PROCESS SAFETY

Prepared by:
Dev Vithlani
CONTENTS

ØWhat is process safety

ØProcess safety fundamentals

ØHazard identification

ØFire explosion prevention

ØPressure control

ØReaction control

ØTemprature control

ØAccident investigation
WHAT IS PROCESS SAFETY

ØProcess Safety is a disciplined framework for managing the integrity of

operating systems and processes handling hazardous substances by
applying good design principles, engineering, and operating practices.

Ø It deals with the prevention and control of incidents that have the
potential to release hazardous materials or energy. Such incidents can cause
toxic effects, fire, or explosion and could ultimately result in serious injuries,
property damage, lost production, and environmental impact.
WHAT IS PROCESS SAFETY

ØAlthough power plant industry doesn't handle hazardous chemicals as much as

chemical, petrochemical or refining industry, it has the same equipments which
can be the source of similar accidents such as:

§Boilers

§Tanks

§Cooling towers

§Reactors Etc.
WHAT IS PROCESS SAFETY

vProcess Safety Information:

ØTo be assesed in process hazard analysis and management of change, following information
should be considerd:

üProcess and instrumentation diagrams (P&|),Block or simplified diagrams of the process flow
diagrams.

üDiagrams of electrical installations.

üA list of critical components.

üMass and energy balances.

üAcceptable upper and lower limits for variables and any deviations fromvariables.

üThe classification of electrical areas.

WHAT IS PROCESS SAFETY

üA safety data sheet of the substances.

ü Design and layout relief and ventilation systems.
ü Specifications for pipes and equipment.
ü A description of the interlock and shutdown systems.
ü A safety data sheet of the substances.
ü The classification of electrical areas.
ü Design and layout relief and ventilation systems.
ü Specifications for pipes and equipment.
ü A description of the interlock and shutdown systems.
PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMETALS

ØProcess safety is absolutely critical in the chemical process industry. At an

industrial scale, processes yield more product, but also have inherent risk. There is
a risk that the process can become unsafe and become uncontainable. Depending
on the process, there may be different safety measures in place to minimize the
risk and danger associated with that process.

v Occupational Hazard Control:

ØThe goal of occupational hazard controls is to provide protection to workers at

every level against hazards and injury. The standard hierarchy of hazard controls
established by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health is
applicable to every industry.
PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMETALS

ØA brief overview of controls at each level follows This chart is designed to be read from the top
down, in which higher-level controls are more effective and recommended over lower-level one.
PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMETALS

vElimination:

Elimination is the process of removing a hazard from a system. For example, leaving flammable
substances in the open is a safety risk. Instead, they should be properly stored in the appropriate
flammable container. Inherently safer design is a popular strategy based on the premise that
something cannot pose a hazard if it’s not present in a system.

vSubstitution:

Risky behavior or process can be replaced by one that results in less risk. A caustic or flammable
chemical in a process could present a safety risk. A less hazardous chemical that is capable of
accomplishing the desired task should be considered over one that is more hazardous.
PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMETALS

vAdministrative Controls:

Administrators have the power to change workplace procedures if they pose a risk. Implementing
an extensive maintenance and safety training program can help increase employee awareness of
risky behavior and ensure that all equipment is handled with care. It is also important to follow
and promote governmental regulations and safety.

vPersonal Protective Equipment (PPE):

Personal protective equipment is required whenever a hazard is present and otherwise

unavoidable. It is the last line of defense and shouldn’t be considered as a replacement for
removing the hazard by the methods above Laboratory coats, safety glasses, and gloves are
common PPE in a laboratory environment. Hearing protection, such as earplugs or earmuffs, is
required in plants where noise levels are typically over 85 decibels, the threshold at which hearing
damage can occur with chronic exposure.
PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMETALS

vRegulatory Symbols and Documentation:

ØThe physical and chemical properties of materials used in industry are carefully documented to
inform and ensure the safety of workers who handle them. Common forms of documentation
include safety data sheets and regulatory labeling.

ØThe OSHA Hazard Communication Standard (HazCom) contains the following requirements:
“Employers that ‘use’ hazardous chemicals must have a program to ensure the [safety] information is
provided to exposed employees. ‘Use’ means to package, handle, react, or transfer.” The Hazard
Communication Standard is designed to inform and protect any worker who will potentially be
exposed to harmful chemicals.

ØRegulatory labels are designed to meet the requirements outlined in the HazCom standard. The
information contained in a regulatory label provides quick, at-a-glance overviews of what types of
hazards a material could present. Employee safety programs are implemented to meet this standard.
Some of the most popular labels used to comply with the hazard communication standard are the
NFPA ; Hazardous Materials Identification System (HMIS), and the Global Harmonized System (GHS).
PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMETALS

vNFPA standard:

ØThe NFPA is a standard designed by the National Fire Protection Association for first responders
to understand the severity of hazards presented by chemicals. Regardless, it has become a popular
general-purpose safety label. The NFPA standard defines the “Fire Diamond,” used ubiquitously in
the U.S. industry to denote the risk factors of a substance. It appears on various containers as a
large diamond subdivided into four smaller, colored diamonds, as shown below.
PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMETALS

ØThough the NFPA standard was originally designed for first responders to understand the
severity of hazard a material presents, many industries have adopted the symbol as part of
employee safety programs.

