STATUTORY INTERPRETATION Doctrine of Presumption of Constitutionality • The legislature of the rule making authority is presumed to enact a law which does not contravene or violate the constitutional provisions. • Therefore, there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality of a legislation or statutory rule unless ex facie it violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. • If the provisions of a law or the rule is construed in such a way as would make it consistent with the Constitution and another interpretation would render the provision or the rule unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction. • Recently, the Supreme Court declined urgent hearing on a plea seeking to declare the Citizenship (Amendment) Act as constitutional and said that there was already a “presumption of constitutionality” to a law passed by Parliament. Chief Justice of India Sharad Arvind Bobde said that the court’s role was to examine the validity, and not declare a law constitutional. “How can we declare it constitutional? There is anyway a presumption of constitutionality.” Bobde said while rejecting the plea. Applicability and Limitation • It is a cardinal principle of construction that the Statute and the Rule or the Regulation must be held to be constitutionally valid unless and until it is established they violate any specific provision of the Constitution. • Further it is the duty of the Court to harmoniously construe different provisions of any Act or Rule or Regulation, if possible, and to sustain the same rather than striking down the provisions out right. • The presumption is not absolute, however, and does not stand when there is a gross violation of the Constitution. • A three-judge Bench in ‘NDMC v State of Punjab’ (1996) spoke of the limitations to the doctrine. The Bench observed that the Doctrine is not one of infinite application; it has recognised limitations. The Court has consistently followed a policy of not putting an unnatural and forced meaning on the words that have been used by the legislature in the search for an interpretation which would save the statutory provisions. • Govindlalji v State of Rajasthan- The constitutional validity of “the Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act” was challenged. Under Section 16 of the said Act, words “affairs of temple” were construed as restricted to the secular affairs, and as such had to be constitutionally valid. If a wider construction would have been given to the said Section, it would have violated Articles 25 and 26 of the constitution. Presumption against Absurdity • It is presumed that the legislature intends the most reasonable and beneficial construction of its enactments. • It is presumed that the legislature never intends its enactment to cause public inconvenience or private hardship. • If a statute is doubtful or ambiguous or fairly open to more than one construction, the construction which avoids absurd results should be preferred. Therefore, if the application of the literal rule of interpretation results in absurd construction then it should be avoided. • But where the language is explicit, its consequences are irrelevant and if the language is plain and unambiguous, the court have to give effect to it regardless of the consequences thereof. • Case- Omprakash v Radhacharan (2009) 15 SCC 66 Presumptions in favor of Natural Justice • Principle of natural justice is derived from word ‘Jus Natural’ of the Roman law and it is closely related to common law and moral principles but it is not codified. • Natural justice simply means to make a sensible and reasonable decision making procedure on a particular issue. • Natural justice is a sense of what is wrong and what is right. • Rules of Natural justice- I) NEMO JUDEX IN CAUSA SUA (no one can be a judge in his case) II) AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM (fair opportunity of being heard) III) REASONED DECISION (recording reasons for coming to a decision) • Natural justice cannot have blind application. Their application varies from case to case. EXAMPLES Nemo judex in causa sua • State of UP v Mohd. Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 • V.N Nadgir v UOI 1970 SLR 134 , A.K. Kraipak v UOI AIR 1970 SC 150 Audi alteram partem • Hiranath Misra v Principal, Rajendra Medical College AIR 1973 SC 1260 • Maharashtra state financial Corporation v Suvarna board mills (1994) 5 SCC 566 Reasoned decision • Union of India v Tulsiram Patel AIR 1985 SC 1416 (related to doctrine of pleasure Art 311) State of Maharashtra and Ors. Vs. Respondent: Indian Hotel and Restaurants Assn. and Ors. 2013 (5) ABR 222 • The Bombay Police Act, 1951 was amended in 2005 with the object of securing public order, morality, dignity of women, and reducing exploitation of women including trafficking of minor girls. Section 33A was inserted that prohibited performance of all types of dance in eating houses or permit rooms or beer bars. Section 33B was inserted that permitted three star hotels and Government associated places of entertainment to hold dance performances. The Indian Hotel & Restaurants Association filed a writ petition challenging Section 33A of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 before the Bombay High Court on the grounds that such prohibition: (a) discriminates against women employed to dance in eateries and bars and those employed to dance in three star hotels and government establishments; (b) interferes with their right to work and right to earn a livelihood, and thus is