A319/A320/A321

TECHNICAL TRAINING MANUAL

MECHANICS / ELECTRICS & AVIONICS COURSE

27 FLIGHT CONTROLS
 SERVO CONTROL OPERATION MODES
Rudder Servo Control:
1- Active Mode:
When the rudder servo control actuator is in active mode, the actuator moves to the right or to
the left according to the control valve position. The high pressure is connected to the return via
the heating orifice; this fulfills the permanent heating leakage.
2- Damping Mode:
The rudder servo control actuator changes to damping mode, as soon as the hydraulic pressure
supply is cut. When the servo control is depressurized, the spring sets the damping and pressure-
relief valve to the bypass position, and the hydraulic fluid goes from one chamber to the other via
the damping orifice.
3- Jammed Control Valve:
If the control valve jams, the rudder servo control actuator follows the rudder surface movement,
ensured by the other rudder servo controls. Rudder locking or runaway in the event of a servo
control valve jamming is prevented by a spring rod and pressure relief valve arrangement.
Spoiler Servo Control:
1- Active Mode:
In active mode the spoiler servo control actuator is hydraulically supplied. According to the
command signal to the servo valve the spoiler surface will extend or retract. The feedback
transducer Linear Variable Differential Transducer (LVDT) provide(s) the servo loop feedback.
2- Biased Mode:
The servo-control actuator is pressurized. Due to an electrical failure the command signal is lost.
The biased servo valve pressurizes the retraction chamber. The spoiler actuator stays pressurized
and the spoiler remains retracted.
3- Locked Mode:
In locked mode, the hydraulic pressure is lost. The closing valve closes the retraction chamber.
The surface can only be moved towards the retracted position, pushed by aerodynamical forces.
4- Manual Mode:
To be unlocked, the servo control actuator must be depressurized. The maintenance unlocking
device can be engaged thanks to a key equipped with a red flame. This tool cannot be removed
when the servo control is in maintenance mode. Once the maintenance unlocking device is
engaged the spoiler surface can be raised manually for inspection purposes.

Aileron Servo Control:

1- Active Mode:
In the active mode, the solenoid valve is energized by the ELevator Aileron Computer (ELAC). This
enables the HP fluid to flow and to put the mode selector valve in the active position. The two
chambers of the actuator are thus connected to the servo-valve control lines. The servo-control is
then in the active mode. The Linear Variable-Differential Transducer (LVDT) supplies an electrical
signal to the ELAC, which identifies this change of state. The feedback transducer (also called
LVDT) gives the servo-loop feedback.
2- Damping Mode:
In damping mode, the actuator follows the control surface movements. In this configuration, the
solenoid valve is de-energized and the mode selector valve moves under the action of its spring.
The two chambers of the actuator are thus interconnected through the damping orifice. The LVDT
identifies this change of state and transmit it to the ELAC. The fluid reserve allows to hold the
volume of fluid in the actuator chambers:
- if the temperature of the hydraulic fluid changes or,
- if there is a leakage.
The fluid reserve is permanently connected to the return line of the servo-valve.
After replacement of the servo-control, it is necessary to adjust the feedback transducer (LVDT). It
is necessary to get an equal voltage in the secondary winding (electrical zero) when the aileron is
 in neutral position. This is done through an action on the feedback transducer adjustment device
located on the actuator.
All aileron actuators revert to damping mode in case of a double ELAC failure or green and blue
hydraulic low pressure.
Elevator Servo Control:
1- Active Mode:
When the elevator servo control is in the active mode, it is pressurized and both solenoid valves
are de-energized. The servo valve is controlled by one computer at a time.
2- Damping Mode:
In case of a computer failure (e.g. ELAC2 failure), the related solenoid valve is energized by the
other computer and the elevator servo control is in the damping mode as it is the actuator that is
depressurized. This causes the interconnection of the two actuator chambers through the
damping orifice.
3- Re-Centering Mode:
When the elevator servo control is in the re-centering mode, it is pressurized, the solenoid valves
and servo valve are de-energized, the servo valve is centered to the neutral position by its
mechanical input. Due to the centering device, the servo control actuator is maintained
hydraulically in its neutral position.
THS Actuator Operation:
1- Manual Mode:
The THS actuator can be operated manually from the THS trim hand wheels on the center
pedestal in the cockpit. They have priority over the electric trim thanks to the override
mechanism.
2- Electric Mode:
Normally the THS actuator is operated by one electrical trim motor through an EFCS computer.
Feedback is given to the THS trim hand wheels in the cockpit.
3- Jamming Mode:
If one control valve or its driving mechanism is jammed the hydraulic supply of both hydraulic
motors is cut by the Shut-Off Valve (SOV) control device in each valve block, the comparator
piston operates both SOVs. The SOV can not detect a jamming. Both POBs are applied and the
THS is immobilized and locked.

