METAPHYSICS

NOTES COMPILATION
METAPHYSICS

NOTES
COMPILATION

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Table of Contents
METAPHYSICS........................................................................................................................................................ii
1. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION OF TERMS...................................................................................1
1.1. The Term "Metaphysics".......................................................................................................................1
1.2. Being and the Greeks..............................................................................................................................1
2. THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS............................................................................................................4
2.1. The Notion of Metaphysics.....................................................................................................................4
2.2. Metaphysics as the Science of Being as Being.......................................................................................5
2.3. Metaphysics and Human Knowledge....................................................................................................6
3. BEING - THE STARTING POINT OF METAPHYSICS...........................................................................8
3.1. The Notion of Being.................................................................................................................................8
3.2. The Essence- Manner of Being of Things............................................................................................13
3.3. The Act of Being (Esse).........................................................................................................................14
3.4. The Act of Being (Esse) as the most Intensive Act.............................................................................15
3.5. Characteristic of Man's Notion of Being.............................................................................................16
4. THE PRICIPLE TRANSCENDETAL STRUCTURE OF BEING..........................................................18
4.1. The Substance-Accident Structure......................................................................................................18
4.2. The Being- Essence Structure..............................................................................................................22
4.3. The Act-Potency Structure...................................................................................................................22

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 1. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
1.1. The Term "Metaphysics"
Metaphysics is a science of being. Aristotle is the founder of this science of being as being. This science of being
has different names according to its historical development.
a. First Philosophy: Aristotle gave this name to this science of being because it considered the first
principles and the first causes. Form this fact it got its primacy of excellence and dignity over all the other
sciences.
b. Divine Science: or simply theology, because it deals with the "most divine being", that is, substances
separated from matter and above all, it deals with the pure act or the first mover.But this name is not quite
correct, since a science has to be defined by its object and God is not the object of the science of being,
although He is the final term of the science because the affirmation of God's existence is the principal
conclusion established by this science.
c. Metaphysics
This name comes from the Greek, "meta ta physika" meaning literally "after the things of nature." About
the year 50B.C. Andronicus of Rhodes classified and catalogued the scholarly writings of Aristotle, so
that he could publish them. In this process the fragments which refereed to the first philosophy were put
together into 14 books and were placed after the books of natural philosophy or physics. Hence the
formulation of the name "la meta to physika biblia" meaning "the books after the books of nature." The
medieval and classical philosophers attributed a philosophical meaning to this formulation. For them the
name indicated the fact that this science was "later than" and "superior" to physics (post physicum et
supra physicum).
In the 17th century, the term ontology was introduced and it was Christian Wolff who popularized its
usage during the time of rationalism in the 18h century. He divided metaphysics into "metaphysika
generalis" also called ontology; and the branches of special metaphysics (metaphysika specialis):
cosmology, psychology and theology.

1.2. Being and the Greeks

Western philosophy began with the Greeks and their first spontaneous questions about philosophy set western
thoughfon a path which leads directly to our present-day contemporary systems. Existentialism, analytical
philosophy, realism, idealism-all these have their roots in Greek thought. So in studying the Greeks. we are going
to the wellspring of western philosophy.
Furthermore, the problems raised by the earlier Greek thinkers have a simplicity and straightforwardness about
their formulation which make them an excellent starting point for the study of metaphysics. Aristotle says of these
early days, "for it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they
wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about greater
matters, for example, about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and of the stars, and about the
genesis of the universe. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant; therefore, since they
philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not
for any utilitarian end."

1.2.1. Approach of Early Philosophers

The wonder of these early Greek thinkers began with what many generations of philosophers have called
"philosophy of nature". As they looked around them, they saw things coming into existence and dropping out of
existence. Men are born and they die. Moved by the wonder which Aristotle calls the beginning of all philosophy,
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the early Greek thinkers were not satisfied with answers to the specific questions about change but pushed their
inquiries to the basic metaphysical questions of the unifying explanatory principle of the world. Looking at the
various formulations of this basic question. we can see that each of the Greek thinkers is looking in his own way
for that which makes our world and our universe one world and one universe. Each of them is asking in his own
way, "what is being?" From Thales to Plotinus all make the question of being a question about essence, that is. to
a man they ask what it is that makes a being a being
The Pre-Socratics
According to Aristotle, the early Greek philosophes identified "being" with a certain type of being that for them
everything was really just this type of being under different appearances.
Thales: he maintained that a thing has been ultimately because it is made of water. This is to say in a simple way
that the essence of being is water. Thales suggests that we can ask, "what is being?" and that the answer is,
"being is water."
Anaximenes: he maintained that the first principle and element of all things is infinite, therefore, for him the
essence of being is the infinite or unlimited. He would answer the question, "what is being?" with, " being is the
unlimited or infinite.
Empedocles: he held that the four roots of things are called, "fire, water, earth and air" Therefore, for him, he
would answer the question, "what is being?" with, "being is the four elements."
Anaxagoras: he speaks not only of the four elements, but of an infinite number of first principles. therefore, if we
were to ask Anaxagoras, "what is being?" his answer would be: "being is an infinity of things." And there is no
way of surpassing this multitude to reach any unity.
Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus: they believed that being was composed of an unlimited number of
elements, the atoms, to which they added a kind of negative reality, the void. Their answer to our question, "what
is being?" would be, "being is part of reality, it is the unlimited number of atoms."
The Pythagoreans: they were impressed by the unlimited and finite, the unit and the infinite multitude of things.
As such they concluded that "infinity itself and unity itself were the substance of the things of which they are
predicated. This is why number was the substance of all things. To our question, "what is being?" the
Pythagoreans would answer, "being is number." Parmenides: he seems to think that which is and its being are
identical. He defines being as "that which is." This obviously encompasses the whole of reality. Its opposite is
"that which is not," or nonbeing and this has no reality whatsoever. Between these opposites there is no real
middle ground. As such," being is and non being is not."
Heraclitus: he was impressed more by the mobility of reality than by its permanence. Thus, "it is not possible to
step twice into the same river." He meant that being is really a flux and nothing stable. His famous panta rhei, "all
things are in a flux," is the answer to the question, "what is being?" and says, "being is the flux."
Plato: for Plato he distinguishes between the two worlds, the real (ontos) spiritual world of forms or ideas which
are permanent and unchanging, and the not-so-real material world of our sense experience, in which things are
always in movement and undergoing change. He also distinguishes the two kinds of knowledge, one by means of
knowledge (episteme), the other by way of opinion (doxa). Knowledge puts us in touch with the stable, spiritual
being, whereas opinion connects us with the changing material appearances. Reading from his dialogue,
Parmenides, ultimately to our question, "what is being?" Plato answers, "being is form."
Aristotle: he was the first to work out an explanation of the four causes: material, formal, efficient and final. He
too, is responsible for the doctrine of matter and form. For Aristotle "being is substance." Thus, at the beginning
of book Z of the Metaphysics he writes, "while "being' has all these senses, obviously that which 'is' primarily is
the 'what' which indicates the substance of the thing." The key element of substance is form, for form makes the
substance actually be what it is. Matter, the correlative of form, may explain the multiplicity of forms in a given
species. When Aristotle says that being is substance and in substance form is the highest act, he is saying all that
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he has to say about the definition of being. For Aristotle therefore, being means substance, and substance is
essence, which is primarily universal.
Plotinus: the last Greek philosopher. According to him there must be a unity, there must be a
"One". But this One is nonbeing, no intelligibility, which is the source of all being and intelligibility. Since the
one is beyond being and intelligibility obviously we cannot understand it. Plotinus, however, would say that it
must be postulated as the source of all being and intelligibility. The One is not Being it is wholly other than being
and yet is somehow the source of Being. For Plotinus, being comes from the One by way of emanation. Plotinus
answers our question, "what is being?" he says that being is intelligibility and that being and intelligibility, as
identical, are the limit which human understanding can reach. He also says, however, that beyond being and
intelligibility there is the unexplainable unity of the One. There is not ultimate human explanation, according to
Plotinus. This is so because explanation means intelligibility and the source of being is beyond intelligibility in
the inexpressible, inconceivable One.

2. THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

The universe has always spurred men to wonder about its origin. Men have labored continuously, seeking an
explanation for the universe, an explanation that can be considered ultimate and universal or all-encompassing.
In this effort various schools of thought arose throughout the course of history, each one offering its own
explanation. Some identified the most radical basis of reality with one particular element intrinsic to it, such as
matter, the spirit, thought or motion; this would imply that everything in the universe is just an offshoot or
derivative of that element.
On the other hand, some maintained the existence of a transcendent principle which made the universe without
forming part of it. Some thinkers proposed the existence of only one origin of the universe, while others held that
the universe came to be from two or more sources.
These questions are not purely speculative; on the contrary, they exert a deep influence on human existence . It
does make a difference for a man to believe that everything, including himself, originated from inert matter and
will go back to it, or to believe that he was created by God, who brought him into being from nothing. To regard
men as beings' subject to the whims of blind destiny, or as absolute masters of their own existence, or as creatures
capable of freely knowing and loving a personal God, all these are doctrinal options that mark out completely
divergent paths for man's life.

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Initially, the study of these questions formed only one undifferentiated body of knowledge called philosophy,
wisdom, or science. Soon after, however, studies on different aspects of reality, for example. mathematics,
medicine, grammar give rise to special or sciences, which became distinct from philosophy proper which dealt
with the more fundamental questions about reality. In turn, as the body of philosophical knowledge grew. there
appeared branches of philosophy dealing with specific objects of study, such as nature, man, and morals. One
discovers among these branches, a core of philosophical knowledge that influences all the other branches, for it
seeks the ultimate structure of the universe, which necessarily leads to the study of its first and radical cause. Thus
science is called metaphysics.
2.1. The Notion of Metaphysics
Metaphysics may be defined as the study of the ultimate cause and of the first and most universal principles of
reality. Let us now discuss in detail the parts of this preliminary definition.
a. Ultimate causes are differentiated from proximate causes which produce in an immediate manner some
specific effects. For instance, a rise in atmospheric pressure is the cause of fine weather; the heart is the
organ that causes blood circulation. The study of these causes pertains to the field of particular sciences.
Ultimate causes also known as supreme causes, in contrast, extend their influences to all the effects
within a given sphere, as a political leader does with respect to his country, or a person's desire for
happiness in relation to his entire human activity. Metaphysics considers the absolutely ultimate cause of
the universe. It strives to identify that cause, and know more about its nature and its activity. Since God is
the ultimate cause of all things, he is evidently a principle subject matter of metaphysics.

b. Metaphysics also studies the first and most universal principles of reality. Aside from causes that exert
influence on their effects from the outside, there exist internal elements in the effects themselves that
constitute them and affect their manner of being and acting. These are usually called principles; thus,
atoms are certain principles which determine the nature and properties of the latter; in living beings, cells
act like the principles of the organism. But metaphysics seeks the first and most universal principles, that
is, those principles which radically constitute all things. Thus. philosophers tend to consider some aspect
of reality as the most basic, and as such, the origin of everything else, for example, change or becoming,
quantity, the essence, or chance. Whenever someone considers something as the first intrinsic principle of
everything, he is already talking at the metaphysical level. At this level. metaphysics includes everything
real within its field of study because it seeks the ultimate cause and fundamental principles of reality, in
contrast, particular sciences study only a limited aspect of the world.

2.2. Metaphysics as the Science of Being as Being

Every science has its own object of study which is an aspect of reality that it deals with. For instance, biology
considers the world of living beings, mathematics studies the quantitative aspects of things and physical
geography deals with the earth's surface. The object of study of a specific science characterizes or defines that
science gives internal coherence to its content and differentiates it from other sciences.
A distinction is usually made between the material and formal object of a science; the former is also known as the
'subject matter of a science since it is the sum totals of what is studied while the latter is the aspect of the material
object on which the science concentrates. Thus the material object of biology includes all living things, but it
formal object limits the object of study because this science proceeds in its study from the standpoint of life.
Analogously, the material object of medicine is the human body, but its formal object is the human body insofar
as it is subject to health or sickness.
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 Metaphysics studies being as being its properties and its causes.
Particular sciences have as objects of study some specific aspects of reality. However, there must be another
science that studies the whole of reality by focusing on the most common aspect of everything: that everything
"is", that it is "real". This common aspect is presupposed by any other particular form of knowledge. Thus, when
a botanist studies and classifies plant species, he knows that "plants are", that they are "beings" the notion of
being comes before that of any plant species. Let us consider the parts of the above-mentioned statement.
i. Being: this is the metaphysical term equivalent to what is called "thing" in ordinary language. Being
signifies "that which is": Or something endowed with the act of being. A tree is a being, and so is a
bird, a man or a diamond; but whereas the word "bird "signifies a particular nature or manner of
being, being expresses the fact that the bird is. The word "being" is present participle of the verb "to
be". Just as a man, insofar as he hears is called hearer, and insofar as he studies is called a student, so,
too, a man, insofar as he has the act of being is called a "being".

ii. As being: St Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, said: "the other
sciences, which deal with particular beings, do not indeed consider being; however, they do not
consider being as being, but as some particular kind of being, for example, number or line or fire."
Hence it can be said that the material object of metaphysics is reality in its entirety, for all things
whatever their nature may be, are beings. On the other hand, its formal object is "being as being" or
"being as such". Metaphysics is a distinct science, for it studies particular aspect of reality proper to
itself and presupposed by other sciences, the being of things.
iii. The properties and the cause of being: in tackling its object of study, every science must study its
characteristics and everything that is in any way related to it. As physics studies the consequences of
physical properties of bodies such as their mass or energy, metaphysics studies the properties of
beings insofar as they are beings. It is T also the task of metaphysics to discover aspects of being as
such, for example "truth", as well as those aspects which do not belong to being as being, such as
"matter" or corporeal nature. Metaphysics therefore, must study the cause of all beings insofar as they
are beings: this is one of its principle areas of study within its proper object. Metaphysics leads us to
the cause of the act of being of all things, God, as creator.
As we progress in the understanding of diverse metaphysical questions, we shall see more clearly that the most
basic characteristic of the real world depends on the fundamental truth that all things are: that they are beings. The
act of being is the most basic property of all things, for any of their perfections or characteristics, before
everything else, must be. This is the primary condition on which everything else depends. Since metaphysics is
the science that seeks the most radical element or reality, it must necessarily focus on the act of being as its basic
object of study.
Some philosophical schools of thought have chosen other aspects of reality as the object of metaphysics, for
example,
"Vitalism" has life for its object; "existentialism" has human existence; "idealism", human thought;" historicism",
historical progress. Kant held on to conditions of scientific knowledge as object of his philosophy ("criticism"),
nevertheless, all these philosophers never managed to avoid the study of being: what they did was to reduce being
into some particular and limited object.

