12/27/23, 10:17 PM [ G.R. Nos. 214336-37.

February 15, 2022 ]

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 214336-37. February 15,
2022 ]
QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION

LOPEZ, J., J.:

Before the Court is a Consolidated Petition for Review on

Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[2] dated January 16, 2014 and the Resolution[3] dated
September 12, 2014 of the Sandiganbayan, First Division
(Sandiganbayan), in Criminal Case Nos. 27803 and 27805,
convicting petitioner Quirino M. Libunao of violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Antecedents

At the heart of the present controversy is the Countrywide

Development Fund (CDF) allocated to accused Constantino H.
Navarro, Jr., then Surigao Del Norte First District
representative. By virtue of Assignment Order No. 00-002
dated January 17, 2000, the Commission on Audit (COA)
conducted a special review of the utilization of Navarro's CDF
for the years 1997 to 1998. The audit team discovered that
P13,832,569.00 of said CDF was used to purchase, on different
occasions, assorted medicines, shabu testing kits, nebulizing
machines, sporting materials, rice paddy plows (araro),
blackboard erasers, chalks, and notebooks from various
suppliers. But instead of conducting a public bidding, the
purchase was done through direct contracting, in violation of
Section 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 302[4] resulting in an
overpricing of the items purchased amounting to
P2,863,689.36 or equivalent to 13.6% to 506% of the
prevailing market prices. Consequently, the COA issued
Notices of Disallowance dated January 23, 2001.[5]

After due proceedings and finding probable cause, the Office

of the Ombudsman criminally charged the following persons
before the Sandiganbayan for their involvement in the said
illegal purchases:
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(1) Congressman Constantino H. Navarro, Jr.

(Navarro);

(2) Quirino M. Libunao (Libunao), Carlos T.

Derecho (Derecho), and Romeo S. Jardenico
(Jardenico), all as Regional Directors of the
Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG)-Caraga Region, the implementing
agency at the time of the transactions;

(3) Benito R. Catindig (Catindig), as Assistant

Secretary for Support Services, and Regional
Operations, DILG-Quezon City;

(4) Iluminada C. Tuble (Tuble), President of San

Marino Laboratories Corporation (San
Marino);

(5) Marlene B. Corpus (Corpus), Owner-Proprietor

of Mt. Bethel Pharmaceutical (Mt. Bethel);

(6) Edwin L. Dizon (Dizon), as owner-proprietor

of E.G. Trading;

(7) Gerardo A. Rosario (Rosario), owner-

proprietor of Revelstone Sales International
(Revelstone); and

(8) Mario Tokong (Tokong), representative of

Revelstone Sales International.[6]

In several Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos.

27796-27805, the accused public officers were charged for
acting in evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving
unwarranted benefits to the accused suppliers by entering into
contracts without the benefit of public bidding. The accusatory
portions of the Amended/Re-Amended Informations filed
against Libunao and said public officers, read:

Criminal Case No. 27803

That in the month of October 1998, or sometime

prior or subsequent thereto, in Region XIII, Caraga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused CONSTANTINO H.
NAVARRO, JR., QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO, and
BENITO R. CATINDIG, both high ranking public
officials, being then the Congressman of the 1st
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District of Surigao del Norte, the Regional Director

of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG)-Caraga Region, and Assistant
Secretary for Support Services & Regional
Operations, DILG-Quezon City, respectively, all
high ranking public officials, committing the
offense in relation to their official duties and taking
advantage of their official functions, conspiring and
confederating with each other and with accused
ILUMINADA C. TUBLE, President of San
Marino Laboratories Corporation, a private
enterprise, and mutually helping one another, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the
very least, through gross inexcusable negligence),
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally give unwarranted benefits, advantage
and preference to San Marino Laboratories
Corporation and cause undue injury to the
Government, by entering into a contract, without
conducting the required public bidding, with said
San Marino Laboratories, for the purchase of
forty five (45) boxes of assorted medicine in the
amount of TWO MILLION PESOS
(P2,000,000.00), which price was manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government
considering that similar medicines available in the
market, as canvassed by the Commission on Audit
(COA), could have been purchased at only SEVEN
HUNDRED SIXTY TWO THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED SIXTY TWO & 25/100 PESOS
(P762,262.25), inclusive of 10% allowance, thereby
resulting to an overprice in the total amount of
ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY & 75/100 PESOS (P1,237,740.75), to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount of overprice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

x x x x.

Criminal Case No. 27805

That during the period from October 16, 1998 to

December 10, 1998, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Region XIII, Caraga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused CONSTANTINO H.
NAVARRO, JR., QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO, and
BENITO R. CATINDIG, both high ranking public

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officials, being then the Congressman of the 1st

District of Surigao del Norte, the Regional Director
of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG)-Caraga Region, and Assistant
Secretary for Support Services & Regional
Operations, DILG-Quezon City, respectively, all
high ranking public officials, committing the
offense in relation to their official duties and taking
advantage of their official functions, conspiring and
confederating with each other and with accused
GERARDO A. ROSARIO and MARIO
TOKONG, proprietor and representative,
respectively, of Revelstone Sales International, a
private enterprise, and mutually helping one
another, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality (or at the very least, through gross
inexcusable negligence), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally give
unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to
Revelstone Sales International and cause undue
injury to the Government, by entering into a
contract, without conducting the required public
bidding, with said Revelstone Sales International,
for the purchase of one thousand two hundred
(1,200) sets of araro tools in the amount of NINE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P900,000.00),
which price was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government considering that
similar araro tools available in the market, as
canvassed by the Commission on Audit (COA),
could have been purchased at only SEVEN
HUNDRED NINETY TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P792,000.00), inclusive of 10% allowance, thereby
resulting to an overprice of in the total amount of
ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS
(P108,000.00), to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount of overprice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

Upon arraignment, Libunao pleaded not guilty to the offense

charged. Hence, trial on the merits ensued. To establish its
case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Rosalina G.
Salvador, an auditor of the COA, Ruby D. Pascual, a
pharmacist editor, Manuel M. Parian, Deputy Regional Chief
of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, and
Manuel Dy Sio, a businessman engaged in selling hardware
and farm construction supplies.[9]

In Criminal Case No. 27803, the prosecution established that

Navarro requisitioned for the purchase of 45 boxes of assorted
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medicines in the amount of P2,000,000.00 from San Marino.

