A Practical Guide to Substation Testing Using

IEC 61850 Mode and Behavior

Edson Hernández, Tovah Whitesell, and Karen Leggett Wyszczelski

Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.

Presented at the
Power and Energy Automation Conference
Seattle, Washington
March 3–4, 2020
 1

A Practical Guide to Substation Testing Using

IEC 61850 Mode and Behavior
Edson Hernández, Tovah Whitesell, and Karen Leggett Wyszczelski, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.

Abstract—IEC 61850 is a standard for integrated protection II. CROSS-STANDARD TESTING

and control systems around the world and has been recently
gaining momentum in North America. There is a growing need to Companies have been experimenting with integrating
verify the successful implementation of this technology when IEC 61850 devices in tandem with the evolution of the
performing commissioning and maintenance in substations. standards, such that when commissioning and testing of these
IEC 61850 Edition 1 introduced several methods of intelligent devices began, the depth of device-interoperability problems
electronic device (IED) testing intended to help overcome the was exposed. Device manufacturers developing products did so
challenges encountered when testing in the field. However, using their own interpretation of the IEC 61850 standards. The
Edition 1 only describes a general approach to IED testing and
does not clearly specify requirements for implementing its testing interoperability issues resulting from the complex and
methods. Therefore, when Edition 2 was published it provided ambiguous nature of the standards required discussion and
more descriptive methods of testing as well as more clarity about deliberation between users and manufacturers to solve. Later,
how to use them; however, in doing so it increased its complexity. these issues and their solutions would be incorporated into the
There are still some issues of incompatibility that could affect second edition of the standard; however, while these
interoperability and produce unexpected results, such as the discussions were happening, a few utilities made investments
simultaneous use of Edition 1 and Edition 2 devices or devices with
other protection protocols. into existing Edition 1 standard systems. Due to the
This paper discusses two of the most important IEC 61850 unlikelihood of replacing admittedly expensive devices, the
Edition 2 test features: Mode Control (widely referred to as “Test reality today is that Edition 1 devices endure in utilities
Mode”) and Simulation. The paper first briefly describes the test systems, even though they and Edition 2 devices are not
features in Edition 2 and then illustrates the applications and guaranteed to be test-interoperable, which is all due to the
guidelines for these features in depth, including potential pitfalls. original ambiguity surrounding testing using Manufacturing
Finally, the paper provides examples related to various utility
Message Specification (MMS), Generic Object-Oriented
domains as a practical guide to help the reader make informed
choices on how to use these test features, independently or Substation Event (GOOSE), and Sampled Value (SV) signals
combined. The use cases include asset additions, commissioning, as first described in IEC 61850.
and multiowner systems. Edition 1 of this standard introduced the concept of testing
relays using two different methods. The first method is by
I. INTRODUCTION sending and receiving signals with the GOOSE message test bit
Creating a standard that works across many application set to either TRUE or FALSE [1]. The second method was by
domains is a challenge that requires dedicated time and effort changing a logical device or logical node’s Mode, which was
to accomplish. The IEC 61850 standard was conceived with the defined as: On, Test, Blocked, Test/Blocked, or Off [2].
purpose of unifying the communications protocols between Unfortunately, an unintended consequence of using this
protective devices. This was meant to solve a breadth of terminology was the escalating overuse of the term “test,”
interoperability problems, where any one asset could which was used both for the GOOSE test bit and for a device’s
communicate with another assuming they could both interpret Mode value. In both cases, test signals are sent to a device. For
IEC 61850 protocols. However, the length of time and diversity example, Fig. 1 shows Wireshark’s GOOSE dissector—which
of effort put into creating this standard resulted in an still uses Edition 1 nomenclature—in which the simulation bit
unfortunate side effect: the insufficient explanations of use is referred to as “test.” Wireshark’s GOOSE dissector test field
published with the IEC 61850 testing methods introduced a should be “Simulation” under Edition 2 [3].
great deal of complexity to the standard. The first edition of the “Test Mode” was coined in the Edition 2 standard in specific
standard pioneered many solutions to various problems of reference to Mode control and Behavior [4]. However, users of
automation, one of which was being able to test a protective equipment were already using the phrase “Test Mode” to
scheme logic. Testing supervisory control and data acquisition- specify any time the unit went into a test state. “Test Mode”
based (SCADA-based) automation schemes with IEC 61850 could refer to any number of different testing conditions
devices uncovered ambiguity surrounding how to meet the including proprietary manufacturer-defined testing states,
standard’s complex requirements. This ambiguity led to GOOSE parameter test = TRUE [1] (renamed “Simulation”
engineers developing and integrating devices that were not with Edition 2), or Mod.stVal/Beh.stVal = TEST, as described
actually interoperable, undermining the purpose of having a in Table I. Due to this added complexity, assumptions should
standard in the first place. not be made when reading or using the term “Test Mode.”
 2

Fig. 1. Wireshark’s dissector for GOOSE messages. The dissector still uses Fig. 2. Device under test receiving and processing signals with the
the Edition 1 standard nomenclature to describe the Simulation bit. Simulation bit set to TRUE [7].