Yaw Damper Servo Actuator:

1- Active Mode:
The actuator is in active mode when both solenoid valves are energized;, the hydraulic pressure
and the servo valve are available. The two selector valves are connected to the servovalve outputs
and allow the servo actuator to operate in active mode. In this case the pressure switch is not
activated. The feedback transducer of the Linear Variable Differential Transducer (LVDT) type ,
supplies the servo loop feedback informa5on to the Flight Augmenta5on Computers (FACs). FAC 1
controls and monitors the green servo actuator and FAC 2 the yellow one. Only one yaw damper
at a time is in active mode, the other one is in a by-pass mode.
2- By-pass Mode:
The two-solenoid valves are de-energized and the associated selector valves are set to the bypass
mode under the action of their spring. The two-piston chambers are, in this case, interconnected.
The pressure switch is not activated.
In case of a single electrical failure causing one selector valve to be in bypass mode, the other
being in active mode, the result lies in the interconnection of the two actuator chambers, thus the
actuator is in bypass mode. In this way, by means of the pressure switch, which is now connected
to the supply pressure, this abnormal configuration is indicated to the FACs.
With no hydraulic pressure, the two selector valves are set, under the action of their spring, in
bypass mode, thus the two chambers of the piston are interconnected. In this case, the pressure
switch is not activated.
General Notes:
1. Alpha/speed lock function: To prevent an aircraft stall, slats cannot be fully retracted at high
angles of attack or low speeds.
2. The aileron droop function: increases the lift on the part of the wing which is not equipped which
flaps. The ailerons are deflected downwards when the flaps are extended.
3. Aileron servocontrol is a MMEL item (one per aileron): Its deactivation is performed by
disconnecting the related electrical connector & It remains mechanically connected and hydraulically
supplied (damping function is not affected).
4. The spoiler servocontrol is a MMEL item (one per wing): To deactivate the spoiler servocontrol,
disconnect the electrical connector from the receptacle of the servocontrol and you must also
deactivate the symmetrical servocontrol on the other wing (Flight Manual performance penalties are
applied).
5. ECAM warning "ELEVator SERVO FAULT "appears with a Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS)
message "USE STandBY XDCR", the two plugs of the elevator servocontrol position XDCRs must be
swapped.
6. ELAC 1 Go Item (as ELAC 1 normally controls the ailerons with ELAC 2 as a backup) & ELAC 2 No
Go Item (as ELAC 2 normally controls the elevators and THS with ELAC 1 as a backup).
7. One SEC May be inoperative.
8. FAC 2 Go Item & FAC 1 No Go Item.
9. FCDC 2 Go Item & FCDC 1 No Go Item.
10. SFCC 2 flap and slat channel may be inopera5ve (Note: Takeoff is not performed in CONF 1+F) &
SFCC 1 No Go Item.
11. The alternate yaw damper law also becomes active in these cases:
• If the roll normal law fails. Turn coordination is no longer available.
• Two Air Data References (ADRs) or two Inertial References (IRs) or two ELevator Aileron
Computers (ELACs) or both ailerons or all spoilers fail or blue + green hydraulic low
pressure or of pitch normal law is lost,
• The alternate law in FAC 1 is ac5ve with the emergency electrical supply (emergency
generator running),
• The yaw damper authority is limited to +/- 5° rudder deflec5on.
12. The mechanical rudder control, which is available at all times, must be used following the failures
shown below:
• two FACs or three ADRs or three IRs or green+yellow hydraulic low pressure or electrical
power on batteries only.
13. Speed Brake (Spoilers 2,Spoilers 2, 3 & 4)has different priorities of this function are:
• The roll order has priority over the speed brake function. When the sum of roll and speed
brake commands, relative to one surface, is greater than the maximum possible deflection,
the symmetrical surface is retracted until the difference between the two surfaces is equal
to the roll order,
• If the Angle-Of-Attack (AOA) protection is activated, or SEC 1 and 3 fault, or elevator left or
right (in this case only spoiler 3 & 4 are inhibited), or in FLAP FULL configuration, the speed
brakes extension is inhibited & If speed brakes are extended, they automatically retract and
kept retracted until inhibition condition disappears and lever reset.
14. The ground spoilers are armed when the speed brake control lever is pulled up into the ARMED
position.
15. Ground spoilers automatically extend when armed:
• both thrust levers at forward idle and both MLG touch down (Flight / Ground transition),
• or during Take Off (TO) run at speed greater than 72 knots (kts) and both thrust levers
retarded at forward idle.
16. Ground spoilers automatically extended (not armed):
• when both MLG touch down and reverse is selected on at least one engine (remaining
engine at idle),
 • or during TO run speed greater than 72 kts and reverse is selected on at least one engine
(remaining engine at idle).
17. Ground spoilers partially extend when reverse is selected on at least one engine (remaining
engine at idle) and one MLG is compressed, This par5al extension (10°), by decreasing the liK,
will ease the compression of the second MLG, and consequently will lead to the normal ground
spoiler extension.
18. Slats & Flaps WTB Operates if:
• Asymmetry is defined as a positional difference between the LH and RH APPUs. Asymmetry
is usually due to a broken shaK between both APPUs. The asymmetry threshold is above 5°
synchro positional difference between both APPUs.
• A runaway is given as a positional difference between both APPUs and the FPPU. Runaway
on slats can occur when a component of the torque shaft drive, common to the LH and RH
wings breaks, leaving the slat system free from the Power Control Unit (PCU) Pressure-Off
Brake (POB). This results in air loads tending to retract the surfaces. Runaway on flaps can
only be possible if the PCU gearbox is broken. Depending on the broken position, the air
load tends to retract or extend the flaps.
• An overspeed is detected when the rotation speed of the torque shafts measured by the
Position Pickoff Unit (PPU) is too high.
• Uncommanded movement is defined as a movement away from the selected position by a
value that exceeds the threshold.
19. Slats & Flaps Half Speed Operation is due to:
• SFCC Lane INOP.
• Valve block related hydraulic system low pressure.
• Spool valve jammed.