Libunao approved the transactions, certified that the expense
was necessary, lawful, and incurred under his direct
supervision; he then signed checks payable to San Marino.
This was supported by documentary exhibits such as
Requisition and Issue Vouchers (RIVs), Purchase Orders (POs),
Disbursement Vouchers (DVs), certificates, and checks.[10]

In Criminal Case No. 27805, it was established that Navarro

requisitioned for 1,200 sets of araro tools in the amount of
P900,000.00 from Revelstone. Again, Libunao approved the
transactions, certified that the expense was necessary, lawful,
and incurred under his direct supervision, and he signed the
checks payable to Revelstone. These were also supported by
documentary exhibits such as RIVs, POs, DVs, certificates,
and checks.[11]

In his defense, Libunao testified that he assumed his position

as Regional Director of DILG-Caraga based in Butuan City on
October 17, 1998. According to him, he signed the documents
in relation to the transactions relying on his subordinates who
assured him that the same were in order. Since his position as
regional director had many functions, he had to rely on these
financial people who prepared the documents he signed.[12]

On January 16, 2014, the Sandiganbayan found that the

prosecution successfully proved with moral certainty that
public officers, Libunao and Derecho gave unwarranted
benefits to Revelstone, San Marino, Mt. Bethel, and E.G.
Trading when they resorted to direct contracting, instead of
public bidding. As for the accused suppliers Rosario, Tuble,
Corpus, and Dizon, however, it was held that the prosecution
failed to establish the same quantum of proof that they were
patently propelled by criminal designs when they allowed their
companies to receive undue benefits. Thus, with respect to
Libunao in Criminal Case Nos. 27803 and 27805, the
Sandiganbayan disposed as follows:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court

hereby renders judgment as follows:

xxxx

7. In Criminal Case No. 27803, accused QUIRINO

M. LIBUNAO is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and
pursuant to Section 9 thereof, is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum up
to ten (10) years as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from holding public office.
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Accused ILUMINADA C. TUBLE, is hereby

ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

xxxx

9. In Criminal Case No. 27805, accused QUIRINO

M. LIBUNAO is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and
pursuant to Section 9 thereof, is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum up
to ten (10) years as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from holding public office.

Accused GERARDO A. ROSARIO, is hereby

ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

xxxx

Except for accused Tuble who is hereby ordered to

pay the DILG-CARAGA the amount of
P1,071,721.80, no civil liability may be assessed
against accused Rosario, Corpus and Dizon
considering that the act or omission from which the
civil liability might arise does not exist.

Let the hold departure order against accused

Rosario, Tuble, Corpus and Dizon by reason of this
case be lifted and set aside, and their bonds
released, subject to the usual accounting and
auditing procedure.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Libunao moved for the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's

January 16, 2014 Decision.[14] On September 12, 2014,
however, said court denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration and undated Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.[15]

Unfazed, Libunao filed the present petition on October 9, 2014

essentially reiterating the following arguments:

I.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

VIOLATED PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.
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A. PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED

OF A CRIME DIFFERENT FROM
THOSE CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATIONS, AMENDED
INFORMATIONS, AND RE-
AMENDED INFORMATIONS.

B. THE THEORY THAT OFFENSE

WHEREIN WHICH PETITIONER
WAS CONVICTED INCLUDES
OR IS NECESSARILY
INCLUDED IN THE OFFENSE
CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION IS NOT
APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.

C. ALLOWING THE PETITIONER

TO BE CONVICTED OF A CRIME
DIFFERENT FROM WHAT HE IS
CHARGED WOULD BE
VIOLATIVE OF THE
PROHIBITION AGAINST
DUPLICITY OF OFFENSE AS
STATED IN SECTION 13, RULE
110 OF THE RULES OF COURT
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF
THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM.

II.

THERE COULD BE NO VIOLATION OF

SECTION 3(g) OF R.A. NO. 3019 AS THE
PROSECUTION WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVE
THE EXISTENCE OF THE ELEMENTS
THEREOF.

A. PETITIONER DID NOT ENTER

INTO ANY CONTRACT WITH
THE PRIVATE SUPPLIERS IN
THE PURCHASE AND
DELIVERY OF THE GOODS.

B. THERE IS NO CONSPIRACY.

III.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT SECTION 3(e)

OF R.A. NO. 3019 WAS ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION, THE ELEMENTS THEREOF
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WERE NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE

DOUBT.[16]

Libunao argues that the Sandiganbayan violated his

constitutional right to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him by convicting him
under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 when he was actually
charged in the Informations of an offense under Section 3(g)
thereof. He claimed that there was neither identity nor
exclusive inclusion between the two offenses. To insist that one
is a mode or manner of committing the other violates the
principle of duplicity of offense in Section 13[17] of Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Be that as it may,
petitioner posits that even assuming the possibility of the same,
he must still be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove
the elements of either Section 3(e) or Section 3(g).

Our Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

Prefatorily, it must be remembered that petitions for review on

certiorari under Rule 45, such as the one filed by petitioner,
must raise only questions of law. Settled is the rule that issues
raised on whether the prosecution's evidence proved the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, or whether the
presumption of innocence was properly accorded, the accused
are all, in varying degrees, questions of fact.[18] In view of the
absence of the recognized exceptions[19] to this rule, the Court
shall refrain from reviewing the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan as it duly considered the totality of
circumstances that led to the conclusion that petitioner violated
the law.

To begin with, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that

his constitutional rights were violated. Petitioner makes much
of the fact that the charge was designated as Section 3(g) in
assailing the validity of the Informations filed against him.
However, well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the dictum that it
is not the technical name given by the prosecutor appearing in
the title of the information, but the facts alleged in the body of
the information that determines the character of the crime.[20]
As early in United States v. Lim San,[21] the Court has
explained that:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense,

it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands
charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. x x x. That to which his attention should be

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directed, and in which he, above all things else,

should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The
real question is not did he commit a crime given in
the law some technical and specific name, but did
he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. If he
did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a
matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the
law denominates the crime which those acts
constitute. The designation of the crime by name in
the caption of the information from the facts
alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion
of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the
crime the accused never has a real interest until the
trial has ended. For his full and complete defense[,]
he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is
of no consequence whatever for the protection of
his substantial rights. The real and important
question to him is, "Did you perform the acts
alleged in the manner alleged?" not "Did you
commit a crime named murder." If he performed
the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law
determines what the name of the crime is and fixes
the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court
alone to say what the name of the crime is or what
it is named. x x x.[22]

Indeed, what is controlling is not the title of the complaint or

the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or
part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of
law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited.[23] As long as
the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity and reasonable certainty that the accused is duly
informed of the offense charged, then the information is
considered sufficient.[24] If the elements of the crime are duly
alleged in the information, the accused can be rest assured of
being informed of the nature of the accusation against him so
as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.[25]

It would not take more than a plain and simple reading of the
Re-Amended Informations herein to be properly apprised of
the nature of the offense charged against petitioner.
Specifically, he, together with his co-accused, Navarro and
Catindig, all high-ranking public officers, were accused of
acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality or at the
very least, through gross inexcusable negligence, in giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to another, and
thereby causing undue injury to the Government, by entering
into a contract for the purchase of various goods at

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disadvantageous prices without conducting the required public

bidding. One cannot mistake this to be something other than
the elements of a violation of Section 3(e)[26] of R.A. No.
3019.