While the term for controlling this simulation was updated

TABLE I
for clarity, its use has not changed. This means Edition 1 and
IEC 61850 EDITION 1 GOOSE MESSAGE DEFINITION
SHOWING THE TEST BIT [4] Edition 2 relays should be able to send and process simulated
and actual signals as prescribed by the IEC 61850 standard.
Parameter Parameter Value/Value
Name Type Range/Explanation
Unfortunately, the same is not true for testing relays via Mode
control and Behavior.
DataSet ObjectReference Value from the instance of GoCB The Edition 1 standard introduced the Mode and Behavior
AppID VISIBLE Value from the instance of GoCB features with the following states: On, Blocked, Test,
STRINGS Test/Blocked, and Off. Specifically, IEC 61850-7-4 defines
GoCBRef ObjectReference Value from the instance of GoCB each Mode and Behavior with a corresponding value [2].
T EntryTime
However, the wording in the table (as described in Table II) is
vague enough that any of a variety of meanings can be assumed.
StNum INT32U For example, Test Mode can describe multiple logics such as
SqNum INT32U function active, outputs generated, reporting flagged as test,
Test BOOLEAN (TRUE) test | (FALSE) no-test function operated, but results are indicated as test results, etc.
[2]. “Reporting flagged as test” is particularly ambiguous
ConfRev INT32U Value from the instance of GoCB
because there are different bits for different things: there is the
NdsCom BOOLEAN Value from the instance of GoCB test bit for simulated GOOSE messages, and the quality.test bit
GOOSE Data [1..n]: Value parameter type depends on the common data classes for Mode. Table II does not differentiate between these values,
defined in IEC 61850-7-3. The parameter shall be derived from GOOSE so any manufacturer could have, and did, set either bit in Test
control. Mode. GOOSE, SV, and MMS handling were not differentiated
Despite the name change of the GOOSE message test bit, in the Edition 1 table, leading to more ambiguity and individual
with some manufacturer devices it is still possible to test interpretation, culminating in a generation of Edition 1 devices
systems that operate with a mix of Edition 1 and Edition 2 that are infrequently interoperable with each other, let alone
devices [1] [5] [6]. IEC 61850-7-1 defines the handling of with Edition 2 devices.
simulation signals via the Sim.Oper.ctVal in the logical node Even though the Edition 2 standard addresses this with better
physical device (LPHD) [7]. As it is explained in Fig. 2, setting defined descriptions and instructive methods, Edition 1 devices
the device to handle simulated GOOSE or SV signals means are still used in the field today and are part of larger, mixed
that only signals with the Simulation bit set to TRUE should be systems that still require testing. Section VI of this paper
processed. outlines a solution to this issue.
 3

TABLE II to Mod.stVal = Test/Blocked using an MMS control. However,

IEC 61850 EDITION 1 INTERPRETATION/DEFINITION OF MODE AND BEHAVIOR
if the human-machine interface (HMI) in the substation was not
Mode and Behavior Value an MMS device, or if it was a DNP3 or Modbus master, then
ON (enabled) the device would not be able to be put into Test, Blocked, or
Function active Test/Blocked Mode, as neither DNP3 nor Modbus masters
Outputs (to process) generated would have access to the IEC 61850 data model.
Reporting (to client)
Control services (from client) accepted
1 Other challenges arise when there is no local HMI to signal
Functional (process related) data visible a device to go into the desired mode. The standard does not
Configuration (capability) data visible provide a mechanism for changing Mode without the MMS
(Normal state)
client interface, but utilities will nonetheless need a method by
BLOCKED which to put a device into different modes for testing. To
Function active resolve this problem, there are devices that have been made
No outputs (to process) generated
No reporting available that can control an intelligent electronic device (IED)
2
Control services (from client) rejected mode without an MMS client.
Functional (process related) data visible
Configuration (capability) data visible
(Process is passively supervised) III. CFE AND THE SUBSTATION AUTOMATION
SYSTEM STANDARD
TEST
Function active The largest utility in Latin America, Comisión Federal de
Outputs (to process) generated Electricidad (CFE), has developed a specification that describes
Reporting (to client) flagged as test the general requirements for the application of the substation
3
Control services (from client) accepted
Functional (process related) data visible automation systems (SASs) in electrical installations, based on
Configuration (capability) data visible the IEC 61850 standard for the supervision, control, and
(Function is operated but results are indicated as test results) operation of apparatus and auxiliary systems [10]. Requirement
TEST/BLOCKED documents describe the need for use of all substation system
Function active protocols beyond just IEC 61850. This means protocols such as
No outputs (to process) generated
Reporting (to client) flagged as test
DNP3 and others must be taken into consideration when
Control services (from client) accepted 4 planning for in-system tests. Fig. 3 illustrates this type of
Functional (process related) data visible system.
Configuration (capability) data visible
(Function is operated in Test Mode but with no impact to the
process)
OFF (disabled)
Function not active
No outputs (to process) generated
No reporting (to client)
5
Control services (from client) rejected
Functional (process related) data not visible
Configuration (capability) data visible
(Function is inactive but shows its configuration capability)

Industry practices dictate that when testing an in-service

device, a clearance must be requested [8] and a device or system
must be isolated from the rest of the system before testing [9].
With a traditional hardwired system, test switches provide a
physical and visible isolation point, allowing engineers another
method of confirmation. However, in IEC 61850, devices that
are virtually connected via digital message exchanges provide
logical isolation instead of a visible open point.
In order to mitigate some of the ambiguity of the Edition 1
standard, some utilities implemented a supervisory bit that was
set via a front-panel interface or pushbutton. If this bit was set, Fig. 3. High-level communications architecture for an SAS.
a light-emitting diode (LED) or other indication on the front
panel could indicate to the technicians that the relay was IV. CFE AND OTHER UTILITY TEST MODE IMPLEMENTATIONS
isolated from the rest of the system. This bit was included in the Utilities are combining virtual and hardwired techniques to
GOOSE message and indicated to subscriber relays that the protect their assets. GOOSE messages are proving reliable in
device was in a test state. communications-assisted protection [11] and thus are
The improvements to the standard introduced in Edition 2, becoming broadly accepted as a replacement for hardwired
which provided the mechanism for setting Mode/Behavior via signals [12]. The use of communications-assisted protection
an MMS client, would allow a device to be either isolated or set schemes has been present since the first edition of the
 4

IEC 61850 standard, and they were used long before it was B. Digital Testing
decided to standardize the way substations could be digitally Testing methods for virtual wiring differ significantly from
tested with the inclusion of the Mode/Behavior in Edition 2. testing hardwired devices. As in traditional testing, the isolation
A. Traditional Testing of devices is required, but, instead of physical isolation, digital
blocking is now needed. Testing procedures for digital
Substation testing can be divided into two main stages:
exchanges should validate the correct configuration and
commissioning and in-service substation testing. During
operation of the relays and guarantee that the two main goals
commissioning, the substation is in a grid-disconnected state,
previously described are achieved.
in which devices such as current transformers (CTs) or voltage
Testing these digital exchanges was not adequately
transformers (VTs) are not connected to the electrical grid.
addressed by IEC 61850 until the release of Edition 2 in 2010.
Commissioning provides the engineers freedom to test
Prior to that, utilities used a heuristic approach that included the
everything without creating unwanted operations within the
use of Boolean equations as interlocks as a way to provide
system or interruptions in the power. After commissioning, the
physical isolation. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show ways of creating a
substation is connected to the electrical grid and put in service.
blocked action using IED internal logic solutions. Utilities
This paper will not address commissioning needs and instead
started calling this new approach Test Mode [13], which over
will focus on in-service testing.
time introduced the confusion that Edition 2 terminology
Once in service, any testing or additional modification is
attempted to clarify [4].
subject to the utility’s clearance procedures. Unlike during
commissioning, the ability to test has now been reduced to
specific subsets of bays or IEDs in the substation. In-service
substation testing has two main goals: first, to successfully
confirm that the programmed functions in the IED work
correctly and guarantee the integrity of the substation; and
second, to prevent undesired operations during testing such as
tripping a breaker or a group of breakers, accidentally enabling
or disabling interlocks, or the unexpected closing of relay
outputs [13].
During traditional testing, a test blade is inserted into the
panel’s test switch. This isolates the IED from the rest of the Fig. 5. Using internal IED protection latch (PLT01) logic to set and reset the
system, shorts the secondary circuits of the CTs, opens the VT Test Mode.
signals, and blocks the breaker trip and any other trip signals by
opening the electrical circuit between the IED contact outputs
and the trip coils. A transmission line protection panel is shown
in Fig. 4, with six test switches installed at the bottom of the
panel. One test switch is for the primary protection, two test
switches for each terminal in the backup protection, two test
switches for each terminal in the bay controller, and the last test
switch for a revenue meter.

