2022 Book HumanAnimalRelationshipsInTran

THE PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
ANIMAL ETHICS SERIES
Human/Animal
Relationships
in Transformation
Scientific, Moral and
Legal Perspectives
Edited by
Augusto Vitale · Simone Pollo
The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series
Series Editors
Andrew Linzey
Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics
Oxford, UK
Clair Linzey
Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics
Oxford, UK
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the ethics of our
treatment of animals. Philosophers have led the way, and now a range of
other scholars have followed from historians to social scientists. From
being a marginal issue, animals have become an emerging issue in ethics
and in multidisciplinary inquiry. This series will explore the challenges
that Animal Ethics poses, both conceptually and practically, to traditional
understandings of human-animal relations. Specifically, the Series will:
• provide a range of key introductory and advanced texts that map out
ethical positions on animals;
• publish pioneering work written by new, as well as accom-
plished, scholars;
• produce texts from a variety of disciplines that are multidisciplinary in
character or have multidisciplinary relevance.
For further information or to submit a proposal for consideration, please

contact Amy Invernizzi, [email protected].
More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14421
Augusto Vitale • Simone Pollo
Editors
Human/Animal
Relationships in
Transformation
Scientific, Moral and Legal
Perspectives
Editors
Augusto Vitale Simone Pollo
Center for Behavioural Sciences and Department of Philosophy
Mental Health Sapienza Università di Roma
Istituto Superiore di Sanità Rome, Italy
Rome, Italy
ISSN 2634-6672 ISSN 2634-6680 (electronic)

The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series
ISBN 978-3-030-85276-4 ISBN 978-3-030-85277-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85277-1
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland
AG 2022, corrected publication 2022
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Preface
Ethics of Human/Animal Relationships is a growing field of academic

research and a topic for public discussion and regulatory interventions
from law-makers, government and private institutions (such as scientific
societies and farming industries). In our societies human/animal
relationships are in transformation and understanding the nature of this
process is crucial for all those who believe that the enlargement of moral
and legal recognition to non-human animals is part of contemporary
civilization and moral/political progress. Understanding the nature of
this process means analysing and critically discussing the philosophical/
scientific/legal concepts and arguments embedded in it. This book aims
at contributing to such analysis by means of collecting ideas and reflec-
tions from leading experts in the fields from different disciplinary
approaches and theoretical/scientific perspectives. Scopes of this book are
both depicting the state of the art of the transformation of Human/
Animal Relationships and presenting ideas to foster this process. In pur-
suing those aims the approach of this book is plural in a double meaning.
First, contributors are plural in their backgrounds and expertise in order
to provide a rich interpretation of the questions at stake. Second, plural-
ity regards the subject matter of the various analyses: Human/Animal
Relationships (and transformations affecting them) are not a monolith.
v
vi Preface
Animal species are many and different and human interactions with them
are equally many and different. The various contributions to the book
move from the awareness of the great variety of human/animal relation-
ships in order to foster the theoretical debate and the public discussion
about the scientific and ethical reasons underlying the changes in our
approaches to animals, a fact that nowadays irreversibly characterizes our
societies.
Rome, Italy Augusto Vitale

Simone Pollo
Series Editors’ Preface
This is a new book series for a new field of inquiry: Animal Ethics.
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the ethics of our
treatment of animals. Philosophers have led the way, and now a range of
other scholars have followed, from historians to social scientists. From
being a marginal issue, animals have become an emerging issue in ethics
and in multidisciplinary inquiry.
In addition, a rethink of the status of animals has been fuelled by a
range of scientific investigations which have revealed the complexity of
animal sentiency, cognition and awareness. The ethical implications of
this new knowledge have yet to be properly evaluated, but it is becoming
clear that the old view that animals are mere things, tools, machines or
commodities cannot be sustained ethically.
But it is not only philosophy and science that are putting animals on
the agenda. Increasingly, in Europe and the United States, animals are
becoming a political issue as political parties vie for the “green” and “ani-
mal” vote. In turn, political scientists are beginning to look again at the
history of political thought in relation to animals, and historians are
beginning to revisit the political history of animal protection.
As animals grow as an issue of importance, so there have been more
collaborative academic ventures leading to conference volumes, special
journal issues, indeed new academic animal journals as well. Moreover,
vii
viii Series Editors’ Preface
we have witnessed the growth of academic courses, as well as university

posts, in Animal Ethics, Animal Welfare, Animal Rights, Animal Law,
Animals and Philosophy, Human-Animal Studies, Critical Animal
Studies, Animals and Society, Animals in Literature, Animals and
Religion—tangible signs that a new academic discipline is emerging.
“Animal Ethics” is the new term for the academic exploration of the
moral status of the non-human, an exploration that explicitly involves a
focus on what we owe animals morally, and which also helps us to under-
stand the influences—social, legal, cultural, religious and political—that
legitimate animal abuse. This series explores the challenges that Animal
Ethics poses, both conceptually and practically, to traditional under-
standings of human-animal relations.
The series is needed for three reasons: (1) to provide the texts that will
service the new university courses on animals, (2) to support the increas-
ing number of students studying and academics researching in animal
related fields and (3) because there is currently no book series that is a
focus for multidisciplinary research in the field.
Specifically, the series will
• provide a range of key introductory and advanced texts that map out
ethical positions on animals,
• publish pioneering work written by new, as well as accomplished,
scholars, and
• produce texts from a variety of disciplines that are multidisciplinary in
character or have multidisciplinary relevance.
The new Palgrave Macmillan Series on Animal Ethics is the result of a

unique partnership between Palgrave Macmillan and the Ferrater Mora
Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics. The series is an integral part of the mis-
sion of the Centre to put animals on the intellectual agenda by facilitat-
ing academic research and publication. The series is also a natural
complement to one of the Centre’s other major projects, the Journal of
Animal Ethics. The Centre is an independent “think tank” for the advance-
ment of progressive thought about animals, and is the first Centre of its
Series Editors’ Preface ix
kind in the world. It aims to demonstrate rigorous intellectual enquiry

and the highest standards of scholarship. It strives to be a world-class
centre of academic excellence in its field.
We invite academics to visit the Centre’s website www.oxfordani-
malethics.com and to contact us with new book proposals for the series.
Oxford, UK Andrew Linzey