violative of the Indian Constitution. The Bombay High Court held that Section 33A is violative of Articles 14 (equality) and 19(1)(g) (right to work), of the Indian Constitution. The Government of Maharashtra filed an appeal before the Supreme Court and prayed that the terms “All dance” found in Section 33A be read down to mean “dances which are obscene and derogatory to the dignity of women” instead of striking it off altogether to ensure that the right to work of women is not interfered with. • The Supreme Court upheld the judgement of the Bombay High Court. It declared that Section 33A violates Article 14 the Constitution of India on the ground that such law is based on an unacceptable presumption that the so-called elite (i.e. rich and the famous) have higher standards of decency, morality or strength of character than their counterparts who have to content themselves with lesser facilities of inferior quality in the dance bars. It declared that Section 33A violates Article 19(1)(g) on the ground that it interferes with the right of women to work and that, contrary to the ban’s purpose, it resulted in forcing some women into prostitution. The Court further urged the government to take affirmative action to ensure the safety and improve the working conditions of the persons working as bar dancers who primarily constitute of women. State is bound by the Statute • In England crown is not bound by a statute unless explicitly named therein or bound by necessary implication. India embraced this tenet in an ancient Privy Council decision in Province of Bombay v Municipal Corp of Bombay. • After independence a majority decision supporting the tenet was delivered in Director of Rationing v Corp of Calcutta AIR 1960 SC 1355, where West Bengal govt was prosecuted for storing supplies without license under Sec 386 of Calcutta municipal act 1923. The SC by majority held the state not to be bound by the statute. • However, in Superintendent & Remembrancer of legal affairs, West Bengal v Corp of Calcutta AIR 1967 SC 997 and Union of India v Jubbi AIR 1968 SC 360, State was held to bee bound by the statute. Thus establishing the rule. Statutes are presumed to be in conformity with International Law • The legislature is presumed to not have enacted any legislation contrary to international law or common law of the realm. Unless, therefore the intention to do so is clearly expressed in the enactment, the court would be inclined to favour an interpretation which would bring the enactment into consonance with those principles rather than accept a grammatical interpretation, the result of which would be startling or unusual.
• The court may not pronounce an act ultra vires as contravening international law but may recoil in case of ambiguity from a construction which would involve a breach of the ascertained and accepted rule of international law. EXAMPLES • PUCL v UOI (2005) 2 SCC 436- SC was required to interpret Sec 3(2)(d) of the Protection of Human rights Act 1993 which stipulated that the human rights commission ought to consist of 2 members to be appointed from amongst people having knowledge or practical experience in matters relating to human rights. The question before the court was that whether a police officer would fall in the category stated. The court stated that aid of international law and guidelines in interpreting the domestic law is taken only when some gap is found in such laws or there is lack of clarity. The said provisions being very clear do not need such aids. The Paris principle and U.N. General assembly resolution referred here cannot be exalted to status of binding covenants of international law.
• Pratap Singh v State of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551
Presumption related to Jurisdiction • Jurisdiction is the authority by which court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters prescribed formally for its decision. • The word jurisdiction does not connote the form or manner in which the act is to be done but relates to the power, scope and ambit of authority. • The jurisdiction of the court may be qualified or restricted regarding place, value and nature of the subject matter. • If a statute purports to exclude the ordinary jurisdiction of civil courts, it must do so either by express terms or by the use of such terms as would necessarily lead to the inference of such exclusion. • When language is doubtful the courts lean against an ouster of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts except in cases which are clearly and specifically indicated by the legislature. Cases • Ramayya v Lakshmi Narayan AIR 1934 PC 84 : The court was considering the ambit of Sec 9 of CPC 1908. The court held that the import of Sec 9 was that civil courts would have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those whose cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. Therefore, the burden of proof would be on the party who pleads an exception to general rule. • Jagannatha v Kathaperumal AIR 1927 Mad 1035: Court was considering suit for cancellation of revenue sale of plaint items. Appellant contended suit cannot be set aside on grounds of fraud or material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale under order XXI rule 92 of CPC. Court held that O XXI R 92 barred suits relating to the execution of the rent decree but that does not imply suits on fraud and irregularity were also banned. Exclusion of jurisdiction of courts ought to be read restrictively and only to the extent it is expressly mentioned.
