Notes.

—It is axiomatic that what determines the nature

of an action and hence, the jurisdiction of the court, are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought. (Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie Phils., Inc. vs.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., 482 SCRA 247 [2006])
In determining whether an action is one of the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first
be ascertained. (Bokingo vs. Court of Appeals, 489 SCRA
521 [2006])
——o0o——

G.R. No. 177667. September 17, 2008.*

CLEODIA U. FRANCISCO and CEAMANTHA U.

FRANCISCO, represented by their grandmother DRA.
MAIDA G. URIARTE as their Attorney-in-Fact,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES JORGE C. GONZALES and
PURIFICACION W. GONZALES, respondents.

Judgments; Execution; The power of the court in executing

judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to
the judgment debtor alone.—The Court finds that it was grave
error for the RTC to proceed with the execution, levy and sale of
the subject property. The power of the court in executing
judgments extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor alone, in the present case
to those belonging to Michele and Matrai. One man’s goods shall
not be sold for another man’s debts.
Family Law; Conjugal Partnership; A wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the
support of the family, or when she borrows money for that purpose
upon her husband’s failure to deliver the needed sum, when
administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the
wife by the

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.
 639

VOL. 565, SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 639

Francisco vs. Gonzales

courts or by the husband, or when the wife gives moderate

donations for charity.—A wife may bind the conjugal partnership
only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the
family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her
husband’s failure to deliver the needed sum; when administration
of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts
or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for
charity. Failure to establish any of these circumstances means
that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for the wife’s
personal obligation. Considering that the foregoing circumstances
are evidently not present in this case as the liability incurred by
Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer
case against her and her partner Matrai.
Judgments; Execution; While the trial courts has the
competence to identify and to secure properties and interest therein
held by the judgment debtor for the satisfaction of a money
judgment rendered against him, such exercise of its authority is
premised on one important fact: that the properties levied upon, or
sought to be levied upon, are properties unquestionably owned by
the judgment debtor and are not exempt by law from execution.—
While the trial court has the competence to identify and to secure
properties and interest therein held by the judgment debtor for
the satisfaction of a money judgment rendered against him, such
exercise of its authority is premised on one important fact: that
the properties levied upon, or sought to be levied upon, are
properties unquestionably owned by the judgment debtor
and are not exempt by law from execution. Also, a sheriff is not
authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging to the
judgment debtor, and even incurs liability if he wrongfully levies
upon the property of a third person. A sheriff has no authority to
attach the property of any person under execution except that of
the judgment debtor.
Civil Law; Obligations; Conjugal Partnerships; In BA Finance
Corporation v. Court of Appeals (161 SCRA 608 [1988]), the court
ruled that the petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted
by Augusto Yulo against his conjugal properties with respondent
Lily Yulo because it was not established that the obligation
contracted by the husband redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership under Article 161 of the Civil Code.—It should be
noted that the judgment debt for which the subject property was
being made to

640

640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Francisco vs. Gonzales

answer was incurred by Michele and her partner, Matrai.

Respondents allege that the lease of the property in Lanka Drive
redounded to the benefit of the family. By no stretch of one’s
imagination can it be concluded that said debt/obligation was
incurred for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or that some
advantage accrued to the welfare of the family. In BA Finance
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 608 (1988), the Court
ruled that the petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted
by Augusto Yulo against his conjugal properties with respondent
Lily Yulo because it was not established that the obligation
contracted by the husband redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the Civil Code. The
Court stated: In the present case, the obligation which the
petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property
managed by the private respondent Lily Yulo was undoubtedly
contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the
time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his
family and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he made it appear
that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L
Industries, to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, to
make A & L Industries liable now for the said loan would be
unjust and contrary to the express provision of the Civil Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; To hold the property in Taal St. liable for the
obligations of Michele and Matrai would be going against the
spirit and avowed objective of the Civil Code to give the utmost
concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.—
Similarly in this case, Michele, who was then already living
separately from Cleodualdo, rented the house in Lanka Drive for
her and Matrai’s own benefit. In fact, when they entered into the
lease agreement, Michele and Matrai purported themselves to be
husband and wife. Respondents’ bare allegation that petitioners
lived with Michele on the leased property is not sufficient to
support the conclusion that the judgment debt against Michele
and Matrai in the ejectment suit redounded to the benefit of the
family of Michele and Cleodualdo and petitioners. Thus, in
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v. Dailo, 453 SCRA 283
(2005), the Court stated thus: x x x Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit,
non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units
without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without
adducing adequate proof, does not persuade