Clair Linzey
Acknowledgements
This book originates from a workshop held at the Lorentz Center, at the
University of Leiden, in September 2017. During that event, we gathered
together with colleagues from different areas of research and different
contexts to discuss animal welfare and human/animal relationships.
Those five days of stimulating discussions made possible the project of
this book and among the contributors of this book many participated in
the workshop. We would really like to thank the staff of the Lorentz
Center for their kindness, mixed with a level of impeccable professional-
ism. Without the relaxed and inspiring environment provided by the
Lorentz Center, this book would have never been even thought of.
xi
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Simone Pollo and Augusto Vitale
Part I Philosophy and Ethics of Human Animal/

Relationships 7
2 Darwinian Biology and the New Understanding

of Animals 9
Simone Pollo
3 Animal Detection and Its Role in Our Attitude towards

Other Species 31
Giorgio Vallortigara
4 The Moral Value of Animal Sentience and Agency 47

Federico Zuolo
5 Affective Animal Ethics: Reflective Empathy, Attention

and Knowledge Sub Specie Aeternitatis 67
Elisa Aaltola
xiii
xiv Contents
Part II Transformations in General Scenarios 91
6 Perceiving Animals Through Different Demographic and

Cultural Lenses 93
Pim Martens and Bingtao Su
7 Animal Welfare in Context: Historical, Scientific, Ethical,

Moral and One Welfare Perspectives119
E. Anne McBride and Stephen Baugh
8 Survival of the Fittest: When an Evolutionary Advantage

Becomes Such a Threat to the Welfare of Other
Non-Human Animal Species That it Threatens Our
Own Species149
Jan L. M. Vaarten and Nancy De Briyne
9 A Proposal for a Multi-Dimensional Profile of

the Animal Researcher171
Augusto Vitale
10 The Two Sides of the Non-Human-Animal Bond:

Reflections on Using and Abusing Companion Animals193
Michał Piotr Pręgowski, Karin Hediger, and Marie-José
Enders-Slegers
Part III Transformations in Cases and Contexts 219
11 Farms, Landscapes, Food and Relationships221

Pasqualino Santori and Clemens Driessen
12 Biotechnologies and Animals: The Impact of Genetic

Engineering on Human-Animal Relationships241
Susanna Pietropaolo
Contents xv
13 Coexisting with Wild Nonhuman Primates in a Brazilian

Semiarid Habitat273
Noemi Spagnoletti
14 Companionship and Wellbeing: Benefits and Challenges

of Human-Pet Relationships289
Marta Borgi and Francesca Cirulli
15 Human-Wildlife Coexistence in the Urban Domain:

Promoting Welfare Through Effective Management,
Responsibility and the Recognition of Mutual Interest317
Oliver Adrian Wookey
Part IV Recognising Transformations 339
16 Political Representation of Animals’ Voices341

Robert Garner
17 Animal Law: What Is Left to be Said by the Law About

Animals363
Marita Giménez-Candela

Correction to: Survival of the Fittest: When an Evolutionary
Advantage Becomes Such a Threat to the Welfare of Other
Non-Human Animal Species That it Threatens Our
Own SpeciesC1
Notes on Contributors
Elisa Aaltola is a philosopher, specialized in animal and environmental

ethics, moral psychology. She works at the University of Turku and is
researching the influence of emotions on our treatment of non-human
animals and nature. Aaltola has written numerous articles, together with
a number of Finnish monographs and edited volumes. In English, she
has also written the books “Varieties of Empathy: Moral Psychology and
Animal Ethics” (2018) and “Animal Suffering: Philosophy and Culture”
(2012), and edited the volume “Animal Ethics and Philosophy:
Questioning the Orthodoxy” (2014) with John Hadley. Her English blog
can be found at www.philosophyhounds.com.
Stephen Baugh, BSc (Hons) BVM&S MRCVS SFHEA, is an experi-
enced companion animal veterinary surgeon and an academic. Baugh is
Principal Lecturer in Animal Health and Welfare at Harper Adams
University and Programme Manager for a suite of animal courses. Baugh
has taught animal health, welfare and animal ethics to undergraduate and
postgraduate students studying Veterinary Medicine, Veterinary
Bioscience, Clinical Animal Behaviour, Veterinary Nursing, Veterinary
Pharmacy, Veterinary Physiotherapy, Applied Zoology and Agriculture.
Baugh has published in peer-reviewed journals and veterinary profes-
sional journals and has contributed chapters to academic books in the
areas of animal health, welfare and animal ethics.
xvii
xviii Notes on Contributors
Marta Borgi is a researcher at the Istituto Superiore di Sanità in Rome,

