers about his professed admiration for
the god of natural theology less and less. If God were God, why does he Alexander Pope, Voltaire attacked the now deceased poet and herald of
need to intervene at all in creation, once it is up and running? The later optimism. He concentrated on the theme of individual suffering's rela-
deists had trouble finding something for the divine clockmaker to do. The tion to the overall good. He recognized that much theorizing about this
shallowness of this approach to God provoked pungent criticisms. Biblical theme was of the armchair variety and did not affect the theorist, so, in-
theists asked, who cares about a deity who has nothing to do with world? stead of framing individual suffering against a philosophical backdrop,
Picture Moses standing on the shore of the Red Sea, waiting for a deist he personalized it. He invited the optimists to come to Lisbon and see
god! A sharper criticism came from the secularist French intellectual Denis
Women and children heaped up mountain high,
Diderot (1713-84), who snidely observed that a deist was someone who Limbs crushed which under ponderous marble lie;
had not lived long enough to become an atheist. Wretches unnumbered in the pangs of death,
Traditional religious thinkers did not mount an effective resistance to Who mangled, torn, and panting for their breath,
what the natural theologians, optimists, and deists were doing. But they Buried beneath their sinking roofs expire,
did not have to. Intellectuals skeptical of religion, both revealed and And end their wretched days in torments dire ( ~ o r i a b i Voltalre,
e 560).
natural, went to the attack. For the rest of this chapter, we will see how
they attacked deism, natural theology, and optimism; in the next chap- But this suffering somehow fits into the theme of universal good,
ter, we will see how they treated revealed religion. does it not? Voltaire contemptuously pointed out how such a theory
Frangois Marie Arouet (1694-1778) wrote under the name Voltaire. A portrays God: "Say, will you then eternal laws maintain, /Which God to
well-educated commoner, he fought a lifelong battle for freedom and cruelties like this maintain?" Could the optimists not realize what they
130 The Problem of Evil in the Western Tradition

assent to [a miracle], is conscious of a continued miracle in his own per- with infinite power and infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the
son, which subverts aLl the principles of his understanding, and gives h m eyes of faith alone" (Dialogues 10).
a determlnat~onto believe what is most contrary to custom and experi- Hume went on to argue that because people believe beforehand that
ence" ( A n Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 10). God exists, they can find him in the universe. He asked:
Deists and natural theologians no doubt chuckled at this rout 'of the
But supposing . . . that this creature [a being unacquainted with our
simple believers, but their time had also come.
universe] is not antecedently convinced of a supreme intelligence, be-
In Dialogtles Concerning Natural Religion (published posthumously in nevolent, and powerful, but is left to gather such a belief from the ap-
1779), Hume focused on a theism based upon the complex and intricate pearance of things-this entirely alters the case, nor will he ever find
workings of the cosmos, clearly the product of a divine intellect for the any reason for such a conclusion (Dialog~res11).
deists and natural theologians. But, he asked, how valid is it to make a
conclusion about the existence of a supernatural being when all we have He next went after the classic deist contention, that God respects his
is natural evidence? And what role does evil play? creation and intervenes only to keep.it running well. He should have in-
In his discussion of evil in chapters 1 0 and 11 of Dialogues, Hume con- tervened more frequently, Hume taunted the deists: "One wave, a little
centrated on methodology. For him, the only knowledge we have comes higher than the rest, by burying Caesar and his fortune in the bottom of
'
from empirical observations. We deduce that God exists from the crea- the ocean, might have restored liberty to a considerable part of man-
tion which we observe. And that is precisely the problem: What do we kind."'For that matter, the divine clockmaker did not do such a good job
observe? "Labor and poverty, so abhorred by everyone, are the certain in the first place; we can observe . .
lot of the greater number; and those few privileged persons who enjoy
ease and opulence never reach contentment or true felicity. . . . Why the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and principles of the
have all men . . . in all ages complained incessantly about the miseries great machine of nature. . . . One would imagine that this grand
of life?" If God exists, these miseries must be explained in reference to production h a d n o t received the last hand of themaker-so little fin-
him. "Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is ished is every part, and so coarse are the strokes with which it is exe-
he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is he both able and will- cuted (Dialog~res11).
ing? whence then is evil?" (Dialogues 10). Hume succinctly stated the
fundamental problem which evil presents to all theists. He finished by returning to the central point, methodology. The only
What of the traditional argument, that we do not understand how knowledge we have in any discussion, the only proof we can offer in any
God acts? Hume responded, if "our common measures of truth and discussion, must come from empirically observable phenomena. We can
falsehood are not applicable" in this discussion, then we do not know see an imperfect world; we can see a world wracked by evil and suffer-
what we are talking about. How can we speak intelligently about some- ing; we can see no other world. From such evidence, how can we infer
thing which we admit we cannot understand? Hume acknowledged the existence of a good dod? We cannot.
that suffering might be compatible with a benevolent deity, but first the The Dialogues fell like a bombshell upon the natural theologians and
existence of that deity has to be established, and innocent suffering deists. Deism floundered and never recovered; natural theology did not
works against that. disappear but it declined precipitously. Hulne had hit his opponents
Natural theologians and deists wanted to go from the existence of a where i t hurt. They wanted to use science to p r o v e ' ~ o dexisted; thanks
harmonious cosmos to the existence of God, but Hume insisted that to Hume, this tool had been turned against them.
empirical evidence shows a world which includes evil as well as good. The greatest continental philosopher of the age, Immanuel I<ant
This clearly points to an imperfect universe. Here is the crux of the mat- (1724-1804), worked to save knowledge from Hulnean skepticism, but
ter: since we all can en~piricallyobserve an imperfect, evil-infested uni- he, too, argued against any theodicy based on reason alone in a brief
verse, how can we use that to prove the existence of a perfect and good work appropriately titled "On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials
God? People can believe in a good deity if they wish, but they cannot in Theodicy." He claimed that one could accept theodicy only by under-
prove such a deity exists. "There is no view of human life or of the con- standing the mind of what he called "the world-author" and grasping
dition of mankind from which, without the greatest violence, we can how that-being works in the sensible world. Since no human being call
infer the moral attributes or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined do that, no one can create a philosophical theodicy.
132 The Problem of Evil in the Western Tradition

The eighteenth century proved that Western intellectuals could no

longer be satisfied with traditional religious teaching about evil. Natural
theologians tried to maintain the traditional teaching but to ration6lize
it as much as possible. Deists went a step further, reducing the deity's
participation in a harmonious cosmos. Voltaire attacked the optimism of
the natural theologians, while Hume destroyed the notion of a harmo-
nious cosmos and thus of the rationalized God who stood behind it. Yet
most Westerners accepted the authority of the Bible, stood by tradi-
tional teachings, and remained untouched by much of this speculation.
But in much of the West, les plzilosophrs also strove to destroy not only
natural religion but also traditional Christianity.