Accordingly, petitioner's claim that the Informations violate the

rule on duplicity of offenses in Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court is untenable. As a general rule, a complaint or
information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same
is defective.[27] Petitioner insists that the Informations accused
him of both Sections 3(e) and 3(g). The argument fails to
convince. While it is true that entering into a contract is also an
element of Section 3(g),[28] We agree with the Sandiganbayan
that the allegation can be considered simply as the means by
which the accused persons violated Section 3(e).[29] As such,
his conviction under the latter could not have been on a
defective Information.

But even assuming that the Informations charged more than

one offense, the fact remains that petitioner did not question
the validity of the same before entering his plea. Time and
again, the Court has held that an accused who fails to move for
the quashal of a duplicitous Information is deemed to have
waived his right to question the same.[30] This is in consonance
with Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground
of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of
this Rule."[31] Indeed, when two or more offenses are charged
in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to
object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the
proper penalty for each offense.[32]

Ultimately, petitioner can no longer deny the validity of the

Informations against him. In no uncertain terms, said
Informations sufficiently charged him with violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 carefully identifying the essential
elements thereof. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 states:

SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.

— In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

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xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any

party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to
officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

In Tio v. People,[33] We laid down the elements of Section 3(e),

to wit: (1) that the accused is a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial, or official functions, or a private
individual acting in conspiracy with such public officer; (2)
that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his action caused
any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his functions. We find no cogent
reason to deviate from the Sandiganbayan's finding that the
elements of the crime charged were sufficiently proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

The first element is self-explanatory. As borne by the records,

petitioner was a public officer acting in his official capacity as
Regional Director of the DILG-Caraga at the time of the
commission of the crime.

The second element pertains to the modalities by which the

offense may be committed. Well-settled is the rule that proof of
any of the three modes, namely: manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, in connection with
the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
is enough to convict.[34] In a long line of cases,[35] the Court
elucidated that:

There is "manifest partiality" when there is clear,

notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to
favor one side or person rather than another.
"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad
judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent
and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or
ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or

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with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for

ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence"
refers to negligence characterized by the want of
even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as
other persons may be affected.[36]

The third element requires that the act constituting the offense
must consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any party,
including the government, or (2) giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
by the accused of his official, administrative or judicial
functions.[37] The former act need not be proven with actual
certainty but by some reasonable basis by which the court can
measure it.[38] As for the latter act, it suffices that the accused
has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise
of his official, administrative or judicial functions.[39] The
word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official
support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or
adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or
improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any
kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference"
signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or
estimation above another.[40]

The second and third elements discussed above are positively

proven by the records of the case. We, therefore, find no error
in the Sandiganbayan's ruling that petitioner gave unwarranted
benefit, advantage, or preference to San Marino and
Revelstone through gross inexcusable negligence in approving
the subject transactions despite the absence of public bidding.

Section 3 of E.O. No. 302[41] expressly provides that awarding

of contracts shall be done through public/open competitive
bidding to ensure efficiency and equitable treatment. As an
exception to the rule, its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) enumerates the conditions under which direct
contracting instead of public bidding may be resorted to:

a. Procurement of items of proprietary nature which

can be obtained only from the proprietary source,
i.e., when patents, trade secrets and copyrights
prohibit others from manufacturing the same item;

b. Those sold by an exclusive dealer or

manufacturer which does not have sub-dealers
selling at lower prices and for which no suitable

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substitute can be obtained at more advantageous

terms to the Government;

c. When the procurement of critical plant

components from a specialist
manufacturer/supplier/distributor serves as a
precondition of a contractor responsible for the
erection of the project for his guarantee of project
performance;

d. For purposes of maintaining standards, such as a

purchase involving a small addition to an already
existing fleet of equipment;

e. In emergencies where procurement must be

immediately accomplished regardless of cost.
Emergencies shall be defined as those situations
where there is imminent danger to life and/or
property as determined by the Head of Agency
concerned or his duly authorized representative.

Settled is the rule that as a matter of policy, public contracts are

awarded through competitive public bidding. Not only does
competitive bidding give the public the best possible quality of
goods and services garnering contracts most favorable to the
government, it also avoids suspicion of favoritism and
anomalies in the execution of public transactions.[42] It
promotes transparency in government transactions and
accountability of public officers as it minimizes occasions for
corruption and temptations to abuse of discretion on the part of
government authorities in awarding contracts.[43] For these
reasons, important public policy considerations demand the
strict observance of procedural rules relating to the bidding
process.[44]

In the present case, not only were the subject purchases of

medicines and araro tools done through direct contracting;
petitioner utterly failed to present any justification sufficient to
forego the conduct of a competitive public bidding as
expressly mandated by E.O. No. 302. Neither was there any
effort to invoke the exceptions under the IRR. In an attempt to
exculpate himself from liability, he merely engaged in a finger-
pointing expedition seeking to pass the blame to both his
superiors as well as his subordinates. Unfortunately for him,
however, We cannot give credence to his defenses in light of
the glaring evidence of his gross inexcusable negligence.

As duly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was the

Regional Director of the DILG, no less, who served thereat for
39 years. It is the mandate of the DILG, as an agency that acts
on behalf of the President to achieve the effective delivery of
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basic services to the citizenry.[45] Explicit in its Charter is its

duty to faithfully conduct the procurement process in strict
compliance with the provisions of applicable law on
procurement.[46] Hence, in all procurement of goods and
services, the DILG ensures that they be governed by the
principles of: (1) transparency in the process and
implementation of contracts; (2) competitiveness by extending
equal opportunity to enable all eligible parties to participate in
public bidding; (3) streamlined procurement process that will
uniformly apply to all government procurement; (4) system of
accountability where both public officials directly or indirectly
involved in the procurement process are held liable for their
actions relative thereto; and (5) public monitoring to guarantee
that contracts are awarded strictly in accordance with law.[47]

The Court cannot, in good conscience, accept his reasoning

that Navarro was "a very powerful congressman" and as such,
he simply implemented the directive to approve the
transactions with the pre-selected suppliers. It is well to
remember that the power of members of the House of
Representatives on the disbursement of the CDF is limited to
the identification of projects, while the determination of the
mode of procurement is vested in the DILG, which in this case,
was under the leadership of petitioner. As such, he was
mandated by law to make an independent assessment of the
subject contracts. However, despite the blatant absence of the
required public bidding, he fully consummated the illegal
transactions in blindly signing the POs, RIVs, certifications,
and checks payable to the pre-selected companies. Indeed, the
Sandiganbayan is justified in saying that by tolerating the
direct purchase from Navarro's favored suppliers, petitioner
reduced his office to a mere puppet.[48] Contrary to his
incessant claims that he merely exercised a ministerial duty, it
was because of his gross inexcusable negligence that allowed
San Marino and Revelstone to derive unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference from the subject transactions.