ØThe top three regions each contain a number from 0 to 4, with higher numbers denoting higher
levels of risk. The blue region denotes health risks, red indicates a substance’s flashpoint, and
yellow denotes how suddenly or violently a substance may react, indicating a potential explosion
hazard.

ØDifferent symbols may appear in the white region to denote a substance’s special hazards.
Officially defined in the NFPA standard are the symbols “OX,” which denotes a substance as an
oxidizer, “SA” to indicate simple asphyxiants, and “ W ” to denote that the substance is reactive
with water.

Ø Other symbols may appear in this area to denote other hazards. This information can be critical
to firefighters and other first responders.
PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMETALS

ØThe following table denotes the meaning of various NFPA hazard levels:
PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMETALS

vHazardous Materials Identification System (HMIS)

ØThe Hazardous Materials Identification System (HMIS) is another label used to denote the
hazards of chemicals. Like the NFPA , HMIS ranks each category 0-4, where 4 is the most severe.
The health and flammability ratings share nearly identical definitions with NFPA . However, the
orange physical hazard category is distinct from the analogous instability category in NFPA.
PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMETALS

vGlobal Harmonized System (GHS)

ØStarting in 2012, OSHA mandated the use of GHS labels on containers used for transportation.
In 2015, this standard was further expanded to include applicable labels on all containers which
may expose workers. Unlike the systems mentioned previously, GHS does not directly denote the
severity of a hazard. The regulatory symbols shown below denote the presence of explosives,
flammable material, oxidizers, and compressed gas respectively.
PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMETALS

ØShown below are the variations used internationally for the transportation of hazardous goods.
These are given a color background and a distinct label to enhance visibility from a distance.
Additionally, a number is used to indicate the category and subcategory of hazard. The transport
pictograms are more descriptive than general pictograms in that each of the above classes in GHS
pictograms is broken down into further subclasses, each with its own distinct label.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

ØHazards are everywhere. Unfortunately, a hazard is not always identified until an

accident occurs. It is essential to identify the hazards and reduce the risk well in
advance of an accident.

ØThe hazard identification methods described in include the following.

1. Process hazards checklists: This is a list of items and possible problems in the
process that must be checked.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

2. Hazards surveys: This can be as simple as an inventory of hazardous materials,

or it can be as detailed as the Dow indexes. The Dow indexes are a formal rating
system, much like an income tax form, that provide penalties for hazards and
credits for safety equipment and procedures.

3. Hazards and operability (HAZOP) studies: This approach allows the mind to
go free in a controlled environment. Various events are suggested for a specific
piece of equipment with the participants determining whether and how the event
could occur and whether the event creates any form of risk.

4. Safety review: An effective but less formal type of HAZOP study. The results
are highly dependent on the experience and synergism of the group reviewing
the process.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

vprocess hazards checklist:

ØA process hazards checklist is simply a list of possible problems and areas to be checked. The list
reminds the reviewer or operator of the potential problem areas. A checklist can be used during
the design of a process to identify design hazards, or it can be used before process operation.

ØThis checklist might contain the following items: Check oil in engine.

üCheck air pressure in tires.

üCheck fluid level in radiator.

üCheck air filter.

ü Check fluid level in windshield washer tank.

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

üCheck headlights and taillights. Check exhaust system for leaks.

üCheck fluid levels in brake system.

ü Check gasoline level in tank.

üChecklists should be applied only during the preliminary stages of hazard identification and
should not be used as a replacement for a more complete hazard identification procedure.
Checklists are most effective in identifying hazards arising from process design, plant layout,
storage of chemicals, electrical systems, and so forth.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

vChecklist for Hazards surveys:

General layout Buildings

üAreas properly drained üFire doors required
ü Emergency accesses and exits üHead obstructions marked
üSafe storage space for raw materials and üAdequate ladders, stairways and escape ways
finished products

üAdequate platforms for safe maintenance üNeed for ladder or stairway to roof
operations

üClearance for overhead power lines üSafety glass specified where necessary
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

Process Piping

üUnstable materials properly stored üSafety showers and eye baths required

üChemistry of processes completely understood and üAll overflow lines directed to safe areas
reviewed

üSpecial fume or dust hoods required üEmergency valves readily accessible

üHazardous reactions possible due to mistakes or üProvisions for thermal expansion

contamination

üProcess diagrams correct and up-to-date üHot steam lines insulated

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

Equipment Instrument & Electrical

üEmergency standby equipment needed üElectrical failures cause unsafe conditions

üSchedule for checking protective devices üSpecial interlocks needed for safe operation

üGuards for belts, pulleys, sheaves and gears üEmergency standby power on lighting equipment
required

üDesigns correct for maximum operating pressure üEmergency disconnect switches properly marked

üAutomatic lubrication of critical machinery? üLabels for all start-stop switches

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

Safety Equipment Raw Materials

Fire extinguishers required Proper containers being used

Flammable vapor detection apparatus required Any materials and products require special
handling equipment

Fire extinguishing materials compatible with Any raw materials and products affected by
process materials extreme weather conditions

Special emergency procedures and alarms Special instructions needed for containers
required
Diking material required Containers properly labelled for toxicity,
flammability, stability, etc
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

vHazards and Operability Studies:

ØThe HAZOP study is a formal procedure to identify hazards in a chemical process facility. The
procedure is effective in identifying hazards and is well accepted by the chemical industry.

