MODULE 2

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

1. TERRITORY (ART. I, 1987 Constitution)

8. Magallona vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 187167. July 16, 2011
Facts:

RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I.

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the government reserved the drawing of
baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in compliance with UNCLOS III in which the
Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and
Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory of
the Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states
to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty, national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the classification of
Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.

Issues:

1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

Petition is dismissed.

1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the citizens who will be directly injured and
benefitted in affording relief over the remedy sought.

2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zone
and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided
under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use
rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from
the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said
distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the treaty—the role
played by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of
merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216
square nautical miles.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA
9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the
length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the
country, for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had
to consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the
classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III.

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around
the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. Petitioners
 contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the
right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The
Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air
space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not
bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles of
international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the
Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated thereto.

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of archipelagic states in exchange for
their right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its
exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone.
Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the
maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the passing of a law and not the Court.
Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for
its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around
our archipelago and it will weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522,
allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is
therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our
national interest.

9. Arigo vs. Swift, G.R. No. 206510. Sept. 16, 2014

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the
Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port
of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for
Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20
a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-
southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial
interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just
a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
 In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which,
for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to
exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have
legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.

Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over
the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its
warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within
the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they
fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial
sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the
following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards
any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of
warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters
with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself
bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep
seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do
with its the US’ acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.”

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the
rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
“international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve
our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal
waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS
directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in
formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the
protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of
warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the
territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their
warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present
petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US
personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for
a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same
vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages,
including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law.

10. The South China Sea Arbitration. 12 July 2016

2. GOVERNMENT
a. Functions
11. PVTA vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-32052. July 25, 1975
12. Romualdez-Yap vs. CSC, G.R. No. 104226. Aug. 12, 1993

b. Doctrine of Parens Patriae

11. Govt. of P. I. vs. Monte De Piedad, G.R. No. L-9959. Dec. 13, 1916
12. Cabañas vs. Pilapil, G.R. No. L-25843. July 25, 1974
13. Vasco vs. CA, G.R. No. L-46763. Feb. 28, 1978
14. People vs. Casipit, G.R. No. 88229. May 31, 1994

c. Act of State
15. Andrew Harvey et.al vs. Commissioner (Miriam Defensor Santiago), G.R. No. 82544. June 28 , 1988/Melencio-Herrera, J.

FACTS ISSUE RULING

Andrew Harvey and John Sherman – American 1--WON there is no provision under 1— The deportation charges instituted by
nationals in Pagsanjan, Laguna. One is Dutch. Section 69 of the Revised Administrative respondent Commissioner are in accordance
Code to authorize the commissioner to with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration
Apprehension for suspected alien pedophiles – by arrest and detain petitioners. Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) Revised Administrative Code.
issued by Miriam Santiago. Detained at CID "(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon
Detention Center with photos of suspected child the warrant of the Commissioner of
prostitutes, boys and girls in sex act. Immigration and Deportation or any other
officer designated by him for the purpose and
2 days after apprehension – chose to face deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner
deportation. of Immigration and Deportation after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of
Deportation proceedings -- for being undesirable the existence of the ground for deportation as
 aliens under Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative charged against the alien;
Code. Charged for deportation.
"Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign
power. A subject of a foreign power residing in
Filed Urgent Petition for Release – due to health the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled,
affected by continuous detention. Doctors certified or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to
they are healthy. his own country by the President of the
Philippines except upon prior investigation,
Filed Petition for Bail – denied. conducted by said Executive or his authorized
agent, of the ground upon which such action is
Availed of Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus -- contemplated. In such a case the person
questioned the validity of their detention. concerned shall be informed of the charge or
charges against him and he shall be allowed not
less than 3 days for the preparation of his
defense. He shall also have the right to be heard
by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his
own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing
witnesses."

2--WON the respondent violated 2--arrest of petitioners was based on probable

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 cause determined after close surveillance for
Constitution prohibiting unreasonable three (3) months during which period their
searches and seizures since the CID activities were monitored. The existence of
agents were not clothed with valid probable cause justified the arrest and the
Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and
required by the said provision. posters without warrant.

3—While not a crime under the Revised Penal

3--WON pedophile is not punishable by Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals
any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be and violative of the declared policy of the State
a pedophile. to promote and protect the physical, moral,
spiritual, and social well-being of our youth
(Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution).

PETITION is dismissed. Writ of Habeas Corpus is

DENIED.

d. De Jure vs. De Facto Government (A de jure government is the legal, legitimate government of a state and is so recognized by other states.
In contrast, a de facto government is in actual possession of authority and control of the state.)

16. Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, G.R. No. L-5. Sept. 17, 1945

FACTS ISSUE RULING

Respondent – refused to take an action and to 1--Whether the judicial acts and 1-- YES. It is a legal truism in political and
continue the proceedings of Co Kim Chan’s civil proceedings of the court existing in the international law that all acts and proceedings of
case 3012. Philippines under the Philippine the legislative, executive, and judicial
Executive Commission were good and departments of a de facto government are good
Proclamation by Gen Douglas MacArthur – valid and remained so even after the and valid. The question to be determined is
invalidates and nullifies all judicial proceedings, liberation of the Philippines by the whether or not the governments established in
judgments of the courts of the Phils under United States and Filipino forces; these Islands under the names of the Philippine
Philippines executive Commission. Executive Commission and Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation or regime were de
facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts
and proceedings of those governments remain
good and valid even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American
 and Filipino forces.

2-- NO. The proclamation of General MacArthur

of October 23, 1944, which declared that “all
laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the
2--Whether the proclamation issued by said Commonwealth are null and void without
General Douglas MacArthur, in which he legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
declared “that all laws, regulations and enemy occupation and control,” has not
processes of any of the government in invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings,
the Philippines than that of the said which are not a political complexion, of the
Commonwealth are null and void and courts of justice in the Philippines that were
without legal effect in areas of the continued by the Philippine Executive
Philippines free of enemy occupation Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
and control,” has invalidated all during the Japanese military occupation, and that
judgments and judicial acts and said judicial acts and proceedings were good and
proceedings of the said courts valid before and now good and valid after the
reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by
the American and Filipino forces.
3--If the said judicial acts and
proceedings have not been invalidated
by said proclamation, whether the 3-- YES. It is a legal maxim, that excepting that of
present courts of the Commonwealth, a political nature, “Law once established
may continue those proceedings continues until changed by the some competent
pending in said courts at the time the legislative power. It is not changed merely by
Philippines were reoccupied and change of sovereignty.” (Joseph H. Beale, Cases
liberated by the United States and on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary Section 9, citing
Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As
of the Philippines were reestablished in the same author says, in his Treatise on the
the Islands. Conflict on Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131):
“There can no break or interregnum in law. From
the time the law comes into existence with the
first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it
must last until the final disappearance of human
society. Once created, it persists until a change
take place, and when changed it continues in
such changed condition until the next change,
and so forever. Conquest or colonization is
impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of
change of constitution, the law continues
unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative
acts creates a change.”

It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts

have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment,
the proceedings in cases, not of political
complexion, pending therein at the time of the
restoration of the Commonwealth Government.

17. Lawyers’ League vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748. May 22, 1986 (not sure)

FACTS ISSUE RULING

G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986

IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner.

R E S O L U T IO N
PER CURIAM:

In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as
erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the question of the
construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the
elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII
of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . ...

The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.

Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to bring this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it is elementary that this Court
assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent
President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.

The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly
gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent
President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to
noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding
on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous
cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not
established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that:

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not
merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
tlie present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic
under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon
C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990
[Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])

For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that President
Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the
Philippines.or the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar,

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

FELICIANO, JJ., concurring.

The petitioner asks the Court to declare who are "the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 elections" as
stated in Article XVIII, Section 5 of the Draft Constitution adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986.
We agree that the petition deserves outright dismissal as this Court has no original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.

As to lack of cause of action, the petitioner's prayer for a declaration as to who were elected President and Vice President in the February 7,
1986 elections should be addressed not to this Court but to other departments of government constitutionally burdened with the task of
making that declaration.

The 1935 Constitution, the 1913 Constitution as amended, and the 1986 Draft Constitution uniformly provide 'that boards of canvassers in each
province and city shall certified who were elected President and Vice President in their respective areas. The certified returns are transmitted to
the legislature which proclaims, through the designated Presiding Head, who were duty elected.

Copies of the certified returns from the provincial and city boards of canvassers have not been furnished this Court nor is there any need to do
so. In the absence of a legislature, we cannot assume the function of stating, and neither do we have any factual or legal capacity to officially
declare, who were elected President and Vice President in the February 7, 1986 elections.

As to who are the incumbent President and Vice President referred to in the 1986 Draft Constitution, we agree that there is no doubt the 1986
Constitutional Commission referred to President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice President Salvador H. Laurel.

Finally, we agree with the Resolution of the Court in G.R. Nos. 73748, 73972, and 73990.

For the foregoing reasons, we vote to DISMISS the instant petition.

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I vote to dismiss this petition on the ground that the Constitution we are asked to interpret has not yet been ratified and is therefore not yet
effective. I see here no actual conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination at this time. (Aetna Life Insurance Co. vs. Haworth, 300
U.S. 227; PACU vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806.)