As the head of the very agency tasked with ensuring that

government contracts strictly adhere to the laws on
procurement, the Court cannot reduce petitioner's acts to
simple errors of judgment. At the time of the commission of
the offense in 1998, E.O. No. 302, had already been in
existence since its passage in 1996. In fact, during said time,
the concept of procurement through public bidding can hardly
be considered novel or complex so as to excuse petitioner's
non-compliance therewith. As can be seen in Our discussion in
Abaya v. Sec. Ebdane, Jr.,[49] the laws on procurement dates
back to the 1900s, thus:

History of Philippine Procurement Laws

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It is necessary, at this point, to give a brief history

of Philippine laws pertaining to procurement
through public bidding. The United States
Philippine Commission introduced the American
practice of public bidding through Act No. 22,
enacted on October 15, 1900, by requiring the
Chief Engineer, United States Army for the
Division of the Philippine Islands, acting as
purchasing agent under the control of the then
Military Governor, to advertise and call for a
competitive bidding for the purchase of the
necessary materials and lands to be used for the
construction of highways and bridges in the
Philippine Islands. Act No. 74, enacted on January
21, 1901 by the Philippine Commission, required
the General Superintendent of Public Instruction to
purchase office supplies through competitive public
bidding. Act No. 82, approved on January 31, 1901,
and Act No. 83, approved on February 6, 1901,
required the municipal and provincial governments,
respectively, to hold competitive public biddings in
the making of contracts for public works and the
purchase of office supplies.

On June 21, 1901, the Philippine Commission,

through Act No. 146, created the Bureau of Supply
and with its creation, public bidding became a
popular policy in the purchase of supplies,
materials and equipment for the use of the national
government, its subdivisions and instrumentalities.
On February 3, 1936, then President Manuel L.
Quezon issued E.O. No. 16 declaring as a matter of
general policy that government contracts for public
service or for furnishing supplies, materials and
equipment to the government should be subjected
to public bidding. The requirement of public
bidding was likewise imposed for public works of
construction or repair pursuant to the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917.

Then President Diosdado Macapagal, in E.O. No.

40 dated June 1, 1963, reiterated the directive that
no government contract for public service or for
furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the
government or any of its branches, agencies or
instrumentalities, should be entered into without
public bidding except for very extraordinary
reasons to be determined by a committee
constituted thereunder. Then President Ferdinand
Marcos issued PD 1594 prescribing guidelines for
government infrastructure projects and Section 4 54
thereof stated that they should generally be
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undertaken by contract after competitive public

bidding.

Then President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No.

301 (1987) prescribing guidelines for government
negotiated contracts. Pertinently, Section 62 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 reiterated the
requirement of competitive public bidding in
government projects. In 1990, Congress passed RA
6957, 55 which authorized the financing,
construction, operation and maintenance of
infrastructure by the private sector. RA 7160 was
likewise enacted by Congress in 1991 and it
contains provisions governing the procurement of
goods and locally-funded civil works by the local
government units.

Then President Fidel Ramos issued E.O. No. 302

(1996), providing guidelines for the procurement of
goods and supplies by the national government.
Then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued E.O.
No. 201 (2000), providing additional guidelines in
the procurement of goods and supplies by the
national government. Thereafter, he issued E.O. No.
262 (2000) amending E.O. 302 (1996) and E.O.
201 (2000).

On October 8, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo issued EO 40, the law mainly relied upon
by the respondents, entitled Consolidating
Procurement Rules and Procedures for All National
Government Agencies, Government-Owned or
Controlled Corporations and Government Financial
Institutions, and Requiring the Use of the
Government Procurement System. It accordingly
repealed, amended or modified all executive
issuances, orders, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent therewith.

On January 10, 2003, President Arroyo signed into

law RA 9184. It took effect on January 26, 2004, or
fifteen days after its publication in two newspapers
of general circulation.[50]

In fact, petitioner even expressly testified that he was "in

charge of the implementation of the projects identified by a
congressman wherein his PDF will be used" and was "tasked
under law to be the particular office to handle procurement and
distribution."[51] But despite knowledge of this, he went on to
state that "his responsibility stops" "after the delivery of the
procured items to the office of the congressman."[52] He
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further admitted that he no longer knows "whether as a matter

of fact, these procured items were delivered to the end-users"
because he "cannot just go to the congressman" and ask "have
you distributed the items already?"[53]

It is clear from the foregoing that petitioner could no longer

feign ignorance to settled law or claim innocence to the acts
charged against him. He persistently blames Navarro as the
one who entered into the purchase agreement without public
bidding. He insists that he merely performed his ministerial
duty of signing the DVs, POs, RIVs, certificates, and checks,
nothing more. The argument, however, fails to persuade. Just
because his name does not appear in the contract, does not
mean he should be absolved of any liability. To repeat,
petitioner was responsible for the consummation of the
contract. He approved the transaction and signed the checks,
which ultimately led to the release of the funds.

On this matter, Our ruling in Tio v. People[54] is instructive.

There, Tio, then Mayor of the Municipality of Luna, and
Cadiz, then municipal accountant, were both convicted of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for awarding a road
concreting project to a private corporation in the absence of
public bidding. While the prosecution was unable to prove that
Cadiz participated in the award of the contract, We did not
hesitate to convict her for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 for her participation in the unlawful release of funds in
consummation of the illegal contract. In certifying the
transactions and signing the DVs despite the presence of
irregularities, Cadiz was remiss in her duty as municipal
accountant, which is to ensure that public funds are disbursed
only after the requirements of law are complied with. To the
Court, this constitutes gross inexcusable negligence.