Italy. She received her PhD in Animal Behaviour from the University of
Florence, studying children’s attitudes towards animals and human
response to infantile features in pets. Her research focuses on the effect of
human-animal interactions on human health and well-being, particularly
in the context of animal-assisted therapeutic programmes. She is also
conducting research for the development of reliable methods for evaluat-
ing animal welfare during animal-assisted interventions.
Francesca Cirulli is a senior researcher in the Center for Behavioural
Sciences and Mental Health at the Istituto Superiore di Sanità in Rome,
Italy. She holds a PhD in Neurobiology from Stanford University (USA).
She investigates the interaction between stress and energy metabolism in
susceptibility to mental disorders. She also works on human-animal
interactions and the role of animals in psychiatric rehabilitation. She is
the past President of the European Brain and Behaviour Society (EBBS)
and Treasurer of the Federation of Neuroscience Societies (FENS).
Nancy De Briyne studied veterinary medicine in Ghent (Belgium).
After working as a veterinary practitioner in Belgium and the UK, she
joined in 2000 the Federation of Veterinarians of Europe (FVE). In 2015,
she became diplomate of the European College of Animal Welfare and
Behavioural Medicine, subspecialty Animal Welfare Science, Ethics and
Law. Within FVE she works on animal welfare, veterinary medicines,
education and communication. Presently, she is Executive Director of the
FVE. She published in 2009 an overview of animal welfare teaching in
veterinary undergraduate education. She is the author of several publica-
tions on animal welfare issues.
Clemens Driessen is a more-than-human geographer working as an
assistant professor in the Cultural Geography group at Wageningen
University, the Netherlands. He is interested in the messy relations
between plants, animals, technologies and humans. Through collabora-
tions with scientists, farmers, artists, designers—and seeking to enlist
voluntary non-human involvement—he develops ambivalent interven-
tions in a variety of practices in agriculture and nature conservation. He
has initiated an effort to design video games for intensively farmed pigs
Notes on Contributors xix
to play with humans, contributed to a documentary on back-bred dedo-

mesticated cattle, and was a collaborator on the Countryside exhibition
at the NY Guggenheim Museum.
Marie-José Enders-Slegers is a clinical and health psychologist. Her
field of interest is the human-animal bond and animal-assisted interven-
tions in health care and education. Her research includes the develop-
ment of the human-animal bond, the meaning and effects of
human-animal interactions and animal-assisted interventions for vulner-
able people. She is interested in the link between domestic violence and
animal abuse. She works as Professor in Anthrozoology, Faculty of
Psychology, Open University Heerlen, the Netherlands, is President of
IAHAIO, International Association of Human Animal Interaction
Organizations, is ISAZ fellow, fellow of the Denver University. She is the
author of many articles and book chapters.
Robert Garner (FRSA) is Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of
Leicester. He has published widely on the politics and philosophy of animal
rights. His books include The Oxford Group and the Emergence of Animal
Rights (with Yewande Okuleye) (2021), A Theory of Justice for Animals (2013)
and the Animal Rights Debate (with Gary Francione) (2010).
Marita Giménez-Candela is Professor of Law at the Universitat
Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB). She is a Humboldt Scholar and a visit-
ing professor at many universities across the world. She has published an
important number of articles, papers and books about animal law, com-
parative law and Roman law. She is the founder and chief editor of the
www.derechoanimal.info website. In 2009 she established, and has since
managed both the onsite and online Master in Animal Law and Society
which is a pioneer initiative in Europe. She is the Director of ICALP
(International Center for Animal Law and Policy). She manages two col-
lections of books on “Animals and the Law”. She is as well the Founder
and Editor-in-Chief of the, indexed by SCOPUS, Journal of Animal
Law: dA. Derecho Animal (Forum of Animal Law Studies, https://revistes.
uab.cat/da/index).
Karin Hediger is a psychotherapist and researcher at the University of
Basel, Switzerland. She investigates the effects of animal-assisted inter-
xx Notes on Contributors
ventions and human-animal interactions. She is endowed chair of

Anthrozoology at the Open University in the Netherlands. She com-
pleted her PhD in Rostock, Germany, in human-animal interaction and
holds certification in animal-assisted therapy, a diploma in equine-assisted
therapy and founded a centre for animal-assisted psychotherapy. She is
the President of the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Human-
Animal Relationship (IEMT), Secretary of the International Society for
Animal Assisted Therapy (ISAAT), Board Member of the International
Association of Human Animal Interaction Organizations (IAHIAO).
Pim Martens has a PhD in Applied Mathematics and Biological Sciences
and is Professor of “Sustainable Development” at Maastricht University
(the Netherlands); he is a member of the Dutch Royal Academy of
Science’s Planetary Health Committee. He has published over 120 jour-
nal papers and has written and edited 12 books. Martens is founder of
AnimalWise, a “think and do tank” integrating scientific knowledge and
animal advocacy to bring about sustainable change in our relationship
with animals.
E. Anne McBride has a degree in Psychology and a PhD in Animal
Behaviour, both from University College London and Certificate in
Conservation from Birkbeck, London. A Senior Lecturer in the School of
Psychology at the University of Southampton, UK, she lectures on ani-
mal behaviour, welfare and human-animal interactions nationally and
internationally and has published extensively on the same in journals,
book chapters and books. She has been awarded Honorary Membership
of the UK veterinary and veterinary nursing professions and, in 2021,
was made Fellow of the International Society for Anthrozoology.
Susanna Pietropaolo has started her career studying behavioural neuro-
biology at the Italian National Institute of health (ISS), in Rome. She has
then obtained her PhD at the ETH of Zurich after 5 years of extensive
training in the behavioural validation of mouse models of neuropsychiat-
ric disorders. She worked afterwards as a post-doctoral fellow at the
Institute of Cognitive and Integrative Neuroscience (INCIA) at the
University of Bordeaux where she became assistant professor in 2012.
Since then, she has carried out research on genetic mouse models of
Notes on Contributors xxi
developmental disorders, with a special emphasis on Fragile X syndrome