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE C. SOVEREIGNTY

1. Effect of Belligerent Occupation on Political Laws

18. Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-533. Aug. 20, 1946

FACTS ISSUE RULING

Japanese revolution in the Phils – military men WON the petitioners subject to the The petition has no merit and that it should be
were assigned at camps. military law at the time of war and dismissed with costs.
Japanese occupation?
Japanese reached Mindoro – Ruffy and group were The petitioners were subject to military law. By
forced to retreat to mountains. their acceptance of appointments as officers in
the Bolo Area, they became members of the
Bolo Area – was organized. Philippine Army—the Bolo Area being a
contingent of the 6th military district which is
Capt. Esteban Beloncio –relieved RUffy and team recognized by the United States army. Thus,
from their positions and duties in the Bolo Area. petitioners are covered by the National Defense
Act, Articles of War, and other pertinent laws
Lieut. Col. Jurado – was slained allegedly by the during an occupation.
petitioners. Murdered.
 19. Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, G.R. No. L-409. Jan. 30, 1947

FACTS ISSUE RULING

Petitioner Laurel – filed petition for Habeas Corpus, Issue: WON enemy occupation can NO. Absolute and permanent allegiance to the
Filipino citizen who aids and comforts an enemy suspend the allegiance of a Filipino gov.
during the Japanese occupation is not treason citizen during the Japanese occupation.
penalized by Art 114 of RPC. Territory occupied by the enemies does not
severe our permanent allegiance, not transferred
Reasons: 1. Phil gov is suspended, so as allegiance to the occupier.
2. change of sovereignty of Filipino citizens upon
the proclamation of Philippine Republic. Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that
“The government established by this constitution
shall be known as the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Upon the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United
States and the proclamation of Philippine
independence, the Commonwealth of the
Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the
Republic of the Philippines.”

2. Effect of Cession on Political Laws

20. People vs. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463. Oct. 4, 1922

G.R. No. L-18463 October 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.

Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing,
shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force.

About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which constituted the
records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. Shortly thereafter, the Philippine
Senate, having been called into special session by the Governor-General, the Secretary for the Senate informed that body of the loss of the
documents and of the steps taken by him to discover the guilty party. The day following the convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920, the
newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading as follows:

Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of records which were kept and preserved
in the iron safe of the Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication that the author or authors of the crime will ever
be discovered.
 To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and the persons in charge of the investigation of the
case would not have to display great skill in order to succeed in their undertaking, unless they should encounter the insuperable
obstacle of offical concealment.

In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy and nothing more.

After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances that have surrounded it, does not surprise us at all.

The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of the place in which it was committed.

How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their conscience and with serenity of mind, that they do not owe
their victory to electoral robbery? How may?

The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of
certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery.

The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution authorizing its committee on elections and privileges to report
as to the action which should be taken with reference to the article published in La Nacion. On September 15, 1920, the Senate adopted a
resolution authorizing the President of the Senate to indorse to the Attorney-General, for his study and corresponding action, all the papers
referring to the case of the newspaper La Nacion and its editor, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto. As a result, an information was filed in the municipal
court of the City of Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the editorial in question was set out and in which it was alleged that the same
constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in
the Court of First Instance of Manila.

During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the defense moved for the dismissal of the case.
On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in force, the trial judge, the
Honorable George R. Harvey, said:

This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code of Spain for the protection of the Ministers of the Crown
and other representatives of the King against free speech and action by Spanish subjects. A severe punishment was prescribed
because it was doubtless considered a much more serious offense to insult the King's representative than to insult an ordinary
individual. This provision, with almost all the other articles of that Code, was extended to the Philippine Islands when under the
dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the Philippines might defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other
representatives of His Majesty. We now have no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority in the Philippines representing
the King of Spain, and said provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but
the Supreme Corut of the Philippine Islands has, by a majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land to-day. . . .

The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is binding upon this court until otherwise determined by proper
authority.

In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following language:

In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and little importance is attached to them,
because they are generally the result of political controversy and are usually regarded as more or less colored or exaggerated.
Attacks of this character upon a legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such publications are
reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to the application of the provision of law under which this case was filed. Our Penal
Code has come to us from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code prescribes punishment for persons who use insulting
language about Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain doubtless left the need of such protection to his
ministers and others in authority in the Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was made applicable here.
Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in a majority decision, has held that this provision is still in force,
and that one who made an insulting remark about the President of the United States was punishable under it.
(U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it would appear to be applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256 must be
enforced, without fear or favor, until it shall be repealed or superseded by other legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall
otherwise determine.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as charged in the information and under article 256 of
their Penal Code sentences him to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and the accessory penalties prescribed by law,
and to pay the costs of both instances.
The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an extensive brief, and eloquent oral argument made in his own
behalf and by his learned counsel, all reduce themselves to the pertinent and decisive question which was announced in the beginning of this
decision.

It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the rule announced in the case of United
States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, 1 not published). In that case, the accused was charged with having said, "To hell with the President and his
proclamations, or words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty in a judgment rendered by the Court
of First Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the Supreme Court, with the writer of the instant decision dissenting on two principal
grounds: (1) That the accused was deprived of the constitutional right of cross-examination, and (2) that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is
no longer in force. Subsequently, on a motion of reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the Court of First Instance had committed
a prejudicial error in depriving the accused of his right to cross-examine a principal witness, set aside the judgment affirming the judgment
appealed from and ordered the return of the record to the court of origin for the celebration of a new trial. Whether such a trial was actually
had, is not known, but at least, the record in the Helbig case has never again been elevated to this court.

There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the Helbig case, in view of the circumstances above described. This
much, however, is certain: The facts of the Helbig case and the case before us, which we may term the Perfecto case, are different, for in the
first case there was an oral defamation, while in the second there is a written defamation. Not only this, but a new point which, under the facts,
could not have been considered in the Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto case, urged upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent to all, the appellate
court is not restrained, as was the trial court, by strict adherence to a former decision. We much prefer to resolve the question before us
unhindered by references to the Helbig decision.

This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same result can be had. A majority of the court are of the opinion that
the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates to written defamation,
abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor
of the Libel Law. The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in the information do
not constitute a violation of article 156 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe that article 256 was abrogated completely by the
change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and is inconsistent with democratic principles of government.

Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position, we will discuss the two main points just mentioned.

1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. — The Libel Law, Act No. 277, was enacted
by the Philippine Commission shortly after organization of this legislative body. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation,
expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the
memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural deffects of one who is
alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws now in
force, so far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."

That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith, and that the Libel Law abrogated certain portion
of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults, must have
been particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the Supreme
Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injuria." Recently, specific attention was
given to the effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with calumny and insults, and it was found that those provisions
of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults in which the elements of writing an publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law.
(People vs. Castro [1922], p. 842, ante.)

The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance article 256.

The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in writing, which may have had the tendency to impeach the
honesty, virtue, or reputation of members of the Philippine Senate, thereby possibly exposing them to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,
which is exactly libel, as defined by the Libel Law. Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that a libel is indictable when defaming a "body
of persons definite and small enough for individual members to be recognized as such, in or by means of anything capable of being a libel."
(Digest of Criminal Law, art. 267.) But in the United States, while it may be proper to prosecute criminally the author of a libel charging a
legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a legislature, are within the range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention
and effect be seditious. (3 Wharton's Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal principles in mind, recall that article 256 begins: Any
person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority," etc.

The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule of statutory construction is, that where the
later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give
expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory
Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons, it is evident that Act No. 277 had the effect so much of this article as punishes defamation, abuse,
or insults by writing.
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256, but as to this point, it is not
necessary to make a pronouncement.

2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the Philippine son article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. —
Appellant's main proposition in the lower court and again energetically pressed in the appellate court was that article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code is not now in force because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines
and because inconsistent with democratic principles of government. This view was indirectly favored by the trial judge, and, as
before stated, is the opinion of three members of this court.

Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. Title I of Book II punishes the crimes of treason, crimes that
endanger the peace or independence of the state, crimes against international law, and the crime of piracy. Title II of the same book punishes
the crimes of lese majeste, crimes against the Cortes and its members and against the council of ministers, crimes against the form of
government, and crimes committed on the occasion of the exercise of rights guaranteed by the fundamental laws of the state, including crime
against religion and worship. Title III of the same Book, in which article 256 is found, punishes the crimes of rebellion, sedition, assaults upon
persons in authority, and their agents, and contempts, insults, injurias, and threats against persons in authority, and insults, injurias, and
threats against their agents and other public officers, the last being the title to Chapter V. The first two articles in Chapter V define and punish
the offense of contempt committed by any one who shall be word or deed defame, abuse, insult, or threathen a minister of the crown, or any
person in authority. The with an article condemning challenges to fight duels intervening, comes article 256, now being weighed in the balance.
It reads as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in
authority, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that the offensive minister or
person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor," — that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult
of any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of America), or other
person in authority in the Monarchy of Spain.

It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, lese majeste, religion
and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are not longer in force. Our present task, therefore, is a
determination of whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the nature of a municipal law or
political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the characteristics and institutions of the American
Government.

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.
"Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance
Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542; Roa vs. Collector of Customs
[1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion in the case of
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict
with the political character, institutions and Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political
jurisdiction and legislative power — and the latter is involved in the former — to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an
established religion or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be
of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted that
the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that
they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the
Constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander dated May 28, 1898, and by
proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the
punishment of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things. But President McKinley,
in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to say: "The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of
the former political relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power." From that day to this, the ordinarily it has been
taken for granted that the provisions under consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the language of the United States Supreme Court
in Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there was not and could not be, except as precise questions were presented, a careful
consideration of the codal provisions and a determination of the extent to which they accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great
principles of liberty and law' which had been 'made the basis of our governmental system.' " But when the question has been squarely raised,
the appellate court has been forced on occasion to hold certain portions of the Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American
constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533;
Weems vs. U.S., supra.)