Fig. 6. Logic used to lock the closing of an output contact (OUT101) in the
IED to prevent undesired operations during the Test Mode.

This Test Mode consists of a series of Boolean logic

equations that have been programmed into the IED and that will
evaluate a condition before an internal logical variable is set or
Fig. 4. Transmission line protection panel with installed test blocks at the an output contact is allowed to operate. This isolation method
bottom. does not rely on reserved fields (LPHD.Sim.stVal = TRUE, or
With the breaker trips blocked, the protection and Simulation mode), the Mode/Behavior of the IED, or on the
automation routines can be executed in the tested device possibly ambiguous value of Quality fields. As a result, this
without provoking an unwanted operation. The testing results Test Mode can be used regardless of the implementation of
are validated and approved by analyzing the sequence of events IEC 61850 in other devices in the substation, and
(SOE) recorded in the IED, which, if the test is successful, interoperability between devices is possible. Conversely, this
demonstrates that the IED logic, protective function, and output method can be overly complicated, leaves room for error, and
contacts operate correctly. may not be supported in all IEDs.
The Test Mode may be enabled by a pushbutton located on
the front panel of the IED, an internal control bit, or with a test
switch blade that drives an input of the IED. In turn, an internal
logical protection latch (PLT) will be controlled based on the
 5

state of the input signals. The output of the PLT will be set to and the mostly experimental adoption of IEC 61850 devices.
TRUE when the IED is in Test Mode. Fig. 5 illustrates a simple Edition 2 clarifications, which explain how Mode is controlled,
logic diagram to put the relay into Test Mode by inserting a test improved the effectiveness of conformance testing and
blade into the IED test switch. provided utility personnel with confidence that the testing
The PLT output can be used for several tasks, one of which scenarios in the standard had been addressed.
is turning on an LED on the front panel, warning the user that The improved implementation of Mode control and
the relay is in Test Mode [8] [9]. It is included as a supervisory Behavior testing features include the standardization of
element in each protection and output contact logic equation to GOOSE message processing [15], the operation of output
prevent unanticipated trip execution or closure. The Test Mode contacts [15], and the setting of flags for the data within
will block any physical trips, regardless of whether the IED GOOSE messages [16]. Table III explains how the output
operates as a result of a protective function or if it receives a contacts of the IED will behave according to the Behavior value
trip command over a GOOSE message. Fig. 6 shows an output of the IED [15]. Table IV explains how the IED will process
contact logic that is used to block the closing of the contact. data in a GOOSE message according to its stVal Quality value
The implementation of this isolation method is time [15].
consuming because each IED is required to be programmed and TABLE III
configured with the corresponding logic and GOOSE OUTPUT CONTACT OPERATION
subscriptions. Further, as the hardwiring is virtual, the mapping
Mode Output Contact Behavior
of GOOSE messages to each subscriber and the assignment of
the Test Mode variables to the protection logic makes this On Contacts operate on processed signals
method prone to errors and misconfigurations, as previously Blocked Contacts DO NOT operate
mentioned. Test Contacts operate on processed signals
Overlooking the effort that must be put into the Test Mode
setup, implementing this isolation method as part of the initial Test/Blocked Contacts DO NOT operate
network design and before commissioning will increase the Off Contacts DO NOT operate
testing and expansion capabilities of the system after it is
TABLE IV
commissioned and put in service. PROCESSING GOOSE AND SV MESSAGES
Once the configuration is finished, it will provide the end
user with a certain level of freedom when testing. The Test Mode q.Validity = Good q.Validity = Good
Mode ensures that unwanted operations, such as false trips, do q.test = FALSE q.test = TRUE
not occur because the protection and automation logic is On Process as valid Do not process
restricted, and the output contacts do not operate when the IED
Blocked Process as valid Do not process
is in a blocking configuration. Once configured, IEDs are
isolated and the system is ready for live system testing without Test Process as valid
the need for clearances that require the system to go offline. The Test/Blocked Process as valid
integration of GOOSE messages with protection, automation, Off Do not process
and control systems acts as a complement to or replacement of
hardwired signals with the current isolation method. Test Mode B. Use Case: The Transition From Handcrafted Equations
has been widely accepted and tested, all while demonstrating to the Use of IEC 61850 Built-In Test Features
the implementation and utilization of IEC 61850 in With the clarification brought by IEC 61850 Edition 2, users
transmission substations around Mexico [10] [11] [14]. can consistently leverage the complex built-in features that the
standard offers without needing to program complex logic
V. THE NEW ERA OF IEC 61850 MODE equations to prevent misoperation during the testing of
CONTROL AND BEHAVIOR in-service substation assets. These built-in features are
A. The Future of Substation Digital Testing explained in depth in this section.
IEC 61850 Edition 2 provides an improved, yet still overly 1) Simulation
complex, explanation of the preferred testing terms and The GOOSE control block contains a Simulation attribute
methods, and it specifies how IEDs should operate based on which is set to TRUE for a simulated message. The S bit, inside
both the Mode (Mod) and the Behavior (Beh). The revised the Reserved 1 section of a GOOSE protocol data unit shown
approach defines a standardized method of isolation that in Fig. 7 [3], mirrors the Simulation attribute. This bit will be
reduces, but does not completely eliminate, the need for referred to as the Sim bit.
complex logic equations in the IEDs that had been necessary
for isolation in Edition 1 IEDs.
Before the release of Edition 2, IED manufacturers
interpreted the standard inconsistently, which contributed to
interoperability problems and allowed greater odds of device
misoperation. These issues contributed to confusion in testing
Fig. 7. The Simulate flag of a GOOSE message.
devices, leading to widespread non-confidence in the standard
 6

