Jia 2016
Jia 2016
To cite this article: Junxue Jia & Yunxia Chao (2016) Growth strategy and TFP growth:
comparing China and four Asian tigers, Economic and Political Studies, 4:2, 156-170, DOI:
10.1080/20954816.2016.1180767
Article views: 3
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Introduction
Perhaps the most important challenge faced by policymakers in China today is how to
sustain economic growth. In the past three decades, China has experienced miraculous
achievements in economic development. Its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
has grown by an average rate of 8.77% during the period 1978–2009, which was
remarkably higher than the world average of 1.38% (World Bank 2010). Furthermore,
China had successfully and impressively maintained a rapid growth during the 2008
global financial crisis. Its growth miracle seems far from ending.
Since the early 2000s, however, economists have been increasingly concerned about
China’s growth strategy and whether its economic growth can be sustained. Some
economists believe that there has been notable growth in the total factor productivity
(TFP), which is attributed to a successful growth strategy pursued by China since
1978.1 For example, Chow and Lin (2002) find that TFP growth was on average 2.7%
during the period of 1978–1998, which accounted for 28% of China’s GDP growth of
that year. Perkins and Rawski (2008) show that an average 3.8% TFP growth explained
over 40% of GDP growth during the period 1978–2005. Similarly, Bosworth and
CONTACT Yunxia Chao [email protected] China Financial Policy Research Center, School of Finance
at Renmin University of China, China
ß 2016 Economic and Political Studies
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 157
Collins (2008) attribute 40.1% of China’s GDP growth to its TFP growth during the
period 1978–2004. By contrast, some studies argue that China’s economic growth is
mainly investment-driven with limited productivity improvement. Young (2003) finds
that the average TFP growth rate in China was 1.4% during the period 1978-1998.
Zheng, Bigsten, and Hu (2009) show that the TFP growth rate was 3.72% in the early
reform periods (before 1995), but declined to 1.77% afterwards. Wu (2011) finds that
the TFP growth in China was only 0.3% during the period of 1978–2008. More recently,
Tian and Yu (2012) employ a meta-analysis of TFP growth in China and find that its
mean was approximately 2% after 1978, contributing to 20% of the GDP growth.
These arguments remind us of the debate in the early 1990s on another economic
growth miracle, which occurred in the Four Asian Tigers (namely, Hong Kong SAR,
Chinese Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea) during the period 1960s–1990s. The
average growth rates of GDP per capita in the four economies were over 6.0%during
the period 1965–1990, whereas the world average was only 1.7% (World Bank 2010).
Such a miracle was commonly thought to be driven by the accumulation of massive
factors (Kim and Lau 1994; Krugman 1994; Young 1994, 1995), which collapsed in the
1998 financial crisis. It is widely accepted that the Chinese mainland shares many fea-
tures with the Four Tigers. They pursued a similar growth strategy during their takeoff
stages, although no agreed definition exists on what constitutes such a growth strategy.
Several major features, including high investment rates, rapid trade-opening, strong
export orientations (with an undervalued currency), active government interventions
and macroeconomic management, have arguably been critical for the growth experien-
ces of these economies (Boltho and Weber 2009; Herrerias and Orts 2010; Sarel 1996;
World Bank 1993; Xu 2010). Given this background, many economists were worried
that the Chinese mainland would follow the Four Tigers’ growth path and that its
growth might suddenly end.
However, the quantitative comparative analysis of the five economies during their
takeoff stages is still inadequate. More importantly, despite the key role that the growth
strategy and TFP growth have played in determining long-run growth performances of
the five economies, limited attempts have been made to explore the relations between
the growth strategy and the TFP growth in these economies.2 Using the data from the
five economies during their high-growth period, this paper compares the TFP growth
performance of the Chinese mainland and the Four Tigers and examines the role of
growth strategies pursued by these economies in determining TFP growth under a
common framework. For each economy, a state-space model in which the TFP growth
is treated as a latent variable is estimated using the Kalman filter algorithm. Since TFP
growth is unobservable, the state-space model seems a natural and appropriate way to
simultaneously estimate the GDP–TFP system and to improve the estimation of TFP
growth (Fuentes and Morales 2011). Moreover, by introducing strategy-related varia-
bles into the state equation, this approach enables us to make a more accurate assess-
ment on the TFP growth effects of the growth strategy. Clearly, this helps identify the
critical challenge for the growth strategies pursued by the Chinese mainland and the
Four Tigers from a productivity perspective, and provides lessons for these economies
and other developing economies to sustain economic growth.