The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under American sovereignty was outlined by President McKinley in that
Magna Charta of Philippine liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. In part, the President said:

In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the Commission should bear in
mind that he government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical
views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be
made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment
 of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government. At the same time the Commission should bear in mind, and the
people of the Islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been
made the basis of our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom,
and of which they have, unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical rules of
government which we have found to be essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and that these
principles and these rules of government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and
happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar. It is evident that the
most enligthened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of these principles and rules, and they will
inevitably within a short time command universal assent.

The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking for our Supreme Court, in the case of United States vs. Bull ([1910],
15 Phil., 7), said: "The President and Congress framed the government on the model with which American are familiar, and which has proven
best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and privileges."

Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made that the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the
Philippine Islands and their customs, habits, and prejudices, to follow the language of President McKinley, demand obeisance to authority, and
royal protection for that authority.

According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the
representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, as set up in the Philippines. It
was in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely for convenience certain of the existing institutions and laws were continued. The
demands which the new government made, and makes, on the individual citizen are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of the
Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our
Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man. We have no rank or station,
except that of respectability and intelligence as opposed to indecency and ignorance, and the door to this rank stands open to every man to
freely enter and abide therein, if he is qualified, and whether he is qualified or not depends upon the life and character and attainments and
conduct of each person for himself. Every man may lawfully do what he will, so long as it is not malum in se or malum prohibitum or does not
infringe upon the qually sacred rights of others." (State vs. Shepherd [1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)

It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of the United States are derived, there were once statutes
of scandalum magnatum, under which words which would not be actionable if spoken of an ordinary subject were made actionable if spoken of
a peer of the realm or of any of the great officers of the Crown, without proof of any special damage. The Crown of England, unfortunately,
took a view less tolerant that that of other sovereigns, as for instance, the Emperors Augustus, Caesar, and Tiberius. These English statutes
have, however, long since, become obsolete, while in the United States, the offense of scandalum magnatum is not known. In the early days of
the American Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making it an offense to libel the Government, the Congress, or the President of the United
States, but the law met with so much popular disapproval, that it was soon repealed. "In this country no distinction as to persons is recognized,
and in practice a person holding a high office is regarded as a target at whom any person may let fly his poisonous words. High official position,
instead of affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as making his character free plunder for any
one who desires to create a senation by attacking it." (Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245; Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A.,
680.)

Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. The
gulf which separates this article from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a
monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United States. This article was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States
established its authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted
monarchical conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the protection of the interests of the
public, have been obliterated by the present system of government in the Islands. 1awph!l.net

From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its terms are
broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon
American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant
of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority
and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due,
but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls
for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks.

The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under
the American flag.

To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should be
reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ARAULLO, C.J., concurring:

I concur with the dispositive part of the foregoing decision, that is, with the acquittal of the accused, for the sole reason that the facts alleged in
the information do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code; for although that article is in force with respect to calumny,
injuria, or insult, by deed or word, against an authority in the performance of his duties or by reason thereof, outside of his presence, it is
repealed by the Libel Law in so far as it refers to calumny, injuria, or insult committed against an authority by writing or printing, as was that
inserted in the said information.

ROMUALDEZ, J., concurring:

I concur with the result. I believe that the responsibility of the accused has not been shown either under article 256 of the Penal Code or under
the Libel Law.

I am of the opinion that article 256 of the Penal Code is still in force, except as it refers to "Ministers of the Crown," whom we do not have in
our Government, and to calumny, injuria, or insult, by writing or printing, committed against an authority in the performance of his duties or by
reason thereof, which portion was repealed by the Libel Law.

Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

21. Macariola vs. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J. May 31, 1982
Bernardita Macariola vs. Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI Leyte

A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114 SCRA 77

FACTS:

In 1963, Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a dispute over their inheritance involving parcels of land located in Leyte. A trial
ensued and Judge Macariola, after determining the legibility of the parties to inherit rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter,
the counsels of the parties submitted a project partition reflecting the preference of the parties. The project partition was, however,
unsigned by Macariola. But her lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly authorized by Macariola as counsel. The judge then
approved the project partition. The decision became final in 1963 as well.

Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold the property to judge Asuncion in 1965.

On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with “acts unbecoming a judge” on the ground that he bought a
property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was involved in a civil case decided by him; this act by Asuncion is averred by
Macariola to be against Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil Code which provides:

"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the
mediation of another:

xxx xxx xxx

 "(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with
the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall
apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession".

Also, Macariola said that Asuncion’s act tainted his earlier judgment. Macariola said that the project partition was unsigned by her
and that what was given to her in the partition were insignificant portions of the parcels of land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision.

HELD:

No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought the property in 1965 – 2 years after his decision
became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the property directly from any of the parties since the property was directly bought by
Galapon, who then sold the property to Asuncion. There was no showing that Galapon acted as a “dummy” of Asuncion.

Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a gross inequality in the partition; or that what she got were insignificant portions
of the land.

The Supreme Court however admonished Judge Asuncion to be more discreet in his personal transactions.

3. Effect of Belligerent Occupation on Municipal Laws

22. Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-49. Nov. 12, 1945

Facts:

Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production,
procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries... was prosecuted for the crime of robbery

He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced... to serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction

The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7
"was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of... which are repugnant to those
aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null
and void... that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve... the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the
Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code."... he City
Fisc

The City Fiscal of Manila... submits that the petition for habeas corpus be denied on the following grounds: That the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal

Jurisdiction and the Acts, Ordinances and Executive Orders, creating it are not of a political complexion, for said Court was created, and the
crimes and offenses placed under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily, in response to an urgent... necessity, according to the preamble of
Ordinance No. 7; that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional right; and that the summary procedure established in said
Ordinance No. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III, section 1 (18) of the

Constitution of the Commonwealth, to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, nor of the provision of
section 1 (1) of the same Article that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without... due process of law.

Issues:
The questions which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the law of nations are, first, the validity of the creation of the Court
of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the ... summary procedure adopted for that court; secondly, the validity of the
sentence which imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of life imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation; and thirdly, if they were
then valid, the effect on... said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth
Government.

Ruling:

"The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government
by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the

Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority
was the same the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation... of October 23, 1944, a
portion of which has been already quoted, 'under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines" was
established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the... peoples' will nor the sanction of the Government of the
United States.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or
recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people,... before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an
absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations."

(1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to be
considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is... well established in International Law that
"The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered
state, it is drawn entirely from the law martial as denned in the... usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through
special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and
authorities of the... occupied district."

A belligerent "occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far as, he admits the
administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless,... so far as is necessary for military purposes, or for the maintenance of
public order and safety, temporarily alter the laws, especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administered as well as the laws
regarding... procedure." (Oppenheim'si International Law, Vol. II, sixth edition, 1944, p. 349.)

It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing
upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the admitted power or... competence of the belligerent
occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted.

In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith,
without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

23. Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-6. Nov. 29, 1945

[ G.R. No. L-6, November 29, 1945 ]

ANICETO ALCANTARA, PETITIONER, VS. DIRECTOR OP PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
FERIA, J:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the petitioner on the ground that the latter is unlawfully
imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent Director of Prisons in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur.

Petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Criminal case No. 23) of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less
serious physical injuries. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon at Baguio modified said sentence (CA-G. R. No. 790) and
sentenced the petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of from four months and twenty-one days of arresto mayor to three years, nine months
and three days of prision correccional. The sentence as modified became final on September 12, 1944, and on June 23, 1945, petitioner
commenced serving his sentence.

Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, on the sole ground that said court was only a
creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation of the Islands; that the Court of Appeals was not
authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio, and that only two Justices constituted the majority which promulgated the
decision in question. The petitioner does not question the validity of said decision on the strength of the Proclamation of General Douglas
MaeArthur of October 23, 1944,.which according to our decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, G. R. No. L-5 (p.
113, ante), does not refer to judicial processes.

In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, this Court ruled that the so-called Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine
Executive Commission established in the Philippines during the Japanese regime were governments de facto organized by the belligerent
occupant, and the judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government, except those of a political complexion. In that same case this Court held that the Court of Appeals which was continued
throughout the Japanese occupation, was the same Court of Appeals that existed prior to the Japanese occupation and was lately abolished by
Executive Order No. 37. The division of the Court of Appeals into several District Courts of Appeals, and the reduction of the number of Justices
sitting in each division, during the regime of the so-called Republic, effected no substantial change in its nature and jurisdiction.

Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court created by the belligerent occupant or the de facto governments
established by him, the judgments of such court, like those of the courts which were continued during the Japanese occupation, were good and
valid and remain good and valid, and therefore enforceable now after the liberation or occupation of the Philippines, provided that such
judgments do not have a political complexion, as this court held in its decision in the above- mentioned case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
and Dizon supra, in accordance with the authorities therein cited.

Obviously, the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He was charged with and convicted of an offense
punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth, the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the sentence of the Court of First Instance of
Uocos Sur, as modified by the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, is valid and enforceable.

A punitive or penal sentence is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes either a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts
already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as new offenses
committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the
protection of the army of the occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to
aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant.