Simulation is the state where the IED is configured to TABLE V

BIT-STRING VALUES
process simulated GOOSE messages (LPHD.Sim.stVal =
TRUE). With Sim.stVal = TRUE, once the IED receives a Bits IEC 61850-7-3 Bit-String
subscribed GOOSE message with the Sim bit set, the IED will Attribute Attribute Value Default
stop processing the normal GOOSE message in favor of the Name Value
simulated message. If the IED subscribes to other,
Good 00 00
nonsimulated GOOSE messages, it will continue to handle the
other subscriptions as before. Only those simulated messages Invalid 01
0–1 Validity
with the Sim bit set will be processed until the IED Reserved 10
LPHD.Sim.stVal = FALSE [7]. Simulated GOOSE, normal
Questionable 11
GOOSE, and Sim bit set messages may all be present on the
network. Simulation can be thought of as a replacement for a 2 Overflow TRUE FALSE
traditional test set that injects analog values and digital inputs 3 OutofRange TRUE FALSE
into an IED. A device in Simulation mode will continue to 4 BadReference TRUE FALSE
process normal data if it does not receive a message with the
5 Oscillatory TRUE FALSE
Sim bit set. Therefore, a device in Simulation mode subscribing
to multiple GOOSE or SV messages may process both 6 Failure TRUE FALSE
simulated streams and actual streams simultaneously 7 OldData TRUE FALSE
depending on the Sim flag of the published messages [7].
8 Inconsistent TRUE FALSE
To allow an IED to process simulated GOOSE messages, the
user needs to write a logical 1 (TRUE) to the 9 Inaccurate TRUE FALSE
LPHD.Sim.Oper.ctlVal that will set the LPHD.Sim.stVal = 10 Source Process 0 0
TRUE, indicating the IED is ready to receive simulated
Substituted 1
messages. Although the simulated GOOSE messages are
typically sent from a test device or software, IED manufacturers 11 Test TRUE FALSE
may have implemented proprietary means by which to 12 OperatorBlocked TRUE FALSE
configure an IED to act like a simulation device and send
simulated GOOSE messages to the network. For example, with When the IED is put into Mode = Test or Test/Blocked, it
a certain manufacturer’s IEDs, the Simulate bit can be set by will process GOOSE messages where the data have q.Test =
writing a logical 1 to the LPHD extended object, LN TRUE set in the Quality string. If an IED is in Mode = On or
LPHD1.PubSim.Oper.ctlVal. It is necessary to mention that Blocked and it receives data with q.Validity = Good and q.Test
both the LN LPHD1.Sim and LPHD1.PubSim are test = TRUE, then the IED will process the data as if it were invalid.
extensions and not present by default in a configured IED Therefore, putting an IED in Mode = Test should not affect an
description (CID) file. upstream device that is not in Mode = Test.
This feature will give users the opportunity to perform test In testing devices that are virtually wired together through
operations on a subset of specific IEDs in an in-service GOOSE, it can be difficult to provide a visible indication that a
substation without affecting the operation of any IEDs that are device has been isolated for testing when there is no MMS
not involved in the test. As the IEDs that do not have the LN client to view the status of the Mode/Behavior or to change the
LPHD1.Sim.stVal=TRUE logic will ignore GOOSE messages mode of the IED. Modern test sets and test software may be
with the Sim flag set, the chance that the IED will process any able to access the data model and provide the Mode status;
trip signals sent via GOOSE messages from the devices under however, an indication on the IED could be used to provide the
test is low, therefore misoperation and false trips are possibly confirmation necessary to verify the IED has been isolated.
avoided without the need of any additional logic. Section VII 3) Behavior of Output Contacts of the IEDs Based on
describes how to use simulation when testing devices across the Mode/Behavior Sent to the IED
both IEC 61850 editions. Using traditional test methods, the test switch was
2) Processing of an Item Contained in an Incoming sometimes used to provide isolation by opening the physical
GOOSE Message Based on the Quality Field Value contact. To perform the test, relay logic was changed to use a
Each data item included in a GOOSE message should spare output contact to verify the operation. In IEC 61850,
contain a bit-string that provides that item’s Quality [16]. The when the Mode/Behavior = Blocked or Test/Blocked, the IED
Quality bit-string contains the following fields, described in provides the required isolation by preventing the operation of
Table V. the output contact.
If a GOOSE message contains data that has q.Validity = As previously described in Table III, when receiving a
Good and q.Test = TRUE, then the data item within that control command via MMS or GOOSE processing logic, no
message is test data and should be processed by a device where output operation will be issued if Mode/Behavior = Blocked or
Mode = Test or Test/Blocked. Refer to Table V. Test/Blocked. The difference between these two is that if
 7