2.3. Metaphysics and Human Knowledge

Metaphysics and spontaneous knowledge
All men have a global knowledge about reality, acquired through the light of natural reason.
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They know what they mean when they talk about "being", "truth' or the "good". They have some knowledge
regarding human nature, and the difference between "substantial" and
"accidental" realities. Moreover. they can know God as the first cause of the universe, who sustains and guides all
things towards their end. This kind of knowledge which we can call spontaneous, deals with the same issue or
topics studied by metaphysics. This should not prove surprising, for man has a natural tendency to know the
world, his place in it, the origin of the universe, and other related matters. The course of his life depends largely
on the knowledge he has of these questions.
Hence, it is understandable that this knowledge has been called spontaneous metaphysics or natural metaphysics
of the human intelligence.
Nevertheless, this fact does not nullify the need for a metaphysics developed as a science, for various reasons.
Because spontaneous knowledge is frequently imperfect or imprecise; because it may not be fir or clear enough in
some specific aspects; and lastly because it is subject to the influence of ideologies prevailing within some
cultural circles, or enjoying popular acceptance.
Besides, one should bear in mind that the moral convictions of every person have a decisive influence on his or
her knowledge about metaphysical questions. Experience shows that as individuals lose their moral uprightness,
they also lose their basic intellectual convictions. thereby falling into sceptic attitude towards the truth. Thus, they
are led to agnosticism with respect to the knowledge one can have about God and to relativism regarding the
demands of the moral law. In the end, man is exalted as the centre of the entire universe. This is the reason behind
the existence of some philosophical systems radically opposed to the truth, such as Marxism, agnosticism and
idealism: all these are theoretical structures built in accordance with some erroneous basic attitudes towards
human life. As a science, metaphysics is to a certain extent influenced by the moral life of the philosophers
involved in it. This influence is more evident in the principal points on which the more technical and special
questions depend.
The guiding role of metaphysics in relation to other sciences.
Since metaphysics deals with the most fundamental questions of human knowledge, and since its object of study
encompasses the whole reality, it is but natural that particular science depends upon metaphysics in some way.
The object of study of every particular science is a particular kind of being. That is why metaphysical principles,
the properties of being and other basic notions about reality must somehow be reflected, too, in the specific sector
of scientific research covered by a particular. For instance, when physicists conduct experiments on the dynamics
of bodies in their physic-chemical activity, they employ the principle of causality, with all its implications.
Similarly, when biologists study the functions of a living organism, they constantly make use of the principle of
finality. It can be seen, them, that metaphysics plays a guiding role with respect to particular sciences since it is
the summit of human knowledge in the natural order. This role is rightly called sapiential, since wisdom has the
proper role of guiding human knowledge and activity in the light of the first principles and of the last end of man.
It can therefore be deduced also that the denial of metaphysical is the denial of all possible inquiries, since for any
enquiry, the object of study must first and foremost exist, must be ir being.

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 3. BEING - THE STARTING POINT OF METAPHYSICS
Before tackling other topics, we need to have an initial overview of some basic metaphysical concepts like being,
act of being, essence and existence. Since being is the object of metaphysics, all questions have to be resolved in
the light of the meaning of being; accordingly, at the very outset, one must get a clear initial understanding of
what being is all about. We may inquire whether there is anything at all, whether the act of being, which causes
things to be, IS a reality.
These questions are answered by the very act of questioning. Whenever we inquire whether anything really is, we
are aware that our act of inquiring and that WE (THE INQUIRER) really ARE. We see this awareness in our
awareness of the act of inquiring, in our lived or exercised knowledge. All this presupposed knowledge of this to
be' and it meaning.
3.1. The Notion of Being
The notion of being can be understood if we consider it from the various points of view:
a. Logically: the word to be' (esse) is used as a link (copula) uniting (is, are) or separating (is not, are not)
the subject and the predicate of a proposition.
b. Ontologically: the word 'ens' (being) has three significations. It may signify a concrete being (essence and
existence); or it may signify essence alone; or it may also signifyexistence alone.
 Concrete being: 'being is a present participle of the verb to be' and here it designates something really
and actually existing
 Essence: here we use BEING substantively as a noun. This noun expresses the essence of the subject of
existence. The subject can be real or possible only.
 Existence: the noun "ens" is derived from the act of BEING.
Being is "that which is" (in Latin, Ens est "id quod est"), "that which exists" or "that which is real". Thus, a man,
a bird, an aero plane are all beings.
However, being cannot be defined properly: it can only be explained.
a. It cannot be defined properly; because a logical definition must have two elements: proximate genus and
specific difference (differentia). But being is not made of many elements. It consists of one simple
element common to all things: hence it cannot be defined. It is for this reason that BEING is called
transcendental because it is over and above every genus and specific difference.
b. It can be explained: because in it broadest sense BEING is whatever exists (ens actuale) or can exist (ens
in potentia)
Thus scientifically, according to St Thomas, "ens est id cujus actus est esse" (being is that whose act is to be). It is
that whose essence is existence (to exist). Thus "ens" is everything that can exist in the mind or outside of it.
"ens" is also defined as "id quod existit aut saltem existere gotest" (that which exists or at least can exist).

The notion of being is not a "simple" notion; it implies the composition of a subject (id quod) and an act (est). two
elements are involved in this notion: "something" which is and the very act if being of that thing. That
"something" plays the role of a subject, that is, the particular reality to which the esse belongs (as the subject of
the act of laughing is the person who laughs).
Nevertheless, the two elements constitute a unity: one element (ens) implies the presence of the other element.
When we say being, we refer implicitly to its esse even though we do not yet form the judgment "it is" or that
"something is". Likewise, when we hear the verb "is" alone, we either assume its subject, or we discover the
absence of a subject of the act.

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We can sum up as follows:
a. Being ("ens") signifies principally the thing which is: being designates it insofar as it has the act of being
(esse).
b. Consequently, being signalise concomitantly the esse of that thing, because a thing can only be if it
possesses the act of being.
c. Therefore, being refers to something which exists in reality
NB: "Real" being has to be differentiated from "being of reason" which is being insofar as it is something that
exists only in the human mind, such as fictitious characters in a novel, or the imaginary characters that inhabit
human fantasies. Of course, these notions have a certain actuality, which consists in their being thought of by our
intellectual faculty. They are mere concepts or mental realities devoid of any existence outside the human mind.
When we say that something is real (a real being) we want to differentiate it from a "being of reason" thus, a real
person is not the product of one's fantasy but someone existing in flesh and blood.
Kinds of Being
Being refers to everything that exists or can exist. It comes from "to be" (esse). Hence there are many kinds of
being as there are different modes of "esse" or existence. All these different modes can be reduced into two and
hence also the two types of being:
a. Objective Being: (in rerum natura) - this is the real. ontological and being so properly so called. It is
twofold:
i. Infinite Being: The Summun Genus, God
ii. Finite Being: every other being. It is in act if it has an explicit existence. It is in potentia if it has only
implicit existence in its cause and both of them are divided into 10 categories.
Finite being is also further divided by reason of order into:

 Intellectual Being, for example, a thought

 Physical Being, for example, body and soul
 Metaphysical Being, for example, substance, accident
 Moral Being, for example, freedom, free act.

b. Subjective Being: this means a mode of being in the apprehension of the intellect. Hence we have the
second type of being; being of the mig (ens rationis). This is the logical or ideal being and being
improperly so called. This being is of two types:

i. Without foundation in things (sine fundamento in re), for example, nothing (nihil); a square circle
ii. With foundation in relation to the intellect with things known as negations, for example, nescience in
a stone, privations as ignorance in peter.