This paper is organised as follows. The empirical methodology and econometric
model are presented in the second section. The third section describes the data and
158 J. JIA AND Y. CHAO
variables used in this paper. The empirical results are analyzed in the fourth section.
The fifth section presents conclusions.
Empirical methodology
In this paper, we use the state-space model to estimate TFP growth and its determi-
nants. For comparison, TFP growth is also estimated by using the growth accounting
method. This section provides a brief description of the two approaches.
Growth accounting
The method widely used to estimate TFP growth in the literature is growth accounting
(GA) based on an aggregate production function. Specifically, the following
Cobb–Douglas production function under the assumption of constant return to scale is
often employed:
growth into the state equation provides a more accurate exploration of the driving
forces behind TFP growth.
It is assumed that TFP growth (DLnðAt Þ) follows a first-order autoregressive and
moving average process (ARMA (1, 1)) augmented with the determinants of TFP
growth.3 The state-space model for the GDP-TFP system is specified through the
observation equation and the state equations as follows.
The observation equation is:
high-growth periods. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables of
the five economies.
Kt ¼ ð1 dÞKt1 þ It ; (6)
where It denotes real investment in period t, and d is the rate of depreciation that is
assumed to be 5% for each economy as in Zheng et al. (2009).4 Following Yang
(2003) and Wu (2011), initial capital stock (K0 ) is estimated according to the following
equation:
K0 ¼ I0 =ðd þ g Þ; (7)
where g is the average GDP growth rate over a stable period, and I0 is the real invest-
ment in the initial period. The initial year and the stable period are selected as 1952
and 1953–1959 for the Chinese mainland, and as 1960 and 1961–1967 for the Four
Tigers to reduce the influences of measurement errors on the estimation of the initial
capital stock. The estimated initial capital stock is US $250,607.1 million for the
Chinese mainland and US$21,489.4 million for Chinese Taiwan, which are very close
to the estimates of Wu (2011) and Chow and Lin (2002).
As shown in Figure 2, all five economies experienced a remarkable accumulation of
physical capital during their high-growth periods. In particular, South Korea accumu-
lated the fastest with an average accumulation rate of 13.0%, which was significantly
higher than its GDP growth rate of 8.2%. However, this key feature of the extensive
growth model is not sustainable in the long run. In practice, all Four Tigers have
undergone dramatic declines in the accumulation rates of physical capital along with
the end of their growth miracles during the late 1990s. Another prominent fact is that
physical capital in the Chinese mainland showed a trend of accelerating accumulation
over the sample: the accumulation rate increased from 8.5% in 1978 to 12.4% in 2009,
which is also higher than its GDP growth rate (9.7%).
Following Barro and Lee (2001), human capital (Ht ) is measured as the average
years of schooling of the working age population (namely, the population from 15 to
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 161
64 years of age). The data on Chinese Taiwan’s human capital stock are directly from
Lin (2003). For other economies, the educational attainment data for five-year intervals
from 1960 to 2010 are from Education Statistics of World Bank (World Bank EdStats
2011). We assume a constant growth rate of educational attainment during the five
years and then obtain data for each year.5 Although the average years of the working
age population in the Chinese mainland increased from 5.6 in 1978 to 8.4 in 2009, the
mean value (6.23 years) is lower than those of South Korea and Hong Kong SAR (7.79
and 7.48, respectively).
162 J. JIA AND Y. CHAO
15
Percent
10
0
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-5 Year
-10
Figure 1. Growth rates of real GDP. Data source: Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten.
2011. ‘Penn World Table Version 7.0.’ Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income
and Prices, University of Pennsylvania.
15
Percent
10
0
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Figure 2. Growth rates of physical capital stock.