and autism spectrum disorders.
Simone Pollo is Associate Professor of Moral Philosophy in the
Department of Philosophy at Sapienza Università di Roma. His research
interests are animal ethics, the biological foundations of morality and
topics in philosophy of biology such as the epistemology of evolutionary
theory, animal cognition and philosophical aspects of ethology. He is the
author also of two monographs (in Italian) on animal ethics: Umani e
animali. Questioni di etica (2016) and Manifesto per un animalismo demo-
cratico (2021).
Michał Piotr Pręgowski is a sociologist and assistant professor at the
Warsaw University of Technology, Poland. His research interests include
social construction of companion animals in the contemporary West,
social contexts of animal abuse, as well as cultural practices of commemo-
rating deceased animals. He has published four books, including edited
monographs Free Market Dogs: The Human-Canine Bond in Post-
Communist Poland (2016) and Companion Animals in Everyday Life.
Situating Human-Animal Engagement within Cultures (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2016).
Pasqualino Santori is veterinarian, farmer and expert in bioethics. He
is President of the “Veterinary Bioethics Committee” (CBV now CBV-A)
since 1997 and President of the Institute of Bioethics for Veterinary and
Agro-Food (IBV-A) since 2018. He is Vice-president of the ethics com-
mittee for animal testing (OpBA) of Tor Vergata University in Rome
since 2008. He has been member of the Italian National Bioethics
Committee from 2002 to 2006 and member of the Scientific Committee
of the Bioparco (Zoo) of Rome from 2004 to 2013. He is the Director of
the series “Documents of Veterinary Bioethics Committee” (Turin, Italy).
Noemi Spagnoletti is a PhD in Animal Biology. Her studies focused on
ecology and evolution of non-human primates’ behaviour, primates’ cul-
ture and human-wildlife interactions. She was Young Talented Researcher
and post-doc at Department of Experimental Psychology, Institute of
Psychology, University of São Paulo (IP-USP) in Brazil and research asso-
ciate at the CNR Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC)
xxii Notes on Contributors
in Rome, Italy. She co-edited the special issue “Primates in anthropogenic

habitats: implications for sustainable human-primate coexistence”,
International Journal of Primatology. Her research interests are biodiver-
sity conservation, human-wildlife coexistence and gender equality in
science.
Bingtao Su is an associate professor in Shandong University, China. She
received her PhD degree from Maastricht University, the Netherlands. Su
is project leader of several projects including the Chinese National Social
Science Fund and some provincial and ministerial-level funds. These
funds are related to sustainable development, in the context of farm ani-
mals’ ecological and carbon footprint, the environmental impacts of food
consumption and sustainable human-animal relationships.
Jan L. M. Vaarten, DVM, was trained as a veterinarian. From 2003 until
his retirement in 2020, he was Executive Director of the Federation of
Veterinarians of Europe (FVE), a federation of 46 national veterinary
organizations in 39 European countries and representing around 350,000
European veterinarians. From 2010 until 2020 he was Executive Secretary
of the World Veterinary Association (WVA), the global veterinary profes-
sional organization. Both FVE and WVA are based in Brussels (Belgium).
He is chair of the Ethical Committee of the Royal Dutch Veterinary
Association and involved in research projects on animal health, animal
welfare and public health.
Giorgio Vallortigara is Professor of Neuroscience at the Centre for
Mind/Brain Sciences of the University of Trento, Italy. His major
research interest is the study of the neural bases of cognition in a com-
parative and evolutionary perspective. He has published more than
300 refereed papers. He is the author of Born Knowing (2021) and
with L.J. Rogers and R.J. Andrew of Divided Brains (2013). He has
been the recipient of several honours and prizes, including the Geoffrey
de St. Hilaire Prize for Ethology, and a doctorate honoris causa from
the University of Ruhr in Germany.
Augusto Vitale holds a PhD in Behavioural Ecology from the University
of Aberdeen (Scotland). He is a researcher in animal behaviour at the
Center for Behavioural Sciences and Mental Health at the Istituto
Notes on Contributors xxiii
Superiore di Sanità, Rome. He was President of the Italian Association of

Primatology, and is General Secretary for the European Federation of
Primatology. He collaborates with the EU Commission on the use of
NHP in laboratory research. He evaluates projects involving the use of
animal models for the Italian Ministry of Health. He has authored several
publications and book chapters on ethology and ethics of research.
Oliver Adrian Wookey holds a Masters in Animal Law and Society
from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB). Following an
internship at the Federation of Veterinarians of Europe, he continues to
work as an Editorial Secretary at the International Centre for Animal
Law and Policy (ICALP) based at the UAB, collaborating primarily by
editing, translating and contributing to the dA. Derecho Animal (Forum
of Animal Law Studies) journal.
Federico Zuolo is Associate Professor of Political Philosophy at the
University of Genova (Italy). Before joining the University of Genova, he
was Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Fellow at the Universities of
Berlin and Hamburg, and research fellow at the University of Pavia. He
published a book on politics and animals (Animals, Political Liberalism
and Public Reason, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), and a number of articles
about respect, toleration, equality and animal ethics.
List of Figures
Fig. 3.1 Schematic representation of some of the stimuli used to

document predispositions for static and dynamic features
typical of animate objects shown by visually naïve vertebrates
at birth (mainly humans and chicks but evidence is also
available for monkeys, see Rosa-Salva et al. 2020 for details).
For each pair of stimuli, the preferred stimulus featuring the
predisposed trait and a control one are shown. From above,
stimuli used to test the preference for hen-like objects (a
stuffed junglefowl-like hen versus a scrambled version of a
similar specimen) in newborn chicks. In the following rows a
pair of similar stimuli obtained from stuffed chick models; a
stuffed duck with her wings occluded compared to a similar
exemplar with the head region occluded; a schematic
face-like stimulus and a non-face control image. The last
stimulus pair evokes similar preferences in human newborns
and newly hatched chicks. The first two images of the second
panel depict a point light display of a walking hen and a
control stimulus with random motion of the same points of
light (the silhouette of the hen is added for illustrative
purposes). In the following two rows a schematic representa-
tion of a speed changing stimulus and its speed-constant
control; an object that always moves in the direction of its
main body axis and its control stimulus. In the last row, on
xxv
xxvi List of Figures
the left the sequence of movement of a self-propelled red

object hitting and putting in motion a non-self-propelled
purple object (the sequence has to be read from above to
below). In this case, chicks preferentially imprint on the red
objects. On the right, both objects appear self-propelled and
chicks display no preferences between the two. Human
newborns show similar preferences for self-propelled objects
as well. (See for complete references Rosa-Salva et al. 2021) 37
Fig. 7.1 Extensive sheep hill-farming (courtesy of Gary Farrell) 124
Fig. 7.2 Intensive feedlot system for beef cattle (from Addison 2012) 125
Fig. 13.1 Study area showing the 49 households present. (Image
courtesy of Alison Howard) 278
Fig. 13.2 Sex and age classes of interviewed. W=woman; M=man 279
Fig. 13.3 Interviewed income (N = 71)280
List of Tables
Table 6.1 Background details of the respondents 98