As examples, the crimes against national security, such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc.,
were crimes against the Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised Penal Code, which were made crimes against the
belligerent occupant.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for the writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

CONCURRING

DE JOYA, J.,

The principal question involved in this habeas corpus case is the validity of the judicial proceedings held, during the Japanese occupation, in the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which herein petitioner was accused of frustrated murder, and in the Court of Appeals of Northern
Luzon, in which, on appeal, said petitioner was found guilty of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries, and sentenced to a
term of imprisonment ranging from four months and twenty-one days of arresto mayor to three years, nine months and three days of prision
correcional; and the effect on said proceedings of the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944. The decision of this
question requires the application of principles of International Law, in connection with the municipal law of this country.

Under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, International Law is a part of the fundamental law of the land (Article II, sec.
3). As International Law is an integral part of our law, it must be ascertained and administered by this Court, whenever questions of right
depending upon it are presented for our determination (Kansas vs. Colorado, 185 U. S., 146; 22 Sup. Ct., 552; 46 Law. ed., 838).

Since International Law is a body of rules accepted by nations as regulating their mutual relations, the proof of their existence is to be found in
the consent of nations to abide by them; and this consent is evidenced chiefly by the usages and customs of nations, as found in the writings of
publicists and in the decisions of the highest courts of the different countries of the world (The Habana, 175 U. S., 677; 20 Sup. Ct, 290; 44 Law.
ed., 320).

But while usages and customs are the older and original source of International Law, great international treaties are a later source of increasing
importance, such as The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

The Hague Convention of 1899, respecting laws and customs of war on land, expressly declares that:

"ARTICLE XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.

"The occupation applies only to the territory where such authority is established, and in a position to assert itself.

ART. XLII. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power
to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country." (32 Stat, II, 1821.)
The above provisions of The Hague Conventions have been adopted by the nations giving adherence to them, among which is the United States
of America (32 Stat., II, 1821).

The commander in chief of the invading forces or military occupant may exercise governmental authority, but only when in actual possession of
the enemy's territory, and this authority will be exercised upon principles of International Law (New Orleans vs. Steamship Co. [1874], 20 Wall.,
387; Kelly vs. Sanders [1878], 99 U. S., 441; Macleod vs. United States, 229 U. S., 416; 33 Sup Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260; II Oppenheim on
International Law, sec. 167).

It will thus be readily seen that the civil laws of the invaded state continue in force, in so far as they do not affect the hostile occupant
unfavorably. The regular judicial tribunals of the occupied territory continue to act in cases not affecting the military occupation, and it is not
usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands, because it is easier to preserve order through the agency of the
native officials, and also because the latter are more competent to adininister the laws of the territory; and the military occupant generally
keeps in their posts such of the judicial and administrative officers as are willing to serve under him, subjecting them only to supervision by the
military authorities, or by superior civil authorities appointed by him (Young vs. United States, 97 U. S., 39; 24 Law. ed., 992;
Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U. S., 509; 24 Law. ed., 1118; Macleod vs. United States, 229 U. S., 416; 33 Sup Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260 Taylor,
International Law, sees. 576, 578; Wilson, International Law, pp. 331-337; Hall, International Law, 6th ed. [1909], pp. 464, 465, 475, 476;
Lawrence, International Law, 7th ed., pp. 412, 413; Davis, Elements of International Law, 3d ed., pp. 330-332, 335; Holland, International Law,
pp. 356, 357, 359; Westlake, International Law, Part II, War, 2d ed., pp. 121-123).

In 1811, during the occupation of Catalonia, Spain, by the French army, a Frenchman, accused of the murder of a Catalan in that province, was
tried and convicted by the assize Court of the Department of the Pyrenees Orientales, France. Upon appeal to the French Court of Cassation,
the conviction was quashed, on the ground that the courts of the territory within which the crime had been committed had exclusive
jurisdiction to try the case and that "the occupation of Catalonia by French troops and its government by the French authorities had not
communicated to its inhabitants the character of French citizens, nor to their territory the character of French territory, and that such character
could only be acquired by a solemn act of incorporation which had not been gone through." (Hall, International Law, 6th ed., p. 461.)

It is, therefore, evident that the establishment of the government under the name of the Philippine Executive Commission, or the so-called
Philippine Republic, afterwards, during Japanese occupation, respecting the laws in force in the country, and permitting our courts to function
and administer said laws, as proclaimed in the City of Manila, by the commander in chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces, on January 3, 1942,
was in accordance with the rules and principles of International Law.

If the military occupant is thus in duty bound to establish in the territory under military occupation governmental agencies for the preservation
of peace and order and for the proper administration of justice, in accordance with the local laws, it must necessarily follow that the judicial
proceedings conducted before the courts established by the military occupant must be considered legal and valid, even after said government
established by the military occupant had been displaced by the legitimate goverament of the territory.

Thus the judgments rendered by the Confederate Courts, during the American Civil War, merely setting the rights of private parties actually
within their jurisdiction, not tending to defeat the legal rights of citizens of the United States, nor in furtherance of laws passed in aid of the
rebellion, had been declared valid and binding (Cook vs. Oliver, 1 Woods, 437; Fed. Cas., No. 3, 164; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U. S., 509; 24
Law. ed., 1118; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U. S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 459; Texas vs. White, 7
Wall., 700; Ketchum vs. Buckley [1878], 99 U. S., 188); and the judgment of a court of Georgia rendered in November, 1861, for the purchase
money of slaves was held valid judgment when entered, and enforceable in 1871 (French vs. Tumllin, 10 Am. Law. Reg. [N. S.], 641; Fed. Case,
No. 5104).

The judgments rendered by the courts of the states constituting the Confederate States of America were considered legal and valid and
enforceable, even after the termination of the American Civil War, because they had been rendered by the courts of a de facto government.
The Confederate States were a de facto government, in the sense that its citizens were bound to render the government obedience in civil
matters, and did not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for such acts of obedience (Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall. [U. S.] 9; 19 Law. ed., 361).

In the more recent case of Ketchum vs. Buckley ([1878], 99 U. S., 188), the Supreme Court of the United States held "It is now settled law in this
court that during the late civil war the same general form of government, the same general law for the administration of justice and the
protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far as the
acts of the States did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights of the citizens, under the
Constitution, they are in general to be treated as valid and binding." (Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U. S., 176; Horn vs. Lockharfc, 17 Wall., 570;
Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall, 459; Texas vs. White, 7 Wall., 700.)

The government established in the Philippines, during Japanese occupation, would seem to fall under the following definition of de facto
government given by the Supreme Court of the United States:

"But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly
denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1) that its existence is maintained by active military
power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2) that while it exists it must
necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become
responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are
established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be
administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force." (MacLeod vs. United States [1913], 229 U. S., 416.)
The government established in the Philippines, under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the so-called Philippine Republic, during
Japanese occupation, was and should, therefore, be considered as a de facto government; and that the judicial proceedings conducted before
the courts which had been established in this country, during said Japanese occupation, are and should be considered legal and valid and
enforceable, even after the liberation of this country by the American forces, as long as said judicial proceedings had been conducted, in
accordance with the law of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The judicial proceedings involved in the case under consideration merely refer to the prosecution of the petitioner in this case, for the crime of
frustrated murder, which was reduced to illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries, under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, in force in this country under the Commonwealth government, before and during Japanese occupation.

Now, petitioner contends that the judicial proceedings in question are null and void, and that the accused should be immediately released from
custody, under the provisions of the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944; as said proclamation nullifies
all the laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

In other words, petitioner demands a literal interpretation of said proclamation issued by General MacArthur, a contention which, in our
opinion, is untenable, as it would inevitably produce judicial chaos and uncertainties. When an act is susceptible of two or more constructions,
one of which will maintain and the others destroy it, the Courts will always adopt the former (United States vs. Coombs [1838], 12 Pet., 72; 9
Law. ed., 1004; Board of Supervisors of Grenada County vs. Brown [1884], 112 U. S., 261; 28 Law. ed., 704; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep., 125; In re Guarina
[1913], 24 Phil, 37; Fuentes vs. Director of Prisons [1924], 46 Phil., 22; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385). The judiciary, always alive
to the dictates of national welfare, can properly incline the scales of its decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote
the public policy (Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136). All laws should receive a sensible construction as not to lead to
injustice, oppresion or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language,
which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter (United States vs. Kirby, 7 Wall. [U.
S.], 482; 19 Law. ed, 278; Church of Holy Trinity vs. United States, 143 U. S., 461; 12 Sup. Ci, 511; 36 Law. ed., 226; Jacobson vs. Massachusetts,
197 U. S., 39; 25 Sup. Ct, 358; 49 Law. ed., 643; 3 Ann. Cas., 765; In re Allen, 2 Phil., 630). The duty of the court in construing a statute, which is
reasonably susceptible of two constructions to adopt that which saves its constitutionality, includes the duty of avoiding a construction which
raises grave and doubtful constitutional questions, if it can be avoided (United States vs. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S., 366; 29 Sup. Ct.,
527; 53 Law. ed., 836).

According to the rules and principles of International Law, and the legal doctrines cited above, the judicial proceedings conducted before the
courts of justice, established here during Japanese military occupation, merely applying the provisions of the municipal law of the territory, as
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code in the instant case, which have no political or military significance, are and should be considered legal,
valid and binding. It is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur knows said rules and principles of International Law, as International
Law is an integral part of the fundamental law of the land, in accordance with the provisons of the Constitution of the United States. And it is
also to be presumed that General MacArthur has acted, in accordance with said principles of Internationa] Law, which have been sanctioned by
the Supreme Court of the United States, as the nullification of all judicial proceedings conducted before our courts, during Japanese occupation,
would be highly detrimental to public interests.

For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion, and the petition for habeas corpus filed in this case should, therefore, be denied.

DISSENTING

PERPECTO, J.,

Following our opinions in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (p. 153, ante), and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (p.
334, ante), G. R. No. L 5 and G. R. No. L~49, respectively, the proceedings attacked by petitioner belong to the judicial processes declared null
and void in the proclamation issued by General MacArthur on October 23, 1944, and, therefore, we vote for the granting of the writ of habeas
corpus prayed for.

DISSENTING

HILADO, J.,

Upon the grounds stated in my main dissenting opinion in G. R. No. L-5, Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (p. 199, ante), in my
dissenting opinion upon the motion for reconsideration therein (p. 398, ante), and in my concurring opinion in G. R. No. L-49,
Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (p. 355, ante), I dissent from the opinion of the majority herein. The writ of habeas corpus sought by petitioner
should be granted because of the nullity of the judgment and proceedings under which he has been imprisoned and restrained of his liberty. As
stated in the majority opinion, the sentence against him became final on September 12, 1944, and had been pronounced by the Japanese-
sponsored Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon upon appeal from a judgment of conviction by the Japanese- sponsored Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur.

4. Effect of Cession on Municipal Laws

24. Vilas vs. City of Manila. 229 US 345 (1911)

FACTS ISSUE RULING

No remedy to collection of claim against gov subd
– plaintiff with valid claim is entitled to maintain
an action.

While military occupation or territorial cession may work a suspension of the governmental functions of municipal corporations, such
occupation or cession does not result in their dissolution.

While there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of inhabitants of ceded territory, and an abrogation of laws in conflict with the
political character of the substituted sovereign, the great body of municipal law regulating private and domestic rights continues in force until
abrogated or changed by the new ruler.

Although the United States might have extinguished every municipality in the territory ceded by Spain under the Treaty of 1898, it will not, in
view of the practice of nations to the contrary, be presumed to have done so.

The legal entity of the City of Manila survived both its military occupation by, and its cession to, the United States, and, as in law, the present
city, as the successor of the former city, is entitled to the property rights of its predecessor, it is also subject to its liabilities.

The cession in the Treaty of 1898 of all the public property of Spain in the Philippine Islands did not include property belonging to
municipalities, and the agreement against impairment of property and private property rights in that treaty applied to the property of
municipalities and claims against municipalities.

One supplying goods to a municipality does so, in the absence of specific provision, on its general faith and credit, and not as against special
funds in its possession, and even if such goods are supplied for a purpose for which the special funds are held, no specific lien is created
thereon.

The facts, which involve the liability of the present City of Manila in the Philippine Islands for claims against the City of Manila as it existed prior
to the cession under the Treaty of 1898, are stated in the opinion.
The plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs below, are creditors of the
city of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands
to the United States by the treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898 [30
Stat. at L. 1754]. Upon the theory that the city, under its present
charter from the government of the Philippine Islands, is the same
juristic person and liable upon the obligations of the old city, these
actions were brought against it. The supreme court of the Philippine
Islands denied relief, holding that the present municipality is a totally
different corporate entity, and in no way liable for the debts of the
Spanish municipality. [220 U.S. 345, 352] The fundamental question is
whether, notwithstanding the cession of the Philippine Islands to the
United States, followed by a reincorporation of the city, the present
municipality is liable for the obligations of the city incurred prior to the
cession to the United States.

We shall confine ourselves to the question whether the plaintiffs in

error are entitled to judgments against the city upon their several
claims. Whether there is a remedy adequate to the collection when
reduced to judgment is not presented by the record. But whether there
is or is not a remedy affords no reason why the plaintiffs in error may
not reduce their claims to judgment. Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100
U.S. 514, 530 , 25 S. L. ed. 699, 703. The city confessedly may be sued
under its existing charter, and that implies at least a right to judgment
if they establish their demands.

The city as now incorporated has succeeded to all of the property

rights of the old city and to the right to enforce all of its causes of
action. There is identity of purpose between the Spanish and American
charters and substantial identity of municipal powers. The area and
the inhabitants incorporated are substantially the same. But for the
change of sovereignty which has occurred under the treaty of Paris,
the question of the liability of the city under its new charter for the
debts of the old city would seem to be of easy solution. The principal
question would therefore seem to be the legal consequence of the
cession referred to upon the property rights and civil obligations of the
city incurred before the cession. And so the question was made to turn
in the court below upon the consequence of a change in sovereignty
and a reincorporation of the city by the substituted sovereignty.

This disposes of the question of the jurisdiction of this court, grounded

upon the absence from the petition of the plaintiffs of any distinct
claim under the treaty of Paris, since, under 10 of the Philippine
organic act [220 U.S. 345, 353] of July 1, 1902 [32 Stat. at L. 695, chap.
1369, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 226], this court is given
jurisdiction to review any final decree or judgment of the supreme
court of the Philippine Islands where any treaty of the United States 'is
involved.' That treaty was necessarily 'involved,' since neither the
court below nor this court can determine the continuity of the
municipality nor the liability of the city as it now exists for the
obligation of the old city, without considering the effect of the change
of sovereignty resulting from that treaty. See Reavis v. Fianza, 215
U.S. 16, 22 , 54 S. L. ed. 72, 75, 30 Sup. Ct. rep. 1.

The historical continuity of a municipality embracing the inhabitants of

the territory now occupied by the city of Manila is impressive. Before
the conquest of the Philippine Islands by Spain, Manila existed. The
Spaniards found on the spot now occupied a populous and fortified
community of Moros. In 1571 they occupied what was then and is now
known as Manila, and established it as a municipal corporation. In
1574 there was conferred upon it the title of 'Illustrious and ever loyal
city of Manila.' From time to time there occurred amendments, and, on
January 19, 1894, there was a reorganization of the city government
under a royal decree of that date. Under that charter there was power
to incur debts for municipal purposes and power to sue and be sued.
The obligations here in suit were incurred under the charter referred
to, and are obviously obligations strictly within the provision of the
municipal power. To pay judgments upon such debts it was the duty of
the ayuntamiento of Manila, which was the corporate name of the old
city, to make provision in its budget.

The contention that the liability of the city upon such obligations was
destroyed by a mere change of sovereignty is obviously one which is
without a shadow of moral force, and, if true, must result from settled
principles of rigid law. While the contracts from which the claims in
suit resulted were in progress, war between the United [220 U.S. 345,
354] States and Spain ensued. On August 13, 1898, the city was
occupied by the forces of this government, and its affairs conducted
by military authority. On July 31, 1901, the present incorporating act
was passed, and the city since that time has been an autonomous
municipality. The charter in force is act 183 of the Philippine
Commission, and now may be found as chapters 68 to 75 of the
compiled acts of the Philippine Commission. The 1st section of the
charter of 1901 reads as follows:

'The inhabitants of the city of Manila, residing within the territory

described in 2 of this act, are hereby constituted a municipality, which
shall be known as the city of Manila, and by that name shall have
perpetual succession, and shall possess all the rights of property
herein granted or heretofore enjoyed and possessed by the city of
Manila as organized under Spanish sovereignty.'

The boundaries described in 2 include substantially the area and

inhabitants which had theretofore constituted the old city.

By 4 of the same act, the government of the city was invested in a

municipal board.

Section 16 grants certain legislative powers to the board, and provides

that it shall 'take possession of all lands, buildings, offices, books,
papers, records, moneys, credits, securities, assets, accounts, or
other property or rights belonging to the former city of Manila, or
pertaining to the business or interests thereof, and, subject to the
provisions herein set forth, shall have control of all its property except
the building known as the ayuntamiento, provision for the occupation
and control of which is made in 15 of this act; shall collect taxes and
other revenues, and apply the same in accordance with appropriations,
as hereinbefore provided, to the payment of the municipal expenses;
shall supervise and control the discharge of official duties by
subordinates; shall institute judicial proceedings to recover property
and [220 U.S. 345, 355] funds of the city wherever found, or otherwise
to protect the interests of the city, and shall defend all suits against
the city,' etc.

Section 69 of the charter expressly preserved 'all city ordinances and

orders in force at the time of the passage of this act, and not
inconsistent herewith,' until modified or repealed by ordinances
passed under this act.

Section 72 is the repealing clause, and provides for the repeal of 'all
acts, orders, and regulations' which are inconsistent with the
provisions of the act.
The charter contains no reference to the obligations or contracts of
the old city.

If we understand the argument against the liability here asserted, it

proceeds mainly upon the theory that inasmuch as the predecessor of
the present city, the ayuntamiento of Manila, was a corporate entity
created by the Spanish government, when the sovereignty of Spain in
the islands was terminated by the treaty of cession, if not by the
capitulation of August 13, 1898, the municipality ipso facto
disappeared for all purposes. This conclusion is reached upon the
supposed analogy to the doctrine of principal and agent, the death of
the principal ending the agency. So complete is the supposed death
and annihilation of a municipal entity by extinction of sovereignty of
the creating state that it was said in one of the opinions below that all
of the public property of Manila passed to the United States, 'for a
consideration, which was paid,' and that the United States was
therefore justified in creating an absolutely new municipality, and
endowing it with all of the assets of the defunct city, free from any
obligation to the creditors of that city. And so the matter was
dismissed in the Trigas Case by the court of first instance, by the
suggestion that 'the plaintiff may have a claim against the Crown of
Spain, which has received from the United States payment for that
done by the plaintiff.' [220 U.S. 345, 356] We are unable to agree with
the argument. It loses sight of the dual character of municipal
corporations. They exercise powers which are governmental and
powers which are of a private or business character. In the one
character a municipal corporation is a governmental subdivision, and
for that purpose exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of
the state. In the other character it is a mere legal entity or juristic
person. In the latter character it stands for the community in the
administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public
purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred.

The distinction is observed in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S.

437, 461 , 50 S. L. ed. 261, 269, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110, 4 A. & E. Ann.
Cas. 737, where Lloyd v. New York, 5 N. Y. 369, 374, 55 Am. Dec. 347,
and Western Sav. Fund Soc. v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. 175, 72 Am. Dec.
730, are cited and approved. In Lloyd v. New York, supra, it is said:

'The corporation of the city of New York possesses two kinds of

powers: one governmental and public, and to the extent they are held
 and exercised, is clothed with sovereignty; the other private, and to
the extent they are held and exercised, is a legal individual. The former
are given and used for public purposes, the latter for private purposes.
While in the exercise of the former, the corporation is a municipal
government; and while in the exercise of the latter, is a corporate legal
individual.'

See also Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. 66; Petersburg v. Applegarth, 28 Gratt.
321, 343, 26 Am. Rep. 357, and Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, 3
Am. Rep. 485.

In view of the dual character of municipal corporations there is no

public reason for presuming their total dissolution as a mere
consequence of military occupation or territorial cession. The
suspension of such governmental functions as are obviously
incompatible with the new political relations thus brought about may
be presumed. [220 U.S. 345, 357] But no such implication may be
reasonably indulged beyond that result.

Such a conclusion is in harmony with the settled principles of public

law as declared by this and other courts and expounded by the text-
books upon the laws of war and international law. Taylor, International
Pub. Law , 578.

That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the

inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws theretofore in
force which are in confiict with the political character, constitution, or
institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their force, is also plain.
Alvarez y Sanchez v. United States, 216 U.S. 167 , 54 L. ed. 432, 30
Sup. Ct. Rep. 367. But it is equally settled in the same public law that
that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic
rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler.
In Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546 , 29 S. L. ed.
270, 271, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1005, it was said:

'It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the
United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative
power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign
to another, the municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are
intended for the protection of private rights, continue in force until
abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign. By the
 cession, public property passes from one government to the other, but
private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws
which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a
matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with
the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new
government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political
jurisdiction and legislative power-and the latter is involved in the
former-to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an
established religion, or abridging the freedom of the [220 U.S. 345,
358] press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the
like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any
declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country on other
subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new
government upon the same matters. But with respect to other laws
affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, and designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health
and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is
general, that a change of government leaves them in force until, by
direct action of the new government, they are altered or repealed.'

The above language was quoted with approval in Downes v. Bidwell,

182 U.S. 244, 298 , 45 S. L. ed. 1088, 1110, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770.

That the United States might, by virtue of its situation under a treaty
ceding full title, have utterly extinguished every municipality which it
found in existence in the Philippine Islands, may be conceded. That it
did so, in view of the practice of nations to the contrary, is not to be
presumed, and can only be established by cogent evidence.

That during military occupation the affairs of the city were in a large
part administered by officials put in place by military order did not
operate to dissolve the corporation, or relieve it from liability upon
obligations incurred before the occupation, nor those created for
municipal purposes by the administrators of its affairs while its old
officials were displaced. New Orleans v. New York Mail S. S. Co. 20
Wall. 387, 394, 22 L. ed. 354, 358. During that occupation and military
administration the business of the city was carried on as usual. Taxes
were assessed and taxes collected and expended for local purposes,
and many of the officials carrying on the government were those found
in office when the city was occupied. The continuity of the corporate
city was not inconsistent with military occupation or the constitution
or institutions of the occupying power. This [220 U.S. 345, 359] is
made evident by the occurrences at the time of capitulation. Thus, the
articles of capitulation concluded in these words: 'This city, its
inhabitants, . . . and its private property of all descriptions, are placed
under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American
Army.' This was quoted in President McKinley's instructions of April 7,
1900, to the Philippine Commission, and touching this he said: 'I
believe that this pledge has been faithfully kept.' And the commission
was directed to labor for the full performance of this obligation. This
instruction was in line with and in fulfilment of the 8th article of the
treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. Under the 3d article of that
treaty the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands was ceded to
the United States, the latter agreeing to pay to Spain the sum of
$20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the 8th article, Spain
relinquished to the United States 'all the buildings, wharves, barracks,
forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property
which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as
such belong to the Crown of Spain.' It is under this clause, in
connection with the clause agreeing to pay to Spain $20,000,000 for
the cession of the Philippine group, that the contention that all of the
public rights of the city of Manila were acquired by the United States,
which country was therefore justified, as absolute owner, in granting
the property rights so acquired to what is called the 'absolutely new
corporation' created thereafter. But the qualifying words touching
property rights relinquished by Spain limit the relinquishment to
'property which, in conformity with law, belonging to the public
domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.' It did not affect
property which did not, in 'conformity with law, belong to the Crown of
Spain.' That it was not intended to apply to property which, 'in
conformity with law,' belonged to the city of Manila as a municipal
cor- [220 U.S. 345, 360] poration, is clear. This is demonstrated by the
second paragraph of the same article, which reads: 'And it is hereby
declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to
which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair
the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession
of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private
establishments . . . having legal capacity to acquire and possess
property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private
individuals.' Thus, the property and property rights of municipal
corporations were protected and safeguarded precisely as were the
property and property rights of individuals.

That the cession did not operate as an extinction or dissolution of

corporations is herein recognized, for the stipulation against
impairment of their property rights has this plain significance.

The conclusion we reach, that the legal entity survived both the
military occupation and the cession which followed, finds support in
the cases which hold that the Pueblos of San Francisco and Los
Angeles, which existed as municipal organizations prior to the cession
of California by Mexico, continued to exist with their community and
property rights intact. Cohas v. Raisin, 3 Cal. 443; Hart v. Burnett, 15
Cal. 530; Townsend v. Greeley, 5 Wall. 326, 18 L. ed. 547; Merryman v.
Bourne, 9 Wall. 592, 602, 19 L. ed. 683, 686; Moore v. Steinbach, 127
U.S. 70 , 32 L. ed. 51, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1067; Los Angeles Farming & Mill.
Co. v. Los Angeles, 217 U.S. 217 , 54 L. ed. 736, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452.

Were corporate identity and corporate liability extinguished as a

necessary legal result of the new charter granted in 1901 by the
Philippine Commission? The inhabitants of the old city are the
incorporators of the new. There is substantially identity of area. There
are some changes in the form of government and some changes in
corporate powers and methods of administration. the new corporation
is endowed with all of the property and [220 U.S. 345, 361] property
rights of the old. It has the same power to sue and be sued which the
former corporation had. There is not the slightest suggestion that the
new corporation shall not succeed to the contracts and obligations of
the old corporation. Laying out of view any question of the
constitutional guaranty against impairment of the obligation of
contracts, there is, in the absence of express legislative declaration of
a contrary purpose, no reason for supposing that the reincorporation of
an old municipality is intended to permit an escape from the
obligations of the old, to whose property and rights it has succeeded.
The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise affected,
and, in law, the present city is, in every legal sense, the successor of
the old. As such it is entitled to the property and property rights of the
predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject to all of its liabilities.
Broughton v. Pensacola 93 U.S. 266 , 23 L. ed. 896; Mt. Pleasant v.
Beckwith, 100 U.S. 520 , 25 L. ed. 699; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 ,
29 L. ed. 620, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398; Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U.S.
646, 655 , 42 S. L. ed. 310, 313, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 957; O'Connor v.
Memphis, 6 Lea, 730; Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866, 1870, in
which case, when a municipality became disabled to act and obtained
a new charter, in an action upon an obligation of the old corporation,
there was judgment for the creditor, Lord Mansfield saying:

'Many corporations, for want of legal magistrates, have lost their

activity, and obtained new charters. Maidstone, Radnor, Carmarthen,
and many more are in the same case with Colchester. And yet it has
never been disputed but that the new charters revive and give activity
to the old corporation; except, perhaps, in that case in Levinz, where
the corporation had a new name; and even there the court made no
doubt. Where the question has arisen upon any remarkable
metamorphosis, it has always been determined 'that they remain the
same as to debts and rights."

Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728, 730. [220 U.S. 345, 362] In Shapleigh v.
San Angelo, supra, this court said in a similar case:

'The state's plenary power over its municipal corporations to change

their organization, to modify their method of internal government, or to
abolish them altogether, is not restricted by contracts entered into by
the municipality with its creditors or with private parties. An absolute
repeal of a municipal charter is therefor effectual so far as it abolishes
the old corporate organization; but when the same or substantially the
same inhabitants are erected into a new corporation, whether with
extended or restricted territorial limits, such new corporation is
treated as in law the successor of the old one, entitled to its property
rights, and subject to its liabilities.'

The cases of Trigas and Vilas went off upon demurrers, and no
question of remedy arises here.

The appeal of Aguado is from a decree upon a final hearing denying

him all relief.

That all three of the plaintiffs in error are entitled to proceed to

judgment when they shall establish their several claims is obvious
from what we have said. But in the Aguado Case it is sought to
establish his claim as a charge against certain property and funds held
by the city as trustee, known as the Carriedo fund. In 1734 one Don
Francisco Carriedo y Perodo bequeathed to the city a fund for the
establishment of waterworks, to be kept as a separate fund and
devoted to the erection and maintenance of the works. This fund was
loyally kept and greatly increased, and was enlarged by a special tax
upon meat, devoted to that purpose. The works were finally completed
in 1878, and have been since operated by the city, the income and
special tax going to maintenance. Certain securities belonging to the
fund are now held by the city, the income being applied to the
operation of the works. Aguado took a contract to supply coal for the
use of the [220 U.S. 345, 363] Carriedo works, and made a deposit to
guarantee the contract. When the city was occupied by the American
Army it was indebted to him for coal so supplied, as well as for the
deposit so made. That the coal was bought for and used in the
operation of the Carriedo works is not denied. But there is no evidence
that the credit was given to the Carriedo fund so held in trust under
the will of Carriedo. The contract was made with the ayuntamiento of
Manila, just as all other contracts for city supplies or works were
made. The contract not having been made with special reference to
the liability of the fund held in trust by the city, but apparently upon
the general credit of the city, we are not disposed to reverse the
judgment of the court below, holding that the claim of Aguado did not
constitute a charge upon the Carriedo fund.

Aguado is, nevertheless, entitled to a judgment. The designation of the

city in the petition as trustee may be regarded as descriptive. The debt
having been incurred by the city, it must be regarded as a city liability.
Taylor v. Davis (Taylor v. Mayo), 110 U.S. 330, 336 , 28 S. L. ed. 163,
165, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 147.

Our conclusion is that the decree in the Aguado Case must be

reversed and the case remanded, with direction to render judgment
and such other relief as may seem in conformity with law. The
judgments in the Trigas and Vilas Cases will be reversed and the
cases remanded, with direction to overrule the respective demurrers,
and for such other action as may be consistent with law, and
consistent with this opinion.
 25. People vs. Lol-lo, G.R. No. 17958. Feb. 27, 1922

FACTS ISSUE RULING

June 1920 – 2 boats left matuta to Peta. One of whether or not the provisions of the The crime falls under the first paragraph
them was a Dutch individual, other boat with Penal Code dealing with the crime of of article 153 of the Penal Code in
other subjs.. piracy are still in force relation to article 154.

2nd boat – arrived in Buang and Bukid after days

ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed
of navigation.surrounded by 6 vintas manned by
against Spaniards, or the subjects of
24 armed moros.
another nation not at war with Spain,
shall be punished with a penalty ranging
Moros – asked for food. violated women and
from cadena temporal to cadena
attacked men.
perpetua. (12yrs and 1 day)
Moros – arrived at Maruro. Two of them were
Lolo and saraw. Lolo raped one woman. imposition of the death penalty upon
the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the
Maruro – women escaped. accused who raped on of the women)

Lolo and Saraw – returned to Tawi tawi. Arrested

and charged of piracy.

Counsel of lolo and saraw – offense not within

the jurisditcuon of the phils,

Judgment – guilty and sentenced to life

imprisonment.

Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the

high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furandi, and in the spirit and
intention of universal hostility.

Piracy – no territorial limits and is a crime against

all mankind.

A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain

The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads
as follows:

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty
of presidio mayor.

ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty
of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article,
from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
 1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.

2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified in articles four
hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.

3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.

4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves.

5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.

ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be
understood as including any part of the national territory.

ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy,
has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.

The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State
to the United States are well-known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is
consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As a
corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are
strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands,
etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)

These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898,
to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the
inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the
punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are
suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in
force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations. This enlightened practice
is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also
General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)

It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156
of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable
not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.

The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The
specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must
necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima
Recopilacion.

The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the
necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is
afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev.
Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal
conception under the law of nations.

It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding
provisions in force in the United States.

By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the
articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States"
and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word
"authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only
public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:

The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another
nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished with
the penalty of presidio mayor.

We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.

There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of
piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves.
It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this
connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least
three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not
necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the
natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and
the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.

, but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act No.
2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the
defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and
place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and
Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a
one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.

5. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

UNCLOS is an acronym for the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea. The convention is also sometimes referred to as the Law of
the Sea Convention or the Law of the Sea treaty. UNCLOS, as a law of the sea came into operation and became effective from 16 th November
1982.

However, the first time such a proposal was announced before the United Nations was in the year 1973. Over the course of nine years, with
representations from over 160 countries coming forward, UNCLOS came into existence. The background of UNCLOS covers can be explained in
detail as follows:

Before the nautical law of UNCLOS came into force, there existed a school of thought known as freedom-of-the-seas. This doctrine had first
come into operation during the 17th century. As per this law, there were no limits or boundaries set to the aspect of marine business and
commercial activities.

Over the years and centuries as technology developed and the needs of the people across the world grew, there emerged a problem. Over-
exploitation of the sea’s resources was immensely felt towards the middle of the 20 th century and many nations started feeling the need to
ensure protection of their marine resources.

Starting with United States in the 1945, many countries across the world brought under their jurisdiction, the natural resources found in their
oceans’ continental shelf. Some of the countries that exercised this power were Argentina, Canada, Indonesia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and even
countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia and Venezuela.

Since the usage of the marine reserves rose even more in the 1960s and since missile launch pads also starting getting based in the oceanic bed,
it became imperative that a specific regulation be placed to ensure proper protection and jurisdiction of the marine reserves.
In 1967, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened. In this conference, the UN ambassador from Malta Mr.
Arvid Pardo requested for a legal power that could bring about international governance over the oceanic floor and bed. Such a legal power
would also ensure that there would not be any problems arising between various countries over the oceanic floor and bed space.

In a major way, it was this UNCLOS III that paved the way for the now existing nautical law.

The features and the highlights of the same can be explained as follows:

 UNCLOS as the currently prevailing law of the sea is binding completely.

 Even as the name of the nautical law suggests a United Nations’ involvement, the UN does not have any major functional role in the
working of UNCLOS

 There are 17 parts, 320 articles and nine annexes to UNCLOS

 The law of the sea provides for full money rights to nations for a 200-mile zone by their shoreline. The sea and oceanic bed extending
this area is regarded to be Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and any country can use these waters for their economic utilization
 The IMO (International Maritime Organisation) plays a vital role in the operation of UNCLOS. Along with the IMO, organisations like
the International Whaling Commission and the International Seabed Authority are vital parties in the functional areas of the nautical
law

Even though UNCLOS has 160 member parties, the US is a country that has still not sanctioned (ratified) the nautical law. The main reason for
the US not sanctioning the law of the sea arises mainly because of its disagreement about Part XI of UNCLOS.

This part deals with the aspect of the minerals found on the seabed on the EEZ. The International Seabed Authority was established on the basis
of this part of the nautical law and called for equitable distribution of the proceeds of such seabeds. The US is opposed to this theory and that is
why it has not ratified UNCLOS in spite of it being one of the most important members of the United Nations.

With the help of a nautical law like UNCLOS, it can be said that marine resources can be protected and safeguarded, especially in contemporary
times where the need for marine resources’ protection has increased even more than it was during the 1960s and 70s.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the Law of the Sea Convention or the Law of the Sea treaty, is an
international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place between
1973 and 1982. The Law of the Sea Convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world's oceans,
establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources. The Convention, concluded in 1982,
replaced the quad-treaty 1958 Convention on the High Seas. UNCLOS came into force in 1994, a year after Guyana became the 60th nation to
ratify the treaty.[1] As of June 2016, 167 countries and the European Union have joined in the Convention. It is uncertain as to what extent the
Convention codifies customary international law.
While the Secretary-General of the United Nations receives instruments of ratification and accession and the UN provides support for meetings
of states party to the Convention, the UN has no direct operational role in the implementation of the Convention. There is, however, a role
played by organizations such as the International Maritime Organization, the International Whaling Commission, and the International Seabed
Authority (ISA). (The ISA was established by the UN Convention.)

UNCLOS replaces the older 'freedom of the seas' concept, dating from the 17th century. According to this concept, national rights were limited
to a specified belt of water extending from a nation's coastlines, usually 3 nautical miles (5.6 km) (three-mile limit), according to the
'cannon shot' rule developed by the Dutch jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek.[4] All waters beyond national boundaries were
considered international waters: free to all nations, but belonging to none of them (the mare liberum principle promulgated by Hugo Grotius).[5]
In the early 20th century, some nations expressed their desire to extend national claims: to include mineral resources, to protect fish stocks,
and to provide the means to enforce pollution controls. (The League of Nations called a 1930 conference at The Hague, but no agreements
resulted.[6]) Using the customary international law principle of a nation's right to protect its natural resources, President Harry S. Truman in
1945 extended United States control to all the natural resources of its continental shelf. Other nations were quick to follow suit. Between 1946
and 1950, Chile, Peru, and Ecuador extended their rights to a distance of 200 nautical miles (370 km) to cover their Humboldt Current fishing
grounds. Other nations extended their territorial seas to 12 nautical miles (22 km).[7]
By 1967, only 25 nations still used the old 3-mile (4.8 km) limit,[8] while 66 nations had set a 12-nautical-mile (22 km) territorial limit [9] and eight
had set a 200-nautical-mile (370 km) limit. As of 28 May 2008, only two countries still use the 3-mile (4.8 km) limit: Jordan and Palau.[10] That
limit is also used in certain Australian islands, an area of Belize, some Japanese straits, certain areas of Papua New Guinea, and a few British
Overseas Territories, such as Gibraltar.[11]