Comprehension of the Idea of Being

Being is the simplest, the most primitive and the most general of all concepts. That is why we cannot define it
strictly. The most we can do is to describe it as we have already done. It is the simplest, because all other concepts
are but determinations, particularizations and modes of it. It is the most general or the most common because only
non-being lies outside its extension. The concept of Being is therefore strictly indefinable.
Furthermore, being as such has no determined essence, but rather goes beyond and includes all determined
essences, that is, the modes of Being. Being is therefore truly the primum notum, strictly per se notum (the first
object of knowledge and known itself), for nothing is clearer or simpler or more evident to the intellect than

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Being itself. Far from being known or explained by anything other than itself, it is the principle of knowledge, the
object of our every first experience and the source of our very first concept.
Being is the first evidence. the source of all other evidence.
It cannot receive any other explanation, because anything which would be used to explain being would be more
complex than being and would presuppose it.
Here is where we can see the greatest endowment that man has received from his creator; for man is the only
animal who understand the word "IS". The proposition "that exists" has an immediate meaning for man. By
continued reflection man can bring home to himself this extraordinary and unique power which is implied in our
capacity to know the real or being, our capacity to say "THAT IS". Matter exists but it does not know that it
exists. I do know that it exits and I know that I exist, I do not know immediately why a thing exists, but I know at
least that something exists. And this is because I am intelligent, that is. capable of knowing BEING.
Forming the Notion of Being
Not by Abstraction
According to Heidegger and Lonergan being cannot be defined in the way essences are defined.
Being is not an essence and so we cannot, strictly speaking, form any idea or concept of being because ideas are
formed by abstraction, leaving out of consideration whatever is not relevant to the idea we are elaborating. But
being encompasses the whole of reality, and so we cannot leave anything out of consideration. Being therefore is
not a universal concept, for such concepts are limited to the area of essence and being must include existence. Or
to put this is yet another way, our notion of being must provide for what is common in all being without reducing
it to a mere common denominator (which would make it the concept with the least meaning). For if we did this,
the differences between beings would have to be outside of being and so "nonbeing," which s absurd. We are
trying to form a notion of being which includes all reality; but a notion of being reached by abstraction excludes
all reality, and so just the opposite of what we intend. As such we cannot form the notion of being through
abstraction.
Negative Judgement of Separation
We have seen that we cannot proceed by way of abstraction. Furthermore, we attain knowledge of existence in
judgement, not in the formation of ideas. As lonergan points out, horses and centaurs, electrons and phlogiston are
equally conceivable, but it is in judgment that we decide which is real (existing) and which is not. The fact that
judgment puts us in contact with existence may serve as a hint that we will need judgment to elaborate our notion
of being. The first of these judgments deals with particular things: John is, this tree is; Fido is; this stone is; and so
forth. As we study these judgments, we see that each has a particular: John, this tree, Fido, this stone, and so
forth, a subject and the verb "iS" as predicate. If we substitute the general pronoun for these subjects, we can state
our judgment generally: SOMETHING IS. The important thing about this generalized judgment is that it does not
leave out the particularity of the individual judgement. "something is" can stand for each one without excluding
the others. "SOMETHING IS" expresses the being of each individual and of the whole community of being. It is
a general way of expressing the common intelligibility of all beings without abstraction. In this judgement the
"something" refers to the essence of the particular objects and expresses their individuality in an indeterminate.
unspecified way. without, however, abstracting from any of the individuality of the essence. The "is" refers to the
unique act of existing of the individual objects. It also points to the fact that the "isness" the existence of a being,
is what makes it a being. A being is being not because it is materiality or living or intelligent, but simply because
it is. Being is, therefore, that which is.
This is an important conclusion, for it explains the meaning of what is referred to as the "negative judgment of
separation". Most simply put, this judgement says that being is not limited to any genus- being is not any essence
or even essence itself. It is not limited to material being or any kind of being. Thus it is a negative judgment.
Similarly, it is a judgement of separation, for it separates "something is" from any class of being-material being,
substance, essence. Or to put it as we did earlier: something is being not because it has this or that kind of nature
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but because it is. To be, therefore, does not mean to be material or sensible or nay particular kind of thing, but to
be. Thus negative judgment of separation gives us an insight into being.

ANALOGY OF BEING
Univocal and Equivocal Predication
Looking at the unity of being in the multiplicity of being, we raise the questions of the nature of our notion of
being. Can we conceptualize our insight that being is that which is? Being is not an essence therefore cannot
conceptualize. The concept we have of an essence is a univocal concept, one which has the same meaning each
time it is applied. Thus, for example, a concept such as "man" means the same thing when applied to James, john,
peter and Paul. And "flower" applied to rose, daffodil, gardenia and hibiscus means the same thing. Such univocal
concepts are elaborated by way of "abstraction." that is, we pick out the meaning common among a group of
things and conceptualize it in an idea, for example, man or flower. This gives another reason why "being" cannot
be conceptualized by a univocal concept. For if it were, it would have 10 abstract from some of reality and leave
it out of consideration. And this is precisely what we cannot do with our notion of being. It must include the
whole of reality

Equivocal predication, is one in which there are different meanings for different uses of a term, for example,
"bark" as applied to a dog and to a tree. We must examine this type of predication to see whether our use of
"being" is an equivocal use of the word. We have to say "equivocal predication", rather than "equivocal concept,"
because in equivocal usage there is no single concept, but only the same word and different concepts. An example
will clarify this. When "bark" is predicated equivocally of a dog and of a tree, there is not one concept or
meaning. "bark," but two. In one case it refers to the noise a dog makes and in the other to the outer surface of a
tree. The two meanings are simply different. What about "being"? is the meaning simply different in each case?
When I say, john is a being; this rose is a being; this horse is a being, am I saying something simply different in
each case? Clearly not. For although each thing is what it is, and so is unique, yet each being does share in
existence. Consequently, being cannot mean something totally different each time it is applied.
Meaning of Analogy
Although being is not a univocal concept nor an equivocal term, it may be used "analogously." that is, in a way at
once alike and different. We speak this way, for instance, when we say a person is healthy and food is healthy.
We call a person healthy because he has health, and food healthy because it is health-giving. There is a
relationship to health in the first two examples, but the relationship is not the same in each case. Hence, the terms
are used in a way which is partly the same and partly different. We say that two things are analogous when,
though they are unlike one another, they do share some basis of resemblance. The analogy between them points to
some relationship of similarity which they have to one another and some proportion or ratio which makes possible
the comparison between the two.
Although we have many form of analogy, they can perhaps all be classified generically as analogies of attribution,
because in each of them something which belongs primarily to one of the terms, for example, health to living
beings, fiery to fire and so forth, is attributed to something else, which properly speaking, does not possess it.
There is also another type of analogy which is not between individual terms but between sets of these terms, or
rather between the relationships or proportions between the two terms in each set. For instance, we find this sort
of analogy between the relationship sense knowledge and the sensible world and the relationship between
intellectual knowledge and intelligible objects. This type of analogy is called analogy of proportionality. The
proportionality is "proper" when we are referring to an intrinsic perfection and "improper" when we are speaking
metaphorically.
Being and the Analogy of Proper Proportionality