ØThe HAZOP procedure uses the following steps to complete an analysis:

üBegin with a detailed flow sheet. Break the flow sheet into a number of process units. Thus the
reactor area might be one unit, and the storage tank another. Select a unit for study

üChoose a study node (vessel, line, operating instruction).

ü Describe the design intent of the study node. For example, vessel V-1 is designed to store the
benzene feedstock and provide it on demand to the reactor.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

üPick a process parameter: flow, level, temperature, pressure, concentration, pH, viscosity, state
(solid, liquid, or gas), agitation, volume, reaction, sample, component, start, stop, stability, power,
inert.

üApply a guide word to the process parameter to suggest possible deviations.

ü If the deviation is applicable, determine possible causes and note any protective systems.

üEvaluate the consequences of the deviation (if any).

üRecommend action (what? by whom? by when?)

ü Record all information.

FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION

Ø The fire triangle, a symbol used in industry to

depict fire risk factors. The sides of the triangle
represent the three components necessary for a
fire. The central region depicts the combustion
reaction, a chain reaction that is self-sustaining
as long as the three components are present. If
any element of the fire triangle is removed,
combustion will be unable to start or persist.
Fire and explosion prevention methods are
designed to make sure these three components
do not interact.
FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION

vFuel

ØFuel is the species that is oxidized during combustion. It can be found in the solid, liquid, or gas
phases. For most fires, the fuel source will be organic matter, but many metals, such as magnesium,
can also be fuel. A vaporized fuel can only ignite within a certain range of concentrations, defined
by the lower and upper flammability limits. Flammability limits occur near the stoichiometric ratio
for the combustion reaction but are also affected by factors including temperature, pressure, and
the concentration of inert gases. One way to lower the concentration of vaporous fuel is through
ventilation.

vVentilating to control fuel concentrations

ØVentilation is the process of introducing air to a system from another source to improve air
quality and prevent the formation of localized flammable atmospheres. Ventilation can be used to
remove flammable fuels present as dust and gas from a system or dilute them until they are no
longer flammable. Ventilation is normally only required in indoor plants, as the lack of confinement
in outdoor plants prevents the buildup of flammable dust and gas.
FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION

ØFume hoods are an example of local exhaust ventilation, as shown in the schematic below. Two
types of hoods are typically used to capture fumes in a local exhaust ventilation system. Slot
exhaust hoods pull gases through narrow slots away from the operator through a duct in the
back. Enclosed hoods are installed over an area of hazardous chemicals and pull gas through
ducts away from the plant using slightly negative pressure. Enclosed hoods require less energy
than slot exhaust hoods and are preferable where they can be installed.
FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION

vOxidizer

ØWhen reaction conditions are met, oxidizers strip electrons from the fuel, resulting in
combustion. Oxidizers are typically highly electronegative and can be solids, liquids, or gases.
Oxygen, the most ubiquitous oxidizer, is particularly problematic in industry since it is present in
reactive concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere.

vInerting to control oxygen concentration

ØInerting involves replacing an oxygen-rich atmosphere in a vessel with an inert gas, typically
nitrogen or argon, to reduce the oxygen concentration well below the limiting oxygen
concentration (LOC). Below the LOC, the chemical chain reaction responsible for combustion
becomes impossible to sustain, and no reaction will occur.
FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION
ØCommon inerting techniques include vacuum, pressure, sweep-through, and siphon purging.

vVacuum Purging

ØVacuum purging removes as much gas from a system as possible, then refills the vessel with inert
gas. Many reactors are designed to handle vacuum pressures. In especially oxygen-sensitive
applications, pressure may be repeatedly cycled until oxygen concentrations on the order of parts
per million are achieved. Vacuum purging is the preferred method in industry because it requires
the lowest quantity of inert gas out of all inerting methods.

vPressure Purging

ØPressure purging is the opposite of vacuum purging and is often used in storage vessels or other
containers that cannot handle low pressures but can withstand high pressures. This process
involves pressurizing a vessel with inert gas to lower the concentration of oxygen within the vessel.
The vessel is then vented to system pressure, decreasing the number of moles of oxygen within the
vessel. Pressure purging uses more inert gas than vacuum purging but is compatible with most
vessels.
 FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION
vSweep-through Purging