641

VOL. 565, SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 641

Francisco vs. Gonzales

this Court. Other than petitioner’s bare allegation, there is

nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that,
indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal
obligation. To hold the property in Taal St. liable for the
obligations of Michele and Matrai would be going against the
spirit and avowed objective of the Civil Code to give the utmost
concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
Same; Same; Same; Ownership; It is clear that both Michele
and Cleodualdo have waived their title to and ownership of the
house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners—the property
should not have been levied and sold at execution sale, for lack of
legal basis.—It is clear that both Michele and Cleodualdo have
waived their title to and ownership of the house and lot in Taal
St. in favor of petitioners. The property should not have been
levied and sold at execution sale, for lack of legal basis.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
M.B. Tomacruz & Associates Law Offices for
petitioners.
M.A. Aguinaldo and Associates for petitioner-
intervenor.
Ubano, Ancheta, Sianghio & Lozada for private
respondents.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision dated April 30, 2007, which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Orders dated June 4, 2003 and
July 31, 2003, denying petitioners’ motion to stop execution
sale.
Petitioners Cleodia U. Francisco and Ceamantha U.
Francisco are the minor children of Cleodualdo M.
Francisco (Cleodualdo) and Michele Uriarte Francisco
(Michele). In a

642

642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Francisco vs. Gonzales

Partial Decision dated November 29, 2000 rendered by the

RTC of Makati, Branch 144, in Civil Case No. 93-2289 for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the Compromise
Agreement entered into by the estranged couple was
approved. The Compromise Agreement contained in part
the following provisions:

“7. In their desire to manifest their genuine concern for their

children, Cleodia and Ceamantha, Cleodualdo and Michele have
voluntarily agreed to herein set forth their obligations, rights and
responsibilities on matters relating to their children’s support,
custody, visitation, as well as to the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains as follows:
(a) Title and ownership of the conjugal property
consisting of a house and lot located in Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shall be transferred by way of a
deed of donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha, as co-owners,
when they reach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old,
respectively, subject to the following conditions:
x x x”1

The property subject of the Compromise Agreement is a

house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
167907 in the name of Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to
Michele U. Francisco, with an area of 414 square meters,
and located in 410 Taal St., Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa City.2
Meanwhile, in a case for Unlawful Detainer with
Preliminary Attachment filed by spouses Jorge C. Gonzales
and Purificacion W. Gonzales (respondents) against George
Zoltan Matrai (Matrai) and Michele, the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 80, rendered a
Decision dated May 10, 2001, ordering Matrai and Michele
to vacate the premises leased to them located in 264
Lanka Drive,

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 74-75.

2 Id., at pp. 64-65.
 643

VOL. 565, SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 643

Francisco vs. Gonzales

Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City, and to pay back

rentals, unpaid telephone bills and attorney’s fees.3
Pending appeal with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
256, an order was issued granting respondents’ prayer for
the execution of the MeTC Decision.4 A notice of sale by
execution was then issued by the sheriff covering the real
property under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-167907
in the name of Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to
Michele U. Francisco.5
When petitioners’ grandmother learned of the scheduled
auction, she, as guardian-in-fact of petitioners, filed with
the RTC an Affidavit of Third Party Claim6 and a Very
Urgent Motion to Stop Sale by Execution7 but this was
denied in the Order dated June 4, 2003.8 Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration was denied per RTC Order
dated July 31, 2003.9
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA.
Pending resolution by the CA, the RTC issued an Order
dated July 8, 2005, granting respondents’ petition for the
issuance of a new certificate of title.10 The RTC also issued
an Order on February 13, 2006, granting respondents’
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession.11
On April 30, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby

DISMISSED. The Order(s), dated June 4, 2003 and July 31, 2003,
of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Br. 256, in Civil
Case No. 01-201, STAND. Costs against the Petitioners.

_______________

3 Rollo, p. 60.
4 Id., at p. 61.
5 Id., at pp. 62-65.
6 Id., at pp. 66-67.
7 Id., at pp. 69-71.
8 Id., at pp. 79-80.
9 Id., at p. 81.
10 Id., at pp. 504-505.
11 Id., at p. 513.
 644

644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Francisco vs. Gonzales

SO ORDERED.”12

Hence, herein petition. As prayed for, the Court issued a

temporary restraining order on July 11, 2007, enjoining
respondents, the RTC, the Register of Deeds, and the
Sheriff from implementing or enforcing the RTC Order
dated July 8, 2005, canceling TCT No. 167907 and Order
dated February 13, 2006, issuing a writ of possession, until
further orders from the Court.13
Petitioners argue that: (1) they are the rightful owners
of the property as the Partial Decision issued by the RTC of
Makati in Civil Case No. 93-2289 had already become final;
(2) their parents already waived in their favor their rights
over the property; (3) the adjudged obligation of Michele in
the ejectment case did not redound to the benefit of the
family; (4) Michele’s obligation is a joint obligation between
her and Matrai, not joint and solidary.14
The Court finds that it was grave error for the RTC to
proceed with the execution, levy and sale of the subject
property. The power of the court in executing judgments
extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to
the judgment debtor alone,15 in the present case to
those belonging to Michele and Matrai. One man’s goods
shall not be sold for another man’s debts.16
To begin with, the RTC should not have ignored that
TCT No. 167907 is in the name of “Cleodualdo M.
Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco.” On its face,
the title shows that the registered owner of the property is
not Matrai and Michele but Cleodualdo, married to
Michele. This describes the

_______________

12 Rollo, p. 44.
13 Id., at p. 557.
14 Id., at pp. 16-24.
15 Go v. Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 107, 124.
16 Yao v. Perello, 460 Phil. 658, 662; 414 SCRA 474, 477 (2003).

645
 VOL. 565, SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 645
Francisco vs. Gonzales

civil status of Cleodualdo at the time the property was

acquired.17
Records show that Cleodualdo and Michele were
married on June 12, 1986, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. As such, their property
relations are governed by the Civil Code on conjugal
partnership of gains.
The CA acknowledged that ownership of the subject
property is conjugal in nature;18 however, it ruled that
since Michele’s obligation was not proven to be a personal
debt, it must be inferred that it is conjugal and redounded
to the benefit of the family, and hence, the property may be
held answerable for it.19
The Court does not agree.
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she
purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or
when she borrows money for that purpose upon her
husband’s failure to deliver the needed sum; when
administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to
the wife by the courts or by the husband; or when the wife
gives moderate donations for charity. Failure to establish
any of these circumstances means that the conjugal asset
may not be bound to answer for the wife’s personal
obligation.20 Considering that the foregoing circumstances
are evidently not present in this case as the liability
incurred by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an
unlawful detainer case against her and her partner Matrai.

_______________

17 Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170346,

March 12, 2007, 518 SCRA 202; Pisueña v. Heirs of Petra Unating, 372
Phil. 267; 313 SCRA 384 (1999); Estonina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
111547, January 27, 1997, 266 SCRA 627.
18 Rollo, p. 41.
19 Id.
20 Go v. Yamane, supra note 15.

646

646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Francisco vs. Gonzales
 Furthermore, even prior to the issuance of the Notice of
Levy on Execution on November 28, 2001,21 there was
already annotated on the title the following inscription:

Entry No. 23341-42/T-167907—Nullification of Marriage

By order of the Court RTC, NCR, Branch 144, Makati City
dated July 4, 2001, which become final and executory on October
18, 2001 declaring the Marriage Contract between Michelle
Uriarte and Cleodualdo M. Francisco, Jr. is null & void ab initio
and title of ownership of the conjugal property consisting of the
above-described property shall be transferred by way of a Deed of
Donation to Cleodia Michaela U. Francisco and Ceamantha Maica
U. Francisco, as co-owners when they reach nineteen (19) and
eighteen (18) yrs. old to the condition that Cleodualdo, shall
retain usufructuary rights over the property until he reaches the
age of 65 yrs. Old.
Date of instrument—Oct 18, 2001
Date of inscription—Oct 22, 2001.22

This annotation should have put the RTC and the sheriff
on guard, and they should not have proceeded with the
execution of the judgment debt of Michele and Matrai.
While the trial court has the competence to identify and
to secure properties and interest therein held by the
judgment debtor for the satisfaction of a money judgment
rendered against him, such exercise of its authority is
premised on one important fact: that the properties levied
upon, or sought to be levied upon, are properties
unquestionably owned by the judgment debtor and
are not exempt by law from execution.23 Also, a sheriff is
not authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging
to the judgment debtor, and even incurs liability if he
wrongfully levies upon the property of a third person. A
sheriff has no authority to attach the property

_______________

21 Rollo, page 208.

22 Id., back of page 65.
23 Abesamis v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 646; 361 SCRA 328 (2001).

647

VOL. 565, SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 647

Francisco vs. Gonzales

of any person under execution except that of the judgment

debtor.24
 It should be noted that the judgment debt for which the
subject property was being made to answer was incurred
by Michele and her partner,25 Matrai. Respondents allege
that the lease of the property in Lanka Drive redounded to
the benefit of the family.26 By no stretch of one’s
imagination can it be concluded that said debt/obligation
was incurred for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or
that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the family.
In BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court
ruled that the petitioner cannot enforce the obligation
contracted by Augusto Yulo against his conjugal properties
with respondent Lily Yulo because it was not established
that the obligation contracted by the husband redounded to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership under Article 161 of
the Civil Code. The Court stated:

“In the present case, the obligation which the petitioner is

seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the
private respondent Lily Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by
Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he incurred
the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left
their conjugal home. Worse, he made it appear that he was duly
authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L Industries, to procure
such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L Industries
liable now for the said loan would be unjust and contrary to the
express provision of the Civil Code.” (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly in this case, Michele, who was then already

living separately from Cleodualdo,28 rented the house in
Lanka Drive for her and Matrai’s own benefit. In fact,
when they

_______________

24 Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

102692, September 23, 1996, 262 SCRA 298.
25 Rollo, p. 611.
26 Id., at pp. 122, 139-140.
27 No. L-61464, May 28, 1988, 161 SCRA 608.
28 Rollo, p. 74.

648

648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Francisco vs. Gonzales

entered into the lease agreement, Michele and Matrai

purported themselves to be husband and wife.29
Respondents’ bare allegation that petitioners lived with
Michele on the leased property is not sufficient to support
the conclusion that the judgment debt against Michele and
Matrai in the ejectment suit redounded to the benefit of the
family of Michele and Cleodualdo and petitioners. Thus, in
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v. Dailo, the Court
stated thus:

“x x x Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who

asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt
redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate
proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioner’s bare
allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel
a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently,
the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of
the principal obligation.”30

To hold the property in Taal St. liable for the obligations

of Michele and Matrai would be going against the spirit
and avowed objective of the Civil Code to give the utmost
concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a
unit.31
In justifying the levy against the property, the RTC
went over the Compromise Agreement as embodied in the
Partial Decision dated November 29, 2000. Oddly, the RTC
ruled that there was no effective transfer of ownership to
the siblings Cleodia and Ceamantha Francisco. In the same
breath, the RTC astonishingly ruled that Michele is now
the owner of the property inasmuch as Cleodualdo already
waived his rights over the property. The Compromise
Agreement must not be

_______________

29 See Complaint in Civil Case No. 4905, p. 147.

30 G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005, 453 SCRA 283, 292.
31 Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. Garcia, 140 Phil. 509; 30 SCRA 111 (1969).

649

VOL. 565, SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 649

Francisco vs. Gonzales

read piece-meal but in its entirety. It is provided therein,

thus:
 “7. In their desire to manifest their genuine concern for their
children, Cleodia and Ceamantha, Cleodualdo and Michelle
have voluntarily agreed to herein set forth their obligations,
rights and responsibilities on matters relating to their children’s
support, custody, visitation, as well as to the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains as follows:
(a) Title and ownership of the conjugal property
consisting of a house and lot located in Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shall be
transferred by way of a deed of donation to Cleodia
and Ceamantha, as co-owners, when they reach
nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old,
respectively, subject to the following conditions:
a.1. Cleodualdo shall retain usufructuary rights over
the property until he reaches the age of 65 years old, with
the following rights and responsibilities:
x x x x”32 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing, it is clear that both Michele and

Cleodualdo have waived their title to and ownership of the
house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners. The
property should not have been levied and sold at execution
sale, for lack of legal basis.
Verily, the CA committed an error in sustaining the
RTC Orders dated June 4, 2003 and July 31, 2003.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Court of Appeals Decision dated April 30, 2007, affirming
RTC Orders dated June 4, 2003 and July 31, 2003, are
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The temporary
restraining order issued by the Court per Resolution of
July 11, 2007 is hereby made PERMANENT.
Costs against respondents.

_______________

32 Rollo, pp. 74-75.

© Copyright 2024 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.