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We are interested in this type of analogy because it has meaning for our study of the analogy of being. Since in
considering the limited beings of experience we have come to an understanding essence and existence- since each
has a unique individual essence and a unique individual existence proportioned to that essence. There is therefore
no common nature of essence or existence; there is no one essence or one existence which all possess, but in each
being there is a relationship between its individual essence and its individual existence which is similar to the
relationship between individual essence and individual existence in other beings, This is, of course, a similarity of
proportions, of the relationships between each essence and each existence.
Each essence is related to its existence in a way similar to that in which every other essence is related to its
existence. John's essence is to John's existence as Peter's essence is to Peter's existence as this tree's essence is to
this tree's existence and so forth. This is to say that although no two beings exist in the same way, each
nevertheless exists in a way which is according to its nature, its essence. Since there is this relationship in finite
beings, they are thus analogous by an analogy of proper proportionality, and every finite being can thus be called
and be understood to be "being" by this analogy.
Being and the Analogy of Causality
If we examine the range of being, from God down through spiritual beings to the lowest material being we see
existence at all of its various levels. God, the highest and the greatest being, is the source of all existence and so
of all beings (since existence is the act of being). Under God all creatures share in being as effects of God's being.
They therefore have existence and so being by attribution; being is attributed to them by God their cause, hence
they have their being by causal attribution. Since they possess being intrinsically, thus is an intrinsic attribution.
Since the being in each is shared a different way, the unity of this casual attribution is not univocal but analogous.
Each finite being intrinsically and in its own way possesses being as an effect and so shares in being by an
analogy of intrinsic causal attribution.
This analogy can be extended to God because God is being by His essence and is the source and cause of all
being. Consequently, He is the primary analogate. What finite beings possess as effects He possesses in its
fullness as cause. Hence, we can say that by the analogy of causal attribution our notion of being extends to the
whole range of being. We should bear in mind, however, that God is not simply the highest in the series of beings.
Between the highest creature and God there is an infinite gap. All finite beings are effects; only God is being in
himself and by his nature, in no way an effect. By seeing God as the unique cause of being and all creatures as
effects, the analogy of causal attribution emphasizes this "transcendence "of God.
Sometimes this analogy is called the analogy of participation since limited being at every level "participates" in
the being which God has by his essence.
3.2. The Essence- Manner of Being of Things
All things are, and at the same time, they are also "something". Each thing is differentiated from other things due
to its nature which specifies' it. When asked about what that thing is, we reply by saying that it is a book, or a
table, or a dog, or whatever thing it might be. These names express what things are, that is, their essence: what
identifies them, independently of any ccidental or changeable qualities they may have. For example, an eagle is
certainly not a mere collection of different qualities; rather, it has an internal unity, or some sort of central core
from which those qualities proceed. That core is grasped by our mind, which in turn expresses it through the
definition of the term eagle'.
Therefore, essence can be defined as that which makes a thing to be what it is . All things have the act of being
(esse), by virtue of which we call them beings (entia). It is evident however, that each thing has its own essence,
by virtue of which it has a name different from that of other things. It is by their respective essences, that a man is
man, wine is wine, and water is water, and not any other thing that exists in the material universe.
Two constituent principles are therefore present in every reality in the universe; the act of being (esse) and the
manner of being (essentia) these are two necessary and inseparable components of every being that exists in the
world. Later on, we shall study in greater detail the relationship between esse and essentia and their respective
roles in constituting reality. At present, however, it is sufficient to point out that a pine tree, or a donkey, a metal,
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that is, the essence of things, implies a mode or manner of being, a specific way of being of a thing. The universe
is a harmonious unity of various realities having esse as a common property, but which are at the same time
specifically differentiated according to the variety of essences or natures.

3.3. The Act of Being (Esse)

We have considered now the principal element of being, namely, its act: to be (esse). The meaning of to be is so
clear to everyone that no special intuition of it is needed, nor is such intuition possible; nevertheless, this does not
make a deeper study of its meaning and implications on the part of metaphysics a superfluous activity.
As a verb, 'to be' or 'esse' is special because it expresses simple metaphysical truth; that everything is, or that there
is no reality which is not. However, we observe, too, that no reality can claim to be in the pure and unlimited
sense of 'simply being' because all things are particular modes of the act of being (esse) and are not esse itself. It
is therefore more proper to say that a thing has esse (as its property), than to say that a thing is pure and simple
esse.
Let us now focus on certain features of esse as act
a. Above all, esse is an act, that is, a perfection of all reality. The term "act' is used in metaphysics to
designate any perfection or property of a thing; therefore, it is not to be used exclusively to refer to
actions or operations (the act of seeing or walking, for instance). In this sense, a white rose is a flower
that has whiteness as an act which gives the rose a specific perfection. Similarly, that 'is' which us applied
to things indicates a perfection as real as the perfection of life' in living things. In the case of esse,
however, we are obviously dealing with a special perfection.
b. Esse is a "universal" act, that is, it belongs to all things. Esse is not exclusively to some particular kind of
reality, since without esse, there would be nothing at all. Whenever we talk about anything, we have to
acknowledge. first of all, that it is: the bird "is", gold "is". the clouds "are".
c. Esse is also a "total" act: it encompasses all that a thing is. While other acts only refer to some part or
aspects of being, esse is a perfection which includes everything that a thing has, without any exception.
Thus, the "act of reading" does not express the entirety of the perfection of the person reading, but esse is
the act of each and of all the parts of a thing. If a tree "is", then the whole tree "is", with all its aspects and
parts-its color, shape, life and growth- in short, everything in its shares in its esse. Thus esse encompasses
the totality of a thing.
d. Esse is a "constituent" act and the most radical or basic of all perfections because it is that by which
things "are". As essence is that which makes a thing to be this of that (chair, lion, man), esse is that which
makes things to be. This can be seen from various angles: i.
i. Esse is the most common of all acts. What makes all things to be cannot reside in their principles of
diversity (their essence) but precisely in that act whereby they are all alike, namely, the act of being.
ii. Esse is by nature prior to any other act. Any action or property presupposes a subsisting subject in
which it inheres, but esse is presupposed by all actions and all subjects, for without it, nothing would
be. Hence, esse is not an act derived from what things are; rather it is precisely what makes them to
be.
iii. We have to conclude, by extension, that esse is the constituent act. No physical or biological
property of beings- their energy, molecular or atomic structure- can make things be, since all of these
characteristics, in order to produce their effects. must, first of all, be.
In short, esse is the first and innermost act of being which confers on the subject, form within all of its
perfections. By analogy, just as the soul is the "form" of the body by giving life to it, esse intrinsically
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"actualizes" every single thing. The soul is the principle of life, but esse is the principle of entity or reality of all
things.
3.4. The Act of Being (Esse) as the most Intensive Act
The act of being (esse) belongs to everything (being) as the first act and the source of all perfections. When we
look around us, however, we see that very diverse things exist in the universe: hence we must conclude that the
act of being is not an act identical in all of them: it is somehow diversified in each thing. This characteristic is not
limited to esse alone; it is also found in qualities and many other acts. Perfections are possessed in varying
degrees by their subjects.
Light, for instance, is found in different degrees of intensity; similarly, the act of understanding or willing can be
exercised with greater or lesser intensity the same individual or in different persons, or in intelligent beings of
diverse natures (men, angles, God).
a. The act of being is possessed in different degrees of intensity by different beings, ranging from the most
imperfect realities all the way to God. There is obviously, a hierarchy of beings in the universe: an
ascending scale of perfections possessed by things, starting from the mineral world (from basic elements
up to the most complex mineral structures), and continuing through the diverse forms of life (plant life,
animal life, spiritual life). until the greatest perfection is reached, which is that of God himself. In the
final analysis. diversity of perfections is rooted in the diverse ways of possessing the act of being: since
the source of the perfections of a thing is its esse, the degrees in which those perfections are possessed
reflect degrees of intensity in the act of being.
God possesses esse in all its fullness and intensity: consequently, He has all perfections. If He were to
lack a perfection. He would not have esse in its fullness, but would be subject to limitation. Creatures, on
the other hand, possess "less esse', and the more imperfect they are. the lesser 'esse they have; they enjoy
a lesser degree of participation in the act of being-
b. Hence, it would be incorrect to consider esse as a vague and indeterminate attribute which would belong
to all things as their least perfection. Some philosophers understood esse as the poorest concept, as that
which is left after having set aside all the characteristics which differentiate things from one another. For
them, it would be the most abstract and empty notion, one which can be applied to everything (maximum
extension) and indicates no more than the bare minimum that all things have in order to be real. This
manner of looking at esse is a logical approach rather than a metaphysical one, and it implies any
understanding of esse as the act of things, possessed in a different way in each one of them and in the
most perfect manner in God.
c. "To be" (esse) is not exactly the same as "to exist), "esse" expresses an act, whereas "to exist" simply
indicates that a thing is factually there. When we assert that a thing exists, we want to say that it is real,
that is not "nothing", that "it is there". Esse, however, signifies something more interior, not the mere fact
of being there in reality, but rather the innermost perfection of a thing, and the source of all its other
perfections. Existence designates no more than the external aspect of esse it is an effect, so to speak of
esse. Since a being has esse, it is really there, brought out of nothingness and it exist. To exist, therefore,
is a consequence of having esse. This difference in meaning between esse and existence is also reflected
in ordinary language. For instance, it can be said that a man is more than a tree and that an angel is more
than a man. However, it cannot be said that one thing "exists more than anther." Either it exists or it does
not, but it does not exist more or less. Thus, "to be" admits an intensive usage which the verb "to exist"
does not allow.
3.5. Characteristic of Man's Notion of Being
We have dealt with being, the starting point of metaphysies and some of the features of its constituent act, that is,
its esse. To complete our initial survey of the object of metaphysics, we shall now consider the properties of our
notion of being (ens).
The Primacy of the Notion of Being in Human Knowledge.