Mode/Behavior is Blocked, incoming normal data (not test Another problem that may arise using Mode/Behavior is that
data) will be processed, but the output contact operation will be other protocols, such as DNP3 or Modbus, have no way of
blocked. If the Mode/Behavior of a device is Test/Blocked, then reading the IEC 61850 Mode/Behavior; however, some device
incoming normal data and test data will be processed but the manufacturers provided means to report the Mode/Behavior
output contact will be blocked. status. For example, I850MOD is one manufacturer’s named
Using the blocked modes prevents undesired operations, analog value in the IED that provides the current value of
such as the trip of a breaker or a group of breakers, or accidently Mode/Behavior at the root logical device. The IED can report
tripping or closing relay outputs when testing relay logic. this value through other communications protocols, which
Because logic is still processed, but the output operation is supports readability beyond IEC 61850.
blocked, utility personnel can examine the SOE recorder to As IEC 61850 experimental adoption continues to grow, test
confirm that the programmed functions in the IED work procedures and methods will evolve. Utilities will need to learn
correctly and thus guarantee the integrity of the substation. to trust the status of digital signals as they previously trusted
The IEC 61850 standard expects that an MMS client will be visibly open test switches. The visibility of Mode/Behavior in
used to change the Mode/Behavior. Modern test sets that IEC 61850 testing methods can provide the reassurance that
support IEC 61850 can access the data model and control the utility personnel seek.
Mode; however, if this type of test set is not available to an IED,
then a utility must find or invent other methods of testing, and VI. USE CASE: TESTING IN-SERVICE SUBSTATIONS WITH
the IED will be unable to report its Mode/Behavior value to A MIXED INSTALLATION OF IEDS SUPPORTING
non-IEC 61850 SCADA clients. IEC 61850 EDITION 1 AND EDITION 2
Some IEDs provide alternate means for modifying and Due to the inconsistencies between the standardized and the
indicating the value of Mode/Behavior. For example, dedicated non-standardized implementations among different IED
logic equations can provide the means to set the IED into Test manufacturers, there is a risk of provoking undesired operations
and/or Blocked Mode through a pushbutton or other input. In when trying to perform digital testing in an in-service
this example, SC850TM is a logic variable that can be used to substation with a mixture of Edition 1 and Edition 2 devices.
set or reset the Test Mode. Similarly, SC850BM is a logic Performing digital testing by using the Mod.stVal = Blocked
variable that can be used to set or reset the Blocked Mode. The or Mod.stVal = Test/Blocked in GOOSE messages between
logic below is an example of how the Mode/Behavior of an IED IEDs supporting both editions of IEC 61850 would produce
is selected through the use of the logic variables SC850TM and unwanted operation by IEDs supporting Edition 1. These IEDs
SC850BM, which in turn are controlled by the logic variables might process all the incoming GOOSE messages, regardless
PTL02 and PLT03, respectively. Table VI illustrates the of the mode of the incoming message data. However, since the
Mode/Behavior of the IED as a result of the state of the Sim/Test bit was standardized, this built-in feature can
SC850TM and SC850BM logic variables. sometimes be leveraged to perform digital testing. This is the
SC850TM := PLT02 case because the name of the reserved bit changed, but not its
SC850BM := PLT03 location in the GOOSE message, which allows users to leverage
TABLE VI
simulated signals.
IED-SELECTED IEC 61850 MODE/BEHAVIOR Consider the testing of a breaker failure scheme for Line 2
in an in-service substation with two lines, as shown in Fig. 8.
SC850TM SC850BM Mode/Behavior
As part of an upgrade project for Line 2, a new breaker failure
0 0 On relay (outlined in bold) is added to this line. All IEDs in Line 2
1 0 Test are new and support the Edition 2 standard, while all IEDs in
Line 1 are older and support Edition 1.
0 1 Blocked
Testing the Line 2 breaker failure scheme, assuming that no
1 1 Test/Blocked additional data are exchanged between Edition 1 and Edition 2
relays through proprietary protocols or communications,
By using this type of logic variable to illuminate front-panel
requires a certain series of steps, described as follows.
LEDs, it provides the visible indication to the testers that an
1. A test blade is inserted into the corresponding test
IED is in the expected mode for testing.
switch for both the line protective and breaker
The value of Mode/Behavior is an enumerated number with
failure relays.
a range of 1–5, defined in either the IED capability description
2. The Line 2 line protective relay Mode/Behavior is set
or the CID file with the following corresponding values [17].
to Mode/Behavior = Test/Blocked.
<EnumType id=“Mod”> 3. The Line 2 line protective relay is set to publish
<EnumVal ord=“1”>on</EnumVal> simulated GOOSE messages to the network.
<EnumVal ord=“2”>blocked</EnumVal> 4. The Line 2 breaker failure relay is set to
<EnumVal ord=“3”>test</EnumVal> Mode/Behavior = Test/Blocked.
<EnumVal ord=“4”>test/blocked</EnumVal> 5. The Line 2 breaker failure relay is set to accept
<EnumVal ord=“5”>off</EnumVal> simulated GOOSE messages in the network.
</EnumType>
 8

6. The Line 2 breaker failure relay is set to publish Edition 2 devices that can block output contacts. Setting
simulated GOOSE messages to the network. Edition 2 IEDs LPHD.Sim.stVal = TRUE and Mode to Blocked
7. All IEDs in Line 1 remain in service with no will allow test signals with Sim bit set to be injected into the
additional configuration. system, but which Edition 1 relays, whose LPHD.Sim.stVal =
8. All protection routines are executed as normal with FALSE, will ignore. Fig. 9 illustrates this idea of using both test
the use of a test setup. methods at once.

Fig. 9. System with both Edition 1 and Edition 2 relays using Sim bit and
Fig. 8. Using Simulation as a way to perform digital testing in in-service
Mode for testing.
substations with a mixture of IEC 61850 Edition 1 and Edition 2 IEDs. Each
device in Line 2 is accepting and processing GOOSE messages from the
other. VII. USE CASE: TESTING A TRANSMISSION LINE
PROTECTION SCHEME IN AN IN-SERVICE SUBSTATION
Setting the Mode/Behavior = Test/Blocked in both Line 2
WITH IEDS SUPPORTING ONLY IEC 61850 EDITION 2
relays will direct them not to close any output contacts as long
the Mode/Behavior = Test/Blocked, providing the required The standardization in IEC 61850 Edition 2 ensures the
physical isolation from other devices. This will also direct the uniform processing of GOOSE messages based on
IEDs to process all data items inside the GOOSE messages that Mode/Behavior and Quality attributes. Thus, having a
contain the Quality attribute Test = TRUE and Mode = On. substation with all IEDs supporting Edition 2 makes the digital
Setting LPHD1.PubSim.stVal = TRUE in both Line 2 relays testing of an in-service substation easier than Edition 1 because
will direct them to set the Sim bit, and then all outgoing all IEDs will process (or disregard) incoming GOOSE
GOOSE messages from these relays will be recognized as messages as explained in Table IV. This will ensure that no
simulated from all IEDs in the network, as shown in Fig. 8. misoperation or false trips will be produced in the system as
Setting LPHD1.Sim.stVal = TRUE in the Line 2 breaker result of a misconfiguration on the IED, faulty logic, or IEDs
failure relay will direct the relay to process only simulated from different manufacturers. This is essential when regional
GOOSE messages that have the Sim bit set [3]. All remaining coordination councils or the specifications listed by some
IEDs in the substation (i.e., Edition 1 IEDs in Line 1) will utilities recommend, or even mandate, that the primary and
process only GOOSE messages with the Sim flag cleared and backup relays should be different in construction, protection
ignore all simulated GOOSE messages published by both IEDs algorithms, and even manufacturers.
in Line 2 [3]. Keep in mind that this will work only if the IEDs Transmission lines are critical elements in the power grid.
in the substation, which may have been made by different Because of this, transmission lines are rarely taken out of
manufacturers, process the Sim/Test bit in the same way. service. A line out of service translates into economic losses for
All of these protection routines can be executed at this time. both utilities and the industries that rely on that power, as well
No output contacts from the IEDs in Line 2 will be closed as an impact to the quality of life of individuals who rely on that
because the Mode is Test/Blocked, and any trip signals electricity. As such, having trustworthy methods to test
transmitted by GOOSE messages, either by the line protection in-service live transmission lines is of utmost importance. The
or the breaker failure relays of Line 2, will be disregarded by vision and effort that IEC TC57/WG10 has put into achieving
all IEDs that are not set to receive simulated GOOSE messages. substation testing in a live system without taking it out of
This setup provides the user with the confidence that no service and putting the system offline, is now possible in the
unwanted operations or false trips will be produced during IEC 61850 Edition 2 release, although it is not perfect and does
testing. not address some points that are explained in Section VIII.
Another option is to take advantage of the Simulation bit and Using the built-in features offered in this revision, in
Mode to test across editions. Edition 1 devices, which may or combination with a good panel design that provides physical
may not correctly block output contacts, are mixed with isolation such as test switches, helps with testing in-service live
systems.
 9