This leads the related valve block POB to be applied.

20. Flaps Disconnect Sensors:
• LGCIU receives signals from two sensors and transmits this data to its related SFCC.
• The SFCCs monitor the flap-attachment failure detection sensors to find connection failure.
If the SFCCs receive a flap disconnect signal:
o The valve block solenoids on the Power Control Unit (PCU) are de-energized,
o The Pressure-Off Brakes (POBs) lock the two hydraulic motors,
o The SFCCs give a class 1 level 2 cau5on and the ECAM display unit shows a failure
message.
21. Load Alleviation Function (LAF) relieves wing structure loads in turbulence by moving the
spoilers 4 and 5 and ailerons symmetrically. The LAF orders are added with Roll orders.
22. The speedbrake lever positions:
• ARMED : -3O
• RET : 0 O
• 1/2 : 28.5 O
• FULL : 57 O
23. A FPPU (Feedback Position Pick-Off Unit), which is attached to the PCU, sends signals on the
position of the flap transmission to the two SFCCs.
24. An APPU (Asymmetry Position Pick-Off Units), The APPUs are the same as, and interchangeable
with, the FPPU. Two synchro transmitter in each APPU sends position data to the SFCC1 &
SFCC2.
25. The IPPU (Instrumentation Position Pickoff-Unit) sends the flap position data to the Flight
Warning Computers (FWC1, FWC2). The FWCs send the data to the Electronic Instrument
System (EIS). The EIS shows the position of the flaps on the upper display unit of the ECAM
system, it's the same unit as FPPU.
 AIRBUS FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

High AOA Protection Load Factor Limitation Pitch Attitude Protection

NORMAL LAW
High Speed Protection Flight Augmentation (Yaw) Bank Angle Protection

Low Speed Stability Load Factor Limitation

ALTERNATE LAW
High Speed Stability Yaw Damping Only

Load Factor Limitation

ABNORMAL ALTERNATE LAW w/o Speed Stability

Yaw Damping Only

DIRECT LAW
 FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS SUMMARY
NORMAL LAW
Normal operating configuration of the system. Failure of any single computer does not affect normal law.
Covers 3-axis control, flight envelope protection, and load alleviation. Has 3 modes according to phase of
flight.

• Active when aircraft is on the ground.

• Direct proportional relationship between the sidestick deflection and deflection of the flight
Ground controls.
Mode • Is active until shortly after liftoff.
• After touchdown, ground mode is reactivated and resets the stabilizer trim to zero.

• Becomes active shortly after takeoff and remains active until shortly before touchdown.
• Sidestick deflection and load factor imposed on the aircraft are directly proportional, regardless of
airspeed.
• With sidestick neutral and wings level, system maintains a 1 g load in pitch.
• No requirement to change pitch trim for changes in airspeed, configuration, or bank up to 33
degrees.
Flight • At full aft/fwd sidestick deflection system maintains maximum load factor for flap position.
Mode
• Sidestick roll input commands a roll rate request.
• Roll rate is independent of airspeed.
• A given sidestick deflection always results in the same roll rate response.
• Turn coordination and yaw damping are computed by the ELACs and transmitted to the FACs.
• No rudder pedal feedback for the yaw damping and turn coordination functions.