UNCLOS I

In 1956, the United Nations held its first Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) at Geneva, Switzerland. UNCLOS I[13] resulted in four
treaties concluded in 1958:

 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, entry into force: 10 September 1964
 Convention on the Continental Shelf, entry into force: 10 June 1964
 Convention on the High Seas, entry into force: 30 September 1962
 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, entry into force: 20 March 1966
Although UNCLOS I was considered a success, it left open the important issue of breadth of territorial waters. [12]

UNCLOS II[edit]

In 1960, the United Nations held the second Conference on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS II"); however, the six-week Geneva conference did not
result in any new agreements.[12] Generally speaking, developing nations and third world countries participated only as clients, allies, or
dependents of the United States or the Soviet Union, with no significant voice of their own. [14]
UNCLOS III[edit]

Sea areas in international rights (Top view)

The issue of varying claims of territorial waters was raised in the UN in 1967 by Arvid Pardo of Malta, and in 1973 the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea convened in New York. In an attempt to reduce the possibility of groups of nation-states dominating the
negotiations, the conference used a consensus process rather than majority vote. With more than 160 nations participating, the conference
lasted until 1982. The resulting convention came into force on 16 November 1994, one year after the 60th state, Guyana, ratified the treaty.
The convention introduced a number of provisions. The most significant issues covered were setting limits, navigation, archipelagic status and
transit regimes, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), continental shelf jurisdiction, deep seabed mining, the exploitation regime, protection of the
marine environment, scientific research, and settlement of disputes.
The convention set the limit of various areas, measured from a carefully defined baseline. (Normally, a sea baseline follows the low-water line,
but when the coastline is deeply indented, has fringing islands or is highly unstable, straight baselines may be used.) The areas are as follows:
Internal waters
Covers all water and waterways on the landward side of the baseline. The coastal state is free to set laws, regulate use, and use any
resource. Foreign vessels have no right of passage within internal waters. A vessel in the high seas assumes jurisdiction under the
internal laws of its flag State.
Territorial waters
Out to 12 nautical miles (22 kilometres; 14 miles) from the baseline, the coastal state is free to set laws, regulate use, and use any
resource. Vessels were given the right of innocent passage through any territorial waters, with strategic straits allowing the passage
of military craft as transit passage, in that naval vessels are allowed to maintain postures that would be illegal in territorial waters.
"Innocent passage" is defined by the convention as passing through waters in an expeditious and continuous manner, which is not
"prejudicial to the peace, good order or the security" of the coastal state. Fishing, polluting, weapons practice, and spying are not
"innocent", and submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag. Nations
can also temporarily suspend innocent passage in specific areas of their territorial seas, if doing so is essential for the protection of
their security.
Archipelagic waters
 The convention set the definition of Archipelagic States in Part IV, which also defines how the state can draw its territorial borders. A
baseline is drawn between the outermost points of the outermost islands, subject to these points being sufficiently close to one
another. All waters inside this baseline are designated Archipelagic Waters. The state has sovereignty over these waters (like internal
waters), but subject to existing rights including traditional fishing rights of immediately adjacent states. [15] Foreign vessels have right
of innocent passage through archipelagic waters (like territorial waters).
Contiguous zone
Beyond the 12-nautical-mile (22 km) limit, there is a further 12 nautical miles (22 km) from the territorial sea baseline limit, the
contiguous zone, in which a state can continue to enforce laws in four specific areas: customs, taxation, immigration, and pollution;
if the infringement started within the state's territory or territorial waters, or if this infringement is about to occur within the state's
territory or territorial waters.[16] This makes the contiguous zone a hot pursuit area.
Exclusive economic zones (EEZs)
These extend 200 nautical miles (370 kilometres; 230 miles) from the baseline. Within this area, the coastal nation has sole
exploitation rights over all natural resources. In casual use, the term may include the territorial sea and even the continental shelf.
The EEZs were introduced to halt the increasingly heated clashes over fishing rights, although oil was also becoming important. The
success of an offshore oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico in 1947 was soon repeated elsewhere in the world, and by 1970 it was
technically feasible to operate in waters 4,000 metres deep. Foreign nations have the freedom of navigation and overflight, subject
to the regulation of the coastal states. Foreign states may also lay submarine pipes and cables.
Continental shelf
The continental shelf is defined as the natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin's outer edge, or 200
nautical miles (370 km) from the coastal state's baseline, whichever is greater. A state's continental shelf may exceed 200 nautical
miles (370 km) until the natural prolongation ends. However, it may never exceed 350 nautical miles (650 kilometres; 400 miles)
from the baseline; or it may never exceed 100 nautical miles (190 kilometres; 120 miles) beyond the 2,500-meter isobath (the line
connecting the depth of 2,500 meters). Coastal states have the right to harvest mineral and non-living material in the subsoil of its
continental shelf, to the exclusion of others. Coastal states also have exclusive control over living resources "attached" to the
continental shelf, but not to creatures living in the water column beyond the exclusive economic zone.

Aside from its provisions defining ocean boundaries, the convention establishes general obligations for
safeguarding the marine environment and protecting freedom of scientific research on the high seas, and
also creates an innovative legal regime for controlling mineral resource exploitation in deep seabed areas
beyond national jurisdiction, through an International Seabed Authority and the common heritage of
mankind principle.[17]
Landlocked states are given a right of access to and from the sea, without taxation of traffic through transit
states.[18]

Part XI and the 1994 Agreement[edit]

Part XI of the Convention provides for a regime relating to minerals on the seabed outside any state's territorial waters or EEZ (Exclusive
Economic Zones). It establishes an International Seabed Authority (ISA) to authorize seabed exploration and mining and collect and distribute
the seabed mining royalty.
The United States objected to the provisions of Part XI of the Convention on several grounds, arguing that the treaty was unfavorable to
American economic and security interests. Due to Part XI, the United States refused to ratify the UNCLOS, although it expressed agreement
with the remaining provisions of the Convention.
From 1982 to 1990, the United States accepted all but Part XI as customary international law, while attempting to establish an alternative
regime for exploitation of the minerals of the deep seabed. An agreement was made with other seabed mining nations and licenses were
granted to four international consortia. Concurrently, the Preparatory Commission was established to prepare for the eventual coming into
force of the Convention-recognized claims by applicants, sponsored by signatories of the Convention. Overlaps between the two groups were
resolved, but a decline in the demand for minerals from the seabed made the seabed regime significantly less relevant. In addition, the decline
of Socialism and the fall of Communism in the late 1980s removed much of the support for some of the more contentious Part XI provisions.
In 1990, consultations began between signatories and non-signatories (including the United States) over the possibility of modifying the
Convention to allow the industrialized countries to join the Convention. The resulting 1994 Agreement on Implementation was adopted as a
binding international Convention. It mandated that key articles, including those on limitation of seabed production and mandatory technology
transfer, would not be applied, that the United States, if it became a member, would be guaranteed a seat on the Council of the International
Seabed Authority, and finally, that voting would be done in groups, with each group able to block decisions on substantive matters. The 1994
Agreement also established a Finance Committee that would originate the financial decisions of the Authority, to which the largest donors
would automatically be members and in which decisions would be made by consensus.
On 1 February 2011, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) issued an advisory opinion
concerning the legal responsibilities and obligations of States Parties to the Convention with respect to the sponsorship of activities in the Area
in accordance with Part XI of the Convention and the 1994 Agreement. [19] The advisory opinion was issued in response to a formal request made
by the International Seabed Authority following two prior applications the Authority's Legal and Technical Commission had received from the
Republics of Nauru and Tonga regarding proposed activities (a plan of work to explore for polymetallic nodules) to be undertaken in the Area by
two State-sponsored contractors – Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. (sponsored by the Republic of Nauru) and Tonga Offshore Mining Ltd.
(sponsored by the Kingdom of Tonga). The advisory opinion set forth the international legal responsibilities and obligations of Sponsoring States
and the Authority to ensure that sponsored activities do not harm the marine environment, consistent with the applicable provisions of
UNCLOS Part XI, Authority regulations, ITLOS case law, other international environmental treaties, and Principle 15 of the UN Rio Declaration. [20]

Part XII – Protecting the Marine Environment[edit]

Part XII of UNCLOS contains special provisions for the protection of the marine environment, obligating all States to collaborate in this matter,
as well as placing special obligations on flag States to ensure that ships under their flags adhere to international environmental regulations,
often adopted by the IMO. The MARPOL Convention is an example of such regulation. Part XII also bestows coastal and port states with
broadened jurisdictional rights for enforcing international environmental regulation within their territory and on the high seas.[21] The United
Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14 additionally has a target regarding conservative and sustainable use of oceans and their resources in
line with UNCLOS legal framework.[22]

Biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction[edit]

In 2017, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voted to convene an intergovernmental conference (IGC) to consider establishing an
international legally-binding instrument (ILBI) on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ). The
IGC will convene for a series of four sessions between 2018 and 2020 to work towards an agreement. [23]

Parties[edit]
Main article: List of parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Parties

Parties, dually represented by the European Union

Signatories

Non-parties

The convention was opened for signature on 10 December 1982 and entered into force on 16 November 1994 upon deposition of the 60th
instrument of ratification.[1] The convention has been ratified by 168 parties, which includes 167 states (164 member states of the United
Nations plus the UN Observer state Palestine, as well as the Cook Islands, Niue and the European Union).[2]