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The real primacy of esse with regard to the other perfections of things gives rise to the primacy of the notion of
being in the realm of knowledge. Every object of our knowledge, before anything else, is perceived to be, and
consequently our intelligence first knows it as something which is, as being. For this reason. the notion of being is
implicitly contained in all other intellectual concepts. Everyone understands that a 'tree" and a 'horse' are things
which are and which possess the act of being in some particular way; he knows them as beings which are, with a
definite essence. Hence, the constituent elements of being, which we have already explained, are inseparably
present in every intellectual knowledge we acquire.
The notion of being is the first among all notions which our intelligence acquires. Before we understand in detail
what a thing is and what its characteristic perfections are, we know, first of all, that that thing is, that is, that it is
something. Given, this initial knowledge, we gradually acquire a better understanding of that reality through our
experience. Thus, even before a child is able to distinguish well the objects found in his surroundings. he knows
that they are; this is his first perception, which takes place at the very awakening of intellectual knowledge.
Nothing at all can be understood unless it is first understood that it is.
Qne must not think, however, that this is solely an initial apprehension; man relates all aspects of reality which he
comes to know in his lifetime to the realm of being, in one way of another. This is what we mean when we say
that all knowledge is resolved into or reduced to being.
Our notion of being is initially imperfect, and we gradually perfect this notion through experience, as we come to
know more beings and diverse manners of being. A similar progress occurs in all areas of knowledge. Thus, a
student of botany, already has some knowledge of plant life, but it only through wider experience and observation
that he acquires a deeper knowledge of its meaning. In like manner, our knowledge of being becomes deeper and
wider as we discover its manifold characteristics and the different manners of being. Metaphysics endeavors to
achieve this task on a scientific level.
"Being" is not a Generic Notion.
A genus is a notion which is applied equally and indeterminately to various things because it signifies only the
characteristics which are common to them all and leaves out the features which differentiate them. The notion
'animal', for instance, is a generic notion which is indistinetly applied to all beings which have sensitive life, for
example, man, horse, dog. In order to pass from a generic notion, such as 'animal', to a more particular notion
such as 'man', we need to add to the former new differentiating aspects which are not contained in the genus,
namely, the differences which we left out in order to form the generic notion, for example, 'rational' or other
distinctive properties of the various species of animals.
The notion of being is not a genus, since no differentiating elements can be added to it, which would not already
be contained in it. The notion of animal does not include the differences which distinguish one animal from
another. The notion ens, however, indicates not only what things have in common, but also their differentiating
aspects; the latter (the differentiating aspects) also are, and are therefore included in the notion of ens.
Some generic notions obtained through abstraction have a greater 'extension' (they include more objects) to the
extent that they include the least number of properties which comprise their content (their comprehension). 'Body'
for instance, is applied to more than 'solid', since the notion of solid adds a new characteristic, namely, the stable
cohesion of parts. Instruments' would include 'string instruments', 'wind instruments' and 'percussion instruments'
which are more determinate species.
The notion of being, however, encompasses everything; it has maximum extension as well as maximum notional
content or comprehension. Ens not only embraces all realities in the world in general, but also signifies them,
with all their singular characteristics. However, all these determining factors and modes of being are signified in
ens in an undifferentiated and somewhat confused manner. Consequently, if we want to make a particular reality
known, we cannot simply say that it is a 'being'. We must also explicitly indicate it particular mode of being (its
essence), saying, for instance, that it is a book, or a pen. This unique property of the notion of ens stems from the
fact that the name ens is taken form esse, which is the perfection of all perfections, and all other factors that
determine it are only modes of being.
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Being: An Analogical Notion
Since it is so varied and rich in content, the notion of 'ens' is analogical, that is, it is attributed to all things in a
sense which is partly the same and partly different. Analogical nations are notion that signify the same perfection
found in many subjects, but possessed in different ways.
'To understand' for instance, is an analogical notion since God, angles and men are all said to understand, but they
do so in different ways and with varying depths of intellectual perception.
The 'good' is also an analogical notion since the end of the action and the means to achieve it are both good,
though not in the same way; similarly, some material resources and the moral uprightness of a virtuous act are
both good, yet they are not good in the same way. Esse is the perfection capable of being possessed in the greatest
number of possible ways since all things in the universe have esse, but in different ways, therefore, since being
(ens) is a notion taken from esse (act of being), it is applied to things in an analogical manner.
This property of the notion of being (ens) has tremendous significance in the study of all metaphysical questions.
For example, 'substance* an 'accidents', 'act' and 'potency', creatures and God the creator, are very diverse realities
but they are all 'beings' in an analogical way.
Consequently, they can all be studied by one and the same science without setting aside the real differences
among them. Analogy is a principle characteristic of the metaphysical method.

4. THE PRICIPLE TRANSCENDETAL STRUCTURE OF BEING

4.1. The Substance-Accident Structure
After seeing the nature and notion of being and other realities closely related to it, we can now study the diverse
manners of being in the light of those basic notions. Among the diverse modes of being we find the substance and
several accidents, which constitute the fundamental manners of being of all created reality.
The Nature of Substance and of the Accidents
Aside from noticing certain more profound changes, through which a thing ceases to be what it is (substantial
changes, such as the death of a living organism or the transformation of one chemical compound into another), we
also constantly experience accidental changes, through which a given reality changes only in its secondary
aspects, without losing its nature. When water undergoes changes in temperature, for instance, it does not cease to
be water; similarly, a certain person continues to be the same person notwithstanding some variations in his
emotional state or in the state of his health. These accidental alterations manifest the presence in things of both a
stable, permanent substratum-the substance- and certain secondary changeable perfections, which are the
accidents.
We realize another characteristic difference between these two manners of being as we observe that in each being
there is a single substantial core which is affected by multiple accidental modifications.
A cypress tree, for instance, is a single subject with many secondary characteristics, such as color, the shape of its
leaves, the arrangement of its branches, its beight and so on.
This brief description should suffice to make us realize that all human being spontaneously possess a certain
knowledge of what substance and accidents are, even though it may be a very inexact knowledge. People may
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speak about a 'substantial' modification of some law, or a merely 'accidental' matter. We also refer to chemical
substances and their properties, the lamer being a particular type of accidents. We now have to determine more
exactly the nature of these realities in order to acquire a deeper knowledge of their characteristics and mutual
relationships.
Substance
The substance is the most important element in each thing, and we shall now consider the two basic aspects that it
has.
a. In the first place, the substance is the subject or substratum that supports the accidents. The very name
'substance' implies this aspect, since the Latin 'substantia' is derived from 'substare' which means to stand
under. The substance, then, is, that which stands beneath.'
b. This role of the substance is itself based on the nature of the substance as something subsistent. This
means that it does not exist in something else, but is by itself, as opposed to the accidents, which need the
support of something else namely, the substance, in order to exist. A man, a trout, and a bee, for instance,
are all substances, because they subsist or have their own being, distinet from the being of anything else,
Whiteness. however, and size or shape, are accidental realities which require an existing subject.