Table 6.2 Summary of multivariate analysis of the effects of ethical
idealism, ethical relativism, gender, and age on public
attitudes toward animals (measured by Animal Attitude Scale
[AAS] and Animal Issue Scale [AIS]) 103
Table 6.3 Important variables influencing the Animal Issue Scale (AIS)
score in the Netherlands 106
Table 6.4 Important variables influencing the Animal Attitudes Scale
(AAS) score in the Netherlands 108
Table 13.1 Characteristics of the 36 houses belonging to respondents 281
xxvii
1
Introduction
Simone Pollo and Augusto Vitale
During the last decades human/non-human animals relationships have

been under increased interest of scientists and under growing scrutiny of
the general public. At the beginning of the 70s of twentieth century the
new field of animal ethics was established as a systematic philosophical
inquiry about the moral status of animals and the ethics of various types
of human/animal relationships. Also, thanks to the work of leading schol-
ars of animal ethics, animal advocacy activism became a social phenom-
enon of growing importance, resurrecting from the oblivion in which it
rested during great part of the twentieth century after its birth and flour-
ishing during the nineteenth century. In the last decades a greater
awareness of the moral relevance of non-human animals has brought
S. Pollo
Department of Philosophy, Sapienza Università di Roma, Rome, Italy
e-mail: [email protected]
A. Vitale (*)
Center for Behavioural Sciences and Mental Health, Istituto Superiore di
Sanità, Rome, Italy
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 1

A. Vitale, S. Pollo (eds.), Human/Animal Relationships in Transformation, The Palgrave
Macmillan Animal Ethics Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85277-1_1
2 S. Pollo and A. Vitale
legislators and scientists to promote changes in the way humans and non-
human animals interact in different contexts, such as, animal compan-
ions, farming animals, animal experimentation, animal-assisted
interventions in health care and wild animals threatened by human
impact on ecosystems. Examples of this developing situation are the
increasing number of lawyers who dedicate time and effort to deal with
animal issues, the publication of the Directive 2010/63/EU on the pro-
tection of animals used in scientific procedures, as well as the growing
urge in the field of animal-assisted interventions for developing (manda-
tory) legislation, procedures and best practices.
Animals are used in different contexts and interactions with humans
happen for a great variety of reasons. The use of animals in scientific
research, farming and animal-assisted intervention (AAI) has significant
effect on science and society, as well as it is the product of scientific and
societal dynamics. Two are the major conceptual and practical issues at
stake: the nature of the human/non-humans relationships and the con-
cepts of animal welfare. These two issues are significantly connected: the
ways we understand and regulate our relationships with animals are based
on the idea of what animals are, what their welfare is and how human and
animal welfare interconnect and interdepend.
However, the very same term animal welfare could be intended in very
different ways, depending on the field of application. A question, for
example, is whether the concept of animal welfare employed in biomedi-
cal research is defined in the same way in other contexts, such as farming
and relations with companion animals. The animal welfare and, in the
case of sentient species, how they are perceived by humans should not be
affected by the kind of utilisation the animal is subjected to. However the
perception of its welfare and then the way it is measured and considered
can vary depending on the context. Public perception of suffering changes
as well depending on the field of application. Laboratory animals, for
example, are thought to suffer often, whereas pet animals are generally
considered safe from suffering, and their level of welfare very rarely com-
promised. As a matter of fact, pets represent a very strong form of rela-
tionships between humans and animals, and a very interesting case-study
about how people understand the differences between us and the other
animals.
1 Introduction 3
The nature of our relationships with the other animals, how they
develop, and how they are influenced by internal (personal) and external
(cultural, societal) influences, and how they have changed with time, are
at the basis of this book. Although the topics of human/non-human ani-
mal relationships and animal welfare have been discussed since many
years now, the aim of this book is to actually bring together different ways
of interacting with animals. The very idea is not to simply put together
views from different disciplines, but to provide a framework in order to
elaborate new concepts that aim at incorporating all our different knowl-
edge about animals. This book also aims at being original in pairing the
more common issue of non-human moral/legal status to the topic of
human/non-human relationships. In fact, this book focuses on the differ-
ent reasons and modalities of the transformations that are taking place in
the different contexts of human/animal relationships. Furthermore, all
the authors aim at elaborating perspectives that move from a solid knowl-
edge of the empirical features of contexts and situations in which the
different human/animal relationships take place.
The first part, Philosophy and Ethics of Human Animal/Relationships,
aims at reconstructing the theoretical, both philosophical and scientific,
background of discussions and reflections about the changes and devel-
opments of human/animal interactions. In the first essay, Darwinian
Biology and the New Understanding of Animals, Simone Pollo tackles the
issue of our understanding of non-human animals after the revolution is
provoked by Darwin’s evolutionary theory: the development of Darwinian
biology, especially the scientific study of behaviour, provides new tools
and concepts to understand non-human animals. From ethological stud-
ies a new understanding of animals as agents emerges and it could entail
some important consequences for the conceptualisation of animal wel-
fare. The understanding of animals is the topic also of Giorgio Vallortigara’s
chapter, Animal Detection and Its Role on Our Attitude Towards Other
Species: from a scientific point of view a distinction can be made in verte-
brate brains between mechanism aimed at recognising animate objects
and distinguishing them from inanimate ones. Such a distinction is inter-
twined with the propensity to attribute mental states to animals, a key
issue in the interpretation of the nature of animal lives and our propen-
sity to anthropomorphise them. From the point of view of ethical
reasoning the question of which feature of a subject should be recognised