In the same vein, the Court ruled in Umipig v. People[55] that

when public officers make certifications that the expense is
necessary and lawful, said officer attests to the transactions'
legality and regularity, which signifies that he or she had
checked all the supporting documents before affixing his or her
signature.[56] The existence of obvious infirmities, however,
shows that the public officer negligently failed to exercise the
reasonable diligence required by law thereby resulting in
government loss in favor of private persons.

To be convicted of violation of Section 3(e), therefore, one's

name and signature do not necessarily have to be written on a
contract. For as long as the prosecution sufficiently proves the
elements of the crime, public officers can rightfully be charged
and convicted of the same by their acts of negligently
approving the illegal transactions and signing checks for the
disbursement of funds. The Court cannot turn a blind eye to
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their participation that is indispensable to the consummation of

the transaction and for which, they must be held accountable.

In a last-ditch effort to save his plight, petitioner continues his

finger-pointing, but this time, he tries to pass the blame to his
subordinates who allegedly assured him of the validity of the
transactions. Invoking the doctrine laid down in Arias v.
Sandiganbayan,[57] petitioner claims that as a head of office,
he can rely in good faith on the acts of his subordinates as he
cannot reasonably be expected to examine every single
document relative to government transactions. Unfortunately
for petitioner, the circumstances of this case prevent him from
seeking refuge behind the Arias doctrine.

The Arias doctrine is not some magic cloak that can be used as
a shield by a public officer to conceal himself in the shadows
of his subordinates and necessarily escape liability.[58] In fact,
the Court has had numerous occasions[59] to reject this defense
in light of circumstances that should have prompted the
government officials to exercise a higher degree of
circumspection and, necessarily, go beyond what their
subordinates had prepared.

Such is the case here. As duly observed by the Sandiganbayan,

it is unacceptable that petitioner blindly signed the subject
documents despite the fact that the absence of public bidding
was readily ascertainable on their face, being as they were,
mere "one-paged documents."[60] As a high-ranking DILG
official, moreover, the first thing he should have determined
was the mode of procurement employed in the transactions.
Instead, he testified in court that his primary act as regional
director, on his very first day, was to sign the checks for the
araro procurement, simply because the accountant told him
that the transactions were in order.[61] According to him, he
"just relied so much on my [his] staff that I [he] do [did] not
even know persons who entered into these transactions."[62]
Had petitioner exerted the necessary precaution, he would have
discovered that, as testified by the president of Revelstone,
said company was never even involved in the production of
medicines, araro tools, and drug testing kits.[63] Regrettably,
and with no valid reason, he failed to pay due attention to the
glaring illegality of the subject contracts.

All told, the Court is convinced that based on the totality of

facts herein, petitioner was correctly convicted of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In blindly proceeding with the
unlawful agreements, he failed to perform his sworn duty as
head of the DILG-Caraga office in clear violation of E.O. No.
302 and its IRR. Had he only exercised enough prudence and
been more circumspect, he could have easily discovered the
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absence of public bidding, and upheld the basic principles of

transparency and accountability that his office was created to
protect. Instead, he chose to tolerate the clear irregularities in
the transactions which resulted in unwarranted preference in
favor of San Marino and Revelstone. Not only were other
suppliers precluded from submitting potentially more
beneficial bids, the government was also effectively robbed of
its right to determine the best possible prices in its acquisition
of supplies.

Indeed, the rules on public bidding and on public funds

disbursement are imbued with public interest.[64] As a system
of transparency in the procurement process, said rules were
formulated to guarantee that the public enjoys the most
advantageous transactions at the least possible expense. It
cannot be denied, however, that these procurement laws, no
matter how good, become meaningless without accountable
public officials to ensure faithful compliance therewith.

Accordingly, the Court affirms the penalty imposed by the

Sandiganbayan. Section 9(a)[65] of R.A. No. 3019 provides
that a violation of Section 3 of the same law shall be punished
with, inter alia, "imprisonment for not less than six (6) years
and one (1) month nor more than fifteen (15) years" and
"perpetual disqualification from public office." Applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is
sentenced to suffer for each count in Criminal Case Nos. 27803
and 27805, the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten
(10) years, as maximum, together with the aforementioned
perpetual disqualification from public office.[66]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

DENIED. The Decision dated January 16, 2014 and the
Resolution dated September 12, 2014 of the Sandiganbayan,
First Division, in Criminal Case Nos. 27803 and 27805 are
AFFIRMED. Petitioner Quirino M. Libunao is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and
accordingly, sentenced to suffer for each count the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and
one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum,
with perpetual disqualification from public office.

SO ORDERED.

Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and Dimaampao,* JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., (Acting Chairperson), J., See Concurring
Opinion.

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* Designated additional member in lieu of Chief Justice

Alexander G. Gesmundo per Raffle dated November 29, 2021.

[1] Rollo, pp. 3-52.

[2]Penned by Chairperson/Associate Justice Efren N. De La

Cruz with Associate Justices Rodolfo A. Ponferrada and Rafael
R. Lagos, concurring; id. at 57-122.

[3] Id. at 123-127.

[4]E.O. No. 302, Providing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and

Regulations for the Procurement of Goods/Supplies by the
National Government, February 19, 1996.

[5] Rollo, pp. 70-71, 87.

[6] Id. at 59-70.

[7] Id. at 64-65.

[8] Id. at 66.

[9] Id. at 70-77.

[10] Id. at 96-97.

[11] Id. at 99-100.

[12] Id. at 78.

[13] Id. at 120-121.

[14] Id. at 57-122.

[15] Id. at 123-127.

[16] Id. at 33-34.

[17] Section 13. Duplicity of the offense. — A complaint or

information must charge but one offense, except when the law
prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.

[18] Jaca v. People, 702 Phil. 210, 238 (2013).

[19]Id., provides that among the exceptions are: (1) the

conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,

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surmise[s], and conjectures; (2) the inference made is

manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the
findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on
record.

[20] People v. Dasmariñas, 819 Phil. 357, 374 (2017).

[21] 17 Phil. 273 (1910).

[22]Id. at 278-279, cited in Consigna v. People, 731 Phil. 108,

120-121 (2014).

[23] People v. Dimaano, 506 Phil. 630, 649 (2005).

[24] Supra note 18, at 239.

[25] Id.

[26] Reyes v. Ombudsman, 783 Phil. 304, 336 (2016), provides

that the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
are: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private
individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b)
that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any
undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his functions.

[27] People v. Court of Appeals, 755 Phil. 80, 116 (2015).

[28] Froilan v. Sandiganbayan, 385 Phil. 32, 44 (2000),

provides that the elements of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019,
are: (a) that the accused is a public officer; (b) that he entered
into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(c) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.

[29] Rollo, p. 125.

[30] People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 822 (2016).