ØSweep-through purging is the process of simultaneously removing gas from and adding inert gas to the
vessel in equal quantities, which lowers the concentration of oxygen within a vessel without changing the
vessel’s overall pressure. This technique is common when a vessel’s pressure tolerance has not been rated or
a constant-pressure process is desired. Sweep-through purging can be done while maintaining a steady
state in the vessel. However, because inert gas is simultaneously added and removed from the vessel, much
more of the inert species is required. Another disadvantage to this technique is that the flow path of inert
gas within the vessel must be considered to ensure there are no pockets with dangerous oxygen
concentrations.

vSiphon Purging

ØSiphon purging is a variation of sweep-through purging meant to decrease the amount of inert gas
required by using liquids to remove oxygen. The vessel is filled with a liquid such as water, then drained
while an inert gas is added. The liquid displaces or absorbs oxygen from the vessel, and is in turn displaced
by the inert gas. If siphon purging can be used, it may prove to be significantly less expensive than
traditional sweep-through purging since it greatly decreases the amount of inert gas required.
FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION

ØThe advantages and disadvantages of the four types of purging discussed in this article are
summarized below:
FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION

vFire Suppression

ØVarious equipment and automatic systems are available to mitigate the devastating effects of a fire even
after ignition.

vFire Blankets

Fire blankets can be thrown on top of small fires or wrapped around an individual to smother a fire.
Smothering will deprive the fire of oxygen, causing the fire triangle to break and the fire to extinguish. Fire
blankets are made of flame retardant material, often wool or Kevlar, and coated in a fire-resistant chemical. Fire
blankets will typically be located along the wall of a building in a red bag, canister, or cabinet.

vFire Extinguishers

Fire extinguishers dispense a chemical designed to isolate the components of the fire triangle. Fire
extinguishers should only be used by properly trained individuals when they will not cause harm to another
individual and when multiple routes to escape the fire exist. Extinguishers come in multiple types which must
be matched to the type of fire, otherwise, the extinguisher may be ineffective or even exacerbate the fire.
 FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION
ØThe different classes of fires are described below:
FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION

ØFire extinguishers should not be used in the event that the class of fire cannot be readily
determined or it is suspected that the fire may be of multiple classes that the extinguisher does
not fully encompass. For example, a gasoline fire that ignites wood is considered both class B and
A and cannot be suppressed by a class A or B extinguisher, but can be by the multi-class ABC
extinguisher.

ØThe ABC extinguisher is the most common type of fire extinguisher used today. The designation
ABC means that the dry chemical agent is capable of extinguishing fires of class A, B, C, or any
combination of the three. ABC dry chemical is effective against class A and B fires because it does
not burn and can form a layer on the surface of materials to isolate them from oxygen. The dry
chemical is also electrically insulating and can disrupt the flow of current in a class C fire in
addition to the previously listed effects. However, ABC fire extinguishers also have a unique
limitation: they contain a chemical that may potentially explode or form harmful gases when
exposed to oxidizers other than oxygen
FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION

vDust Explosion Risk Factors and How to

Control Them:

ØThe risk of dust explosions is an important safety

consideration in various chemical engineering
processes. Dust explosions usually result in
secondary explosions due to forces acting on
excess confined dust that is stirred up from the
initial explosion. Keeping all areas completely clean
of dust and debris will help prevent this from
happening.
FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION

ØSolid fuel sources are only capable of combustion at the surface, where they are directly
exposed to oxidizers. Dust is especially dangerous due to its extremely high surface area
to volume ratio and therefore combusts rapidly. For a given spherical volume of solid
fuel, dividing it into 1,000 particles will increase its surface area by more than an order of
magnitude. Because of this high surface area, dust can be compared to gases in terms of
their combustive properties. Additionally, dust particles are less predictable than gases
due to their non-uniform shapes, larger particle size, and the effects of gravity.

ØA dust’s surface area also makes transportation challenges, as static charge can build
up rapidly and create a potential ignition source. Since a chemical explosion can be
caused by rapid combustion, dust is a major explosion risk factor in the industry,
especially where particulate organic matter is handled, such as with sawdust, coal dust, or
sugar.
FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION

ØIn addition to the risk factors in the fire triangle, two more elements, dispersion,
and confinement, are required for dust explosions. These five elements are
represented in the pentagon. As before, removing any one side of the dust
explosion pentagon will prevent a dust explosion from occurring.
FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION

vCase Study- 2008 Imperial Sugar Dust Explosion:

ØOn February 7, 2008, an explosion occurred in a tunnel beneath a silo at an Imperial Sugar
refinery in Port Wentworth, Georgia. The explosion ignited spilled sugar throughout the facility,
causing secondary explosions that killed 14 workers and injured 36 more.
FIRE EXPLOSION PREVENTION

ØPrior to the incident, Imperial Sugar staff had built an enclosure around a conveyor belt to
mitigate sugar spillage but neglected to include a dust collection system. Over time, airborne
sugar concentrations reached hazardous levels in the enclosure. Though the exact cause is not
fully understood, it is believed that an overheated bearing was the ignition source that ignited the
sugar. Although sugar is typically not considered a fire risk, it can flash at temperatures above 375
°C. With the dispersed sugar dust confined within the enclosure, all five elements of a dust
explosion – fuel, oxidizer, dispersion, confinement, and ignition source – were present. The
explosion propagated across several buildings in the facility due to the significant quantities of
spilled sugar that accumulated on various surfaces over the years.