as relevant to attribute him/her/it a moral status is a crucial one: in his
chapter, The Moral Value of Animal Sentience and Agency, Federico Zuolo
deals with such a question and discusses the alternative between sentience
and agency as properties granting moral status. Such a discussion raises
the problem of how to combine moral status recognition with the adop-
tion of a basic principle of equality. Recognition of moral relevance of
animals is also the topic of Elisa Aaltola’s essay, Affective Animal Ethics:
Reflective Empathy, Attention and Knowledge Sub Specie Aeternitatis, in
which she offers a perspective centred on human capacity to empathise
with animals’ emotions. Rather than focusing on animals’ capacities and
subsequent moral status Aaltola stresses the importance of development
and perfectioning of humans’ reflective empathy in a holistic framework.
Essays of the second part, Transformations in General Scenarios, are
focused on some key ideas and facts involved in the contexts in which the
ongoing transformation of human/animal relationships takes place. In
Perceiving Animals Through Different Demographic and Cultural Lenses
Pim Martens and Bingtao Su empirically investigate the correlation
between public attitudes towards animals and ethical ideologies, acknowl-
edging the relevance of such correlation for decision-making processes
regarding animals and their uses by humans. E. Anne McBride and
Stephen Baugh in Animal Welfare in Context: Historical, Scientific, Ethical,
Moral and One Welfare Perspective examine the plurality of meanings of
animal welfare and how this produces different definitions and practices
of animals. The variety of animal welfare approaches (and their link with
human welfare) affects the way human/animal interactions are under-
stood and their reform is conceived. Survival of the Fittest: When an
Evolutionary Advantage Becomes Such a Threat to the Welfare of Other, Non
Human Animal Species that It Threatens Our Own Species by Jan
L.M. Vaarten and Nancy De Briyne discuss the human “domination” of
other species from an evolutionary perspective. From this perspective
Vaarten and De Briyne present arguments for the role of veterinarians in
improving human/animal relationships in their professional practice and
in promoting a similar improvement in the general public. Use of ani-
mals in research is the topic of A Proposal for a Multi-Dimensional Profile
of the Animal Researcher by Augusto Vitale. The chapter is focused on the
1 Introduction 5
role of the scientist at the intersection of the different dimensions of

researches using animals. Awareness of such dimensions by researchers
could lead to more transparent and open attitudes towards the public
debate on ethical issues of animal experiments. Michał Piotr Pręgowski,
Karin Hediger and Marie-José Enders-Slegers in the chapter The Two
Sides of the Human-Animal Bond. Reflections on Using and Abusing
Companion Animals examines the variety and complexity of interspecies
relationships focusing on the human/animal bond, especially in assisted
interventions and contexts where animals serve humans. The chapter
unveils the reality of possible animal abuses entailed in such contexts.
The third part Transformations in Cases and Contexts moves closer to
the specific contexts of human/animal interaction providing detailed
analyses and examinations of particular cases. Farms, Landscapes, Food
and Relationships by Clemens Driessen and Pasqualino Santori presents
an overview of understandings of the relations between farmers or farm
workers and the animals on their farm. Also the role of the consumers of
food products coming from the work of farmers is discussed, questioning
the role of society as whole for improving quality of life of animals and of
the humans involved in their care. Susanna Pietropaolo in the chapter
Biotechnologies and Animals: The Impact of Genetic Engineering on Human-
Animal Relationships overviews the biotechnologies that mostly affect
human attitudes and approaches to animals. In particular genetic modi-
fications of laboratory animals are examined in bioethical and scientific
terms evaluating their advantages and limitations. Animals in wilderness
and how humans interact with them are the topic of Noemi Spagnoletti
essay Coexisting with Wild Non-Human Primates in a Brazilian Semiarid
Habitat. Interviews of people living in a Brazilian community coexisting
with a wild population of bearded capuchin monkeys (Sapajus libidino-
sus) provide important details on the framework in which a non-conflic-
tual relationship can take place. A different kind of relationship is
examined by Marta Borgi and Francesca Cirulli in Companionship and
Wellbeing: Benefits and Challenges of Human-Pet Relationships. Moving
from the current literature in the field of animal-assisted interventions
Borgi and Cirulli analyse the potential for domesticated animals for pro-
viding emotional and physical opportunities to enrich the lives of many
frail subjects. Such relationships are examined from the concept of
“One-Health” and its application both to humans and animals. Another

kind of human/animal interaction with wild animals is examined in the
last chapter, Human-Wildlife Coexistence in the Urban Domain: Promoting
Welfare Through Effective Management, Responsibility and the Recognition
of Mutual Interest, by Oliver Adrain Wookey. The essay examines the
threats posed by humans to welfare of wild animals in urban environ-
ments and proposes suggestions to improve human/animal relationships
in this context.
The fourth and final part, Recognising Transformations, examines the
two public dimensions in which animal status and transformations of
human/animal relationships are advocated and brought into practice,
politics and law. Robert Garner in the chapter Political Representation of
Animals’ Voices examines the “political turn” of animal ethics, that is the
growing interest of scholars for the issue of representing animals in the
political arena of democracy. The “enfranchisement model” for animals’
representation is supported against rival alternatives. The last chapter by
Marita Candela, Animal Law. What Is Left to Be Said by the Law About
Animals, offers an overview of the motives that have brought to the ongo-
ing inclusion of animals under the umbrella of law from their absence in
legal systems. The key notion for the “animal turn in legal studies” is
animal sentience, whose recognition fosters the de-objectification, the
constitutionalisation and the globalisation of animals.
Scholars and students at different levels will find in the book new theo-
retical analyses contributing to the discussion in the fields of animal eth-
ics and animal studies. Common denominator of the chapters is the
effort to bring new ideas to the debate and to progress towards a new and
contemporary relationships between us and our fellow animals.
Part I
Philosophy and Ethics of Human
Animal/Relationships
2
Darwinian Biology and the New
Understanding of Animals
Simone Pollo
1 Premise
Together with the Copernican revolution the “Darwinian revolution” is
the scientific event that has most affected human civilization. On one
side Copernicus and Galilee removed the human being from the center
of the universe and proved the corruptible nature of the skies. On the
other side Charles Darwin irrevocably debunked the idea of teleology in
nature, proving the Homo sapiens (like any other organism) to be not the
outcome of a benevolent project but the result of a historical process
without purpose. The consequences of both those scientific revolutions
are enormous since they contributed in many intertwined ways to the
abandonment of traditional ideas deeply embedded in human cultures
(mostly Western, but not only).
In this chapter I will especially focus on one aspect of the influence
Darwinian revolution has had and is still having on human civilization,
S. Pollo (*)
Department of Philosophy, Sapienza Università di Roma, Rome, Italy