• Transition to flare mode occurs at 50' RA during landing.

• System memorizes pitch attitude at 50' and begins to progressively reduce pitch, forcing pilot to
Flare flare the aircraft
Mode
• In the event of a go-around, transition to flight mode occurs again at 50' RA.

Load factor Limitation

• Prevents pilot from overstressing the aircraft even if full sidestick deflections are applied.

Attitude Protection

• Pitch limited to 30 deg up, 15 deg down, and 67 deg of bank.

• These limits are indicated by green = signs on the PFD.
• Bank angles in excess of 33 deg require constant sidestick input.
• If input is released the aircraft returns to and maintains 33 deg of bank.

High Angle of Attack Protection (alpha):

Protections • When alpha exceeds alpha prot, elevator control switches to alpha protection mode in which angle
of attack is proportional to sidestick deflection.
• Alpha max will not be exceeded even if the pilot applies full aft deflection

High Speed Protection:

• Prevents exceeding VMO or MMO by introducing a pitch up load factor demand.

• The pilot can NOT override the pitch up command.

Low Energy Warning:

• Available in CONF 2,3, or FULL between 100' and 2,000' RA when TOGA not selected.
• Produces aural "SPEED SPEED SPEED" when change in flight path alone is insufficient to regain a
positive flight path (Thrust must be increased).
 ALTERNATE LAW
If Multiple Failures of Redundant Systems occur, the flight controls revert to Alternate Law.
The ECAM displays the message: ALTN LAW: PROT LOST
Ground
The ground mode is identical to Normal Law.
Mode

• In pitch alternate law the flight mode is a load factor demand law similar to the Normal Law flight
mode, with reduced protections.
• Pitch alternate law degrades to pitch direct law when the landing gear is extended to provide feel
for flare and landing, since there is no flare mode when pitch normal law is lost.
Flight • Automatic pitch trim and yaw damping (with limited authority) is available.
Mode
• Turn coordination is lost.
• When pitch law degrades from normal law, roll degrades to Direct Law - roll rate depends on
airspeed.

• All protections except for load factor maneuvering protection are lost.
• The load factor limitation is similar to to that under Normal Law.
• Amber XX's replace the green = attitude limits on the PFD.
• A low speed stability function replaces the normal angle-of-attack protection
o System introduces a progressive nose down command which attempts to prevent the
speed from decaying further.
o This command CAN be overridden by sidestick input.
o The airplane CAN be stalled in Alternate Law.
o An audio stall warning consisting of "crickets" and a "STALL" aural message is activated.
o The Alpha Floor function is inoperative.
Protections • The PFD airspeed scale is modified:
o VLS remains displayed
o VALPHA PROT and VALPHA MAX are removed
o They are replaced by a red and black barber pole, the top indicating the stall warning
speed VSW
• A nose up command is introduced any time the airplane exceeds VMO/MMO to keep the speed from
increasing further, which CAN be overridden by the sidestick.
• Bank angle protection is lost.
• Certain failures cause the system to revert to Alternate Law without speed stability.
• Yaw damping is lost if the fault is a triple ADR failure.
 ABNORMAL ALTERNATE LAW
Abnormal Alternate Law is activated if the airplane enters an unusual attitude, allowing recovery from the
unusual attitude.

• Pitch law becomes Alternate (without autotrim or protection other than Load Factor protection).
• Roll law becomes Direct law with mechanical yaw control.
• After recovery from the unusual attitude, the following laws are active for the remainder of the flight:
o Pitch: Alternate law without protections and with autotrim.
o Roll: Direct law
o Yaw: Alternate law
• There is no reversion to Direct law when the landing gear is extended.

DIRECT LAW
Direct law is the lowest level of computer flight control and occurs with certain multiple failures.

• Pilot control inputs are transmitted unmodified to the control surfaces, providing a direct relationship between
sidestick and control surface.
• Control sensitivity depends on airspeed and NO autotrimming is available.
• An amber message USE MAN PITCH TRIM appears on the PFD.
• If the flight controls degrade to Alternate Law, Direct Law automatically becomes active when the landing
gear is extended if no autopilots are engaged. If an autopilot is engaged, the airplane will remain in Alternate
Law until the autopilot is disconnected.
• There are no protections provided in Direct Law, however overspeed and stall aural warnings are provided.
• The PFD airspeed scale remains the same as in Alternate Law.

MECHANICAL BACKUP
In case of a complete loss of electrical flight control signals, the aircraft can be temporarily controlled by
mechanical mode.

• Pitch control is achieved through the horizontal stabilizer by using the manual trim wheel.
• Lateral control is accomplished using the rudder pedals.
• Both controls require hydraulic power.
• A red MAN PITCH TRIM ONLY warning appears on the PFD.