ØThe explosion could have been greatly mitigated or prevented by installing proper dust
collection systems and implementing stricter industrial hygiene standards. This disaster prompted
the Chemical Safety Board to make recommendations to OSHA regarding stricter explosive dust
regulation. In 2009, OSHA began implementing these regulations.
PRESSURE CONTROL

ØPressure control is crucial to any process so that machinery does not rupture or break, as well as
preventing harm to any employees. Pressure affects temperature and when left unregulated can lead to
numerous disastrous consequences. It is essential that pressure is monitored, and that when pressure
exceeds the process pressure range there is a relief system in place to mitigate it. There are many relief
mechanisms to regulate pressure, the most common being rupture discs and valves. These mechanisms,
coupled with controls, can help mitigate the risks of high pressure in a process.

ØPressure control systems are put into place to keep the operating pressures of all equipment below
the maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP). If the MAWP is ever exceeded, pressure relief
devices relieve pressure and prevent equipment failure. A pressure control system acts on a signal that
is sent from a pressure sensor to a pressure controller. After some control calculations based on
comparing the desired setpoint pressure to the actual pressure in the equipment, the controller sends a
control signal to the pressure control element, which is typically a control valve. The valve opening then
changes so that the pressure can better match the setpoint pressure. If this control system were to ever
fail, relief devices lower the system pressure. When control or relief valves allow liquids or gases to exit
process equipment to maintain a safe operating pressure, this fluid is sent to secondary containment
equipment.
PRESSURE CONTROL

vOverpressure Risk Factors:

ØOverpressure in process equipment can damage equipment, cause explosions, and injure
workers. Risks include runaway reactions, blocked relief paths for process fluid, equipment failure,
and excessive heat input. Any situation in which the temperature rapidly increases or the volume
of fluid rapidly increases has the potential for overpressure. Runaway reactions can both lead to
rapid volume increases and temperature increases in an exothermic reaction. A blocked relief path
or exit stream can rapidly increase the pressure in a system as the volume of fluid builds. Process
lines also pose a risk as a blocked line can be heated by ambient temperature or sunlight. There
are many ways in which equipment failure can result in overpressure. For example, blocked pumps
can heat up process fluid circulating within them. If a valve that supplies fluid to a process fails,
excess fluid can rapidly enter the equipment, increasing the pressure. Equipment can also receive
excessive heat input in a variety of ways, such as systems being heated for too long, the jacket
fluid being too hot, or accidental exposure to sunlight or flames.
PRESSURE CONTROL

vPressure Control Equipment

vSensor-Transmitters:

ØSensor-transmitters measure the pressure in the system and send signals to the controller. The
pressure sensor element is usually a diaphragm or membrane with differing pressures on either
side of it. The pressure difference results in a deflection that is proportional to the difference and
produces an output signal. The transmitter element translates the displacement in the diaphragm
to an electric or pneumatic signal that the controller will understand. Other kinds of pressure
sensors include piezo devices, capacitors, and potentiometers.
PRESSURE CONTROL

vControl Valves

ØThe final control element in a pressure control loop

is a control valve, which operates by restricting or
permitting the flow of the fluid in a process. An
actuator controls the valve based on the signal it
receives from a controller. Pneumatic actuators are
quite common because they are simpler than electrical
or hydraulic actuators. They work by using pressurized
air to regulate the valve opening. In a pneumatic
actuator, pressure is applied to a diaphragm whose
position is determined by an actuator spring on the
other side. When the force applied is greater than that
of the spring, the attached valve plug will lift from the
valve seat and allow more fluid to pass, decreasing the
pressure.
PRESSURE CONTROL

Øcontrol valves are designed to fail in the completely shut or completely open position,
depending on the process. For example, if the valve were handling wastewater being sent to a
river, the desired fail position would be closed, because if it remained open it would send
contaminated water into the river.

vPressure Relief Equipment

ØPressure relief systems are used in high-pressure systems as a backup, should the pressure
control system fail. These systems open at a preset pressure so that excess pressure and the
contents causing that excess pressure can be relieved from a process. It is also important to have
redundancies in a pressure relief system so that failure of any individual piece of equipment does
not compromise the safety of the process. Without pressure relief equipment, a failure in pressure
control equipment could lead to equipment or pipeline failures, potentially causing an explosion
or releasing toxic and flammable substances into the surroundings. The main types of relief
devices are spring-operated valves and rupture discs.
PRESSURE CONTROL

vSpring-operated Valves

ØThe three main types of spring-operated valves

are relief valves, safety valves, and safety relief
valves. These spring-operated valves are used for
the relief of liquid, gas, and liquid and gas
respectively. Safety relief valves function as either
relief or safety valves depending on the phase of
the fluid present in the process. Spring-operated
valves open once the operating pressure exceeds
the set pressure of the valve and close once the
pressure approaches the set pressure again.
PRESSURE CONTROL