10 S. Pollo
whereby “civilization” must be understood to include the human under-

standing of reality (human nature included), and moral/political beliefs
and practices. This aspect is the understanding by humans of non-human
animals and the moral beliefs about their moral status (and the following
practices and behaviors). This is an enormously wide and articulated
topic and its history dates back to Darwin himself when in Notebook B
he wrote:
If we choose to let conjecture run wild then animals our fellow brethren in
pain, disease death & suffering & famine; our slaves in the most laborious
work, our companion in our amusements, they may partake, from our
origin in one common ancestor we may all be netted together. (Darwin 1987)
Using words like “fellow brethren,” “slaves,” and “companion” Charles

Darwin was pushing his thoughts beyond the borders of scientific realms
and he was entering into the territory of ethics (assuming that clear bor-
ders between science and ethics exist).
My aim will not be to provide a detailed account and analysis of the
impact of Darwinian evolutionary biology on the understanding of non-
human animals and on the moral reflection on them. Rather I will focus
on one aspect of such impact. I will analyze how Darwinian revolution
produced a novel science in the framework of contemporary biology,
which is the scientific study of behavior or ethology (a more precise defi-
nition will be provided later on). More precisely I will claim that the birth
of ethology may represent a “change of paradigm” in the scientific under-
standing of animals affecting moral beliefs and practices. In a nutshell,
my claim is that the birth of ethology and its ongoing development and
flourishing represent a crucial part of that process of transformation of
the human/animal relationship ignited by Charles Darwin’s revolution-
ary work. Such a process is still in progress and it continues to be fueled
by ethological research (mostly by study of non-human cognition—as I
will claim at the end of this work).
From a methodological point of view, I want to stress that my aim is
not a historical reconstruction of the birth and development of ethology
within the framework of life sciences and evolutionary biology. Remarks
from the history of science will be functional to the theoretical argument
2 Darwinian Biology and the New Understanding of Animals 11
but they shall not be understood as part of an effort to write a chapter in

the history of science. The aim of this chapter is rather to elaborate a
theoretical argument about the role and function of the scientific study of
behavior both in theoretical reflection (mostly about ethics) and in ordi-
nary human life (mostly in ordinary moral beliefs). In a sense, what will
follow should be understood as a contribution to a “philosophy of ethol-
ogy.” At present, such a definition seems to be rarely used and when it is
employed it seems mostly in reference to philosophical discourses about
“animality” spelled with the voice of continental and hermeneutical phil-
osophical tradition (Chrulew 2014). On the contrary, my use of “philo-
sophical ethology” must be understood as embedded into the domain of
the philosophy of biology within the framework of philosophy in analyti-
cal tradition and style. In this sense, philosophical ethology must be
regarded as a part of philosophy of biology rather than a self-standing and
autonomous domain of enquiry.
2 umans and Animals: A Short History

H
of Everything
I anticipated that my aim would be to show the role of ethology as a
change of paradigm in the understanding of animals capable of affecting
and transforming actual relationships humans have with non-human ani-
mals. In order to pursue such scope, a preliminary recognition of how
human beings understood animals before Darwin’s revolution and the
rise of ethology is required. It seems evident that such a task cannot be
analytically performed here. A detailed and complete account of human
understanding of animals before Darwin is such a wide and articulated
topic that it could not even be fully addressed in a book. What can be
done here is to highlight some key ideas that have commonly character-
ized the human understanding of animals in Western culture and civiliza-
tion. More precisely these ideas are some of those that have been deeply
challenged by ethology and whose questioning leaves room for change
and transformation of human/animal relationships. Before presenting
12 S. Pollo
those ideas three general premises about human/animal relationships and

the human understanding of animals are required.
When talking of human relationships with animals at least three gen-
eral premises have to be made. These premises help to set the general
framework for discussion and to avoid some common mistakes that are
usually made when talking about human/animal relationships (not only
in ordinary discourse and public debate, but also in more refined theo-
retical discussion). The first premise regards the very nature of the second
term implied in the locution “human/animal relationships,” that is “ani-
mal.” Animals are the organisms belonging to the biological kingdom
Animalia. About one million and a half currently living animal species
belong to that kingdom and an unknown number of yet to be discovered
and classified belong to it also (the total number of species is a hard mat-
ter of scientific controversy: Mora et al. 2011). “Animal” in “human/
animal relationships” refers to such a huge number of species (minus the
Homo sapiens, that of course is also part of the Animalia). This clarifica-
tion is required as a premise in order to keep in mind that talking of
“animals” in theoretical analysis is always a tremendous oversimplifica-
tion. This oversimplification can be justified and required to perform a
general analysis like the one that will be provided here, but the need to
precisely identify the exact species involved (or taxa or other appropriate
taxonomic categories) should never be forgotten when discussing specific
contexts of human/animal interaction. When labelling the enormous and
astonishing variety of organisms included in the kingdom Animalia as
“animals” it should never be forgotten that when we talk of “animals” we
are talking of forms of life that can be dramatically different among them
regarding their specific features, both behavioral and ecological.
Indeed, the specific contexts of human/animal interactions are the
topic of the second premises. “Animals” comprise a huge number of liv-
ing and different living organisms and, in a similar manner, “relation-
ships” include many different kinds of interactions humans entertain
with animals. Factory farming and lab experiments are the most evident
uses of animals by human beings (and the most debated both in society
and animal ethics), but many other types of interaction happen and they
can be of very different natures. Some of them can be hardly recognized
but they take place and affect a huge number of animals (often
jeopardizing their welfare and chances of survival) as in the case of all