[31] Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash

the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an

offense;

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(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction

over the offense charged;
xxxx
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished;
xxxx
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted
or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.

[32] Supra note 27, at 117.

[33] G.R. Nos. 230132 & 230252, January 19 2021.

[34] People v. Naciongayo, G.R. No. 243897, June 8, 2020.

[35]Id.; Tio v. People, supra note 33; Villarosa v. People, G.R.

Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020; Sabaldan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao, G.R. No. 238014, June 15, 2020;
Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 228154, October 16, 2019; Cabrera
v. People, G.R. Nos. 191611-14, July 29, 2019; Sabio v.
Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 233853-54, July
15, 2019; Abubakar v. People, 834 Phil. 435, 472 (2018).

[36] Id.

[37] Villarosa v. People, supra note 35.

[38] Cabrera v. People, supra note 35.

[39] Villarosa v. People, supra note 35.

[40] Id.

[41]
Providing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for
the Procurement of Goods/Supplies by the National
Government, February 19, 1996.

[42] Abubakar v. People, supra note 35, at 474-475.

[43] Cabrera v. People, supra note 35.

[44] Id.

[45] R.A. No. 6975, An Act Establishing the Philippine

National Police under a Reorganized Department of the
Interior and Local Government and for other Purposes;

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12/27/23, 10:17 PM [ G.R. Nos. 214336-37. February 15, 2022 ]

Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990;

Approved on December 13, 1990.

[46]DILG Citizen's Charter, 2020 (2nd Edition); last accessed

on May 18, 2021.

[47] DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2016-96, July 15, 2016.

[48] Rollo, pp. 109-110.

[49] 544 Phil. 645 (2007).

[50] Abaya v. Sec. Ebdane, Jr., id. at 679-682.

[51] Rollo, p. 462.

[52] Id. at 467.

[53] Id. at 468.

[54] See Tio v. People, supra note 33.

[55] 691 Phil. 272 (2012).

[56] Id. at 306.

[57] 259 Phil. 794 (1989).

[58] Rivera v. People, 749 Phil. 124, 151-152 (2014).

[59] Abubakar v. People, supra note 35, citing Office of the

Ombudsman, et al. v. PS/Supt. Espina, 807 Phil. 529 (2017);
Cesa v. Office of the Ombudsman, 576 Phil. 345 (2008);
Alfonso v. Office of the President, 548 Phil. 615 (2007); Escara
v. People, 501 Phil. 532 (2005).

[60] Rollo, p. 110.

[61] Id. at 442.

[62] Id. at 445.

[63] Id. at 84-85.

[64] Cabrera v. People, supra note 35.

[65] Section 9. Penalties for violations. — (a) Any public

officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts
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or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act

shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years
and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual
disqualification from public office, and confiscation or
forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest
and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his
salary and other lawful income.

Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal

prosecution was initiated shall, in case of conviction of the
accused, be entitled to recover in the criminal action with
priority over the forfeiture in favor of the Government, the
amount of money or the thing he may have given to the
accused, or the fair value of such thing.

xxxx

[66] People v. Naciongayo, supra note 34.

CONCURRING OPINION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Petitioner Quirino M. Libunao (Libunao), a former Regional

Director of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG), was convicted in the Sandiganbayan for two (2)
counts of violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. (RA)
3019 because of procurements in 1998 that did not go through
public bidding.

The ponencia denies Libunao's appeal, ultimately ruling that

the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Libunao as he was
guilty of giving unwarranted benefits in favor of two suppliers.

I agree.

I offer this Opinion, however, to clarify that Libunao is guilty

not because of the mere failure to conduct public bidding for
the procurements involved, but rather, because the elements of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are present in these cases.

It must be emphasized that in criminal cases involving Section

3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to alleged irregularities in
procurement committed by public officers, "findings of
violations of procurement laws, rules and regulations, on their
own, do not automatically lead to the conviction of the public
officer under the said special penal law. It must be established
beyond reasonable doubt that the essential elements of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 are present."[1]
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Brief review of the facts

The controversy arose from the Countrywide Development

Fund (CDF), a form of "pork-barrel" fund, allocated to
Constantino H. Navarro, Jr. (Navarro), then the representative
of the First District of Surigao del Norte to the House of
Representatives. For the years 1997 to 1998, Navarro's CDF
was "used to purchase assorted medicines, shabu testing kits,
araro (rice paddy plows), notebooks, ballpens and blackboard
erasers."[2] The DILG-CARAGA was one of the implementing
agencies for Navarro's CDF, and Libunao was the Regional
Director of DILG Region XL Libunao participated in two
procurements involving Navarro's CDF:

(1) Procurement of 45 boxes of assorted medicines

from San Marino Laboratories Corporation
(San Marino) in the amount of P2,000,000.00;
and

(2) Procurement of 1,200 sets of araro tools from

Revelstone Sales International (Revelstone) in
the amount of P900,000.00.

It is undisputed that the procurements did not go through

public bidding. The said fact was only discovered, however,
upon post-audit made by the Commission on Audit (COA) on
the utilization of Navarro's CDF. The COA also discovered an
alleged overprice

when they compared the suppliers' purchase price

with the price of the same items obtained through
personal canvass conducted in Surigao City and in
Manila. The canvass was made with the use of a
canvass or quotation forms with the listed items.
The forms were given to suppliers for them to
quote the prices of the items listed.[3]

Based on the result of COA's audit, Informations were

eventually filed in the Sandiganbayan against Navarro, the
Regional Directors of DILG-CARAGA, and the owners of the
companies which were the suppliers for the projects covered
by Navarro's CDF. The accusatory portions of the Informations
where Libunao is one of the accused read:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 27803

[(Procurement of assorted medicines from San Marino)]

That in the month of October 1998, or sometime

prior or subsequent thereto, in Region XIII, Caraga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused CONSTANTINO H.
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NAVARRO, JR., QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO, and

BENITO R. CATINDIG, both high ranking public
officials, being then the Congressman of the 1st
District of Surigao del Norte, the Regional Director
of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG)-Caraga Region, and Assistant
Secretary for Support Services & Regional
Operations, DILG-Quezon City, respectively, all
high ranking public officials, committing the
offense in relation to their official duties and taking
advantage of their official functions, conspiring and
confederating with each other and with accused
ILUMINADA C. TUBLE, President of San Marino
Laboratories Corporation, a private enterprise, and
mutually helping one another, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least,
through gross inexcusable negligence), did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally give
unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to
San Marino Laboratories Corporation and cause
undue injury to the Government, by entering into a
contract, without conducting the required public
bidding, with said San Marino Laboratories, for the
purchase of forty five (45) boxes of assorted
medicine in the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS
(P2,000,000.00), which price was manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government
considering that similar medicines available in the
market, as canvassed by the Commission on Audit
(COA), could have been purchased at only SEVEN
HUNDRED SIXTY TWO THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED SIXTY TWO & 25/100 PESOS
(P762,262.25), inclusive of 10% allowance, thereby
resulting to an overprice in the total amount of
ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY & 75/100 PESOS (P1,237,740.75), to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount of overprice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 27805