ØAn important aspect of relief device design is the sizing of the equipment. Equipment must be
large enough to accommodate possible high-pressure situations, but not so large that other
issues can occur. In the case of spring-operated relief valves, chatter is common when the relief
area is too large. This occurs when pressure increases and the valve relieves pressure so quickly
that it closes again in a short amount of time. If the root of the increasing pressure has not been
resolved, the relief device will open and close rapidly, causing damage to it.
PRESSURE CONTROL

vRupture Discs

Ø Rupture discs are designed to

burst open at a pressure that is
specified by the material properties
and construction of the disc. They
enhance process safety by relieving
fluids, thus lowering operating
pressure, and protecting other
equipment from corrosive and toxic
chemicals.
PRESSURE CONTROL

ØThey can also be used to inform process personnel of the pressure at the site of rupture
when used in combination with embedded wires that activate alarms when broken or
with a pressure gauge. They can be used by themselves or in combination with other
forms of pressure relief. If the relief line is meant to remain open once the pressure disc
ruptures, a pressure disc can be used by itself. If the relief line needs to close once the
pressure has been relieved, a ruptured disc can be used in combination with other forms
of pressure relief, and the disc can then be replaced after it bursts. When placed in series
with other pressure relief equipment, the goal is to decrease the exposure of relief
devices to a corrosive substance, and also to isolate toxic or flammable materials. Rupture
discs are commonly used first in series with spring-operated devices, as discs are
generally cheaper and limit the contact between a potentially damaging environment
and the spring-operated devices.
PRESSURE CONTROL

vCase study- 2013 Williams Olefins Equipment Rupture, Fire, and Explosion:

ØIn 2013, a reboiler in a Williams Olefins plant ruptured, causing an explosion and subsequent fire
that lasted for three and a half hours as a result of the ignition of propane and propylene process
fluid. In this incident, two employees were killed and an additional 167 injuries were reported.
PRESSURE CONTROL

ØIn this plant, they had two functional

reboilers that they switched between to
maintain continuous operation. The reboilers
functioned by sending 185°F water into the
tank of the reboiler and partially vaporizing
the propane within the shell of the reboiler.
When one of the reboilers was not
functioning properly, the operations
supervisor opened the quench water valves
on the offline reboiler to begin switching to
the other reboiler. Due to a mistakenly
opened valve or equipment failure, propane
was already within the shell and began to
expand while the exit shell valve was closed.
PRESSURE CONTROL

ØWith nowhere to go, the pressure within the shell quickly increased and the reboiler shell failed.
This case study demonstrates the importance of ensuring an open path to relief devices. If the
relief valve had been opened prior to the quench water valves, it would not have mattered that
propane was already within the shell as it would have had a route through which it could escape
to relieve pressure. An additional pressure relief valve would also have helped, as it could have
relieved pressure once it reached a certain point without the need for human operation.
PRESSURE CONTROL

vCase Study -2008 Goodyear Heat Exchanger Rupture

ØIn 2008, a heat exchanger rupture and ammonia release at a Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company plant killed one employee and injured five others. This incident
happened when an isolation valve placed between the heat exchanger and relief
valve was closed to replace a burst rupture disc. The next day, a block valve
between the heat exchanger and a pressure control valve was closed, and steam
was supplied to the process to clean out the process piping. With no opportunity
to relieve the building pressure as steam was supplied, the heat exchanger
ruptured, killing one worker and exposing five more to the process coolant,
ammonia.
PRESSURE CONTROL

ØThe picture was taken after the heat exchanger

ruptured, showing the damage to the equipment
and surrounding area. This case study
demonstrates the importance of always having an
open path to relief devices, even when
maintenance is being performed. In this case, the
proper relief equipment was in place, but when
maintenance was being performed, the same level
of awareness of pressure buildup was not
demonstrated.
REACTION CONTROL

ØWhile no reactor can achieve zero risk of fire, explosion, or thermal runaway, many process
control methods exist to control pressure, temperature, and other hazards within a reactor.

ØThermal runaway is the primary risk associated with chemical reaction engineering. In
exothermic reactions, the reactor temperature increases due to the heat generated by the
reaction, which is balanced by the heat removed by the cooling system. In addition, the other
species inside the reactor have the capacity to absorb that increase in energy, as dictated by their
specific heat. This will determine the rate at which the temperature change takes place. An
additional caveat is that increasing temperature will in most cases increase the rate of reaction.