The intention behind the built-in features of Edition 2 is to through input/output contact signals. Similarly, the 50BFI and
perform testing of the functions that protect the transmission 79I signals are also published to the network via GOOSE
line without disruption of service, as well as providing messages.
protection needed to clear any fault in the transmission line in
C. Breaker Failure IED
the event that real failure occurs in the system.
Consider a traditional transmission line protection scheme, The breaker failure IED serves as breaker failure protection
as illustrated in Fig. 10. Each end of the line contains four (50BF). Unlike the primary and backup protection IEDs,
protective relays whose functions are explained in the following normally the breaker failure IED does not exchange data with
sections. the other IEDs in other substations. However, trip signals such
the 50BF and the trip to the lockout relay (86BF) are exchanged
with other IEDs in the same substation through input/output
contact signals. Similarly, the 50BF and 86BF trip signals are
also published to the network via GOOSE messages.
D. Bay Controller IED
The bay controller IED provides local control of breakers
and disconnect switches of the bay to the operators. The bay
controller may receive the statuses of alarms, apparatuses,
breakers, disconnect switches, GOOSE messages, and
interlocks, all signaling the bay controller to operate its
contacts. The IED is programmed to handle these varied inputs.
Fig. 10. A traditional transmission line protection scheme. To accomplish both the testing of each IED and its related
protective functions, the Mode/Behavior will be changed only
A. Primary Protection IED in the IED to be tested.
The primary protection IED at the local substation
exchanges differential data with the primary protection IED in E. Testing the Primary Protection (87L Function)
the remote substation to achieve differential line protection To test the 87L relays, IEDs at both ends of the transmission
(87L) by sharing the current measurements between the line are set to Mod.stVal/Beh.stVal = Test/Blocked. All the
terminals of the line. The 87L communications run via a remaining IEDs in the scheme (21L/67L, 50BF, and the bay
proprietary protocol. This protocol may allow the transmission controller) remain unchanged (Mod.stVal/Beh.stVal = On).
of additional bits, such as the permissive overreaching transfer With both 87L relays’ Mode/Behavior = Test/Blocked, no
trip (POTT) or the direct transfer trip (DTT), to share with the output contacts will be closed by these relays and the protection
differential line protection data. This feature helps to reduce testing routines can be started. Any trip signals received
additional communications equipment and hardwiring. Trip (whether from GOOSE messages, over the 87L channel,
signals generated from the 87L, POTT, and DTT schemes are transfer trips from other IEDs, or trips as the result of an
also published to the network via GOOSE messages. induced fault by a test set) will be processed per manufacturer
The primary protection IED also exchanges data with other specifications, but no output contacts will be closed. Without
IEDs in the same substation using input/output contact signals. the 87L relays closing the output contacts, no hardwired trip
Protection schemes such as the breaker failure initiate (50BFI) signals will be propagated to other IEDs. Trip signals published
and the reclosing initiate (79I) schemes are achieved by this in a GOOSE message by the 87L relays will have the Quality
method of communication. Similarly, trip signals, such as the (q) test field value set to TRUE. The published trip signals by
87L, POTT, and DTT operations, are also published to the the 87L relays will not be processed by other IEDs in the
network via GOOSE messages. network; these trip signals will be discarded due to the .q field
value mismatch. This physical and digital isolation will prevent
B. Backup Protection IED the 87L relays and other IEDs from tripping the breaker.
The backup protection IED serves as the distance and Setting the 87L relays’ Mode/Behavior = Test/Blocked, the
directional overcurrent line protection (21L/67L). The backup following results are achieved:
protection IED also exchanges protection data, such as POTT • Transfer trips sent over the 87L channel will be
and DTT bits, using a proprietary protocol, usually through a received and processed on the other end, but no
communication multiplexer. The purpose of this physical contacts will be closed at either end.
communication exchange is to provide IEDs with faster trip • Hardwired transfer trips will not be propagated to
processing, rather than relying on only the 21L/67L protective other IEDs because no contacts will be closed in the
functions. Trip signals generated from the 21L, 67L, POTT, and IEDs under test.
DTT schemes are also published to the network via GOOSE • Digital transfer trips, sent through GOOSE messages
messages. by the 87L relays, will be discarded by the subscribing
Similar to the primary protection IED, the backup protection IEDs that are not set to the same Mode/Behavior as
IED also exchanges data with other IEDs in the same substation the 87L relays.
to enable protection schemes, such as the 50BFI and 79I,
 10