[(Procurement of araro tools from Revelstone)]

That during the period from October 16, 1998 to

December 10, 1998, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Region XIII, Caraga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused CONSTANTINO H.
NAVARRO, JR., QUIRINO M. LIBUNAO, and

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BENITO R. CATINDIG, both high ranking public

officials, being then the Congressman of the 1st
District of Surigao del Norte, the Regional Director
of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG)-Caraga Region, and Assistant
Secretary for Support Services & Regional
Operations, DILG-Quezon City, respectively, all
high ranking public officials, committing the
offense in relation to their official duties and taking
advantage of their official functions, conspiring and
confederating with each other and with accused
GERARDO A. ROSARIO and MARIO TOKONG,
proprietor and representative, respectively, of
Revelstone Sales International, a private enterprise,
and mutually helping one another, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least,
through gross inexcusable negligence), did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally give
unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to
Revelstone Sales International and cause undue
injury to the Government, by entering into a
contract, without conducting the required public
bidding, with said Revelstone Sales International,
for the purchase of one thousand two hundred
(1,200) sets of araro tools in the amount of NINE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P900,000.00),
which price was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government considering that
similar araro tools available in the market, as
canvassed by the Commission on Audit (COA),
could have been purchased at only SEVEN
HUNDRED NINETY TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P792,000.00), inclusive of 10% allowance, thereby
resulting to an overprice of in the total amount of
ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS
(P108,000.00), to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount of overprice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

Based on the evidence presented during the trial, the

Sandiganbayan made the following factual findings:

1. The funds used to pay the purchases came

from accused Navarro's CDF;

2. There was no public bidding conducted;

3. Accused Navarro certified the urgency of the

purchases;

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4. The subject purchases had available substitutes

in the market;

5. The accused-suppliers were pre-selected by the

office of accused Navarro before the actual
procurement;

6. All RIV's were signed by accused Navarro;

7. The DILG-CARAGA undertook the

procurement process, including the payments;

8. The DILG-CARAGA delivered the supplies to

the office of accused Navarro;

9. Accused Derecho and Libunao did not deny

their signatures on the documents;

10. Except for accused Rosario of Revelstone, all

accused private individuals admitted to have
received the payments.[6]

From these factual findings, the Sandiganbayan proceeded to

convict Libunao (and Carlos T. Derecho [Derecho], another
Regional Director of DILG-CARAGA who was also an
accused in the other Informations) for violations of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 for their participation in the procurements
which did not undergo public bidding. Particularly with
Libunao, the Sandiganbayan found him guilty because he
approved the Requisition and Issue Vouchers (RIVs) and
Purchase Orders (POs) which were necessary for the
procurement, and he certified in the Disbursement Vouchers
(DVs) that the "expenses were necessary and lawful, and
incurred under his direct supervision."[7]

The ponencia upholds both of Libunao's convictions.

As already mentioned, I agree.

In the recent ruling of the Court en banc in Martel v. People,[8]

the Court emphasized that

in order to successfully prosecute the accused under

Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 based on a violation of
procurement laws, the prosecution cannot solely
rely on the fact that a violation of procurement
laws has been committed. The prosecution must

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prove beyond reasonable doubt that: (1) the

violation of procurement laws caused undue injury
to any party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference, and (2) the accused acted with evident
bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable
negligence.[9]

The prosecution was able to prove the foregoing in both of the

two cases.

Elements of a violation
of Section 3(e), RA
3019

To be found guilty of violating Section 3(e), RA 3019, the

following elements must concur:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public

officer's official, administrative or judicial
functions;

(3) the act was done through manifest partiality,

evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and

(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to

any party, including the Government, or gave
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference.[10]

The existence of the first two elements — that Libunao was a

public officer and the acts in question were done in the
discharge of his official functions — are not disputed. The
disagreement lies in the existence of the third and fourth
elements, particularly whether his act of signing the RIVs,
POs, and DVs during the procurement process even as no
public bidding was undertaken was (1) done in either evident
bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence,
and it (2) resulted in either causing the government undue
injury or giving any private party unwarranted benefits.

Third element: Evident

bad faith, manifest
partiality, or gross
inexcusable negligence

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There is gross inexcusable negligence in this case. '"Gross

inexcusable negligence' refers to negligence characterized by
the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in
a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected."[11]
"More than committing a breach of a legal duty, it is necessary
that in committing the said breach, the public officer was
inattentive, thoughtless, and careless."[12]

In this case, there is indeed gross inexcusable negligence

because, as the ponencia points out, Libunao had been with the
DILG for 39 years, and he himself admitted that he was aware
of the requirement to conduct public bidding for procurements
in the government. Moreover, the following ratiocinations of
the Sandiganbayan deserve merit:

It is unbelievable that he just blindly signed the

[RIVs] and [POs] upon presentation and assurance
of his staff that the documents were in order, such
that he did not know that the method of
procurement used was direct contracting and not
public bidding. The [RIVs] and the [POs] were just
one-page documents, and it was readily
ascertainable on their face that the brands of the
medicines were indicated as well as the suppliers.
In fact, as a ranking official of the DILG and the
deciding authority, the first thing he should have
determined was the mode of procurement employed
in the transactions. He did not have to dig into piles
of records to realize that the purchase did not go
through a public bidding.

[While] it has been held that heads of offices have

to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates
and on the good faith of those who prepare bids,
purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations, it is
not unreasonable to expect [Libunao] to exercise
the necessary diligence in making sure at the very
least that the proper formalities in the questioned
transaction were observed — that public bidding
was conducted. This step does not entail delving
into intricate details of product quality, complete
delivery or fair and accurate pricing. Unlike other
minute requirements in government procurement,
compliance or non-compliance with the rules on
public bidding is readily apparent, and the
approving authority can easily call the attention of
the subordinates concerned.[13]

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Fourth element: Undue

injury or unwarranted
benefits

There is "giving of unwarranted benefits" in these cases. To be

clear, the law punishes the act of "giving [to] any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his [or her] official administrative or judicial
functions."[14] While it was not Libunao but Navarro who gave
Revelstone or San Marino the preferences it obtained as
supplier, Libunao's gross negligence ultimately enabled the
consummation of the transactions, thereby allowing the
aforementioned companies to obtain the unwarranted benefits
they received.

To be clear, I maintain, as I had stressed in the case of

Villarosa v. People,[15] that the element of "unwarranted
benefits" must be seen from the lens of graft and corruption.
Thus:

As its name implies, and as what can be gleaned

from the deliberations of Congress, RA 3019 was
crafted as an anti-graft and corruption measure. At
the heart of the acts punishable under RA 3019 is
corruption. As explained by one of the sponsors of
the law, Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, "[w]hile we
are trying to penalize, the main idea of the bill is
graft and corrupt practices. x x x Well, the idea of
graft is the one emphasized." Graft entails the
acquisition of gain in dishonest ways.

Hence, in saying that a public officer gave

"unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference," it
is not enough that the benefits, advantage, or
preference was obtained in transgression of laws,
rules and regulations. Such benefits must have been
given by the public officer to the private party with
corrupt intent, a dishonest design, or some
unethical interest. This is in alignment with the
spirit of RA 3019, which centers on the concept of
graft.[16]

I recognize, however, that in cases of gross negligence —

meaning, the crime was committed through culpa, not dolo —
the courts cannot expect to be shown proof of "corrupt intent, a
dishonest design, or some unethical interest."[17] Thus, for
cases where the crime was committed through the modality of
gross negligence, it is enough that the actions, or inaction, of
the accused resulted in ultimately causing undue injury or
giving unwarranted benefits. It is well to clarify, however, that

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the negligence must be so gross — as the jurisprudential

definition puts it, "with conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected"[18] — that the
negligence would rise to the level of willfulness to cause
undue injury or give unwarranted benefits.

Having said that, the alternative element of "causing undue

injury to the government" is also present in this case, at least
for the procurement of 45 boxes of assorted medicines from
San Marino.

In Cabrera v. People,[19] the Court explained that an accused

is said to have caused undue injury to the

government or any party when the latter sustains
actual loss or damage, which must exist as a fact
and cannot be based on speculations or
conjectures. The loss or damage need not be
proven with actual certainty. However, there must
be "some reasonable basis by which the court can
measure it." Aside from this, the loss or damage
must be substantial. It must be "more than
necessary, excessive, improper or illegal."[20]

Based on the foregoing standards, the prosecution's evidence

failed to establish the existence of undue injury in the
procurement of 1,200 sets of araro tools from Revelstone but it
was able to establish the same in the procurement of 45 boxes
of assorted medicines from San Marino. For this, I note that
the Sandiganbayan observed that "except for the x x x 45
boxes of medicines from San Marino, the allegation of
overprice was not sufficiently established."[21]

The Sandiganbayan, citing jurisprudence on the matter,

explained that "an allegation of overprice is not provable by
plainly comparing apple to apple or orange to orange. The
comparison must be between the same variety of apples or
oranges, bought at or about the same period, within the same
locality."[22] The prosecution's evidence, however, failed to
comply with the jurisprudential parameters to establish
overprice.[23] The Sandiganbayan also noted that even the
auditor, who was a prosecution witness, "aired a reservation as
to the conclusiveness of their findings of overprice."[24] Thus,
in the absence of any conclusive proof on overprice, there
consists reasonable doubt on the existence of the element of
undue injury.

The foregoing, however, applies only to the procurement of

araro tools from Revelstone. Overprice — and therefore,
undue injury on the part of the government — was duly proven
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in the procurement of 45 boxes of assorted medicines from San

Marino. The Sandiganbayan noticed that in these consolidated
cases, there were two procurements from San Marino: (1)
procurement of 97 boxes of medicines, where the signatory
was Regional Director Derecho, where each box was priced at
P20,628.96; and (2) procurement of 45 boxes of medicines,
where Libunao was the signatory, where each box was priced
at P44,445.00.[25] The Sandiganbayan noted that in both
procurements, the boxes contained the same set of medicines.
[26] The price difference in the two procurements was
acknowledged and admitted by the President of San Marino
herself, and the Sandiganbayan adjudged her civilly liable to
return the overprice of P1,071,721.80.[27]

Given the foregoing proof on overprice, there is thus no doubt

that the element of undue injury was present in the
procurement of the 45 boxes of medicines from San Marino.
Libunao should thus be convicted for violation of Section 3(e)
of RA 3019 for this procurement because his gross inexcusable
negligence caused undue injury to the government in the
amount of P1,071,721.80.

Conclusion

In sum, I find that Libunao should be convicted on both counts

of violating Section 3(e), RA 3019. He should be convicted in
the charge involving the procurement of 45 boxes of medicines
from San Marino, not simply because the procurement did not
go through public bidding as required by law, but because it
was attended by gross inexcusable negligence that caused
undue injury to the government and gave unwarranted benefits
to San Marino. In the same vein, Libunao should be convicted
in the charge involving the procurement of the 1,200 sets of
araro tools from Revelstone, not because the procurement did
not go through public bidding, but because it was attended by
gross inexcusable negligence that gave unwarranted benefits to
Revelstone.

Based on these premises, I vote to DISMISS the appeal and

AFFIRM the conviction of petitioner Quirino M. Libunao for
two (2) counts of violating Section 3(e), Republic Act No.
3019.

[1] Martel v. People, G.R. Nos. 224720-23 & 224765-68,

February 2, 2021, accessed at <https://elibrary.
judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/67194>.

[2] Rollo, p. 87.

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[3] Id. at 71.

[4] Id. at 65-65.

[5] Id. at 66.

[6] Id. at 102-103.

[7] Id. at 109.

[8] Supra note 1.

[9] Id.

[10] Sison v. People, 628 Phil. 573, 583 (2010).

[11]
Albert v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164015, February 26,
2009, 580 SCRA 279, 290.

[12] Martel v. People, supra note 1.

[13] Rollo, pp. 110-111.

[14] RA 3019, Sec. 3(e).

[15] G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020, accessed at

<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs
/1/66280>. Italics and underscoring in the original.

[16]Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin

S. Caguioa in Villarosa v. People, G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June
23, 2020, accessed at
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66280>.

[17] Id.

[18] Supra note 14.

[19]Cabrera v. People, G.R. Nos. 191611-14, July 29, 2019,

910 SCRA 578.

[20] Id. at 588. Emphasis supplied.

[21] Rollo, p. 114.

[22] Id. at 117.

[23] Id. at 115.

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[24] Id. at 116.

[25] Id. at 112.

[26] Id.

[27] Id. at 121.

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