ØThermal runaway occurs at the temperature of no return, the temperature at which the heat
generated by the reaction becomes greater than the maximum amount of heat the cooling system
is capable of removing. When a thermal runaway occurs, the temperature and pressure within a
vessel can increase until the point of explosion or until a reactant is exhausted. As such, the
purpose of safe reactor design is to reduce the risk of thermal runaway.
REACTION CONTROL

ØThe risk associated with a reactor is largely determined by the potential for the temperature and
pressure controls to fail. Without pressure and temperature controls, such as vents and cooling
jackets, exothermic reactions could generate heat and pressure within the reactor until the reactor
bursts, which could result in an explosion and/or a fire. Designed layers of protection, such as
cooling jackets, containment pots, and rupture valves can be put in place to prevent disasters.

vTypes of Runaway Reactions

ØA runaway reaction occurs when the pressure and temperature of an exothermic reaction
increase without sufficient control. In an exothermic reaction, the rate of heat release varies
exponentially with temperature while the rate of cooling varies linearly with temperature. As such,
exothermic reactors are typically designed with numerous cooling systems to prevent thermal
runaway, such as ventilation. When a reactor vent is opened, vapor pressure reactions will lose heat
to the atmosphere through vaporization, reducing the temperature and pressure of the reactor.
Gas-phase systems, on the other hand, are composed of non-condensable gases, so their pressure
would not be reduced when the reactor is opened to the atmosphere. Large vents are required to
remove non-condensable gas from a gassy reactor.
REACTION CONTROL

vVapor Pressure Reactions

ØA vapor pressure system is one in which no permanent gas products are generated. The
contents of a vapor pressure reactor will boil (or vaporize) before they decompose into non-
condensable gases, so no non-condensable gases will form. The pressure of the reactor is
determined solely by the vapor pressure of the contents of the reactor. In these situations, a
calorimeter measures the rate of temperature increase between the set pressure and the
maximum pressure determined by the operator. These reactors typically require smaller vents
because the contents of the reactor can be condensed. Because vapor pressure is dependent on
temperature, reducing the pressure of the reactor also reduces its temperature. The size of the
vent is dependent upon the rate of temperature rise at standard operating pressure.
REACTION CONTROL

vGassy Reactions

ØA gassy system is one in which the only source of pressure increase is the generation of non-
condensable gases. The gas generated in these reactions comes from the decomposition of the
reactor contents. The pressure of the reactor is equal to the pressure of the generated gases.
Calorimeters determine the maximum rate of pressure increase from the gases generated, and
vents are sized to reduce the pressure of the reactor by at least that amount. Unlike in vapor
pressure reactions, reducing the pressure of a gassy reaction does not reduce its temperature.
Additional controls are necessary to reduce the temperature of a gassy system.

vHybrid Reactions

Ø Hybrid reactions have significant vapor pressure and also produce non-condensable gases. In
these reactors, some reactor contents decompose before they boil and others do not. The total
pressure in the reactor is the sum of the partial pressure of the gaseous product and the vapor
pressure. Ventilation can reduce both pressure and temperature in a hybrid system; the vent size is
determined by the flashpoint of the reactor contents.
REACTION CONTROL

vCase Study 1: 2007 T2 Laboratories Explosion and Fire

ØIn 2007, an explosion occurred in a 2,500-gallon batch reactor producing methylcyclopentadienyl

manganese tricarbonyl MCMT, a gasoline additive, at T2 Laboratories in Jacksonville, FL. The
resulting explosion killed four T2 workers and injured thirty-two additional individuals.

ØThe explosion occurred due to an inadequate cooling system regulating the temperature of
MCMT production, an exothermic process. The process used in MCMT production involved a batch
reactor with a water cooling jacket, in which water would be pumped into a surrounding vessel and
evaporated off in order to cool the MCMT reaction.

ØThe process had experienced several thermal regulation issues before this event, mainly because
the operation was upscaled from a test reactor several orders of magnitude smaller. Those
implementing the process neglected that the cooling of the reactor would be approximately
proportional to the surface area (length squared) of the cooling jacket, while the rate of exotherm
would increase with the volume of the reaction (length cubed). In essence, the reactor was reliant
on a high degree of manual control because it was not operating at a steady state.
REACTION CONTROL

ØAdditionally, the cooling water had no reserve tanks or backup valves, so a single failure of the
waterline was sufficient to cause a thermal runaway. A rupture disk was set to initialize the pressure relief
system once the reactor pressure passed 400 psig, but the reaction was already uncontrollable before
the system reached this pressure. The runaway reaction increased the pressure in the reactor by an
estimated 32,000 psi per minute, causing an immediate tank rupture and subsequent explosion. Had T2
installed redundancies within its process control system the disaster could have been prevented.
Additionally, testing the reaction in an AR ( Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool) calorimeter would
have informed the plant managers that as temperature and pressure increased, a second, highly
exothermic side reaction occurs.
TEMPRATURE CONTROL

ØTemperature control is very important to the application of process safety since it can prevent
runaway reactions, fires and explosions, and equipment failure. Process temperature is often
monitored by temperature control systems that are in place to achieve and maintain a setpoint
temperature. These control systems are made up of several components that send and receive
signals to one another to adjust the system temperature. When control systems cannot keep
process temperature within safe limits, Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) are used as shown
in Process Safety Fundamentals.