• Any digital transfer trips sent over proprietary G. Testing the Breaker Failure Protection (50BF Function)
protocols by the 87L relays will be processed by the To test the 50BF relay, the IED will set Mode/Behavior =
receiving IEDs, but no physical contact will be closed, Test/Blocked. All remaining IEDs in the scheme (87L,
preventing the trip of field breakers. 21L/67L, and the bay controller) remain unchanged
• The transmission line will be continuously protected (Mod.stVal/Beh.stVal = On).
by the 21L/67L relays during the testing of the 87L With the 50BF relay Mode/Behavior = Test/Blocked, no
relays, providing the flexibility to test the required output contacts will be closed in this relay. At this point, the
IEDs and not lose protection without protection testing routines can be started. As before, any trip
decommissioning the line. signals received via GOOSE messages will be processed, but
After the end of the test, 87L relays at both ends will be set no output contacts will be closed. Without the 50BF relay
to Mode/Behavior = On. This returns the relays to normal closing the output contacts, no hardwired trip signals will be
operation. propagated to other IEDs. Trip signals published in a GOOSE
F. Testing the Backup Protection (21L/67L Function) message by the 50BF relay will have the .q test field value set
to TRUE, and the trip signals published by the 50BF relay will
To test the 21L/67L relays, IEDs at both ends of the not be processed by other IEDs in the network; these trip signals
transmission line are set to Mode/Behavior = Test/Blocked. All will be discarded due to the .q field value mismatch. This
remaining IEDs in the scheme (87L, 50BF, and the bay physical and digital isolation will prevent the 50BF relays and
controller) remain unchanged (Mod.stVal/Beh.stVal = On). other IEDs from tripping the breaker.
With both 21L/67L relays’ Mode/Behavior = Test/Blocked, When setting the 50BF relay’s Mode/Behavior to
no output contacts will be closed by these relays, allowing the Test/Blocked, the following results are achieved:
protection testing routines to start. Like the 87L testing,
• Transfer trips sent over a proprietary communications
received trip signals can be processed but no output contacts
channel will be received and processed, but no
will be closed. Without the 21L/67L relays closing the output
physical contacts will be closed.
contacts, no hardwired trip signals will be propagated to other
• Hardwired transfer trips will not be propagated to
IEDs. Like the 87L relays, trip signals published in a GOOSE
other IEDs because no contacts will be closed in the
message will have the .q test field value set to TRUE. The trip
IED being tested.
signals published by the 21L/67L relays will not be processed
• Digital transfer trips, sent through GOOSE messages
by other IEDs in the network as these trip signals will be
by the 50BF relay, will be discarded by any
discarded due to the .q field value mismatch. This physical and
subscribing IEDs that are not set to the same
digital isolation will prevent the 21L/67L relays and other IEDs
Mode/Behavior as the 50BF relay.
from tripping the breaker.
Setting the 21L/67L relays’ Mode/Behavior to • Any digital transfer trips sent over proprietary
Test/Blocked, the following results are achieved: protocols by the 50BF relay will be processed by the
receiving IEDs, but no physical contact will be closed,
• Transfer trips sent over the proprietary
preventing the trip of field breakers.
communications channel will be received and
After the end of the test, the 50BF relay will be set to
processed on the other end, but no physical contacts
Mode/Behavior = On. This returns the relay to normal
will be closed at either end.
operation.
• Hardwired transfer trips will not be propagated to
other IEDs because no contacts will be closed in the H. Testing the Bay Controller Function
IEDs under test. It is common for the bay controller to be used only for the
• Digital transfer trips, sent through GOOSE messages local and remote control of the IED bay and not as a protective
by the 21L/67L relays, will be discarded by any device, meaning it does not trip the breaker directly. Due to this,
subscribing IEDs that are not set to the same the IED may only be tested using the controls from SCADA or
Mode/Behavior as the 21L/67L relays. from a local HMI in the substation.
• Any digital transfer trips sent over proprietary To test the bay controller relay, the IED is set to
protocols by the 21L/67L relays will be processed by Mode/Behavior = Test/Blocked. All remaining IEDs in the
the receiving IEDs, but no physical contact will be scheme (87L, 21L/67L, and the 50BF) are unchanged
closed, preventing the trip of field breakers. (Mod.stVal/Beh.stVal = On). One must consider whether the
bay controller receiving the status of breakers, disconnect
After the end of the test, 21L/67L relays at both ends will set
switches or any other interlocks via GOOSE messages. If so, all
Mod.stVal/Beh.stVal = On, returning to normal operation.
publishing IEDs servicing the bay controller will be set to the
same Test/Blocked Mode/Behavior.
 11

With the Mode/Behavior of the bay controller and any • As the IEC committees change both the Behavior of
auxiliary relays set to Test/Blocked, no output contacts will be IEDs and the processing of GOOSE messages with
closed in these relays, meaning the control testing routines can each revision [15], best practices suggest the proper
be started. Any closing or opening signals of breakers or design of GOOSE-assisted protection that includes the
disconnect switches (via MMS, over an open communication use of test switches to guarantee the safety of
protocol, over a proprietary communication channel or personnel and devices in the substation.
protocol, or via GOOSE messages) will be processed, but no • The example provided here (the Section VII example
output contacts will be closed. Without the bay controller relays of transmission line testing) will only work in
closing the output contacts, no hardwired closing or opening protection schemes that use primary and backup
signals will be physically issued. This physical and digital protection. If one were to use this feature in protection
isolation will prevent the bay controller relays and other IEDs schemes with no backup protection, it would become a
from opening or closing the breakers or disconnect switches. true hazard risk. One IED must not be in a blocked
Setting the bay controller relay’s Mode/Behavior to mode because it must be able to operate contacts that
Test/Blocked, the following results are achieved: protect the line. This is an issue because the setup will
• Transfer commands sent over a proprietary have only one end set to Mode/Behavior =
communications channel or protocol will be received Test/Blocked while the other end remaining set in
and processed, but no physical contacts will be closed. Mode/Behavior = On. The end being tested will keep
• Digital transfer controls sent by the bay controller transmitting transfer trips over the communication
relay through GOOSE messages will be discarded by channel, which will be processed by end units not
the subscribing IEDs that are not set to the same blocking their output contacts, resulting in an
Mode/Behavior as the bay controller relay. undesired breaker trip.
After the end of the test, the bay controller relay will be set These types of scenarios are not addressed in the standard
to Mode/Behavior = On. This returns the relays to normal but describe actual problems with current power systems.
operation. Understanding these shortcomings then falls to the end users,
who, if they fail in that understanding, will then spend large
VIII. WARNINGS, CAVEATS, INCONVENIENCES, HAZARDS amounts of time and money on IEC 61850 Edition 2, only to
Unfortunately, Edition 2 of the IEC 61850 standard does not discover it does not meet all their real-world needs.
consider that installed IEDs and substations use other
communication protocols, both proprietary and open. Several IX. CONCLUSION
issues that arise from this omission have not been addressed. Only through reducing its complexity will the IEC 61850
• The standard does not address how IEDs whose standard have the possibility of becoming a powerful tool for
Mode/Behavior is not Blocked or Test/Blocked would testing in-service devices. Until that time, this paper offers a
behave or operate when receiving a trip signal over few practical scenarios to using the standard. Even with the use
other protocols from an IEC 61850 IED under test. cases outlined, this paper shows that there are rarely perfect
• The standard does not address how IEDs might environments for in-system testing. Systems will likely have
behave when receiving commands from other multiple protocols controlling and reporting statuses. These
protocols. protocols are developed even while those creating it cannot
• Simulated GOOSE messages may direct data to know every situation that every engineer and substation will
functions that are not being tested. face, meaning that only those most commonly reported are
• Devices may lose their isolation settings, whether considered. IEC 61850 does refer to other automation
from the IED losing power or being power-cycled protocols, but it does not define how to fully test a real-world
during testing, and misoperate if the Mode/Behavior is system. This paper has endeavored to help outline practical and
not saved. useful solutions and has addressed some of the areas the
• Incorrectly setting the sequence of isolation may lead IEC 61850 standard does not cover.
to unintended operation.
• Even if the Sim feature is standardized across X. ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Edition 1 and Edition 2, there may still exist a The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of
possibility that manufacturers had implemented this Veselin Skendzic, Amandeep Kalra, Hamza Abubakari,
feature in a manner unlike what the standard Jose Lemus, Rebecca Dong, and Jaya Yellajosula and their help
prescribes. Due to this, users must consider how each on this document.
installed IED will behave before proceeding to live
testing.
 12

XI. REFERENCES XII. BIOGRAPHIES

[1] IEC 61850-7-2, Communication Networks and Systems in Substations, Edson Hernández received his BS degree in Electronic Engineering from the
Section 15: Generic Substation Event Class Model (GSE), Table 29, Instituto Tecnólogico de San Luis Potosí, Mexico in 2006. That same year, he
2003. served as an associate technician to the Instituto Potosino de Investigación
[2] IEC 61850-7-4, Communication Networks and Systems in Substations, Científica y Tecnológica (IPICyT) in the automation of laboratory processes
Section 6: Data Name Semantics, Table 9, 2003. and in the research and development of nanotechnology-based devices for the
IPICyT Advanced Materials Division. In 2008, he joined Schweitzer
[3] IEC 61850-9-2, Communication Networks and Systems for Power Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (SEL) as an integration and automation
Utility Automation, Section 5.3.3.4.4: Reserved 1, 2011. engineer. Since then, he has designed, applied, and supported integration,
[4] IEC 61850-7-1, Communication Networks and Systems for Power automation, control, communications and network products for utilities around
Utility Automation, Section 7.8.4: Test Mode, 2011. the world. He is currently a lead integration and automation engineer in SEL
[5] H. Pandzic, A. J. Conejo, I. Kuzle, and E. Caro, “Yearly Maintenance research and development, working in device integration, control and
Scheduling of Transmission Lines Within a Market Environment,” IEEE automation, communications protocols, secure communications, and
Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 27, Issue 1, February 2012, cybersecurity.
pp. 407–415.
[6] IEC 61850-7-2, Communication Networks and Systems for Power Tovah Whitesell received her first three bachelor’s degrees from the
University of Washington in 2003, her master’s degree from Washington State
Utility Automation, Section 18.2.3.1: GOOSE Message Syntax
University in 2005, and her latest bachelor’s degree from Washington State
Table 43: GOOSE Message Definition, 2010.
University in 2014. She joined Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. in
[7] IEC 61850-7-1, Communication Networks and Systems for Power 2012 as a software engineer. Mrs. Whitesell is currently an engineering
Utility Automation, Section 7.8.2: Multicast Signals Used for manager with the protection systems division helping develop automation
Simulation, 2011. solutions.
[8] Washington Administrative Code, WAC 296-45-335, Deenergizing
Lines and Equipment for Employee Protection, 2019. Karen Leggett Wyszczelski received her BS in Computer Systems
[9] IEEE Standard C37.233, IEEE Guide for Power System Protection Engineering Technology from the Oregon Institute of Technology in 1986. She
Testing, 2009. worked at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation and at an industrial integration
company before becoming a SCADA engineer at Grays Harbor PUD in
[10] Comisión Federal de Electricidad, Sistema de Automatización de
Washington state. She joined Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (SEL)
Subestaciones IEC 61850, Revisión 2 [Substation Automation System
in 2008 as an integration and automation engineer. She completed a master’s
IEC 61850, Revision 2], 2018. degree in engineering management from Eastern Michigan University in 2019
[11] V. M. Flores, D. Espinosa, J. Alzate, and D. Dolezilek, “Case Study: and is currently an engineering manager in research and development at SEL.
Design and Implementation of IEC 61850 From Multiple Vendors at
CFE La Venta II,” proceedings of the 60th Annual Conference for
Protective Relay Engineers, College Station, TX, March 2007.
[12] T. Tibbals and D. Dolezilek, “Case Study: New Testing and Verification
Practices for Virtual Wiring Among IEDs Via Ethernet
Communications,” proceedings of the 1st Annual Protection,
Automation and Control World Conference, Dublin, Ireland, June 2010.
[13] D. Burkart, W. Edwards, A. Atalay, and S. Snuggs, “If You Cannot Test
It, You Cannot Use It – IEC 61850 GOOSE System Designed With
Testing in Mind,” proceedings of the 70th Annual Conference for
Protective Relay Engineers, College Station, TX, April 2017.
[14] N. Moreno, M. Flores, L. Torres, J. Juárez, and D. González, “Case
Study: IEC 61850 as Automation Standard for New Substations at CFE,
Practical Experiences,” proceedings of the 12th Annual Western Power
Delivery Automation Conference, Spokane, WA, April 2010.
[15] IEC 61850-7-4, Communication Networks and Systems for Power
Utility Automation, Annex A, Table A.2, 2010.
[16] IEC 61850-8-1, Communication Networks and Systems for Power
Utility Automation, Section 8.2: Mapping of Quality Common Data
Attribute Type Specified in IEC 61850-7-3, Table 33, 2011.
[17] IEC 61850-6, Communication Networks and Systems for Power Utility
Automation, Annex B, 2012.

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