The definition of substance is drawn from this second characteristic: substance is that reality 10 whose essence or
nature it is proper to be by itself and not in another subject. Thus, a dog is a substance, for in view of its nature or
essence, it is proper for it to subsist by itself, that is, to be a distinct individual separate from others and from its
surroundings.
This definition states, for good reason, that substance is that to whose essence or nature it is proper... instead of
directly stating that it is 'a being which is by itself". In our earlier study of being, we saw that esse is restricted to
a special way of being precisely by nature of the essence.
Thus, a specific being is a man because of his human nature or essence, which confers on him a specific manner
of being distinet from that of other things. It is by virtue of this same nature that he is a subject which is able to
subsist (a substance). In contrast, the accidents are always found in something else. It is of the very essence of
color. for instance, to inhere in something. For this reason, a 'subsistent' whiteness does not exist, rather we speak
of a white wall, a white car, or a white suit.
Thus, strictly speaking, a thing is a substance and not an accident by virtue of its essence rather than by virtue of
its act of being. Hence, in the definition of substance the essence has to be mentioned, since it is precisely the
principle of diversification of esse.
We can, therefore, see why the term 'essence' is sometimes used as equivalent to 'substance'.
The essence determines a things manner of being and the substance is nothing but a certain manner of being that
is actually subsisting. Nevertheless, 'essence' and "substance"
perfect synonyms. Both refer to the same reality, but 'essence' designates it insofar as it constitutes a particular or
determinate manner of being, by virtue of which it falls under a given species (for example, man, dog, horse),
whereas the term 'substance' stresses its being the substratum of accidents ('substat) and its receiving the act of
being as its own act (that is, it subsists).
Accidents
We have earlier described accidents as multiple perfections inhering in a single permanent subject, and as
secondary or derived determinations of the central core of a thing. What basically characterizes them, therefore, is
their dependence on the substance. For this reason, an accident is commonly defined as a reality to whose essence
it is proper to be in something else, as in its subject. What is most characteristic of substance is to subsist, whereas
what is most characteristic of any accident is 'to be in another' (esse in or inesse).
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The substance has a nature or essence to which subsistence is fitting, and which places the subject within a
species. Likewise, each accident has its own essence, which differentiates it from other accidents, and to which
dependence on the being of a subject is fitting. For instance, color has an essence distinct from that of
temperature, and yet to subsist is not fitting to any of them. Rather, both of them are in some substance.
There is a great variety of accidents, but we can classify them into four groups according to their origin:
a. Accidents which belong to the species: these are accidents which spring from the specific principles of
the essence of a thing, and are therefore properties common to all individuals of the same species, for
example, the shope of a horse, the powers of understanding and willing in man.
b. Accidents which are inseparable from each individual: these accidents stem from the specifie way the
essence is present in a given individual, for instance, being tall or short. being fair or dark-complexioned,
being a man or a woman-these are all individoal characteristics which have a permanent basis in their
subject.
c. Accidents which are separable from each individual: these accidents, such as being. seated or standing,
walking or studying, stem from the internal principles of their subjects, but they affect it only in a
transient manner.
d. Accidents which stem from an external agent: some of these may be violent, that is, they are imposed
upon the subject against the normal tendency of its nature, for example, a viral disease; others, in contrast,
may actually be beneficial to the subject which receives the, for example, instruction received from
another person.
Metapinsical and logical accidents
From the metaphysical point of view, that is, taking into account the being of things, there is no middle ground
beween the substance and the accidents: any realiy is' either by itself or in another.
Thus it should not be surprising that such important properties of man as the intelligence and will have to be
included among the accidents, since they do not subsist by themselves, but only in the human person who is their
subject. It is not a distinctive mark of accidents to be of scant importance and thus, to be absolutely dispensable.
Their distinguishing characteristic is their inherence in something else in order to be. There are in fact aceidents
of great importance, such as the action of willing and other of lesser importance, such as being seated.
In logic, however, since the first type of aceidents earlier mentioned are attributed in a necessary manner to all of
the individuals of a given species, they are given a special, more precise name:
'proper' accidents or 'properties'. The term 'accident' is thus reserved for the other three types, which may or may
not be found in a given individual of some species. From the logical point of view, therefore, one can consider
'properties' as realities in some way between the substance and the accidents.
The Act of being belongs to the Substance
Strictly speaking, what properly is is that which has the act of being as an act belonging to itself, that is, which is
by itself. and this is true only of the substance. In contrast, since the accidents do not subsist, they do not have
being (esse) strictly speaking: it is their subject that is, in one way or another, in accordance with these accidents.
The weight of a horse does not exist by itself, neither does its color or shape. Hence, it is more correct to say that
the horse is heavy, or is white, precisely because of having these accidents.
In the final analysis, accidents do not possess an act of being "of their own" rather they depend on the act of being
of the substance, which is their subject. Thus, a 5-kilo weight only exists in a body endowed with that specific
heaviness. This does not mean that the accidents are nothing; they also are, that is, they are real, insofar as they
form part of the substance and constitute specific determinations of that subject.
Hence, the accidents always imply imperfection, 'since their being consists in 'being in another', or which it
depends and, consequently, in being part of a composition formed with some subject.

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We can also arrive at the conclusion that the accidents do not have an act of being of their own by observing
generation and corruption. Since generation and corruption- the acquisition and loss of being-affect that which
has being, these terms are only applied to the substance.
Whiteness, for instance, is neither engendered nor corrupted; rather, bodies become white or lose their original
whiteness. Aceidents are neither generated nor corrupted, We can only validly sate that accidents are 'generated'
or 'corrupted' insofar as their subjeet begins to be or ceases to be in act in accordance with these accidents.
The Composite of Substance and Accidents
After the study of the nature of each of these two manners of being, it would now be appropriate to turn our
attention to the way they relate to one another in every individual being.
Real distinction
A substance and its accidents are really distinct from one another. This can be clearly seen by observing
accidental changes, in which certain secondary perfections disappear and give way to other new ones without the
substance itself being changed into another substance. Such alterations are only possible if accidents are really
distinct from the substance which they affect.
The color of an apple, for instance, is something really distinct from the apple itself, since the apple changes in
color when it ripens, but does not cease to be an apple.
The readily changeable accidents are not only the ones really distinct from the substance. All the accidents, by
virtue of their very essence, are distinct from their subject. For instance, to be divisible is by nature proper to
quantity whereas substance is by itself both one and indivisible.
Relation is a reference to another in contrast, substance is something independent.
Substance has its own consisteney, truly distinct from that of the accidents and superior to it.
Substance determines the basic content of things and makes them to be what they are (a flower, an elephant, a
man). In contrast, accidents depend on the substantial core and at the same time constitute its determining aspects.
Unity of the composite
The real distinction between substance and accidents may seem to undermine the unity of a particular being. This,
in fact, is the result that emerges from theories which regard the substance as a substratum disconnected from the
accidents, and merely juxtaposed to them in an extrinsic fashion. It must, however, be stressed that the real
distinction between substance and accidents does not destroy the unity of the being. Substance and accidents are
not several beings put together to form a whole, just as various decorative element are combined to constitute a
room.
There is only one being in the strict sense, namely, the substance; all the rest simply "belong to it”. A tree for
instance, does not cease to be a single thing even though it has many accidental characteristics. The accidents are
not complete, autonomous realities added to as substance; they are only determining aspects of the substance,
which complete it and do not, therefore, give rise to a plurality of juxtaposed things.

The three ways in which substance and accidents are related

To wind up our study of the composite of substance and accidents, it will be helpful to state briefly the three main
aspects of their mutual relationship:
a. The substance is the substratum of the accidents, not only insofar as it supports them, but also insofar as it
gives them the act of being.
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 b. The substance is the cause of those accidents which arise from it. The shape of a given animal, for
instance, is an effect of its essential principles, and for this reason all of the individuals of the same
species have a similar shape.
c. The substance has a passive capacity (potency) of receiving further perfections conferred on it by the
accidents. which are thus called accidental forms; for instance, operations (which are accidents) are a kind
of perfection to which a substance is in potency.
Our Knowledge of the Substance and of the Accidents
Our way of knowing substance and accidents is determined by their respective natures and their mutual relation.
In the first place, the substance-accident composite is known through the intelligence on the basis of the data
provided by the senses. Sense knowledge always refers directly to the accidents of a thing; in contrast, the
intelligence grasps, through the accident, their source and basis, which is the substance. This, of course, is
possible because the accidents are not like a veil that hides the substance: on the contrary, the accidents reveal the
substance.
Since its proper object is being, the intellect is not limited to grasping the more peripheral aspects of things, so to
speak, but knows "everything that is", that is, the entire being with all its real characteristics. Thus, the intellect
perceives being as a whole composed of substance and accidents and which is not merely the result of putting
together various aspects of the things. The distinction between substance and accidents can only be grasped
through the intellect. It cannot be obtained through the external or internal senses because these faculties perceive
only the accidents.
4.2. The Being- Essence Structure
We have already discussed the notion of being in our previous topics. We will also discuss in detail the notion on
essence. But for the sake of clarity on the structure of being -essence we will note that the intellectual experience
leads to the discovery of an interior duality of the existent: a type of flaw between that which a thing is (such as,
for example, man), and the principle that makes him exist: being. Being requires being that which it is: perfection
of every perfection without limits in the intensive sense. Instead, it is coerced, measured and limited by the
particular natures. As such, whatever exists (being) has that which makes it to be what it is (essence).
4.3. The Act-Potency Structure
After studying the different manners of being which are to be found in things, we shall now proceed to examine
the two aspects of reality, act and potency, which are found in all creatures, and which enables us to acquire a
deeper knowledge of being. Here we are dealing with a central point of metaphysics which St Thomas took from
Aristotle, but viewed from a broader perspective. It is of great importance for a correct understanding of the world
and for the metaphysical ascent to God.

The Notion of Act and Potency

We acquire an initial knowledge of act and of potency through the analysis of motion or change.
Due to a rigid conception of being as one and immutable. Parmenides could not explain the reality of change and
relegated it to the realm of mere appearance. In his view, being is and nonbeing is not. Consequently, being
cannot come from being which already is, nor can it come from non-being. since it is nothing. Aristotle provided
a more realistic explanation of change. which he considered not as absolute passage from non-being to being, but
as the transition of a subject from one state to another (as initially cold water becomes warm water). Through
change a thing acquires a perfection which it did not possess before. In the subject, however, there must be a
capacity for having this quality which is obtained through change. Aristotle's examples were clear and simple:
neither an animal nor a small child knows how to solve mathematical problems; the child, however, can learn to
do so, while an animal never can. A block of wood is not yet a stature, but it does have the capacity to be turned
into one by the sculptor, while water and air have no such capacity.
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The capacity to have a perfection is called potency. It is not the mere privation of something which will be
acquired, but a real capacity in the subject to acquire certain perfections. The reality of potency which breaks
Parmenides homogeneous view of being, was an important contribution which Aristotle introduced in his effort to
understand the reality of change.
Act, the perfection which a subject possesses is contrasted to potency. Some examples of act: are the sculptured
shape of wood, the temperature of water and acquired knowledge. Motion or change, then, is the successive
actualization of the potency: it is the transition from being something in potency to being it in act. The tree, for
instance, is potentially in the seed, but is it only through growth that it comes to be an actual tree.
Aristotle considered act and poteney under two aspects- the physical (linked to motion or change), and the
metaphysical. Under the physical aspect, act and potency form the elements that explain motion or change, but in
such a way to be in act and to be in potency are never found present simultaneously in a given subject: being
actually a stature is opposed to being potentially a stature. Under the second aspect, act and potency are
considered stable constituents principles of all things, such that poteney, even after having been made actual,
continues being a co-principle of its correspond act. Thus, in all corporeal beings, which are composed of prime
matter (potency) and substantial form (act), the prime matter remains after receiving its form.
Act
In general, act is any perfection of a subject. Examples of acts are: the color of a thing, the qualities of a
substance, the understanding, willing. sensing and the like.
The notion of act is a primary and evident one. Therefore, strictly speaking, it cannot be defined; it can only be
described by means of examples and by differentiating it from potency. Speaking about act, Aristotle said: "what
we mean becomes evident by induction from particular ones.
Certainly, one does not have to ascertain the definition of everything; it is enough for him to intuitively grasp
somethings through analogy. Act is related to potency as one who builds to someone capable of building, as one
who is awake to someone who is asleep, as one who sees to someone whose eyes are closed but who has the
power of sight, as that which proceeds from matter to matter itself, and as that which has been processed to that
which is still unprocessed.
Potency
Potency is also directly known through experience as correlative to act. It must be noted that, in the case of
potency, the reference to act is unavoidable, since it is constitutive of potency to be directed towards some type of
act. Sight, for instance, is the potency (or power) of seeing and movability is the capacity to be in movement.
These potencies are known through their respective acts.
A potency is that which can receive an act or already has it. We shall go over some of the characteristics implied
by this description.
a. In the first place, potency is distinct from act. This can be clearly seen when an act is separable from the
corresponding potency. The sense of sight, for instance, is something actually seeing and at other times is
not; an animal retains the capacity to move when it is actually resting, as well as during those moments
when it is in fact moving. The distinction between act and potency is not, however, of a purely temporal
nature. The potency may or may not be actualized, but it always remains a potency. Even when the sense
of sight is actually seeing, it does not lose its capacity to see, which is, rather, perfected by its act. An
empty glass has the capacity to contain a liquid, and when it actually contains it, the potency does not
vanish but is fulfilled. Strictly speaking. therefore, potency is characterized by being the capacity to have
an act or by being a receptive subject.
b. Act and potency are not complete realities, but only aspects or principles which are found in things.
Although we can well understand that they are distinct, we cannot represent them in our imagination,
which always tends to view potency as an already complete reality which is nonetheless empty and bare,
expecting to receive its act. Furthermore, since the object suited to our understanding is the already
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 constituted being, we encounter a certain difficulty in trying to speak about its internal principles, which
can never exist separately.
c. Potency is to act as the imperfect is to perfect. In the strict sense, act is a perfection, a completion,
something determinate. Potency, in contrast, is an imperfection, a "perfectible" capacity. The figure of a
stature, for instance, is a positive quality of the marble, a perfection, an act, whereas the shapeless block
of marble is impertect and indeterminate to the extent that it is deprived of that figure, In this sense, there
is a clear opposition between act and poteney; the latter is "that which is not in act", Thus, a person who
merely has the poteney to know, but does not actualize it, does not know; and as long as the piece of
marble has not been sculptured, it is not a stature, This contrast clearly shows that poteney is not act in a
germinal or implicit state.
d. Nevertheless, in itself potency is not a more privation of act, but a real capacity for perfection. A stone,
for instance, does not see, and in addition, it is not even capable of this act, whereas some new-born
animals do not see, but they do have the capacity or power to see.

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