ØThe control system functions through sensor transmitters that record the process temperature
and send a signal to a controller that reflects the error between the measured and setpoint
temperatures. The controller then adjusts the control element to manipulate a key variable that
affects the temperature of the system.
TEMPRATURE CONTROL

ØTo create a safe process, it is essential to monitor the temperature of the process. Depending on
whether the process is heated or cooled, a measurement and control system is put in place to
keep the temperature in an operatable range so that equipment and employees are not hurt or
damaged. Temperature control may look different based on the process, but each temperature
control system is responsible for maintaining proper temperature ranges to ensure the process
and product are at specification. A change in temperature could influence not only the equipment
but thermodynamic properties within the process. This can lead to the degradation of the final
product.
TEMPRATURE CONTROL

vOvertemperature Risk Factors

ØAs can be seen in the case studies above, maintaining the process temperature within an
allowable range is very important to avoid damage to process equipment and harm to employees.
The mechanism for temperature control varies depending on whether the process is heated or
cooled, and the repercussions of failed temperature control can range from a loss of product to
explosions. Risk factors include runaway reactions, excessive heat input, inadequate cooling, and
equipment failure. A misunderstanding of the reaction chemistry, non-attentive operators, and a
broken coolant valve are all examples that could lead to an increase in system temperature. With
proper temperature control, safeguards are in place to counteract any unexpected temperature
changes.
TEMPRATURE CONTROL

vTemperature Control Equipment

vSensor-Transmitters

ØSensor-transmitters measure system properties and

send signals to the controller. The most common form of
the temperature sensor is a thermocouple, seen below.
Thermocouples work by measuring the voltage between
two dissimilar wires which are exposed to the process
stream. Due to the thermoelectric effect, the voltage in
the wires changes with changing temperature, so the
voltage can be used to determine the temperature of the
process. Thermocouples are generally housed in
thermowells, which are metal housing welded to the
inside of process equipment.
TEMPRATURE CONTROL

vControllers

ØThe controller compares the signal sent by the sensor

transmitter to a setpoint temperature and then sends a
signal to the final control element to lower or raise the
system temperature. Within the controller, the signal
received from the transmitter is converted from analog
to digital for the computer to perform calculations,
then back to analog when the control signal is being
sent. There are many types of controllers, including
on/off, proportional, proportional-integral (PI), and
proportional-integral-derivative (PID). Temperature
control loops typically use PID controllers, such as the
one shown below, which analyze the rate at which a
system is moving away from the setpoint pressure to
act more quickly than other types of controllers.
TEMPRATURE CONTROL

vCase Study 2: 2006 Universal Form Clamp Inc. Vapor Cloud Explosion

ØIn 2006, an explosion that resulted from the ignition of a vapor cloud at Universal Form Clamp
Inc. in Bellwood, IL killed one person and injured two.
TEMPRATURE CONTROL

ØAn operator was mixing the flammable combination of heptane and mineral spirits in an open-
top tank when he noticed a dense fog accumulating on the floor near the tank. The tank was
heated using steam valves, and this resulted in the formation of flammable vapor that filled the
room. Unlike the CAI/Arnel manufacturing explosion, this tank had temperature control
equipment and a ventilation system in place. It was determined after the incident that
temperature control elements did not function properly. The thermowell was designed to contain
a thermally conductive fluid that it did not have and it was not properly assembled. This likely led
to an incorrect or delayed temperature reading that led to the tank overheating. The local
ventilation system that was in place was broken at the time of the incident and the building
ventilation system was on the ceiling, so it was too far from the tank to aid in the removal of the
vapor. This incident highlights the importance of proper installation and maintenance of control
equipment. If the control equipment and local ventilation systems had been maintained, the
system likely would not have overheated and the ventilation would have helped remove the
undesired vapor.
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

ØThe investigation of accidents and near misses (that is, close calls) provides opportunities to
learn how to prevent similar events in the future. Accident investigations, including detailed
descriptions and recommendations, are commonly shared within the chemical industry.

vLearning from Accidents:

ØEvery member of an investigation team learns about problems that precipitate accidents. This
new knowledge helps every team member avoid similar situations in the future. If the
investigation is appropriately reported, many other will also benefit.

ØThis concept is also important for reporting minor accidents or near misses. Minor accidents and
near misses are excellent opportunities to obtain "free chances" to prevent larger accidents from
occurring in the future. It is much easier to correct minor problems before serious accidents occur
than to correct them after they are manifested in major losses.
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

ØAccident investigations are designed to enhance learning. The fundamental steps in an investigation
include:

ü Developing a detailed description of the accident

ü Accumulating relevant facts

ü Analyzing the facts and developing potential causes of the accident

ü Studying the system and operating methods relevant to the potential causes of the accident

ü Developing the most likely causes

üDeveloping recommendations to eliminate recurrence of this type of accident

ü using an investigation style that is fact-finding and not faultfinding; faultfinding creates an
environment that is not conducive to learning.
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

vInvestigation Process: