Astrosociology Aff+Neg - GDS

Georgetown 2011-12
[AstrosocioIogy Affirmative] [LIoyd, Wutu, Anushka & Nick]

"InteIIectuaIs. They're Iike the mob. They onIy kiII their own." - Woody AIIen 1
ASTROSOCIOLOGY-AFF-AND-NEG---RBDD---GDS-2011-1

Astrosociology Aff .................................................................................................................................... 4
1AC ..................................................................................................................................................... 4
ontention 1: They're Out There (Not E.T.) .............................................................................................. 5
Plan ....................................................................................................................................................... 16
ontention 2: Beyond Hard Science ....................................................................................................... 17
ExistentaI Risk ................................................................................................................................. 19
axipok Principle 1A Worthy ............................................................................................................ 20
mpact alc FWK 1A Worthy ......................................................................................................... 21
Plan Reduces Existential Risk ................................................................................................................ 22
Preventative Action Key 1A Worthy .................................................................................................. 23
Limited Nuclear War Not An Existential Risk .......................................................................................... 24
We an Only Die Once .......................................................................................................................... 25
They Say: "Risk Of Extinction Low/Exaggerated.................................................................................... 26
They Say: "Probability Outweighs agnitude ........................................................................................ 27
They Say: "Plan Doesn't 'Solve' Extinction ............................................................................................ 29
They Say: "Prioritizing Existential Risk Hurts urrently-Existing People ................................................. 30
They Say: "Extinction Unlikely / Empirically Denied ............................................................................... 31
They Say: "urrent Lives Outweigh General ...................................................................................... 32
They Say: "urrent Lives Outweigh Temporal Preference .................................................................. 34
They Say: "urrent Lives Outweigh Diminishing arginal Utility ......................................................... 35
They Say: "urrent Lives Outweigh Uncertainty ................................................................................. 36
They Say: "urrent Lives Outweigh Opportunity osts ....................................................................... 37
They Say: "Free arket Solves ............................................................................................................. 38
They Say: "Fear of Existential Risk Bad ................................................................................................ 39
They Say: "Technology Bad .................................................................................................................. 40
Case/CPs .......................................................................................................................................... 40
AT: Ground P ...................................................................................................................................... 41
AT: Private P ....................................................................................................................................... 42
AT: Refuge P ...................................................................................................................................... 43
AT: Existential Risk Trade-off DA ........................................................................................................... 44
AT: Get Off The Rock P ....................................................................................................................... 45
AT: P out of Astrosociology ................................................................................................................ 46
AT: UN P ............................................................................................................................................. 49
Heg Add-on ........................................................................................................................................... 50
Soft Power Add-on ................................................................................................................................. 51
AT: STE P ........................................................................................................................................ 52
STE Links to PTX nertia .................................................................................................................. 53
STE Links to PTX Partisanhip .......................................................................................................... 54
STE Links to PTX P ....................................................................................................................... 55
STE Links to PTX AT: t Doesn't ....................................................................................................... 57
Space olonization Add-on .................................................................................................................... 58
Plan key to Space olonization .............................................................................................................. 61
Econ Add-on .......................................................................................................................................... 67
Kuiper-Belt Add-on ................................................................................................................................ 68
ase Solves DA..................................................................................................................................... 71
AT: Ks............................................................................................................................................... 72
AT: K of Science .................................................................................................................................... 73
Enlightenment Good .............................................................................................................................. 74
K mpacts Wrong ................................................................................................................................... 75
AT: K of Enlightenment Progress Turn ................................................................................................ 77
AT: Enlightenment Totalitarianism .......................................................................................................... 78
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ede the Political ................................................................................................................................... 79
K Splits ovements ............................................................................................................................... 81
AT: odernism = Obsolete .................................................................................................................... 82
AT: K Of Experts .................................................................................................................................... 83
Positivism Good ..................................................................................................................................... 85
Frontier K Slayer .................................................................................................................................... 87
Specific Perm ard ................................................................................................................................ 88
AT: Numbing/Fear Good ........................................................................................................................ 90
nstitutionalized Ethics Good .................................................................................................................. 91
K Alts Fail clean ............................................................................................................................. 94
AT: Link of Omission .............................................................................................................................. 95
AT: Anthro/Frontier K No Link ............................................................................................................. 96
AT: Anthro nevitable .......................................................................................................................... 98
AT: Anthro Perm ard......................................................................................................................... 99
AT: Deep Eco/Anthro Alt Fails ........................................................................................................... 100
AT: Deep Eco/Anthro Alt = Genocide ................................................................................................ 101
AT: Anthro Humans First Key to Environment................................................................................. 102
AT: Eurocentrism West is Good ........................................................................................................ 103
AT: Eurocentrism Knowledge Production .......................................................................................... 105
AT: West Exclusive .............................................................................................................................. 106
Alt Links to the K: Uses Western Epistemology .................................................................................... 107
Alt Bad: ntroverted/gnorant ................................................................................................................ 109
AstrosocioIogy Neg ....................................................................................................................... 109
Neg Strat deas .................................................................................................................................... 110
Framework ..................................................................................................................................... 110
1N ..................................................................................................................................................... 111
Deliberative Democracy mpact............................................................................................................ 112
K Things ......................................................................................................................................... 114
1NEurocentrism ritique of Sociology ............................................................................................ 115
2N/1NRAlternative ......................................................................................................................... 119
2N/1NRSociology Bad ................................................................................................................... 120
K of Enlightenment/Rationality Link ...................................................................................................... 122
Anthropocentrism K Link ...................................................................................................................... 123
Deep Eco/Anthro K Link ....................................................................................................................... 124
Agency ini-K ..................................................................................................................................... 127
Foucault ini-K .................................................................................................................................... 128
ethodology ini-K ............................................................................................................................. 129
Specific ntellectualism Turn................................................................................................................. 130
PoIicy Case Defense ...................................................................................................................... 130
1N Frontline Asteroid mpact .......................................................................................................... 131
Ext 1 No Asteroid Risk ...................................................................................................................... 133
A2: Panic -> Nuclear War..................................................................................................................... 135
A2: High risk of Small Asteroids ........................................................................................................... 137
Ext 2 Squo surveys Solve ................................................................................................................. 138
Ext 3 Won't Deflect ........................................................................................................................... 139
Nuke War Outweighs Asteroids............................................................................................................ 140
AT: EP .............................................................................................................................................. 141
AT: Soft Power Add-on ........................................................................................................................ 142
AT: Economy mpacts .......................................................................................................................... 144
ExistentiaI Risk .............................................................................................................................. 144
Risk of Natural Extinction Low .............................................................................................................. 145
Risk of Anthropogenic Extinction High .................................................................................................. 146
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Extinction s Unlikely For A Long Time ................................................................................................. 147
ore Gott Evidence/Prodict ................................................................................................................. 148
&N CP/No &SFG Key Warrant ....................................................................................................... 149
UN P 1N ......................................................................................................................................... 150
Extinction Refuge CP .................................................................................................................... 150
1N Shell ............................................................................................................................................ 151
P Solves Extinction............................................................................................................................ 152
P Better Than Asteroid Program ........................................................................................................ 153
They Say: "Not Feasible ..................................................................................................................... 154
Net-Benefit: Existential Risk Tradeoff DA ............................................................................................. 155
STEM CP ........................................................................................................................................ 156
1N Shell ............................................................................................................................................ 157
P key to Student Success .................................................................................................................. 159
P key to SET .................................................................................................................................... 162
Students Say Yes ................................................................................................................................ 163
Teacher Union PTX ............................................................................................................................. 164
Ext: Teachers Unions Like P ............................................................................................................. 165
Ext. Teachers key to the Agenda ......................................................................................................... 166
PoIitics Links/Link Turns ............................................................................................................... 166
Plan Unpopular .................................................................................................................................... 167
Plan Popular ........................................................................................................................................ 170

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ASTROSOCIOLOGY AFF

1AC
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CONTENTION 1: THEY'RE O&T THERE (NOT E.T.)

Status-quo NASA programs are insufficient to detect a significant number of
near-earth objects - expanding survey capacity is key to discovering potentiaIIy
hazardous asteroids
NationaI Academies, 10
[ Over many decades, the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, nstitute of
edicine, and National Research ouncil have earned a solid reputation as the nation's premier source
of independent, expert advice on scientific, engineering, and medical issues, "Defending Planet Earth:
Near-Earth Object Surveys and Hazard itigation Strategies
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12842&page=41]

Congress has established for NASA two mandates addressing near-Earth object (NEO) detection. The first mandate, now known
as the Spaceguard Survey, directed the agency to detect 90 percent of near-Earth objects 1 kilometer in diameter or greater by
2008. By 2009, the agency was close to meeting that goal. Although the estimate of this population is continually revised, as
astronomers gather additional data about all NEOs (and asteroids and comets in general), these revisions are expected to remain.
The 2009 discovery of asteroid 2009 H82, a 2- to 3-kilometer-diameter NEO in a retrograde ("backwards) orbit, is, however, a
reminder that some NEOs 1 kilometer or greater in diameter remain undetected. The second mandate, the George E. Brown, Jr.
Near-Earth Object Survey section of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-155), directed that
NASA detect 90 percent of near-Earth objects 140 meters in diameter or greater by 2020. However,
what the surveys actuaIIy focus on is not all NEOs but the potentiaIIy hazardous NEOs. t is possible for an
NEO to come close to Earth but never to intersect Earth's orbit and therefore not be potentially hazardous. The surveys are primarily
interested in the potentially hazardous NEOs, and that is the population that is the focus of this chapter. Significant new
equipment (i.e., ground-based and/or space-based teIescopes) wiII be required to achieve the latter
mandate. The administration did not budget and Congress did not approve new funding for NASA
to achieve this goaI, and IittIe progress on reaching it has been made during the past 5 years. The
criteria for the assessment of the success of an NEO detection mandate rely heavily on estimates that could be in error, such as the
size of the NEO population and the average reflectivity properties of an object's surface. For many years, the average albedo
(fraction of incident visible light reflected from an object's surface) of NEOs was taken to be 0.11. ore recent studies (Stuart and
Binzel, 2004) determined that the average albedo was more than 25 percent higher, or 0.14, with significant variation in albedo
present among the NEOs. The variation among albedos within the NEO population also contributes to the uncertainties in estimates
of the expected hazardous NEO population. This difference implies that, on average, NEOs have diameters at least 10 percent
smaller than previously thought, changing scientists' understanding of the distribution of the NEO population by size. Ground-
based teIescopes have difficuIty observing NEOs coming toward Earth from near the Sun's
direction because their cIose proximity to the Sunas viewed from Earthcauses sunIight scattered by
Earth's atmosphere to be a probIem and aIso poses risks to the teIescopes when they point toward these
directions. Objects remaining in those directions have orbits IargeIy interior to Earth's; the
understanding of their number is as yet very uncertain. n addition, there are objects that remain too far
from Earth to be detected aImost aII of the time. The latter include Earth-approaching comets (comets with orbits
that approach the Sun at distances less than 1.3 astronomical units [AU] and have periods less than 200 years), of which 151 are
currently known. These represent a class of objects probably doomed to be perpetually only partly known, as they are not likely to
be detected in advance of a close Earth encounter. These objects, after the completion of exhaustive searches for NEOs, could
dominate the impact threat to humanity. Thus, assessing the completeness of the NEO surveys is subject to uncertainties: Some
groups of NEOs are particularly difficult to detect. Asteroids and comets are continually lost from the NEO population because they
impact the Sun or a planet, or because they are ejected from the solar system. Some asteroids have collisions that change their
sizes or orbits. New objects are introduced into the NEO population from more distant reservoirs over hundreds of thousands to
millions of years. The undiscovered NEOs couId incIude Iarge objects like 2009 H82 as weII as objects
that wiII be discovered onIy months or Iess before Earth impact ("imminent impactors). Hence, even
though 85 percent of NEOs Iarger than 1 kiIometer in diameter might aIready have been discovered,
and eventually more than 90 percent of NEOs larger than 140 meters in diameter will be discovered, NEO surveys shouId
nevertheIess continue, because objects not yet discovered pose a statisticaI risk: Humanity must
be constantIy vigiIant. Finding: Despite progress toward or completion of any survey of near-Earth objects, it is impossible to
identify all of these objects because objects' orbits can change, for example due to collisions. Recommendation: Once a near-Earth
object survey has reached its mandated goal, the search for NEOs shouId not stop. Searching should continue to
identify as many of the remaining objects and objects newly injected into the NEO population as possible, especially imminent
impactors.

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And most recent studies show a high risk of an incoming asteroid
Easterbrook, 8
[Gregg, American writer, lecturer, and a senior editor of The New Republic June 2008, Atlantic
agazine, " The Sky s Falling, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/06/the-sky-is-
falling/6807]

Breakthrough ideas have a way of seeming obvious in retro-spect, and about a decade ago, a olumbia University geophysicist
named Dallas Abbott had a breakthrough idea. She had been pondering the craters left by comets and asteroids that smashed into
Earth. Geologists had counted them and concluded that space strikes are rare events and had occurred mainly during the era of
primordial mists. But, Abbott realized, this deduction was based on the number of craters found on landand because 70 percent of
Earth's surface is water, wouldn't most space objects hit the sea? So she began searching for underwater craters caused by
impacts rather than by other forces, such as volcanoes. What she has found is spine-chilling: evidence that severaI enormous
asteroids or comets have sIammed into our pIanet quite recentIy, in geologic terms. f Abbott is right, then you
may be here today, reading this magazine, only because by sheer chance those objects struck the ocean rather than land. Abbott
believes that a space object about 300 meters in diameter hit the Gulf of arpentaria, north of AustraIia, in 536 A.D.
An object that size, striking at up to 50,000 miles per hour, could release as much energy as 1,000 nuclear bombs. Debris, dust, and
gases thrown into the atmosphere by the impact would have blocked sunlight, temporarily cooling the planetand indeed,
contemporaneous accounts describe dim skies, cold summers, and poor harvests in 536 and 537. "A most dread portent took
place, the Byzantine historian Procopius wrote of 536; the sun "gave forth its light without brightness. Frost reportedly covered
hina in the summertime. Still, the harm was mitigated by the ocean impact. When a space object strikes land, it kicks up more dust
and debris, increasing the global-cooling effect; at the same time, the combination of shock waves and extreme heating at the point
of impact generates nitric and nitrous acids, producing rain as corrosive as battery acid. f the Gulf of arpentaria object were to
strike iami today, most of the city would be leveled, and the atmospheric effects could trigger crop failures around the world.
What's more, the Gulf of arpentaria object was a skipping stone compared with an object that Abbott thinks whammed into the
ndian Ocean near adagascar some 4,800 years ago, or about 2,800 B.. Researchers generally assume that a space object a
kilometer or more across would cause significant global harm: widespread destruction, severe acid rain, and dust storms that would
darken the world's skies for decades. The object that hit the ndian Ocean was three to five kilometers across, Abbott believes, and
caused a tsunami in the Pacific 600 feet highmany times higher than the 2004 tsunami that struck Southeast Asia. Ancient texts
such as Genesis and the Epic of Gilgamesh support her conjecture, describing an unspeakable planetary flood in roughly the same
time period. f the ndian Ocean object were to hit the sea now, many of the world's coastal cities could be flattened. f it were to hit
land, much of a continent would be leveled; years of winter and mass starvation would ensue. At the start of her research, which has
sparked much debate among specialists, Abbott reasoned that if colossal asteroids or comets strike the sea with about the same
frequency as they strike land, then given the number of known land craters, perhaps 100 large impact craters might lie beneath the
oceans. n less than a decade of searching, she and a few colleagues have already found what appear to be 14 large underwater
impact sites. That they've found so many so rapidly is hardly reassuring. Other scientists are making equally unsettling discoveries.
Only in the past few decades have astronomers begun to search the nearby skies for objects such as asteroids and comets (for
convenience, let's call them "space rocks). What they are finding suggests that near-Earth space rocks are more
numerous than was once thought, and that their orbits may not be as stabIe as has been
assumed. There is aIso reason to think that space rocks may not even need to reach Earth's
surface to cause catacIysmic damage. Our soIar system appears to be a far more dangerous pIace
than was previousIy beIieved. The received wisdom about the origins of the solar system goes something like this: the sun
and planets formed about 4.5 billion years ago from a swirling nebula containing huge amounts of gas and dust, as well as relatively
small amounts of metals and other dense substances released by ancient supernova explosions. The sun is at the center; the
denser planets, including Earth, formed in the middle region, along with many asteroidsthe small rocky bodies made of material
that failed to incorporate into a planet. Farther out are the gas-giant planets, such as Jupiter, plus vast amounts of light elements,
which formed comets on the boundary of the solar system. Early on, asteroids existed by the millions; the planets and their satellites
were bombarded by constant, furious strikes. The heat and shock waves generated by these impacts regularly sterilized the young
Earth. Only after the rain of space objects ceased could life begin; by then, most asteroids had already either hit something or found
stable orbits that do not lead toward planets or moons. Asteroids still exist, but most were assumed to be in the asteroid belt, which
lies between ars and Jupiter, far from our blue world. As for comets, conventional wisdom held that they also bombarded the
planets during the early eons. omets are mostly frozen water mixed with dirt. An ancient deluge of comets may have helped create
our oceans; lots of comets hit the moon, too, but there the light elements they were composed of evaporated. As with asteroids,
most comets were thought to have smashed into something long ago; and, because the solar system is largely void, researchers
deemed it statistically improbable that those remaining would cross the paths of planets. These standard assumptionsthat
remaining space rocks are few, and that encounters with planets were mainly confined to the pastare being upended. On arch
18, 2004, for instance, a 30-meter asteroid designated 2004 FHa hunk potentially large enough to obliterate a cityshot past
Earth, not far above the orbit occupied by telecommunications satellites. (Enter "2004 FH in the search box at Wikipedia and you
can watch film of that asteroid passing through the night sky.) Looking at the broader picture, in 1992 the astronomers David Jewitt,
of the University of Hawaii, and Jane Luu, of the assachusetts nstitute of Technology, discovered the Kuiper Belt, a region of
asteroids and comets that starts near the orbit of Neptune and extends for immense distances outward. At Ieast 1,000
objects big enough to be seen from Earth have aIready been Iocated there. These objects are 100 kilometers
across or larger, much bigger than whatever dispatched the dinosaurs; space rocks this size are referred to as "planet killers
because their impact would likely end life on Earth. nvestigation of the Kuiper Belt has just begun, but there appear to be
substantially more asteroids in this region than in the asteroid belt, which may need a new name. Beyond the Kuiper Belt may lie the
hypothesized Oort loud, thought to contain as many as trillions of comets. f the Oort loud does exist, the number of extant
comets is far greater than was once believed. Some astronomers now think that short-period comets, which swing past the sun
frequently, hail from the relatively nearby Kuiper Belt, whereas comets whose return periods are longer originate in the Oort loud.
But if large numbers of comets and asteroids are still around, several billion years after the formation of the solar system, wouldn't
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they by now be in stable orbitsones that rarely intersect those of the planets? aybe not. During the past few decades,
some astronomers have theorized that the movement of the soIar system within the ilky Way varies the
gravitational stresses to which the sun, and everything that revolves around it, is exposed. The soIar system may
periodicaIIy pass cIose to stars or groups of stars whose gravitationaI puII affects the Oort CIoud,
shaking comets and asteroids Ioose from their orbitaI moorings and sending them downward, toward the
inner planets. onsider objects that are already near Earth, and the picture gets even bleaker. Astronomers traditionally spent little
time looking for asteroids, regarding them as a lesser class of celestial bodies, lacking the beauty of comets or the significance of
planets and stars. Plus, asteroids are hard to spotthey move rapidly, compared with the rest of the heavens, and even the nearby
ones are fainter than other objects in space. Not until the 1980s did scientists begin systematically searching for
asteroids near Earth. They have been finding them in disconcerting abundance. lick here to find out more! n 1980,
only 86 near-Earth asteroids and comets were known to exist. By 1990, the figure had risen to 170; by 2000, it was 921; as of this
writing, it is 5,388. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, part of NASA, keeps a running tally at www.neo.jpl.nasa.gov/stats. Ten years
ago, 244 near-Earth space rocks one kilometer across or morethe size that would cause global calamitywere known to exist;
now 741 are. Of the recently discovered nearby space objects, NASA has classified 186 as "impact risks (details about these rocks
are at www.neo.jpl.nasa.gov/risk). And because most space-rock searches to date have been low-budget affairs, conducted with
equipment designed to look deep into the heavens, not at nearby space, the actual number of impact risks is undoubtedly much
higher. Extrapolating from recent discoveries, NASA estimates that there are perhaps 20,000 potentiaIIy
hazardous asteroids and comets in the generaI vicinity of Earth. There's still more bad news. Earth has
experienced several mass extinctionsthe dinosaurs died about 65 million years ago, and something killed off some 96 percent of
the world's marine species about 250 million years ago. Scientists have generally assumed that whatever caused those long-ago
mass extinctionscomet impacts, extreme volcanic activityarose from conditions that have changed and no longer pose much
threat. t's a comforting notionbut what about the mass extinction that occurred close to our era? About 12,000 years ago, many
large animals of North America started disappearingwoolly mammoths, saber-toothed cats, mastodons, and others. Some
scientists have speculated that Paleo-ndians may have hunted some of the creatures to extinction. A millennia-long minice Age
also may have been a factor. But if that's the case, what explains the disappearance of the lovis People, the best-documented
Paleo-ndian culture, at about the same time? Their population stretched as far south as exico, so the minice Age probably was
not solely responsible for their extinction. A team of researchers led by Richard Firestone, of the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, in alifornia, recently announced the discovery of evidence that one or two huge space rocks, each perhaps several
kilometers across, exploded high above anada 12,900 years ago. The detonation, they believe, caused widespread fires and dust
clouds, and disrupted climate patterns so severely that it triggered a prolonged period of global cooling. ammoths and other
species might have been killed either by the impact itself or by starvation after their food supply was disrupted. These conclusions,
though hotly disputed by other researchers, were based on extensive examinations of soil samples from across the continent; in
strata from that era, scientists found widely distributed soot and also magnetic grains of iridium, an element that is rare on Earth but
common in space. ridium is the meteor-hunter's lodestar: the discovery of iridium dating back 65 million years is what started the
geologist Walter Alvarez on his path-breaking theory about the dinosaurs' demise. A more recent event gives further cause for
concern. As buffs of the television show The X Files will recall, just a century ago, in 1908, a huge explosion occurred above
Tunguska, Siberia. The cause was not a malfunctioning alien star-cruiser but a small asteroid or comet that detonated as it
approached the ground. The blast had hundreds of times the force of the Hiroshima bomb and devastated an area of several
hundred square miles. Had the explosion occurred above London or Paris, the city would no longer exist. ark Boslough, a
researcher at the Sandia National Laboratory, in New exico, recently concluded that the Tunguska object was surprisingly small,
perhaps only 30 meters across. Right now, astronomers are nervously tracking 99942 Apophis, an asteroid with a
slight chance of striking Earth in April 2036. Apophis is also small by asteroid standards, perhaps 300 meters across,
but it couId hit with about 60,000 times the force of the Hiroshima bomb-enough to destroy an
area the size of France. n other words, smaII asteroids may be more dangerous than we used to thinkand
may do considerabIe damage even if they don't reach Earth's surface. Until recently, nearly all the thinking
about the risks of space-rock strikes has focused on counting craters. But what if most impacts don't leave craters? This is the
prospect that troubles Boslough. Exploding in the air, the Tunguska rock did plenty of damage, but if people had not seen the
flashes, heard the detonation, and traveled to the remote area to photograph the scorched, flattened wasteland, we'd never know
the Tunguska event had happened. Perhaps a comet or two exploding above anada 12,900 years ago spelled the end for saber-
toothed cats and lovis society. But no obvious crater resulted; clues to the calamity were subtle and hard to come by. omets,
asteroids, and the little meteors that form pleasant shooting stars approach Earth at great speedsat least 25,000 miles per hour.
As they enter the atmosphere they heat up, from friction, and compress, because they decelerate rapidly. any space rocks
explode under this stress, especially small ones; large objects are more likely to reach Earth's surface. The angle at which objects
enter the atmosphere also matters: an asteroid or comet approaching straight down has a better chance of hitting the surface than
one entering the atmosphere at a shallow angle, as the latter would have to plow through more air, heating up and compressing as it
descended. The object or objects that may have detonated above anada 12,900 years ago would probably have approached at a
shallow angle. If, as Boslough thinks, most asteroids and comets expIode before reaching the ground, then this
is another reason to fear that the conventionaI thinking seriousIy underestimates the frequency of
space-rock strikesthe smaII number of craters may be IuIIing us into compIacency. After all, if a space
rock were hurtling toward a city, whether it would leave a crater would not be the issuethe explosion would be the issue. A
generation ago, the standard assumption was that a dangerous object would strike Earth perhaps once in a million years. By the
mid-1990s, researchers began to say that the threat was greater: perhaps a strike every 300,000 years. This winter, asked William
Ailor, an asteroid specialist at The Aerospace orporation, a think tank for the Air Force, what he thought the risk was. Ailor's
answer: a one-in-10 chance per century of a dangerous space-object strike. Regardless of which estimate is correct, the likelihood
of an event is, of course, no predictor. Even if space strikes are IikeIy onIy once every miIIion years, that
doesn't mean a miIIion years wiII pass before the next impact-the sky couId suddenIy darken
tomorrow. Equally important, improbable but catacIysmic dangers ought to command attention because of
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their scope. A tornado is far more IikeIy than an asteroid strike, but humanity is sure to survive the
former. The chances that any one person wiII die in an airIine crash are minute, but this does not
prevent us from caring about aviation safety. And as Nathan yhrvold, the former chief technology officer of
icrosoft, put it, "The odds of a space-object strike during your lifetime may be no more than the odds you will die in a plane crash
but with space rocks, it's like the entire human race is riding on the plane.

The impact is extinction - timeframe is fast and aII their impact defense is wrong
BrownfieId '4 (Roger presented at the Planetary Defense onference: Protecting Earth from Asteroids, Orange
ounty, alifornia, Feb. 23-26, 2004 -- "A illion iles a Day. Brownsfield is part of the Gaiashiled project available at:
http://www.aiaa.org/content.cfm?pageid=406&gTable=Paper&gD=17092)
Once upon a time there was a Big Bang... ause/Effect - ause/Effect -ause/Effect and fifteen billion years later we have this chunk of cosmos weighing in at a couple trillion
tons, screaming around our solar system, somewhere, hair on fire at a million miles a day, on course to the subjective center of the universe. Left to its own fate --
on impact -- this Rock would release the kinetic energy equivalent of one Hiroshima bomb for every man,
woman and child on the planet. Game Over... No Joy... Restart Darwin's clock. again. No happy ever after. There is simply no
empirical logic or rational argument that this could not be the next asteroid to strike Earth or that the next
impact event could not happen tomorrow. And as things stand we can only imagine a handful of dubious undeveloped and untested
possibilities to defend ourselves with. There is nothing we have actually prepared to do in response to this event. From an empirical analysis of the
dynamics and geometry of our solar system we have come to understand that the prospect of an Earth/asteroid collision is a primal and ongoing
process: a solar systemic status quo that is unlikely to change in the lifetime of our species. And that the distribution of these impact
events is completely aperiodic and random both their occasion and magnitude. From abstracted averaged relative frequency
estimates we can project that over the course of the next 500 million years in the life of Earth we will be struck by approximately
100,000 asteroids that will warrant our consideration. ost will be relatively small, 100 to 1,000 meters in diameter,
millions of tons: only major city to nation killers. 1,000 or so will be over 1,000 meters, billions of tons and large
enough to do catastrophic and potentially irrecoverable damage to the entire planet: call them global civilization killers. Of those,
10 will be over 10,000 meters, trillions of tons and on impact massive enough to bring our species to extinction. All these asteroids are out there, orbiting the sun... now. Nothing
more needs to happen for them to go on to eventually strike Earth. As individual and discrete impact events they are all, already, events in progress. By any definition this is an
existential threat. Fortunately, our current technological potential has evolved to a point that if we choose to do so we can deflect all these impact events. Given a
correspondingly evolved political will, we can effectively manage this threat to the survival of our species. But since these events are aperiodic and random we can not simply
trust that any enlightened political consensus will someday develop spontaneously before we are faced with responding to this reality. f we would expect to
deflect the next impact event a deliberate, rational punctuated equilibrium of our sociopolitical will is required now.
The averaged relative frequency analysis described above or any derived random-chance statistical probabilistic assessment, in itself, would be strategically meaningless and
irrelevant (just how many extinction level events can we afford?). However, they can be indirectly constructive in illuminating the existential and perpetual nature of the threat.
Given that the most critically relevant strategic increment can be narrowly defined as the next "evergreen 100 years, it would follow that the strategic expression of the existent
risk of asteroid impact in its most likely rational postulate would be for one and only one large asteroid to be on course to strike Earth in the next 100 years... f we do eventually
choose to respond to this threat, clearly there is no way we can address the dynamics or geometry of the Solar System so there is no systemic objective we can respond to
here. We can not address 'The Threat of Asteroid mpact' as such. We can only respond to this threat as these objects present themselves as discrete impending impactors:
one Rock at a time. This leaves us the only aspect of this threat we can respond to - a rationally manifest first-order and evergreen tactical definition of this threat Which
unfortunately, as a product of random-chance, includes the prospect for our extinction. Asteroid impact is a randomly occurring existential condition. Therefore the next large
asteroid impact event is inevitable and expectable, and that inevitable expectability begins... now. The Probability is Low: As a risk assessment: "The
probability for large asteroid impact in the next century is low... is irrelevant. Say the daily random-chance probability for
large asteroid impact is one in a billion. And because in any given increment of time the chance that an impact will not happen is far greater than it will, the chance that it will
happen can be characterized as low. However, if we look out the window and see a large asteroid 10 seconds away from impact the daily random-chance probability for large
asteroid impact will still be one in a billion... and we must therefore still characterize the chance of impact as low... When the characterization of the probability can be seen to be
tested to be in contradiction with the manifest empirical fact of the assessed event it then must also then be seen to be empirically false. Worse: true only in the abstract and as
such, misleading. f we are going to respond to these events, when it counts the most, this method of
assessment will not be relevant. f information can be seen to be irrelevant ex post it must also be seen to be irrelevant ex ante. This assessment is
meaningless. onsider the current threat of the asteroid Apophis. With its discovery we abandon the average relative frequency derived annual random-chance probability for a
rational conditional-empiric probabilistic threat assessment derived from observing its speed, vector and position relative to Earth. The collective result is expressed in
probabilistic terms due only to our inability to meter these characteristics accurately enough to be precise to the point of potential impact. As Apophis approaches this point the
observations and resulting metrics become increasingly accurate and the conditional-empiric probability will process to resolve into a certainty of either zero or one. Whereas
the random-chance probability is unaffected by whether Apophis strikes Earth or not. These two probabilistic perceptions are inherently incompatible and unique, discrete and
nonconstructive to each other. The only thing these two methodologies have in common is a nomenclature: probability/likelihood/chance, which has unfortunately served only to
obfuscate their semantic value making one seem rational and relevant when it can never be so. However, merely because they are non rational does not make averaged
relative frequency derived random-chance probabilities worthless. They do have some psychological merit and enable some intuitive 'old lady' wisdom. When we consider the
occasion of some unpredictable event that may cause us harm and there is nothing tangible we can do to deflect or forestall or stop it from happening, we still want to know just
how much we should worry about it. We need to quantify chance not only in in case we can prepare or safeguard or insure against potentially recoverable consequences after
the fact, but to also meter how much hope we should invest against the occasion of such events. Hope mitigates fear. And when there is nothing else we can do about it only
then is it wise to mitigate fear... "The probability for large asteroid impact in the next century is low does serve that purpose. t is a metric for hope. Fifty years ago, before we
began to master space and tangibly responding this threat of asteroid impact became a real course of action, hope was all we could do. Today we can do much more. Today we
can hold our hope for when the time comes to successfully deflect. And then, after we have done everything we can possibly do to deflect it, there will still be of room for hope...
and good luck. Until then, when anyone says that the probability for large asteroid impact or Extinction by NEO is low
they are offering nothing more than a metric for hope -- not rational information constructive to metering a
response or making a decision to do so or not. Here, the probability is in service to illusion... slight-of-mind... and is nothing more than
comfort-food-for-thought. We still need such probabilistic comfort-food-for-thought for things like Rogue Black Holes and Gamma Bursts where we are
still imaginably defenseless. But if we expect to punctuate the political equilibrium and develop the capability to effectively respond to the existential
threat of asteroid impact, we must allow a rational and warranted fear of extinction by asteroid impact to drive a rational and warranted response to this
threat forward. Forward into the hands and minds of those who have the aptitude and training and experience in using fear to handle fearful things.
Fear focuses the mind... Fear reminds us that there are dire negative consequences if we fail. f we are going to concern ourselves with mounting a
response and deflecting these objects and no longer tolerate and suffer this threat, would it not be far more relevant to know in which century the
probability for large asteroid impact was high and far more effective to orient our thinking from when it will not to when it will occur? But this
probabilistic perspective can not even pretend to approach providing us with that kind of information. As such, it can never
be strategically relevant: contribute to the conduct of implementing a response. The same can be said when such abstract reasoning is used
to forward the notion that the next asteroid to strike Earth will likely be small... This leads us to little more than a hope based Planetary Defense. f we
Georgetown 2011-12

are ever to respond to this threat well then we must begin thinking about this threat better. Large Asteroid
mpacts Are Random Events. Expect the next one to occur at any time. Strategically speaking, this means being at
Defon 3: lock-cocked and ready to rock, prepared to defend the planet and mankind from the worst case scenario, 24/7/52... forever. Doing
anything less by design, would be like planning to bring a knife to a gunfight. f we expect our technological abilities to
develop and continue to shape our nascent and still politically tacit will to respond to this threat: if we are to build an effective Planetary Defense, we
must abandon the debilitating sophistry of "The probability for large asteroid impact in the next century is low in favor of rational random inevitable
expectation... and its attendant fear.

Even a smaII impact triggers gIobaI panic and nucIear war
Arentz et. aI, 10
[ Robert Arentz, Ball Aerospace & Technologies orp. , Harold Reitsema, Ball Aerospace & Technologies
orp. , Jeffrey Van leve, NASA Ames Research enter SET nstitute and Roger Linfield, Ball
Aerospace & Technologies orp. "NEO Survey: An Efficient Search for Near-Earth Objects by an R
Observatory in a Venus-like Orbit, Space, Propulsion & Energy Sciences nternational Forum, American
nstitute of Physics, http://www.astrosociology.org/Library/PDF/SPESF2010_Arentz-etal_NEO-
Survey.pdf]

rucial to the politics of NEO searches is the size-frequency distribution, which until the past two or three years has statistically
indicated that the next significant impact is not likely for maybe 1,000 years, enough time for the groundbased community to find
most of the NEOs with diameters roughly larger than 100 meters. However, . Boslough (2009), of Sandia National Labs, has
recently changed this argument by applying supercomputing-based numerical codes, used to model nuclear detonations, to the
enigma of the Libyan Desert Glass (LDG) event. Boslough concluded that a 100-meter-class NEO disintegrated in the air far
above the Saharan desert, with aII of its kinetic energy and momentum continuing downwards as something informally
referred to as an "air hammer. When this air hammer struck the Earth's surface, the entrained fireball initially had core temperatures
on the order of 5,000 kelvin. The fireball portion of this complex event then spread laterally to about 20 kilometers in diameter. The
air hammer also produced a hypersonic blast wave that extended radially for perhaps 50 kilometers. The fireball portion of the
interaction remained on the ground for about 40 seconds and melted a patch of sand some 15 kilometers in diameter and several
centimeters thick to produce the Libyan Desert Glass. Occasional expeditions to the site collect 100s of kilograms of the glass and
sell it on the internet for a few dollars a gram. Boslough (2009) also modeled the 1908 Tunguska event and rescaled the estimated
size of the Tunguska body downwards from ~80 meters to ~30 meters. At this new size, the mean interval between impacts is 150
years. Here is where the astrosociology of this paper's contents becomes pertinent This newly recognized threat rgime (diameter
>30 meters) contains far more objects than the diameter >140 meter NEOs. This 140-meter threshold arose circa 2003 when the
United States ongress set the goal of compiling a catalogue complete to 90% by 2020 of all NEOs larger than 140 meters in
diameter. This 90%, 140 meter, 2020 set of goals was named in honor of George E. Brown (GEB). erging the GEB goals to
Boslough's (2009) work gives two results. The first is that all the 1,000-year-intervaI arguments no Ionger work.
Instead, the mean intervaI between serious impacts is roughIy 150 to 200 years. This shortened
mean-intervaI forcefuIIy argues for an efficient and timeIy NEO survey being compIeted in the next
few years. Next (and this point is both subtle and powerful), typical arguments against performing a
spacebased survey usually begin by a person saying something like-- "Yes, an event similar to Tunguska
might happen in the next 100 years, but so what? Roughly six percent of the Earth's surface is populated,
so the next event is likely to be a non-event in terms of fatalities. However, even though ~6% of the
Earth's surface is popuIated, the worId's wideIy distributed infrastructure is vastIy Iarger and
extremeIy vuInerabIe to the physics of Boslough's (2009) modeled airbursts. A typicaI LAA airburst
couId create a cascade of faiIures across many distributed and interconnected networks which
wouId be extensive, unpredictable, and impossibIe to quantify. Additionally consider the following:
Suppose a Iarge-scaIe airburst occurred above the Indian Ocean and kiIIed no one. The resuIting
psychoIogicaI trauma around the worId couId create panic on an unprecedented scaIe, panic which
would at least ripple though the gIobaI financiaI markets. And if such an airburst happened without
warning in pIaces Iike the MiddIe East, or the much larger, and nucIear armed areas of Asia or
Russia, the resuIting response couId initiate a chain of human events resuIting in severe miIitary
action. It's this nonIinear psychoIogicaI aspect that needs addressing in this conference because its
message has been overlooked in the past. ost risk anaIyses done to date have only considered what can be
quantifiedthe immediate body count and all the property damage arising from the initial impact. Perhaps this conference shouId
pIace an added emphasis on the worId's vastIy extended infrastructure and its interdependency,
as weII as the reaIities of Iarge-scaIe human reaction to a sudden and catastrophic airburst event.

The time is now - any deIay decreases mitigation success and increases the risk
that we defIect with nucIear weapons
Arentz et. aI, 10
[ Robert Arentz, Ball Aerospace & Technologies orp. , Harold Reitsema, Ball Aerospace & Technologies
orp. , Jeffrey Van leve, NASA Ames Research enter SET nstitute and Roger Linfield, Ball
Georgetown 2011-12

Aerospace & Technologies orp. "NEO Survey: An Efficient Search for Near-Earth Objects by an R
Observatory in a Venus-like Orbit, Space, Propulsion & Energy Sciences nternational Forum, American
nstitute of Physics, http://www.astrosociology.org/Library/PDF/SPESF2010_Arentz-etal_NEO-
Survey.pdf]

Derating the Tunguska object from ~80 meters to today's ~30 meters greatly decreases the mean impact
interval from ~1,000 years to ~150 years. Given that Tunguska happened 101 years ago, the next
impact is arguabIy 50 to 100 years away, so why the urgency? From contract start, it wouId take an
experienced aerospace contractor about 3 years to buiId and Iaunch NEO Survey, and then 7 more
years (worst case) to compIete the cataIogue, or 10 years to completion. Assume for the moment
that near the end of this period of 10 years, a 50-meter diameter NEO is discovered having an
impact date in 50 years. What does this mean? Groundbased systems couId easiIy miss such an
object for an apparition or two, resuIting in perhaps a few years, or perhaps a few months of warning
time before impact. If, by remote chance, it was determined that the strike Iocation was cIose to a
high-density human popuIation, it wouId force the evacuation of miIIions of peopIe from a Iarge
geographic area and wouId produce a Iong-Iasting, global sociological disruption that wouId
eventuaIIy outweigh the immediate harm resuIting from a Iarge-scaIe Ioss of human Iife and
damage to a distributed infrastructure. And since there is no predicting the reaction of popuIations
or their governments to such a trauma, such an incident couId possibIy trigger a chain of events
resuIting in miIitary action of unforeseeabIe severity. learly, the effect of such an event on the global economy
could also be large compared to the cost of flying a sensitive and efficient NEO cataloguing mission. onsider also the value
of finally having a deterministic answer to the question: "Are we safe for the next few hundred years? as
opposed to the present case of arguing from statistics. If NEO Survey found an incoming NEO with a
warning time of onIy 50 years, what would it take to execute a successful mitigation effort, and how
long would that effort last? To begin with, it wouId take a year or two for groundbased assets to do
detaiIed foIIow-up orbitaI refinements. Then, a space mission to the object would be required for in-situ
characterization because all conceivable mitigation techniques require detailed knowledge of the object's
composition, mechanical properties, spin state, whether it has a moonlet, and so on. Only then could the
appropriate mitigation solution be chosen and negotiated in a global political setting. It wouId then take
an additionaI 10 years, approximateIy, to design, buiId, fIy, and compIete the mitigation task.
Additionally, the results of any mitigation action would have to be closely monitored, and perhaps a
second mitigation mission wouId be required to produce the desired final result. These timelines are
in series and mean that 50 years of Iead-time is aImost tomorrow. ReIiance on groundbased assets
to find these smaIIer NEOs over a period of decades ignores the threats LAAs represent to the
modern worId. Additionally, the Ionger the warning time becomes, the Iess deIta-vee is needed to
move an impact off the Earth, simpIifying the mitigation effort. For example, the difference between
10 years and 20 years of warning time couId enabIe a passive mitigation option compared to a
nucIear option

NucIear defIection faiIs - guarantees a bigger asteroid impact
O'NeiII, 8
[an, PhD Solar Physics @ University of Wales - Space Producer for Discovery News, Nov. 27, 2008, "
Apollo Astronaut Highlights Threat of Asteroid mpact, http://www.astroengine.com/2008/11/apollo-
astronaut-highlights-threat-of-asteroid-strike/]

Unfortunately, the commonly held opinion is to dispense an incoming asteroid or comet with a few
carefully placed atomic bombs (by a generic crew of Hollywood oil drillers). Alas, Armageddon this ain't.
Even if we were abIe to get a bomb onto the surface of an incoming object, there is IittIe hope of it
doing any good (whether we get Bruce Willis to drop it off or launch it B style. or would that be
PB, as in nterplanetary Ballistic issile?). What if we are deaIing with a near-Earth asteroid
composed mainIy of metaI? A nucIear bIast might just turn it into a hot radioactive Iump of metal.
What if the comet is simply a collection of loosely bound pieces of rock? The force of the bIast wiII
probabIy be absorbed as if nothing happened. n most cases, and if we are faced with an asteroid
measuring 10 km across (i.e. a dinosaur killer), it wouId be Iike throwing an egg at a speeding train
and expecting it to be derailed. There are of course a few situations where a nucIear missiIe might work
too weII; bIowing the object up into thousands of chunks. But in this case it would be like making the
choice between being shot by a single bullet or a shot gun; it's bad if you have one impact with a
Georgetown 2011-12

singIe Iump of rock, but it might be worse if thousands of smaIIer pieces make their own smaIIer
impacts aII over the pIanet. f you ever wondered what it might be like to be sandblasted from space,
this might be the way to find out! There may be a few situations where nuclear missiles are successful,
but their use would be limited.

We need a new approach to the oncoming asteroid - we must consider the
economic, poIiticaI, and socio-cuIturaI ramifications by integrating aII of sociaI
sciences to save humanity
Pass 6 (Jim, 09-21, Ph.D. in sociology, University of Southern alifornia, Founder of
Astrosociology.com & Senior onsultant "Applied Astrosociology: The New mperative to Protect Earth
and Human Societies, STAF, http://www.astrosociology.com/Library/PDF/Protecting%20Societies.pdf)

The proposal offered here will change societies around the world in ways unseen in the past. This new
strategy represents an ideal type (i.e., the extreme form of implementation). The ideal type represents the
best system humanity can produce to detect, defend, and survive any threat by any object regardless of
reaction time or cost to implement. eeting the requirements of ideal type would be impossibly expensive
and require an outrageously large infrastructure, so we must decide as individual societies and as a
species how close we wish to approximate this model of the "perfect planetary defense system.
t is best to think of this type of policy decision as falling along a continuum. At one end, there is no
implementation of any part of the system at all. At the other extreme, there is the full implementation of all
parts of the system that perfectly matches the ideal type. n practice, humanity will select an approach the
falls between the two extremes. The assumption, then, involves the great likelihood that societies will
implement at least some aspects of the various components of the strategy. Two dimensions are
important: (1) which features actually result in implementation and (2) the extent to which these features
match those of the ideal type. Such decision-making involves a cost/benefit analysis that weighs
considerations related to technical capabilities, costs, the willingness of publics around the world to
participate, subjective assessments of the threat, and the potential reactions of populations to various
scenarios associated with planetary defense. Thus, decisions involve technical, economic, political,
social, and cultural considerations. Astrosociologists can assist in the study of the latter four categories.

Even if the tech faiIs, astrosocioIogy is criticaI to the survivaI of humanity
and Human Societies, STAF, http://www.astrosociology.com/Library/PDF/Protecting%20Societies.pdf

Even though the study of social effects receives only passing mention, it does nevertheless create an opening for social scientists to
work on the types of issues emphasized in this discussion. Here, it receives the greatest attention of the three parts of the planetary
defense strategy. Burrows27 argues that protection of the Earth and our collective civilization represents a vital goal, and it is best
TP PT accomplished in a variety of ways including moving a sizable number of humans off planet as well as greatly improving the
other two elements of this overall strategy. uch of the money needed to accomplish this, he argues, is derivable through the
elimination of waste and reallocation of funds at NASA as well as other institutions and agencies that comprise the social structures
of societies. The expansion of an astrosociological approach would emphasize the protection of the human
species; and more precisely, it would attempt to ensure the survivability of human societies in order to
carry on from the point of impact should the defensive measures fail. Essentially, survival entails resisting
the effects of a direct impact upon the Earth or any other effects that occur from a cosmic object such as
the creation of tsunamis or even the equivalent of a nuclear winter. This phase of the strategy is no less
challenging or less financially burdensome than the other two phases. Social scientist Albert Harrison 28
emphasizes the need to ensure the viability of "survival communities by determining which criteria will
ensure maximum protection. The need to take other measures also exists. Another set of considerations
involve: ...finding secure locations, constructing and stocking shelters, ensuring that the people who are
entitled to be at the shelter are present and accounted for, ejecting stowaways, and maintaining law,
order and morale during the period of confinement.29 n addition, as Harrison also observes, social
scientists have conducted extensive research on life in isolated circumstances that can assist us in
preparing for the survival phase should it become necessary. The best approach is to protect as many people as
possible in shelters scattered all around the world. Selection criteria should include the power elite while also including a
proportional number of citizens that reflects the most important characteristics of the population distribution as a whole. For
example, the surviving population would benefit the most from a great diversity of occupational statuses within its ranks because it
could take advantage of the great variety of skills available to them. This would greatly assist the population to survive, especially in
the calamitous of circumstances. TP TP Thus, survival partly involves a similar approach to the utilization of bomb shelters against
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nuclear attack commonplace during the old War. t would require the building of infrastructure on a much larger scale, however.
Another difference, obviously, involves the inability to threaten a cosmic object heading for a collision course with the Earth through
the use of policies such as utually Assured Destruction (AD). An asteroid, for example, is not subject to negotiation
like another government. This fact requires that governments around the world commit to the construction of underground and
otherwise hardened facilities that can allow for the carrying on of social life in a more or less usual manner. As with the other
components, the question arises: who will pay for such facilities in developing nations or those who refuse to devote any resources
to the overall project? Unlike the other two components of the strategy, this component involves extensive construction of material
culture within the borders of individual nations. Peter et al.30 suggest the need for at least two types of shelters. Short-term shelters
would exist for impacts of TP TP small asteroids (less than one kilometer in size) since the devastation would not occur on a global
scale. Different segments of a population could access both public and private shelters meaning that different sets of decision
makers would decide how to populate them. n contrast, long-term shelters would serve a different purpose. Long-term shelters
should be designed to host people for 5 to 10 years. They would have the two main goals to maintain a colony of humans to
preserve humanity until they can repopulate the Earth and to preserve the key technologies, global knowledge, and culture until the
Earth ecosystem returns to habitable conditions for humankind. These shelters will be underground colonies with all facilities
mandatory to preserve life.31 This passage demonstrates again that the survival component advocated here is not a new idea.
However, the intensity of research by social scientists needs to increase so that we may become better informed about the social
and cultural complications that may arise. We must also become much more attentive to the needs of the populations and
governments in different societies (which will differ from one another on a multitude of diverse measures). PT PT Survival exists
on three distinctive yet interrelated dimensions, all of which must occur simultaneously and successfully.
The three dimensions include (1) the cultural dimension (i.e., ideas including values, norms, and material
culture); (2) the social dimension (i.e., social structures such as groups, organizations, and institutions);
and (3) the personal dimension (i.e., the individuals in the population). The most common focus involving
survival in the literature falls upon saving people without enough regard to cultural or social protection.
This new focus comes from a social science perspective that fall beyond the scope of research normally carried out by most
members of the space community. Do we have the willingness to build infrastructure that can ensure the survivability of societies in
all three dimensions? This component of the strategy will likely receive the greatest amount of complacency and opposition due to a
number of reasons including: (1) its cost; (2) our potentially unrealistic faith that we can defend ourselves from an object heading in
our direction; and, perhaps most dangerous, (3) the mistaken assumption that the risk is too small to warrant a sizable or serious
course of action. The most recent "scares from asteroid Apophis and others only resulted in timid responses focusing on detection
and defense improvement. The survival element of the proposed strategy received no or extremely little consideration. n the end,
each society will need to make decisions about the whether or not to put this component into practice, and beyond that, how many
resources to allocate to it as well as which tactical areas would receive funding. The nature of survival component implementation
would also constitute important data valuable to other nations as guidelines for their decisions. t may be that particular nations will
decide to take the ultimate risk of ignoring this survival element altogether. Given the current status of our technological
capability to defend against NEOs, or probably worse long-duration comets unknown to us, their recovery
if struck by a cosmic object would be difficult at best. Finally, each nation will need to decide how to implement this
component of the strategy in a way that would allow them to protect their citizens, their material culture, and the body of knowledge
characteristic of their culture and sciences. Options include construction of shelters for average citizens, underground libraries and
art galleries, and shelters for societal elites such as government leaders and scientists. Escape plans for moving coastal residents to
higher ground in the circumstance that an object strikes an ocean represents another survival tactic due to the potential of the
impact creating a tsunami. Would some citizens adopt an underground lifestyle in order to operate and protect underground
shelters, libraries, and art galleries? Given the fact that a large object can potentially destroy the human civilization, such
considerations should receive serious consideration. The decision to implement a survival plan for developing nations will require
assistance from developed nations, possibly through a program operated by the United Nations or new international body dedicated
specifically to the task. We must approach this challenge on a large scale. We must take rational steps as societies to protect
ourselves on all three dimensions rather than allowing nature to make such decisions for us.

Asteroid defIection requires astrosocioIogy - we need to know how to react to the
threat

A. Detection: Eventually, the detection element alone will likely involve satellites, facilities on the Earth
and the oon, and the dedication of a many governments, organizations, and individuals. There exists
the possibility that the interest of politicians and even some space scientists may wane over time without
the confirmation of a threatening object. This type of social effect is best studied by astrosociologists
rather than space scientists; or even more productively, with the assistance of space scientists.
An important aspect of the astrosociological component to detection comes into play when detecting an
object and indisputably calculating it to be on an impact course with the Earth. How will the scientific
community react? How will governments react? Will they favor secrecy or openness to their publics? f
openness prevails, how will publics and the subcultures within them (e.g., religious groups and political
entities) react to such dire news?
Georgetown 2011-12

Detection of a massive object heading for the Earth will equate to a death threat unless the other two
parts exist. At minimum, a successful defensive reaction would be required. n the best of circumstances,
of course, we would not require the survival component due to a fully successful implementation of a
defense tactic. However, even a partial success, or mitigation of the original risk, may indeed require the
implementation of survival tactics. Thus, while the detection element is vital and much of our effort and
resource allocation should go to its ongoing operation, the second and third components are crucial as
well. We should not wait until it is too late to realize that we need a defense against a confirmed threat or,
even worse, the survival tactics to protect our societies, standards of living, and characteristic ways of life.

Reducing existentiaI risk by even a tiny amount outweighs every other impact -
the math is concIusiveIy on our side.
Nick Bostrom, Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford artin School, Director of the Future of
Humanity nstitute, and Director of the Programme on the mpacts of Future Technology at the University
of Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Eugene R. Gannon Award for the ontinued Pursuit of Human
Advancement, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the London School of Economics, 2011 ("The oncept
of Existential Risk, Draft of a Paper published on ExistentialRisk.com, Available Online at
http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html, Accessed 07-04-2011)
Holding probability constant, risks become more serious as we move toward the upper-right region of figure 2. For any fixed
probability, existentiaI risks are thus more serious than other risk categories. But just how much more
serious might not be intuitively obvious. One might think we could get a grip on how bad an existential
catastrophe would be by considering some of the worst historical disasters we can think ofsuch as the two
world wars, the Spanish flu pandemic, or the Holocaustand then imagining something just a bit worse. Yet if we
look at global population statistics over time, we find that these horrible events of the past century faiI to
register (figure 3).
[Graphic Omitted]
Figure 3: World population over the last century. alamities such as the Spanish flu pandemic, the two world wars, and the
Holocaust scarcely register. (f one stares hard at the graph, one can perhaps just barely make out a slight temporary reduction in
the rate of growth of the world population during these events.)
But even this reflection fails to bring out the seriousness of existential risk. What makes existential
catastrophes especiaIIy bad is not that they would show up robustly on a plot like the one in figure 3, causing a precipitous
drop in world population or average quality of life. nstead, their significance lies primarily in the fact that they would
destroy the future. The philosopher Derek Parfit made a similar point with the following thought experiment:
believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. ompare three
outcomes:
(1) Peace.
(2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world's existing population.
(3) A nuclear war that kills 100%.
(2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? ost
people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very
much greater. . The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. ivilization began only
a few thousand years ago. f we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny
fraction of the whoIe of civiIized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the
difference between this tiny fraction and aII of the rest of this history. f we compare this possible
history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second. (10: 453-454)
To calculate the loss associated with an existential catastrophe, we must consider how much value would
come to exist in its absence. t turns out that the uItimate potentiaI for Earth-originating inteIIigent Iife
is IiteraIIy astronomicaI.
One gets a large number even if one confines one's consideration to the potential for biological human beings living on Earth. f
we suppose with Parfit that our planet will remain habitable for at least another billion years, and we assume
that at least one billion people could live on it sustainably, then the potential exist for at least 10
18
human
Iives. These lives could also be considerabIy better than the average contemporary human Iife,
which is so often marred by disease, poverty, injustice, and various biological limitations that could be
partly overcome through continuing technological and moral progress.
However, the relevant figure is not how many people could live on Earth but how many descendants we
could have in total. One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future accessible
universe (based on current cosmological estimates) is 10
34
years.[10] Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will
be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of 10
54
human-
brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10
71
basic computational operations).(4)[11] f we make the less conservative
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assumption that future civilizations could eventually press close to the absolute bounds of known physics
(using some as yet unimagined technology), we get radicaIIy higher estimates of the amount of computation and
memory storage that is achievable and thus of the number of years of subjective experience that could be
realized.[12]
Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of
space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected Ioss of an existentiaI catastrophe is
greater than the vaIue of 10
18
human Iives. This implies that the expected vaIue of reducing
existentiaI risk by a mere one miIIionth of one percentage point is at Ieast ten times the vaIue of a
biIIion human Iives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10
54
human-brain-emulation
subjective life-years (or 1052 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give
this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a
mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected vaIue of reducing existentiaI risk by a
mere one biIIionth of one biIIionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred biIIion times as
much as a biIIion human Iives.
One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existentiaI risk has an expected vaIue
greater than that of the definite provision of any "ordinary" good, such as the direct benefit of
saving 1 biIIion Iives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on
the total cumulative amount of existential riskpositive or negativeis almost certainly larger than the positive
value of the direct benefit of such an action.[13]

Err Aff - uncertainty means you shouId defauIt to worst-case predictions -
precautionary principIe - it's try-or-die for the aff
Seamone, 4
[Evan, J.D., University of owa ollege of Law; .P.P. and B.A., University of alifornia, Los Angeles.
Evan Seamone is an attorney and a Judge Advocate in the U.S. Army stationed at Fort Polk, Louisiana,
"The Precautionary Principle as the Law of Planetary Defense: Achieving the andate to Defend the
Earth Against Asteroid and omet mpacts While There is Still Time, Georgetown nternational
Environmental Law Review. Washington: Fall 2004. Vol. 17, ss. 1; pg. 1, 23 pgs]

AIthough the topic of asteroids and comets striking the earth (natural impact) has caused innumerabIe
skeptics to roII their eyes condescendingIy,1 the pubIic came very cIose to knowing the horror of an
impending asteroid disaster first-hand on January 13, 2004. On the very day before President George W. Bush was expected
to deliver a speech on the new American space policy, asteroid threat detection experts contemplated issuing a warning
that an asteroid named 2004 ASl could collide with the Earth within 36 hours.2 Unlike other recent "near misses," this one prompted
agencies like the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to consider their limitations in responding to a short-notice
asteroid threat and their subsequent responsibility to notify more capable operational agencies.3 For the first time, scientists were
forced to answer the difficult questions that they had previously entertained only as brainteasers: * which agencies are responsible
for planetary defense; * what options do they have in mounting an effective defense; * how do they determine unacceptable
consequences in their selection of methods to prevent utter chaos; * who has the final say; and * what guarantees that nations will
cooperate in defensive measures rather than taking a unilateral approach?4 For a brief time while decision-makers confirmed the
nature of the threat posed by 2004 ASl, the total lack of answers to these questions indicated to the scientific community the
importance of clarifying such "rules of the road" as quickly as possible. Fortunately, the threat posed by 2004 ASl never
materialized. Even before the 2004 ASl incident, space policymakers were beginning to recognize the need for mitigation
measures.5 While no living person has experienced the horror of a massive asteroid or comet strike, the inherent threats from space
debris and deorbiting space stations have independently alerted governments of their need to plan for such dangers. While
developing threat response programs to address the falls of Skylab in 1979 and the ir Space Station in 2001, various agencies
considered several different collision scenarios and concluded that no amount of planning fully contain all potential threats.6 Without
question, asteroids and comets are distinct from falling space stations or space debris because they are far Iess
predictabIe and pose much greater harm. First, the lack of a coordinated series of telescopes across the globe makes
it impossible for astronomers to monitor all potential asteroid and comet threats.7 As a result, some policymakers have wagered that
novice sky watchers will be just as likely as professional astronomers to spot the next significant asteroid or comet threat.8 n
addition to inadequate monitoring capabilities, some threats, such as long period comets, may emerge so quickly that they will
evade even the best telescopes altogether or until it is too late to respond.9 Second, unlike Skylab or the ir Space Station, the
coIIision of even a smaIIer range asteroid can cause damage simiIar to the detonation of a nucIear
bomb.10 While scaremongers or filmmakers may dwell entirely on horrific predictions of significant damage, it is evident to even
the most objective scientist that victims of an asteroid or comet impact face severe consequences. mpacts in the oceans will
endanger coastal regions with tsunamis; direct impacts with land could result in a host of problems, like earthquakes in proximate
regions, individuals losing their hearing from the sound of the strike, and poisoning of the atmosphere.11 Based on predicted
harm to earth popuIations, statisticaI anaIyses of the IikeIihood of another significant impact, and
continuing discovery of large asteroid craters across the globe, international policymakers have concluded that a real threat will
require international cooperation, and that decisions made in the near-term may have consequences for
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many generations to come.12 Ultimately, governments can increase the chances of limiting or
eIiminating threats to an impact zone by detecting such threats Iong before the impact is due. With
enough time to mount defensive measures from a space station or from earth, governments will be able to deflect or destroy the
oncoming object. However, even if time is limited or affirmative defensive measures fail, agencies can secure life and property by
effectively preparing local governments and their citizens to evacuate and survive under the difficult and undesirable conditions. n
light of recent unexpected crises including the international outbreak of Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), widespread
blackouts affecting anada and the United States, and continued terrorist activities across the globe, planners are beginning to
recognize the public's increasing vulnerability to unpredictable threats. Perhaps the greatest stride in planning has been the
Department of Homeland security's development of the National Response Plan, which is designed to consolidate various threat-
specific policies into a single all-hazards plan to deal with sudden onset harm.13 Natural impact falls within this scope of
unpredictable harm because planners suffer from a lack of experience deflecting and destroying threatening space objects.14 n the
context of planetary defense, proclamations that nations and local governments must cooperate accomplish nothing of substance.
Such gestures are, in fact, not much different from the concerns historically voiced by experts in relation to all space threats. n the
1960s, legal scholars attacked the vague principles regarding cooperation and concern for future generations on the basis that
these policies contributed to a "legal vacuum" in space, devoid of practical guidance.15 The greatest problem then, and now, is that
well-intentioned principles impair the ability of governments to address foreseeable danger because these vague principles create a
false sense that important inroads have been forged.16 Despite the provisions of the existing Outer Space Treaty, and several
United Nations policies and proclamations, none of these documents provided clear direction to the international community
regarding responsibilities to deal with the fall of Skylab.17 The historical push for greater, more meaningful, regulation of space
harm provides a working definition for true progress in planetary defense: "detailed administration," opposed to "the language of
agreement,"18 coupled with "methods for reaching specific decisions in particular cases."19 This Article addresses four legal and
policy aspects of planning for sizeable asteroid and comet threats. Part explains specific measures required by the precautionary
principle. The purpose of this Part is to provide the general theoretical basis underlying governmental obligations to take certain
actions to prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural impact threats. Part applies Homeland security Presidential
Directive/HSPD-5 to the threat of asteroid and comet impact. HSPD-5 is crucial to planetary defense because it reveals that the U.S.
Government recognizes an obligation to act preventively against all potentially serious, national-level threats. While the document is
still being revised, it must inevitably deal with the problem of natural impact and, as a result, represents a significant stride in space
disaster mitigation. Part V considers the potential liability that governments face for inaction or accidents encountered during
deployment of defensive measures. t emphasizes that the need to take preventive action is entirely separate from the issue of how
governmental agencies should conduct themselves in an operational sense. While nations have an inherent right to self-defense
under the United Nations harter,20 they cannot defend themselves with any and all possible means. Operational considerations
such as necessity and the use of proportional force provide guidance.21 onsiderations of governmental liability will assist agencies
responding to natural impact in a similar way by providing additional considerations while the agencies act on their obligation to
mount defensive measures. Finally, Part V shares helpful lessons in organization and collaboration gleaned from public health,
especially in the area of infectious disease law and policy at domestic and international levels. These final considerations emphasize
that some problems are so common to all crises that their successful resolution in one context will assist governments in another
context, even when, as in this case, it is difficult to appreciate even the possibility of natural impact devastation. All the
considerations addressed by this Article apply equally to any asteroid or comet threat regardless of the amount of time existing
before an impact is due, including threats that manifest with no notice at all. . THE PREAUTONARY PRNPLE The
precautionary principIe governs responses to unknown types of harm. n many international agreements
and other bodies of rules, the principle obligates governments to institute measures to prevent potential harm from a source, even if
it is not certain if, when, or where, the harm will occur.22 The current poIicy of the United States requiring agencies to
prevent terrorist attacks before they occur rests squareIy within this principIe. itigation measures
contained in this policy depend on preventive and anticipatory action: "[t]he greater the threat, the greater the risk of
inaction-and the more compeIIing the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if
uncertainty remains as to time and pIace of the enemy's attack."23 In the context of pIanetary defense,
the same principIe appIies because some naturaI impact threats can strike without notice (e.g., long-
period comets). Likewise, in hypothesized situations where asteroids are spotted with some advance notice, response times may
require so much preparation that delaying action will preclude effective intervention. n line with the precautionary principle,
lawmakers and planners should be cautious of adopting different alternatives to deal with asteroid and comet threats that are
projected to occur within different timeframes.24 While some priorities must change over time, such as evacuating people in impact
zones closer to the time of impact, governments must be capabIe of responding to threats of the greatest
magnitude at aII times. PIanning for a "worst case scenario" is common in disaster relief circles. Whether
the harm is an earthquake, flood, or other natural disaster, the government's goaI must be to withstand maximum
harm; not onIy harm that is considered "normaI."25 The logic underlying this practice recognizes that there may
onIy be one chance to avert significant harm. ultiple plans for every imaginable scenario could lead to mass
confusion.26

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PLAN

Thus [partner's name] and I advocate that the &nited States federaI government
shouId deveIop and depIoy asteroid detection and pIanetary defense
technoIogies beyond the Earth's mesosphere with an astrosocioIogicaI
perspective.
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CONTENTION 2: BEYOND HARD SCIENCE

Our speech act is uniqueIy key - nonscientists are uItimateIy the ones who wiII
deaI with the threat

Despite the widely accepted assessment of cosmic objects as real and potentially devastating threats to
humankind and human societies (chiefly among space scientists and engineers), politicians and publics
of various societies may indeed downplay the likelihood of being struck by a comet or asteroid.
Assessment of the threat by nonscientists within societies falls under the purview of the social sciences,
and the final decision concerning financing and implementation ultimately becomes the responsibility of
politicians rather than scientists. The importance of bringing in social scientists should be clear as their
training focuses on these exact types of issues; issues beyond the scope of the natural sciences.

Our demand and action is key to sparking a new worId consciousness - our
speech act chaIIenges defense and technocratic discourse institutions

These components exist roughly in sequential order as to their application. Practically speaking, detection
of a possible threat should set into motion a logical determination of the best defensive countermeasure
to implement. f components one and two occur successfully, then the third one becomes unnecessary.
As a practical matter, however, we should move forward with component three as an insurance policy in
the event that failures in the first two steps catch us by surprise and we have no time to implement step
three from scratch. n fact, societal survival may well depend upon infrastructures currently undreamed
about by space scientists and engineers, or anyone else for that matter.
The construction of infrastructure to achieve these components involves the creation of material culture.
n this case, the construction of such infrastructure would demonstrate a particular society's prioritization
of protecting itself from asteroids and comets. oreover, the stylistic elements and emphasized functional
elements of facilities would inevitably reflect the society's cultural ideas and beliefs in a number of
different ways. These types of considerations are important if we intend to construct a global system
because it will become important to put the individual pieces together to create the whole. A particular
society's government could refuse to participate or favor one type of facility (e.g., detection) or another
(e.g., survival). t may be possible to make up for the missing pieces in one society by building those
pieces in another that may accept them, although accomplishing this will require an understanding of the
cultural priorities of various societies around the world.
The detection component of the strategy currently receives the most funding followed by the defense
component (especially in the form of surveys). Very little serious discussion in the literature currently
emphasizes the third component of survival. This is where astrosociology and the social sciences in
general can add insights normally outside the interests and expertise of those within the space
community. Through collaboration, however, we can easily add this new element to the traditional list of
priorities favored by space scientists and engineers. The study of the various social ramifications of all
components and their outcomes, as well as political and economic phenomena that relates to the level of
willingness to implement this new strategy, also fall under the purview of astrosociology.

The interdiscipIinary approach we advocate sparks discussion of cosmic impacts
- this is criticaI to evaIuating and pIanning for the future of humankind

Astrosociology is defined as the scientific study of astrosocial phenomena (i.e., the social and cultural
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phenomena that connect space and society).19, 20 Each of the components of any planetary defense
project represents astrosocial phenomena because they involve space phenomena, and even more
saliently human beings and their societies. The social and cultural implications associated with the
implementation and operation of proactive defensive measures against cosmic objects involves social
organization that establishes patterns of social interaction that deal with the threat before, during, and
following a real life-threatening incident. Astrosocial phenomena related to planetary defense represent
serious issues that threaten the very existence of human beings and the societies to which they belong.
n many ways, if our current assessment of the threat represents even a close approximation of its
objective nature, then these types of astrosocial phenomena mandate a significant elevation of
significance as threats to the future of humankind and thus the involvement of astrosociologists.

Our demand for a change in societaI consciousness wouId be Iike the Overview
Effect - binding societies and Earth together in human unity. Our position as the
&SFG is key and the threat of an asteroid soIves - no K's

Positive benefits may resuIt from potentiaI disaster. Much Iike the overview effect defined by
Frank White, 23 the reaIization that humanity's future may come to abrupt end can potentiaIIy
serve to bind societies together. We are all in the same "boat, so to speak. All of us live on a single
planet, and we now know that our planet is under serious threat. The politically strong-minded
governments, along with the assistance of the United Nations and other international bodies, should take
advantage of our new perspective in a way that leads to the construction of both a planetary defense
strategy and the infrastructure to carry it out. With the threat of cosmic disaster now strongly creeping into
the cultures of societies around the world, the new imperative to protect Earth and human societies will
likely receive the greatest degree of support it has ever enjoyed at all levels of societal and international
organization. Still, its justification will be subject to debate and controversy. The most advantageous
approach is to consider the worst-case scenario and construct a system that can counter it to the best of
our ability, to build the most capable system that we believe we can afford. n the end, we will have to live
with our choices should a killer asteroid or comet head our way.

Our project is key to reinvigorating the pubIic sphere and reenergizing thought
and societaI consciousness
GangaIe and DudIey-FIores, 7
[Thomas, Executive Director, OPS-Alaska ; and arilyn, EO/hief Research Scientist, OPS-Alaska;
"The Globalization of Space The Astrosociological Approach, Presented at the AAA SPAE 2007
onference & Exposition 18 - 20 September 2007, Long Beach, aliforni]

The citizen space community is smaII, fractured, and appears to Iack a cohesive core of expertise.
The pooI of expertise that it possesses is diffused among a generaI popuIation of enthusiasts,
which makes it difficuIt to focus that expertise to a productive purpose. n a positive development,
the American nstitute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, a professional organization that draws its
membership from industry, government, and academia, has begun to increase its efforts in the policy
arena, both through its annual ongressional Visit Day and through greater visibility of its Public Policy
ommittee. The citizen group ProSpace's annuaI "March Storm" on CapitoI HiII is a nobIe effort;
however, an informed voice that speaks both to civiI society and in the corridors of power is
soreIy needed. The generaI pubIic is ignorant of space to a Iarge degree. As a society, we have a
poor understanding of our pIace in the soIar system: the relative distances between Earth, the
oon, the sun, and the various planets and their moons; the relative sizes of these celestial bodies; the
environmental conditions on them. n 2003, author Gangale observed firsthand how bogus satellite
imagery of the 1 February destruction of olumbia and the 14 August electrical blackout of the
northeastern US and eastern anada passed uncritically through the email system among engineers at
one of the nation's largest utility companies. One wouId have thought that such technicaIIy-trained
peopIe wouId not have been so easiIy duped. Jim Pass' (2004) distinction is apt; we have yet to
become a true spacefaring civiIization, we are mereIy a space-capabIe civiIization.
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Socio-cuIturaI considerations come first - the neg's pureIy body count based
Iogic is fIawed

The ideal type involves a three-prong strategy that is required in order to cope with the inevitability of a
large space-born object on a collision course with the Earth. This proposed strategy involves many of the
issues raised in the literature with an added emphasis rarely brought into the discussion. The new
approach consists of three major, though interrelated, components. Emphasis on the protection of
societies and their cultures shifts the common treatment of asteroid and comet defense to a higher level
of protection. While protection of the Earth's biosphere remains vital to ensure human survival, the
survival of social systems at their current level of development should become the new standard.
Any strategy to defend the Earth, the human species, and human societies and their cultures at this
current stage of scientific and technological development cannot logically rely on a successful outcome.
Other aspects of our societies and cultures such as the arts, literature, religious sites, and government
buildings face potential destruction at some point in the future. Humanity must work on all three
components of the strategy simultaneously in order to protect the all of these entities over the long term.
Perhaps the most important thing we need to protect, in a general sense, is the characteristic details that
define social life in various societies. any elements of culture such as values, customs, and subcultural
idiosyncrasies could easily disappear following an impact; yet they demand protection.

Our framework is essentiaI to theirs - sociaI science informs poIicy anaIysis

The contribution of social scientists lies in the analysis of how social systems and individuals operate/act
during three phases of the cosmic threat: (1) before an object is known to be heading for a collision with
the Earth; (2) following confirmation that an object will impact the Earth; and (3) following the aftermath of
the successful defense or actual impact (partial or unsuccessful defense). Never before has a species on
the Earth possessed enough intelligence to understand the ramifications of a cosmic impact. The
dinosaurs certainly did not, yet the next great impact could be just as devastating or even more intense.
The behaviors of human beings and societies enter into the equation in a very real and significant way.
Now that we realize that the threat is both real and serious, we must do something about it. Doing so will
prove to be difficult in a multitude of different areas including the scientific and technological aspects of
making the system work on a technical level, but also including areas related to cultural and
social/societal considerations. The latter two related areas will exist in all phases of the construction and
operation of the planetary defense system. We should appreciate this fact from the very beginning.
A continuation with the status quo in which the space community works to solve the issues related to the
cosmic threat without the input of social scientists will leave us all more vulnerable. Planners of any large-scale
system must take into account the various cultures to be involved which will affect each of their subjective
assessments of the threat and thus the level of willingness of various governments to participate at all and,
if so, how extensively. Each society will chose to protect different elements of their social and cultural
systems, so planners must be sensitive to these differences even if they fail to correspond to
expectations. The need to negotiate with governments who possess different sets of priorities will exist,
so planners must be prepared to interact with them in ways that maintain a healthy respect for the
differences.

EXISTENTAL RISK
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MAXIPOK PRINCIPLE - 1AC WORTHY

PoIicymakers shouId adopt the Maxipok principIe and prioritize the reduction of
existentiaI risk.
bAdvancement, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the London School of Economics, 2011 ("The oncept

These considerations suggest that the Ioss in expected vaIue resuIting from an existentiaI catastrophe is
so enormous that the objective of reducing existentiaI risks shouId be a dominant consideration
whenever we act out of concern for humankind as a whoIe. t may be useful to adopt the following
rule of thumb for such impersonal moral action:
axipok
aximize the probability of an "OK outcome, where an OK outcome is any outcome that avoids
existential catastrophe.
At best, maxipok is a rule of thumb or a prima facie suggestion. t is not a principle of absolute validity, since there clearly are moral
ends other than the prevention of existential catastrophe. The principle's usefulness is as an aid to prioritization. Unrestricted
altruism is not so common that we can afford to fritter it away on a plethora of feel-good projects of suboptimal efficacy. f
benefiting humanity by increasing existential safety achieves expected good on a scale many orders of
magnitude greater than that of alternative contributions, we would do well to focus on this most
efficient phiIanthropy.
Note that maxipok is different from the popuIar maximin principIe ("hoose the action that has the best worst-
case outcome).[14] Since we cannot completely eliminate existential riskat any moment, we might be tossed into
the dustbin of cosmic history by the advancing front of a vacuum phase transition triggered in some remote galaxy a billion years
agothe use of maximin in the present context would entail choosing the action that has the greatest
benefit under the assumption of impending extinction. aximin thus implies that we ought all to start
partying as if there were no tomorrow. While perhaps tempting, that implication is impIausibIe.

**Dear Neg: Please read the unhighlighted portions!!!
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IMPACT CALC - FWK - 1AC WORTHY

Reducing existentiaI risk is desirabIe in every framework-our argument doesn't
require extreme utiIitarianism.

We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions).
We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks.
For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters:
believe a better basis for ethical theory in this area can be found in quite a different directionin a commitment to
the future of humanity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the
human race. The aspiration for a better societymore just, more rewarding, and more peacefulis a part of this
project. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding,
and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to
which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. t also includes our interest in the lives of our children
and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and
grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or
unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason
to pursue or avoid it. . ontinuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of
humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my
whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any
isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its
connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average)
quality of life of a population-at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way.
We owe, think, some loyalty to this project of the human future. We also owe it a respect that we would owe
it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it.
(28: 472-473)
Since an existential catastrophe would either put an end to the project of the future of humanity or
drastically curtail its scope for development, we would seem to have a strong prima facie reason to avoid
it, in Adams' view.
We also note that an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences, suggesting
that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. n a similar vein, an ethical view emphasizing that
public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation by all stakeholders would
favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose, as is plausible, that a majority of the world's population would
come to favor such policies upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as
stakeholders). We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us
by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants.[24] We do not want to be the failing link in the
chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that
humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from
having reached a natural terminus. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential
catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: f God created the world and the human species, one
would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or
hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]
We might also consider the issue from a less theoretical standpoint and try to form an evaluation instead
by considering analogous cases about which we have definite moral intuitions. Thus, for example, if we feel
confident that committing a small genocide is wrong, and that committing a large genocide is no less
wrong, we might conjecture that committing omnicide is also wrong.[26] And if we believe we have some
moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a small number of people, and a stronger
moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a larger number of people, we might
conjecture that we have an even stronger moral reason to prevent catastrophes that would kill the entire
human population.

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PLAN RED&CES EXISTENTIAL RISK

The pIan reduces the existentiaI risk from asteroids.
Advancement, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the London School of Economics, 2011 ("Existential
Risks FAQ, Version 1.0, ExistentialRisk.com, Available Online at http://www.existentialrisk.com/faq.html,
Accessed 07-04-2011)

There are some obvious actions that would probably reduce existential risk by a tiny amount. For example,
increasing funding for ongoing efforts to map Iarge asteroids in order to check if any of them is
on coIIision course with our pIanet (in which case countermeasures could be devised) wouId probabIy
reduce the asteroid risk by a modest fraction. Since asteroids pose only a small existential risk to
begin with (on a time scale of, say, a century) this is unlikely to be the most cost-effective way to reduce
existential risk. Nevertheless, it might dominate conventional philanthropic causes in terms of expected
amount of good achieved. (This is not obvious because conventional philanthropy likely has some indirect effects on the
level of existential riskfor instance by changing the probability of future war and oppression, promoting international collaboration,
or affecting the rate of technological advance.)
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PREVENTATIVE ACTION KEY - 1AC WORTHY

Preventative action is necessary-we don't get a second chance.
Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards, ournal of Evolution and
Technology, Volume 9, Number 1, Available Online at http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html,

Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of triaI-and-error. There is no opportunity to Iearn
from errors. The reactive approach see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience is
unworkabIe. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new
types of threats and a wiIIingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and
economic) of such actions.

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LIMITED N&CLEAR WAR NOT AN EXISTENTIAL RISK

A smaII nucIear exchange is not an existentiaI risk.

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a
possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and
terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon
would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large
nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states
may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between ndia and
Pakistan for instance, is not an existentiaI risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind's
potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately,
we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter
in the 21st century.

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WE CAN ONLY DIE ONCE

ExistentiaI risks aren't cumuIative - we can onIy die once.

Finally, when considering existential-risk probabilities, we must recognize that one existentiaI catastrophe
can preempt another. f a meteor wipes us out next year, the existential risk from future machine
superintelligence drops to zero. The sum of all-things-considered probabilities of disjoint (mutually
exclusive) existential risks cannot exceed 100%. Yet conditional probabilities of disjoint existential risks
(conditional, that is to say, on no other existential disaster occurring preemptively) could well add up to more than 100%.
For example, some pessimist might coherently assign an 80% probability to humanity being destroyed by
machine superintelligence, and a 70% conditional probability to humanity being destroyed by
nanotechnological warfare given that humanity is not destroyed by machine superintelligence. However,
if the unconditional (all-things-considered) probability of our being eradicated by superintelligence is 80%, then
the unconditional probability of our being eradicated by nanotech war must be no greater than 20%, since
we can onIy be eradicated once.[9]
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THEY SAY: "RISK OF EXTINCTION LOW/EXAGGERATED"

Wrong-their takeouts are a product of the avaiIabiIity heuristic and "good-story
bias".

any kinds of cognitive bias and other psychological phenomena impede efforts at thinking clearly and
dealing effectively with existential risk.[32]

For example, use of the availability heuristic may create a "good-story bias whereby people evaluate the
plausibility of existential-risk scenarios on the basis of experience, or on how easily the various
possibilities spring to mind. Since nobody has any real experience with existential catastrophe,
expectations may be formed instead on the basis of fictional evidence derived from movies and novels. Such
fictional exposures are systematically biased in favor of scenarios that make for entertaining stories.
Plotlines may feature a small band of human protagonists successfully repelling an alien invasion or a robot army. A story in
which humankind goes extinct suddenlywithout warning and without being replaced by some other
interesting beingsis Iess IikeIy to succeed at the box office (although more IikeIy to happen in
reaIity).

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THEY SAY: "PROBABILITY O&TWEIGHS MAGNIT&DE"

Even if the probabiIity is Iow, the risk is high.

We can explicate the seriousness of a risk as the expected loss associated with it. That is,

[equation omitted without using graphics, closest version is this: Seriousness(R) = E[Loss(R)] = P(R)Loss(R)]

f some particular risk is defined in terms of how much value is lost as a consequence of an untoward evente.g., the risk "lightning
kills one personthen Loss(R) can be straightforwardly read off from the definition (in this case, the value of the loss of one life).[4]
Often, however, risks are defined without explicit reference to the value of the loss they would cause. For example, the risk "there is
a smallpox outbreak materializes if and only if there is a smallpox outbreak; but the value lost as a result of such an event ranges
over a wide interval: The outbreak might kill nobody or it might produce hundreds of millions of casualties. n such a case, Loss(R)
is itself an expectation value:

[equation omitted without using graphics, closest version is this: Loss(R)=E Loss (R, hi)P(h1)]

The sum here is over a partition of specific hypotheses, H = {hi}, about the specific ways in which the unfavorable event might
unfold. A risk of some event X occurring can therefore be serious even if (a) X is unIikeIy to occur and
(b) it is unIikeIy that much harm wouId resuIt if X does occur. Such a risk can stiII be serious if the
potentiaI harm is sufficientIy great. Thus, for example, the risk of theft of a nuclear weapon from a military
installation is fairly serious, even though it may be unlikely that any such weapon will be stolen or, if stolen,
successfully detonated. The worst-case scenario is sufficiently bad that it is worth taking precautions
even against this double unlikelihood. For this reason, nuclear weapons are not only kept under lock and
key, protected by armed guards, but are also equipped with specialized security features such as
permissive action links.

Their first-order probabiIity assessment is inaccurate because it ignores
uncertainty and error-proneness-even if our scenario is not probabIe, the risk is
high.

Probability can be understood in different senses, but most relevant here is the epistemic sense in which
probability is construed as (something like) the credence that an ideaIIy reasonabIe observer shouId
assign to the risk's materiaIizing based on currentIy avaiIabIe evidence.[5] f something is not known
to be objectively safe, it is risky at least in the subjective sense relevant to decision making. onsider the
hypothetical risk from particle collider experiments. t is very likely that these experiments have no
potential whatsoever for causing global disaster; and that therefore the objective risk is zero, as most experts
believe. But just how confident can we be that there is no objective risk? An empty cave is likewise
unsafe in the relevant sense if you cannot tell whether or not it is home to a hungry bear. t would be
rationaI for you to avoid the cave if you reasonably judge that the expected harm of entry outweighs the
expected benefit.

Assessing risk probabilities is often difficult. The uncertainty and error-proneness of our first-order
assessments of risk is itseIf something we must factor into our aII-things-considered probabiIity
assignments. This factor often dominates in low-probability, high-consequence risksespecially those
involving poorly understood natural phenomena, complex social dynamics, or new technology, or those that are difficult to assess
for other reasons. Suppose that some scientific analysis A indicates that some catastrophe X has an
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extremely small probability P(X) of occurring. Then the probability that A has some hidden crucial flaw may
easiIy be much greater than P(X).[6] Furthermore, the conditional probability of X given that A is crucially
flawed, P(X |A), may be fairIy high. We may then find that most of the risk of X resides in the
uncertainty of our scientific assessment that P(X) was smaII (figure 1).(9)

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THEY SAY: "PLAN DOESN'T 'SOLVE' EXTINCTION"

That's not our argument-
The plan reduces existential risk, it doesn't eliminate it.

And, that's important-the difference in conditionaI probabiIities is key to
assessing the desirabiIity of the pIan.

We should also distinguish between the all-things-considered probability of an adverse outcome and
various conditional probabilities, such as the conditional probability of an adverse outcome given that
some proposed avertive action is (or is not) taken. Each kind of probability term is relevant, but to different purposes.
When deciding whether some precaution is worth taking, we need to know the difference in conditionaI
probabiIitiesthat is, how much the precaution wiII Iower the risk.

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THEY SAY: "PRIORITIZING EXISTENTIAL RISK H&RTS C&RRENTLY-
EXISTING PEOPLE"

We shouId do both-there's no forced choice.

$houldn't we focus on helping the people who exist now and who are in need, rather than on reducing existential risk?

The easy answer wouId be to say that we shouId do both. Perhaps the easy answer is the correct
answer.

The underlying question hinges on deep and difficult issues in moral philosophy and population ethics
issues on which there is no consensus, even among smart and decent people who have thought long and hard about them. We
should recognize that we are, for the time being, laboring under moral uncertainty on this point.

t is important to note, however, that given certain moral assumptionsassumptions that are fairly widely, though by no
means universally, acceptedexistential risk mitigation comes up as a dominant moraI priority (see the answer
to the previous questions).

Emphasizing existentiaI risks doesn't mean ignoring current probIems-their
argument is a reduction ad absurdum.
Jason G. Matheny, Research Associate at the Future of Human nstitute at Oxford University, Ph.D.
andidate in Applied Economics at Johns Hopkins University, holds a aster's in Public Health from the
Bloomberg School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University and an .B.A. from the Fuqua School of
Business at Duke University, 2007 ("Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction, #isk Analysis, Volume 27,
ssue 5, October, Available Online at http://jgmatheny.org/matheny_extinction_risk.htm, Accessed 07-04-
2011)

t might be feared that consideration of extinction risks would lead to a reductio ad absurdum: we ought to
invest all our resources in asteroid defense or nuclear disarmament, instead of ADS, pollution, world
hunger, or other problems we face today. On the contrary, programs that create a healthy and content
global population are likely to reduce the probability of global war or catastrophic terrorism. They should
thus be seen as an essential part of a portfolio of risk-reducing projects.

Georgetown 2011-12

THEY SAY: "EXTINCTION &NLIKELY / EMPIRICALLY DENIED"

The fact that we haven't gone extinct yet isn't a reason that we won't in the future.

Other anthropic arguments may be more successful: the argument based on the Fermi-paradox is one example and the next section
provides another. n general, one lesson is that we should be careful not to use the fact that life on Earth has
survived up to this day and that our humanoid ancestors didn't go extinct in some sudden disaster to infer
that that Earth-bound life and humanoid ancestors are highly resilient. Even if on the vast majority of
Earth-like planets life goes extinct before intelligent life forms evolve, we should still expect to find
ourselves on one of the exceptional planets that were lucky enough to escape devastation.[15] n this
case, our past success provides no ground for expecting success in the future.

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THEY SAY: "C&RRENT LIVES O&TWEIGH - GENERAL"

No justification for vaIuing current Iives over future Iives when it comes to human
extinction.
2011)

An extinction event today could cause the loss of thousands of generations. This matters to the extent we
value future lives. Society places some value on future lives when it accepts the costs of long-term environmental policies or
hazardous waste storage. ndividuals place some value on future lives when they adopt measures, such as screening for genetic
diseases, to ensure the health of children who do not yet exist. Disagreement, then, does not center on whether
future Iives matter, but on how much they matter.6 Valuing future lives less than current ones
("intergenerational discounting") has been justified by arguments about time preference, growth in consumption,
uncertainty about future existence, and opportunity costs. will argue that none of these justifications
appIies to the benefits of deIaying human extinction.

No basis of devaIuing future Iives.
2011)

n summary, there are good reasons not to discount the benefits of extinction countermeasures. Time
preference is not justifiable in intergenerational problems, there is no diminishing marginal utility from
having ever existed, and uncertainties about human existence should be represented by expected values.
thus assume that the vaIue of future Iives cannot be discounted. Since this position is controversial, later show
how acceptance of discounting would affect our conclusions.

Even if they're right about discounting, the pIan's stiII cost-effective.
2011)

Although the usual justifications for discounting do not apply to extinction, we might accept discounting
and still conclude that delaying human extinction is cost effective. n the tabular display below estimate the cost
effectiveness of asteroid defense under different discounting schemes. As above, these estimates assume asteroid defense will
save an expected 8 billion life-years. However, now the value of future life-years is discounted, relative to the value of a life-year
lived now. The cost of asteroid detection and deflection is still assumed to be $20 billion, paid in the present.

Discount Rate (Form) Present Value of Life-Years Saved ost per(Present Value) Life-Year Saved
No discounting 8.0 109 $2.50
Gamma (Weitzman, 2001 ) 1.4 108 $140
1% constant geometric 5.0 105 $40,000

The cost per life-year saved is $2.50 in the undiscounted case and $140 in the declining discounted case.
Under constant discounting, the cost per life-year saved ranges from $40,000 to $200,000. Because the value
of future life-years declines rapidly under constant discounting, these costs change by less than $1 if one pessimistically assumes a
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human duration of 1,000 years. Thus, even with discounting, and even assuming a 1,000-year human duration,
asteroid defense could be more cost effective than much existing health spending.

Even if we expected humanity to become extinct within a generation, traditional statistical life valuations
would warrant a $16 billion to $32 billion annual investment in asteroid defense (Gerrard & Barber, 1997 ). Yet
the United States spends only $4 million per year on asteroid detection and there is no direct spending on
mitigation.17

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THEY SAY: "C&RRENT LIVES O&TWEIGH - TEMPORAL
PREFERENCE"

No ethicaI basis for temporaI preference.
2011)

Under time preference, a good enjoyed in the future is worth less, intrinsically, than a good enjoyed now. The typical
justification for time preference is descriptivemost people make decisions that suggest that they value current goods
more than future ones. However, it may be that people's time preference appIies onIy to instrumentaI goods,
like money, whose value predictably decreases in time. n fact, it would be difficult to design an experiment in which time
preference for an intrinsic good (like happiness), rather than an instrumental good (like money), is separated from the other forms of
discounting discussed below. But even supposing individuals exhibit time preference within their own lives, it is
not cIear how this wouId ethicaIIy justify discounting across different Iives and generations
(Frederick, 2006 ; Schelling, 2000 ).

n practice, discounting the value of future lives would lead to results few of us would accept as being
ethical. For instance, if we discounted lives at a 5% annual rate, a life today would have greater intrinsic
value than a biIIion Iives 400 years hence (owen & Parfit, 1992 ). Broome (1994) suggests most economists and
philosophers recognize that this preference for ourseIves over our descendents is unjustifiabIe and agree
that ethical impartiality requires setting the intergenerational discount rate to zero. After all, if we reject
spatial discounting and assign equal value to contemporary human lives, whatever their physical distance
from us, we have similar reasons to reject temporaI discounting, and assign equal value to human
lives, whatever their temporaI distance from us. Parfit (1984) , owen (1992) , and Blackorby et al. (1995) have
similarly argued that time preference across generations is not ethicaIIy defensibIe.7

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THEY SAY: "C&RRENT LIVES O&TWEIGH - DIMINISHING MARGINAL
&TILITY"

There's no diminishing marginaI utiIity to existence-no basis for discounting
future generations.
2011)

There could still be other reasons to discount future generations. A common justification for discounting economic
goods is that their abundance generally increases with time. Because there is diminishing marginal utility from
consumption, future generations may gain less satisfaction from a dollar than we will (Schelling, 2000 ). This principle makes
sense for intergenerational transfers of most economic goods but not for intergenerationaI transfers of
existence. There is no diminishing marginaI utiIity from having ever existed. There is no reason to
believe existence matters less to a person 1,000 years hence than it does to a person 10 years hence.

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THEY SAY: "C&RRENT LIVES O&TWEIGH - &NCERTAINTY"

&ncertainty about future generations doesn't warrant discounting their interests.
2011)

Discounting could be justified by our uncertainty about future generations' existence. f we knew for
certain that we would all die in 10 years, it would not make sense for us to spend money on asteroid
defense. t would make more sense to live it up, until we become extinct. A discount scheme would be
justified that devalued (to zero) anything beyond 10 years.

Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 261262) defend discounting on these groundswe are uncertain about humanity's long-term
survival, so planning too far ahead is imprudent.8 Discounting is an approximate way to account for our uncertainty
about survival (Ponthiere, 2003). But it is unnecessaryan analysis of extinction risk should equate the
value of averting extinction at any given time with the expected value of humanity's future from that
moment forward, which includes the probabilities of extinction in all subsequent periods (Ng, 2005). f we
discounted the expected value of humanity's future, we wouId count future extinction risks twice
once in the discount rate and once in the undiscounted expected valueand underestimate the vaIue
of reducing current risks.

n any case, Dasgupta and Heal's argument does not justify traditional discounting at a constant rate, as the
probability of human extinction is unlikely to be uniform in time.9 Because of nuclear and biological weapons, the
probability of human extinction could be higher today than it was a century ago; and if humanity colonizes other planets, the
probability of human extinction could be lower then than it is today.

Even Rees's (2003) pessimistic 50-50 odds on human extinction by 2100 would be equivalent to an annual discount rate under 1%
for this century. (f we are 100% certain of a good's existence in 2007 but only 50% certain of a good's existence in 2100, then the
expected value of the good decreases by 50% over 94 years, which corresponds to an annual discount rate of 0.75%.) As Ng
(1989) has pointed out, a constant annual discount rate of 1% implies that we are more than 99.99% certain of
not surviving the next 1,000 years. Such pessimism seems unwarranted.

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THEY SAY: "C&RRENT LIVES O&TWEIGH - OPPORT&NITY COSTS"

Opportunity costs aren't a reason to discount future generations.
2011)

A last argument for intergenerational discounting is from opportunity costs: without discounting, we would always invest our money
rather than spend it now on important projects (Broome, 1994 ). For instance, if we invest our money now in a stock market with an
average 5% real annual return, in a century we will have 130 times more money to spend on extinction countermeasures (assuming
we survive the century). This reasoning could be extended indefinitely (as long as we survive). This could be an argument for
investing in stocks rather than extinction countermeasures if: the rate of return on capital is exogenous to the rate of social savings,
the average rate of return on capital is higher than the rate of technological change in extinction countermeasures, and the marginal
cost effectiveness of extinction countermeasures does not decrease at a rate equal to or greater than the return on capital.

First, the assumption of exogeneity can be rejected. Funding extinction countermeasures would require
spending large sums; if, instead, we invested those sums in the stock market, they would affect the average
market rate of return (owen & Parfit, 1992 ). Second, some spending on countermeasures, such as research on
biodefense, has its own rate of return, since learning tends to accelerate as a knowledge base expands.
This rate could be higher than the average rate of return on capital. Third, if the probability of human
extinction significantly decreases after space colonization, there may be a small window of reducible risk:
the period of maximum marginal cost effectiveness may be limited to the next few centuries.

Discounting would be a crude way of accounting for opportunity costs, as cost effectiveness is probably
not constant. A more precise approach would identify the optimal invest-and-spend path based on
estimates of current and future extinction risks, the cost effectiveness of countermeasures, and market
returns.

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THEY SAY: "FREE MARKET SOLVES"

PoIicy interventions are uniqueIy warranted in the context of existentiaI risk
mitigation-muItipIe reasons.
2011)

We may be poorly equipped to recognize or plan for extinction risks (Yudkowsky, 2007). We may not be good
at grasping the significance of very large numbers (catastrophic outcomes) or very small numbers
(probabilities) over large timeframes. We struggle with estimating the probabilities of rare or
unprecedented events (Kunreuther et al., 2001). Policymakers may not plan far beyond current political
administrations and rarely do risk assessments value the existence of future generations.18 We may
unjustifiably discount the value of future lives. Finally, extinction risks are market failures where an
individual enjoys no perceptible benefit from his or her investment in risk reduction. Human survivaI may
thus be a good requiring deIiberate poIicies to protect.

ExistentiaI threats are a market faiIure.

Reductions in existential risks are gIobaI pubIic goods [13] and may therefore be undersuppIied by the
market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international
plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a Iegitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures
against a major existential risk.

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THEY SAY: "FEAR OF EXISTENTIAL RISK BAD"

Their criticism doesn't appIy to existentiaI risks-the probIem is not too much
fear but too IittIe.

We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies
that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. ExistentiaI risks are a different
kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have
never yet witnessed such disasters.[5] Our coIIective fear-response is IikeIy iII caIibrated to the
magnitude of threat.

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THEY SAY: "TECHNOLOGY BAD"

OnIy technoIogy can reduce existentiaI risk-benefits outweigh the costs.

We should not blame civilization or technology for imposing big existential risks. Because of the way we
have defined existential risks, a failure to develop technological civilization would imply that we had fallen
victims of an existential disaster (namely a crunch, "technological arrest). Without technoIogy, our chances of
avoiding existentiaI risks wouId therefore be niI. With technoIogy, we have some chance, although the
greatest risks now turn out to be those generated by technology itself.

CASE/CPS
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AT: GRO&ND CP

Extend the soIvency deficits from the 1ac

Perm do both

Doesn't soIve - atmosphere and sunIight bIock the scopes
[ Over many decades, the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, nstitute of
of independent, expert advice on scientific, engineering, and medical issues, "Defending Planet Earth:
Near-Earth Object Surveys and Hazard itigation Strategies
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12842&page=41]

The 2003 NASA NEO Science Definition Team Study concIuded that an infrared space teIescope is a
powerfuI and efficient means of obtaining vaIuabIe and unique detection and characterization data
on NEOs (Stokes et al., 2003). The thermal infrared, which denotes wavelengths of light from about 5 to
10 microns, is the most efficient color regime for an NEO search. An orbiting infrared teIescope that
detects these wavelengths and has a mirror between 0.5 and 1 meter in diameter is sufficient to satisfy
the goaI of detecting 90 percent of potentiaIIy hazardous NEOs 140 meters in diameter or greater.
Also, locating an NEO-finding observatory internal to Earth's orbit is preferable for identifying NEOs with
orbits mostly or entirely inside Earth's orbit. Specific advantages to space-based observations include the
following: A space-based teIescope can search for NEOs whose orbits are largely inside Earth's
orbit. These objects are difficuIt to find using a ground-based teIescope, as observations risk
interference from the Sun when pointing to the areas of the sky being searched; Thermal-infrared
observations are immune to the bias affecting the detection of low-albedo objects in visible or near-
infrared light, by observing the thermal signal from the full image of the NEO, providing more accurate
albedo measurements (see the discussion above); Space-based searches can be conducted above
Earth's atmosphere, eIiminating the need to caIibrate the effects introduced by the atmosphere on
the Iight from an NEO; and Observations can be made 24 hours a day.

Doesn't soIve - inner-earth objects
ESA, 3
[European Space Agency, Jan 2003, " EARTHGUARD- A Space-Based NEO Detection System,
http://www.esa.int/gsp/completed/neo/earthguard1_execsum.pdf]

There is good theoretical evidence, however, to suggest there may be a popuIation of asteroids in
orbits that Iie entirely within the Earth's orbit, the so-called "inner-Earth objects (EOs) or Apohele
asteroids. As a result of perturbation of their orbits by the inner planets they may become Earth
crossers but remain virtuaIIy undetectabIe from the Earth. OnIy with the heIp of a space-based
search teIescope observing at small angular distances from the Sun can we hope to cIose the gap Ieft
by the groundbased surveys and facilitate a complete and reliable assessment of the terrestrial impact
hazard

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AT: PRIVATE CP

Perm: Do both - Government and Private industry is needed
GangaIe and RowIey, 7
[Thomas and arilyn, San Francisco State U, "To Build Bifrost:
Developing Space Property Rights and nfrastructure"
http://www.astrosociology.com/Library/PDF/Submissions/To%20Build%20Bifrost.pdf]

The reaI barrier to commerciaIizing space is the huge capitaI investment that is required
to deveIop a transpIanetary infrastructure. Some authors imagine that private enterprise
can puII itseIf up to the Moon and Mars by its own bootstraps. This position ignores the
history of opening frontiers. The libertarian mantra that "government is the problem is
nonsensical. Neither is government the entire soIution, but it is a necessary partner in the
soIution--on Iand and on sea, in the air and in space. BuiIding a transpIanetary
infrastructure is not something that private enterprise is going to accompIish... ever. First
must come the poIiticaI vision to buiId rainbow bridges to the heavens, then wiII come the
economic incentive to traveI them.

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AT: REF&GE CP

1. Perm: Do Both

IF THEY READ PTX/$ NB:
2. Their Matheny evidence says $20 biIIion - stiII triggers the Iink.

2/3. [Read the Space CoIonization Add-on]

3/4. SoIvency deficit - doesn't soIve the integration of astrosocioIogy (extend astrosocioIogy key
to surviving, Iiving after near-extinction)

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AT: EXISTENTIAL RISK TRADE-OFF DA

Bostrom supports the pIan - he's a soIvency advocate for the pIan

Some of the lesser existential risks can be countered fairly cheaply. For example, there are organizations
devoted to mapping potentially threatening near-Earth objects (e.g. NASA's Near Earth Asteroid Tracking
Program, and the Space Guard Foundation). These could be given additional funding. To reduce the probability of a
"physics disaster, a public watchdog could be appointed with authority to commission advance peer-review of potentially hazardous
experiments. This is currently done on an ad hoc basis and often in a way that relies on the integrity of researchers who have a
personal stake in the experiments going forth.
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AT: GET OFF THE ROCK CP

Getting off the rock is not a sustainabIe aIternative - if there's any risk of anyone
staying on the Earth post-CP, we win

One way to ensure humanity's survival, and the survival of social institutions and cultures, involves
sending part of the population off planet. This reality will exist, but not for a considerable period. The
problem with this solution relates to the fact that the bulk of our species will remain firmly planted on the
Earth. One plan may involve establishing one of the first lunar settlements populated by individuals who
construct and operate components of the planetary defense system there. Realistically, we must prepare
ourselves by constructing the alternatives and the necessary infrastructure to protect our planet and
beyond that, our societies. Other partial solutions could involve sending partial populations, presumably
volunteers, to live in underground communities and others to communities under the surface of the
oceans on Earth. We cannot begin early enough for an unknown cosmic body may already have us
targeted.

Perm: Do both.

AstrosocioIogy is a prerequisite to getting off the rock

K the NB OR Read the Space CoIonization Add-on

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AT: PIC O&T OF ASTROSOCIOLOGY

AstrosocioIogy is criticaI to effective pIanetary defense - CP doesn't soIve the
case

Historically, a great divide existed between the social sciences and aerospace in which the social
sciences were rarely involved in the space community and those in the natural sciences saw no reason to
change this social pattern.2 As will become clear, however, the need for planetary defense surpasses the
usual ideas of simply avoiding a collision with the Earth. nstead, it involves saving the diversity and
achievements of societies, and human civilization itself. Such a goal must involve the social sciences,
behavioral sciences, and the humanities (hereafter referred to as the social sciences for brevity) due to
their focus on issues related to society and human behavior. Although its subject matter was largely
absent in the past,3 astrosociology in particular now exists in order to bring in social scientists to work
with space scientists and engineers. First, let us assess the cosmic threats to the existence of our social
systems as well as to our lives as individuals. ost members of the public failed to recognize any threats
to our existence coming from space until quite recently.4 any knew about the mass extinction of the
dinosaurs that was most likely due to an asteroid impact, yet they tended to dismiss it as an improbable
event that killed off a bunch of dumb animals. Surely, it was commonly believed, humans would be able
to counter such a threat should the unlikely possibility prove itself a real hazard once again. Therefore,
until recently, even experts dismissed the threat as an improbable event and thus not worth pursuing,
including many space scientists specializing in the field. As a result, the nations around the world possess
nearly no capacity to protect themselves at the current time, with very little coordination among them for
this purpose. f we detected a large space object on a collision course with the Earth, only a disorganized
response could result as various societies attempt to coordinate some type of hasty defense. The actual
seriousness of the threat received little notice, and remained underestimated for decades despite the fact
that history has shown the Earth is far from immune from cosmic impacts. For one thing, small meteorites
bombard the Earth every day. One of the more famous examples is the Tunguska incident in 1908, which
probably involved a meteor that exploded in the Earth's atmosphere over central Siberia sending a
shockwave that flattened trees over a vast area. The tremendous devastation resulted in very little effect
on the policies of societies around the world. The object hit a desolate area, so it had no great impact
upon any population. Had it struck a populated area, the reaction would have brought attention to the true
nature of the threat.5 Even so, humanity lacked the capability to mitigate the threat at the beginning of the
twentieth century. n part, the remoteness of past episodes in terms of both distance and time relegated
the subjective threat to a gamble worth taking. Traditionally, most scientists took a similar attitude. That is,
until recently. Over the last ten years or so, scientists have become increasingly certain that a huge
catastrophe is inevitable from a space-born source at some point in the future, even if they disagree
about the probability of such an event.6 dentification of a true threat to our planet could occur in a
century, a decade, or tomorrow. The watershed event that put this reality into the forefront of scientists'
minds, and ultimately the minds of publics around the world, occurred after Jupiter's gravitational field
ripped apart omet Shoemaker-Levy 9 after it passed too closely. Between July 16 and July 22, 1994, 21
distinct fragments of this comet struck Jupiter. t represents the only time in human history that a space
object or fragments of it collided with a planet in our solar system under the scrutiny of human observers.
The resulting impacts from pieces as large as approximately two kilometers traveling at sixty kilometers
per second left visible scars in Jupiter's atmosphere that lasted for several weeks. Just one of the larger
pieces could have ended human civilization had it struck the Earth. The impacts of these cometary
fragments served to drive home the fact that while the Earth was not targeted by this particular comet,
humanity may not be so fortunate the next time around. Assessment of the threat changed overnight into
a realization that our solar system is still inherently chaotic and dangerous.7 Assessment changed from
very little concern to a "new reality in which the Earth suddenly seemed vulnerable and unprotected.
Protection from comet nucleus and asteroid impacts suddenly became mainstream science rather than a
"backwater concern of sorts. Near Earth Objects (NEOs) and specifically Near Earth Asteroids (NEAs)
probably pose the most immediate threats. ost of these objects circle the Sun between ars and
Jupiter. f left alone, the vast majority of these objects would pose little or no threat to the Earth. Others
may have already the Earth in their sights. Additionally, objects can interact with one another
Georgetown 2011-12

gravitationally and thereby change their orbital trajectories as with omet Shoemaker-Levy 9. While
scientists can track asteroids for at least a short time, comets and asteroids from the Kuiper belt beyond
Pluto and the Oort cloud even farther away from the orbit of the Earth can arrive seemingly from nowhere
due to their large orbits around the Sun. f on a collision course with our planet, they would present
Earthlings little or no time to react. omets can also originate in other solar systems and later captured by
our Sun. We can devise protection strategies against NEAs though other types of space objects present
different problems altogether. For example, the inclusion of comet protection requires a defensive system
with elements capable of reacting immediately to a newly discovered threat from near Earth observation.
Elements stationed far from our planet could provide us with a greater warning period. We need to
determine whether to first construct a system capable of only a considerable reaction time or strive for
comet protection from the beginning. The latter would necessitate components of the system in space as
well as a much more thorough survey of our solar system. ost of us know that an impact of a cosmic
object resulted in the extinction of nearly all life on the Earth approximately sixty-five million years ago.
The impact resulted in a global rather than local catastrophe that changed the course of life's evolutionary
path subsequent to its occurrence in the distant past. We can trace our emergence as the dominant
species to this monumental event. How could the impact of a 10-km asteroid or comet kill such a large
fraction of the Earth's creature, including the dinosaurs? No one is sure about the details, but a number of
suggestions have been put forth. To start with, there is the global cloud of impact-generated dust,
sufficient to produce a layer an inch or more think over the whole planet when it settled back to the
ground. alculations show that such a quantity of dust, when suspended in the atmosphere, could block
all sunlight from reaching the surface. Temperatures would have dropped, photosynthesis ceased, and
perhaps 99% of the individual organisms on our planet perished within a few weeks.8 While not all life
became extinct, the dominant species of the time certainly did. The lesson from this event informs us that
we are at risk and should take some concerted actions to increase the probability of our survival. No one
can predict the time of impact or degree of devastation of the next big event, but we can take rational
steps in the attempt to increase the odds of our survival. Yet small objects that disintegrate in our
atmosphere constantly bombard the Earth, and witnesses have documented their sightings of larger
objects throughout recorded history.9, 10 ost surviving witnesses failed to record their observations for
sociological reasons. "...[O]ne need not subscribe to conspiracy theories to see that various forms of
censorship and discrimination must have profoundly deterred the publication and preservation of these
reports by peasants and lower-class witnesses.11 n contrast to the past, the events that occur today are
subject to immediate dissemination to the public by the electronic and printed media. Agreement about
the size of an object capable of ending human civilization, and those of other categories of threats, has
slowly increased over time. The threshold for global killers is usually taken to be 1 to 2 km in diameter.
The definition is a bit arbitrary, because the lethality of the impact depends on where and when it lands,
and to a smaller degree on its composition (density). There are conceivable circumstances in which a
slightly smaller body might be equally damaging.12 Others such as orrison et al. (2004)13 estimate the
size of the civilization destroyer at 2-3 kilometers. n contrast, space bodies of about 100 meters
represent regional hazards and those of 10 meters represent local threats.14 Each of these categories
requires a different response. What is the likelihood of an impact? Objective estimates of the potential
damage due to asteroid impacts (consequences multiplied by risk) are within the range of other risks that
governments often take very seriously...oreover, public interest is high, fueled by increasing discovery
rates and the continuing interests of the international news media.15 The likelihood of dying by an
asteroid impact is approximately one in 20,000, a probability comparable to dying in a plane crash and
more likely than dying in a tornado, bite, or sting (though less likely than a car crash or electrocution).16 A
large impact is not something we expect to happen in our lifetime, in our children's lifetime, or even our
grandchildren's lifetime. t would be very bad luck if it did happen. But it could happen at any time (David
orrison as quoted by Britt 2002).17 Further technical details about the characteristics of the strikes of
these objects fall outside the scope of the present discussion. Suffice it to state that the likelihood of an
impact of a large object (greater than one kilometer) is well above zero, inevitable over large time scales,
so the threat demands measured attention. Smaller impacts by smaller objects are even more likely and
can cause widespread devastation depending on their size. The planetary defense system discussed
later does not represent something we necessarily have to construct immediately but rather a model that
demands consideration and debate; one that adds new astrosociological issues to the current discussion
currently dominated by space scientists, science and technology authors, and engineers. The
contributions of social scientists should join the dialogue. A cultural/social threat that often goes
unconsidered involves the unwillingness to do anything about the threat, a possibility that some within the
space community have considered. think that what matters is how we react to this knowledge. That, in
Georgetown 2011-12

the long run, is what will make a difference to our planet and its inhabitants. t is not the impact itself that
may be immediately relevant; it is how we react to the idea of an impact that may change the course of
human history. am afraid that we will deal with this potentially mind-expanding discovery in the way we
deal with most issues that relate to matters of great consequence: we will ignore it until the crisis is upon
us.18 Despite the widely accepted assessment of cosmic objects as real and potentially devastating
threats to humankind and human societies (chiefly among space scientists and engineers), politicians and
publics of various societies may indeed downplay the likelihood of being struck by a comet or asteroid.
Assessment of the threat by nonscientists within societies falls under the purview of the social sciences,
and the final decision concerning financing and implementation ultimately becomes the responsibility of
politicians rather than scientists. The importance of bringing in social scientists should be clear as their
training focuses on these exact types of issues; issues beyond the scope of the natural sciences.
Georgetown 2011-12

AT: &N CP

Massive timeframe soIvency deficit - no other country has the infrastructure for
survey
[Over many decades, the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, nstitute of
of independent, expert advice on scientific, engineering, and medical issues. "Near-Earth Object Surveys
and Hazard itigation Strategies:
nterim Report http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12738]
Despite expressions of interest in various countries around the globe, the majority of search efforts
and funding for discovering NEOs comes from the &nited States. Several smaIIer projects, such as the
Beijing Schmidt D Asteroid Program (no longer operational) and the Asiago DLR Asteroid Survey (an ongoing joint venture
between the German Aerospace Agency's [DLR's] nstitute of Space Sensor Technology and Planetary Exploration, the University
of Asiago, and the Astronomical Observatory of Padua in taly), have made so me inroads on detecting NEOs, but not
on the scaIe of the &.S. projects. n addition, with the notable exception of anada, through its Near-Earth Object
Surveillance Satellite (NEOSSat) mission, and Germany, via its AsteroidFinder mission, which are both relatively limited in scope,
no other countries have committed funding for a "next generation" NEO-discovery program.
AsteroidFinder The German Aerospace Agency has selected AsteroidFinder as the first pay load to be launched under its new
national compact satellite program. urrently the spacecraft is planned to launch sometime in 2012 with a 1-year baseline-mission
duration and the possibility of an extension; this mission is funded through the development stage. t will be equipped with a 30-
centimeter telescope mirror. ts primary science goals are to estimate the population of NEOs interior to Earth orbit, their size-
frequency distribution, and their orbital properties. AsteroidFinder will also aid in the assessment of the imp act hazard due to NEOs
and provide a space-based platform detecting space debris from artificial satellites. Near-Earth Object Surveillance Satellite
NEOSSat is currently in development and is being constructed in anada as a joint venture between the anadian Space Agency
(SA) and Defense Research and Development anada, an agency of the anadian Department of National Defence. NEOSSat is
based on a previous satellite, OST, launched in 2003, that remains operational long after completion of its initial mission. Set to
launch in mid 2010, NEOSSat is scheduled to operate continuously for at least one year and should operate considerably longer.
NEOSSat will conduct two simultaneous projects during its operational lifetimeHigh-Earth Orbit Surveillance System (HEOSS),
which will monitor and track human-made satellites and orbital debris, and Near-Earth Space Surveillance (NESS), which will
discover and track NEOs. NEOSSat will be the first satellite to be built on anada's ulti-ission icrosatellite Bus and will be
roughly the size of a large suitcase with a mass of approximately 75 kilograms. t will have a 15-centimeter mirror. This microsatellite
will operate in a Sun-synchronous orbit at an altitude of ~700 kilometers. NEOSSat will be the first dedicated space platform
designed to obtain observations on both human-made and natural objects in near-Earth space. The NESS project will focus
primarily on discovering NEOs whose orbits are partially or fully inside Earth's. NEOSSat will expand overall knowledge of NEOs,
monitor them for cometary activity, perform follow-up tracking of newly discovered targets, aid in the development of asteroid search
and tracking algorithms for space-based sensors, and explore the synergies between ground- and space-based facilities involved in
NEO discovery and characterization. Finding: The &nited States is the onIy country that currentIy has an
operating survey/detection program for discovering near-Earth objects; Canada and Germany are
both buiIding spacecraft that may contribute to the discovery of near-Earth objects. However, neither mission wiII
detect fainter or smaIIer objects than ground-based teIescopes.

OnIy &.S. Ieadership ensures effective response
Dinerman, 9
[Taylor, author and journalist based in New York ity, " The new politics of planetary defense, July 20,
2009, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1418/1]
While the &S is obviously going to have to take the Iead in any effort to detect and possibly deflect any
ceIestiaI object that might do our pIanet harm, it will have to consult with others, both to keep other nations informed
and to help make the choices needed to deal with the threat. Yet in the end, it is likely that the decision, if there is one, wiII
rest with the President of the &nited States. He or she is the onIy worId Ieader today with the
wherewithaI to deaI with such a threat. This is why any pIanning effort that Ieans to heaviIy on
internationaI institutions may endanger the whoIe pIanet. The process inside an organization like the UN would
simply get bogged down in procedural and political questions. &S Ieaders may find that the system wouId be
paraIyzed whiIe, for example, nations argued over defIection or destructions methods or who wouId control
and pay for them. Precious time would be lost while nations would consider their own best interests in supporting one approach or
another. If the &S is have any cIaim to gIobaI Ieadership in the 21st century it wiII have to
unambiguousIy take the Iead in pIanetary defense. t should do so in an open way and be ready to listen to
everyone's concerns and ideas. But if the Earth is to be effectiveIy protected, the uItimate decisions wiII
have to be American. n this case "gIobaI governance" couId end up setting the stage for a disaster.

Georgetown 2011-12

HEG ADD-ON

Doesn't soIve for Ieadership - &.S. has to Iead the asteroid defense effort
Garretson and Kaupa, 8
[ Lieutenant olonel Garretson is chief, Future Science and Technology Exploration Branch,
Headquarters USAF Future oncepts and Transformation, Washington, D. ajor Kaupa, stationed at
Edwards AFB, alifornia, is an operational test pilot and test director for the chief of staff of the Air
Force's top-priority acquisition programthe K-45A, Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2008, " Planetary
Defense Potential itigation Roles of the Department of Defense,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/fal08/garretson.html]

The &nited States reaps significant economic benefits by providing internationaI security. We
have the most to gain by maintaining security and the most to Iose if it faiIs. By visibIy pursuing
the capabiIity to defend the pIanet, we make ourseIves increasingIy essentiaI to internationaI
security. Furthermore, we wiII IikeIy have to pay the biII anyway. The humanitarian crisis that could ensue from
an impact with a 300-meter asteroid could easily dwarf the Asian tsunami of 2004. The humanitarian supply, airlift, sealift, and
rebuilding costs would be staggering. Economic losses to US investors, huge costs to US insurers, and a possible recession or
depression resulting from the loss of a city or nation would likely occur. Despite concerns about the expense of developing such a
pIanetary-defense system, it would transIate into a competitive advantage for the &nited States. SoIving
difficuIt probIems wouId create &S inteIIectuaI capitaI, industriaI capacity, and new technicaI areas
of Ieadership criticaI to maintaining our Iead in space.

GIobaI nucIear war
KHALILZAD, 95
[Zalmay, fmr. Ambassador to Afghanistan, RAND orporation analyst, "Losing the moment? The United
States and the World After the old War". The Washington Quarterly 18:2: 03012.]

Under the third option, the &nited States wouId seek to retain gIobaI Ieadership and to precIude the rise
of a gIobaI rivaI or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a
vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a worId in which the &nited States exercises Ieadership would
have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets,
and the rule of law. Second, such a world wouId have a better chance of deaIing cooperativeIy with the worId's
major probIems, such as nucIear proIiferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and Iow-IeveI
confIicts. Finally, &.S. Ieadership wouId heIp precIude the rise of another hostiIe gIobaI rivaI, enabling
the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a gIobaI
nucIear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power
system.

Georgetown 2011-12

SOFT POWER ADD-ON

&.S. space science key to soft power
Dinerman, 8
[Taylor, author and journalist based in New York ity, " The next battlestar, arch 31, 2008,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1094/1]

Most of NASA's programs can be seen as an expression of America's "soft power". By Ieading a
program that expands our knowIedge of the soIar system and the universe, the space agency
contributes to a gIobaI sense that America is the worId's Ieader in science and technoIogy. Others
have reached the same concIusion: ESA's Rosetta mission to the comet hurymov-Gerasimenko can
be seen as an attempt to grab some of that soft power for the E&.

Soft power necessary to prevent disease, terrorism, and WMD
Nye, 4
Joseph Nye, Harvard, US LTARY PRAY S FAT - SO, NOW, WORK ON 'SOFT POWER' OF
PERSUASON, April 29, 2004, p,
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2004/nye_soft_power_csm_042904.htm

Soft power co-opts peopIe rather than coerces them. It rests on the abiIity to set the agenda or
shape the preferences of others. t is a mistake to discount soft power as just a question of image, public relations, and
ephemeral popularity. t is a form of power - a means of pursuing national interests. When America discounts the
importance of its attractiveness to other countries, it pays a price. When US policies lose their legitimacy and
credibility in the eyes of others, attitudes of distrust tend to fester and further reduce its Ieverage. The
manner with which the US went into raq undercut American soft power. That did not prevent the success of the four-week military
campaign, but it made others less willing to help in the reconstruction of raq and made the American occupation more costly in the
hard-power resources of blood and treasure. Because of its leading edge in the information revolution and its past investment in
military power, the US probably will remain the world's single most powerful country well into the 21st century. But not aII the
important types of power come from the barreI of a gun. Hard power is reIevant to getting desired
outcomes, but transnationaI issues such as cIimate change, infectious diseases, internationaI
crime, and terrorism cannot be resoIved by miIitary force aIone. Soft power is particuIarIy
important in deaIing with these issues, where miIitary power aIone simpIy cannot produce
success, and can even be counterproductive. America's success in coping with the new
transnationaI threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction wiII depend on a deeper
understanding of the roIe of soft power and developing a better balance of hard and soft power in foreign policy.

Georgetown 2011-12

AT: STEM CP

Perm: Do both.

[Insert CP Iinks to PTX - be specific to the scenario]

Can't soIve - the CP doesn't expand or enhance coIIege education - this is key
Pass 7 (Jim, Ph.D. in sociology, University of Southern alifornia, Founder of Astrosociology.com &
Senior onsultant, AAA Space 2007 onference and Exposition, "Enhancing Space Exploration by
Adding Astrosociology to the STE model,
http://astrosociology.com/Library/PDF/ontributions/Space%202007%20Articles/Adding%20Astrosociolo
gy%20to%20STE%20odel.pdf, 18-20 September)WZ

Ultimately, the only way to develop astrosociology in a legitimate manner involves the creation of
programs in existing departments of colleges and universities. The body of knowledge slowly
accumulating since 2003 provides prospective astrosociology majors with a sound grounding in the new
field.** UnIortunately, they cannot pursue it at the present time due to its absence in the schools they
attend. A few students have taken it upon themselves to instill change by beginning to pressure their
proIessors and advisors to accept an astrosociology topic Ior theses and dissertations, though their success rate still
remains inconclusive. Writing research papers about astrosociological topics in introduction and other courses may
prove a more accessible way oI seeding academia with astrosociology.
n order for astrosociology to truly become an academic field, the efforts of supporters must cross a
threshold in which the preexisting (current) condition, an absence of astrosociology, is replaced by its
formal presence in the academic world. It would take the Iorm oI either a substantial number oI students
demanding astrosociology courses or proIessors and other academicians doing the same. An even more eIIective
strategy Ior astrosociology`s development would consist oI a 'perIect storm comprised oI the simultaneous demand
Ior this new Iield by both students and educators across the United States. In Iact, the storm would be more 'perIect
to the extent that all interested parties advocate it development. It would place enough pressures on departments
around the country to begin considering astrosociology courses perhaps starting with making available an
Introduction to Astrosociology course on a trial basis. This would serve as a critical initial step. Once
astrosociology`s acceptance is demonstrated in academe, then the development oI astrosociology will accelerate to
new levels otherwise impossible. Similar gains at the high school level and below would also beneIit its
development immensely.
Once a particular department becomes bold enough to offer the first major in the field, it will herald the
beginning of a new era in which the average sociologist/social scientist finally begins to regard the study
of astrosocial phenomena as a much more serious matter. Since we cannot aIIord to presume such an
outcome, it behooves supporters Irom all quarters to pursue the development oI astrosociology. It is plausible that
the combination of student and faculty pressures will result in the crossing of the threshold that finally
results in the initial manifestations of formal astrosociology courses, followed later by the formation of
astrosociology programs and departments. Space scientists, engineers, architects, and others in the space
community who come to recognize how astrosociology can beneIit their eIIorts serve as another source oI support
Ior the developing Iield and add to the eIIort Iurther astrosociology`s development as an academic Iield. Formal
collaboration between the social science and space communities has always represented a vital goal
from the outset of the author's efforts to develop this newly emerging field. This represents just another
dimension of that mutual need to bring in the social-scientific perspective to the study of space
exploration issues in both the non-academic and academic worlds.

Georgetown 2011-12

STEM LINKS TO PTX - INERTIA

Reforms are unpopuIar - Congress prefers inertia on NCLB
HoII, S - Education Week (David J., "Darling-Hammond report calls for moving away from K-12 tests
and sanctions" http://ed.stanford.edu/suse/news-
bureau/displayRecord.php?tablename=susenews&id=436)

ederuI poIIcymukers almost certainly wIII be reudy Lo do u LIorougI revIew oI LIe NCB law and other K-
12 legislation, according to Washington observers. BuL Congress und LIe new presIdenLDemocrat or
RepublicanwouId be onlikely to be interested In mukIng the drumuLIc cIunges recommended in the
forum's report, one experienced policy hand said. "TIe Lendency oI poIIcy Is Lowurd InerLIu, Lo muInLuIn
LIe sume poIIcy or add on to it incrementally," suId Jack JennIngs, the presIdenL oI LIe CenLer on
EducuLIon PoIIcy, a Washington group that has tracked implementation of the NLB law. n K-1z
educuLIon, Ior exumpIe, Congress Ius cIunged dIrecLIon onIy LwIce In LIe pusL o yeurs, according to r.
Jennings, who worked as an aide to House Democrats on education issues from 1967 through 1994. The
first was when it passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965, during the administration
of President Lyndon B. Johnson. The ESEA created the Title program for disadvantaged studentsthe
largest federal K-12 program. The next time was when ongress required states to adopt standards for
student performance in the 1994 version of the ESEA, r. Jennings said. n passing the latest version of
the ESEA, the No hild Left Behind lawchampioned by President Bushin 2001, ongress put more
teeth into the law by requiring states to hold schools accountable for meeting goals for student
performance in reading and mathematics. r. Jennings' organization has convened a group of
researchers to evaluate federal efforts to improve schools and recommend whether the federal law
should be just tinkered with or totally overhauled. One staunch supporter of the NLB law said 2,or
ch,nges ,re onlikely. Congress muy be reudy Lo umend LIe uccounLubIIILy ruIes and add efforts to
improve states' curricula, buL IL Is unIIkeIy Lo rewrILe LIe Iuw or udd mujor new provIsIons, said Kati
Haycock, the director of the Education Trust, a Washington nonprofit that lobbies for improving the
educational opportunities of disadvantaged children

Georgetown 2011-12

STEM LINKS TO PTX - PARTISANHIP

NCLB debates create partisan fights
,Ier, q Senior Education Policy Analyst @ Heritage
(Krista, "No hild Left Behind: Where Do We Go From Here? Heritage Foundation Report 7/6/04,
http://www.heritage.org/research/education/bg1775.cfm)

Will Rogers once said, I you ever InjecLed LruLI InLo poIILIcs, you wouId Iuve no poIILIcs. TIIs Is
especIuIIy Lrue wIen IL comes Lo educuLIon und the federal law known as the No hild Left Behind Act
(NCB). BuL LruLI--always a rare commodity--Is growIng rurer sLIII us LIe nuLIon upproucIes November,
und dIscussIon ubouL LIIs compIex und bIpurLIsun Iuw Is deLerIoruLIng InLo u purLIsun mud IIgIL.

Georgetown 2011-12

STEM LINKS TO PTX - PC

Drains poIiticaI capitaI - eIection proves
e2,nn, S (Nicholas, "What No hild Left Behind Left Behind, Writer @ The Washington onthly,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0808.lemann.html)

BoLI presIdenLIuI cundIduLes have IeIL LIemseIves some room Lo muneuver on No Child eft Behind,
partly jusL by not t,lking ,boot it very much. John cain could conceivably have come all out for
vouchers, and abandoned No hild Left Behind as an unwarranted exercise of federal power. He didn't.
Barack bumu couId Iuve cuIIed Ior eIImInuLIng No Child eft Behind, us Hillary CIInLon dId (although
she voted for it in 2001), for liberal reasons: too much testing and teaching to the test; too little funding
and teacher autonomy. He dIdn`L. L`s suIe Lo ussume LIuL no matter who wins the election, o Child
eIt Behind will not be going ,w,y.
BuL Lo IIx IL-reuIIy IIx IL-wIII requIre drumuLIc cIunges und consIderubIe InvesLmenL oI poIILIcuI cupILuI.
NeILIer cundIduLe has IndIcuLed LIuL Ie Ius LIuL In mInd. There isn't any good way to ensure that
students have basic skills, which they desperately need in order not to be left behind in the twenty-first-
century economy, without testing. But to start with tests is to go at the problem backward. What schools
need is, first, a national standard of what proficiency in reading and math means; second, a curriculum
that gets students to that level; and finally, tests tailored specifically to that curriculum. That way teaching
the class and "teaching to the test" are the same thing. And the schools with students farthest from
proficiency are going to need a lot of extra resources to get them there.

Georgetown 2011-12

STEM LINKS TO PTX - PC

Obama has tons of poI cap, but the pIan drains it
$tickings, q Assistant Editor, The oderate Voice
(ichael, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Here We Are Back in ulture War Hell, The oderate Voice, 1/16/09,
lexis)

First, how is it ostartling. The opronouncement was blunt, to be sure, but, as Fox admits, Obama has
long been opposed to the policy. Second, ILs noL IIke LIe poIIcy Is exLremeIy popuIur, wIereus bumu Is.
He`II need Lo spend mucI oI IIs poIILIcuI cupILuI on the stimulus package, of course, and then on health
care, energy, and educuLIon reIorm, among other initiatives, buL LIe good LIIng Is, Ie Ius u IoL oI cupILuI
Lo spend. There would certainly be opposition both from within the military and from without, and it could
become a minor distraction, but Obama would no doubt be able to handle it while making a strong case
for doing away with the policy. Third, it is the right that wants to, and intends to, reopen the culture wars,
as Palin and others tried to do during the presidential campaign, and it will go there regardless. Yes, this
would give them an opening, but standing up for the rights of gays and lesbians to serve their country
against bigots who want them to keep quiet about who they are or, better, to get the hell out of the military
altogether is a fight Obama and the opponents of the policy should be willing to have.(more) Newstex D:
ODV-0001-31100840

Georgetown 2011-12

STEM LINKS TO PTX - AT: IT DOESN'T

PIan can't be popuIar - no constituency for reform
$,b,, S - president of the American Board for ertification of Teacher Excellence
(Dave, "Student Success Strategy, American Board for ertification of Teacher Excellence blog,
December 3
rd
, http://www.abcte.org/blog/2008/12/student-success-strategy)

L Ius been incredibly diIIicolt Lo guIn momenLum Ior the sysLemIc cIunge necessury Ior success In uII
oI AmerIcu`s scIooIs. True change requires a comprehensive strategy that focuses on the many variables
that affect student performance. While many IndIvIduuI progrums are workIng Lowurd LIIs gouI, those
organizations working alone wIII noL produce LIe educuLIon our sLudenLs deserve and requIre In order Lo
be compeLILIve in the world market.
TIe poIILIcs oI educuLIon oversIudows LIe merILs oI educuLIon cIunge in America. TIe Lwo cumps Iuve
become so enLrencIed that many politicians determine which side they need to be on by who supports or
fights against any given program. WIIIe conservuLIves usually Iocus on working toward educuLIon reIorm,
LIuL reIorm Is perceIved us prIncIpuIIy revoIvIng uround scIooI cIoIce. As Andy Rotherham opined in a
recent blog, conservuLIves ure seen us reIIexIveIy IosLIIe Lo pubIIc scIooIs.
On the other side, LIere ure powerIuI groups LIuL wunL Lo muInLuIn LIe sLuLus quo. TIey Iuve been ;ery
eIIecti;e In posILIonIng LIemseIves us LIe sLudenL udvocuLe LIrougI u compreIensIve sLruLegy Lo pusI Ior
smuIIer cIuss sIzes, unIversuI pre-k, more spending on education in general, higher salaries for teachers
und reduced LesLIng for students. These have the appearance of advocating for students when they really
benefit the adults. A state group will work at the state level toward these goals, often with the advice and
additional resources of a national group.
MeunwIIIe, educuLIon reIorm groups operuLe In u sIngIe sIIo wILI nuLIonuI IeudersIIp und muybe u sLuLe
group that is advocating for a single item in the reform agenda. Each state represents a win or lose
scenario for each group. But eucI sIIo reuIIy onIy ImpucLs u smuII number oI sLudenLs so IL Is Loo eusy Lo
murgInuIIze LIuL group wIen compured Lo LIe enLIre sysLem. Reaching a small number of students has
not, and will not, induce systemic change to provide better opportunities for all students. TIe posILIon
Irom LIe deIenders oI LIe sLuLus quo Is LIuL eucI educuLIon reIorm does noL uddress LIe Iurger need oI uII
sLudenLs so we sIouId conLInue Lo sLuy wILI LIe currenL and implement their strategy.

Georgetown 2011-12

SPACE COLONIZATION ADD-ON

AstrosocioIogy key to effective and sustainabIe space coIonization
Senior onsultant "Astrosociology and the space community,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/424/1)WZ

Highlighting four astrosociological considerations Decisions associated with space operations consist of
social components that many continue to overlook. onsider the four examples below that strengthen the
case that the social sciences offer significant contributions to the professional space community. Elites in
space characterize the initial constituency of space travelers. The first people in space are the
government elites and the wealthy. The average citizens of even developed nations are subject to denials
of the privilege of space travel. urrently, of course, one can argue that space travel is just too
dangerous. As technology develops, societies must decide how important it is to open space up to the
average person. onsiderations of risk exist, but so does the question of public support for something for
which they cannot partake. nclusion of non-elites as part of future space expeditions represents an
ethical/justice matter, traditionally the realm of sociology. These sorts of ethical and justice matters
require consideration before our technology allows for greater capabilities. Space communities, whether
they consist of elites or include average citizens, will require careful consideration as to how they are
constructed. n this context, space community refers to space settlements rather than the social network
of space professionals described earlier. While the space habitat's architecture (i.e., physical
environment) remains vitally important for the survival of inhabitants, construction of the social
environment is no less important for their survival. And, in fact, the two types of environments must be
considered together, especially when we contemplate space communities with characteristics including
long duration, extreme isolation, and vast distances from Earth. eanwhile, we must consider these
realities as we construct the first space communities in closer proximity to our planet so we may learn
more about what to expect subsequently in more extreme situations. SET and other astrobiological
research remains an important consideration. The relationship between astrosociology and astrobiology
is strong due to cultural values that favor determining if Earthlings represent the only species in the
universe. Why do we pursue the search for extraterrestrial life with an uncertain likelihood of success?
Values that support the search for microbial life possess consequences for actions. The question "Are we
alone? is probably nearly as old as human language itself. The answer to such a question belongs to all
of humanity and not only governmental and scientific elites. Full disclosure represents an ethical concern:
does anyone have the right to conceal such a discovery from the masses? oreover, the discovery of life
of any variety would produce social change among societies' institutions and social groups. After all, social
institutions, including religion, politics, and science, would need to adapt to such a development. ultural
adaptations reflect inevitable developments. We should be in position to study such potential scenarios
should they unfold. Applied astrosociology has direct application to the public space program as well as to
private ventures due to its direct approach in adding sociological and social scientific insights to space
missions. Applied astrosociology is defined as using sociological knowledge to solve social problems
related to astrosocial phenomena; that is, direct application of astrosociological research to improve
astrosocial conditions. urrently, this contribution remains largely absent even as it becomes more
significant to the success of ever-more complex missions planned into the future. The time to integrate
astrosociology into the organizational patterns of social groups within the space community is now in
order to meet greater challenges that arise. n fact, sociologists and other social/behavioral scientists
should be directly involved in planning for space missions involving human and robotic spaceflight, as
both comprise complementary aspects of the same program. The current concept of human factors
requires expansion to include well-established traditional sociological and social science
conceptualizations and research findings. solated space communities will need to be self-sustaining in all
of their dimensions. Social problems that will inevitably occur comprise a critical concern even while the
physical environment continues to operate properly. As we move forward, we must maximize our
understanding of practical astrosociological issues in order to help maximize success.

SoIves inevitabIe, guaranteed human extinction
Objective Observer '03
("The ase for olonizing ars, July, http://www.theobjectiveobserver.com/articles/space01.shtml)
Georgetown 2011-12

Homo sapiens, human beings, have to be one of the least intelligent species on the planet. realize that this statement flies in the
face of most scientific evidence given the large brain capacity of homo sapiens, the use of tools by homo sapiens and the fact that
homo sapiens can engage in abstract thought. However, all of these traits make it that much more unlikely and fantastic that homo
sapiens as a species continue to largely ignore the colonization of ars. One simple fact screams out for human beings
to coIonize Mars with aII due haste. That fact makes it crystal clear that the Earth has a deplorable track
record when it comes to its ability to support liIe. onsider that 99.9 oI all species that have ever existed on
planet Earth are extinct. Now, when you look at that fact, please also consider that this does not mean that .1% of species have
survived since the dawn of time. The .1% figure simply represents species that have yet to go extinct. n other words, we happen to
have some species alive and thriving on the Earth today. Those species by and large evolved relatively recently. Thus, the .1%
figure is not really a survival rate but rather a percentage of all species that have ever existed on the Earth that currently happen to
be alive. Another way of viewing this is in terms of survival rate as a function of time instead of as a function of species. f we were
to look at all species that have existed during the last 10 years, the survival rate would be close to or at 100%. n other words, of all
the species that have existed on planet Earth for the last 10 years, no extinctions have occurred. f we were to look at species that
have existed for the last 1,000 years that 100% figure would drop slightly due to extinctions such as the dodo and the passenger
pigeon. Looking at the survival rate species that have existed for the last 10,000 years, that 100% figure would be even less and as
we go further and further back in time, the survival rate would approach or become zero. Therefore, we can state as a
certainty that the longer a species exists on the Earth, the more likely it becomes that that species will become
extinct and this continues until that species` extinction is a certainty. What causes these extinctions?
rrelevant. am not here to debate the cause of animal extinctions. There are many theories regarding
why extinctions occur. The most popular today being that asteroids and/or comets randomIy strike the
Earth every millennia or so and serve as a first strike that initiates extinction. Asteroids and comets are currently
blamed for many of Earth's mass extinctions throughout its history. However, regardless of whether extinctions occur by asteroid, by
comet or by some other as yet unknown device, the fact that 99.9% of species that have ever existed on the Earth are extinct
remains the same. onsider also that human beings are on the top of the food chain, quite similar to dinosaurs in their day. Why is
this relevant? Well, for one simple fact. Land extinctions tend to kill off the large, dominate animals at the top of the food chain while
some of the smaller animals near the bottom of the food chain survive. Oddly enough, mass extinctions seem to happen in reverse
in the ocean, the smaller animals at the bottom of food chain become extinct and the ones at the top of food chain tend to survive.
This may actually explain why intelligence evolved first on land instead of in the oceans, but that is the subject of a different essay.
Of course, one might argue that there has never been a species of animal on the Earth that was so intelligent, so diverse and so
well adapted to its environment as are homo sapiens. Thus, the argument is that if there is going to be a species that survives a
mass extinction, homo sapiens have the best chance. However, this argument is rather full of logical errors in reasoning. First, in
terms of diversity and adaptation, homo sapiens rather pale in comparison to other successful organisms such as all of the species
of dinosaurs. Second, there is absolutely no evidence that intelligence has anything to do with surviving a mass extinction. Thus,
we have a few simple scientific facts that human beings have been quite aware of for several decades
that make it perfectly clear to any reasonable mind that :2an beings WILL beco2e extinct if tey re2ain
solely on planet Eart. nd yet, :2an beings by and large are doing very little to colonize Mars. And by very
little, do not mean to denigrate those individuals that have written on this subject or those at NASA and other agencies around the
world that are working right now on all of the problems associated with colonizing ars. However, what am proposing is to make
the colonization of ars a priority of the United States and world governments second only to national defense. This last argument
is sure to spark protests and outrage from many different sectors am sure. can hear the arguments now. "We have
enough problems to solve here on Earth first before we start trying to colonize other planets. "Why not put resources into deflecting
or destroying asteroids and comets instead of colonizing ars? "We do not have the technology to colonize ars. "Why not
colonize the oceans? Why not colonize the oon? "We have no evidence that colonizing ars will avoid human extinction. will
address each of the arguments in turn. "We have enough problems to solve here on Earth first before we start
trying to colonize other planets. This statement is very true, human society is fraught with all kinds of
problems. However, aII other probIems paIe in comparison to the extinction of the species. The
reason is simple. f homo sapiens as a species becomes extinct, aII other probIems are irreIevant. "Why
not put resources into deflecting or destroying asteroids and comets instead of colonizing ars? This one is quite simple. First, one
should know that we probably only know of about 5% of the asteroids and/or comets that pose a severe threat to the Earth. f one of
those asteroids within that 5% was going to hit the Earth, we would have some warning; maybe enough to come up with and
successfully execute a plan to deflect it. However, for the other 95%, we would have little or no warning. Second, we do not know for
a certainty that asteroids or comets cause mass extinctions. We have some pretty good evidence that points to this, but nothing
certain. ass extinctions might be caused by viruses or some as yet unknown device. The only certainty in
preserving the human species is to expand beyond the bounds of planet Earth. "We do not have the technology
to colonize ars. Yes we do. We are 100 or perhaps a 1,000 times more prepared today to tackle the problem of ars colonization
than we were to tackle the problem of landing on the moon. Our society is perhaps the best prepared it has ever been throughout its
entire history to tackle such an exploration and colonization. Quite simply, we have the technology today to begin terraforming and
permanently colonizing ars. n addition, it has already been proven that when nations make certain well-defined goals and
objectives top priority, the problem is solved with surprising rapidity. This can be seen with the development of the atomic bomb as
well as the Apollo program to land on the moon. "Why not colonize the oceans? This argument stems from the fact that ocean
extinctions tend to occur in reverse of land extinctions. That is, the big, dominant animals at the top of the food chain tend to survive
ocean mass extinctions. First, human beings are not native to the oceans and therefore, the normal "rules would not apply. Second,
big, dominant animals do go extinct in the oceans. Third, 99.9% of all species that have ever inhabited the earth, on land and on
water have gone extinct. Expanding to an ocean environment does not change that fact. "Why not colonize the oon? ndeed, this
seems reasonable. t gets our species off of planet Earth and the oon is a lot closer than ars. However, the oon lacks the
ability to support a self-sustaining human colony. A oon colony would be much too dependent on Earth for its very existence. This
does not mean that we should not pursue a permanent oon colony. ndeed, a permanent oon colony may be a crucial step in
Georgetown 2011-12

colonizing ars. However, a oon colony cannot serve as a replacement for ars colonization. "We have no evidence that
colonizing ars will avoid human extinction. This is absolutely true. However, we know for a fact that it is a certainty
tat if we re2ain solely on planet Eart we will go extinct. We also know that creating a selI-sustaining colony
on another planet is the best and perhaps only way to avoid extinction. And Mars is the 2ost likely candidate
within our solar system Ior colonization.

Georgetown 2011-12

PLAN KEY TO SPACE COLONIZATION

Construction of a sociaI environment is equaIIy important to a physicaI
environment when we get off the rock
Senior onsultant "The Astrosociology of Space olonies: Or the Social onstruction of Societies in
Space, STAF,
http://www.astrosociology.com/Library/PDF/submissions/STAF_Astrosociology%20of%20Space%20olo
niesPDF.pdf)WZ

f we truly intend to develop a space colony, we should remember one fundamental rule: construction of
the social environment is just as important for survival as construction of the physical environment. The
social construction of a space colony refers to the idea that settlements in space involve the creation of a
social environment in addition to the physical environment. onsequently, the major concerns of this
essay focus upon the consideration of the social environment created with the establishment of the space
society. This additional focus will be healthy for the entire project. As becomes evident, planning by all
types of scientists for the issues and problems that inevitably follow ensures the greatest likelihood of
success.

Georgetown 2011-12


A successfuI space coIony requires astrosocioIogicaI considerations
Space, STAF,
niesPDF.pdf)WZ

An initial realization from a sociological perspective is that space societies represent isolated social
groups dependent upon life support systems beyond the confines of the Earth's biosphere. There is no
doubt that the physical environment must be capable of reliably maintaining life support as well as
protection from space-bound threats to human life such as radiation. Two camps of people exist which
are necessary for the successful operation of a space society: (1) the engineering/physical science camp
(i.e., the space community) and (2) the social science camp. The former is traditionally involved with the
study of space colonies. The social sciences, with the exception of sociology, participate far less
frequently and with much less organizational prowess than the former. onsequently, a major focus on
the social environment requires bringing sociology and the other social sciences into the mix in addition to
developing astrosociology as a banner under which sociologists and all interested scientists can collaborate in an organized
manner in order to build a coherent body of knowledge and related literature. Formal collaboration between
astrosociologists and space scientists/engineers can serve to provide all those involved with a well-
rounded understanding of all the issues involved with constructing a space society. Sociology and the
other social sciences must gain access to that element of the space community focusing on space
colonies. A multidisciplinary approach is vital to successful establishment and functioning of any space
colony. As Harrison (1997) pointed out in the concluding chapter of his book entitled After ontact: The
Human Response to Extraterrestrial Life, while traditionally separated and suspicious of one another,
scientists from the "hard sciences and "soft sciences must work together in order to achieve the most
comprehensive and well-rounded perspective. Since proposing astrosociology and founding
Astrosociology.com in July 2003, have always advocated it as a multidisciplinary approach in which the
social science and space communities could come together for collaboration under a single banner
(Pass, 2005a, 2005b). Perhaps no greater area of space exploration requires sociological input than that
of space colonies due to its very nature: placing an isolated society in space that must ensure its own
ongoing survival without reliance on Earth. Presently, this appeal for formal collaboration faces a difficulty,
as described earlier. To some extent, astrosociology requires acceptance from within the discipline of
sociology as a mainstream subdiscipline. Efforts in this direction already continue to show progress.
Furthermore, collaboration with other scientists outside of sociology will undoubtedly force the
sociological community to view astrosociology as more legitimate. This multidisciplinary approach may
prove in the end to catapult astrosociology into acceptability among all involved in the study and planning
of space exploration. This is the goal.

Georgetown 2011-12


DeveIoping a space community is key to coIoniaI success
Space, STAF,
niesPDF.pdf)WZ

The concept of "space society represents a vital expansion of the current tendency to focus on
engineering and the physical sciences to solve problems associated with the planning for a successful
space colony. Again, the social environment must not be left to chance or else failure is the most likely
outcome. Sociologists define a society as something similar to a population situated in a particular
territory that shares a common culture and serves to carry out the major functions of life. n contrast, a
community relates to the collection of primary and secondary groups within which an individual actually
carries out these important functions of life. n part, whether a colony characterizes a community or a
society depends upon its population size as well as the makeup of the members of the population.
On another level, "space community represents a good concept because it speaks to the idea that
community life is vital even within a large population in space. That is, community must exist at some
level within the overall social structure to ensure the survival of colony citizens. n fact, we must seek to
establish viable communities within the colony if its population is too large. t remains vital to put into
place the social relationships characteristic of communities, as part of an organized social life, and not
just focus on the well being of individuals, so that we allow for the possibility of a successful colony. For
this reason, the concept of community must be considered throughout the planning process lest we
become complacent about the possibility of constructing an impersonal social environment unable to
carry out important life functions.
Georgetown 2011-12


CoIonists have to break down sociaI norms on earth before reIocating to space -
faiIure guarantees current of norms
Space, STAF,
http://www.astrosociology.com/Library/PDF/submissions/STAF_Astrosociology%20of%20Space%20oo
niesPDF.pdf)WZ

onsequently, then, one area of planning uniquely requires the input of sociologists and other social
scientists. We must think in terms of constructing initial social conditions for the colony as deemed
preferable based on specific criteria determined as part of the very beginning of the planning process.
This process includes establishment of a dominant culture as well. Sociologist Robert Bierstedt (1970)
identified three dimensions of culture as consisting of ideas (including values), norms, and material
culture. nitial conditions must include formulation of these elements. Values, norms, and role
expectations supportive of the space settlement will be extremely important upon reaching the
destination. nitial ideas and priorities for the initial cultural environment will largely shape the colony early
on, and we should also consider community needs and subcultural priorities before well before the
launch.
Our sense of social reality, or worldview, is learned from our culture. Social structure provides us with
recurring social patterns that make a stable society possible. Without social structure, our social reality
tomorrow would be substantially different than the social reality today. These social patterns allow for a
sustainable social reality for a long-term basis, and they are guided by cultural values and protected by
social norms.
Social conditions and social change affect cultural and social development, and even the psychological
health of the members of society. olonists must be educated to expect social problems to emerge and
cope with them as they do so. Furthermore, negative social conditions may force individuals and social
groups to adapt in ways considered "criminal or otherwise deviant according to the standards of the
larger culture while others simply take advantage of the social disorganization by employing approved,
though harmful, means. Social institutions may break down under severely challenging social conditions.
We have all seen the possibilities of negative social conditions in space in the numerous depictions from
science fiction. Such scenarios actually represent literary adaptations of conditions familiar to the
inhabitants of Earth. A system of formal in informal social control must therefore exist to protective the
normative climate of the colony.
Proper anticipation of social needs ahead of time allows for incorporation of social and cultural patterns
into the fabric of these communities from the beginning. Any new society must be built upon a solid
foundation. ts organization and functioning must be guided by ideas and a sense of purpose (provided by
culture). olonists must learn the values and norms of their new society before they depart. A new colony
in space, or anywhere else, cannot sustain itself as intended without detailed planning of its overall social
structure and the social institutions that are part of that structure.
A final consideration covered here regards the development of the culture. Based on experiences on
Earth, it is probable that the space society will become more and more ethnocentric over time. ts
members will come to view their own society as superior to others on Earth and elsewhere. This should
be anticipated and plans must be made for the development of "interplanetary relations (Pass, 2004b,
2004c). Research from scholars now focusing on international relations, political science, and political
sociology can provide valuable insights.
Georgetown 2011-12


AstrosocioIogy is criticaI to achieving a utopian society in space
Space, STAF,
niesPDF.pdf)WZ

Regarding the second theme, astrosociology should be adopted by both sociology (and the other social
sciences) and the physical sciences (especially by scientists working within the space community).
Astrosociology, due to it very focus, is the perfect field to allow for the forging of this multidisciplinary
approach. t should be accepted as a fundamental area of study within space and engineering
conferences, NASA and all national agencies, and by the sociological discipline and all those within the
social sciences, behavioral sciences, and humanities. This bold call for the acceptance of astrosociology
is necessary due to the fact that, even now, we begin plans for a oon base without adequate attention
to the social environment. The foregoing discussion and recommendations below demonstrate the
seriousness of this shortsighted approach.
The social construction of a society in space involves the purposeful creation of initial social conditions
that planners deem to be appropriate and desirable based on Earth history and the philosophies,
teachings, and lessons learned on this planet. n a sense, when we aim to create a new society in space
that is isolated from direct influences of Earth, we are attempting to formulate a social system based on
some type of utopian model. The newly emerging subfield within sociology known as futures studies seeks
to apply the sociological perspective to the scientific study of possible alternative futures. (See Bell
(2003a) and Bell, (2003b) for an excellent treatise on this new subfield). Utopian models are clearly one
type of alternative future, and one which we strive for under the best of circumstances. The social
construction of a space society provides us with the perfect opportunity to set initial conditions to utopian
standards as defined by the planners of the mission. We should get started right now, and seek the
assistance of futurists from sociology and the other social sciences.
A warning bell must be sounded, however: We should hope and plan for utopia, but remain prepared to
deal with dystopian conditions. With proper consideration, the initial utopian conditions are unlikely to
devolve into chaos or anarchy, though we can expect value conflict, social groups with different agendas,
as well as deviance at all levels of social reality (i.e., micro, middle, and macro levels). To minimize social
conflict and cope with it, we must take certain precautions. As discussed earlier, we must put into place
the social institutions necessary to provide the life functions for the colony as well as to cope with social
change and social disorganization.
The preliminary list of recommendations below deserve great deliberation and collaboration among
scientists from all of the sciences in order to achieve the greatest likelihood of success for project related
to space settlements, simple and complex, and all along this continuum.

Georgetown 2011-12


AstrosocioIogy is key to estabIishing coIonies in space
Pass, J., "Astrosociology and Space Exploration: Taking Advantage of the Other Branch of Science,
Space Technology and Applications nternational Forum (STAF) onference Proceedings, Volume
969(1), pp. 879-887, reproduced by permission by the American nstitute of Physics at the Astrosociology
Research nstitute (AR) Virtual Library [online archive],
http://www.astrosociology.org/Library/PDF/STAF2008_OtherBranch.pdf, 2008 apanday

With the Great Divide finally bridged, even if that structure is still a bit rickety, we can now move forward.
The foregoing discussion clearly describes how the social and behavioral sciences, the humanities, and
the arts were only minimally involved with the space exploration. Yet, as also demonstrated above, the
addition of a social science perspective such as astrosociology allows humanity to explore the stars by
considering the human dimension in addition to the inanimate world. The other branch of science already
possesses a great wealth of theoretical constructs and observational data regarding human behavior on
Earth that (1) will prove directly or indirectly applicable to space and (2) focuses precisely on the study of
space analogs on Earth. n the form of astrosociology, this knowledge could become both available to the
social scientists who pursue this new field and the space community members through collaboration with
them. n fact, natural scientists already pursue the study of space analogs from a natural science
perspective. Astrosociologists should join them. An example of existing knowledge applicable to space
involves society's institutions in the context of replicating a society in space (i.e., a space society) (Pass,
2007a; Pass, 2006a). n order to place a population of human beings in an isolated and dangerous space
environment, planners must construct these institutions (e.g., government, family, economy, and criminal
justice) to regulate social life just as they function to do so on Earth. Though social groups will adapt to
space the best they can manage, the basic organizational patterns have been tested over thousands of
years. They are unlikely to change on a fundamental level. Thus, data available from the study of space
analogs is especially relevant to early settlements as well as the early history of all new ones. n space,
the impact of astrosocial phenomena on human beings and their social systems seems rather obvious.
Early space settlers will experience great hardship on physical, social, and emotional levels. On the
Earth, in contrast, it is easy to overlook the fact that most humans involved with space today, and
throughout the space age, live on our species' home planet. Only elite astronauts and wealthy individuals
have traveled into space thus far. Yet everyone is affected by astrosocial phenomena. Astrosociologists
must remember to investigate astrosocial phenomena wherever they impact on human beings, including
in terrestrial societies. t makes no sense to send humans into outer space without input from the fields
and disciplines that developed to understand human behavior - and the connections between social
constructs and other elements of the physical world; or psychological reactions to social, cultural, and
physical manifestations. n the area of space medicine, for example, medical astrosociology focuses on
the social, cultural, psychological, and ethical dimensions of risk to exposure and other dangers along
with elements associated with treating patients in space. Economic concerns will also play a role as
"medical decisions may well hinge on weighing treatment options against costs and the availability of
resources.

Georgetown 2011-12

ECON ADD-ON

Asteroid surveys soIves the economy
and Human Societies, STAF,
http://www.astrosociology.com/Library/PDF/Protecting%20Societies.pdf)WZ

Planetary defense initiatives contribute to economic security due to the extensive problems that would
occur if a massive object struck the Earth. A well-functioning economic system in fact serves as a major
component of overall security for a particular society. The overall attempt to ensure economic survival in
all of its manifestations serves as an insurance policy for societal survival. The aftermath of an
unsuccessful defense against a massive space object could easily result in dystopias around the world.
Disruptions to social life including a well-functioning economic system would hinder the ability of
victimized societies to recover and rebuild. Economic security partly involves our ability to protect this vital
institution. We must begin to discuss our options for doing so. By diverting funds from a variety of different
budgetary categories into planetary defense, including from the military, the economies of the world could
avoid the upheaval that would occur due to inaction. n fact, it is arguable that spending to build the
infrastructure needed to deploy the various system components would actually pay for itself when the
threat of impact becomes real at some point in the future. Disruption of economic activity represents a
real potential problem, but so does reconstruction of various societal and physical components. Who will
pay for the reconstruction necessary in poor developing societies should they face such circumstances? t
will probably come from international sources such relief agency of the United Nations and aid from
developed nations. The availability of a planetary system can even bolster the economic systems if
handled correctly. ompanies that build the components of the system will profit, as will shareholders. An
entire industry will probably develop not only to build the planetary protection system, but also to operate
it and service it over the course of time. f we determine that we need such a system, then we should
make it benefit society as best we can.

Great power war
Mead, 9
2/4, Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the ouncil on Foreign Relations, Only akes You
Stronger: Why the recession bolstered America, The New Republic]

one oI which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that Iinancial crises actually help capitalist great
powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. II financial crises ave been a nor2al part of
life during the 300-year rise oI the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so as war. The wars oI the League oI
Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the apoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold
war: Te list of wars is al2ost as long as te list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars.
E:rope was a pretty peacef:l place in 1928, b:t te Depression poisoned Ger2an p:blic opinion and
elped bring dolf Hitler to power. If te c:rrent crisis t:rns into a depression, wat ro:g beasts 2igt
start slo:cing toward Moscow, Karaci, Beijing, or New Deli to be born? Te United States 2ay not, yet,
decline, b:t, if we can't get te world econo2y back on track, we 2ay still ave to figt.

Georgetown 2011-12

K&IPER-BELT ADD-ON

Survey Ieads to more Kuiper BeIt discoveries
NASA, 7
[" Near-Earth Object Survey and Deflection Analysis of Alternatives, Report to ongress, arch 200
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/171331main_NEO_report_march07.pdf]

A wide area search, such as that being proposed for NEOs, wiII aIso substantiaIIy increase the
identification of Kuiper BeIt Objects (KBOs). For example, if 10 percent of 24the observing time on the proposed
Dedicated LSST was spent in a KBO search mode, roughIy 100,000 faint KBOs shouId be discovered. An
expanded KBO database wiII aIIow the study of dynamicaI distributions, further resonances, the
existence of a KBO demarcation beyond 50 AU, high-eccentricity/high-inclination orbits, size distributions, frequency of binary
objects and collision rates, chemicaI compositions and the reIationship of objects to dust disks around
other stars. The survey will also provide a rich database of targets for future space missions. Detection surveys such as the
proposed Pan-STARRS and LSST provide unique solarsystem science because they are designed to detect and perform follow-up
studies of moving objects. Centaurs, Jupiter FamiIy Comets, and certain extinct comets may be reIated
through a common origin in the Kuiper BeIt. Dedicated assets wiII assure that appropriate foIIow-
up is carried out over the annuaI timeframes that are required to produce orbits for the sIower-
moving objects found in the outer soIar system. Thus, a coIIateraI resuIt of the NEO survey
program couId be both the deIineation of the structure of the Kuiper BeIt and the discovery of
many new minor pIanet

Kuiper beIt research is essentiaI to discovering the origins of Iife and the
universe
Frueh, 2
[Sara, staff writer National Academies of Science, " issions to Pluto-Kuiper Belt and Europa Should
Top NASA's Agenda, inFocus, Summer/Fall 2002 Vol. 2 No. 2
http://www.infocusmagazine.org/2.2/eng_space_exploration.html]

"Data coIIected on the Kuiper BeIt over the Iast decade suggest that it's made up of innumerabIe
objects, and that they have a bizarre variety of properties," said ichael Belton, president, Belton Space
Exploration nitiatives, Tucson, Ariz., and chair of the committee that wrote the report. "A mission would let us study some of those
properties more closely." This examination may heIp scientists understand how the soIar system began,
because the giant pIanets are beIieved to have been created from objects Iike those in the Kuiper
BeIt. A mission might aIso provide cIues to the origin of Iife on Earth, the report says, which may have
started with organic materiaI deIivered by a comet from the region biIIions of years ago. A mission to
Pluto and the Kuiper Belt has been on and off NASA's agenda for several years. The Bush administration eliminated funding for the
mission in NASA's 2003 budget, citing the high cost involved. But the report says that a trip to the Kuiper Belt could gather enough
data -- possibly paradigm-shifting information -- to justify its price tag, which is midsize by space-exploration standards. Another
reason not to delay the mission is that the time window for studying Pluto is closing. The planet is beginning the leg of its 248-year
solar orbit that is farthest from the sun; more of the surface will be shadowed and the atmosphere will freeze, making study
impossible. A thaw -- and another chance to survey the brightest object in the murky Kuiper Belt -- won't happen again for more than
a century. The report makes several recommendations for NASA's space exploration agenda over the next decade, prioritizing
missions within different size classes -- including large missions, which NASA has shied away from in recent years. But giving up
larger missions would be a mistake, the committee believes. "For the scientific health of the space program you need a major
mission from time to time," said Belton. "They're costly, but they can help us achieve a breadth of knowledge that smaller missions
can't." The next large mission should be sent to Jupiter's moon Europa, the report says. The satellite is thought to have an ocean
under its icy crust -- which makes it, with ars, the best place beyond Earth to search for life. The mission would confirm the
presence of the ocean, study its qualities, and try to determine whether it does in fact harbor living organisms. Important
research can be done from the ground as well, the report notes, urging NASA to partner with the National Science
Foundation to buiId a Iarge-aperture survey teIescope, which could survey the faintest objects in the entire northern
sky every week. n addition to aiding the study of distant Kuiper BeIt objects, the telescope would offer a very
concrete benefit: the ability to better detect and assess the risk posed by small asteroids and comets that most frequently collide
with Earth.

That's key to preserving earth's biodiversity - impact is extinction
Chung et. aI, 10
[ S.Y. hung P. Ehrenfreund, Space Policy nstitute, Elliott School of nternational Affairs, The George
Washington University, J.D. Rummel, nstitute for oastal Science and Policy, East arolina University
Georgetown 2011-12

and N. Peter, European Space Policy nstitute, " Synergies of Earth science and space exploration,
Advances in Space Research
Volume 45, ssue 1, 4 January 2010, Pages 155-168 ]

Planet Earth is currently the only habitable world we know. Although life may have existed as early as 3.5 billion years ago, humans
have lived for only a rather short time on Earthabout 2 million years. Nonetheless, we are (unfortunately) making up for lost time
as a factor affecting the habitability of the planet. In the Iast 200 years humans have changed the Earth
dramaticaIIy, caIIing into question how Iong the Earth and its naturaI systems can baIance its
Iimited energy and materiaI resources against the effects of human-caused poIIution. Keeping
Earth's naturaI "Iife support" processes operating, and the pIanet habitabIe by humans, has
become a criticaI chaIIenge. Space activities, particularly environmental satellites that monitor the biosphere, are becoming
essential tools to help us to manage and sustain our very lives (Sadeh et al., 1996). Space observations can tell us about our
current biosphere, but the Earth as a system has not aIways been hospitabIe to human Iife. For
approximately half of its existence, there was virtually no free oxygen in the Earth's atmosphere, and a completely different set of
biogeochemical cycles operated to keep the Earth relatively stable in that state. Fundamental knowledge of the Earth is of more
than casual interestit is essentiaI that we understand how to keep it from changing back to a stabIe
state with conditions that wouId not support human Iife. Astrobiology, the study of Iife in the universe,
seeks answers to fundamentaI questions on the origin, evolution, distribution and future of Iife, wherever it
may exist. As an interdisciplinary science field that unites astronomers, biologists, physicists, chemists, geologists and many of their
subdisciplines it addresses many questions that are relevant for sustaining life on planet Earthand in particular, the relationships
between a planet (especially the Earth) and life, and how each affects the other. Astrobiology provides both the knowledge and
perspective to inform us about how to maintain the Earth as a long-term habitable home for humanity. Originally a creation of NASA
(under the titles, "exobiology and "planetary biology), astrobiology has grown worldwide as a multi- and interdisciplinary endeavor.
Together, astrobiologists have collaborated in writing down a "NASA Astrobiology Roadmap (Des arais et al., 2008) now in its
third iteration that covers seven main goals, given in temporal, and not priority, order. Of particular interest here in joining Earth
sciences and space studies is roadmap goal number 6, which states that astrobiology, as a field, should work to, Understand the
principles that will shape the future of life, both on Earth and beyond. Elucidate the drivers and effects of microbial ecosystem
change as a basis for forecasting future changes on time scales ranging from decades to millions of years, and explore the potential
for microbial life to survive and evolve in environments beyond Earth, especially regarding aspects relevant to US Space Policy.
Here "US Space Policy is a reference to the specific US interest in returning to the oon and going on to ars, as mentioned
above. AstrobioIogy, and particuIarIy the desire to understand the origin, evolution, and distribution of Iife
in the universe, is one of the chief motivators for expanded human capabiIities to conduct science
on other worIds (Fig. 1). 3.1. Lessons from astrobiology: conservation of biodiversity and life in extreme environments Over the
course of the last 4.5 billion years, Earth has created an ideal environment to sustain life of an astonishing variety. Dynamic
processes in the Earth's interior have established a magnetosphere that protects the Earth from harmful cosmic ray particles. The
Earth's atmosphere, in turn, shields life from harmful ultraviolet radiation and allows for a stable climate and temperature cycle by
providing a "greenhouse effect that retains some of the infrared radiation that is emitted from the Earth's surface. A brief look at our
planetary neighbors shows that Venus, with an average surface temperature of 500 (as a result of a "runaway greenhouse
effect), and ars, with a surface temperature from ~60 to +10 and a thin atmosphere (with an insufficient greenhouse effect),
are both unable to sustain life as we know it at the surface. The combination of Earth's physical and chemical processes (e.g. ocean
circulation, atmospheric flows, plate tectonic recycling of the crust, etc.) and living processes, together, form biogeochemical cycles
that transform the elements and compounds related to life (the bio-elements such as H, , O, S, N, P). While humans originally
were part of these natural cycles, the discovery and proliferation of human-discovered technology have caused major disruptions to
these bio-cycles in many, if not most, parts of the globe. As a consequence, and with the orders-of-magnitude rise in human
population over the last 200 years, humans are coming to dominate and destroy the natural cycling of the elements with
unpredictable consequences. While it is well known that natural processes have led to extinction of species, other life forms arose
over time. Regrettably, the effects of modern human activities are rapid on the evolutionary timescale, and consequently are
impacting climate, ecosystems, and other species at a rate that does not allow for natural replacement of ecosystems in the same
time-span. onsequently, the loss of ecosystems on which we depend is affecting human habitats adversely, all over the planet.
Biodiversity is a measure of the variety and numbers of life found at all levels of biological organization. As a concept, biodiversity
can embrace all forms of diversity in biological systems: in genetics, species, and ecosystems. The conservation of biodiversity has
become a global concern because different species contribute in essential (and often uncharacterized) ways to the functioning of the
Earth's life support systems, on which we all depend. Effectively, the loss of biodiversity results in the loss of valuable ecosystem
services that we take for granted, and which we (if we care to continue to inhabit the Earth) can ill-afford to lose. The ongoing
Ioss of biodiversity is of concern to astrobioIogists, in particular, they realize that the Earth, as a system, is
quite capabIe of operating without it-but that it can operate as a system that does not provide
essentiaI support (e.g. oxygen in the atmosphere) for human Iife. n fact, the most criticaI difference between
today's Earth, and that of 2.5 biIIion years ago, is biodiversity. The effects of other living systems have made
the Earth the extremely habitable planet that it is today, and it would be ironic if humanity's influence were to destroy those systems
on which we all very much depend. Scholes et al. (2008) note that unlike climate change there are no widely accepted and globally
available set of measures to assess biodiversity and critical information that can aid in the preservation of biodiversity. Thus,
challenges lie in integrating biodiversity data that are diverse, physically dispersed, and in many cases, not organized in a way that
makes them accessible to modern researchers. The threat to biological diversity was among the topics discussed at the UN World
Summit for Sustainable Development in 2002. At the Summit, the governments adopted the "onvention on Biological Diversity to
conserve biological diversity. "Biodiversity is one of the nine 'societal benefit areas' identified by GEOSS. The Biodiversity
Observation Network (BON) (Scholes et al., 2008) is an initiative within GEOSS which establishes a framework for data collection,
standardization, and information exchange in biodiversity studies (BON, 2009). NASA and DVERSTAS, an international program of
Georgetown 2011-12

biodiversity science, is leading the planning phase of GEO-BON, in collaboration with the GEO secretariat. Nine other organizations
and programs are participating in this initiative. n a sense, the astrobioIogicaI interest of Iife in extreme
environments is compIementary to the study and appreciation of biodiversity. Life on Earth is
extremeIy adaptabIe, and has been shown to overcome extremes in temperature, pH, and pressure in abundance (see Table
1). Equally interesting is the fact that some microbes depend exclusively on abiotic processes for their existence, including
organisms in deep mines that survive on the products of radioactivity and organisms at deep sea vents. While it is encouraging that
life is so tenacious, it is also humbling in a sense. While these microbes live in "extreme environments quite successfully (and thus
would not be hurt if the Earth, itself, were to become "extreme) the word "extreme is used because it connotes an environment
where humans could not live, at all. The study of extreme Iife is important in determining both where Iife
may be found eIsewhere, and in understanding the functioning and adaptabiIity of Iife that we
have here on Earth. Both NASA and the US National Science Foundation have had or currently have programs to study
"extremophiles and recently, the European ommission has initiated within its "Framework 7 a program called AREX
(oordination Action for Research Activities on life in Extreme Environments), that coordinates and sets scientific priorities for
research of life in extreme environment (ESF, 2007). AREX endorses cross-sector interests in microbes, plants, and animals
evolving in diverse marine, polar, and terrestrial extreme environment as well as outer space (AREX, 2008). By reIating
information on both biodiversity and extreme Iife, this synergy of Earth and space science can
heIp to provide concepts (based on recent scientific data) on how ecosystems respond to rapid rates of
change and determine possibIe directions by which the Earth and its biosphere (including humans) wiII
survive and co-evoIve in the future. This approach requires appIying the principIes and
perspectives of astrobioIogy to identify options that might aIIow humanity to haIt the destruction
of its own habitat as weII as the decIine of biodiversity on Earth, while addressing a variety of related
economic and energy-related scenarios associated with those options.
Georgetown 2011-12

CASE SOLVES DA

Even if they win a catastrophe is not imminent we shouId address asteroids now
- the aff is a prerequisite to soIving their harms
and Human Societies, STAF,
http://www.astrosociology.com/Library/PDF/Protecting%20Societies.pdf]WZ

The sky is not faIIing. On the other hand, the threat of a serious impact is reaI and therefore
deserves attention. The imperative to protect the Earth and human societies exists because we now
know of the threat. Without panicking, we must thoughtfully develop a reasonable set of strategies to
protect life, as we know it. Even the survival component requires consideration and debate before its
implementation. The shelters discussed earlier may seem like going too far by many. However, we should
look at the problem on a more general basis. Steps taken to protect us from asteroids and comets
can aIso prove usefuI against other caIamities such as terrorism, gIobaI warming, nucIear faIIout,
and other atmospheric caIamities.

Georgetown 2011-12


AT: KS
Georgetown 2011-12

AT: K OF SCIENCE

Critiques of science are faIse - the scientific method questions authority
Bronner, 4
Stephen Eric, Professor of Political Science and omparative Literature at Rutgers University, "Reclaiming the Enlightenment olumbia University
Press p. 29-30
The idea of progress was alwaysanthropologically as well as historically less about the eradication of subjectivity
and the domination of nature than the possibility of personal liberation, popular empowerment, and
overcoming the spell of myth and nature. Progress is an inherently rational idea. But it does not call for
belief in the omnipotence of reason, the superfluous character of passion, or the existence of an objective solution to
every problem. 35 Neither ondorcet nor Kant provided an ontological foundation for progress and even the most rabid believer in progress, an
adamant atheist and technological enthusiast, like Holbach could write in his System de la nature that "it is not given man to know everything; it is not
given him to know his origins; it is not given him to penetrate to the essence of things or to go back to first principles. The issue for the philosophes
was not the discovery of absolute truth but the establishment of conditions in which truth might be pursued. Or, to frame the matter in terms of a new
critical theory with some sense of the concrete, the extent to which progress manifested itself was the extent to which
claims could be treated as provisional. Reason and knowledge were never the enemies of progress. But their enemies were also the
enemies of progress. David Hume, in this vein, liked to say that "ignorance is the mother of devotion. Unreflective passion offers far
better support than scientific inquiry for the claims of religion or the injunctions of totalitarian regimes. The
scientific method projects not merely the "open society, but also the need to question authority. This was
already evidenced in the eno when Socrates showed that he could teach mathematics to a slave and in The Republic when, exhibiting the frustration
of the anti-intellectual, Thrasymachus insisted that justice is the right of the stronger. On one point, however, the most famous adversary of Socrates
was right: his position suggested that whether the moral possibilities of progress are realized is not the province of
philosophy but of politics. This would have radical implications. Upsetting the divine structure of things
marked the Enlightenment notion of progress. ts advocates privileged over liberty rather than order and
the communicable power of discourse over the incommunicable experience of grace. These new values
would serve as the points of reference for all other values: order would no longer be employed as an
excuse to smother liberty, but rather be understood as the precondition for its pursuit.36 Order always preceded
liberty for the philosophes: it was seen as providing the rules and procedures for "constituting the liberty enjoyed by citizens through the protection of
the state.37

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ENLIGHTENMENT GOOD

Even if continuing bias exists, the basis for reform is in EnIightenment ideaIs -
we can't abandon them
Bronner, 4
Press p. 64-67
Fighting against a world dominated by monsters and saints, witches and gods, myths and prejudices, misery and
privilege, custom and laziness, demanded a mixture of courage and clarity. The assault on metaphysics introduced
by the authors of The Spectator, Joseph Addison and Richard Steele, prepared the way for the new egalitarian emphasis upon "common sense
offered by Thomas Paine. Utilitarianism, so boring in its shopkeeper mentality, nonetheless gave the individual a measure of respect by making clear
that each was capable of discerning his or her interest and that social welfare was the primary aim of government. Lessing, ontesquieu, and Goethe
challenged the church injunction against suicide. ost partisans of the Enlightenment were repulsed by slavery and the
subordination of women plays a role in many of their works. Their privileging of persuasion over coercion,
their vision of the fully formed personality, their interest in matters outside their immediate expertise and
experience, their emphasis upon tolerance, all project an eradication of what is brutal and unjust in the
name of a better society with a new set of human relations. Resistance undertaken in the name of
progressive, liberal, and ultimately socialist ideals served to separate critical from affirmative intellectuals
and place some thinkers often associated with the Enlightenment, such as Samuel Johnson and Edmund Burke,
outside the tradition that they might otherwise seem to espouse. The result was what might be termed a great divide that
separated intellectuals of the Enlightenment from those of the ounter-Enlightenment. Enlightenment intellectuals were not pillars of
political correctness. Organizations condemning slavery were formed. Salons may have accorded women a new public presence,9 and the
grosser expressions of anti-Semitism and even anti-uslim attitudes were generally looked down upon. But the Enlightenment was still primarily a
male, white, straight, and hristian world. n the United States, moreover, slavery was embedded in the national legislative process: Jefferson
supported the idea that a slave is three-fifths of a person for purposes of representation, which won him the election of 1800, and Washington placed
the national capital in slave territory. Admittedly, for such individuals, support for measures of this sort probably had less to do with their personal
approval of slavery than with its political use to protect the economic base of the South: it remained the case into the twentieth century that no serious
political career was open to Southerners opposed to slavery or supportive of civil rights.10 But that doesn't change the reality: it was
what it was. Still, it would be misleading to lump the philosophes together with their adversaries. The
principles underpinning the critique of slavery, sexism, and exclusion of the other derived from the
Enlightenment. Then, too, the political stance of its advocates on such issues was generally qualitatively
different from those of the ounter-Enlightenment. t is instructive, for example, to consider the views on women and divorce
expressed by archreactionaries like Justus oeser or Bonald; the views on prejudice offered by Burke; the irrationalism of Hamann; the unyielding
hristianity of De aistre; the brutal anti-Semitism of the Abb Bruelle; and the alternatives offered to cosmopolitanism, constitutionalism, and social
equality by the rest of the reaction. t is also easy to forget the witch trials that cost thousands upon thousands of women their lives;11 the slaughters
attendant upon the rusades;12 the nquisition, and the constant pogroms. ichel Foucault may be correct in his assertions that
the Enlightenment in its time had little sympathy for the "unreasonable: the beggars, the petty criminals,
and the insane.13 n practical terms, however, the more progressive programs for improving the
conditions of these groups were again inspired by Enlightenment principles and intellectuals of the
ounter-Enlightenment would historically show even less interest in these groups and the reforms
capable of bettering their lot. Above all, however, it wrong to suggest that the prejudices of the philosophes somehow invalidate the ideals
associated with their republic of letters. The logic of the Enlightenment suggested that citizenship should be open to
everyone with a pen and an argument to make in the name of freedom. Sex, race, religion, property, and
class, shouldin principleplay no role in determining the ability of individuals to participate in the public
realm and they should be able to pursue their private interests as they see fit. Kant's notion concerning the formal
equality of all subjects, in fact, made possible a criticism of any such barriers to the public exercise of reason while the principles underpinning the
liberal rule of law enabled suffragettes and civil libertarians as well as advocates of the excluded and insane to contest the existence of positive laws
tainted by discrimination and regressive attitudes. t is only fair to note that: The Enlightenment public sphere assigned new importance to women as
producers and consumers of culture, but often on the basis of values that served to justify their subordination. ts norms of openness and inclusion
created new kinds of association, but also new forms of exclusion. For all this ambiguity, however, we continue to invoke the norms of
openness and transparency preached by the Enlightenment public sphere even as we criticize its failure
to live up to them. For that reason its legacy is more enduring than it seems, whatever its vicissitudes from the
Enlightenment to our own day.14 "Enlightenment was initially seen as depending upon the "courage of the individual to exercise his or her intellect,
question rather than obey and, according to the famous formulation, "leave behind his self-imposed immaturity. ontrary to popular opinion, however,
Kant did not leave the individual subject hovering in the metaphysical stratosphere. t was clear to him no less than to the rest of the philosophes that
summoning such courage becomes easier with the existence of liberal institutions and a "public animated
by civic interests.15 That is why liberating the "public not merely from dogma, but from the institutions and
conditions that promote it, became the primary goal of Enlightenment intellectuals. The philosophes
understood that the right to criticism is the precondition for the exercise of autonomy and, if not the pursuit of
absolute truth, then the rectification of error. Thus, in contrast to thinkers of the ounter-Enlightenment like Burke and De aistre, Kant and
Paine would insist that no age can commit the future to a condition in which it would be impossible to extend knowledge or correct errors. 16

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K IMPACTS WRONG

Their impact cIaims are fIawed - they create a fIawed vision of IiberaIism and ignore physicaI
conditions
Bronner 4
Press p. 108-110
With respect to understanding totalitarianism of the left and the right, Dialectic of Enlightenment began with the wrong premises and drew the wrong
conclusions. rucial was its claim that the attack on metaphysics by Enlightenment notions of science undermined the exercise of conscience thereby
unleashing a savage egoism. n contrast to bourgeois liberalism, however, fascist thinking is marked by the demand for
irrational sacrifice for the race or the nation or the class. Thus, it would necessary to make the purely
abstract assertion that "in the innermost recesses of humanism, as its very soul, there rages a frantic prisoner
who, as a Fascist, turns the world into a prison.36 The same connection between humanism and the prison would later find
expression in the writings of ichel Foucault37 which, also in keeping with the Frankfurt School, noted the exclusion of the mentally
ill and children from universalistic worldviews like humanism and liberalism: the terms in which these groups should be
treated, of course, are never discussed. There is also no reference to the reflexive element within
humanism, its intrinsic belief in the dignity of the individual first raised by Pico della irandola, or the relevance of
"rights in addressing the claims of the weak and exploited.38 Enough to claim that what the Enlightenment sought to destroy
will reappear as its own product and that the "turn from the liberal to the total authoritarian state occurs on the basis of one and the same economic
order and with regard to the unity of this economic base, we can say that it is liberalism that 'produces' the total-authoritarian state out of itself, as its
own consummation at a more advanced stage of development.39 apitalism cannot be blamed for Stalinism. But, then, the real
issue for critical theory was always less the inequalities, imperatives, or conflicts produced by capitalism than the metaphysical critique of the
"instrumental values underlying its production process and how the logic of the commodity form undermines all normative concerns.. This shifts the
discussion from "capitalism to "advanced industrial society or "modernity. The anthropological merges with the historical
critique of Enlightenment. Qualitative differences between regimes vanish and diverse regimes fall under
the same rubric. The resulting standpoint is both fatalistic and didactic. What only became apparent at the
end is now projected back to the beginning. The issue is no longer how totalitarianism might have been
resisted, but how it emerged as the telos, the logical projection, of what preceded it. Philosophy comes too
late: the Owl of inerva yawns at dusk. Enlightenment sets the stage for Weimar and Weimar for Hitler. Everything else is a combination of nave
hopes, ideology, and nostalgia. The image emerges of a society blithely and unwittingly walking into the abyss. The
way opens for a library of mid-level novels and films produced by the culture industry that use fascism or Nazism as the backdrop, and that provide the
audience with a frisson regarding the horrible result without offering any sense of how it was actually achieved. Political ethics becomes the
province of the resigned prophet or simply the scold. Thus it only made sense for Dialectic of Enlightenment to claim that
humans will "pay for the increase of their power with alienation from that over which they exercise their power. Enlightenment behaves towards things
as a dictator toward men. He knows them insofar as he can manipulate them.40 The meta-political and anthropological
"dialectic becomes a replacement for the analysis of political and historical conflicts. Progress will thus
generate regression and modernity will inspire barbarism. f the alienation embedded within liberalism and
the logic of science reaffirm illiberal forms of authority and the power of myth then fascism can be seen as
an expression of what it opposed: the Enlightenment. This indeed makes it possible to interpret
totalitarianism in terms of "the conditions that prevailed before its coming to power, not in a negative sense, but
rather in terms of their positive continuation.41 The point for Horkheimer and Adorno no less than their
postmodern followers is not simply that fascism grows in liberal societies, but that totalitarianism is both
the culmination of the anthropological enlightenment and thealbeit unintentionalproduct of the historical
Enlightenment. n this way, though its lessons were actually quite limited, the Weimar Republic became a
"parable for the fragile character of liberal democracy in general.
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K IMPACTS WRONG

Their ev's inabiIity to differentiate between the EnIightenment thinkers and fascism coIIapses any
chance of effective action or historicaI backing for their impact cIaims
Bronner 4
Press p. 110-113
This prejudice is sometimes seen as hindering the Frankfurt School from making differentiated political judgments
in the aftermath of World War . 42 There is also something to this claim. embers of the Frankfurt School, however,
were often capable of discerning differences within the "totally administered society in terms of everyday
politics: Herbert arcuse, for example, called upon American students to support George cGovern against Richard Nixon in the presidential
elections of 1972. Horkheimer and Adorno were also aware that, in spite of their previous equation of "mass enlightenment with "mass deception,
education might mitigate threats to liberal norms.43 The question is whether such pronouncements logically derive from
the theory or rather are insights whose determinations were essentially ad hoc. They certainly never
received sustained political, philosophical, or anthropological justification. This would indeed have been difficult to
provide: for, while it might still have been possible to claim that the "the whole is false, parts of the whole
would now apparently need to be considered more or less "false than others and in the same vein, if
"wrong life cannot be lived rightly,44 the question arises whether in drawing such distinctions the
fundamental principle of "negative dialectics is being betrayed. These are crucial matters since only upon
the assumption that the Enlightenment and totalitarianism are integrally related elements of "modernity is
it possible to speak about a "totally administered society in which the metaphysical or, better, philosophical-
aestheticassertion of subjectivity must supplant explicitly political forms of resistance. Totalitarianism did
free the instincts from what is commonly called conscience and Horkheimer and Adorno are correct in their claim that "anti- Semitic
behavior is generated in situations where blinded men robbed of their subjectivity are set loose as subjects and action becomes an autonomous end in
itself and disguises its own purposelessness.45 Linking this philosophical perspective with the Enlightenment, however,
is possible only by broadening it to include its greatest and most self-conscious critics: Sade,
Schopenhauer, Bergson, and Nietzsche.46 With any of them it can be said though not for any of the major
philosophesthat action becomes its own end and disguises its lack of purpose. t was again less either rationalism or
positivism than voluntarism, though admittedly of a vitalist sort, which influenced the thinking of right-wing totalitarians, Henry Pachter was surely
correct when he wrote that: The common denominator of all these undercurrents of European civilization was the new feeling that "life had been
slighted. t expressed itself in a vitalistic philosophy, which the Nazis bowdlerized into a murderous racism, the Fascists into a swaggering nationalism.
Transposed onto the political scenewhere it did not belongthis pseudo-rebellion appeared as sadism, clothed in the glitter of heroism.47 Not
Sade, Schopenhauer, Bergson, or Nietzsche had the least identification with the principles of
enlightenment political theory or the practice associated with it. They were anti-liberal, anti-socialist, anti-
democratic and anti-egalitarian, anti-rationalist and anti-historical: enough of them and their followers,
moreover, prized the very exercise of arbitrary power that enlightenment political theory sought to curb.
There is something provocative about the later insistence of Adorno that "not least among the tasks now confronting thought is that of placing all the
reactionary arguments against Western culture in the service of progressive enlightenment.48 But the "progressive character of this imperative was
left hanging in the abstract. Thus, while important insights can obviously be gained from conservative thinkers, the potential contradictions generated
by the attempt to merge right-wing ideology with left-wing practice were never taken into account. Whatever the theoretical sweep of
the argument advanced by Dialectic of Enlightenment, from the standpoint of history and politics, it was
predicated on false concreteness and misplaced causality. nstrumental reason did not bring about
Nazism or destroy the ability of individuals to make normative judgments: it is indeed time to move
beyond this abstract and indeterminate perspective.. nstrumental reason and bureaucracy may have been the
necessary, but they were not even the remotely sufficient condition for totalitarianism: all twentieth-century
western movements have been bureaucratic and, by definition, modern.49 The question is why fascism emerged victorious in
some instances and failed in others and why totalitarianism arose in some dictatorial circumstances and not in others. Demands for historical
specification explode metaphysical and anthropological forms of argumentation. The Nazi victory was the
historical product of a political clash between real movements inspired by divergent intellectual traditions
whose members were quite capable of making diverse judgments concerning both their interests and
their values. s it really that difficult to discern the debt to the Enlightenment of those democrats and
socialists like Heinrich ann or Harry Kessler or Rudolf Hilferding who defended the Weimar Republic as
against the debt to the ounter-Enlightenment of those who sought to bring it down like Ernst Junger,
Oswald Spengler, and the gang surrounding Hitler?

Georgetown 2011-12

AT: K OF ENLIGHTENMENT - PROGRESS T&RN

Critiques of enIightenment vaIues are anti-progress
Bronner 4
Stephen Eric, Professor of Political Science and omparative Literature at Rutgers University, "Reclaiming the Enlightenment olumbia University Press p. 17
ax Weber already envisioned the spirit of enlightenment "irretrievably fading and a world comprised of "specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart.1 But he was bitter
about this development, which places him in marked contrast to much of contemporary opinion. The Enlightenment always had its critics. Beginning with the Restoration of 1815
and the new philosophical reaction to the French Revolution, however, they were almost exclusively politicalif not necessarily culturaladherents of the right: intelligent
conservatives committed to organic notions of development like Edmund Burke, elitists seeking a return to the sword and the robe like Joseph de aistre, racists intent on
viewing world history as a battle between Aryans and Jews like Houston Stewart hamberlain, and apocalyptics prophesying doom like Oswald Spengler. Today, however,
many on the left forward a critique of the Enlightenment. The criticisms come in various guises:
postmodernists consider the enlightenment as "essentialist, radical feminists view it as "male, and
postcolonial thinkers disparage it as "Eurocentric. ommunitarians condemn its individualism, religious radicals bemoan its skepticism,
populists castigate its intellectualism, and the politicians of identity criticize its rejection of experience as the criterion of
truth. Dogmatic arxists dismiss the Enlightenment as "bourgeois, anarchists are repelled by its reliance
on the state, and ecologists by its belief in science and technology. Followers of the Frankfurt School still
view it as the unwitting source of modern totalitarianism. Left critics of the Enlightenment form a motley
crew and, perhaps, this reflects the current disarray of progressive forces. Still there is something that,
ultimately, binds aII of them: a basic discomfort with the notion of progress.

Turns the K - progress key to positive change of the worId and uncovering bad institutions
Bronner 4
Stephen Eric, Professor of Political Science and omparative Literature at Rutgers University, "Reclaiming the Enlightenment olumbia University Press p. 18-20
Forged amid the scientific revolution, the birth of modern idealism, and the struggle for political liberty, the term "progress is usually seen as having been coined by Fontenelle.
But it is unnecessary to employ the word to believe in its feasibility. Progress is the crucial category for talking about change,
autonomy, and even making sense of reality. The current understanding of progress, however, has become impoverished. The category has been
flattened out. t is a travesty to reduce "progress to the disenchantment of the world, the dissolution of myths,
and the substitution of "knowledge for fancy.2 Progress is, above all, an attack on "the illusion of finality:3
closure, certainty, and utopia. Enlightenment thinkers believed that they were changing the world by formalizing empirical data under the
abstract laws of nature that were open to testing and observation. But these thinkers also knew that normative concerns were intertwined with
the quantitative extension of knowledge.4 They recognized that religion rested on revealed claims and that
the aristocracy justified its privileges by invoking a mythical past. Acceptance of such beliefs no less than
social evils now became understood less as the result of original sin than ignorance and prejudice or
those assumptions and opinions, customs and traditions, preserved from critical reflection.5 With this
change in the causation of misery and the new emphasis on reason came, quite logically, the desire to better the
condition of humanity. n the first instance, this meant throwing off the veils of ignorance imposed by centuries of
ideological oppression. The agic Flute indeed expressed this fundamental assumption of the Enlightenment that no "dialectic would ever fully ruin: The
rays of the sun Drive away the night; Destroyed is the hypocrite's Hidden might. The Enlightenment idea
of progress ultimately implied something very simple and very dramatic: transforming the invisible into the
visible, the ineffable into the discursive, and the unknown into the known. Hobbes put the matter well when he noted in De ive
(1642) that "there is a certain clue of reason whose beginning is in the dark; but by the benefit of whose conduct, we are led, as it were, by the hand into the clearest light. t
is secondary whether this meant clarifying the workings of electricity, translating ethical intuitions into discursive
statements, the activities of the market into economic laws, or fears about human nature into institutions capable of
constraining arbitrary power: Hegel only rendered absolute what had been the guiding impulse, the regulative principle, of the general trend toward
"enlightenment when he based his Phenomenology of ind on the famous assumption that "there is nothing in the essence of object that does not become evident in the series
of its appearances. arx would echo this sentiment and provide it with an even more radical material formulation in the second of the "Eleven Theses on Feuerbach where he
writes: The question whether objective (gegenstaendliche) truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question
of theory but is a practical question. n practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness
(Diesseitigkeit) of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from
practice is a purely scholastic question. The Enlightenment envisioned progress as the process of bringing what had once been shrouded in darkness
into the light. This meant not simply recognizing existing differences among people of different cultures as
morally legitimate,6 but also what is institutionally required in order that people may safely exercise their
differences. The crucial issue was, for this reason, never the "subjectivity of the subject. Advocates of the
Enlightenment instead sought to foster the moral autonomy of the individual over established traditions
and the critical use of rationality against what Ernst assirer termed "mytho-poetical thinking. This enabled them to
link progress with the extension of freedom and the exercise of the intellect.

Georgetown 2011-12

AT: ENLIGHTENMENT TOTALITARIANISM

EnIightenment vaIues don't cause totaIitarianism or genocide - they are directIy opposed to them
Bronner 4
Press p. 7-8
Enlightenment thinkers evidenced anticipatory insights, speculations, and contradictory views on an extraordinary variety of issues. The less
systematic the thinker, it is possible to assume, the more perverse the ways in which his or her ideas could be appropriated. Enlightenment
thinkers, however, were rarely endorsed or embraced by conservative or fascist political movements: it is
hard to imagine a bust of Locke or Voltaire sitting on the desk of ussolini. The philosophes had their most profound
impact on the Left: Locke and Kant influenced all manner of liberals, socialists, and anarchists. Beccaria, Holbach, and Adam Smith were deeply
committed to moral development and social reform. Thomas Paine is among the founders of modern internationalism. There is hardly a genuinely
democratic regime that is not indebted to ontesquieu. Enlightenment philosophers would inspire generations of those
languishing under the weight of despotism and dogma. The extent to which their political contribution is
forgotten is the extent to which the contemporary left will constantly find itself intellectually reinventing the
wheel. The Enlightenment privileged a critical reflection on society, its traditions, its ideologies, and its
institutions. ts spirit was opposed from the beginning, both in terms of style and content, by the type of fanaticism
evidenced yesterday by secular totalitarians and today by religious fundamentalists. Just as there is a spirit of the
Enlightenment, there is a phenomenology of the anti-Enlightenment. The language of both hasoften unwittinglycarried over into the modern age. A
lack of awareness about the past, however, has undermined the ability to make sense of the present. Arguing that the Enlightenment
with its emphasis upon civil liberties, tolerance, and humanism wasfor examplesomehow responsible for
the "Terror of the French Revolution or twentieth-century totalitarianism indulges the pseudo-dialectical
sensibility without looking at political history, movements, or institutional practices. The entire political
landscape is distorted by this view: its revision alone justifies the popular academic reinterpretation of the
enlightenment legacy. Understanding the current clash between secularism and religious fundamentalism in the present, no less than the
most profound political conflicts of the past, calls for first recognizing that the "ounter-Enlightenment was not some "dialectical
response to the success of the Enlightenment but an immediate response, born of fear and loathing,
against everything associated with its spirit. Perversions of the original impulse still go unacknowledged. Enlightenment
values run directly counter to the exercise of arbitrary power no less than the censorship, collectivism,
and conformism of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes of both the left and the right. t was also not that the
Enlightenment somehow blended with its opposite, the ounterEnlightenment, but thatfrom the firsttwo traditions confronted one another. The
hatred between them only intensified in the aftermath of the age of democratic revolution and the epic battle would culminate in Auschwitz: it was a
battle lost by the partisans of the Enlightenment and won by its enemies.

Georgetown 2011-12

CEDE THE POLITICAL

EnIightenment-based poIitics aIIow for reaI change - escaping into meta-theory
contributes to oppression of society
Bronner 4
Stephen Eric, Professor of Political Science and omparative Literature at Rutgers University, "Reclaiming the Enlightenment olumbia
University Press p. viii-xiii
What follows is an attempt to reclaim the Enlightenment, with its peculiar tradition of theory and practice. Of course, the twenty-first
century is not the eighteenth: there is clearly no exact symmetry between past and present. The analog it might provide for
engaged intellectuals, no less than its ethical model for resisting oppressive structures of power, needs
reinterpretation to meet new conditions. Rigid notions of progress have fallen by the wayside; no group or party can any longer claim to
incarnate the ideals of humanity, and the intellectual too often identifies the university with the world. mages from television and film rather
than words on the page now shape the public sphere. Liberal regimes have often been corrupted by imperialist ambitions and parasitical
elites. Both the left and the right have championed totalitarianism. The new global expansion of capitalism, the rise of the bureaucratic
state, media consolidation, thoughtless consumerism, disregard for the environment, and cultural relativism have all undermined the ideals
of cosmopolitan tolerance, economic justice, democratic accountability, and the idea of the "good society generally associated with the
Enlightenment. But, if the progressive intellectual can no longer guarantee the realization of reason's
promise, it is still the liberal rule of law with its explicit privileging of civil liberty, the interventionist
state as an agent of social justice, and cosmopolitan movements intent on demanding recognition
of the "other, that serve as the preconditionthe condition sine qua nonfor bettering the lives
of individuals, enabling them to expand the range of their experiences, which is the most basic
meaning of progress. urrent forms of engagement probably seem more pedestrian: perhaps that is
the case. But political engagement is no less important than in earlier times. Universal interests
remain real. t is only that the engaged intellectual can no longer indulge in the old romantic
expectations of "changing the world in one fell swoop. Enlightenment intellectuals may have laced their
political engagement with drama, but they never fell into the trap of demanding all or nothing. To view them as
either utopians or totalitarians is philosophically untenable and historically absurd. They took the
world as it was, and sought to deal with the problems that it presented in a pragmatic and
principled way. But the world has changed. There is no longer an "agent capable of realizing the emancipatory values of the
Enlightenment. Neither "humanity nor the proletariat nor the once colonized peoples can any longer be identified with what Hegel termed
"the world spirit. There is also no longer a "republic of letters. But these changes are, too often, employed as an
excuse for passivity. There is an even more diverse cosmopolitan community of critical
intellectuals and there exists an even greater variety than heretofore of progressive organizations
that dealand often deal positivelywith crucial issues ranging from world hunger to the protection of
individual liberties to animal rights. Specifying an 'agent of change or creating a hierarchy of
causes is neither possible nor necessary. Teleology has fallen by the wayside and realizing freedom lacks any historical
guarantee. The issue is no longer what party or social movement or interest group is joined; rather the issue concerns the initial
decision to engage political reality and the choice of an ethical stance capable of fostering
solidarity between organizations. That, indeed, is where the Enlightenment legacy still has a role to
play. Solidarity should not simply be assumed: the landscape of the left is still littered by ideological turf-wars inherited from the 1960s.
Enlightenment political values are important not only because they contest narrow organizational ambitions that interfere with
cooperative action, but also because they provide a historical and speculative orientation for progressive
activists and intellectuals. That orientation virtually vanished following the fragmentation of the
civil rights and poor peoples movements and the new popularity accorded the variants of
postmodernism andwhat perhaps lies at the root of them allthe "late brand of critical theory associated with Dialectic of
Enlightenment by ax Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. n keeping with the decline of radical political parties, and the identification of
resistance with the expression of subjectivity, the Enlightenment has been subjected to a new metaphysical form of "immanent critique. ts
political legacy has thus become a secondary concern. The preoccupations of the philosophes with social and
institutional reform , and what ax Weber termed the "elective affinity between their values and
progressive agents for change, now seem to receive scant attention. This is all the more unfortunate since
new transnational movements have come into existence, often confused in terms of how they should respond to "globalization, along with
functioning transnational political institutions that still suffer from a deficit of loyalty. New communications technologies are providing new
organizational possibilities for political resistance, expanding the range of available experiences, and opening the way for new
understandings of the most diverse cultures. New forms of solidarity, reflected in the popular concern with
"human rights, have challenged imperialist wars, outdated cultural norms, and authoritarian
politics. The objective conditions for realizing the unrealized hopes associated with
internationalism, liberal democracy, and social justice are already there; only the ideological
willingness to embrace the assumptions underpinning these values is lacking. That is what provides the
Enlightenment with a new salience for our time. Humanity is not in the past, but rather in the making. onservatism may have
set the agenda since the last quarter of the twentieth century. But that does not justify the
resignation and increasingly debilitating pessimism associated with so many current forms of
Georgetown 2011-12

"radical thought. Genuinely progressive changes have occurred: dictators have fallen and more
citizens of the world have been enfranchised; battles for economic justice have been won; racism
and sexism are on the defensive; and there has been poetry good poetryafter Auschwitz. Easy to downplay the
gains, suggest that they have now been "absorbed; and embrace a new version of the old and
tired attitude known as "cultural pessimism. ynicism always comes cheap. The real challenge
lies in recognizing how the "system, which was never as "totally administered as many would
like to think has been changed for the better through social action inspired by the Enlightenment.
The closed society has become more open andagainst the provincial, religious, exploitative, and authoritarian
sources of oppositionit has the potential of becoming more open still. Deciding to enter the fray, however,
becomes more difficult when relying on philosophical perspectives that leave their supporters
wandering about lost in Hegel's night in which all cows are black. t is necessary to distinguish
between traditions not by making reference to metaphysics, but rather by looking at the political
conflicts between actual movements. Again, to be sure, the radical democratic and egalitarian aspects of the Enlightenment
have been betrayed often enough. But this recognition presupposes that there was indeed something to betray. Which promises made by
the Enlightenment have been broken becomes apparent not from the standpoint of "negative dialectics, communitarian convictions,
"pragmatism, or ethical relativism, but rather by taking seriously its universal understanding of liberty and progress. To be sure:
universalism can be found in western imperialist propaganda and notions like "the sun never sets on the British Empire. n reality, however,
such universalism is not universal at all: it lacks reciprocity, an open discourse, and a concern with protecting the individual from the
arbitrary exercise of power: That is what differentiates Enlightenment universalism from its imitators,
provides it with a self-critical quality, and enables it to contest Euro-centrism and the prevalent
belief in a "clash of civilizations. Let there be no mistake: it has no use for misguided tolerance. Refusals to entertain
"western criticisms can easily be used to insulate repressive non-western traditions from criticism
if only because non-western elites can also be authoritarian. Enlightenment political theory
always refuses to justify tradition simply because it exists. ts best representatives argue for tolerance over
prejudice, innovation over stasis, the rights of the minority over the enthusiasms of the majority, and the moral autonomy of the individual
over the revealed claims of religious authority. The radical moment of the Enlightenment lies in its universal
assault on privilege and prejudice. ts reflexive and critical character enables its most distinctive
political theory to call for constraining the arbitrary exercise of institutional power and expand the
possibilities of individual experience in both western and nonwestern societies. Enlightenment intellectuals
provide an analogy for what contemporary intellectuals should strive to accomplish and a model of how to combat oppressive institutions,
unjustifiable privileges, and anachronistic cultural practices. Viewing their political theory as the source of
bureaucratic conformism or totalitarianism is a profound mistake. Their insistence upon
demonstrating a plausiblenot a perfect, but a plausibleconnection between means and ends
with respect to political action and social change was not merely to be directed against the ruling
elites but against those who would resist them. They anticipated how the collapse of this connection
would historically work against the interests of the lowly and the insulted. They sensed that it would turn
individuals into a means for political ends and let them be seen as nothing more than economic "costs of production. Resisting this state of
affairs is the most radical purpose of the two most important political products of the Enlightenment: liberalism and socialism. Both inspired
progressive mass movements and, for good reasons, inspire them still. The point of their intersection has become the intellectual point of
departure for any genuinely progressive politics. dentification with the disenfranchised and the exploited from a cosmopolitan standpoint is
the necessary implication of this position. Such is the legacy of the Enlightenment. aking good on it, however, calls for
privileging the satisfactions and benefits of political interpretation over the esoteric and
metaphysical vagaries of fashionable pseudo-political philosophical currents. f philosophy really has been
an expression of what Novalis termed "transcendental homelessness, which doubt, then perhaps it is time to confront the
philosophical with the political and, finally, for the prodigal to return home.

Georgetown 2011-12

K SPLITS MOVEMENTS

The K coIIapses Ieftist movements - undermines inteIIectuaI coherence, heIping conservatism
Bronner 4
University Press
p. 1-2
n the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, amid the intellectual retrenchment consonant with the unending "war against
terror, the Enlightenment legacy has becomemore than ever before a contested terrain. Human rights is often used as an ideological
excuse for the exercise of arbitrary power; the security of western states has served as a justification for the constriction of personal
freedom; and, with flags flying, hristian fundamentalists have called for the defense of western "values. The best of thempolitical
liberty, social justice, and cosmopolitanism are rooted in the Enlightenment, and they retain
their radical character. But not only the right is distorting them. These values have also come under assault
from important intellectual representatives of the left: anarchists, communitarians, postmodernists, half-
hearted liberals, and authoritarian socialists. ntellectual and political disorientation has been the result.
deas long associated with reactionary movementsthe privileging of experience over reason,
national or ethnic identity over internationalism and cosmopolitanism, the community over the
individual, custom over innovation, myth over sciencehave entered the thinking of the American
left. ts partisans have thus become increasingly unclear about the tradition into which they fit and
the purposes their politics should serve. The collapse of intellectual coherence on the left reflects
the collapse of a purposeful politics from the left. Reconstructing such a politics depends upon appropriating the
Enlightenment to meet new conditions. onservatives have, ironically, been more clear-sighted. n the past, they deplored the "nihilism of
the Enlightenment1: its devastating assault on communal life, religious faith, social privilege, and traditional authority. onservatives, and
those even farther to the right, consistently rejected Enlightenment concerns with individualism, dissent, secularism, reform, and the
primacy of critical reflection. This differentiated them from the left. f many leading conservatives now insist upon the
importance of "reason in chastising radical reformers in the West and the advocates of slam in
the Orient, indeed, their "cultural appropriation truncates the radical spirit of the Enlightenment
and its critical ethos.2 The defense of western civilization by conservative intellectuals is, unsurprisingly, mixed with anti-
Enlightenment and anti-modern prejudices. They obsess about sexual license and the decline of family values, "radical reformers and the
loss of tradition, tolerance for divergent life-styles and the erosion of national identity. Their "west is not the "west of the
Enlightenment. Those conservatives most concerned about the coming "death of the west, in fact, sound like their forefathers who
feared "the age of reason and later the destruction of privileges associated with an obviously white and hristian world.3 Discussion
of the Enlightenment has subsequently become skewed to the right where, instead, it should be
treated as the razor that divides "left and right. The radical moment has dropped out. f there is
any legitimacy to claims concerning the increasing irrelevance of fundamental political distinctions,
indeed, here lies the historical source.

Georgetown 2011-12

AT: MODERNISM = OBSOLETE
We can stiII expIain the worId on the terms of modernism-things Iike the nation-state aren't
obsoIete, they've just become gIobaIized
Jarvis, 2K Prof Philosophy @ U South arolina (Darryl, Studies in nternational Relations, "nternational Relations and the hallenge of
Postmodernism, pg. 59-60)
ost generations are apt to be consumed with their own self-importance and their sense of difference from previous generations. But difference,
transformation, or change does not necessarily equate with new. f we are in a new postmodern era, to
what extent is this merely the consequence of the modernist epoch maturing, growing, and expanding?
The notion of new, often expressed by the prefix post signifying disjuncture and breakage, is specious.
Social processes, economics, politics, and the human condition have not suddenly reinvented themselves
in the space of a few short decades. Rather is the case that they have been subtly altered and affected by
changing scientific innovations, technological progress, and attendant reorientations in knowledge and
understanding. This is the way Anthony Giddens explains the so-called postmodern age, not as a new era but part of the unfolding tapestry of
modernity, where the radicalization and universalization of modernity now make its consequences manifest.29 Processes otherwise
claimed as evidence of a "postmodern condition," then, are more appropriately explained as the
consequences of modernity that, through reflexivity, continually transposes its form, effects, and style.
Thus, for example, the new forms of cultural expressionism that postmodernists claim are a reaction
against the monism of modernist universality are more likely the logical consequence of technological
innovations that make the mass transmission of ideas possible, as with, for example, the explosion of
niche magazines that cater to specific (mass) taste cultures. Likewise, the fragmentation of political
movements and the growth of special interest groups that postmodernists insist represent a new political
sensibility celebrating diversity might also be explained by the increasing spread and acceptance of
liberal ideas that reject absolutism while embracing tolerance. So too, the innovative styles and objectives of literary texts
which have been coterminous with challenges to traditional conceptions of the role and purpose of theory are likely not so much instances of
postmodernist theory as they are a reflection of the depreciation of Western literary influences through greater cross-culturalism due to global
advances in literacy, communications, and travel. Likewise, the advent of hyperconsumerism that postmodernists claim is a result of the "simulacra"
and the fixation with image and style is more obviously caused by materialist saturation, mass consumption, and mass marketing techniques, and
fabricated by the availability of the mass electronic and print medias. And far from the nation-state withering away in an era of
globalization, it is more likely the case that we are witnessing the universaliza-tion of capitalism and of a
liberal trade regime just as the nation-state too has become universalized as the preferred medium of
territorial-sociopolitical organization. This is not "radical disjuncture" from previous historical experience,
but the triumph of that experience on a global scale. The fact that Japanese wear Levi jeans while attending baseball games in
Tokyo, or that the hinese sample Big acs in Beijing, or that a New Yorker can communicate via the internet with a South African in real time is more
accurately explained by the spread of modernity, technology, and, perhaps, the Americanization of global cultural taste preferences than it is by
declarations of new epochs, new cultures, and new worlds. n other words, talk of a postmodern age is merely talk of the
consequences of modernity, particularly developments in its constituent parts, namely liberal democracy,
industrialism, capitalism, technology, and science. What postmodernists mistake as new cultural forms or
as new modes of production are really consequences of old and well-established modernist practices: a
case of old wine in new bottles.

Georgetown 2011-12

AT: K OF EXPERTS

Rejection of expertise and training as "eIitism" risks extinction
Sam H,rris, Newsweek 9-20-0S http://www.newsweek.com/id/160080/page/1
TIe prospecLs oI u PuIIn udmInIsLruLIon ure Iur more IrIgILenIng, In IucL, LIun LIose oI u PuIIn nsLILuLe Ior PedIuLrIc Neurosurgery. Ask yourseII: Iow
Ius eIILIsm become u bud word In AmerIcun poIILIcs? TIere Is sImpIy no oLIer wuIk oI IIIe In wIIcI
exLruordInury LuIenL und rigoroos tr,ining ,re denigr,ted. We wunL eIILe pIIoLs Lo IIy our
pIunes, eIILe Lroops Lo underLuke our mosL crILIcuI mIssIons, eIILe uLIIeLes Lo represenL us In
compeLILIon und eIILe scIenLIsLs Lo devoLe LIe mosL producLIve yeurs oI LIeIr IIves Lo curIng our
dIseuses. And yeL, wIen IL comes LIme Lo vesL peopIe wILI even greuLer responsIbIIILIes, we
consIder IL u vIrLue Lo sIun uny und uII sLundurds oI exceIIence. WIen IL comes Lo cIoosIng LIe
peopIe wIose LIougILs und ucLIons wIII decIde LIe I,tes oI 2illions, LIen we suddenIy wunL
someone jusL IIke us, someone IIL Lo Iuve u beer wILI, someone down-Lo-eurLI-In IucL, uImosL unyone, provIded LIuL Ie or
sIe doesn'L seem Loo InLeIIIgenL or weII educuLed. beIIeve LIuL wILI LIe nomInuLIon oI SuruI PuIIn Ior LIe vIce presIdency, LIe
sIIIIness oI our poIILIcs Ius IInuIIy pot oor n,tion ,t risk. TIe worId Is growIng more
compIex-und dungerous-wILI eucI pussIng Iour, und our posILIon wILIIn IL growIng more
prec,rioos. SIouId sIe become presIdenL, PuIIn seems cupubIe oI enucLIng poIIcIes so deLucIed Irom LIe common InLeresLs oI IumunILy, und
Irom empIrIcuI reuIILy, us Lo unILe LIe enLIre worId uguInsL us. WIen usked wIy sIe Is quuIIIIed Lo sIouIder more responsIbIIILy LIun uny person Ius IeId
In Iumun IIsLory, PuIIn cILes Ier reIusuI Lo IesILuLe. ou cun'L bIInk, sIe LoId GIbson repeuLedIy, us LIougI LIIs were u prImordIuI LruLI oI wIse
governunce. eL us Iope LIuL u PresIdenL PuIIn wouId bIInk, uguIn und uguIn, wIIIe 2ore thooghtIol people decide
the I,te oI ci;iliz,tion.

Rejecting expertism means you vote for PaIin- this aIIows conservative, reactionary, uneducated
masses to takeover democracy and swamp reason
Murk ill, Is u proIessor oI IumunILIes uL CoIumbIu UnIversILy und u Iormer edILor oI LIe PubIIc nLeresL.WSJ 11-8-oS
ILLp:JJsec.onIIne.wsj.comJurLIcIeJSB1zz61o8ooq81ozq.ILmI?mod=urLIcIe-ouLseL-box
TIe dIe wus cusL. ver LIe nexL z yeurs LIere grew up u new generuLIon oI conservuLIve wrILers wIo cuILIvuLed
none oI LIeIr eIders' InLeIIecLuuI vIrLues -- Indeed, wIo suw LIemseIves us coonter-
intellecto,ls. MosL ure weII-educuLed und muny Iuve uLLended vy eugue unIversILIes; In IucL, one oI LIe musLermInds oI
LIe PuIIn nomInuLIon wus once u Hurvurd proIessor. BuL LIeIr IuncLIon wILIIn LIe conservuLIve movemenL Is no
Ionger Lo educuLe und ennobIe u popuIIsL poIILIcuI Lendency, IL Is Lo deIend LIuL Lendency uguInsL LIe supposedIy
monoIILIIc und unIIormIy hostile edoc,ted cl,sses. TIey mock LIe udvIce oI NobeI PrIze-
wInnIng economIsLs und pruIse LIe IInuncIuI ucumen oI pIumbers und buIIders. TIey rIdIcuIe
umbussudors und dIpIomuLs wIIIe promoLIng ingoistic journuIIsLs wIo Iuve never IIved
ubroud und speuk no IoreIgn Iunguuges. And wILI LIe rIse oI sIock rudIo und LeIevIsIon, LIey Iuve Iound u Iurge,
popuIur uudIence LIuL eugerIy ubsorbs LIeIr conte2pt Ior intellecto,l elites. TIey Ioped Lo
sIupe LIuL uudIence, buL LIe LruLI Is LIuL LIeIr ,odience h,s now sh,ped the2. Buck In LIe ';os,
conservuLIve InLeIIecLuuIs Ioved Lo LuIk ubouL rudIcuI cIIc, LIe weII-known Lendency oI
educuLed, oILen weuILIy IIberuIs Lo projecL LIeIr poIILIcuI IunLusIes onLo bruLuI revoIuLIonurIes und
sLreeL LIugs, und romunLIcIze LIeIr sLruggIes. BuL popolist chic" is ost the in;ersion oI
"r,dic,l chic," ,nd is no less ,bsord, co2ic,l or o2inoos. TrudILIonuI conservuLIves
were uIwuys suspIcIous oI popuIIsm, und LIey were rIgIL Lo be. TIey suw eIILes us u IucL oI
poIILIcuI IIIe, even oI democruLIc IIIe. WIuL muLLers In democrucy Is LIuL LIose eIILes ucquIre LIeIr
posILIons LIrougI t,lent ,nd experience, ,nd th,t they be edoc,ted to ser;e the poblic
good. BuL it ,lso 2,tters th,t they own op to their elite st,tos ,nd deIend the need Ior
elites. They 2ost be Iriends oI de2ocr,cy while protecting it, ,nd the2sel;es,
Iro2 the le;eling ,nd ;olg,riz,tion ,ll de2ocr,cy tends tow,rd. WrILIng recenLIy In LIe New ork
TImes, DuvId Brooks noLed correcLIy (II beIuLedIy) LIuL conservuLIves' dIsduIn Ior IIberuI InLeIIecLuuIs Iud sIIpped
InLo dIsduIn Ior LIe educuLed cIuss us u wIoIe, und worrIed LIuL LIe RepubIIcun PurLy wus uIIenuLIng educuLed voLers.
couIdn'L cure Iess ubouL LIe IuLure oI LIe RepubIIcun PurLy, buL do cure ubouL LIe qo,lity oI
politic,l thinking ,nd odg2ent in the coontry ,s , whole. TIere wus u LIme wIen conservuLIve
InLeIIecLuuIs ruIsed LIe IeveI oI AmerIcun pubIIc debuLe und IeIped Lo keep IL sober. TIose duys ure gone. As Ior poIILIcuI judgmenL, LIe promoLIon oI
SuruI PuIIn us u possIbIe worId Ieuder speuks Ior ILseII. TIe RepubIIcun PurLy und LIe poIILIcuI rIgIL wIII survIve, buL LIe conservuLIve InLeIIecLuuI
LrudILIon Is uIreudy deud. And uII oI us, even IIberuIs IIke myseII, ure poorer Ior IL.

Georgetown 2011-12

AT: K OF EXPERTS

Experts necessary for change - even if their Ianguage can be obscure
Bronner 4
Press p. 77-78
But praise for the amateur also has its limits. To ignore the need for critical disciplinary intellectuals with
various forms of scientific expertise is to abdicate responsibility for a host of issues involving knowledge
of fields ranging from physics and genetics to electronics and even environmentalism. There is surely an
overabundance of jargon and mystification and, as has been mentioned before, the need exists for a new sensitivity
to the vernacular. 39 But it is also the case that complex issues sometimes require complex language and,
often for good reasons, fields generate their own vocabularies. A judgment is undoubtedly necessary with
respect to whether the language employed in a work is necessary for illuminating the issue under
investigation: that judgment, however, can never be made in advance. There must be a place for the
technocrat with a political conscience as surely as for the humanist with a particular specialty. The battle
against oppression requires a multi-frontal strategy. Best to consider the words of Primo Levi who understands the critical intellectual as a
"person educated beyond his daily trade, whose culture is alive insofar as it makes an effort to renew itself, and keep up to date, and who does not
react with indifference or irritation when confronted by any branch of knowledge, even though, obviously, he
cannot cultivate all of them.40

Georgetown 2011-12

POSITIVISM GOOD

Truth cIaims must come from empiricism
Houghton, '08 Prof. Poli Sci @ U of entral Florida (David, nternational Politics Vol. 45 pg. 115-128, pg. 116-117, " Positivism 'vs'
Postmodernism: Does Epistemology ake a Difference?, Pro Quest)
ertainly, postpositivist epistemologies 'license' the analysis of topics, which mainstream positivist scholars
have tended to ignore or otherwise neglect as Smith argues, epistemology may beget ontology in this sensebut it is not
clear whether postpositivists cover a broad range of topics because their epistemology allows them to, or
choose a licensing epistemology because it matches their preexisting ontological commitments. The direction
of the causal arrows is not clear, and as Smith concedes, the relationship appears to work in both directions. This essay takes issue with
the position that epistemology matters in such a fundamental way. The reasoning offered is as follows: it is not clear
whether there exists any real alternative to the kind of 'observation' beloved by positivists, denigrated by
postpositivists, but engaged in by both. While doing empirical work does not make one an empiricist in the philosophical sense of that
term, it is far from clear that the epistemological position one adopts has much effect on the kind of truth
claims one makes. The adoption of postpositivist epistemologies has not meant that 'anything goes' in the
new postpositivist scholarship; every example in the growing body of that literature, which illustrates (or is intended to illustrate) a
theoretical point is drawn from experience and observation, and is surely 'empirical' in nature. This raises
the question of whether it is possible to be genuinely postpositivist at all. argue here that ultimately it is
not, for observations cannot be plucked out of thin air; one's truth claims about the world have to come
from somewhere.

Postmodernists inevitabIy support their schoIarship with empirics
Houghton, '08 Prof. Poli Sci @ U of entral Florida (David, nternational Politics Vol. 45 pg. 115-128, pg. 118, " Positivism 'vs'
Nevertheless, it is surely beyond dispute that positivists can be said to 'buy into' the first three propositions to some degree. ainstream R
theorists are all essentially positivists, because all agree that while analysts look at the world in ways
that are partly subjective some basic features of the world can be shown more or less 'objectively' to
be a certain way (although they do of course disagree on what the objective realities are). Postmodernism, on the other hand, argues
at its root that reality is socially constructed and subjective. This, postmodernists suppose, fundamentally
undermines established theories of R. f there is no objective international reality out there to understand,
then our theories are in effect created by our values and beliefs and are nothing more than the reflections
of ourselves and our own minds. There is, and can be, no privileged or objective standpoint that one can
use to make sense of reality, and the analyst is effectively attempting to play God when he or she lays
claim to such a standpoint. Postmodernism is often attacked as a 'French fad' or dismissed as the product of 'Parisian intellectual fashions'
(Wallace, 1996; Navon, 2001), while others have regarded it as a genuine threat to serious thinking about R (Jarvis, 2000). ertainly, dialogue
between the two camps has been hindered by the failure of each camp to accept the core assumptions and comprehend the language used by the
other. This has led to a widespread failure within mainstream circles to take postmodernist approaches seriously. However, would argue that the
approaches taken by scholars such as James Der Derian, David ampbell, Richard Ashley and R.B.J. Walker at least deserve to be assessed on their
own merits. Rather than add to chorus of criticism here, shall question whether the debate between postmodernists and positivists ultimately 'matters'
in the sense of having a material impact upon the kind of empirical claims that each group of scholars makes. n short, conclude that it does not
matter in this sense, in part because postmodernist work as it currently exists is not genuinely
'postpositivist' in its practical application. Put differently, there exist if not contradictions then strains
and inconsistencies in the work of some major postmodernists, which render the claims they make for
their empirical research more or less indistinguishable in kind from those made by positivists.

Georgetown 2011-12

POSITIVISM GOOD

Empiricists don't think that their schoIarship is objective truth
The foregoing is certainly a tenable position to adopt in a philosophical sense: there is no inherent contradiction between
asserting that we can never know how the world is and then tentatively offering us one's own highly
subjective vision of it, although the analyst's position as a legitimate commentator on the world is
weakened by conceding the former. However, my argument is simply this: it does not materially change an argument
to make it 'tentatively' and confess that one has some degree of personal doubt about it. ost if not all
mainstream theorists would also readily concede that although they think their world views are better
supported than those associated with rival approaches, they cannot definitively prove that they are correct
in a scientific sense. n stressing the uncertainty of our perceptions of the social world, postmodernists do
not depart from the views of mainstream scholars such as Gary King, Keohane and Sidney Verba, who readily concede this point
in their widely-read book Designing Social Enquiry (King et al., 1994). To this one could counter that postmodernists are more
likely and willing to admit to the contingency of their views than are most contemporary positivists.
Perhaps this is true, but being so willing does not change the nature of those views, and it is therefore
questionable what difference 'tentativeness' and 'humility' really makes. Deep down, most academics
who believe in their theories truly believe them, whether they call themselves postmodernist,
postpositivist, positivist or something else. For example, to return to Ashley and Walker's quote, does it really make a difference to
the content of an argument to be 'respectful of the uncertainties of life'? And is it always true to say that postmodernists are
more humble before knowledge than positivists? n answer to the latter, it is not always clear that postmodernists like Der Derian
actually do express themselves in such a way or feel any less committed to their own personal visions of the world. Reading Anti-diplomacy,
for instance, the author sounds just as convinced by the 'truth' of his vision as, say, Waltz does in Theory
of nternational Politics or Keohane and Nye do in Power and nterdependence. And one wonders what the
difference is between Ashley and Walker's claim that practices of power 'visibly labour' to fixmeani ngs and Waltz's conviction that bipolar systems are
more stable than multipolar ones when one considers each proposition as a truth claim.

Recognition of subjectivity does not aIter the substance of an argument-aII engage in empiricaI
research
t would be wrong to claim that all postmodernists are nothing more than positivists in disguise; they begin from different
philosophical assumptions and study phenomena in which mainstream theorists have usually expressed
only a fleeting interest. But as soon as one begins to make statements about how the world is, or how we
think it is, we are engaging in an empirical (if not empiricist) exercise and making claims that are
effectively identical in kind (though not usually in substance) to those made by mainstream scholars. What
we can say is that postmodernists sometimes make their empirical and epistemological claims with more
recognition of their subjectivity and contingency, or aspire to do this. But even if one concedes the
argument that postmodernists 'believe in' their arguments less strongly than do positivists, it is rather
questionable what difference this makes. Were Robert Keohane to declare himself a postmodernist
tomorrow and hedge his arguments about the significance of international institutions around with great
tentativity and reservations, would he not be making the same substantive argument? Or supposing that
James Der Derian became a positivist overnight and asserted that his claims about the significance of
simulation in world politics can be demonstrated more or less objectively, would this alter their content?
Even if these two miracle counterfactuals were in fact to come to fruition, there is good reason to doubt whether the substantive
theoretical debate between different paradigms would be altered in any significant way.

Georgetown 2011-12

FRONTIER K SLAYER

AstrosocioIogy's unique perspective deconstructs imperiaIist thoughts of
"ordering space" - we are Iink turning the criticism and supercharging the perm
Keenan, 8
[William, Prof. of Sociology @ Nottingham Trent University, "Review of osmic $ociety: Towards a
$ociology of the Universe, found on Sociological Research Online,
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/5/reviews/keenan.html, NKN]

AstrosocioIogy (Pass 2004; Omrod 2005) takes us on an expeditionary voyage of cosmic discovery
that carries the potentiaI payoff of gIobaI recovery by getting us to see in true perspective our
human fraiIty and vuInerabiIity, on the one side, and our terrifying overkill capacity, on the other side.
As a veritable 21st century traveller's tale, this is a book designed to enthral and excite those who cling on
to the pioneer sociologists' hopes of 'salvation through social science'. This 'socioIogy of the universe' -
eschewing hubris, defiantly committed to a soaring, searing, far-seeing sociological ambition to tell it like
it is and how it might become - breaks out of the confines of the urban-industriaI heritage of the
discipIine and reaches for the skies, literally and figuratively, where new worlds are being staked out,
designed and part-built for future colonisation. LittIe wonder that 'imperiaIism' occupies one of the
most packed items in the detaiIed index. ndeed, in his hortatory front page remarks, Bryan Turner
commenting on 'the modern period of cosmic colonialism', ('cosmic imperiaIism' is the author's own
expression, p. 179), refers to Dickens and Omrod as 'as it were, the Marx and EngeIs of the poIiticaI
economy of space and consequently their publication is the Grundrisse of the mode of space
production'. With Cosmic SocioIogy we Ieave behind the trusty methodoIogicaI anchors and
reIiabIe 'first, second, third, fourth worlds' signposts of the founding parents to fIoat in the
unchartered virtuaI spheres of cyber-space in search of post-socioIogicaI bearings.
Georgetown 2011-12

SPECIFIC PERM CARD

An interdiscipIinary approach is needed - prefer the specificity of our evidence
LaIIement, 05
[R. , June 05, SS Scientific Report, "The Need for nterdisciplinarity", http://www.issibern.ch/PDF-
Files/SR-003.pdf]

An ever-increasing number of scientific fieIds are using the opportunities offered by space fIight
that began with sounding rockets in the middIe of the 20th century and were quickly followed by the
historic launch of Sputnik. Since then, measurements in space and observations from space have
assumed an essentiaI roIe in SoIar System research, astronomy and cosmoIogy, and in the earth
sciences. Indeed, today space research is indispensabIe for a muItitude of scientific fieIds. But
that is not enough. To cope with the growing compIexity of scientific probIems that are now being
studied with the vastIy improved sensitivity and resoIving power of space-borne instruments, an
interdiscipIinary approach is required. Such an approach can aIso provide us with earIy warnings
of the undesirabIe side effects that go aIong with every rapidIy evoIving technoIogy. All of these
considerations were the guiding motivation in creating SS. n the brochure issued in 1994 by the
Association Pro-SS one reads

Georgetown 2011-12

SPECIFIC PERM CARD

InterdiscipIinary approach proven to work - ISSI
LaIIement, 05
[R. , June 05, SS Scientific Report, "The Need for nterdisciplinarity", http://www.issibern.ch/PDF-
Files/SR-003.pdf)
"InterdiscipIinarity" is often invoked, but not as often impIemented. There are practicaI reasons for
this and, for space research, they are probabIy mostIy the resuIt of the invoIvements of the space
scientists in projects that continue from one to the next. ISSI's activities are, as a ruIe, not reIated
to specific space projects, and this has aIIowed for true interdiscipIinarity. I wiII try to show here
that ISSI has done more than organize sequences of activities in different scientific fieIds, which
wouId be muIti-discipIinarity. ISSI has been a pIace where distinct scientific communities Iearn
from each other. t has thus been a true interdisciplinarity institution. Good examples of interdisciplinarity
"at work at SS that have witnessed were the first workshop held in 1995, and one of the recent
working teams, which met in autumn 2004. These examples illustrate that throughout the first 10 years
SS has initiated and maintained interdisciplinary curiosity.

Georgetown 2011-12

AT: N&MBING/FEAR GOOD

Fear appeaIs coupIed with poIicy proposaIs overcome numbing and motivate
action to soIve the threat-perm do both
White '86
[Ralph, Emeritus Prof. Social Psych. George Washington U., in "Psychology and the Prevention of
Nuclear War, Ed. White, p. 558-561]
4. Psychic numbing and the need for clearness about preventive action. Five chapters, two at the beginning and three at the end, bring out this theme. n hapter 1, Lifton and
Falk give striking examples of how "psychic numbing" works. They broaden out the concept by stating, "What * am calling psychic numbing
includes a number of classical psychoanalytic defense mechanisms: repression, suppression, isolation,
denial, undoing, reaction formation, and projection, among others. [A follower of Harry Stack Sullivan might add "selective inattention," a term about as broad as "psychic
numbing" itself.] But the defense mechanisms overlap greatly around the issue of feeling and not feeling. With that issue so central to our time, we do well to devote to it a single
overall category" (p. 12). Lifton describes also how his own anxiety and surprising reluctance to begin systematic study of the survivors of Hiroshima "seemed to recede as
found myself listening carefully during the interviews for psychological patterns in survivors' descriptions. n other words, had begun to carry out my professional task, with the
aid of the selective professional numbing have mentioned in connection with surgeons" (p. 14). The cure, it seems, was invoIvement in a cIear
and meaningfuI course of action reIated to the source of anxiety. ack and Snow bring in the same theme when they
describe the reactions of children and adolescents to the nuclear threat as more direct and honest than the reactions of most adults. The adults presumably have built up
psychological defenses against candid recognition of the nuclear horror. The children, meanwhile, "having their whole lives to live and beffig less emotionally defended,
penetrate with their words the barriers to feeling we have erected in relation to the nuclear threat" (p. 17). But action helps. "Some teenagers advocate
specific actions, such as thinking actively about the nuclear threat, giving speeches, marching, and
demonstrating. Those that recommend such actions seem to be more hopeful" (p. 25). Section X, "hanging War-
Related Attitudes," addresses somewhat indirectly a very practical question: ShouId the antinucIear movement continue to
emphasize fear appeaIs such as those in Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth and in films such as The Day After
(1984)? Or, for those whose reaction to them is some form of psychic numbing, have they become counterproductive? The classic, path breaking
experiment of Janis and Feshbach (1953) first raised doubts about the effectiveness of strong fear appeals. n keeping with much clinical evidence of resistance to painful
thoughts, it had the surprising result that strong fear appeals seemed to change behavior less than weaker fear appeals did. n this volume Feshbach briefly
reviews some later studies. The majority of them, such as that of Ronald Rogers and . Ronald ewborn (hapter 31) have not
shown that strong fear appeals are counterproductive; and some of them, in some experimental conditions, have
indicated that strong fear appeaIs are a good deaI more effective than are weak ones. y inference from
these findings, and more directly from the experiment of ohen (1957), is that the antinucIear movement wouId be wise to continue
occasionaI strong fear appeaIs, as a reminder and a revitaIizer of motivation, with one essential proviso: that each
strong fear appeal should be followed by discussion of preventive actions and of reasons why some preventive actions are likely to be effective. As we have seen, the chapter
by Yankelovich and Doble provides strong factual backing for hope that intelligent remedial actions, which take into account the new characteristics of American public opinion,
are likely to be effective, most notably on the no-first-use issue. hapter 31, by Rogers and ewborn, gives strong support to our proposed proviso. t and other evidence shows
that the clearness of paths of escape from danger is unquestionably more important in determining the effectiveness of a fear appeal than is the strength or weakness of that
appeal. hapter 33, "New Ways of Teaching for the Nuclear Age," by Alexander and Wagner, brings out a similar theme. t stresses the need for hope, and for confidence in
one's own ability to take constructive action, as major goals of peace education in the schools. "Educators are learning that nuclear education
must do more than provide information about nuclear weapons; it must also enable young people to
develop a realistic sense of hope and responsibility for the future" (p. 538). "A more collaborative approach to understanding the
central problems of our time sparks students' belief in the possibility of creating change.. .. Students are encouraged to develop action-oriented projects of their choicefor
instance, to survey their classmates about problems of racism or to write a letter to the editor for or against the X" (p. 539). Similarly, though more briefly, Kimmel, in his
introduction to Section X, "Peace Education," ends with this sentence: "The challenge is to translate our knowledge into educational programs and activities that students can
understand and use" (p. 537; italics added). And, in hapter 34, Boulding stresses the need for children to develop resourcefulness and confidence in knowing or discovering
what to do. "As looked at different studies of violence and aggression in children's behavior, it became very clear that the more experience children have in different ways of
doing things, the more they've been encouraged to think, the more answers they're able to pull out of their own minds in a crisis. But the child who has very few ideas about
what to do next sulks,, strikes out, hits. The same is true of an adult. The more resources you develop, the more answers you find. t's the richness and compassion of the life
experience in dealing with others that keeps you from hitting out" (p. 542).

Georgetown 2011-12

INSTIT&TIONALIZED ETHICS GOOD

InstitutionaIization of our ethics is vitaI. OnIy the state can reconciIe our
obIigations of preventing extinction with our other obIigations

Fagana '9
[adeleine, PhD andidate in nt'l Pol. Dept. Aberystwyth U., ontemporary Political Theory, "The
nseperability of Ethics and Politics: Rethinking the Third in Emmanuel Levinas, 8,
doi:10.1057/cpt.2008.20]

However, we can never live up to what the Other demands of us. We can never fulfil our responsibilities, never be assured that we have taken the responsible course of action,
'done the right thing'. The demands of the Other upon us are already infinite, because we are charged even with their responsibilities to
Others, and we are always confronted also with our infinite responsibilities to the Third. f the face-to-face, my complete
responsibility to the Other, is necessarily a one-on-one situation, the presence of a Third immediately moves relations into a different realm, for in absolute responsibility to the
first person betray my duty to the second, and so on. The Third for Levinas creates a problem for the idea of infinite responsibility in
the face-to-face relation: 'responsibility for the Other [...] is troubled and becomes a problem when a third party enters' (2004, p. 157). f the Third is immediate, this
problematization of responsibility is immediate. What this shift in focus does is to emphasize the way in which we are always obligated to one Other and to all the other Others,
the generality, rules, institutions and norms. These demands are, necessarily, incompatible, because responding to the one Other via duty, rules or law is immediately to do
violence to their alterity by approaching them as an instance of a type and to deny the immediacy of the face and its demands. This is, emphatically, not to say that the general,
universal, rules, norms, law and so on have no place in Levinas's thought. Nor are they in any way secondary. What is key about Levinas's approach is the interpenetration of
the general and the particular he is concerned with 'Totality and nfinity' [emphasis added] rather than a hierarchy or choice between the two terms, as suggested by Dooley
(2001, p. 43). The Third means that our obligations are not clear; we can never fulfil them because the infinite responsibility we
have to the Other and to the Third are necessarily completely incompatible because of the excessive
nature of these responsibilities. We are, then, always irresponsible in any attempt to be responsible. The difficulty arises in the fact that there is always more
than one Other or that the Other is not a unitary self-identical subject, which means that any taking up of responsibility in response to one Other is necessarily a dereliction of
duty with regard to another Other. t is also, by extension, a dereliction of duty to the generality of rules and norms which would adjudicate between the claims of the Other and
the other Others. We are in this sense always turning away from the face of the Other, sacrificing them and reneging on our responsibility to them, in part because what is
demanded of us is infinite and excessive but also because the demand itself and the structure of the way that demands are relayed to us are always impossible because the
Third is already there, in the demand, in the face of the Other. And, importantly, this impossibility is not a limit, weakness, or oversight in Levinas's work. t is the very fact that
the call of the Other does not determine a particular response and that it is always in competition with the incompatible calls of other Others and provides no way of adjudicating
between these demands that means that the possibility of responsibility, rather than the violence of an obsession with the one Other, or a clear knowledge of what we should do,
is maintained. Further, Levinas's approach of aligning responsibility with the choice to respond to the Other as face rather than in a totalizing way means that even in some
hypothetical face-to-face relationship without the Third, 'being responsible' would not be possible. n a face-to-face without the Third there would be no possibility of decision and
as such no possibility of responsibility. t is the possibility of the approach of proceeding from universality, entering into a totalizing relation with the Other that conditions the
possibility of the response not being pre-determined; we could approach the face as face or we could approach it in a totalizing way. This possibility of there being a decision
only happens when the Third enters (otherwise we would be completely commanded and our response determined by the face of the one Other), so the element of choice that
Levinas seems to see as necessary for responsibility, or goodness, is only possible with the Third; it would not be possible to be responsible in this sense in the face-to-face. n
the face-to-face we would know what to do, our obligations would be clear. But the Third is always already there in the face, our obligations are never clear, and rather than
making responsibility impossible it is this which conditions its possibility. Responsibility (in terms of a responsible response rather than in terms of obligation) as a concept only
makes sense with an appreciation of the Third in Levinas's work. t is the Third which conditions the possibility of responding in some un-predetermined way, of responding
responsibly, but the Third simultaneously makes this responsibility impossible because there is no response which could meet my responsibilities to both the Other and the
Third. t is in this sense that Levinas must be seen as confronting an aporia of responsibility and in this sense that he does not attempt to offer a way out of the aporia, not
because of a failure of his theorizing at this point, but through an acknowledgement that it is the aporia itself, and perhaps its foregrounding and recognition, which conditions
the possibility of responsibility. As such, the idea of Levinas's face-to-face relation as providing the horizon or grounding for thinking about responsibility and politics becomes
problematic. Problematizing Ethics and Politics: The Ethico-Political This interpenetration of the responsible and the irresponsible in the figure of the Third is mirrored in
Levinas's discussion of ethics and politics. Levinas is sometimes read as calling for a critique or disruption of the political in the name of the ethical (ritchley, 1992, p. 223;
Simmons, 1999, p. 98; ritchley, 2004, p. 182; Thomson, 2005, p. 101). Similarly, the idea of the passage or movement from ethics to knowledge, the Other to the Third and so
on characterizes much of the debate regarding Levinas's political utility (ritchley, 1992, p. xiv; Simmons, 1999, p. 96). However, this approach relies on a distinction, both
categorical and temporal, between these realms, which do not think is to be found in much of Levinas's work. His understanding of ethics and politics, charity and justice is,
argue, more complex than this separation suggests and can be more usefully characterized by the idea of the ethico-political. Levinas's approach to
politics concerns the need to create institutions, rules, universalizable and generalizable structures as
required by the Third. t also encompasses a more traditional, concrete understanding of politics,
addressing issues such as the state and democracy, although these issues arise out of the same concerns. It is justice that
demands institutionaIization and poIitics for Levinas. He is definite about the requirement for justice, which for him is in the realm of
the general, abstract and universalizable: 'Justice is necessary, that is, comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order, thematisation, the visibility of faces'
(Levinas, 2004, p. 157). Justice is, he argues, the only way to regulate relations with other Others, the mechanism by which the claims
of Others are compared and judged. Justice, as calculation and legislation, plays an important role: 'against the
persecution which targets Others and especially those close by, one has to have recourse to justice' (Levinas
and Robbins, 2001, p. 100). Justice is necessary because of the Third, immediately present in the face of the Other. n approaching the Other, 'A third party is also
approached; and the relationship between the neighbour and the third party cannot be indifferent to me when approach. There must be a justice among noncomparable ones'
(Levinas, 2004, p. 16). The demand for responsibility to the Third, and in this to a multiplicity of Others, requires that what may seem initially a commitment to infinite
responsibility to one Other is in fact in Levinas's work an argument that there must be a comparison between incomparables. t is this comparison and
calculation, in the form of justice, that makes charity or responsibility possible among many Others: 'justice and
the just state constitute the forum enabling the existence of charity within the human multiplicity' (Levinas and Robbins, 2001, p. 230). However, it is also this calculation and
comparison which threatens this possibility, if separated from a continued concern with the infinite responsibility of the face-to-face (as discussed below). Levinas's
introduction of the Third then requires a consideration of justice, which demands politics. The Third means
that justice and comparison are required, in the name of infinite responsibility, and it is the state which
institutionalizes this necessity for Levinas and Robbins (2001, p. 66); 'This muItipIicity of human beings
must be organised, caIcuIated. I can cede my responsibiIity within a society organised in a State,
in justice'. The state is not put forward as purely positive or negative, as ethical or unethical (although these categories are themselves problematic in this context). The
Third both extends and limits our responsibility and this very difficulty is reflected in the state and in institutions. t is, for Levinas and Robbins (2001, p. 67), 'necessary
in order to make comparisons, judge, have institutions and juridical procedures, which are necessary'.
However, as well as being necessary, the state is unavoidably violent, as all limits to infinite responsibility to one singular Other are violent: 'You find [...] the necessity of the
state. Violence, of course, in relation to the charity rendered necessary precisely by the charity inspired by the face of the neighbour' (Levinas and Robbins, 2001, p. 67). The
Georgetown 2011-12

state both supplements and denies the 'work of interpersonal responsibility' (Levinas and Robbins, 2001, p. 67). As such, the state or institutionalization are not necessarily a
corruption of some ethical relationship which needs to be interrupted in the name of that relationship; the relationship between ethics, charity and politics or justice is more
complex than this. Levinas is however concerned with an approach which separates politics and justice out from concerns of charity. Although charity for Levinas and Robbins
(2001, p. 181) is impossible without justice and the state, justice is 'warped' without charity. t is in this sense that Levinas criticizes the state and justice, as problematic when
approached as sufficient in, or legitimized by, themselves. Again, this is a reflection of the aporia of the ethico-political relation, the insufficiency of either the face-to-face or the
relation to the Third to the demands of responsibility. Justice, taken by itseIf, inseparabIe from formaIized and sedimented
institutions or the 'pure' poIitics criticized above 'risks causing us to misrecognise the face of the
other man' (Levinas and Robbins, 2001, p. 223). The judgement required by justice is, for Levinas and Robbins (2001, p. 115), violent, in
that it transforms faces into "[O]bjective and plastic forms, into figures which are visible but defaced, the
appearing of men, of individuals, who are unique but restituted to their genera. With intentions to scrutinise and acts to
remember." t is in response to this (unavoidable) violence that Levinas argues that 'love must always watch over justice', in order to provide a foil to its possible totalizing
tendencies, to negotiate the violence done in its name (although in the name of another violence aimed at the Third) (Levinas and Robbins, 2001, p. 169). Justice is for Levinas
an impossible concept, precisely because of its position with regard to the competing demands of the Other and the Third. Justice, Levinas argues, 'remains justice only in a
society where there is no distinction between those close and those far off, but in which there remains the impossibility of passing by the closest' (2004, p. 159). Justice is then
in a sense the very impossibility at the heart of the ethico-political relation whereby we are under obligation both to the immediate absolute demand of the Other and to the
generality, rules and norms which adjudicate between Others. The complexity of the relationship between justice and charity is what complicates Levinas's approach to politics
and the state. Levinas does not see all politics as totalizing, as inimical to a concern with the ethical. What, argue,
Levinas is concerned to emphasize is the danger in some kind of idea of pure politics, of generalization, univeralization, a concern only with the Third in an abstract sense:
'Politics left to itself bears a tyranny within itself; it deforms the and the Other who have given rise to it, for it judges them according to universal rules, and thus as in absentia'
(Levinas, 2005, p. 300). For him, this approach does not make sense, in the same way that a 'pure' ethics does not. Politics is always already about a negotiation between the
Other and the Third, always already the ethico-political. Levinas contrasts the liberal state with a totalizing state arguing that
one leaves space for charity and the interpersonal where the other attempts to bring everything within
'pure' politics or institutionalization. Although Levinas's commitment to the liberal state is problematic, even (or especially) on his own terms, this question
of the relative merits of various types of state is not central to this stage of the argument being made here.1 Levinas's work on the liberal state is relevant in this context because
of the way he uses it to highlight the importance of charity within justice, in contrast to the totalitarian state which he sees as an attempt at closing down this dimension of charity
and the interpersonal but which, importantly, always fails in this task. His discussion of the totalizing state also acts to illustrate his concern with the fragility of charity in the face
of totalizing 'pure' justice and politics. Whether Levinas is correct in his approach to various forms of state does not impact on the conclusions regarding the relationship
between justice and charity in his work. Levinas suggests that the liberal state recognizes, at least to an extent, the
impossibility of the concept of 'pure' politics. Because the state is an institutionalization of the aporetic
ethico-political interpersonal relationship it contains within itself contradictory elements, and so an
openness: space for the personal and the institutional and an acknowledgement of the singular and
particular as that which demands the universal and general and the liberal state recognizes this. For Levinas and
Robbins (2001, p. 69) there is 'an appeaI to mercy behind justice' in the IiberaI state, an acknowIedgement
of the duty we have to the Other at the same time as our duties to the Third and the generaIity,
that is, to justice. The state is viewed not as a result of some 'war of all against all', a limitation of violence, but rather as a tool to control and limit our excessive
responsibilities (Levinas, 1985, p. 80). A state which recognizes this has the possibility, for Levinas, of not excluding charity, it is an acknowledgement of 'the presence of the
singular in the universal' (Levinas and Robbins, 2001, p. 69).

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INSTIT&TIONALIZED ETHICS GOOD

InstitutionaI ethics is vitaI to mediate competing ethicaI demands.
Simmons, 99
[William Paul, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. and Dir. A Program in Social Justice and Human Rights ASU,
Philosophy & Social riticism, "The Third: Levinas' Theoretical ove From An-Archical Ethics to the
Realm of Justice and Politics 25:6, Sage]
However, it is impossible to have a face-to-face relationship with each member of humanity. Those far away can only be
reached indirectly. Thus, the appearance of the Third extends the an-archical responsibility for the Other into the realm
of the said, ushering in the latent birth of language, justice and politics. The an-archical relationship with the Other is the pre-
linguistic world of the saying. Language is unnecessary to respond to the Other. The Third, however, demands an explanation. 'n its frankness it [language] refuses the
clandestinity of love, where it loses its frankness and meaning and turns into laughter or cooing. The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other language is justice.'38
The appearance of the Third also opens up the dimension of justice. Judgements must be made. The
ego must compare incomparable Others. 't is consequently necessary to weigh, to think, to judge, in
comparing the incomparable. The interpersonal relation establish with the Other, must also establish with other men.'39 Therefore, Levinas distinguishes the ethical
relationship with the Other from justice which involves three or more people.40 Finally, the Third introduces the realm of politics. The
ego's infinite responsibility must be extended to all humanity, no matter how far off. Ethics must be
universalized and institutionalized to affect the others. To the extent that someone else's Face brings us
in relation with a third party, y metaphysical relation to the Other is transformed into a We, and works
toward a State, institutions and laws which form the source of universality. 41

PoIiticaI institutions are key to ethics
Simmons, 99
[William Paul, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. and Dir. A Program in Social Justice and Human Rights ASU,
Philosophy & Social riticism, "The Third: Levinas' Theoretical ove From An-Archical Ethics to the
Realm of Justice and Politics 25:6, Sage]

Levinas' critique of the foundations of political thought changes the very nature of politics. A politics based on the battle
between autonomous selves, like Hobbes', is a negative politics whose primary purpose is to constrain individual desires. Levinas, on the other hand, insists that politics must
have a positive role. Politics must serve ethics. The occidental ethic always proceeds from the fact that the other is a limitation for me. Hobbes says you can come directly to
philosophy from this mutual hatred. Thus we could attain a better society without love for the other, in which the other is taken into account. That would be a politics that could
lead to ethics. believe, on the contrary, that politics must be controlled by ethics: the other concerns me.32 Although
Levinas is suspicious of the Western political tradition, his thought is not apolitical as some have charged. His
philosophy begins and ends with politics. For example, Peperzak argues that 'the point of orientation and the background of all other
questions' in Totality and nfinity is 'the question of how the violence that seems inherent to all politics (and thus
also to history) can be overcome by true peace'.33 Politics is also a necessary step that Levinas' ethical thought
must take. Just as the an-archical saying requires the ontological said, an-archical ethics requires politics. The mutually interdependent relationship between the saying
and the said serves as the paradigm for the relationship between ethics and politics. Ethics, which is a manifestation of the saying, has been traditionally subordinated by
politics, a manifestation of the said. A resuscitation of the ethical is needed to check the political. However, the political
should not be abandoned. Ethics requires the political to be universalized into laws and institutions.

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K ALTS FAIL - MCCLEAN

Abstract phiIosophizing kiIIs aIt soIvency - it faiIs at poIicy prescription
McCIean, 1
(David E., "The ultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope, Am. Phil. onf., www.americanphilosophy
.org/archives/ past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm)
Yet Ior some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, Ieftist
critics continue to cite and reIer to the eccentric and oIten a priori ruminations oI people like those just mentioned, and a
litany oI others including Derrida, DeIeuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugeIy more
irreIevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest poIicy prescriptions (when
they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the iIIs of homeIessness, poverty, market
greed, nationaI beIIigerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time Ior American social critics who are
enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I
myselI must remember to stay IaithIul to my own twelve step program oI recovery. The disease is the need for
eIaborate theoreticaI "remedies" wrapped in neoIogicaI and muIti-syIIabic jargon. These
eIaborate theoreticaI remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmaticaIIy
settIed questions about what shape democracy shouId take in various contexts, or whether private property
should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, iI not deIined (heaven Iorbid!), in such statements as
"We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without Iear oI death" and "We like to keep our children saIe Irom poverty").
As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic Ieftists says that some topic has been
'inadequateIy theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy oI language, or
Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version oI economic determinism. . . . These futiIe attempts to
phiIosophize one's way into poIiticaI reIevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left
retreats from activism and adopts a spectatoriaI approach to the probIems of its country.
Disengagement from practice produces theoreticaI haIIucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey
put it in his The eed Ior a Recovery oI Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud
long since reduced to woody Iiber, or an apologetics Ior lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic Iormalism, unless it can somehow
bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle oI successIul action." Those who suIIer or have suIIered
Irom this disease Rorty reIers to as the Cultural LeIt, which leIt is juxtaposed to the Political LeIt that Rorty preIers and preIers Ior good
reason. Another attribute oI the Cultural LeIt is that its members fancy themseIves pure cuIture critics who
view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods
for achieving those successes, as mostIy eviI, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even
when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission oI the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural LeIt, in this
country, too oIten dismiss American society as beyond reIorm and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a
disastrous concIusion, i.e. disastrous for the ultural Left. think it may also be disastrous for our
social hopes, as will explain. Leftist American cuIture critics might put their considerabIe
taIents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's sociaI and poIiticaI
prospects and heIp forge pubIic and poIiticaI possibiIities in a spirit oI determination to, indeed, achieve our
country - the country oI JeIIerson and King; the country oI John Dewey and Malcom X; the country oI Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard
Rustin, and oI the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words oI King, and with reIerence to the American
society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread oI agape into
a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots Ior nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both
same sex unions and Iaith-based initiatives will be able to be part oI the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the
university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part oI the same answer to the threat oI social and ethical nihilism.
We who fancy ourseIves phiIosophers wouId do weII to create from within ourseIves and
from within our ranks a new kind of pubIic inteIIectuaI who has both a hungry theoreticaI
mind and who is yet capabIe of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important
questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect oI our Ilourishing - questions such as "How
is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character oI the Samaritan on the road to Jericho
almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the Iantasy oI a missile deIense system with
the need to treat America as but one member in a community oI nations under a "law oI peoples?" The new public philosopher might
seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories oI surplus value; the logic oI international
markets and trade agreements as much as critiques oI commodiIication, and the politics oI complexity as much as the politics oI power
(all oI which can still be done Irom our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts oI our quotidian social institutions, into
the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the oIIicers and bureaucrats oI those institutions take
diIIicult and oIten unpleasant, imperIect decisions that aIIect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly
understand how those institutions actually Iunction in the actual world beIore howling Ior their overthrow commences. This might
heIp keep us from being sIapped down in debates by true poIicy pros who actuaIIy know
what they are taIking about but who Iack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from
which they proceed, and who have not yet Iound a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures Irom philosophers and
culture critics with their snobish disrespect Ior the so-called "managerial class."

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AT: LINK OF OMISSION

Omission is not excIusion; NO discursive act can incIude everything; this doesn't
mean we reject or marginaIize these concerns
Rorty, 2
(Richard, Professor of omparative Literature @ Stanford, Richard, Peace Review, vol. 14, no. 2, p. 152-153)
have no quarrel with ornell's and pi v ak' s claim that "what is missing in a literary text or historical
narrative leaves its mark through the traces of its expulsion." For that seems simpl ty o say that any
text will presup osp e the existence of people, things, and institutions that it hardly mentions. So the
readers of a literary text will always be able to ask themselves questions such as: "Who prepared the
sumptuous dinner the lovers enjoyed?" "How did they get the money to afford that meal?" The reader
of a historical narrative will always be able to wonder about where the money to finance the war came
from and about who got to decide whether the war would take place. "Expulsion," however, seems
too pejorative a term for the fact that no text can answer aII possibIe questions about its own
background and its own presuppositions. onsider aptain Birch, the agent of the East ndian
ompany charged with persuading the Rani of Sirmur not to commit suicide. Spivak is not exactly
"expelling" aptain Birch from her narrative by zeroing in on the Rani, even though she does not try
to find out much about Birch's early days as a subaltern, nor about the feelings of pride or shame or
exasperation he may have experienced in the course of his conversations with the Rani. n the case
of Birch, Spivak does not try to "gently blow precarious ashes into their ghostly shape," nor does she
speculate about the possible sublimity of his career. Nor should she. S.ivak has her own fish to and
her own witness to bear just as Kipling had his when he spun tales of the humiliations to which newly
arrived subalterns were subjected in the regimental messes of the Raj. So do all authors of literary
texts and historical narratives, and such texts and narratives should not alwa s be read as disin enuous
exercises in repression. They should be read as one version of a story that could have been told, and
should be told, in many other ways.

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AT: ANTHRO/FRONTIER K - NO LINK

The Space and TerrestriaI environments are unconnected
Reiman 09'
[Saara, Department of Social and oral Philosophy, University of Helsinki, "Is space an environment?
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964609000289#sec3|

One good reason to think that environmentaI ethics is important and that we ought to reguIate our
actions towards other beings is that, on Earth, aII things are connected and the harm we infIict
upon our environment may weII become harm done to ourseIves. Earth is practically a cIosed
system,1 and we do not yet fuIIy understand its compIexity [1]. Even if we agree that there are good
reasons to limit the exploitation of Earth and preserve it, do we have to agree that we shouId adopt
simiIar attitudes regarding outer space? ost people think intuitively that it shouId make no moraI
difference whether we traveI some thousands of kiIometres westwards or upwards. But is this
intuition correct? onsidering space as something that does not enjoy a moral status equal to that of
Earth's environments does not imply that it would be wise for us to exploit it short-sightedly. CertainIy, it
wouId stiII be wise to keep our own Iong-term interests in mind whiIe pIanning new projects.
However, it is a very different thing to recognize that it is in our own best interest, e.g. to reduce the
amount of debris in important orbits (see [2]) or to preserve areas that have important historical or
aesthetic value, than it is to say that space, for the most part, has inherent value in the same way that
Earth environments are thought to have. On Earth, the term 'environment' is Ioaded in so many ways
that 'space' is not. Our own weII-being is cIoseIy connected with the weII-being of our pIanet. If
there is excessive poIIution we wiII become iII or may even have to move away from areas that
have become unsafe. Space, on the other hand, is extremely hostile to humans to begin with. While it
can be argued that some phenomena taking place in space are significant from the perspective of human
well-being, our actions in general do not have the power to affect those phenomena in nearly the same
way that we can affect the flourishing or extinction of life on Earth. Second, on Earth we have an
abundance of Iife forms. In space we have interesting phenomena but it is IifeIess, and in
environmentaI ethics Iife is of speciaI importance; many centraI environmentaI ethicaI concepts
and ideas make sense onIy when we are taIking about pIaces where there is Iife. t is still under
dispute how far we should go to protect and cherish life here on Earth. Another complication is that the
theory of environmental ethics is often quite different from the practices in place in various levels of
society: even when we know that polluting our environment is harmful, we often choose to do it anyway
for one reason or another. Keeping this in mind, it may be difficult to argue that we should prohibit all
exploitation of space on the grounds that pollution in the process is inevitable. For instance, if we think
about the idea of terraforming Mars, the 'ethics of Iife' makes a great deaI of sense. If there is
indigenous Iife on Mars, the question is: wouId it thrive more if the atmosphere were denser, if
there were steady suppIies of water on the surface, etc. Or wouId such Iife suffer and perhaps
even become extinct? n the latter case, terraforming would not be ethically acceptable because doing
so would diminish the diversity of life in the universe, even if we could later bring Earth life to ars.
Spreading life from Earth to other planets would just increase its quantity (and consequently the chances
of survival were a disaster to make Earth hostile to such life). But Martian Iife wouId be quaIitativeIy
different and, therefore, Iosing it wouId be a Ioss that couId not be compensated by introducing
Terran Iife to a terraformed Mars, even if it were possibIe to introduce more species than originaIIy
existed on that pIanet. The danger, as pointed out by WiIIiamson, is that an attempt to terraform
Mars - the most likely candidate - could destroy existing but undiscovered life forms, as well as changing
existing landforms and other physical features [1]. StrictIy speaking, it is unIikeIy that, at the time
when a decision to terraform another pIanet was made, we couId compIeteIy excIude from
consideration the possibiIity of the existence of Iife not yet discovered. A good question is thus
when is the IikeIihood of discovering hidden Iife Iow enough to justify terraforming? On the other
hand, if we can assert with great certainty that Mars is a dead pIanet, then terraforming it wouId be
a good deed, as it would make ars more diverse, a more special place than it is as a lifeless place, as
well as increasing the chances of long-term survival for species that could be introduced to a new planet.
nteresting geological features of ars would still probably exist and possibly even provide a base for
forming new kinds of ecosystems capable of supporting the evolution of species that could not evolve on
Earth. Our connection with minor planets, comets and stars is very thin, however. How could building
polluting mines on eres affect human welfare at all (except that it might reduce pollution on Earth)? And
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since eres is as far as we know - a lifeless place, what good would be gained by investing in
expensive systems that reduce pollution? The concept of poIIution is a negative one, something that
is undesirabIe and produces adverse effects. It may, however, be misIeading to taIk about
poIIution in pIaces where there is nothing that couId be affected adverseIy. Not every effect that is
caused by human action, nor every alteration to a natural state, may be adverse. Not every piece of
discarded material may be pollution - the presence of that materiaI has to produce bad
consequences in some way. In many cases, humans wiII be the ones to suffer from a buiId-up of
debris. In the case of congested major orbits this is aIready true [1]. This fact can be
acknowIedged without taIking about 'harm to the environment' in cases where the existence of an
'environment' is questionabIe. Besides, most of what we can perceive in outer space is not nearly as
complex as any one square metre of Earth, a planet soaked in life.2 Rocks and snowballs, clouds of dust
and stars are fascinating, but often lack complexity compared to the smallest eucaryotes found on Earth.
While some space environments display phenomena that are not known on Earth, others do not. t is
perfectly coherent to think that we ought to protect life on Earth and at the same time believe that, apart
from a few special places such as the Apollo landing site and the geostationary orbit - expIoitation of
space has few ethicaI issues unreIated to the protection of mankind's Iong-term interests.
Therefore, we might as weII taIk about protection of humanity's Iong-term interests when
appropriate, without assigning any speciaI moraI status to space.

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AT: ANTHRO - INEVITABLE

The space environment wiII naturaIIy become much worse - factors Iike the sun
and moon dust - the aIt can't soIve the aIt causes
Huebert, 08 [Jacob Huebert, http://jhhuebert.com/articles/environmentalists-in-outer-space/,
"Environmentalists in Outer Space in The Freeman. n addition to serving as Adjunct Professor of Law at
Ohio Northern University Pettit ollege of Law, Professor Huebert also serves as Adjunct Faculty ember
of the Ludwig von ises nstitute. He was twice awarded a Felix orley ompetition Prize in Journalism.]

All of that may sound bad, but in fact the space environment is onIy going to become much worse.
That's because our sun wiII eventuaIIy change to a "subgiant" star, then a Red Giant, then a nebula,
then a White Dwarf, then a Black Dwarf. n the end, aII the pIanets, incIuding earth, wiII Iose their
atmospheres and exist at a temperature just a few degrees above absoIute zero. In sum, the space
environment is so bad right now that, from anything other than a human-hating perspective, it
couId not get much worse-except that biIIions of years from now, it wiII get worse, and there is
nothing anyone can do about that. Considering the soIar system's present and future
environmentaI state, the idea of space poIIution becomes absurd. Air pollution? As we've seen, there is no air
on the moonand to the extent that our neighboring planets have an atmosphere at all, it's almost entirely carbon dioxide, which is
toxic and the bane of environmentalists when produced by humans here on earth. Thus nothing we could do to other celestial
bodies could make the "air more toxic than it already is. Water pollution? There is no surface liquid water anywhere but on earth.
Radiological pollution? There's already dangerous radiation in space against which humans must shield themselves. The Mars
atmosphere may Iimit the amount of radiation on its surface-but given its poison-gas
environment, not to mention its aIready highIy toxic soiI, how much worse wouId some radiation
here and there make the pIanet? To speak of poIIution or contamination of space in the abstract-
apart from human beings' property rights-makes no sense. Law professor Lawrence D. Roberts suggests that
"[u]biquitous commons [sic] resources on Earth such as air and water will likely pose the same kinds of environmental challenges for
space developers as they do for Earth developers, adding, "The need to recycle such valuable commodities will require stringent
regulation of the discharge of hazardous byproducts into the waste stream. We find this implausible. f there's any air or surface
water on the moon or elsewhere in space, how did it get there? t could only be from humans who brought or created it there. Where
would it be found? nside the space vehicles or other structures people brought or built there. And here we get to the key space
environmental policy: to protect humans' environment in space, we need only protect their private property rights. On earth such a
policy has presented some technical difficulties. For example, it may be difficult to determine which factories contributed to victims'
air or water pollution and in what amounts, as contaminants may travel imperceptibly over long distances. Pollution victims may also
suffer very small harms individually such that a lawsuit would cost them more than it was worth. Those problems are not
insurmountable in the earthbound contexttechnological advances and the availability of class-action lawsuits should make them
decreasingly problematicbut they do exist. In space, though, apart perhaps from radioIogicaI poisoning,
some sort of cIear physicaI invasion wouId be necessary for anyone to poIIute anyone eIse's air or
water. Thus enforcement of a property-rights regime for poIIution shouId be simpIe and effective.

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AT: ANTHRO - PERM CARD

Permutation soIves - absoIute rejection is unnecessary
Barry, 99
[John, Lecturer in Politics @ Keele, 1999, #ethinking Green Politics, pg. 35]

We may think oI environmental virtue as having to do with the reIinement oI moral discernment in regard to
the place oI nature as a constitutive aspect oI the human good. The cultivation oI environmental virtues can
then be regarded as a matter oI discerning the place nature has within some particular human good or interest.
A more positive statement would be to say that those who destroy nature are motivated by an unnecessarily
narrow view oI the human good, and that 'what they count as important is too narrowly conIined' (Hill, 1983:
219). In so doing the inherent plurality oI the 'human good' is occluded. That is, Iorms oI anthropocentrism
which narrow the human good and human interests can be criticized as vices, or potential vices. At the same
time, those who destroy nature also oIten have a mistaken appreciation oI the 'seriousness' (Taylor, 1989) oI
the human interest or good in the service oI which nature is destroyed. However, to reject
antropocentris2 is not te sol:tion, but is rather itselI a vice oI which we need to be aware. A virtue
approach is thus anthropocentric in that its reIerence point is some human good or interest, but as argued in
the next chapter, this ethical (as opposed to metaphysical) anthropocentrism is compatible with including
considerations oI non-human interests and welIare.

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"InteIIectuaIs. They're Iike the mob. They onIy kiII their own." - Woody AIIen
100
AT: DEEP ECO/ANTHRO - ALT FAILS

PhiIosophy has rendered itseIf useIess to change - pure critique faiIs
Zimmerman, 89
[icheal E., "n a nterview with Zimmerman, found in n ontext, a Quarterly on Sustainable Human
ulture, Summer, pg. 24, http://www.context.org/LB/22/Zimmrman.htm, NKN]

A|ar: loW do lrese ||rds ol deve|oprerls |r pr||osopry ard olrer acader|c d|sc|p||res l||ler lre|r Way oul |rlo aclua| soc|a| crarge?
ichael: That's a very good question, and it's an unfortunate response have to give. think that
philosophy has made itself socially useless. No one cares what philosophers say. Now, that wasn't true
before World War . Dewey and other American pragmatists had an enormous impact on American
education and social reflection. But after the war philosophers, with their interest in analytic philosophy
and epistemology, made their questions and their research not relevant to the larger public. They
engaged in much less reflection upon the categories and presuppositions of culture, and their reflection
became so rarefied that they just took themselves out of the ball game.

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AT: DEEP ECO/ANTHRO - ALT = GENOCIDE

Sacrificing humanity on the aItar of space, in the form of the aIt, Ieads to
genocide
Smith, 9
(Wesley J., Senior Fellow in Human Rights and Bioethics at the Discovery nstitute and a special
consultant for the enter for Bioethics and ulture, "Poverty is the Answer: Radical Environmentalism
Leading Us to a New Form of Human Sacrifice, http://stanford.wellsphere.com/bioethics-article/poverty-
is-the-answer-radical-environmentalism-leading-us-to-a-new-form-of-human-sacrifice/632295)

So, people need to be poorer, with all the concomitant increase in human suffering and shorter lives that
would result from lower levels of prosperity. And remember, he only writes here about the well off areas of
the world. But you can bet that he and his co-believers would strive mightily to stifle development in now
destitute areas of the world--dooming perhaps billions of people to lives of continued squalor, disease,
and lower life expectancies. ore to the point of what we discuss here at SHS, human beings are a
logical species: We take our ideas where they lead! (Thus, once Americans accepted the verity of
Jefferson's "We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal..."it doomed slavery,
because servitude and equality are incompatible.) For the same reason, once we accept the fundamental
premise of the piece--that we must sacrifice human prosperity to "save the planet"--the misanthropic
ideology of Deep Ecology--humans as a viral infection afflicting Gaia--with radical depopulation as the
cure--consider the genocidal implications--become a logical next step And thus we see how the healthy
environmentalism that cleaned up filthy rivers and reduced Los Angeles air pollution is quickly mutating
into an implicit and explicit anti-humanism that is in danger of leading to becoming so degraded in our self
perception, that we could reach the point of being urged (forced?) to become human sacrifices on Gaia's
altar.

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AT: ANTHRO - H&MANS FIRST - KEY TO ENVIRONMENT

Human-centeredness is key to environmentaI sustainabiIity
Schmidtz 2k
[David, Philosophy Prof. @ University of Arizona, Environmental Ethics, p. 379-408]
Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about equilibria and perturbations that keep
systems Irom converging on equilibria. Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about
competition and unintended consequences, and the internal logic oI systems, a logic that dictates how a
system responds to attempts to manipulate it. Environmental activism and regulation do not automatically
improve the environment. It is a truism in ecology, as in economics, that well-intentioned interventions do
not necessarily translate into good results. Ecology (human and nonhuman) is complicated, our knowledge is
limited, and environmentalists are themselves only human. Intervention that works with the system`s logic
rather than against it can have good consequences. Even in a centrally planned economy, the shape taken by
the economy mainly is a Iunction not oI the central plan but oI how people respond to it, and people respond
to central plans in ways that best serve their purposes, not the central planner`s. ThereIore, even a dictator is
in no position simply to decide how things are going to go. Ecologists understand that this same point applies
in their own discipline. They understand that an ecology`s internal logic limits the directions in which it can
be taken by would-be ecological engineers. Within environmental philosophy, most oI us have come around
to something like Aldo Leopold`s view oI humans as plain citizens oI the biotic community.21| As Bryan
orton notes, the contrast between anthropocentrism and biocentrism obscures the Iact that we increasingly
need to be nature-centered to be properly human-centered; we need to Iocus on "saving the ecological
systems that are the context oI human cultural and economic activities." 22| II we do not tend to what is
good Ior nature, we will not be tending to what is good Ior people either. As Gary Varner recently put it, on
purely anthropocentric grounds we have reason to think biocentrically.23| I completely agree. What I wish
to add is that the converse is also true: on purely biocentric grounds, we have reason to think
anthropocentrically. We need to be human-centered to be properly nature-centered, Ior iI we do not tend to
what is good Ior people, we will not be tending to what is good Ior nature either. From a biocentric
perspective, preservationists sometimes are not anthropocentric enough. They sometimes advocate policies
and regulations with no concern Ior values and priorities that diIIer Irom their own. Even Irom a purely
biocentric perspective, such slights are illegitimate. Policy makers who ignore human values and human
priorities that diIIer Irom their own will, in eIIect, be committed to mismanaging the ecology oI which those
ignored values and priorities are an integral part.

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AT: E&ROCENTRISM - WEST IS GOOD

West good: not perfect, but comparativeIy better for happiness and freedom. Even if they win their
framework of being inteIIectuaIs, we must ceIebrate and teach Western vaIues in this debate
round for Western civiIization to survive
Kors, '01 Prof history @ U Penn (Summer 2001, Alan, American Foreign Relations, "America and the West: Triumph Without Self Belief, pg.
354-355)
The fruits of that civilization have been an unprecedented ability to modify the remediable causes of
human suffering, to give great agency to utility and charity alike; to give to each individual a degree of
choice and freedom unparalleled in ail of human history; to offer a means of overcoming the station in life
to which one was born by the effort of one's labor, mind, and will. A failure to understand and to teach
that accomplishment would be its very betrayal. To the extent that Western civilization survives, then, the
hope of the world survives to eradicate unnecessary suffering; to speak a language of human dignity, responsibility, and rights linked to a
common reality: to minimize the depredations of the irrational, the unexamined, the merely prejudicial in our lives: to understand the world in which we
find ourselves, and. moved by interest and charity, to apply that knowledge for good. The contest, then, is between the realists and the antirealists, and
the triumph of the West ultimately depends on its outcome. The failure to assess the stakes of the struggle between the West and its communist
adversary always came from either a pathological self-hatred of one's own world or at the least, from a gross undervaluation of what the West truly
represented in the history of mankind. The West has altered the human relationship to nature from one of fatalistic
helplessness to one of hopeful mastery. t has made possible a human life in which biological atavism,
might be replaced by cultural value, the rule of law, individuation, and growing tolerance. t also created
an intellectual class irrationally devoted to an adversarial stance. That adversarial view of the West, in the past generation
at least, had become a neo-Gramscian and thus nee-arxist one in which the West was seen as an unparalleled source of the arbitrary assignment of
restrictive and life-stultifying roles. The enemies of the Westfor some, in practice; for others, increasingly in the idealrepresented an active make-
believe that supposedly cast grave doubt upon the West's claim of enhancing freedom, dignity, and opportunity. With the triumph of the
West in reality, and with the celebration of arxism and the Third World shown more and more to have
been truly delusional, the adversarial intellectual class appears to be retreating into ideologies and
philosophies that deny the very concept of reality itself. One sees this in the growing strength in the humanities and social
sciences of critical theories that view all representations of the world as mere text and fiction. When the world of fact can be twisted to
support this or that side of delusion (as in astrology or parapsychology'), pathology tries to appropriate what it can of
the empirical. When the world of fact manifestly vitiates the very foundations of pathological delusion,
then it is the claim of facticity or reality per se that must be denied. This is what we now may expect: the
world having spoken, the intellectual class, the left academic wing of it above all, may appropriate a little
postcommunist chaos to show how merely relative a moral good the defeat of Stalin's heirs has been. f it
does so, however, it will assail the notion of reality itself. n Orwell's 1984, it was the mark of realistic, totalitarian power to make
its subjects say that all truth was not objective but political"a social construction,'' as intellectuals would say nowand that, in the specific case, 2 + 2
= 5. By 2004, making students in the humanities and social sciences grant the equivalent of 2 + 2 = 5 will be the goal of adversarial culture.
They will urge that all logicaland, one should add, inferentialinductive truths from experience are
arbitrary, mere social constructions. The West Has ndeed Sur ivedSo Far The ramifications of that effort will
dominate the central debates of the humanities in the generation to come. Until there is a celebration and
moral accounting of the historical reality of "The Triumph of the West," that "triumph" will be ephemeral
indeed. Academic culture has replaced the simplistic model that all culture was functional, a model that
indeed could not account for massive discontents or revolutionary change, let alone for moral categories,
by the yet more astonishing and absurd model that virtually all culture is dysfunctional. Whole disciplines now
teach that propositions are to be judged by their therapeutic value rather than by their inductive link to evidence until, in the final analysis, feeling good
about saying something determines the truth-value of what is said. Understanding human weakness, however, the West has always believed that it is
precisely when we want to believe something self-gratifying that we must erect barriers of experiment, rigor, and analysis against our self-indulgence
and our propensity for self-serving error. The human ability to learn from experience and nature, so slighted in current humanistic theory, is not merely
an object of cultural transmission, let alone of social control, but an evolutionary triumph of the species, indeed, a triumph on which our future ultimately
depends. There is nothing more desperate than helplessness, and there is no more inveterate cause of helplessness than the inability to affect and
mitigate the traumas of our lives. f the role of both acquired knowledge and the transmission and emendation of the
means of acquiring knowledge is only a "Western" concern, then it is a Western concern upon which
human fate depends. n the current academic climate of indoctrination, tendentiousness, and fantasy, the
independence of critical intellect and the willingness to learn open-mindedly from experience of a reality
independent of the human will are the greatest hopes of our civilization. Has Western civilization
survived? That is, has a human relationship to the world based upon the assumption of a knowable
reality-, reason, and a transcendent value of human dignity and responsibility survived? Has a will to know
oneself and the world objectively survived? Has a recognition of human depravity and the need to limit the power of men over men survived? do
not think that free men and women will abandon that hard-won shelter from chaos, ignorance, parochial
tribalism, irrationalism, and, ultimately, helplessness. Has Western civilization survived, its principle of
reality justified and intact? Yes, indeed, though it requires constant defense. The demand for perfection is
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antinomian, illogical, and empirically absurd. The triumph of the West is flawed but real. While everyone else
around you weeps, recall Alexander Ushakov and celebrate the fall of the Soviet threat as he celebrated the fall of Grenada. Then recall how
everything depends on realism in our understanding, and rejoin the intellectual struggle.
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AT: E&ROCENTRISM - KNOWLEDGE PROD&CTION

West inevitabIe: resiIient and constantIy produces new and better forms of knowIedge production
to respond to crises
348-349)
The view that Western civilization has ended has had various incarnations, with the most sensitive souls
of many epochs imagining themselves to be the last bearers of the Western torch. One needs perspective
in such things. The question, in many ways, was more compelling when Athens fell: when hristian Rome
was sacked by barbarians: when the Norsemen ravaged settled Europe when feudal warlords reigned
unchecked; when, at the end of the first millennium, all signs indicated a divine disfavor that seemed to
presage the end of the world when the Black Death of the fourteenth century left, soul and society without
mooring. ndeed, imagine the question posed to atholic and Protestant apologists of the sixteenth century, viewing each other's religion as the
Antichrist and seeing Western hristendom rent first in two and then into a multitude of competing sects. How fragile, if not spent. The Nest seemed
during, the religious civil wars culminating in the devastation of the Thirty Years' War. There were lamentations in profusion during the Terror of the
French Revolution and the decades of revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars that followed, and again, with gravitas. There were the inward and outward
sermons on the West uttered on the slaughterfields of World War 1, and at Auschwitz, and in the gulag. The West is resilient beyond all
seeming possibility, and something gives it that resiliency. The West has survived its barbarians without and
more dreadful yetits own barbaric offspring within. f it could outlast Attila the Hun and the armed ideologies of the Third
Reich and Stalin's Russia, it surely can outlast Jacques Derrida, Stanley Fish, and ichel Foucault. At
each moment of seeming dissolution, there were diverse profound voices that compellingly analyzed the
depths to which we had fallen: the almost infinite remove we were from any light: the loss of something
that we never could recoverand yet the West survived. There was something about its mind and spirit. Greece fell, but
its philosophers conquered the minds of the Romans who conquered its soil, and its conceptual
categories still organize our understanding of reality and knowledge. Rome fell, but its language became
the lingua franca and thus the definitional universe of hristendom, while its history became the great
drama by which to understand the glory and the baseness of political life. The barbarian tribes believed that they had
conquered Rome, but Rome in greater part had conquered them. Their descendants called their realm the Holy Roman Empire, terms that were not,
until much later, bereft of meaning. When the Norsemen came, learning fled to monasteries, and that learning and even those monasteries eventually
conquered the Norse, whose Norman descendants in Britain founded universities that live to this day. t is the last thing that any frightened monk taking
desperate shelter in the eighth century ever could have imagined. The Thirty Years' War seemed to sensitive and moral
observers the end of civilization, but its battles are mostly forgotten, and what is it that remains of the
seventeenth century? Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Pascal, Bayle, Boyle, Fenelon, Harvey,
Huyghens, Newton, Locke. Louis XV is a tourist attraction at Versailles: his wars changed precious little. The conceptual revolution of the
West, however, changed a great deal in that same century. t arose from the very dynamics of the West's models of
learning-disputation, accounting for appearances, refining inductive and deductive logic-now linked to
expanded education and printing. What happened in the minds of the graduates of Europe's hristian universities changed the human
relationship to nature, to knowledge, to the rights of inquiry and conscience, and to political and economic life. The hristian West kept the traditions of
the Greek mind alive, and thus, through its own debates, it overthrew the presumptive authority of the past in matters of natural knowledge and its
application. The West believed that we were not cast fatally adrift in this world, but that we could learn new
things and that we could alter the sorry scheme of experience closer to the heart's desire for knowledge,
order, and well-being. t was not Faust, who dreamed of occult knowledge that would make him a
demigod, but Bacon, who commanded that knowledge proceed from humility and charity, who becarne
the prophet of the great scientific revolution of the West. Louis XV is a statue; Bacon is a living force
wherever the West touches minds.

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AT: WEST EXCL&SIVE

EnIightenment/Western vaIues aren't excIusive to Western peopIes or universaI - muItipIe
historicaI exampIes
Bronner 4
University Press p. 31-32
The belief that enlightenment values are somehow intrinsically "western is surely parochial and
most likely racist. Just as money, the division of labor, and class conflict can be found in
precapitalist cultures like Egypt, Greece, and Rome, so is it the case that liberal and cosmopolitan
values usually identified with western thinking in general and the Enlightenment in particular were
expressed in any number of nonwestern societiesincluding the three great civilizations of ndia, hina,
and slam40by religious figures like ohammed and the Buddha; political leaders from yrus the
Great, who allowed each nation to choose its religion and keep its customs, to the sixteenth-century leader Akbar who
condemned slavery and the immolation of widows; and philosophers like Plotinus, Avicenna,
Averroes, who highlighted the cosmological elements of the classical heritage and generated a tradition that extended from Giordano
Bruno over Spinoza and Leibniz to Ernst Bloch. Amid the civil wars and religious conflicts of the premodern world, enough reflective people
of compassion, appalled by religious fanaticism and the devastation of war insisted upon fairness and the rule of law, and highlighted the
sanctity of the individual conscience and the plight of the lowly and the insulted. n a fine essay,41 Amartya Sen has made western
intellectuals aware of what we should have been more aware of from the beginning: nonwestern and premodern thinkers
had also emphasized the "pursuit of reason rather than "the reliance on tradition. The idea of
progress, of making the solutions to conflict more civilized, is not simply a western idea. This
does not mean that all regions and nations embraced the idea of progressalong with its liberal,
egalitarian, and cosmopolitan implications or that all will ever do so to the same degree. This is not the venue in
which to examine the complex reasons why capitalism and the modern notion of progress were generated in the West. But it is
necessary to emphasize that progress and enlightenment values are not the preserve of a
geographic entity. 42 ntellectual tendencies that seek to promote such an understanding of
progress have existed within diverse cultures and manifold traditions, and these have something
to offer for the vision of a liberated society. t would be the height of arrogance, for example, to
suggest that a hinese tradition harking back three thousand years is somehow invalidated by
the philosophical efforts of a small minority of European intellectuals writing between 1650 and
1800 or to deny that Gandhi could justify his vision of a multi-ethnic, democratic order from within
his own religious understanding. The belief that achieving a genuine consensus on moral issues calls upon all participants in
the discourse to think through arguments in the same way is absurd. The quest for humanitarian values has taken many paths in the past
and it will do so, again, in the future.

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ALT LINKS TO THE K: &SES WESTERN EPISTEMOLOGY

Postmodern critiques of Western epistemoIogy contradict themseIves-they must inevitabIy take
part in what they cIaim to oppose
349-351)
t is odd that conservatives question whether Western civilization has survived the twentieth century at the very time that so many academics on the
cultural Left define that civilization as a singular hegemon that stands astride the globe. What, after all, is the "multiculturalism" so
ardently but desperately proclaimed in higher education but the belief that there is a hegemonic Western
civilization that, unchallenged, frames all issues and provides almost all modes of understanding? For the
so-called multiculturalists, the question is not whether what they see without complexity as Western
civilization will survive into the twenty-first century, but whether anything other than Western civilization
will so survive. What do they mean by the hegemony of the West? t is not physical colonialism and
imperialism that concern them anymore. No, they see as far more ominous what they term the cultural
colonialism and imperialism of the West, a triumphant colonialism of the mind by a civilization that
believes in universal categories that transcend itself. The West believes its values to be accessible to all
human souls. The West believes its science to be a method bv which ail human beings everywhere can
rise above ignorance, superstition, helplessness, and prejudice. The West believes that there are rights
and obligations that belong to humanity qua humanity, beyond the power of governments and political
wills. onservatives despair at the disappearance of the West: the cultural Left despairs at its
transcendent success. There are profound ironies about the multiculturalists, so many of which testify to
the dynamism and inescapable appeal of precisely that Western civilization to whose dismemberment
they are in theory committed. n theory, they are all moral relativists, but in reality, they tend to sound like
Biblical prophets, calling power to categorical moral duty, or like traditional Western social critics who in this case have not
thought out either their facts or their logic terribly well. Their self-contradictions betray their inability to
escape from the civilization they claim so to despise. n their epistemology, they are the third-rate heirs of
the Greek skeptics and historianswithout, to their shame, even knowing that fact. Their assaults upon dogmatism,
at their best, never rise above the level of the subtleties and paradoxes handed down to us by Sextus Empiricus, chronicler and compiler of the Greek
skeptical tradition. The works of Sextus Empiricus were best sellers during the sixteenth century and widely translated in the seventeenth. lis writings
intellectually delighted European men of letters, including clerics, many of whom embraced him as a tonic antidote to the pride of human reason. any
philosophers modified their views of the claims of metaphysics in the face of such skepticism. The West has always been concerned with the limits of
reason and knowledge, the role of received prejudice and custom, the appropriateness or arrogance of its metaphysical conclusions, and the
phenomenon of paradox. ndeed, the West has authored the formal exposition and mental fireworks of such concerns. The heirs of the least subtle
forms of that tradition do not even know their parentage. t was the Greeks and their heirsnot any postmodern critics of postcolonialismwho
obsessed so creatively about the role of King Nomas, of received opinion, of education and prejudgment, and of the seeming relativity of values,
beliefs, and taste to time, place, and accident of birth. ontesquieu, in the eighteenth century, was profoundly struck by the malleability of the human
condition and by the relativity of what might seem the most foundational aspects of human existence to geography, time, and historical vicissitudes. He
also saw, however, what our current social constructionists do not see: that as undeniable as that malleability may be, there is a natural reality that
underlies, conditions, and sets limits to it, and that the relationship of human malleability and natural reality is a proper subject of deep objective study.
For ontesquieu, certain forms of human association may persist for a wide variety of reasonsincluding terror and despotism but there is a real
human nature and a set of real human needs, and these will out toward their true ends because there is an ultimate reality in which our human forms
nave consequences. Postmodern canon, despite its proclaimed alienation from Western thought and values,
derives not from any non-Western culture, but from the internal debates of the West and the products of
its educational vitality: from arcuse, Gramsci, arx, Hegel, and Rousseaufrom, in short, the debates
that the West has always had with itself. Postmodernists, when the issue is involuntary female
circumcision, for example, seek asylum in America for the victims of such customary rites, citing notions
of legal equality and of universal human dignity, not their alleged commitments to the relativity of all
human values and cultures. They seek tenure at universities with medieval traditions of what the West called "philosophical liberty." n the
first and in the final analysis, so-called multiculturalists are simply Western radicals, in the Western radical
tradition, with the most imperial, dogmatic, and absolutist aspirations of all. Further, they are the
beneficiaries of the Western commitment to intellectual debate instead of coerced intellectual conformity
in the Republic of Letters. They are the beneficiaries of the Western tradition, from Aristotle's insistence
that we overcome all possible arguments against our beliefs, to the medieval insistence upon seek contra objections in formal
disputations, to ill's insistence that beliefs untested by free criticism are no longer truly alive. The radical dissenters are thus the
unwitting and ungrateful beneficiaries of the West's own philosophical pluralism, and, indeed, of its
constant extension. The current barbarians within also remind us that the West is, again and again, the author of its own worst follies and
abuses, compared to most of which the postmodernists pale into virtual insignificance. We are the authors of our own religious wars and persecutions,
our own enthusiastic superstitions, our own conquests of lands and peoples over which and whom we had no rights, our own ultimate nightmares of
National or Leninist Socialism, which drowned our world in blood unimaginable in any century but the twentieth, and which truly threatened to bring this
civilization to an awful end. We have had the will, however, to learn from depravity and from reality, and to bear ultimate witness to the higher sides of
our being. What civilization has ever engaged in more searing analysis and soul searching of its own sins?
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Having defeated the National Socialists and the communists within, the bearers of the best of this
civilization have reason for a moment of optimistic pride.

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ALT BAD: INTROVERTED/IGNORANT

The aIt reIies on an introverted, seIf-contained view of the West that masks the wrongs of
imperiaIism
Krishna, '93 Prof Poli Sci @ U of Hawaii (Summer, Sankaran, Alternatives, "The mportance of Being ronic: A Postcolonial View on ritical
nternational Relations Theory, pg. 402-403)
What is particularly compelling about the critique of postmodernist positions on subjectivity that emanates
from writers such as Spivak and hooks is the fact that they connect it explicitly to the self-contained view
of the West that informs many of these works. Thus, whereas Foucault's meticulous genealogies of the
micropolitics of power in discursive practices have had such a tremendous impact, his work itself
geopolitically isolates the West and is completely oblivious to a whole history of imperialism that surely
has much to do with the very practices that he investigates. n this context, Spivak notes: am suggesting ... that to buy a self-
contained version of the West is to ignore its production by the imperialist project. Sometimes it seems as if the very brilliance of Foucault's analysis of
the centuries of European imperialism produces a miniature version of the heterogeneous phenomenon: management of spacebut by doctors;
development of administrationsbut in asylums; considerations of the peripherybut in terms of the insane, prisoners and children. The clinic, the
asylum, the prison, the universityall seem to screen allegories that foreclose a reading of the broader narratives of imperialism. . . . "One can
perfecdy well not talk about something because one doesn't know much about it," Foucault might murmur [Power/Knowledge p. 66]. Yet, we have
already spoken of the sanctioned ignorance that every critic of imperialism must chart.40 f these works
argue for the necessity of strategically essentializing identity or subjectivity, critical international theorists
are by no means completely blind to the issue. t is more a matter of emphasis: focused on a critique of
the essentialist conceits and the unitary notion of sovereignty that characterizes international theory,
critical theorists seem to underestimate the implications for people interested in retaining a notion of
political subjectivity. n this regard, Ashley and Walker note that a political essentializing of subjectivity may be necessary for others in their
struggles. They eschew a blanket decrying any notion of subjectivity when they note: t would have been far better to have respected the paradoxical
reality of one's local situation, a reality that radically subverts all pretenses that one's situation might be bounded, clearly represented, and represented
as a paradigm for the strategic situation of others. Respecting this reality would not lead to any kind of introversion, imperial conceit, or smug
indifference to others' circumstances. Least of all would it lead to passivity. t would instead encourage a patient labor of listening and questioning that
seeks to explore possible connections between the strategic situations of others and one's own, always sensitive to the problem of expanding the
space and resources by which the ongoing struggle for freedom may be undertaken there as well as here.41 Unfortunately, it is a fact that
many of the thinkers and authors who have formed the inspirational core of critical international theory
can be charged precisely with what Ashley and Walker describe as "introversion, imperial conceit, or
smug indifference to others' circumstances." am thinking here of Baudrillard, Lyotard, hantal ouffe,
Julia Kristeva, Gilles Deleuze, and Foucault, as far as their attitudes and statements regarding the Third
World are concerned.42 t is difficult to imagine a more appropriate location for an explicit discussion of these imperial conceits than the
discipline of international relations.

ASTROSOCIOLOGY NEG
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NEG STRAT IDEAS

Out-lefting them:

Off:
K of Enlightenment/Rationality OR Post-positivism K
ANTHROPOENTRS K
Asteroids Reps K (if you can't win a link to this on astrosociology, you suck)

ase:
Asteroids Defense
ini-Ks
Specific ntellectualism Turn

Out-righting them:

Off:
Framework
PTX
Some big DA (preferably with an impact that's existential)
STE/Ground P
UN P

ase:
Asteroids Defense/AT: Existential risk framing
Specific ntellectualism Turn

FRAMEWORK
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1NC

. Interpretation: Te aff can only defend advantages based on te conseq:ences of
ypotetical enact2ent of teir plan by te USFG.

B. Violation - te aff clai2s advantages and arg:2ents off teir speec act

C. Standards

1) Plan foc:s - insert so2e arg:2ents ere]

2) 1:dge eval:ation - teir fra2ework provides no coerent criteria for ow te j:dge
so:ld assess co2peting clai2s or weig i2pacts. We give criteria by wic one can 2ake
decisions, wereas teir arg:2ents a2o:nt to e2pty spec:lation at best.

3) Topic ed:cation - insert arg:2ents ere]

D. Voter for fairness and ed:cation. Fra2ework is a prereq:isite to debate.
Sively, 2k
(Ruth Lessl, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&, Political Theory and Partisan Politics,
2000, p. 181-182)
The requirements given thus Iar are primarily negative. The a2big:ists must say "no" tothey 2:st reject
and li2it-so2e ideas and actions. In what Iollows, we will also Iind that they must say "yes" to some
things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea oI rational persuasion. This means, Iirst, that they must
recognize the role oI agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The
mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the
end oI contestthat consensus kills debate. But this is true only iI the agreement is perIectiI there is
nothing at all leIt to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperIect. We
agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities b:t not on specifics, on principles b:t not on
teir applications, and so on. And tis kind of li2ited agree2ent is te starting condition of contest and
debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; thereIore we can argue about them. It
seems to have been one oI the corruptions oI intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when
agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. Tere can be no arg:2ent except on the premise,
and witin a context, of agree2ent. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot arg:e abo:t so2eting
iI we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on te topic and ter2s of arg:2ent or if we ave
:tterly different ideas abo:t wat co:nts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we 2:st agree
abo:t wat it is tat is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot ave an
arg:2ent abo:t e:tanasia wit so2eone wo tinks e:tanasia is a 2:sical gro:p. One cannot
successIully stage a sit-in iI one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or iI those doing the
sitting have no complaints. or can one demonstrate resistance to a policy iI no one knows that it is a policy.
In other words, contest is 2eaningless if tere is a lack of agree2ent or co22:nication abo:t wat is
being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters 2:st ave so2e sared ideas abo:t te s:bject
and/or te ter2s of teir disagree2ents. The participants and the target oI a sit-in must share an under-
standing oI the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short,
the contesting oI an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about
intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on so2e basic agree2ent or harmony.

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DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IMPACT

InstrumentaI affirmation of a poIicy through roIe-pIaying is a prerequisite to
IiberaI democratic participation
RawIs, 99
(John, Harvard Professor of Philosophy, bad-ass, The Law of Peoples, 1999, p. 56-57)
To answer this question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to tink of te2selves as if tey were legislators and ask
te2selves wat stat:tes, supported by what reasons satisIying the criterion oI reciprocity, tey wo:ld tink it 2ost
reasonable to enact. When Iirm and widespread, te disposition of citizens to view te2selves as ideal
legislators, and to rep:diate govern2ent officials and candidates Ior public oIIice wo violate p:blic
reason, for2s part of te political and social basis of liberal de2ocracy and is vital for its end:ring
strengt and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens f:lfill teir d:ty of civility and s:pport te idea of
p:blic reason, wile doing wat tey can to old government officials to it. Tis d:ty, like other political
rights and duties, is an intrinsically 2oral d:ty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, Ior in that case it would be incompatible
with Ireedom oI speech. Similarly, the ideal oI the public reason oI Iree and equal peoples is realized, or satisIied, whenever chieI
executives and legislators, and other government oIIicials, as well as candidates Ior public oIIice, act Irom and Iollow the principles oI
the Law oI Peoples and explain to other peoples their reasons Ior pursuing or revising a people`s Ioreign policy and aIIairs oI state that
involve other societies. As Ior private citizens, we say, as beIore, that ideally citizens are to tink of te2selves as if tey
were exec:tives and legislators and ask te2selves wat foreign policy supported by what considerations
tey wo:ld tink it 2ost reasonable to advance. Once again, when Iirm and widespread, te disposition of
citizens to view te2selves as ideal exec:tives and legislators, and to repudiate government oIIicials and candidates
Ior public oIIice who violate the public reason oI Iree and equal peoples, is part of te political and social basis of peace
and :nderstanding a2ong peoples.

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DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IMPACT

Our interpretation is better - simuIating poIicymaking is key to good citizenship
and activism
Gunderson, 2k
Adolf G., Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&, Political Theory and Partisan Politics,
2000, p. 108-9)
Will deliberation work the same way among ordinary citizens? Yes and no. Yes, deliberation will tend to
heighten citizens appreciation oI their interdependence. At the same time, the results are likely to be
analogous rather than identical to those in Iormal governmental bodies, since citizen deliberation must oI
course Iunction in the absence oI the institutional interdependence established by the US constitution, with its
clear speciIication oI joint responsibilities. The theoretical mutuality oI interests assumed by the Constitution
exists among ordinary citizens, too. The diIIerence is that they have only their interests, not the impetus oI
divided power, to encourage them to discover and articulate them. Granted. But once they begin to do so,
they are every bit as likely to succeed as the average representative. Citizen deliberation, in other words, will
intensiIy citizens' appreciation oI interdependence. Although I cannot prove the point, tere are co2pelling
reasons to tink tat citizen deliberation yields an awareness of overlapping interests. I have already
alluded to the Iirst, and perhaps most telling oI these: iI governors in a system oI divided government such as
our own succeed in deliberating their way to the public interest (however imperIectly or irregularly), surely
ordinary citizens can be counted upon to do the same thing. Indeed, iI my initial argument that decision-
making spells the end oI deliberation is on the mark, then we ave good reason to expect citizens to
deliberate better tan teir representatives. One can add to these theoretical considerations a lengthening
list oI e2pirical findings which s:ggest not only tat citizens are willing and able to engage in political
deliberation, b:t also tat tey are q:ite able to do soable, that is, precisely in the sense oI coming to a
deeper appreciation oI the collective nature oI the problems they Iace (Dale et al. 1995; Gundersen 1995;
Dryzek 1990; see also Gundersen n.d., chapter 4). In the end, the claim that deliberation enhances
interdependence is hardly a radical one. AIter all, iI deliberation will oI itselI diminish partisanship, as I
started out by saying, it must at the same time enance interdependence. To aim between Athens and
Philadelphia requires, perhaps more than anything else, a changed way oI thinking about partisanship.
Instit:tions and ways of tinking tend to cange togeter; ence if te instit:tional reorientation
s:ggested ere is to take root, it 2:st be acco2panied by a new way of tinking abo:t partisansip.
Sifting o:r appraisal of partisansip will a2o:nt to a noting less tan a new attit:de toward politics.
It will req:ire tat we aspire to so2eting new, something that is at once less loIty (and less threatening)
than the unity to which direct democracy is supposed to lead, but more democratic (and more deliberative)
than encouraging political deliberation among a selected group oI representatives. As I argued above, it will
require tat we seek to sti2:late deliberation a2ong all citizens. With Madison, we need to view
partisanship as inevitable. Collective choice, indeed choice itselI, is a partisan aIIair. But we also need to
resist the equation oI politics and partisanship. II politics is seen as nothing more than a clash oI partisan
interests, it is likely to stay at that level. Conversely, Ior deliberation to work, it must be seen as reasonable, iI
not all-illuminatingas eIIicacious, iI not all-powerIul. At the same time, oI course, citizens 2:st borrow a
page Irom the participatory democrat's book by coming to view deliberation as teir responsibility rater
tan so2eting tat is done only by oters in city all, te state capitol, or Congressoters wo are,
aIter all, :nder direct and constant press:re to act rater tan deliberate. Politics, in other words, 2:st be
res:scitated as an allegiance to de2ocratic deliberation.

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K THINGS
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1NC-E&ROCENTRISM CRITIQ&E OF SOCIOLOGY

SocioIogy is profoundIy Eurocentric-their acceptance of western socioIogy as
universaI dispIaces IocaI knowIedges and entrenches epistemoIogicaI hegemony.
John CIammer, Visiting Professor and Deputy Director of the United Nations University-nternational
ourses, Director of nternational ooperation and Development at the UNU-, Adjunct Professor at
Kanda University of nternational Studies, former Professor of Sociology and Asian Studies at Sophia
University, holds a D.Phil. from Oxford University, 2009 ("Sociology and Beyond: Towards A Deep
Sociology, Asian ournal of $ocial $cience, Volume 37, Number 3, Available Online to Subscribing
nstitutions via BRLL, p. 333-334)

Does sociology actually answer the questions that it purports to? This is partly a question of levels of course: at the level of
statistical generalisations sociology has proved quite successful but beyond that, 'explanations', the goal of conventional
sociology, weaken as they deepen. The primary examples of this, and representing a kind of litmus test for the claims of
sociology as a whole, are the subjects of religion, art and suicide. All have attracted a substantial sociological literature, yet little of it
is fully satisfying for example, the paucity and weaknesses of sociological theories of art (Heywood, 1997). Furthermore, since
Durkheim sociologists have struggled with the explanation of suicide, the most insightful and sensitive book that know of on the
subject is the work not of a sociologist but of a literary critic personally acquainted through his friendship with the poet Sylvia Plath
with this tragic phenomenon (Alvarez, 1974).

There are, suggest, a number of reasons for this which include an unwiIIingness to confront what are in
fact the basic existentiaI questions of human Iife death, love, embeddedness in nature, illness, the continuation
of the old philosophical error of confusing expIanation and understanding, and a commitment to a now
very outdated modeI of what socioIogists think that the naturaI sciences do, with a corresponding
attachment to a positivistic and reductionist mode of anaIysis. This is tied to a continuing de facto
epistemoIogicaI Eurocentrism signalled by the failure to take the philosophical dimensions of
globalisation seriously: while accepting, and perhaps celebrating, the fact that globalisation and its
corresponding universalisation of knowledge makes an ever bigger range of indigenous knowledge
available to all of us, while simultaneously refusing to take them seriousIy as rivaIs or aIternatives to
hegemonic Western 'scientific' knowIedge, or admitting the possibility that Western sociology and
anthropology are, as arshall Sahlins has argued, [end page 333] simply forms of local knowledge that for
historical reasons (imperialism, colonialism and military power being amongst the main ones) have become effectively
universalised, suppressing as a consequence Iegitimate aIternative IocaI anthropoIogies and
socioIogies of other cultures and societies (Sahlins, 1996).

Eurocentrism is the greatest threat to humanity-comparativeIy outweighs and
accesses every major impact.
Tim Wise, antiracist author and educator, 2006 ("Paleness as Pathology: The Future of Racism and
Anti-Racism in America, P Magazine, ay, Available Online at
http://www.timwise.org/2006/05/paleness-as-pathology-the-future-of-racism-and-anti-racism-in-america/,

While most of the left has long argued that capitalism is the primary impediment to peace and stability
whether economic, ecologic or otherwise in fact, white world supremacy may be at least as critical, if not more so.
ndeed, the extent to which capitalism is itself an outgrowth of European/white supremacy has been
underappreciated by most on the left (particularly the white left, for reasons that are probably easy to understand). arimba Ani, in
her classic work Yurugu: An African entered ritique of European ultural Thought and Behavior, and harles Ephraim, in The
Pathology of Eurocentrism, (among others), have argued persuasively that competitive systems of economics did not simply
develop naturally, as if by some arxian edict of logical progression. Rather, they grew principally out of the dualistic mindset so
common to European cultural thought and systems, stemming from Platonic and Aristotelian ethics. The splitting off of reason from
emotion, now to be seen as conflicting human characteristics, or the splitting of nature from humanity, whereby the latter is seen as
in need of controlling the former, and other such dyads, led to the creation of market systems, as well as racism and patriarchy.

Ani explains that Plato laid the groundwork of "an elaborate trap:

"Once the person was artificially split into conflicting faculties or tendencies, it made sense to think in terms of one faculty
'winning' or controlling the other(s). And here begins a pattern that runs with frighteningly predictable consistency throughout
European thought.The mind is trained from birth to think in terms of dichotomies or 'splits,' (which) become irreconcilable,
antagonistic opposites.one is considered 'good,' positive, superior; the other is considered 'bad,' negative, inferior. And unlike
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the Eastern conception of the Yin and the Yang, or the African principle of 'twinness,' these contrasting terms are not
conceived as complementary and necessary parts of a whole. They are, instead, conflicting and 'threatening' to one
another.it is this dichotomized perception of reality on which the controlling presence (imperialistic behavior) depends.

To clarify: am not saying that racism, in modern terms, preceded capitalism or patriarchy. Rather, am suggesting that a
particular way of viewing reality and the world a dominant cultural paradigm, or what scholars call cosmology
emanating from Europe, having first taken root in ancient Greece and Rome, is what made the class system
(ultimately capitalism), the gender system (patriarchy) and the race system (white supremacy) inevitable. All three
are essentially European.

What began as a system of cultural imperialism, and hristian religious imperialism, later became racialized, with
the creation of the concept of the white race. Although this concept was, as Theodore Allen has noted, largely crafted so as to
rationalize oppression of African peoples, and to divide and conquer economically oppressed persons from one another, what
arxist theorists have often ignored is the origin of class conflict itself, which was necessary for either capitalism or racism to
blossom. ost arxists view capitalism as an inevitable stage of development, and thus, see no need to delve further into its
culture-specific roots. But can we really view as merely coincidental the fact that the class system and capitalism as we know it
developed in and from Europe? Or should we recognize in this something specific, something unique (and uniquely dangerous)
about the European worldview?

As Euro/white supremacy developed into a full-blown system of now racialized and color-coded exploitation, it gained new life in the
colonies of what would become the United States, and then the U.S. itself, even as the old European empires were beginning to
crumble. Thus, white supremacy increasingly came to be a USAmerican product: after all, being expelled from one's colonial
outposts, as happened with the British, the French, the Belgians, the Dutch and the Portuguese, made it increasingly difficult for
Europeans to cling to the fantasies of their own inherent superiority. That dream had begun to die, for them, at the hands of
Toussaint L'Ouverture in Haiti, and would continue its slow demise throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Likewise, the visible
depravity with which Europeans treated one another with Nazi Germany being only the most extreme example made the idea
of European supremacy harder to swallow, for those actually embedded in the cultures that had brought forth such monstrosities.

But in the U.S., second thoughts have been harder to come by, if for no other reason than the relative insularity, provincialism and
even security that being bound by two oceans has long provided and encouraged. t is the American form of white
supremacy, still, as with its predecessor rooted in the dichotomization of peoples into good/bad, responsible/irresponsible,
which leads a nation such as the U.S. to believe itself entitled to the resources of the earth, be they oil reserves
beneath the sands of raq, or coal deposits in a West Virginia mountainside. That entitlement mentality precedes the drive for profit,
and helps to place it in its proper context. That same mentality then contributes to the world's ecological
predicament, including global climate change, soil and wetland erosion, polluted drinking water and air,
and the related health effects of all these.

t is the same white supremacist mindset that leads such a nation to believe itself worthy of dictating which
nations around the globe can and cannot have weapons of mass destruction, or develop nuclear energy
programs "responsibly. White nations can, as can sraelwhich although not quite as "white as the lands of Northern Europe,
nonetheless is led by mostly European-descended Jews, in contradistinction to the region's darker, Arab majority. On the other
hand, the black and brown are presumed incapable of possessing such munitions, and are to be stopped
whenever possible in their quest to do so.

White supremacy, American-style which has become the dominant form on the planet today is what leads U.S.
policy elites not only to believe an invasion of raq on false pretenses is justified, but also to assume it will
be a smashing success. The hubris and self-congratulatory narcissism that predicted Americans would be met in the streets
by raqis throwing flowers to the troops and which now cannot seem to fathom how badly things are going for the American
empire stems from the mindset of racial and cultural supremacy that simply fails to see oneself through the eyes of others. After
all, privilege and domination has allowed that same culture to never really care, or need to care, what others think. The result of
such willed ignorance, is, sadly, now proving to be disastrous.

And it was only white Americans who seemed not to envision such a disaster, or to consider the moral implications of such a course
of action. After all, prior to the arch 2003 invasion, persons of color were largely opposed to the war in raq especially when the
prospect of large-scale civilian death there was raised while whites, especially white men, remained resolute that the slaughter
must go on, no matter how many raqis had to perish in the process. While black and brown folks, and even white Europeans, took a
more nuanced and critical view of American war plans, that special breed of white person who we might call aucasoid Americanus
who, unlike their European counterparts haven't (yet) had their attachment to white supremacy tempered by the crumbling of our
own version of colonialism pushed forward, convinced in the righteousness of the cause, and the invincibility of our gung-ho
military.

This same mindset has regularly allowed the brushing off of mass death, so long as those doing the dying
weren't white like us. Five hundred thousand raqis dead from U.S. sanctions, according even to former Secretary of State
adeline Albright? No problem. At least 30,000 raqi civilians dead because of the current war, even according to Bushwho
proclaimed this grim (and no doubt highly understated) fact with no more emotion than one might demonstrate when telling another
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the day's weather forecast? Again, no problem. t's worth it: a sentiment most assuredly to be heard as well, and delivered every bit
as coolly somewhere deep in the caves of Afghanistan with regard to 9/11. Sorry, but them's the breaks.

Even the old War was seen by many American war planners as a racial, and not merely economic or ideological
conflict. onsider what General Edward Rowney, who would become President Reagan's chief arms negotiator with the Soviets,
told anning arable in the late 1970s, and which arable then recounted in his book The Great Wells of Democracy:

"One day asked Rowney about the prospects for peace, and he replied that meaningful negotiations with the Russian
ommunists were impossible. 'The Russians,' Rowney explained, never experienced the Renaissance, or took part in Western
civilization or culture. pressed the point, asking whether his real problem with Russia was its adherence to communism.
Rowney snapped, 'ommunism has nothing to do with it!' He looked thoughtful for a moment and then said simply, 'The real
problem with Russians is that they are Asiatics'.

n other words, even the struggle with the Soviet Union, which drained both nations of such resources, helped squander monies that
could have been used for human needs, and led to millions of deaths in Africa, Asia and entral America (and the deaths of more
than a few U.S. and Russian citizens as well, in places like Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan) was in large measure predicated on a
desire to maintain white supremacy. Quite a cost, this system.

White supremacy also cannot prepare for, though it is directly implicated in, the coming energy crunch
facing the West. Largely unwilling to move toward renewable energy because it is less profitable (at least at the present time),
and because it fails to satiate the white desire to consume and destroy, thereby demonstrating the power of one's will and genius
the West ambles into unsustainable and irrational energy policies (like drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge or building more
refineries and drilling platforms in the hurricane-ravaged Gulf of exico). So, too, we maintain our dependence on iddle East oil
reserves, not realizing that given a few more years of American imperialism abroad, OPE may decide they've had enough, and
choose to stop trading in dollars as their main currency. A shift to the euro on the part of the oil producing nations (something a few
of those states have already talked about) would literally cripple the American economy, demonstrating the limits of white
supremacy, American style.

n other words, and to put it in colloquial terms, this cowboy shit won't work for much longer. At some point, the
ndians fight back: economically, militarily, socially and culturally. For those seeking an answer to the eternal (and
almost exclusively white) question, "Why do they hate us? you couldn't do much better than to come to understand the way in
which racism and white supremacy, with capitalism and militarism as its primary transmission belts, has been experienced by the
brown-skinned persons of the planet.

These are folks, after all, who know (whether at the level of the actual data, or merely intuitively) that a fraction of our culture's
military budget could save millions of lives if redirected to the immunization needs of their nation's people; that less than a couple of
weeks of spending on the war in raq could guarantee sanitary water supplies for everyone in the world. That the U.S. in this way
could save millions of children from death every year and yet chooses not to do so, speaks volumes
about the fundamental evil of the white supremacist mindset, and fairly guarantees the kind of hatred,
instability and even terrorism down the line, that Americans have come to fear.

So, for those concerned about terrorism; upset by how the war is going in raq; pissed off at the price of
gasoline, or worried about the melting of the polar ice caps, extreme weather events, and related
environmental catastrophes: Blame white supremacy. For those upset about the unavailability of health
care in the U.S., and the unwillingness of this nation to make such a thing a birthright rather than a commodity, blame white
supremacy too. After all, the difference between the U.S. and Europe when it comes to providing a wide array of social services
has long been the sense that in America "those people (meaning the black and brown) would suck up too many taxpayer dollars
under such initiatives. Racist backlash to welfare programs has then, ironically, limited benefits for whites as well.

And for those concerned about their wages being too low, don't just lash out at capitalism: blame white
supremacy, too. After all, it is the sense that persons working in sweatshops abroad or harvesting our food here at home are not
fully human (and certainly not the intellectual or cultural equals of white Americans) that feeds our unwillingness to push for higher
wages and better working standards globally, not just the desire for mega-profits in a vacuum.

Likewise, how else (except as a product of a deeply supremacist mind) can we rationalize the words of former World Bank chief
economist (and most recently President of Harvard University) Lawrence Summers, who said in a 1991 memo that the West should
encourage polluting industries to locate in "less developed countries, because "health impairing pollution should be done in the
country with the lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages. He went on to explain, " think the economic logic
behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that, and that, in his
estimation, "under-populated countries in Africa are vastly under-polluted. While such sentiment poses as mere economic hard-
headed rationality, in fact it demonstrates a racist contempt for the victims of such policies, which whether deliberate and thought
out, or merely so taken for granted as to approach the level of the banal, results in the same thing: dead brown people for the
benefit and glory of whites.

ronically, by keeping the world's black and brown poor in a state of destitution (or even making it worse, as Summers would
prescribe), we guarantee the kind of economic hardship that will encourage businesses to take advantage of their labor
desperate people, after all, will work for shitty wages and in awful conditions to the detriment of wage rates and benefits in the
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U.S. as well. And anyone who has a problem linking such cavalier dismissals of human life and worth on the one hand, to "anti-
Americanism and terrorism on the other, demonstrates a profound inability to connect even the most basic of dots.

At some level, perhaps we already know the linkages are real, even as we are loathe to say so out loud. onsider, just for a moment
the meaning of a 2004 study in the Journal of the American edical Association, noting that America has a rate of mental illness
roughly double the global average, and five times higher than conflict and corruption-torn Nigeria. And not just for any mental
disorders, but specifically for "anxiety related disorders and substance abuse maladies. Why, pray tell would such a thing be true?
Why should the most powerful people on the planet and we can rest assured that as with all clinical studies, whites were likely
oversampled and make up the disproportionate bulk of those examined in the U.S. have more anxiety and feel more stressed
than the world's poor?

Perhaps it is precisely the privilege and power that remains so tightly in our hands, which generates the anxiety,
the sense of dread, the fear that provokes such ludicrous concepts as "preventative war, so as to get them
before they get you. Add to the disproportionate power the mindset of competition and greed nurtured by
both white supremacy and capitalism and you have the perfect recipe for mass paranoia. As Derrick Jensen
explains in The ulture of ake Believe, such a national ethos causes the world, in the eyes of its people, to "devolve into
consisting almost entirely of victims and perpetrators, the fuckers and the fucked.You will perceive that everyone is out to get you.
And why not? After all, you are certainly out to get them. n other words, white supremacy is crazy-making, and not only
for its targets.

The aIternative is to contest socioIogy.

Instead of bIindIy extending it into outer space, we shouId contest the dominant
ideoIogies that underwrite modernist socioIogy-our critique is a prerequisite to
the case.
Ananta Kumar Giri, Associate Professor at the adras nstitute of Development Studies in ndia, holds a
Ph.D. in Anthropology from Johns Hopkins University, an .A. in Sociology from the Delhi School of
Economics at the University of Delhi, and an .A. in Anthropology from Johns Hopkins University, 2009
("Sociology and Beyond, Asian ournal of $ocial $cience, Volume 37, Number 3, Available Online to
Subscribing nstitutions via BRLL, p. 329)

Exploring new frontiers of sociology does not mean extending the existing theories and methods of
socioIogy but an interrogation of some of its uncriticaIIy accepted modernist assumptions, such
as the equation of society and nation-state, the dualism of individual and society and that of ontology and
epistemology. This special issue of Asian Journal of Social Science explores pathways beyond sociology in terms of exploring
the contours of a transformational sociology which seeks to transform the assumptions, as well as horizons, of sociological
imagination. Despite all the waters that have flown around the world for the last one hundred and fifty years,
contemporary sociology, even the so-called global sociology, suffers from what Ulrich Beck himself calls the NATO-Iike
fire-power of western socioIogy. n this context, sociology has to open itself to transcivilisational dialogues
and planetary conversations as to the very themes of thinking about self, culture and society. So far,
gIobaIisation of socioIogy has meant gIobaIisation of themes and methods of modernist socioIogy
which makes an easy equation between socioIogy and modernity. For sociologists, such as Giddens, Beck
and Beteille, sociology is a modern discipline. But if sociology blindly follows the post-traditional teleology of modernity how can it
study varieties of forms of life traditional, modern, as well as postmodern? These varieties of forms of life exist not only in so-
called traditional societies, such as ndia or Lapland, but in all contemporary societies be it ndia, ndonesia, Sweden, France,
England, Germany, Singapore, hina or the USA. Beyond Sociology thus challenges us first of all to go beyond an a
priori teleological privileging of the post-traditional telos of modernist sociology. t invites us for a
foundationaI interrogation of modernist socioIogy as a preIude to making socioIogy part of a
pIanetary conversation as to the very themes, such as society and individual that it seeks to
understand.

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2NC/1NR-ALTERNATIVE

The aff goes in exactIy the wrong direction-instead of taking socioIogy to space,
we need to bring it back down to Earth.
nstitutions via BRLL, p. 344)

The founder of Deep Ecology, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, in an early essay (Naess, 1973/1995), contrasted what he
called the shallow approach of conventional, reformist environmentalism with all its compromises with the resource extraction
industries and its wholly anthropocentric approach which sees nature simply as a place for recreation for humans and as a source of
medicines or other benefits equally for humans and with no intrinsic value in itself, and the approach of Deep Ecology which takes a
biocentric approach, expands the concept of the self to include its deep dependence on and interconnectedness with nature and
recognises the rights of other living entities to be allowed to live and evolve in peace. n a similar way in this essay, am
contrasting what find to be the existential shaIIowness, cuIturaIism and anthropocentrism of
conventional sociology with the possibility of a rich and transforming engagement with the issues and
approaches to life that artists, spiritual seekers, poets and deep ecologists have long pioneered and the
absence of which is both the source of so much of the aridity of sociology and the crises that global
society and environment now confront. The materials for this reconstruction lie all around us in those
visions of the world just enumerated, in the works of those significant, but marginalised, thinkers mentioned earlier in this essay and
in the works of many others like them, and in the possibility that art and nature are not passive subjects of analysis, but the carriers
of valid knowledge, and as such, like the many forms of indigenous knowledge supposedly the subject matter of anthropology, ways
of seeing and acting in and on the world. As the theologian and ecologist Thomas Berry puts it, that in the context of our
present crisis and the extraordinary denial that surrounds it, "We must recognise that the onIy effective
programme avaiIabIe as our primary guide toward a viabIe human mode of being is the
programme offered by the Earth itseIf (Berry, 1999: 71). The responsibility of sociology, as with the other
social sciences, is to grasp that challenge.

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2NC/1NR-SOCIOLOGY BAD

SocioIogy doesn't have the answers we need-onIy the critique avoids repIicating
the faiIed methodoIogy of modernist socioIogy.

Entrapment within the discourse that sociology has created for itself and which is the legacy of its founding fathers
may not be a sufficient modeI for addressing the human, sociaI and ecoIogicaI probIems of the
current century. Even as arxism was a child of and a profound shaper of a now outdated industrial,
resource extractive, polluting and unequal societal order, so too sociology shares in that legacy and, for all
its undoubted achievements in throwing light on the organisation of human society, now needs rethinking if it is to have
any constructive roIe in the civiIisation that must arise from the faiIures of the oId order if
humanity and nature are to have a future at aII.

Thus, beyond, beIow and behind the conventional questions of sociology (or the questions of conventional
sociology) issues of class, stratification, deviance, social order and control , lie ultimately the fundamental existential
questions of birth, death, our place in nature, meaning, ends, sleep and dreams, love and suffering that sociology,
having largely severed its roots in philosophy, rarely speaks of. To confront these as the fundamental issues at the
heart of existence at all times and in all cultures (however specifically framed or addressed in different instances)
poses basic methodoIogicaI and theoreticaI questions for the student of the human and social
sciences. Given the emerging and challenging features of the world system, ecological and social justice issues paramount
amongst them, how do we define the nature and scope of our investigations as contemporary sociologists? And, once defined, how
do we interrogate it in ways that truly illuminate the human condition to act for change where we believe that to be necessary? How
do we site sociology, place it in the context that gives it reality and meaning as an enterprise, that context in fact being nothing less
than the basic and evolutionary forces that shape the cosmos? To do this we have to work paradoxically at both the maximal and
minimal levels at the very micro in the internal worlds of individual [end page 334] memory, imagination, anticipation, hope and
purpose, and at the very macro level, not only of the 'world system' and its structural qualities, but also of the cosmic context in
which all human systems are embedded, including, pre-eminently, nature.

The very foundation of socioIogy is wrong-the "sociaI" doesn't exist
independentIy of its naturaI and existentiaI context.
nstitutions via BRLL, p. 336)

learly sociology has always had a critical and self-critical dimension, and indeed has always been a contentious and even
undefined discipline (a characteristic that it shares with anthropology). However, in most cases it is discourses within
socioIogy that are critiqued, not the notion of socioIogy itseIf. t has sometimes been pointed out
that Asian societies (hina being the paradigm case) have rarely spontaneously produced what in the West
would be recognised as sociology and this is seen as some kind of deficiency; this is a serious mistake:
all such societies have rich traditions of social thought but primarily expressed through philosophical and
religious idioms. One of the centraI errors of Western sociology and hence of the Iimits of its
expIanatory power has been the assumption, again largely deriving from Durkheim, of the autonomy of society:
of there being, in other words, a category of phenomena that can be abstracted from and studied
independent its Iarger existentiaI and naturaI context. The very recent discovery in the West of a new sub-
discipline, entitled 'environmental sociology', is highly indicative of this and unwittingly signals the existence of a concept of society
divorced from nature and in which sociological explanations were thought to be autonomous. When, however, one looks at
social thought in Japan, hina and ndia, and in particular those forms of thought rooted in Buddhism, Hinduism and to a
lesser extent Shinto, a very different conception of human Iife in the universe begins to emerge.
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Separating society from the individuaI is methodoIogicaIIy indefensibIe-there is
no "seIf" distinct from the "sociaI".

This broad conception has a number of elements. Firstly, that the fundamental uncertainty of life its hazards and
unpredictability (that have [end page 335] surfaced in Western social thought as the 'risk' analyses of Ulrich Beck and ary
Douglas, amongst others) has tended, in mainstream sociology, to generate 'systems' when, in fact, it shouId
point us back to Iife itseIf and to the richness of the present moment. Existence is actually
unknowabIe by anaIyticaI means and can only be grasped through other techniques that have not so
far appeared in the vocabulary of sociology, including the meditative techniques common to the religious traditions of
Asia. Secondly, that the common assumptions of autonomy, independence and individualism that pervade
Western thought make no sense from the perspective of Asian social psychologies which stress the
interdependence of all entities, at the social level what the Vietnamese Buddhist thinker and activist Thich Nhat Hanh calls
'nterbeing' (Thich, 1998) and, at the ecological level, in the recognition of the fundamental embeddedness of humans in nature. The
'ecological self' announced by 'Deep Ecology' has, in fact, long been anticipated in Asian religious traditions. The seIf is not
autonomous it is the nexus of both socio-cuIturaI forces and naturaI ones and the points at
which these meet such as in the biological/ cultural heritage enshrined and celebrated in the notion of ancestors, so central to
East Asian religious and social practices. The recent invention in the West of 'ecopsychology' and the recognition of the deep scars
that result from the artificial and, in fact, non-existent radical separation of humans and nature imposed on people by many aspects
of our industrial-urban civilisation, signals the belated re-emergence of a clearer and more modest perception of the place of
humans in the cosmos as simply a part in a complex web of life and not necessarily as the apex of evolution. To overcome the
illusion of separateness is the first step in a reinvented socioIogy.

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K OF ENLIGHTENMENT/RATIONALITY LINK

AstrosocioIogy is the centraI pIanning of space - reIying on eIites and
technocrats and a new EnIightenment of rationaI thought
GangaIe and DudIey-FIores, 7
[Thomas, Executive Director, OPS-Alaska ; and arilyn, EO/hief Research Scientist, OPS-Alaska;
"The Globalization of Space The Astrosociological Approach, Presented at the AAA SPAE 2007
onference & Exposition 18 - 20 September 2007, Long Beach, alifornia, NKN]

Lifting our gaze skyward, the question arises, what forms of governance shaII we take with us, and
what shaII we Ieave behind? We have an opportunity for a revoIution in human thought regarding
human nature and human rights, the relationship oI individual, society, and state, and to question the Iactors oI
production, the means oI production, and modes oI production. In short, as one writer on outer space law has
remarked to the authors, we get to do the EnIightenment over again. Stewart B. Whitney (1984, pp. 11-12)34
wrote:
We can chaIIenge socioIogy to provide the conceptuaI basis of the sociaI design for space
settIement, to construct sociaI modeIs required for the successfuI adaptation of Humankind to
space. Planning the social design oI space settlements is necessary Ior the success oI space
industrialization; without appropriate sociaI organization, accompIishment of industriaIization
tasks wiII faiI.
RationaI pIanning for the sociaI design of space settIements must rest on the knowIedge of sociaI
scientists and schoIars. This requirement presents a particularly diIIicult problem Ior those who
plan the social aspects oI space settlements. This does not constitute an insurmountable diIIiculty,
however, because knowledge oI human social responses to various types oI problems and
diIIiculties is available; this knowledge can be applied to analysis oI the unique problems that are
likely to require societal resolution in space settlements Irom which logical models oI social
design can be developed. These logical models can serve as a starting point Ior social planning
and can be modiIied as additional knowledge and insight are developed.

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ANTHROPOCENTRISM K LINK

The aff's caIcuIative use of nature extends to space - the frontier of
hyperrationaIity, eIiminating naturaI distinctions and thought
Thorburn, 10
[Stephanie Lynn, A in Sociology from Goldsmiths ollege and a BSc. (Honors) in Sociology/
Psychology from ity University, Space Renaissance nitiative Board of Directors, professor @ the UAS,
her dissertation The Astrosociological magination and the $pace #enaissance nitiative: A Discourse
Analytical Perspective, taken from hapter 1: "The SR: A Radical Approach to Re-rationalisation in
Response to the Ecological risis of Postmodernity,
http://www.spacerenaissance.org/papers/Abridged_STR.pdf, NKN]

n 'Rationality and Nature' (1994), Raymond urphy summarises effectively some of the key 'green
options' under which central strands of thought within ecological politics can be analysed. He forwards the
categories of the intensification of rationalisation under the premise of greenness, re-rationalisation and
de-rationalisation. &nderIying these aIternatives is the idea that the intensification of rationaIity
invoIves a certain 'pIastic' view of our interactions with nature through an anthropocentric
manipuIation process, Ieading further toward hierarchicaI domination, economically and politically of
humans over other humans. The conceptuaI background to this cIassification system is the
appIication of Weber's theory of instrumentaI rationaIity or goal as opposed to vaIue-orientated
reason, in association with an increasingly bureaucratic society, suffering from the destructive
dominance of technicaI reason. The intensification of rationality involves ecological goals still
connected to the maintenance of a high standard of living for humans. The now familiar ideas of reduction
of waste, reuse and recycle are therefore a form of ecological rationality and part of a dialectical
relationship between social action and the processes of nature. n this 'garden vision' the consequences
of technology upon the environment are calculated so as to produce an ecological improvement towards
the next stage of societal development. n this context, the visions of the SRI can be seen as
extending the remit of sustainabIe deveIopment beyond our own atmosphere. Neo- althusians
have attacked sustainable development ideas on the grounds that nature is not in fact malleable and our
capacity to sustain population and consumption may be more limited than assumed implicitly by
sustainability theorists. This equation has aImost certainIy been considered within the manifesto of
the SRI, who unlike conventional sustainable development theorists do not ignore more fundamental
equations and instead suggest a need for reassessment of economic and environmental issues through
an 'open world view', extending our concept of society from the parochiaI remit of Earth. Whether
the SR have appraised the origins of our present societal crises within a sufficiently critical standpoint
regarding the role of capitalism and bureaucratic processes is however unclear and a point will return to
later.

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DEEP ECO/ANTHRO K LINK

The desire and impuIse to expIore and coIonize space is a symptom of the root
cause - anthropocentric movement dividing and moving away from nature
Mander, 95
[Jerry, activist and author about environmental issues, hapter 29 "Leaving the Earth: Space olonies,
Disney, and Epcot, pg. 311-2 of Deep Ecology for the 21
st
entury, edited by George Sessions, NKN]

BANSHENT FRO EDEN
Over the years, I have wondered about the apparentIy strong appeaI of space traveI and
deveIopment to the pubIic mind. I can understand why corporations, miIitaries, and governments
want to promote departing from the planet, and have mentioned its appeal to the New Age collective
ego. But it hasn't been easy for me to grasp why the idea is so attractive to others. finally realized that
space traveI is not new; it is onIy the finaI stage of a departure process that actuaIIy began Iong
ago. Our society reaIIy "Ieft home" when we pIaced boundaries between ourseIves and the earth,
when we moved en masse inside totally artificial, reconstructed, "mediated" worlds-huge concrete cities
and suburbs and we aggressiveIy ripped up and redesigned the naturaI worId. By now, nature has
IiteraIIy receded from our view and diminished in size. We have Iost contact with our roots. As a
culture, we don't know where we came from; we're not aware we are part of something Iarger than
ourseIves. Nor can we easily find places that reveal natural Processes still at work. . . . As a corporate
cuIture, we have begun to feeI that one pIace is as good as the next; that it's okay to sacrifice this
pIace for that one, even when the new pIace is not even on Earth. n the end, this leaves us all in a
Position similar to the millions of homeless people on our streets. n truth we are all homeless, though we
long to return.
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The drive to coIonize space is an eternaI Ionging for an Eden we can't find, a new
grasp and hoId of nature. This drive manifests itseIf in greater destruction of the
Earth and means no soIvency - turning the case
Mander, 95
Disney, and Epcot, pg. 312 of Deep Ecology for the 21
st

y friend Gary oates, an architecture professor at Kansas State University, has argued provocatively
that our quest for space is actuaIIy a distorted expression of a desire to return home to Eden, the
place we abandoned. He sees our whoIe cuIture as caught in a repIay of the Adam-and-Eve story. n
a recent conversation, oates put it to me this way: "Like all creation myths, the story of the Garden of
Eden is not something that never happened or only happened long ago; it is something that is happening
in every moment. . . . It was the murder of AbeI, who represented a state of oneness with the earth,
that set Cain off wandering in a never-satisfied quest for the return to, or re-creation of, paradise.
Within the confines of our totaIIy artificiaI environments on Earth, as they wiII soon aIso be in
heaven, we aIso seek to re-enter Eden. n particular, the creation of the Leisureworlds' Disney Worlds,
megamalls, Air Stream mobile home cities, lifestyle-segregated condominium communities, and
especially genetic engineering, space coIonization, and terraforming of pIanets, are aII updated
forms of Cain's desire to return home by remaking the originaI creation. The tragedy is that in
attempting to recover paradise we acceIerate the murder of nature. t's yet another repeat of the
story of ain and Abel, another acting out of the founding myth of Western history."

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The drive to coIonize space is an eternaI Ionging for an Eden we can't find, a new
grasp and hoId of nature, the root cause of impacts. This drive manifests itseIf in
greater destruction of the Earth and means no soIvency - turning the case
Mander, 95
Disney, and Epcot, pg. 319 of Deep Ecology for the 21
st

Remaking authentic communities into packaged forms of themselves, recreating environments in one
pIace that actuaIIy beIong somewhere eIse, creating theme parks and lifestyle-segregated
communities, and space traveI and coIonization-aII are symptomatic of the same modern maIaise: a
disconnection from a pIace on Earth that we can caII Home. With the naturaI worIdour true
homeremoved from our Iives, we have buiIt on top of the pavement our new worId, a new Eden,
perhaps; a mentaI worId of creative dreams. We then Iive within these fantasies of our own
creation; we live within our own minds. Though we are stiII on the pIanet Earth, we are disconnected
from it, afloat on pavement, in the same way the astronauts fIoat in space.
That our cuIture has taken this step into artificial worlds on and off the pIanet is a huge risk, for the
IogicaI resuIt is disorientation and madness and, as oates argues, the obsessive need to attempt
to re-create nature and Iife.
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AGENCY MINI-K

Agency can onIy be articuIated in opposition to the restrictive structuraIisms of
the status quo-we can cIaim our agency onIy by rejecting a state-centric view of
poIitics - turns the case
BIeiker, 2k
[Roland, Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, ambridge, Humboldt, Tampere,
Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal nstitute of Technology and the
nstitute of Social Studies in The Hague, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, ambridge
University Press]

":estions of agency ave been disc:ssed extensively in international teory, 2ostly in te context of te so-
called str:ct:re-agency debate. lto:g strongly wedded to a state-centric view, tis debate neverteless
evokes a n:2ber of i2portant concept:al iss:es that are relevant as well to an understanding oI transversal
dynamics. The roots oI the structureagency debate can be traced back to a Ieeling oI discontent about how
traditional approaches to international theory have dealt with issues oI agency. Sketched in an overly broad manner,
the point oI departure looked as Iollows: At one end oI the spectrum were neorealists, who explain state identity and
behaviour through a series oI structural restraints that are said to emanate Irom the anarchical nature oI the
international system. At the other end we Iind neoliberals, who accept the existence oI anarchy but seek to
understand the behaviour oI states and other international actors in terms oI their individual attributes and their
ability to engage in cooperative bargaining. II pushed to their logical end-point, the two positions amount,
respectively, to a structural determinism and an equally IarIetched belieI in the autonomy oI rational actors. 24
The structureagency debate is located somewhere between these two poles. Neiter str:ct:re nor agency
receive analytical priority. Instead, te idea is to :nderstand te interdependent and 2:t:ally constit:tive
relationsip between te2. The discussions that have evolved in the wake oI this assumption are highly complex
and cannot possibly be summarised here. 25 Some oI the key premises, though, can be recognised by observing how
the work oI Anthony Giddens has shaped the structureagency debate in international relations. Giddens speaks oI
te 'd:ality of str:ct:re,' of str:ct:ral properties tat are constraining as well as enabling. Tey are bot 'te
2edi:2 and o:tco2e of te contingently acco2plised activities of sit:ated actors'. 26 Expressed in oter
words, neiter agents nor str:ct:res ave te final word. H:2an actions are always e2bedded in and
constrained by te str:ct:ral context witin wic tey for2 and evolve. B:t str:ct:res are not i22:table
eiter. :2an being, Giddens stresses, will 'know a great deal abo:t te conditions of reprod:ction of te
society of wic e or se is a 2e2ber'. 27 Te actions tat e2erge fro2 tis awareness ten sape te
processes tro:g wic social syste2s are str:ct:rally 2aintained and reprod:ced.

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FO&CA&LT MINI-K

The aff's search for a pure poIiticaI system of order and controI obscures power
reIations and the true nature of institutions - turns the case
Rabinow, 84
(Paul, Professor of Anthropology at the University of alifornia (Berkeley), Director of the Anthropology of
the ontemporary Research ollaboratory (AR),The Foucault #eader, ntroduction, p 5-6, NKN)

Foucault, typically, refuses to answer why he is interested in politics. He finds this both trivial and self-
evident. nstead, he shifts the "why" question to a "how" question-how am interested in politics?
ertainly not, he parries, "by imagining an ideal social model for the functioning of our scientific or
technological society." One of the hallmarks of Western political philosophy, in Foucault's interpretation,
has been its devotion to such abstractions, first principles, and utopias-i.e., theory . n the West we have
consistently approached the problem of political order by building models of the just social order or
searching for general principles by which to evaluate existing conditions. But, Foucault claims, it is exactly
this emphasis, this "will to knowledge," that has left us almost totally in the dark about the concrete
functioning of power in Western societies. Our task is to cast aside these utopian schemes, the search for
first principles, and to ask instead how power actually operates in our society. "t seems to me," Foucault
expounds, "that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the working of institutions
which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize them in such a manner that the political
violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can
fight them. "4

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METHODOLOGY MINI-K

OnIy pure critique can soIve - disruption of the status quo frees theory from the
constraints of fact-sorting and opens thought to methodoIogicaI pIuraIism -
internaI-Iink turns their framework arguments
BIeiker, 2k
(Roland, Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, ambridge, Humboldt, Tampere,
Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal nstitute of Technology and the
nstitute of Social Sudies in The Hague, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, ambridge
University Press)
What Iollows may thus be called 'disr:ptive writing', a process that Shapiro describes as tackling an iss:e not by
way of well-reearsed debates, b:t tro:g an alternative set of texts and narratives. 46 My analysis
juxtaposes Iamiliar images oI agency in global politics, such as the collapse oI the Berlin Wall, with relatively
unusual sites oI investigation, such as Renaissance perceptions oI dissent or contemporary poetics. Te objective of
tis disr:ptive process is not to declare alternative for2s of knowledge tr:e or even s:perior, b:t to reveal
wat as been disc:ssed above: tat te nat:re of international relations is intrinsically linked to te stories
tat are being told abo:t it, and tat an :nsettling of tese stories as te potential to redirect te teory and
practice of global politics.
Disr:ptive writing dist:rbs. It inevitably creates anxieties. Max Horkheimer observed halI a century ago that
widespread ostility e2erges as soon as teorists fail to li2it te2selves to verifying facts and ordering te2
into fa2iliar categories categories which are indispensable Ior the sustenance oI entrenched Iorms oI liIe. 47
Likewise, a disr:ptive reading of agency in global politics will not be 2et wit :nifor2 approval. Tere are
tose wo are concerned wit 2aintaining te proper episte2ological bo:ndaries of a coerent and
selfcontained discipline. Jack Levy, Ior instance, deIends a distinct separation between the work oI historians and
international relations scholars. The Iormer, he points out, use theory 'primarily to structure their interpretations oI
particular events'. The latter, by contrast, are political scientists whose task is to 'Iormulate and test general
theoretical propositions about relationships between variables and classes oI events'. 48 Ens:ing 2etodological
principles, wic are strongly infl:enced by a positivist :nderstanding of social dyna2ics, ave often been
disc:ssed in te context of te level of analysis proble2. Tat is, tey ave been evoked to deter2ine wat is
and is not a proper s:bject-st:dy of international relations. Barry Buzan convincingly points out that such
approaches, which have become particularly inIluential in orth American academia, Iail to see that there are two
diIIerent issues at stake. On one side are ontological q:estions tat ave to do wit deter2ining te proper
:nits of analysis (individ:als, state, syste2, etc.), and on te oter side are episte2ological q:estions tat
concern te proper researc 2etod, te 2anner in wic one explains te :nits' beavio:r. 49 By combining
these two Iorms oI delineating theoretical and analytical activities, the discipline oI international relations has turned
into a rather narrowly sketched Iield oI inquiry. foc:s tat is all too often confined to states and syste2ic
factors is f:rter restricted by li2its i2posed on te types of knowledge tat are considered legiti2ate to
:nderstand global politics. Consider how a group oI highly inIluential scholars argue that the objective oI proper
research is 'to learn Iacts about the world' and that all hypotheses about them 'need to be evaluated empirically
beIore they can make a contribution to knowledge'. 50 s soon as tese episte2ological bo:ndaries are
transgressed, anxieties e2erge and defensive 2ecanis2s beco2e operative. Te warning against s:c
transgressions is lo:d and clear: ' proposed topic tat cannot be refined into a specific researc project
per2itting valid descriptive or ca:sal interference so:ld be 2odified along te way or abandoned.' 51
disr:ptive reading and writing of the agency problematique in international theory co2bines a co22it2ent to
2etodological pl:ralis2 wit an interdisciplinary and 2:lti-layered :nderstanding of transversal str:ggles.
International relations, then, is to be treated primarily as a broadly sketched theme oI inquiry, rather than a
disciplinary set oI rules that determine where to locate and how to study global politics.
Gazing beyond te bo:ndaries of disciplinary knowledge is necessary to open :p q:estions of transversal
dissent and :2an agency. cade2ic disciplines, by virt:e of wat tey are, discipline te prod:ction and
diff:sion of knowledge. Tey establis te r:les of intellect:al excange and define te 2etods, tecniq:es
and instr:2ents tat are considered proper for tis p:rpose. S:c conventions not only s:ggest on wat
gro:nd tings can be st:died legiti2ately, b:t also decide wat iss:es are wortwile to be assessed in te
first place.
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SPECIFIC INTELLECT&ALISM T&RN

Their definition of specific inteIIectuaIism is wrong - specific inteIIectuaIs are
those who hoId power (the hard-scientists), not those who engage it
(astrosocioIogists/debaters). This turns their framework
Rabinow, 84
(Paul, Professor of Anthropology at the University of alifornia (Berkeley), Director of the Anthropology of
the ontemporary Research ollaboratory (AR), The Foucault #eader, ntroduction, p23, NKN)

But Foucault is not a biologist or a physicist, a man of science, either . Such scientists occupy the key
positions of the "specific intellectual" (Foucault's term for those sectorial specialists on whom our future
depends and who must speak to us from their laboratories ) . Their voices are given an authority because
their work and our fate are intertwined, not because they have any special claim to represent reason .
The specific intellectual is "he who, along with a handful of others, has at his disposal, whether in the
service of the state or against it, powers which can either benefit or irrevocably destroy life . He is no
longer the rhapsodist of the eternal, but the strategist of life and death . " 33 As a professor who holds the
hair of the History of Systems of Thought at the ollege de France, Foucault is clearly not without a
certain prestige, yet he is obviously not a "strategist of life and death"-even if he has become their
historian .

**We do not endorse and we apologize for the gendered language Foucault uses

POLICY CASE DEFENSE
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1NC FRONTLINE - ASTEROID IMPACT

1. Zero impact to asteroids - either too improbabIe or too smaII to matter
Bennett, 10
[James, Eminent Scholar and William P. Snavely Professor of Political Economy and Public Policy at
George ason University, and Director of The John . Olin nstitute for Employment Practice and Policy,
"The hicken Littles of Big Science; or, Here ome the Killer Asteroids! THE DOOSDAY LOBBY 2010,
139-185, DO: 10.1007/978-1-4419-6685-8_6]

The smaIIest faIIing bodies, those with diameters under a few meters, are of "no practicaI concern, says
hapman, and in fact they are to be desired, at least by those who keep their eyes on the skies watching for brilliant fireballs whose
burning up in the atmosphere provides a show far more spectacular than the most lavish Fourth of July fireworks. Even bodies
with diameters of 10-30 meters, of which hapman estimates six may faII to earth in a century, cause
IittIe more than broken windows. They expIode too high in the atmosphere to cause serious harm. The
next largest potential strikers of Earth are those in the Tunguska range of 30 meters100 meters. The shock waves from the
atmospheric explosion wouId "toppIe trees, wooden structures and ignit[e] fires within 10 kilometers, writes hapman.
Human deaths could result if the explosion took place over a populated area. Though hapman estimates the likelihood of a
Tunguska occurring in any given century at four in ten, it is worth noting that there is no evidence that such an
expIosion has kiIIed a singIe human being in aII of recorded history. Either we're overdue or that 40 percent
is high. oreover, given that the Iocation of such an expIosion is utterIy unpredictabIe, it wouId be far
more IikeIy to happen over an ocean or a desert than over, say, Tokyo or anhattan. The after effects
wouId be minimaI, and hapman says that "nothing practicaI can be done about this modest hazard
other than to clean up after the event. n fact, "It makes no sense to pIan ahead for such a modest disaster.
other than educating the public about the possibility. The cost of a teIescopic survey capabIe of picking up
bodies of such diminutive size wouId be prohibitive. t would be the ultimate Astronomers Full Employment Act. A
body of 100 meters-300 meters in diameter wouId either expIode at Iow aItitude or upon impact with
the ground; it would be "regionally devastating, but Chapman pegs the chances of such a catastrophe at 1
percent per century. A smaII nation couId be destroyed by the impact of a body of 300 meters-1
km in diameter, or a "flying mountain of sorts, which would explode with energy yield ten times more than "the largest
thermonuclear bomb ever tested. f striking land, it would carve out a crater deeper than the Grand anyon. f it hit a populated
area, the death toll could be in the hundreds of thousands. The likelihood of such a collision hapman estimates at 0.2 percent per
century. An asteroid or comet of 13 kilometers in diameter would cause "major regional destruction, possibly verging on
"civilization-destruction level. hapman puts the chances of this at 0.02 percent per century. The impact of a body more than 3
kilometers in diameter might plunge the Earth into a new Dark Age, killing most of its inhabitants, though the chances of this are
"extremely remote less than one in 50,000 per century. Finally, mass extinction wouId IikeIy occur shouId a
body greater than 10 kiIometers pay us a visit, though the chances of this are Iess than one in a
miIIion every century, or so infinitesimaI that even the most worry-wracked hypochondriac wiII not
Iose sIeep over the possibiIity. n fact, for any impact with a Chapman-caIcuIated IikeIihood of Iess
than one in a thousand per century, he concedes that there is "IittIe justification for mounting
asteroid-specific mitigation measures." The chance of a civiIization-ender is so remote that he
counseIs no "advance preparations or almost none. For hapman recommends further study of NEOs, as well as
investigation into methods of their diversion. 82 This is exactly what the NEO lobby wants.

2. Status quo surveys soIve for extinction-IeveI asteroids
Morrison, 10
[David, Director, arl Sagan enter for Study of Life in the Universe, " mpacts and Evolution: Protecting
Earth from Asteroids,
PROEEDNGS OF THE AERAN PHLOSOPHAL SOETY VOL. 154, NO. 4, DEEBER 2010,
http://www.amphilsoc.org/sites/default/files/1540404.pdf]

Although the impact hazard was treated with substantial skepticism two decades ago when surveys
were i rst proposed, it has become conventionaI wisdom that we should carry out the Spaceguard
Survey for asteroids large enough to threaten global disaster (e.g., Posner 2004; larke 2007; Slovic
2007; orrison 2007). The question whether need a much more expensive survey for sub-km asteroids is
still being debated, however (Atkinson et al. 2000; hapman 2000, 2007a; orrison et al. 2003; Stokes
2003; Sidle 2007; NR Report 2010). As the originaI Spaceguard Survey goaIs are within reach, the
residual hazard lies in the few undiscovered asteroids larger than 1 km and in the sparsely sampled sub-
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km asteroids. The largest hazard will be from tsunamis caused by impactors several hundred meters in
diameter, but this is primarily a risk to property since fatalities can be greatly reduced by the application of
tsunami warning systems. The most life-threatening hazard from sub-km impacts is associated with
airbursts over land. The survey results have already transformed our understanding of the impact risk.
For asteroids with diameter of 5 km or more, which is roughIy the threshoId for an extinction
event, our knowIedge is compIete today. Astronomers have aIready assured us that we are not
due for an extinction-IeveI impact from an asteroid within the next century. Barring a very unlikely
strike by a large comet, we are not about to go the way of the dinosaurs. Thus, the rest of this paper
focuses on the more frequent impacts by asteroids with diameters from 5 km down to the atmospheric
cut-off at about 50 m diameter, spanning the range from global catastrophic disasters at the top end down
to local endurable disasters at the lower end of the energy range.

3. SeIf-interest means we won't defIect
Schweickart, 4
[Russell, AAA Associate Fellow, hairman, B612 Foundation, " THE REAL DEFLETON DLEA,
2004 Planetary Defense onference: Protecting Earth from Asteroids Orange ounty, alifornia February
23-26, 2004 ]

This chaIIenge is, by its nature, international. While there is the exceptional circumstance where the defIection path
wiII lie entirely within the bounds of a single nation state, the general case is one where the path of risk will cross several, or
even many, nationaI borders. t would therefore seem appropriate that the many legal and risk sharing issues embedded in
deflecting asteroids be addressed by either the United Nations or some other authoritative international policy institution. The
timing for such poIicy consideration is a chaIIenging issue in itseIf. The quaIity of information on a
pending NEO impact is highIy variabIe over time. t ranges from a surprise impact with no prior knowledge to the
case of 1950 DA 2 where we know today that there is a probability between 0 and 0.33% that this 1.1 km asteroid will impact Earth
on arch 16, 2880. For all other known NEOs between these two cases we can only state that with the exception of ~ 45 of them
the remaining 2700 pose no threat to the Earth for the next 100 years. The residual 45 pose a very small but non-zero threat of an
Earth impact at various times within the next 100 years. The issue then, of what wiII we know and when wiII we
know it, becomes extremeIy criticaI to the timing and development of a coordinated international public policy on
the NEO environmental threat. The naturaI temptation with such an improbabIe event is to wait untiI it
becomes either a certainty or near-certainty before addressing it seriously. The price that wouId be paid
for such an avoidance option in this instance wiII be the wieIding of extreme seIfserving nationaI
infIuence in the policy making process. f, e.g., it is discovered that a modest NEO wiII impact in Japan and
that the defIection path wouId take it across Korea and over Beijing and hina prior to liftoff, one can
easiIy imagine the difficuIty in onIy then initiating internationaI deIiberations on appropriate deflection
policies. learly, rational mission planning criteria and risk sharing policies should be discussed and even put into formal treaty
documents well before the specifics of a particular impact come to light. Objective evaluation of risk trade-offs and rational mission
design will be far easier to achieve in such a proactive environment than in the power-politics confrontation that would dominate a
wait and see alternative. An even more difficult, though similar, situation applies to the considerations of mission execution. What
agency or agencies of any national government will be trusted to "truck a 100+ T bomb across the countryside in order to
eliminate certain devastation in a neighboring country? ould one seriously imagine today the U.S. DoD being accepted by the
world as the responsible agency for deflecting an asteroid from an impact in Afghanistan when the path of deflection would take it
directly across Tehran? Of course this is a highly improbable example, but the IikeIihood that similar poIiticaI
considerations wiII not exist when we discover a probabIe NEO impact is dangerous wishfuI
thinking. ONLUSON The Real DefIection DiIemma wiII arise when the peopIe of Earth awake to
discover that a near Earth asteroid is headed for an impact with the pIanet. t will present itself as a terrible
choice; do nothing to prevent it and suffer the consequences, or mount a mission to defIect it from
impact thereby, in the process, pIacing a swath of peopIe and property not otherwise at risk in jeopardy.
n a very real sense, however, we are aIready ensnared in this diIemma, for we all know that such a moment in time
will come. Therefore our own Real Deflection Dilemma is whether to confront the intractable policy choices implicit in protecting the
Earth from asteroids now, or to avoid this terrible responsibility and force some future generation to face them in reaI time
when they wiII become all but impossibIe to resoIve

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EXT 1 - NO ASTEROID RISK

Err Neg - Aff authors exaggerate
Bennett, 10
139-185, DO: 10.1007/978-1-4419-6685-8_6]

We shouId here acknowIedge, without necessarily casting aspersions on any of the papers discussed in this chapter, the
tendency of scientific journaIs to pubIish sexy articIes. (Sexy, at least, by the decidedly unsexy standards of
scientific journals.) Writing in the Public Library of Science, Neal S. Young of the National nstitutes of Health, John P.A. oannidis of
the Biomedical Research nstitute in Greece, and Omar Al-Ubaydli of George ason University applied what economists call the
"winner's curse of auction theory to scientific publishing. Just as the winner in, say, an auction of oil drilling rights is the firm that has
made the highest estimation often overestimation of a reserve's size and capacity, so those papers that are seIected
for pubIication in the eIite journaIs of science are often those with the most "extreme, spectacuIar
resuIts. 63 These papers may make headIines in the mainstream press, which Ieads to greater
poIiticaI pressure to fund projects and programs congruent with these extreme findings. As The Economist
put it in an article presenting the argument of Young, oannidis, and Al-Ubaydli, "Hundreds of thousands of scientific researchers are
hired, promoted and funded according not only to how much work they produce, but also where it gets published. CoIumn
inches in journaIs such as Nature and Science are coveted; authors understand fuII weII that studies with
spectacuIar resuIts are more IikeIy to be pubIished than are those that wiII not Iead to a wire story.
The problem, though, is that these fIashy papers with dramatic resuIts often "turn out to be faIse." 64 n a
2005 paper in the Journal of the American edical Association, Dr. oannidis found that "of the 49 most-cited papers on the
effectiveness of medical interventions, published in highly visible journals in 19902004. a quarter of the randomised trials and five
of six nonrandomised studies had already been contradicted or found to have been exaggerated by 2005. Thus, those who pay the
price of the winner's curse in scientific research are those, whether sick patients or beggared taxpayers, who are forced to either
submit to or fund specious science, medical or otherwise. The trio of authors call the implications of this finding "dire, pointing to a
2008 158 6 The hicken Littles of Big Science; or, Here ome the Killer Asteroids! paper in the New England Journal of edicine
showing that "almost all trials of anti-depressant medicines that had had positive results had been published, while almost all trials
of anti-depressants that had come up with negative results "remained either unpublished or were published with the results
presented so that they would appear 'positive.' Young, oannidis, and Al-Ubaydli conclude that "science is hard work with limited
rewards and only occasional successes. ts interest and importance should speak for themselves, without hyperbole. EIite
journaIs, conscious of the need to attract attention and stay reIevant, cutting edge, and avoid the
curse of stodginess, are prone to pubIish gross exaggeration and findings of dubious merit. When
lawmakers and grant-givers take their cues from these journals, as they do, those tax dollars ostensibly devoted to the pursuit of
pure science and the application of scientific research are diverted down unprofitable, even impossible channels. The charlatans
make names for themselves, projects of questionable merit grow fat on the public purse, and the disconnect between what is real
and what subsidy-seekers tell us is real gets ever wider. 65 The matter, or manipuIation, of odds in regards to a
coIIision between a space rock and Earth wouId do Jimmy the Greek proud. As ichael B. Gerrard writes
in Risk Analysis in an article assessing the relative allocation of public funds to hazardous waste site cleanup and protection against
killer comets and asteroids, "Asteroids and comets are. the uItimate exampIe of a Iow-probabiIity/high-
consequence event: no one in recorded human history is confirmed to have ever died from one.
Gerrard writes that "several billion people will die as the result of an impact "at some time in the coming half million years, although
that half-million year time-frame is considerably shorter than the generally accepted extinction-event period. 66 The expected
deaths from a coIIision with an asteroid of, say, one kilometer or more in diameter are so huge that by
jacking up the tiny possibiIity of such an event even a IittIe bit the annuaI death rate of this never-
beforeexperienced disaster exceeds deaths in plane crashes, earthquakes, and other actuaI reaI Iive
dangers. Death rates from outIandish or unusuaI causes are fairIy steady across the years. About
120 Americans die in airplane crashes annually, and about 90 more die of lightning strikes. Perhaps five might die in
garage-door opener accidents. The totaI number of deaths in any given year by asteroid or meteor
impact is zero holding constant since the dawn of recorded time

You overexaggerate by a factor of 10,000
Bennett, 10
139-185, DO: 10.1007/978-1-4419-6685-8_6]
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The cIosest thing to an impact even distantIy reIated to the "catastrophic" occurred just over a
century ago. n June 1908, in an event that is central (because seemingly unique in modern times) to the killer asteroid/comet
lobby, the so-called Tunguska asteroid, 70 yards (60 meters) in length, exploded about 8 kilometers above the ground in remote
Siberia. ts explosion unleashed 20 or more megatons of energy and "flattened about 2,000 square kilometers of forest. 30 No
human casualties were reported, as this was an unpopulated spot in Siberia. Sharon Begley of Newsweek once quoted John Pike of
the Federation of American Scientists as saying that a Tunguska-sized rock from outer space could kill 70,000 people if it hit in rural
American and 300,000 if it struck an urban area. 31 aybe. Although it helps to remember that a Tunguska-sized rock did hit the
Earth a century ago, and its human death toII was a nice round number: zero. Does Tunguska have antecedents?
As Gregg Easterbrook elucidated in the Atlantic onthly, geophysicist Dallas Abbott of olumbia University has argued that space
rocks of, respectively, 35 kilometers and 300 meters struck the ndian Ocean around 2800 B.. and the Gulf of arpentaria in 536
A.D. 32 The latter led to poor harvests and cold summers for two years, while the former may have unleashed a planetary flood.
Abbott's evidence is a crater 18 miles in diameter at the bottom of the ndian Ocean, the impact from which she believes a 600-foot-
high tsunami wracked incredible devastation. t should be noted, as the New York Times did, that "Most astronomers doubt
that any Iarge comets or asteroids have crashed into the Earth in the Iast 10,000 years. Abbott and
what she calls her "band of misfits in the Holocene mpact Working Group take a decidedly minority view of the matter, and
while that does not mean that they are wrong, it does mean that their alternative estimation of the frequency of 10-
Megaton-size impacts once every 1,000 or so years as opposed to the more generaIIy accepted
once every miIIion years - shouId be viewed with great skepticism. 33 (Easterbrook, ignoring the majority of
scientists who dispute Abbott's contentions, concludes that "Our solar system appears to be a far more dangerous place than was
previously believed.) Easterbrook is a fine science writer but his piece contains certain telltale phrases (100-kilometers asteroids
are "planet killers and NASA's asteroid and comet-hunting efforts are "underfunded) that point to an expensive conclusion. He
takes up the cause of Dallas Abbott, who complains that "The NASA people don't want to believe me. They won't even listen.
onsider this quote: After noting that scientists estimate that a "dangerous" object strikes the Earth every
300,000 to one miIIion years, Easterbrook asks William Ailor of The Aerospace orporation, "a think tank for the Air Force,
what his assessment of the risk is. Ailor's answer: "a one-in-10 chance per century. 3

Risk is aImost niI and civiI defense soIves
Rozeff, 7
[ichael, retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York. February 21, 2007, " Asteroid
Risk itigation, Anyone?, http://www.lewrockwell.com/rozeff/rozeff139.html]

The space fliers and explorers of the ASE pass themselves off as experts on the risks of a
catastrophe arriving from outer space; but they are far more IikeIy to be biased observers and
commentators than scientists who have no space axe to grind. Robert Roy Britt writes for Live Science.
n an article posted two years ago, he pointed out many pertinent facts. At that time, he gave the Iifetime
odds (over one's entire life) of an asteroid hit as 1 in 200,000 or perhaps as little as 1 in 500,000.
Death by Iightning has odds of 1 in 84,000, by legal execution 1 in 59,000, by air travel 1 in 20,000, by
fire 1 in 1,100, by faIIing down 1 in 246, and by suicide 1 in 121. He pointed out that there are those
who have heId to asteroid death odds of 1 in 50,000, however, untiI more asteroids are cataIogued
and their movements accounted for. Even at 1 in 50,000, the risk is very Iow. Famine, disease, and
war are the biggest kiIIers on the pIanet and occur constantly. Two of these are preventable, and one
can be ameliorated.
The ASE is making noises about an asteroid 140 meters long called Apophis. Astronomers say that it has a chance of striking the
earth on April 13, 2036. This will be a Palm Sunday. The odds noised about in the recent spate of articles are 1 in 45,000 that it hits
the earth. t's supposed to miss us by 20,000 miles. f it does hit, the damage could be large, depending on many factors. f it landed
in the Pacific Ocean, a likely target, it would create 50-foot tidal waves lasting an hour. The odds of being killed are far lower, as
Britt notes, and they vary depending upon where one lives. In the worst eventuaIity that Apophis hit
the earth, the area of impact wouId by the time it headed for earth be pinpointed. PeopIe couId
then evacuate that area, and the death toII couId be greatIy reduced. The stated odds do not take
human action into account.

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A2: PANIC -> N&CLEAR WAR

Best evidence proves no panic
CIarke, 2
[ Lee larke, professor of sociology at Rutgers University, and the author of Worst ases; Terror and
atastrophe in the Popular magination, "Panic: yth or Reality? ontexts; Fall 2002; 1, 3; Social
Science odule]

panic facts Panicky behavior is rare. t was rare even among residents of German and Japanese cities
that were bombed during WorId War II. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, established in 1944 to study the effects of
aerial attacks, chronicled the unspeakable horrors, terror and anguish of people in cities devastated by firestorms and nuclear
attacks. Researchers found that, excepting some uncontrolled flight from the Tokyo firestorm, little chaos occurred An
enormous amount of research on how peopIe respond to extreme events has been done by the Disaster
Research enter, now at the University of Delaware. After five decades studying scores of disasters such as
floods, earthquakes and tornadoes, one of the strongest findings is that peopIe rareIy Iose controI. When the
ground shakes, sometimes dwellings crumble, fires rage, and people are crushed. Yet people do not run screaming through the
streets in a wild attempt to escape the terror, even though they are undoubtedly feeling terror. Earthquakes and tornadoes wreak
havoc on entire communities. Yet peopIe do not usuaIIy turn against their neighbors or suddenIy forget
personaI ties and moraI commitments. nstead the more consistent pattern is that peopIe bind
together in the aftermath of disasters, working together to restore their physical environment and their
culture to recognizable shapes. onsider a few cases where we might have expected people to panic. The first, investigated by
Norris Johnson, happened during emorial Day weekend in 1977, when 165 people perished trying to escape a fire at the Beverly
Hills Supper lub in Southgate. Kentucky. The supper club case recalls the fire-in-the-theater concept in which panic supposedly
causes more deaths than the failure to escape in time. Roughly 1,200 people were in the club's abaret Room, which had three
exits. Two exits were to the side and led outdoors, and one was in the front and led to another part of the dub. When the clubs
personnel, having discovered fire in the building, started telling customers to leave, a handful of people went to the front entrance
while the others started filing calmly out of the other exits. However, the people who tried to get out of the front entrance soon ran
into smoke and fire, so they returned to the abaret Room. Survivors reported feeling frightened, but few acted out their fear.
People were initially calm as they lined up at the two side exrts, near which all of the deaths occurred. When smoke and fire started
pouring into the abaret Room, some began screaming and others began pushing. As fire entered the room, some people jumped
over tables and chairs to get out. Notice what they did not do They did not pick up those chairs and use them to strike people
queued up in front of them. They did not grab their hair and shove them aside in a desperate rush to get out. They did not
overpower those more helpless than themselves. They did not act blindly in their own self-interest. n Kentucky, few people acted
out a panic. ndeed, had people developed a sense of urgency sooner, more would have gotten out and fewer would have died.
Panic was probably not the cause of any of the deaths, ft is more accurate to say that the building layout was inadequate for
emergencies. The second case, also researched by Johnson, happened in December 1979 at the Riverfront oliseum (as it was
then called) m incinnati, where 11 people were killed at a rock concert by The Who. The concertgoers were killed in a crush that
was popularly perceived as a panic. The reality was far different. Approximately 8.000 people were waiting for the concert, but the
building was not built to accommodate that many people waiting at once. After the doors opened, about 25 people fell. Witnesses
say there was little panic. n fact, people tried to protect those who had fallen by creating a human cordon around them. But the
push of the people behind was too strong. The crowd trampled the 25 people out of ignorance rather than panic. Like the Beverly
Hills club, incinnati's Riverfront oliseum was not designed to fail gracefully. Users would be safe as long as they arrived in
anticipated numbers and behaved in ways designers had anticipated. onsider, also, the tragic flight of American Airlines 1420. n
Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1,1999, Flight 1420 tried to land in a severe thunderstorm. As the pilots approached, they couldn't
line the plane up with the runway and by the time they righted the craft they were coming in too fast and too hard. Seconds after the
plane touched down, it started sliding and didn't stop until after lights at the end of the runway tore it open. The plane burst into
flames, and 11 of the 145 aboard were killed. The National Transportation Safety Board's "Survival Factors Factual Report" has
more than 30 pages of survivor testimony. ost survivors who were asked about panic said there was none. nstead there were
stores of people helping their spouses, flight attendants helping passengers, and strangers saving each other's lives. One fellow
said that after the plane came to rest "panic set in." But his description of subsequent events doesn't look much like panic. Having
discovered the back exit blocked, he found a hole in the fuselage. Then, "he and several men." says the report, "tried to pull the exit
open further." He then allowed a flight attendant and "six to eight people" to get out before he did. Another passenger said that
people panicked somewhat. But in his telling, too, people worked together to push an exit door open. He himself helped pick up a
row of seats that had fallen atop a woman. As "smoke completely filled the cabin from floor to ceiling." people could barely see or
breathe; yet they "were in a single file line [and] there was no pushing and shoving." We would not expect that much order if
everyone was panicking. The same message rises from the rubble of the World Trade enter. Television showed images of people
running away from the falling towers, apparently panic-stricken. But surely no one would describe their flight as evincing "excessive
fear" or" injudicious effort." Some survivors told of people being trampled in the mass exodus, but those reports are unusual. ore
common are stories such as the one from an information architect whose subway was arriving underneath the Trade enter just as
the first plane crashed. He found himself on the north side of the complex, toward the Hudson River; "'m looking around and
studying the people watching. would say that 95 percent are completely calm. A few are grieving heavily and a few are running, but
the rest were very calm. Walking. No shoving and no panic." We now know that aImost everyone in the Trade
Center Towers survived if they were beIow the fIoors where the airpIanes struck. That is in Iarge
measure because peopIe did not become hystericaI but instead created a successful evacuation. Absent a full
survey of disasters, we do not have statistical evidence that chaotic panic is rare, but consider the views of E. L. QuaranteIIi.
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co-founder of the Disaster Research Center and a don of disaster research. He recently concIuded (in
correspondence to me) that "I no Ionger beIieve the term 'panic" shouId be treated as a sociaI science
concept. t is a label taken from popular discourse... During the whoIe history of [our] research invoIving nearIy
700 different fieId studies, I wouId be hard pressed to cite... but a very few marginal instances of anything
that couId be caIIed panic behavior." panic rules That peopIe in great periI usuaIIy heIp others, even
strangers, seems to contradict common sense. t also contradicts the idea that people are naturally self-interested. f people are
so self-regarding, why do they act altruistically when their very lives are at stake? One answer is that people sometimes act
irrationally by going against what is in their best interests. From this view, the men on American Airlines Flight 1420 were not
exercising sound judgment when they helped free the woman whose legs were pinned. They could have used the time to save
themselves. f cases like this were rare, it might be reasonable to call such behavior irrational. But they're not rare, and there is a
better explanation of them than irrationality. When the World Trade enter started to burn, the standards of civility that people
carried around with them every day did not suddenly dissipate. The rules of behavior in extreme situations are not much different
from rules of ordinary life. People die the same way they live, with friends, loved ones and colleaguesin communities. When
danger arises, the ruleas in normal situationsis for people to help those next to them before they help themselves. At the
Supper lub fire and The Who concert, people first helped their friends and family. As we have seen, people help strangers. That's
one of the big lessons from the World Trade enter. Such behavior seems odd only if we're all naturally selfish. nstead, an
externaI threat can create a sense of 'we-ness' among those who are simiIarIy threatened.
Disasters, like other social situations, have rules, and people generally follow them. They are not special rules, even though
disasters are special situations. The rules are the same ones at work when the theater is not on fire. Human nature is social, not
individually egoistic. People are naturally social, and calamities often strengthen sociaI bonds.

Err neg on risk - panic is highIy unIikeIy
Chapman, 4
[lark, Southwest Research nstitute, Boulder O, "The hazard of near-Earth asteroid impacts on earth
Earth and Planetary Science Letters 222 (2004) 1 15 ]

The practical, pubIic impIications and requirements of the impact hazard are characterized by its
uncertainty and ''iffy'' nature. Yet, the chief scientific evaIuations of the hazard, and thus (because of the
subject's popularity) its public promulgation in the news, is skewed with respect to reaIity. n the last few years, many
peer-reviewed papers have been published (often with popular commentaries and even NN crawlers) about how many >1-km
NEAs there are, ranging from lows of f 700 [71] to highs approaching 1300. Yet far Iess attention is paid (although not quite
none at all (e.g., [72]) to the much greater uncertainties in environmentaI effects of impacts. And there is
essentiaIIy no serious, funded research concerning the Iargest sources of uncertaintythose
concerning the psychoIogy, socioIogy and economics of such extreme disasters which truly
determine whether this hazard is of academic interest only or, instead, might shape the course of history. For
example, many astronomers and geophysicists, who are amateurs in risk perception and disaster
management, assume that ''panic'' is a probabIe consequence of predicted or actual major asteroid impacts.
Yet some sociaI scientists (e.g., [73]) have concIuded that peopIe rareIy panic in disasters. Such issues,
especially in a post-September 11th terrorism context, could be more central to prioritizing the impact hazard than anything earth
and space scientists can do. f an actual Earthtargeted body is found, it will be the engineers and disaster managers whose
expertise will suddenly be in demand.

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A2: HIGH RISK OF SMALL ASTEROIDS

Even smaII asteroids onIy hit once in 10,000 years
Morrison et. aI, 3
[orrison, D., NASA Astrobiology nstitute, A. W. Harris, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, G. Sommer,
RAND orporation, . R. hapman, Southwest Research nstitute, and A. arusi, stituto di Astrofisica
Spaziale, Roma, Dealing with the impact hazard. n Asteroids , ed. W. Bottke, A. ellino, P. Paolicchi,
and R. P. Binzel, 73954. 2003. University of Arizona Press. ]

While most of the data are approximately consistent with a power law, the Iunar-derived NEO
popuIation curve of Werner et al. (2002) shows an obvious departure, usually interpreted as a shortage
of smaII (diameter less than a few hundred meters) impactors, although it might also suggest an early
excess of large asteroids or comets not currently represented in the NEA flux. nterpreted in the usual
way, however, the lunar curve indicates that the frequency of Tunguska-size impactors is roughIy
one per 10,000 yr, more than an order of magnitude beIow the usuaIIy quoted frequency of such
impacts, and a surprising result given that we experienced such an event within the Iast century.
We don't know where the problem lies, but we suggest that the NEA population derived by Werner et al.
from the lunar cratering statistics warrants consideration of alternative interpretations of the data

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EXT 2 - SQ&O S&RVEYS SOLVE

The risk is zero - current surveys are adequate
Harris, 8
[Alan, senior research scientist with the Space Science nstitute, " What Spaceguard did, Nature 453,
1178-1179 (26 June 2008) ]

eanwhile the estimated risk of impact is dwindIing. n the very largest size range, asteroids about 10 kilometres in
diameter, the three already discovered are almost certainly all that exist. These would produce an impact similar to that which killed
the dinosaurs 65 million years ago, with an estimated impact interval of around 108 years roughly the last time dinosaurs walked
on Earth. Oddly, an object that might cause a Tunguska-like event roughly 50 metres in diameter should collide with Earth only
about every 1,500 years, and the last event we saw was only 100 years ago. Recently, ark Boslough at Sandia National
Laboratories, in Albuquerque, New exico, suggested that the energy of the Tunguska event may have been as low as 3
megatonnes6. That adjustment reduces the expected time between similar events to perhaps about once in 500 years, still leaving
the chances of an event within a century as unlikely. 'Statistics of one' cannot be held too rigorously to formal probability estimates,
but our view of the skies has produced a strong predictor for the frequency of impacts. t is so strong, in fact, that it could and should
rule out some suggestions of past impacts such as the multiple kilometre-sized objects claimed by some to have pelted Earth during
the Holocene period7. Such an event is inconsistent with what we see in the skies, by about two orders of magnitude. Another
NASA study8 in 2003, estimated the expected damage from impacts of various sizes. Using those values of expected damage, and
the impact frequency from the newly derived population (Fig. 1), estimated the 'risk spectrum' of impacts over the entire size range
of those that can penetrate the atmosphere. Figure 2 shows that 'spectrum', first for the entire population, that is, the 'intrinsic risk'
before any NEOs had been discovered, and secondly the 'residual risk' from the fraction of the NEO population that remains
undiscovered. Since the objects that have been discovered have been found to have no, or a vanishingly small, probability of hitting
Earth in the next 50 or more years, we can think of that fraction of the intrinsic risk as 'retired' for the short term over which we can
predict impact trajectories, about a human lifetime. Figure 2 shows that the risk from Iarge impacts the kind that
wouId cause gIobaI cIimatic disaster and potentiaIIy bring down our civiIization has been
dramaticaIIy reduced, by more than an order of magnitude. In the smaIIer size range, from several-
hundred-metre-diameter objects that could cause massive tsunamis if they crashed into an ocean, down to sub-hundred-metre
objects the size of that in the Tunguska event which could cause ground damage from airbursts current surveys have done
little to retire the risk. But the intrinsic risk from these events is very smaII, and in fact resembIes that of
other naturaI disasters such as tsunamis, earthquakes and voIcanic eruptions in that they do not
pose a gIobaI threat to Iife as we know it. n the 2003 NASA report8, the recommendation was made for a new
survey to reduce the assessed residuaI impact risk from objects Iess than 1 kiIometre in diameter by a
further order of magnitude. t was estimated at that time that to achieve this goal would require discovering 90% of NEOs larger than
140 metres in diameter. This has become the new mantra of survey plans9, but perhaps this shouId be reconsidered.
Because of the steep dip in the popuIation curve in the size range between about 50 metres and
about 500 metres, the intrinsic impact frequency, and hence the impact risk, is about three times
Iower than was estimated in the 2003 report. So, in a way, two-thirds of the risk assumed to exist in those
reports is gone aIready, without even Iooking at the sky. n the earlier reports, the 'residuaI risk' to be
addressed by a next-generation survey was assumed to be approximateIy 300 fataIities per year,
but using my new population estimate that figure drops to around 80 per year. In comparison to other risks
in life, this is negIigibIe. What is the risk that your death wiII come from the sky? Before the
Spaceguard Survey, it was thought to be comparable to the risk of dying in a commerciaI aeropIane
accident. CurrentIy, however, the residuaI risk from the remaining undiscovered NEOs is more
comparabIe to the risk of death from a fireworks accident (see graphic, previous page). At some point one has
to ask how far down we need to drive the residual risk, especially because the cost of doing so increases steeply as the size of
impactors decreases.

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EXT 3 - WON'T DEFLECT

Bureaucratic inertia means no defIection
Schweickart, 4
[Russel, hairman B612 Foundation, " Asteroid Deflection: An nternational hallenge, Presented at the
World Federation of Scientists meeting of the ultidisciplinary ore Group on Planetary Emergencies,
Rome, taly, December 2004]

n any event, the minimal policy decision involved in any asteroid deflection would be whether to deflect it at all or simply suffer the
consequences of the nominal impact. f the incoming asteroid were on the order of 100 meters in diameter the resultant impact
would be on the order of 80 T and the resulting damage could lie entirely within the borders of one nation. f this nation were not a
space faring nation who would respond to a request to mount such a mission? onversely if the nominal impact were located within
the borders of a space faring nation, would the risk to others along the deflection risk path deter that nation from mounting a
deflection mission? Who will make these decisions? Who will pay for a deflection mission? Who will be charged with the
responsibility for executing such a mission? How is liability to be assigned? Who will trade off local devastation vs. placing many
remote lives at slight risk? Who will determine the planning criteria? Who will monitor and/or control the deflection mission? These
and many other difficuIt and criticaI poIicy questions are impIicit in the concept of asteroid defIection.
n all but the exceptional case the choices to be made invoIve severaI, if not many, nations. The entire subject
is pIanetary in scope since asteroid impacts may (and eventually will) strike anywhere on the globe. An Alternative to
nstitutional nertia The easiest and perhaps most IikeIy course of action for internationaI institutions
facing questions of this kind is to simpIy avoid them. And yet, for those involved in the Spaceguard Survey and
others informed on the subject it is clear that addressing these choices onIy after the announcement of a
pending impact wiII resuIt in great contention, seIf serving argument, and power poIitics. Once a
specific P is determined the hope for rationale, equitabIe poIicies emerging from such a beIated undertaking
becomes futiIe. n the limit an asteroid impact which destroys all human civilization is possible, though extremely improbable.
No other natural disaster is capable of such destruction, and yet this natural hazard, unlike most others, can actually be prevented
by human intervention. We therefore face the daunting challenge of convincing the international community to plan for a highly
unlikely but devastating global event, and to do it now. Yet many more immediate probIems invoIving the Iives of
miIIions of peopIe face the internationaI community on virtuaIIy a continuous basis. It is "naturaI"
to avoid this issue. Risk situations characterized by extreme infrequency and devastating consequences
are difficuIt for individual human beings, let alone bureaucratic institutions to handIe. This is even more the
case when the questions to be addressed are so intractable and without precedent. Yet the time for rational policy
to be developed to guide behavior and prepare for such an eventuality is prior to the discovery of an asteroid actually bound for an
impact. The reality we face, however, is that there is about a one in twenty chance that within the next decade or so we may in fact
discover such a pending impact. Worse still, from the standpoint of alarming the public, is the much higher likelihood that in
completing the inventory of NEOs down to 100 meters, the astronomical community will in fact discover one or more objects
destined to pass within several Earth radii. The problem in this case will arise in that it may take many years before the telescopic
observations are able to distinguish between this near miss and an impact. During this period of time no one wiII be abIe to
state with certainty whether or not an impact is coming. This circumstance, with perhaps a 50/50
likelihood of occurrence, wiII be extremeIy frustrating to the professionaIs and alarming to the public.

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N&KE WAR O&TWEIGHS ASTEROIDS

Nuke war outweighs - guaranteed extinction
Toon et. aI, 97
[ Owen B. Toon 1 Kevin Zahnle David orrison NASA Ames Research enter offett Field, alifornia
Richard P. Turco Department of Atmospheric Sciences and nstitute of Geophysics and Planetary Physics
University of alifornia, Los Angeles urt ovey Environmental Programs Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory Livermore, alifornia, " ENVRONENTAL PERTURBATONS AUSED BY THE PATS
OF ASTERODS AND OETS, Reviews of Geophysics, 35, 1 / February 1997 pages 4178 ]

On the other hand, nucIear wars couId be worse in some ways than impacts that reIease comparable
or even substantiaIIy Iarger amounts of energy. In a nucIear war the infrastructure of societythe
transportation, communications, and energy supplieswouId be purposefuIIy targeted for
destruction. Much of the abiIity of society to raIIy for recovery wouId be intentionaIIy suppressed.
Although even a reIativeIy smaII impact may have the potentiaI to disrupt crop harvests for a year,
such an impact wouId be unIikeIy to destroy the worId's economic and transportation
infrastructure. t is therefore much more likely that society couId cope with the probIems foIIowing a
smaII impact better than it couId adjust to the probIems foIIowing a nucIear war. For instance, an
impact occurring in the southern hemisphere during the late fall of the northern hemisphere might lead to
crop loss in the southern hemisphere. However, enough food might still be stored in the northern
hemisphere and grown during the next harvest to make up for the agricultural losses in the southern
hemisphere, thereby alleviating mass starvation. However, for an impact rivaling the size of the K-T event,
global fres may rage that would destroy most structures and therefore make it impossible for portions of
society that still have food to help those that do not.

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AT: EMP

No impact to EMP
Fetzer and Dunn, 6
[J.R. Dunn is the author of a landmarkthree part series on the futurestrategies of jihad terrorism. Among
many other things, he was editor of the nternational ilitary Encyclopedia for twelve years, April 21, 2006
" The EP Threat: Electroagnetic Pulse Warfare,
http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/04/the_emp_threat_electromagnetic.html]

n fact, the universaI coIIapse envisioned as a resuIt of a high-aItitude EMP strike may be
impossibIe in any case. The situation has never been tested. The Starfish Prime results were an accident, one that
has never been repeated. No further tests could be made due to the omprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which forbade weapons tests
in the atmosphere or outer space, going into effect shortly afterward. Much of what we think we know about EMP
Iies in the reaIm of theory, with IittIe in the way of hard evidence. Some scientists beIieve that the
effect has been overrated. These incIude eIectromagnetic speciaIist Dr. William A. Radasky, who thinks
that disruptions wouId be minor and temporary. The puIse couId very weII be attenuated by
distance and other factors, some of which may be completely unknown to us at this time. Mountain ranges such as
the Rockies and the Sierra Nevadas couId provide considerabIe protection, along with various deep valleys around the
country. And in any case, the coIIapse wouId be weII short of 'universaI'. Even if everything went according to plan,
Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, Guam, Gitmo, and all the fleets and overseas bases would still be intact. In the worst case, the
&.S. wouId remain a reigning miIitary power. And with only a handful of suspects, it would not be long until the troops
paid a visit to the guilty party.

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AT: SOFT POWER ADD-ON

No impact - Soft power is useIess
Fan 7 (Ying, Senior Lecturer in arketing at Brunel Business School, Brunel University in London, "Soft
power: Power of attraction or confusion?, November 14)

Despite its popularity, the concept soft power remains a power of confusion. The definition is at best loose
and vague. Because of such confusion it is not surprising that the concept has been misunderstood,
misused and trivialised ( Joffe, 2006a ). riticisms of soft power centre mainly around three aspects: defi
nition, sources and limitations. There may be little or no relationship between the ubiquity of American
culture and its actual influence. Hundreds of millions of people around the world wear, listen, eat, drink,
watch and dance American, but they do not identify these accoutrements of their daily lives with America
( Joffe, 2006b ). To Purdy (2001) soft power is not a new reality, but rather a new word for the most effi
cient form of power. There are limits to what soft power could achieve. n a context dominated by hard
power considerations, soft power is meaningless ( Blechman, 2004 ). The dark side of soft power is
largely ignored by Nye. Excessive power, either hard or soft, may not be a good thing. n the affairs of
nations, too much hard power ends up breeding not submission but resistance. Likewise, big soft power
does not bend hearts; it twists minds in resentment and rage ( Joffe, 2006b ).
Nye's version of soft power that rests on affection and desire is too simplistic and unrealistic. Human
feelings are complicated and quite often ambivalent, that is, love and hate co-exist at the same time.
Even within the same group, people may like some aspects of American values, but hate others. By the
same token, soft power can also rest on fear ( heow, 2002 ) or on both affection and fear, depending on
the context. uch of hina ' soft power in south-east Asia testifi es to this. Another example is provided
by the mixed perception of the United States in hina: people generally admire American technological
superiority and super brands but detest its policies on Taiwan.

Empirics prove soft power faiIs
GreenwaId 10 (Abe, associate editor of OENTARY, "The Soft-Power Fallacy, July/August,
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/the-soft-power-fallacy-15466?page=2)

Like Francis Fukuyama's essay "The End of History, soft-power theory was a creative and appealing
attempt to make sense of America's global purpose. Unlike Fukuyama's theory, however, which the new
global order seemed to support for nearly a decade, Nye's was basically refuted by world events in its
very first year. n the summer of 1990, a massive contingent of Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait
and effectively annexed it as a province of raq. Although months earlier Nye had asserted that
"geography, population, and raw materials are becoming somewhat less important, the fact is that
Saddam invaded Kuwait because of its geographic proximity, insubstantial military, and plentiful oil
reserves. Despite Nye's claim that "the definition of power is losing its emphasis on military force, months
of concerted international pressure, including the passage of a UN resolution, failed to persuade Saddam
to withdraw. n the end, only overwhelming American military power succeeded in liberating Kuwait. The
American show of force also succeeded in establishing the U.S. as the single, unrivaled postold War
superpower.
Following the First Gulf War, the 1990s saw brutal acts of aggression in the Balkans: the Bosnian War in
1992 and the Kosovo conflicts beginning in 1998. These raged on despite international negotiations and
were quelled only after America took the lead in military actions. t is also worth noting that attempts to
internationalize these efforts made them more costly in time, effectiveness, and manpower than if the
U.S. had acted unilaterally.
Additionally, the 1990s left little mystery as to how cataclysmic events unfold when the U.S. declines to
apply traditional tools of power overseas. n April 1994, Hutu rebels began the indiscriminate killing of
Tutsis in Rwanda. As the violence escalated, the United Nations's peacekeeping forces stood down so as
not to violate a UN mandate prohibiting intervention in a country's internal politics. Washington followed
suit, refusing even to consider deploying forces to East-entral Africa. By the time the killing was done, in
July of the same year, Hutus had slaughtered between half a million and 1 million Tutsis.
And in the 1990s, Japan's economy went into its long stall, making the Japanese model of a scaled down
military seem rather less relevant.
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All this is to say that during the presidency of Bill linton, Nye's "intangible forms of power proved to hold
little sway in matters of statecraft, while modes of traditional power remained as critical as ever in
coercing other nations and affirming America's role as chief protector of the global order.
f the linton years posed a challenge for the efficacy of soft power, the post-9/11 age has exposed Nye's
explication of the theory as something akin to academic eccentricity. n his book, Nye mentioned "current
issues of transnational interdependence requiring "collective action and international cooperation.
Among these were "ecological changes (acid rain and global warming), health epidemics such as ADS,
illicit trade in drugs, and terrorism. Surely a paradigm that places terrorism last on a list of national
threats starting with acid rain is due for revision.
For what stronger negation of the soft-power thesis could one imagine than a strike against America largely inspired by what Nye
considered a great "soft power resource: namely, "American values of democracy and human rights? Yet Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-
Qaeda's second-in-command, had in fact weighed in unequivocally on the matter of Western democracy: "Whoever claims to be a
'democratic-uslim,' or a uslim who calls for democracy, is like one who says about himself ' am a Jewish uslim,' or ' am a
hristian uslim'the one worse than the other. He is an apostate infidel.
With a detestable kind of clarity, Zawahiri's pronouncement revealed the hollowness at the heart of the
soft-power theory. Soft power is a fine policy complement in dealing with parties that approve of American
ideals and American dominion. But applied to those that do not, soft power's attributes become their
opposites. For enemies of the United States, the export of American culture is a provocation, not an
invitation; self-conscious "example-setting in areas like nonproliferation is an indication of weakness, not
leadership; deference to international bodies is a path to exercising a veto over American action, not a
means of forging multilateral cooperation.

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AT: ECONOMY IMPACTS

DecIine doesn't cause war
orris MiIIer, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, '2K
(nterdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis
that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as
some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation
of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a
catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would
then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in
train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by inxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the
arnegie Endowment for nternational Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis.
After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia
in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 uch of the conventional wisdom about
the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis as measured in
terms of inflation and negative growth bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in
democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... n the cases of dictatorships and semi-
democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of
violence to abort another).

Recent empirics go neg
Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LL, contributing editor/online columnist for
Esquire, 8/25/'9
(Thomas P., "The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial risis, Aprodex, Asset
Protection ndex, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-
398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of
scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great
Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery --
surprisingly led by hina and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over
the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact
whatsoever on the international security landscape.
None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed
to the global recession. ndeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the
Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in
the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the
exican "drug war" begun in 2006). ertainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically
timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important
external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-
decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.
Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts,
insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the
only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, srael v. ran) are both tied to one side
acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends.
And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (raq and
Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite
modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug
efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off
Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally
pressing the hinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa ommand, for example, hasn't
led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

EXISTENTIAL RISK
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RISK OF NAT&RAL EXTINCTION LOW

Low risk of naturaI extinction-history is on our side.

Humanity has survived what we might call natural existential risks for hundreds of thousands of years; thus it is
prima facie unIikeIy that any of them will do us in within the next hundred.[2] This conclusion is
buttressed when we analyze specific risks from nature, such as asteroid impacts, supervolcanic
eruptions, earthquakes, gamma-ray bursts, and so forth: EmpiricaI impact distributions and scientific
modeIs suggest that the likelihood of extinction because of these kinds of risk is extremeIy smaII on a
time scale of a century or so.[3]
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RISK OF ANTHROPOGENIC EXTINCTION HIGH

Anthropogenic existentiaI risks are most probabIe.

n contrast, our species is introducing entireIy new kinds of existentiaI riskthreats we have no track
record of surviving. Our longevity as a species therefore offers no strong prior grounds for confident
optimism. onsideration of specific existential-risk scenarios bears out the suspicion that the great bulk
of existential risk in the foreseeable future consists of anthropogenic existentiaI risksthat is, those
arising from human activity. n particular, most of the biggest existential risks seem to be linked to potential future
technological breakthroughs that may radically expand our ability to manipulate the external world or our
own biology. As our powers expand, so will the scaIe of their potentiaI consequencesintended and
unintended, positive and negative. For example, there appear to be significant existential risks in some of the advanced
forms of biotechnology, molecular nanotechnology, and machine intelligence that might be developed in the decades ahead.

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EXTINCTION IS &NLIKELY FOR A LONG TIME

Humanity wiII survive for between 5,000 and 8 biIIion years: 95% confidence
intervaI.
2011)

We have some influence over how long we can delay human extinction. osmology dictates the upper
limit but leaves a Iarge fieId of pIay. At its lower limit, humanity could be extinguished as soon as this
century by succumbing to near-term extinction risks: nuclear detonations, asteroid or comet impacts, or volcanic
eruptions could generate enough atmospheric debris to terminate food production; a nearby supernova or gamma ray burst could
sterilize Earth with deadly radiation; greenhouse gas emissions could trigger a positive feedback loop, causing a radical change in
climate; a genetically engineered microbe could be unleashed, causing a global plague; or a high-energy physics experiment could
go awry, creating a "true vacuum" or strangelets that destroy the planet (Bostrom, 2002 ; Bostrom & irkovic, 2007 ; Leslie, 1996 ;
Posner, 2004 ; Rees, 2003 ).

Farther out in time are risks from technologies that remain theoretical but might be developed in the next century or centuries. For
instance, self-replicating nanotechnologies could destroy the ecosystem; and cognitive enhancements or recursively self-improving
computers could exceed normal human ingenuity to create uniquely powerful weapons (Bostrom, 2002 ; Bostrom & irkovic, 2007 ;
kle, 2006 ; Joy, 2000 ; Leslie, 1996 ; Posner, 2004 ; Rees, 2003 ).

Farthest out in time are astronomical risks. n one billion years, the sun will begin its red giant stage, increasing terrestrial
temperatures above 1,000 degrees, boiling off our atmosphere, and eventually forming a planetary nebula, making Earth
inhospitable to life (Sackmann, Boothroyd, & Kraemer, 1993 ; Ward & Brownlee, 2002 ). f we colonize other solar systems, we
could survive longer than our sun, perhaps another 100 trillion years, when all stars begin burning out (Adams & Laughlin, 1997 ).
We might survive even longer if we exploit nonstellar energy sources. But it is hard to imagine how humanity will survive beyond the
decay of nuclear matter expected in 10
32
to 10
41
years (Adams & Laughlin, 1997 ).3 Physics seems to support Kafka's remark that
"[t]here is infinite hope, but not for us."

While it may be physically possible for humanity or its descendents to flourish for 10
41
years, it seems unlikely that humanity will live
so long. Homo sapiens have existed for 200,000 years. Our closest relative, homo erectus, existed for around 1.8 million years
(Anton, 2003 ). The median duration of mammalian species is around 2.2 million years (Avise et al., 1998 ).

A controversial approach to estimating humanity's life expectancy is to use observation selection theory.
The number of homo sapiens who have ever lived is around 100 billion (Haub, 2002 ). Suppose the number
of people who have ever or will ever live is 10 trillion. f think of myself as a random sample drawn from
the set of all human beings who have ever or will ever live, then the probability of my being among the
first 100 billion of 10 trillion lives is only 1%. t is more probable that am randomly drawn from a smaller
number of lives. For instance, if only 200 billion people have ever or will ever live, the probability of my being among the first 100
billion lives is 50%. The reasoning behind this line of argument is controversial but has survived a number of theoretical challenges
(Leslie, 1996 ). Using observation selection theory, Gott (1993) estimated that humanity wouId survive an
additionaI 5,000 to 8 miIIion years, with 95% confidence.

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MORE GOTT EVIDENCE/PRODICT

Humans wiII Iive for at Ieast 5,000 more years - Copernican PrincipIe
New York Times, 7
(John Tierney, 'A Survival Imperative Ior Space Colonization July 17,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/17/science/17tier.html)
In 1993, J. #icard Gott III co2p:ted wit scientific certainty tat :2anity wo:ld s:rvive at least
5,100 2ore years. At the time, I took that as reason to relax, b:t Dr. Gott has now convinced me I was
wrong. He as iss:ed a wake-:p call: To ens:re o:r long-ter2 s:rvival, we need to get a colony :p and
r:nning on Mars witin 46 years. II you`re not awakened yet, I understand. It`s only prudent to be
skeptical oI people who make scientiIic Iorecasts about the end oI humanity. Dr. Gott, a professor of
astropysics at Princeton, got plenty oI grieI aIter he made his original prediction in 1993. But in the
ensuing 14 years, his prophetic credentials have strengthened, and not merely because humanity is still
around. Dr. Gott as :sed is tecniq:e to s:ccessf:lly forecast te longevity of Broadway plays,
newspapers, dogs and, most recently, te ten:re in office of :ndreds of political leaders aro:nd te
world. He bases predictions on j:st one bit of data, ow long so2eting as lasted already; and on one
assumption, tat tere is noting special abo:t te partic:lar 2o2ent tat yo:`re observing tis
peno2enon. This assumption is called the Copernican Principle, aIter the astronomer who assumed he
wasn`t seeing the universe Irom a special spot in the center. Suppose you want to Iorecast the political
longevity oI the leader oI a Ioreign country, and you know nothing about her country except that she has just
Iinished her 39th week in power. What are the odds that she`ll leave oIIice in her 40th week? According to
the Copernican Principle, there`s nothing special about this week, so there`s only a 1-in-40 chance, or 2.5
percent, that she`s now in the Iinal week oI her tenure. It`s equally unlikely that she`s still at the very
beginning oI her tenure. II she were just completing the Iirst 2.5 percent oI her time in power, that would
mean her remaining time would be 39 times as long as the period she`s already served 1,521 more weeks
(a little more than 29 years). So you can now conIidently Iorecast that she will stay in power at least one
more week but not as long as 1,521 weeks. The odds oI your being wrong are 2.5 percent on the short end
and 2.5 percent on the long end a total oI just 5 percent, which means that your Iorecast has an expected
accuracy oI 95 percent, the scientiIic standard Ior statistical signiIicance. And you can apply this Copernican
Iormula to lots oI other phenomena by assuming they`re neither in the Iirst 2.5 percent nor the Iinal 2.5
percent oI their liIe spans. ow, that range is so broad it may not seem terribly useIul to you, and Dr. Gott
readily concedes that his Copernican Iormula oIten is not the ideal method. The best the Iormula could do
regarding Bill Clinton, who had been president Ior 127 days when the 1993 paper in ature was published,
was predict he would serve at least three more days but not more than 13.6 more years. You could have
gotten a narrower range by using other inIormation, like actuarial data Irom previous presidencies, or
Iactoring in the unlikelihood that the Constitution would be changed so he could serve more than two terms.
But the beauty oI the Copernican Iormula is that it allows you to make predictions when you don`t have any
other inIormation, which is how Dr. Gott 2anaged to predict te ten:re of virtually every oter nation`s
leader tat day in 1993 - a total of 313 leaders. If none of tose still in power stays in office beyond
age 100, Dr. Gott`s acc:racy rate will t:rn o:t to be al2ost exactly 95 percent. Some philosophers and
experts in probability theory have argued that Dr. Gott is making unwarranted deductions Irom past liIe
spans, and that it is wrong to assume there is nothing special about the moment we`ve chosen to make a
Iorecast. (Seewww.tierneylab.com Ior details oI the debate.) But last year two philosophers, Bradley Monton
and Brian Kierland, analyzed the criticisms and concluded in an article in the Philosophical Quarterly that
Dr. Gott had indeed come up with a useIul tool Ior diIIicult situations like trying to Iorecast doomsday
without data Irom other planets. The Copernican Iormula predicts, based solely on our 200,000-year track
record, that the human race is likely to survive at least 5,100 more years but not longer than 7.8 million
roughly the same prediction you`d make based on the longevity oI past mammals on Earth, Dr. Gott says.

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&N CP/NO &SFG KEY WARRANT
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&N CP 1NC

Text: The &nited Nations shouId coordinate and provide financiaI support for a
gIobaI effort to deveIop and depIoy asteroid detection and pIanetary defense
technoIogies beyond the Earth's mesosphere with an astrosocioIogicaI
perspective.

Incorporation of astrosocioIogy wiII require an internationaI effort Ied by the &N -
an effort by one nationaI couId resuIt in a geopoIiticaI power-grab
onstruction of a planetary defense infrastructure (i.e., material culture) involves a global effort, a level of
cooperation now possible due to cooperation in other areas. However, some governments may still view
planetary defense as a low priority due to more urgent social problems. Developing nations in particular
may hold such a view, or they may simply find themselves in a situation in which they are unable to afford
a costly contribution to the overall project. Developed nations may need to finance some aspects of the
project for these poorer nations. Developing nations may need to find other ways to contribute, such as
the provision of land for facilities and personnel to operate them. The obvious fact is that the entire cost to
construct a planetary defense system and the outlay of additional funds to operate it on an ongoing basis
will escalate to the point of unaffordability for one or even a few nations. Negotiations would become
necessary, as all parts of the globe require protection. f viewed as a single project, this effort would
include all societies because all represent potential targets. For late detections, a regional response may
be necessary in order to execute a drastic response. The best last-minute trajectory for a missile, for
example, may require a launch from a developing nation. This capability involves military considerations
due to the possible need of placing space weapons in the territories (even if not under the control) of
nations with lower levels of military technology and/or potential enemies of democratic nations. any of
the sociopolitical issues unrelated to planetary defense may prove just as difficult to overcome as
monetary and technical issues. any governments will initially evaluate planetary defense as a low
priority, especially those developing countries that face practical social problems such as overpopulation,
disease, and violence. Still, they require saving as well whether or not they agree to cooperate. Space
exploration can lead to planetary unity partly due to the economic incentives associated with doing so, but
can also produce other positive effects. Other aspects of space exploration reinforce these trends toward
unity and cooperation as well. For example, the cost of large-scale space projects encourages
cooperative efforts and a natural movement toward what have called the human space program.
Because such projects are very expensive, running into the billions of dollars, joint efforts make good
economic sense.35 However, as White also points out, large-scale projects such as the construction of a
planetary defense system can result in negative outcomes such as a totalitarian world government. As we
build this new system, we must also keep in mind the values and other societal assets we attempt to save
in the first place. Otherwise, the unity gained harms individuals whether we are struck by an asteroid or
not. The &nited Nations or new dedicated international body must become invoIved in a coordinating
effort invoIving the determination of which nations can afford to assist (and in what ways) along
with construction efforts to impIement the three components of the strategy introduced here. As
we build the new system, the values, norms, and priorities of the member nation-states should receive
due consideration in order to achieve a positive outcome for humanity as a whole. Problems may also
ensue based on national security issues.36 The impact of a comet or asteroid may harm some nations
more than others. Some government leaders of the less affected nations may see this situation as an
opportunity to take advantage of their historical nemeses in some way, including the introduction of
warfare. Treaties at the international level can help to minimize the risk of such social problems by
requiring cooperation and prohibiting conflict under these circumstances. f the impacting object is large
enough to threaten humanity on a global scale, then this type of requirement should prove enforceable.
However, for a localized effect, enforcement may prove more difficult. Astrosociologists and independent
social scientists can provide insights before this situation arises and advice following its aftermath.
Political scientists and international relations scholars could prove invaluable.

EXTINCTION REF&GE CP
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1NC SHELL

The &nited States federaI government shouId construct and maintain seIf-
sufficient, remote, permanentIy occupied refuges meant to protect humanity from
extinction events. We'II cIarify.

The counterpIan prevents extinction-even if onIy a few peopIe survive, it
ensures humanity wiII recover.
2011)

Perhaps more cost effective than building refuges in space would be buiIding them on Earth. Elaborate
bunkers exist for government leaders to occupy during a nuclear war (camley, 2007). And remote facilities
are planned to protect crop seeds from "nuclear war, asteroid strikes, and climate change" (Hopkin, 2007).
But know of no self-sufficient, remote, permanently occupied refuge meant to protect humanity from a
range of possible extinction events. Hanson (2007) argues that a refuge permanentIy housing as few as
100 peopIe wouId significantIy improve the chances of human survivaI during a range of gIobaI
catastrophes. The Americas and Polynesia were originally populated by fewer than 100 founders (Hey,
2005 ; urray-cntosh et al., 1998 ). Although it would take thousands of years for 100 people to repopulate
Earth, this wouId be a smaII setback compared to extinction.
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CP SOLVES EXTINCTION

The counterpIan protects humanity against all existentiaI threats and is more
cost-effective than the pIan.

A possibly somewhat more cost-effective project might be to operate a bunker or refuge that could enabIe a
smaII human popuIation to survive a wide range of catastrophic scenariosplagues, nuclear
winters, supervolcanic eruptions, asteroid impacts, complete collapses of human food production
systems, and various "unknown unknowns. The refuge might be buried deep underground, stocked with
supplies to last a decade or more, and designed to be easily defendable. deally it would be continually
staffed by a quarantined population and stocked with tools that survivors could use in subsistence
agriculture upon emerging from the shelter in the aftermath of a civilization-destroying catastrophe.

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CP BETTER THAN ASTEROID PROGRAM

The CP soIves more cost-effectiveIy than asteroid programs.
2011)

Some extinction risks are probably greater than asteroid impacts, and some risk-reducing projects are
probably more cost effective than asteroid defense. A refuge would probably cost less than $20 billion to
build and occupy, and would provide a stronger insurance policy against a broader range of extinction
risks. Like other forms of catastrophic insurance, the probability of its being needed is low, but its
expected value is high.

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THEY SAY: "NOT FEASIBLE"
Yes feasibIe.
Robin Hanson, Professor in the Department of Economics at George ason University, 2007
("atastrophe, Social ollapse, and Human Extinction, Forthcoming hapter in Global atastrophic #isk,
August, Available Online at http://hanson.gmu.edu/collapse.pdf, Accessed 07-04-2011)

f we value future generations of humanity, we may be willing to take extra efforts to prevent the extinction
of humanity. For types of disasters where variations in individual ability to resist disruptions are minor, however, there is little point in
explicitly preparing for human extinction possibilities. This is because there is almost no chance that an event of this type would put
us very near an extinction borderline. The best we could do here would be to try to prevent all large disruptions. Of course there can
be non extinction-related reasons to prepare for such disruptions.

On the other hand, there may be types of disasters where variations in resistance abilities can be important. f so, there might be a
substantial chance of finding a post-disaster population that is just above, or just below, a threshold for preserving humanity. n this
case it is reasonable to wonder what we might do now to change the odds.

The most obvious possibility would be to create refuges with sufficient resources to help preserve a small
group of people through a very large disruption, the resulting social collapse, and a transition period to a
post-disaster society. Refuges would have to be strong enough to survive the initial disruption. f desperate people trying to
survive a social collapse could threaten a refuge's longterm viability, such as by looting the refuge's resources, then refuges might
need to be isolated, well-defended, or secret enough to survive such threats.

We have actually already developed similar refuges to protect social elites during a nuclear war (camley,
2007). Though nuclear sanctuaries may not be designed with other human extinction scenarios in mind, it is probably worth
considering how they might be adapted to deal with non-nuclear-war disasters. t is also worth considering whether to
create a distinct set of refuges, intended for other kinds of disasters. imagine secret rooms deep in a mine, well stocked with
supplies, with some way to monitor the surface and block entry.

A important issue here is whether refuges could by themselves preserve enough humans to supply enough genetic diversity for a
post-disaster society. f not, then refuges would either have to count on opening up at the right moment to help preserve enough
people outside the sanctuary, or they would need some sort of robust technology for storing genes and implanting them. Perhaps a
sperm bank would suffice.

Developing a robust genetic technology might be a challenging task; devices would have to last until the human population reached
sufficient size to hold enough genetic diversity on its own. But the payoff could be to drastically reduce the required post-collapse
population, perhaps down to a single fertile female. For the purpose of saving humanity reducing the required population from one
thousand down to ten is equivalent to a factor of one hundred in current world population, or a factor of one hundred in the severity
of each event. n the example of figure 1, it is the same as reducing the disaster event rate by a factor of fifty.

Refuges could in principle hold many kinds of resources which might ease and speed [end page 11] the
restoration of a productive human society. They could preserve libraries, machines, seeds, and much more. But the
most important resources would clearly be those that ensure humanity survives. By comparison, on a cosmic
scale it is a small matter whether humanity takes one thousand or one hundred thousand years to return
to our current level of development. Thus the priority should be resources to support a return to at least a hunter-gatherer
society.

t is important to realize that a society rebuilding after a near-extinction crisis would have a vastly smaller scale than our current
society; very different types and mixes of capital would be appropriate. Stocking a sanctuary full of the sorts of capital that we find
valuable today could be even less useful than the inappropriate medicine, books, or computers often given by first world charities to
the third world poor today. achines would quickly fall into disrepair, and books would impart knowledge that had little practical
application.

nstead, one must accept that a very small human population would mostly have to retrace the growth path of our human ancestors;
one hundred people cannot support an industrial society today, and perhaps not even a farming society. They might have to start
with hunting and gathering, until they could reach a scale where simple farming was feasible. And only when their farming
population was large and dense enough could they consider returning to industry.

So it might make sense to stock a refuge with real hunter-gatherers and subsistence farmers, together with the tools they find
useful. Of course such people would need to be disciplined enough to wait peacefully in the refuge until the time to emerge was
right. Perhaps such people could be rotated periodically from a well protected region where they practiced
simple lifestyles, so they could keep their skills fresh. And perhaps we should test our refuge concepts, isolating real
people near them for long periods to see how well particular sorts of refuges actually perform at returning their inhabitants to a
simple sustainable lifestyle.

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NET-BENEFIT: EXISTENTIAL RISK TRADEOFF DA

Focusing on [x existentiaI risk] trades off with efforts to reduce other existentiaI
risks which are more probabIe-onIy the counterpIan addresses every risk.

To correct for the good-story bias, one might want to reduce one's credence in exciting scenarios and
upgrade one's credence in boring outcomes. At the same time, however, one should avoid relying too heavily
on a "silliness heuristic, which penalizes hypotheses merely because similar-sounding ideas have been
promoted by people viewed as not respectablecrackpots, radicals, science-fiction aficionados, and other "non-serious
folk. We might find existential-risk concerns gaining traction, only to see the ensuing resources funneled
almost exclusively to the study of asteroid hazard, climate change, and a few other such "respectable
risks to the neglect of more speculative risks, such as machine superintelligence, advanced
nanotechnology weaponry, future dystopian evolutionary scenarios, simulation-shutdown scenarios,
synthetic biology mishaps and misuse, space-colonization races, and global totalitarianismeven though
the cumulative existential risks flowing from these and other "silly-seeming sources may be orders of
magnitude greater than those from the more respectable and well-established fields. (Another plausible
diversion is that research mainly gets directed at global catastrophic risks that involve little or no existential risk.)

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STEM CP
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1NC SHELL

Text: The &nited States federaI government shouId incorporate astrosocioIogy into Science,
TechnoIogy, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) nationaI education standards under the No
ChiId Left Behind Act of 2001.

Current STEM education isn't sufficient - we stiII need astrosocioIogicaI focus

Thus, we must go even further than STE for the benefit of the United States. We must also pursue
utilizing the motivation that space exploration brings in social science classrooms. aking connections
between space and the social sciences, the fundamental purpose of astrosociology, will result in the
development of well-qualified astrosociologists an outcome just as important as STE graduates if one
accepts the premise that humanity will migrate to a significant extent beyond the Earth. Astrosociology
must be added to the STE concept for the sake of future progress both in space and on terrestrial soil.
The renewed emphasis on STE subjects and their relationship to our understanding of space
exploration and related topics is important, yet this approach is unidimensional. t is unsustainable to
ensure the success of human beings in space environments or to study the effects of space on terrestrial
societies because these effects involve astrosocial phenomena, the very focus of astrosociology. As the
missing perspective, astrosociology will add new insights to the prevailing ideas in the space community.
n the process, new fundamental areas of knowledge will begin to take shape based on a formal and
ongoing collaboration between the two branches of science. n order to make this possible, we need to
educate and train both STE- oriented students and astrosociologists.

Status quo STEM education is at the expense of astrosocioIogy

The danger related to the current drive within educational circles to improve on STE education relates
to the assessment among many educators that social science education is somehow less important or even
more extreme, irrelevant to the future of space exploration. t also implies that understanding human
behavior and society represents a secondary status to understanding natural and physical phenomena.
The pursuit of STE education at the expense of the social sciences represents an extremely
shortsighted and thus risky approach. The development of astrosociology counters such trends, though
attitude favoring STE subjects may also make it more difficult to develop this new field. Along with the
development of astrosociology, then, advocates must constantly remind educators and policy makers of
all stripes to maintain a proper balance between the natural sciences and the social sciences within the
curricula of educational organizations at all levels. Within the space community, advocates should strive
for a more equal balance although the space sciences and engineering fields will still dominate.
A. The Status Quo and the Alternative:
By emphasizing the natural sciences, technology, engineering, and mathematics, NASA potentially
alienates students interested in outer space but also partial to the social sciences. At the very least, this
effort contributes to the prevailing belief (at the macro level) within social science disciplines and related
fields that outer space has little to do with human behavior. n reality, space from a social science
perspective is all about humankind. For example, space scientists do not study asteroids and comets just
because they are out there. They study them in part because one may strike the Earth someday; one
large enough to disrupt human societies potentially enough to knock them back to the Stone Age.
Planetary defense is an important specialty within astrosociology as the protection of societies and their
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cultures is required.14 oreover, findings from space scientists enrich the cultures of societies. Space
policy is intertwined with social policy that affects a multitude of social institutions and groups. This social
reality the strong connection between outer space and society requires addressing.
NASA's current approach infers that the social sciences are not very important to space exploration. This
stance never was realistic throughout the space age, however. The social sciences tie efforts related to
STE and outer space to society. The irony is that an astrosociological approach represents an
extremely relevant yet missing perspective.15 Thus, the best approach involves attracting students with
interests in all subjects related to space exploration. The alternative to the status quo does not involve the
replacement of long-standing tradition with something new. Rather, it involves the addition of
astrosociology to the STE subjects. Of great interest are the dynamic interactions between natural
science students and social science students who both emphasize space as their primary interest. When
this reaches a large enough scale, the potential outcomes of combined research between the two types
of students will surpass what can emerge from strictly a natural science perspective. The same synergy
will occur among professional scientists as well.
Now is not the time to discard the social sciences in favor of bolstering the STE subjects and
disciplines. Rather, a well-rounded approach is necessary, just as was always the case. We must not
abandon the social sciences precisely because they represent an entire branch of science that comes
under indirect attack by educational organizations (i.e., schools) that begin to emphasize science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics over understanding human behavior as well, even as new
complex patterns and trends will emerge as humanity increases the intensity of, and thus its reliance on,
its connection to the cosmos.
Exposure to a well-rounded educational program provides students with exposure to fields and disciplines
from the natural sciences, social and behavioral sciences, the humanities, and the arts. Such exposure
fairly allows each student to select which field or discipline to pursue. Whenever a student opts to pursue
anything related to space, whether a natural science or social science, the overall impact furthers space
exploration. This outcome that includes the development of astrosociology possesses implications for
improvements in science and technology as well as national security for a particular society. oreover,
the overall body of knowledge and its related literature improves. The traditional bifurcation between the
study of outer space issues as a natural science privilege versus the inability to study outer space issues
from a social science perspective makes little sense. STE education at the expense of the social
sciences no longer serves human societies well as we need both perspectives to carry out, and
understand the effects of, the human exploration of space from Earth (e.g., astronomy or planetary
defense) or in space environments (e.g., space settlement, long-duration spaceflight, or space tourism).

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CP KEY TO ST&DENT S&CCESS

Expanding from STEM to STEMA wouId create more successfuI students

t is perfectly acceptable to utilize children's initial interest in outer space to motivate those who
demonstrate both skills and interest in STE subjects to pursue them as they progress through their
levels of educational attainment. And the pursuit of bolstering the rolls of STE students and successful
graduates provides an answer to the dearth of students currently pursuing careers in science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics. This problem requires a strong effort to solve. t seems clear that the
Department of Education, NASA, and other organizations have responded to this problem in a big way.
n essence, however, this one-sided reaction involves limitations and fails to cater to all students. Not
every student favors the STE subjects nor has the aptitude to become successful in such courses.
These students also require a good education to contribute to society in positive ways. any students
demonstrate skills and/or interests more appropriate to the social sciences. Based on earlier arguments, it
is reasonable to hypothesize that many social science students would find inspiration and interest in an
astrosociological approach to space research. Attempting to convert the social-science-oriented students
into STE-oriented students probably results in a waste of time. At the same time, without the possibility
of pursuing astrosociology, their interest in space would most likely dissipate over time in favor of more
traditional specializations within the social sciences.
Preparations for living, working, and recreating in outer space must involve a formal collaborative
structure between the space community and the social science community. This will involve a new
educational approach not now in existence: the formal training of astrosociologists. To accomplish this we
must bring space into the social science classroom just as we do for STE classrooms; that is, to add an
"A to the STE acronym in the context of studying space exploration issues. Potentially, examples
utilizing outer space inspires even those social science students who eventually go into other specialties
by keeping them in school. t provides benefits for students beyond aspiring astrosociologists. On the
other side of the ledger, an astrosociological perspective adds an exposure to concepts rarely discussed
in either STE-oriented or social science classes. When students learn about astrosocial phenomena,
they gain a more comprehensive view of how space exploration relates to their everyday lives.
n addition, our society faces a growing need to study space exploration from a social science
perspective. Rather than leaving students who turn down pursuit of the STE subjects without options,
we should motivate them by bringing the wonders of space exploration into the social science
classroom.16 We need to assist those who wish to study the various specializations within the field of
astrosociology. s this important? Are there even enough students interested in space but from a social
science perspective? These questions receive attention at this juncture. f astrosocial phenomena truly
affect social life on Earth and humanity seeks to explore space by venturing out into it, then the relevance
of astrosociology seems quite apparent.

Expanding STEM to incIude astrosocioIogy wouId increase effectiveness of the
program

Space can potentially motivate students to stay in school, and pursue majors that often contribute to
continuation of space exploration over the next generation. While STE subjects receive the greatest
attention in this regard for good reasons, including the operation of past space program issues, the future
of space exploration will necessarily change when human beings venture into space to live, work, and
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play on permanent and sustained bases. f this assumption is indeed correct, then any particular society
that desires to pursue the exploration of space would benefit itself most if it utilized space to motivate all
students regardless of their current interests or intentions. We will need astrosociologists just as much as
space scientists and engineers when humans leave the Earth, so NASA will find that it needs a well-
rounded workforce comprised of experts in the natural sciences and in the social sciences to work
together.
NASA does a fairly good job in motivating students to pursue STE subjects. However, their
effectiveness has limitations. For one thing, some students find the social sciences and humanities more
interesting or simply fail to find excitement in STE subjects without much exposure to an
astrosociological approach within their social science programs. As an amendment to its current efforts,
rather than one intended to shift natural science students to the social sciences, NASA should pursue the
development of astrosociological education in conjunction with its efforts regarding the STE subjects. t
will be a great day when a "social studies or sociology teacher launches into space for example. n other
words, NASA should promote a greater understanding of space from all scientific perspectives. By adding
the "A to the end of the STE acronym (i.e., STEA), the focus broadens to include the social sciences
which increasingly have something to contribute to space exploration and related issues. This approach
should motivate space scientists and engineers while simultaneously adding social science majors who
would finally have the option of choosing to study space in the form of astrosociology.
t is time to add a new dimension to the development of astrosociology. t currently lacks a pedagogical
component that will prove invaluable in its growth. Astrosociology courses and programs must develop.
This would allow for a rush of students and educators to embrace this new field on a much grander scale
as its existence in these forms would indicate the legitimacy of astrosociology. While the development of
astrosociology can indeed continue without taking this vital step, it will remain limited and ultimately fail
due to an insufficient number of astrosociologists who dedicate themselves to this cause. Therefore, it
behooves current supporters who are now students to pressure their professors to allow astrosociology
into the social science classroom and those who are now professors/educators to advocate the creation
of course and curricula in their own departments. n this way, the development of astrosociology will grow
through the attraction of new students who will come to call themselves "astrosociologists. Based on the
limited survey presented in this article, this possibility does not seem farfetched at all. n fact, it may well
result as the inevitable outcome of the movement to develop this new field. The author predicts that the
development of astrosociology as an academic field will become a vital part of the effort to advance the
space exploration effort in the twenty-first century and thereafter. This prediction is based on the
increasing importance of the human dimension (as well as its growing recognition) and all of the
complications that this brings to the space exploration table and, most directly, this prediction is based
on the corresponding imperative to understand these astrosociological issues.

AstrosocioIogy are needed to compIiment the science basis of STEM

A. Summary of a Synergistic Effect
By enhancing space exploration through the addition of astrosociology to the STE approach to
education, both the space community and the social sciences are enhanced. n fact, our overall society
benefits as well on a general level. This is something that could not soon occur without the existence of
astrosociology. The natural and social sciences comprise two sides of the same coin that represents
human space exploration.
n short, then, "developing astrosociology for the space sciences [and other avenues of research common in
the space community] involves the addition of astrosocial knowledge to space-based knowledge to form a
more balanced understanding of humanity's destiny in space. Knowledge relevant to the space sciences
and engineering disciplines remain important, of course, but they represent only half of the overall
knowledge base...Astrosocial knowledge represents the other side of a figurative coin. A great need exists
to recognize each side of this figurative coin and bring both sides together to form the total knowledge
needed to understand the full range of ramifications involving space and its important connections to
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terrestrial societies...This combination of both space knowledge and astrosocial knowledge possesses the potential
to produce synergies of knowledge impossible by either knowledge base alone. Our continuing failure to pursue this
avenue of research [i.e., astrosociological research] can only result in...[limited] progress, and perhaps avoidable
negative circumstances.17
Thus far, we have concentrated heavily on the natural science side and largely neglected the social
science side. We have overlooked the complementary aspect of space exploration in favor of
concentrating on only one its two elements. Even when we send robotic probes, rovers, or landers to
other worlds, we do so in order to further human knowledge. When we send human beings, we add
innumerable complications that require input from social scientists that are fully prepared to cope with
them.
The traditional pattern of concentrating on STE subjects overlooks the rich history of sociology and the
other social sciences. ountless research findings originally discovered during research aimed at
terrestrial societies possess important applications toward social life in space environments that go far
beyond the adaptation of findings associated with isolated social groups known as "space analogs. For
example, when considering the space settlements, we must perceive it as the replication of societies in
space that includes social groups and institutions as well as cultures. n fact, then, the natural scientists
and the social scientists each need one another.18 The one-sided approach common to the past
functioning of the space community will prove inadequate to move forward in the future if human beings
are to move into space environments.
This overall discussion regarding the need to expose social science students to astrosociology suggests
an important question. Are social science students even interested in the relationship between space
exploration and society (or social/cultural issues)? After all, their ability to study such issues does not exist
in today's educational system. Further, if there is no interest, then the entire argument of this article may
represent a fruitless exercise. At best, it would indicate that extraordinary efforts may be required to
interest social science students in space issues.
The pilot study conducted by the author could not address the specific interest in astrosociology among
social science majors specifically. nstead, it surveys students who took an ntroduction to Sociology class
to fulfill their general education requirements most of them were undeclared majors. But while this
preliminary examination of the issue proved imperfect due to issues related to funding, access to
students, and the types of students surveyed, it does indeed provide an enlightening glimpse into
students' interest following a semester-long exposure to sociology.
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CP KEY TO SETI

Incorporating astrosocioIogy into STEM wouId enhance SETI

Another good example of the potential synergy gained by combining the approaches of the space
community and the social science community involves the study of astrobiology including the Search for
Extraterrestrial ntelligence (SET). The social, cultural, and psychological ramifications of discovering
alien life are too numerous to discuss here, but they would change humanity forever in a great variety of
ways. Even the search itself possesses characteristics worthy of study. Past research on this general
topic by social scientists does indeed exist, though one cannot characterize this body of work as a well-
structured body of knowledge. By placing it under the purview of astrosociology as a formal
specialization, the location of this research would be more accessible and the ability to contribute would be
enhanced. Similar improvements would occur with the other subjects proposed as astrosociological
specializations.

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ST&DENTS SAY YES

If given the option students wouId enroII in astrosocioIogicaI study

During my last three ntroduction to Sociology courses at my most recent college, it turned out a fortunate
circumstance that decided to add an optional short answer item to the final exam of my last three
classes before leaving the organization. Students had the option of answering this short-answer question
or another concerning an aspect of social inequality. Because the proper development of astrosociology
requires that it becomes part of curricula at a growing number of colleges and universities, it is important
to gauge the interest in the new field among college freshmen and students at other levels of educational
attainment.
1. Frequency Table
The results shown in Table 3 indicate a strong interest in astrosociology among an admittedly very small
population (and thus sample) of general education college students. t is significant that these students
were members of an ntroduction to Sociology course rather than one that focused on space or
technology in some way. This fact makes their interest in the "sociology of space exploration all the more
powerful as most of them were taking sociology to fill their general education requirements. nformally,
most indicated to the author that they did not intend to pursue sociology.
The results in Table 3 mimic the general support of NASA's mission of space exploration found in the
general population by major opinion polls, albeit even more strongly than those polls indicate. Potentially,
then, many students who may pursue other subfields within social science disciplines would be attracted
to astrosociology if it was available to them as a college course. While placing astrosociology in the
curricula of academic programs at secondary and post-secondary levels will prove difficult, it will not
necessarily prove impossible. One may infer that the example of astrobiology's development indicates a
strong potential for astrosociology.
2. $hort Answers
As evident by the examples of responses from students provided below, the breakdown into the three
categories found in Table Two serves as a rather crude categorization scheme. Students who indicate
they would not enroll in an astrosociology course tend to have mixed feelings about their decisions. The
survey serves the purpose of an exploratory examination of the hypothesis that a significant number of
social science students would enroll in an ntroduction to Astrosociology course as part of their education
(i.e., if the author taught such a class). Again, it does not assess whether or not they would pursue an
astrosociology major if it were possible. This would require a much greater commitment and indicate a
much greater level of support for astrosociology. The survey of sociology and other social science majors
looms as an extremely important project for the future.

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TEACHER &NION PTX

Teachers &nions support nationaI standards
Weingarten, 9 president of the American Federation of Teachers
(Randi, "The ase for National Standards" http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/story/2009/02/15/ST2009021502025.html)

From my office in Washington, can see beyond the apitol to Virginia. can ride a few stops on the
etro and be in aryland. These three jurisdictions are so close in miles yet have very different
standards for what their students should know and be able to do -- just as every state in the union has its
own standards. The result is 51 benchmarks of varying content and quality. There are many areas in
education around which we need to buiId consensus. A good place to start would be revisiting the issue
of national standards. Abundant evidence suggests that common, rigorous standards lead to more
students reaching higher levels of achievement. The countries that consistently outperform the United States on
international assessments all have national standards, with core curriculum, assessments and time for professional development for
teachers based on those standards. Here in the United States, students in assachusetts, which has been recognized for setting
high standards, scored on a par with the highest-performing countries in both math and science on a recent international
assessment. After innesota adopted rigorous math standards, students there ranked fifth in the world on the mathematics portion
of that assessment. Academic standards for students in the rest of the country, unfortunately, are a mixed bag.

The American Federation of Teachers is the most powerfuI Iobby in congress-
they controI the agenda at aII times
Carney, 9 senior reporter for the Evans-Novak Political Report and Washington Examiner columnist
(Timothy P., "Teachers unions say 'jump,' ongress says 'how high?'"
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columns/Timothyarney/Teachers-unions-say-jump-
ongress-says-how-high-40384837.html)

Teachers unions, through their allies in the Democrat-controlled ongress, are on the verge of
demolishing the chief threat to their monopolyschool vouchers for low-income families in the District of
olumbia. f they win in the end and kill this program, it will be another triumph for a near-monopoly that
has lined the coffers of nearly every member of ongress and deployed an army of lobbyists throughout
Washington. When the House passed the $410 billion omnibus appropriations bill this weekfunding the
normal operations of government for the next seven monthsit included a provision that effectively would
end the D.. school voucher program after next school year. While there are legitimate doubts about the
educational results of the D.. voucher program, which provides $7,500 in federal taxpayer money to
some low-income district parents to use on private or religious schools, the voucher program is in
ongress's crosshairs because of the lobbying efforts and campaign contributions of the teachers'
unions, which don't want competition from private schools. Public school teachers, for the most part, are
not well paid. Theirs is a noble undertaking, and in places like D.. they do dangerous and difficult work
with inadequate support. But the image of the hard-working self-sacrificing teacher is not the proper
symbol for the teachers unions in this country. They are more like huge corporations with high-powered
lobbying arms and cozy connections with important politicians. Beltway bandits, defense contractors,
influential industriesmost of them paIe in their infIuence efforts compared to the teachers unions,
according to data from the enter for Responsive Politics. Take defense contractors. Lockheed artin,
the top recipient of military contracts most years, spent more on politics than any other defense firm in the
2008 elections. They still spent less than the American Federation of Teachers, which shelled out $2.8
million in the last cyclewith nearly every AFT dime going to Democrats. The top two teachers unions
AFT and the National Education Associationspent more combined, $5.27 million, than the top two
defense contractors. The top five Iobbying firms, combined, didn't equaI the AFT and the NEA in
federaI contributions in the 2008 cycle. Both of the teachers unions gave more than any oil company,
and the NEA and AFT combined gave more than the top four oil companies combined. These
contributions give the unions clout, and federal lobbying records show they use this clout. Again, on closer
inspection, the teachers unions look an awful lot like those corporate special interests Democrats supposedly oppose. The NEA
employs four different lobbying firms in Washington, in addition to their in-house lobbying arm, which includes at least six lobbyists.
Over the past two years, the NEA spent $10.7 million on lobbying. Reviewing the filings of the NEA, the AFT, and their K Street
hires reveals that lobbying to kill D vouchers was a priority.
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EXT: TEACHERS &NIONS LIKE CP

Education reform popuIar among teacher unions
Iannuzzi, 9 - presIdenL oI New ork SLuLe UnILed TeucIers, LIe sLuLe`s IurgesL unIon represenLIng over
6oo,ooo proIessIonuIs In educuLIon und IeuILIcure. NSUT Is uIIIIIuLed wILI LIe AmerIcun ederuLIon oI
TeucIers und LIe NuLIonuI EducuLIon AssocIuLIon (RIcIurd C., RIcIurd C. unnuzzI: TeucIers unIons
embrucIng reIorm ILLp:JJwww.buIIuIonews.comJ1qqJsLoryJ6z6qq1.ILmI)

ReIorm Is u cIuIIenge LeucIers unIons embruce. es, LIuL`s rIgIL. TIe record cle,rly de2onstr,tes LIe
commILmenL oI LeucIers unIons Lo ImprovIng pubIIc educuLIon. UnIon Ieuders undersLund we Iuve u
responsIbIIILy Lo muke scIooIs work, especIuIIy In our cILIes wIere LIe ucIIevemenL gup und uII ILs
rumIIIcuLIons LIreuLen LIe vIbruncy oI IocuI economIes. TIIs deepIy IeId beIIeI In reIorm Is wIy NSUT
wus un eurIy udvocuLe Ior smuIIer cIusses, IIgIer ucudemIc sLundurds, sLrIcL dIscIpIIne, quuIILy eurIy
cIIIdIood educuLIon progrums und LIe proIessIonuI deveIopmenL necessury Lo provIde every cIIId wILI LIe mosL
quuIIIIed LeucIers possIbIe. bumu recenLIy pusIed Ior even more reIorm - rewurdIng LeucIer exceIIence, IoIdIng LeucIers more
uccounLubIe und promoLIng InnovuLIon, sucI us cIurLer scIooIs. RuLIer LIun consIderIng LIose subjecLs Luboo, we Iuve been
speukIng oI LIe sume LIIngs. Dozens oI LeucIers unIons In New ork Iuve negoLIuLed InnovuLIve compensuLIon modeIs - Irom
sLIpends Ior LIose wIo eurn nuLIonuI cerLIIIcuLIon Lo New ork CILy`s boId experImenL In scIooI-bused perIormunce puy. NSUT
proudIy represenLs LeucIers In more LIun u dozen cIurLer scIooIs, IncIudIng IIve Iere In BuIIuIo. CIurLer scIooIs cun provIde
opporLunILIes Ior InnovuLIon und experImenLuLIon. We uIso beIIeve cIurLers musL be uccounLubIe Ior LIe Lux money LIey receIve und
LrunspurenL In Iow LIey spend IL, und urge cuuLIon so LIuL u proIIIeruLIon oI cIurLers does noL undermIne IuII supporL Ior LrudILIonuI
pubIIc scIooIs. Under LIe IeudersIIp oI RundI WeIngurLen, LIe AmerIcun ederuLIon oI TeucIers Ius IuuncIed u $1
mIIIIon InnovuLIon Iund Lo ImpIemenL susLuInubIe reIorm eIIorLs deveIoped by unIon members. And IocuI
unIons In DunkIrk und redonIu Iuve begun LukIng purL In u NuLIonuI EducuLIon AssocIuLIon- Iunded
progrum Lo deveIop IeurnIng communILIes LIuL Iocus on endIng LIe ucIIevemenL gup.

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EXT. TEACHERS KEY TO THE AGENDA

LiberaI education Iobbies overwheIm conservative opposition and buiId poI cap
Kurtz, 8 - udjuncL IeIIow oI LIe Hudson nsLILuLe und u SenIor eIIow uL LIe ELIIcs und PubIIc PoIIcy
CenLer
(SLunIey, ConservuLIves Dropped LIe BuII, TIe Corner, u bIog oI TIe NuLIonuI RevIew, zJJzoo8,
ILLp:JJcorner.nuLIonuIrevIew.comJposLJ?q=NmMxMGMxzcjdINGRIZmEqmVkNzJmNWRmNDAZ
TA=)

TIe NEA und LIe IIgIer educuLIon Iobby ure 2,ssi;e, und I,r 2ore inIloenti,l on LIe HIII LIun mosL
peopIe reuIIze. eL wIen IL comes Lo IIgIer educuLIon, Ior exumpIe, LIere ure sImpIy no conser;,ti;e
IobbyIng orgunIzuLIons Lo counLer LIem. ConservuLIves r,rely e;en show op Ior mosL IegIsIuLIve buLLIes
over educuLIon, und wIen LIey do, LIey ure vusLIy ouLspenL und ouLgunned. And uguIn, sucI educuLIon
buLLIes us LIe BusI udmInIsLruLIon Ius cIosen Lo IIgIL InLenLIonuIIy uvoId precIseIy LIe cuILure wur
Issues LIuL mIgIL muke u reuI dIIIerence.
TIe BusI udmInIsLruLIon`s uLLILude wus LIuL BIII BenneLLJynn CIeney-Lype cuILure wur Issues sup
poIILIcuI cupILuI LIuL couId more proIILubIy be puL Lowurd LIe wur eIIorL or socIuI securILy reIorm. TIIs wus
u Iuge mIsLuke. IgILIng LIe educuLIon cuILure wur wouId Iuve uccumuIuLed poIILIcuI cupILuI. WIen IL
comes Lo LIe IeIL-IeunIng cruzIness oI LIe educuLIon sysLem, LIe pubIIc Is wILI us. TIe uwrence Summers
dIspuLe, Ior exumpIe, wus u dIsusLer Ior LIe ucudemy In LIe pubIIc eye. InkIng LIe DemocruLs wILI LIeIr
cruzy IeILIsL puIs In LIe ucudemy Is LIe besL wuy Lo beuL LIem. TIe pubIIc Is wILI us on LIIs. TIe probIem Is
LIuL we Iuven`L deveIoped uny InsLILuLIonuI wuy oI IurnessIng pubIIc unLIpuLIy Lo educuLIonuI bIus.
WIuL we need Is u muss-membersIIp orgunIzuLIon, modeIed on, suy, PeopIe Ior LIe AmerIcun Wuy, ubIe Lo
ruIIy IoIks wIo wunL Lo do someLIIng ubouL our educuLIon sysLem - or perIups sepuruLe orgunIzuLIons,
one Ior K-1z und one Ior IIgIer educuLIon. WILIouL un Iurge, broud-bused Iobby group, we cun`L eIIecLIveIy
counLer-buIunce LIe mussIve LeucIer-proIessor-bused educuLIon IobbIes. DemocruLs ure co2pletely in
the pocket oI these liber,l lobby groops, und even RepubIIcuns IegIsIuLors Iuve IILLIe reuson Lo
oppose LIem und pIenLy oI reuson Lo Ieur LIem.

POLITICS LINKS/LINK T&RNS
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PLAN &NPOP&LAR

AFF WILL BE SEEN AS A "SKY IS FALLING" SCENARIO - SAPS CAPITAL.
DEARING 11. [atthew, A in Physics @ ornell, former intern @ Argonne National Laboratory, "Protecting the planet
requires heroes, money, and citizen scientists Dynamic Patterns Research 4/12 --
http://research.dynamicpatterns.com/2011/04/12/protecting-the-planet-requires-heroes-money-and-citizen-scientists/]

any of us while growing up and listening to our bedtime stories learned to not freak out and run screaming through the
streets if we thought that the "sky is falling. As little chickens, we were taught at an early age that it was best to
be brave, calm, and rational, else be considered a crazed lunatic. This childhood behavioral bias infiltrated adulthood
in the relationship between professional astronomers, policy-makers and national budget-number
crunchers. When a scientist expresses probabilistic concerns about the impending doom of our planet from a
cataclysmic change of a major impact event, say, in the next 100, 1,000, or 10,000 years, it requires just too much risk
of political capital and tax-payer dollars to divert significant budget resources to something that might only
be a concern for our uber-great grandchildren. The simultaneous efforts of two Hollywood studios in the late nineties of
the last century tried to get something stirring in our cultural awareness with their mega-disaster flicks, Armageddon and Deep
mpact. These features did bring us through the box office (which was certainly their primary goal!), but they did not push us en
masse to the round table to prepare for the ultimate defensive plan for our planet. ombating Earth-bound asteroids, or "near-
earth objects (NEOs), is an unsolved problem, and one that citizen scientists largely ignore because it's assumed
that this issue must be only approached via the domain that has access to the massive amounts of taxpayer
dollars and the international collaborations between those nations who can liberally spend all of that money. It's this
requirement of essentiaIIy unIimited funds that is the sticking point to making serious progress on
defending against an event that may, or may not, happen in the upcoming budget cycIe.

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PLAN &NPOP&LAR

NO RISK OF T&RNS - NO POLITICAL S&PPORT FOR ASTEROIDS POLICY -
ONLY RISK OF BACKLASH.
DEARING 11. [atthew, A in Physics @ ornell, former intern @ Argonne National Laboratory, "Protecting the planet
requires heroes, money, and citizen scientists Dynamic Patterns Research 4/12 --
http://research.dynamicpatterns.com/2011/04/12/protecting-the-planet-requires-heroes-money-and-citizen-scientists/]

There are many issues that NASA must juggle with here, including political, financial, and scientific. Who is
willing to risk one's political capital to champion the destruction of once-in-an-epoch giant fireballs in the sky,
albeit one that can destroy our civilization as we know it? How much of taxpayer dollars can be appropriated to a
once-in-an-epoch event, albeit one that can destroy our civilization as we know it? And, with deflection technology really
already at hand, how professionally interesting is it to track and monitor orbiting rocks, since a Nobel Prize doesn't target too many
rocks these days? The bottom line is that the political will and the money are not available from the United States
federal government, so the financing of advancing technologywell in advance of pending doomis not really an option right now,
and will likely continue to not be an option for some time. ethods of averting potentially impacting objects have already been
proposed, and should be reasonable to implement without too much of a technological leap, if any, although the funding factor will
always be an application killer. n fact, according the the task force's minutes, NASA should stay out of the direct defensive
activities, and leave that to those who know how to defend, like the Air Force. Of course, the United States is already over-criticized
for being the police force of the world, so why should it now have to be the defender of the planet and of all civilization?

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PLAN &NPOP&LAR

Asteroid expIoration unpopuIar - no pubIic support
Thompson 11 (Loren, hief Financial Officer Lexington nstitute, "Human Spaceflight, April,
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/HumanSpaceflight-ars.pdf)

This all makes sense from a budgetary and scientific perspective. What's missing is a grasp of the rationale required to
sustain political support across multiple administrations. While exploration of the oon's far side or nearby
asteroids may have major scientific benefits, those benefits are unlikely to be appreciated by politicians
struggling to reconcile record deficits. NASA's current research plans do not connect well with the policy
agendas of either major political party, and the flexible path will not change that. To justify investments of
hundreds of billions of dollars in human spaceflight over the next 20 years while entitlements are being pared and taxes are
increasing, NASA must offer a justification for its efforts commensurate with the sacrifices required. ars is the only
objective of sufficient interest or importance that can fill that role. Thus, the framework of missions undertaken
pursuant to the flexible-path approach must always be linked to the ultimate goal of putting human beings on the artian surface,
and the investments made must be justified mainly on that basis. The American public can be convinced to support a
costly series of steps leading to a worthwhile objective, but trips to the oon and near-Earth objects aren't likely to
generate sustained political support during a period of severe fiscal stress.

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PLAN POP&LAR

Even in Iight of budget deficits- space expIoration poIicies are bipartisan- spun as
maintaining Ieadership
WoIf, 10 (7/15 -- Frank, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.) is the senior Republican on the House Appropriations Subcommittee on
ommerce, Justice and Science, " Adoption of NASA compromise means continued leadership in space exploration,
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/109109-adoption-of-nasa-compromise-means-continued-leadership-in-space-
exploration-rep-frank-wolf//sb)
In a rare victory for bipartisanship and the IegisIative branch, Congress has raIIied behind an
important compromise pIan to ensure continued American Ieadership in space. Six months after the
release of the president's budget which effectively mothballed NASA's exploration program the
Senate and House have sent a cIear signaI to the White House that such cuts are unacceptabIe.
Last month, joined Reps. Dutch Ruppersberger (D-d.), John ulberson (R-Texas), Gene Green (D-Texas) and 58 other
bipartisan members representing 18 states on a letter to President Obama detailing a compromise plan centering on the immediate
development of a "heavy lift rocket and crew capsule capable of exploring beyond low Earth orbit, something the U.S. has not done
since the Apollo era. Our compromise proposal which was embraced by the Senate ommerce ommittee
in its NASA authorization bill ensures that NASA will have an exploration rocket available within six years. Our plan also
capitalizes on the nearly $10 billion already invested in the development of the next-generation rocket,
guaranteeing that taxpayers' previous investments were not made in vain. mportantly, it protects our defense industrial
base and keeps our skilled space workforce employed, making sure we don't lose their critical skill sets.
applaud the Senate ommerce ommittee for reporting out a NASA authorization bill that embraces our compromise proposal on
exploration. hope the House Science ommittee will similarly adopt this compromise and consider its authorization bill. As ranking
member on the House Appropriations Subcommittee on ommerce, Justice and Science, believe it's important for the
authorizers to signal their support so that we can enshrine this new policy in the fiscal year 2011
appropriations bill. This issue is particularly important for me because NASA has been a critical source of
inspiration, innovation and national pride for Americans over the last 50 years. Our achievements in exploration
and manned spaceflight have rallied our nation in a way that no other federal program aside from our armed services can.
believe that manned spaceflight and exploration is one of the last remaining fields in which the U.S. maintains
an undeniable competitive advantage over other nations. Our space program is a critical security and
economic asset. ountless Americans have dedicated their lives and in some cases have given their lives to earn our
current leadership in space. Our achievements in space have been hard earned. We simply cannot afford to abandon our
position in space, as the White House plan proposed. With the adoption of this important compromise, am
increasingly confident of continued American leadership in space.

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PLAN POP&LAR

T:rn - Plan is pop:lar - bipart s:pport.
Fo:st, 3
[Jeff, editor and publisher of The Space Review. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site, " The
gaps in NASA's support, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/41/2]
t's long been assumed that support for NASA in the &nited States is widespread. From a poIiticaI
standpoint, NASA enjoys a degree of bipartisan support (or, perhaps more accurately at times,
bipartisan neglect) not seen in many other government agencies. A typicaI NASA program is Iess
IikeIy to become a poIiticaI footbaII for one party or the other than programs at the Defense
Department, EPA, or even the Department of Education. Along the same lines, NASA appears to have
widespread support from the American peopIe as a whoIe. While there is a fraction of the public is
always critical of the space agency (a fraction that tends to fluctuate depending on NASA's publicized
successes or failures), it's never seemed obvious that this opposition to NASA is poIarized aIong
poIiticaI, racial, income, or other Iines.

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[AstrosocioIogy Affirmative] [LIoyd, Wutu, Anushka & Nick]

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