Table 2. Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) unit root tests for main variables.
Economy D ln ðY=L Þ D ln ðK=L Þ D lnðRpÞ D lnðSgÞ D lnðOpenÞ D lnðOvalÞ D lnð1 þ Inf Þ
Chinese Mainland 3.065** 4.171** 4.821*** 5.102*** 4.293*** 4.001*** 5.417***
Hong Kong SAR 5.100*** 7.059*** 3.148*** 3.674*** 2.672*** 2.900*** 4.847***
Chinese Taiwan 3.597** 3.964** 5.114*** 4.307*** 2.730*** 3.265*** 6.509***
Singapore 3.145** 1.719* 3.796** 3.588** 4.397*** 2.648** 6.051***
South Korea 4.378*** 2.930* 5.223*** 4.624*** 4.683*** 2.767*** 4.663***
D indicates the first difference operator.
*, **, and *** denote the significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
capital goods relative to consumption goods, and only had they undergone an obvious
decline in the relative price. Inflation rates seem relatively moderate in the five econo-
mies. South Korea exhibited the highest inflation rate (11.47%). In the state Equation
(5), these variables are measured as year-to-year percentage changes by taking the log
difference transformation multiplied by 100. For the inflation rate, we use the trans-
formation of D lnð1 þ Inft Þ multiplied by 100 instead, since negative inflation rates are
very common in our sample.6
Finally, as shown in Table 2, the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) unit root tests
suggest that we can generally view the variables used in the regressions as being sta-
tionary at the 10% level of significance.
Results
We first investigate the TFP growth performance of the Chinese mainland and the
Four Tigers, and then examine the effects of strategy-related variables on TFP growth.
Table 3 reports the Kalman filter estimation results for the models (4)–(5).7 The
explanatory variables, D lnðXt Þ, are selected according to the general-to-specific
approach based on the minimised Akaike information criterion, considering up to one
lag of each variable in the state equation. For comparison, TFP growth is also esti-
mated using the growth accounting method. The ML estimation results of the growth
accounting Equation (3) for each economy are reported in Table 4.8
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 165
10
8
6
4
2
Percent
0
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-2
Year
-4
-6
-8
Hong Kong SAR Chinese Taiwan
-10 Singapore South Korea
Chinese Mainland
-12
Figure 3. Growth rates of TFP estimated from the state-space model.
its GDP growth. This finding is consistent with the findings of Timmer and van Ark
(2000).
These results confirm previous findings in the literature: TFP growth and its contri-
bution to GDP growth were quite limited in the Chinese mainland and the Four
Tigers. In contrast, these countries’ economic growth relied heavily on physical capital
accumulation, whose contribution was 97.54% for South Korea, 84.77% for Chinese
Taiwan, 73.16% for the Chinese mainland, 71.36% for Hong Kong SAR, and 45.33%
for Singapore.
It is important to note that the growth accounting results are obviously different,
particularly for the Four Tigers: The output elasticity of capital (a) is much smaller,
as shown in Table 4, and TFP growth and its contribution are obviously larger in
absolute value. However, Table 4 shows that the capital elasticity is not statistically
significant for Singapore, and that neither is the parameter c in the cases of the
Chinese mainland and South Korea. This result implies that one or more assump-
tions underlying the growth accounting method may be violated for these econo-
mies, thus yielding misleading results. In addition, the assumption that TFP grows
at a constant rate over long periods is also unreasonable. Hence, the results from
the state-space model should be more accurate, as indicated by Fuentes and
Morales (2011).
Conclusion
This paper compares TFP growth performance for the Chinese mainland and the Four
Asian Tigers during their high-growth periods and examines the role that growth strat-
egies pursued by these economies played in determining TFP growth. Specifically, the
state-space model in which TFP growth is treated as a latent variable is applied for
each economy using the Kalman filter.
168 J. JIA AND Y. CHAO
Our results show that TFP growth and its contribution to economic growth were
quite limited in the Chinese mainland and the Four Tigers during their takeoff stages,
which is mainly attributed to their growth strategies. The price of capital goods relative
to consumption goods shows no statistically significant effects on TFP growth for
Hong Kong SAR and Chinese Taiwan. Moreover, the decline in this relative price is
significantly related to a slowdown in TFP growth in the Chinese mainland, Singapore
and South Korea. Thus, no evidence exists for investment-specific technological pro-
gress in Chinese mainland and the Four Tigers. That is, the rapid growth of invest-
ments failed to deliver significant productivity bonuses in the five economies. Similarly,
no significant gains in productivity and efficiency arise from trade openness and an
undervalued currency in these economies. Trade openness even hinders TFP growth in
South Korea, as the undervalued exchange rate does for Chinese Taiwan and
Singapore. We also find that government interventions, as measured by the share of
government expenditure to GDP, encourage TFP growth in the long run for the
Chinese mainland and Taiwan, but that government interventions hinder it for the
other economies. Macroeconomic instability, with higher inflation, reduces TFP growth
in Chinese Taiwan and Singapore.
These results have important policy implications for long-term sustainable growth,
particularly for the Chinese mainland. A similar growth strategy, characterised by a
high investment rate, rapid opening of trade, strong export orientation and active gov-
ernment intervention, has been widely thought of as a key driving force behind
remarkable economic growth of the Chinese mainland and the Four Tigers during
their takeoff stages. However, such a growth strategy also appears to be a major source
of the poor performance of TFP growth in these economies. Given the collapse of the
economic growth of the Four Tigers, it is necessary for the Chinese mainland to
change its growth strategy to avoid a similar collapse. Significant reform efforts should
be made to reduce the heavy dependence on the high investment rate and export by
encouraging greater consumption. More importantly, the Chinese mainland should
take effective measures to improve the efficiency of investment and the quality of cap-
ital and to encourage technical upgrades and shifting of export structure towards more
sophisticated high-technology products. Of course, such alternatives are challenging
and involve many short-term costs, but they are very critical for the long-term sustain-
able economic growth of China. Finally, the Chinese mainland should increase govern-
ment expenditures on R&D, education, training and health services, since such
expenditures have turned out to be important to improve productivity.
Notes
1. For reviews on the TFP growth estimates for China, see Tian and Yu (2012). In the
literature on economic growth, TFP was widely used to measure technological progress
and efficiency gains, thus it plays a central role in assessing growth performance and the
sustainability of economies in the long run(Easterly and Levine 2001).
2. Thomas and Wang (1996) and Collins, Bosworth, and Rodrik (1996) investigated the TFP
growth effects of government interventions and economic distortions by running a
regression of TFP growth, which is estimated using the growth accounting method in a
first step, on these variables in a second step. However, the growth accounting method has
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 169
a couple of caveats and, thus, an incorrect estimate from the first step could invalidate the
conclusions obtained from the second-step regression.
3. In the existing studies, TFP growth is often assumed to follow an AR(1) process (Fuentes
and Morales 2011). Clearly, an ARMA (1, 1) process is more general compared with an
AR (1) process.
4. The depreciation rate is also set at 4%, as in Sarel (1996). Our results are insensitive to
this change.
5. Young (2003) found that the growth of human capital stock in the non-agriculture sector
of the Chinese mainland wasalmost constant during the period 1978–1998.
6. After the log difference transformation, the correlation among these explanatory variables
is mostly negligible for each economy.
7. The estimate results turn out to be robust for different initial guesses of the parameters
among the reasonable ranges. The log-likelihood function is maximised using the
Berndt–Hall–Hall–Hausman (BHHH) algorithm under the assumption of Gaussian errors.
In addition, we require data on the Four Tigers as far back as the 1960s, and few long
data series are available. Thus, some potential factors that determine TFP growth may be
omitted from the model. However, the Jarque–Bera tests show that the residuals are very
close to normality, indicating that this problem should not be serious.
8. The Wald tests show that the assumption of constant returns to scale cannot be rejected at
the 5% level of significance for each economy.
9. By the long-run cumulative multiplier, we mean the sum of current and lagged coefficients
of each variable divided by (1b).
Disclosure statement
The authors report no conflicts of interest. The authors alone are responsible for the content
and writing of this article.
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