human actions impacting ecosystems. Therefore, another oversimplifica-
tion has to be accepted but at the same time kept under strict control:
“relationships” can include very different kinds of interactions (that is
different scopes, various human attitudes, and different outcomes for ani-
mals). What must never be forgotten is the fact that all those different
relationships are deeply intertwined with past and present human forms
of life and their evolution, both biologically and culturally. For example,
domesticating animals and using them for food and work have repre-
sented—together with agriculture—the turning point in human evolu-
tion leading the Homo sapiens to the evolutionary “success” and the
civilization we live in (Diamond 1997). Therefore, any attempt to give
detailed accounts of human/animal relationships means describing the
human form of life, since animals (and relationships with them) are
everywhere (Herzog 2010; Pollo 2016). Also, for the very same reason,
efforts to transform the real-world different types of human/animal rela-
tionships (i.e., the use of animal for food) are characterized by the pecu-
liar difficulty of dealing with habits and practices so deeply embedded in
human life. Of course, this not a reason to drop such efforts if they are
morally justified (as a matter of fact a key feature of moral reflection is the
critique of tradition), but as something that has to be necessarily taken
into account in order to produce moral reflections (and calls to action)
compatible with real life and therefore likely to really produce some
effects and changes in real life.
The third and final premise regards human attitudes toward animals
and aims at debunking a commonplace about those attitudes. A wide-
spread idea (not just in ordinary opinions but also in theoretical analyses)
is the belief that before Charles Darwin the most common view about
animals (endorsed almost universally) was akin to the one philosophically
elaborated by Descartes, who regarded all animals as soulless machines
whose behaviors are just the outcome of finely designed mechanisms (just
like clocks). Reserving the soul just for human beings Descartes drew an
impassable border between animals and humans (an ontological border
whose moral consequence is the limitation of any moral consideration
just to humans) (Harrison 1992). Descartes’ philosophical view about
this border is the most well-known and influential elaboration of the
14 S. Pollo
creationist view represented in the biblical tale of the creation of the

world and its living inhabitants. Notwithstanding the deeply pervasive
influence of Judeo-Christian thought on Western culture, regarding that
view as universally accepted and endorsed seems to be a mistake. On one
side, many philosophers and scientists argued in favor of continuationist
views and, on the other side, in ordinary life, human beings interacted
with animals attributing them mental states such as intention and emo-
tions. This does not mean that the biblical/cartesian creationist view has
not been influential (and it continues to be so nowadays), since animals
have been mostly universally regarded as available means for human pur-
poses (Steiner 2005). Nonetheless, in real-life interactions (and seldom in
science and philosophy) animals were often regarded not as mindless
machines but as living beings with features analogous to humans. In a
sense, folk psychology anticipated cognitive ethology and comparative
psychology (Shipman 2011).
3 Ethology, Philosophy,
and the Darwinian Paradigm
Apparently, the last of the three premises I set out in the previous para-
graph seems to undermine the claim that represents the backbone of this
chapter, that is, the idea that Darwinian science of behavior represents a
paradigm shift in understanding animals. To clarify this point I must
specify what “paradigm shift” means here. As it is well-known, the expres-
sion “paradigm shift” was introduced by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure
of Scientific Revolution—one of the most important contributions to
twentieth-century epistemology and philosophy of science (Kuhn 2012).
Here I do not mean to endorse Kuhn’s theory as a whole and to adopt his
conceptual apparatus to support my view. I use the notion of “paradigm
shift” here just to stress the incommensurability (another Kuhnian idea
embedded in the concept of “paradigm shift”) of pre-Darwinian biology
with Darwinian biology. For example, whereas teleology could make
sense in biology ante Darwin, it no longer has room in Darwinian evolu-
tionary biology. In the present context the incommensurability of ante
Darwin biology with the post one means that the Darwinian and etho-
logical understanding of animals relies upon scientific and theoretical
grounds that make such understanding discontinuous with respect to
former ideas and concepts. Furthermore, it allows the use of new con-
cepts for describing and understanding animals. Such concepts were not
commonly used before Darwin and ethology, or they were poorly and
improperly used.
Before trying to show the paradigm shift ethology produced in under-
standing animals, some remarks must be made on the connection between
Darwin’s work and the scientific study of animal behavior. As anticipated,
my aim here is not to provide a historical reconstruction, and therefore
the following remarks could appear incomplete. Nonetheless, my scope is
just providing some key points about the collocation of ethology within
the framework of Darwinian evolutionary biology. The first point that
must be highlighted is the novelty of ethology and its structural connec-
tion with the key ideas of Darwinian theory and its subsequent develop-
ments. Of course, animal behavior has always raised the interest and
curiosity of human beings and, therefore, one could legitimately ask
whether it would be possible to locate the birth of ethology before
Darwin. This is an open question for historians of science and here I just
adhere to the view that warns against the abuse of modern and contem-
porary definitions and labels for research programs from the past. In a
sense, for example, Aristotle could be defined as the first ethologist
because of his wide and absolutely innovative scientific study of animals.
Nonetheless, that definition and calling his studies on animal life “ethol-
ogy” (or “biology”) appear to be mistakes. Ethology, like other modern
and contemporary fields of scientific enquiry, makes sense only within
the framework of modern biology (Cunningham 1999). This idea is well
expressed by Konrad Lorenz in his The Foundations of Ethology:
Ethology, the comparative study of behavior, is easy to define: it is the dis-

cipline which applies to the behavior of animals and humans all those
questions asked and those methodologies used as a matter of course in all
the other branches of biology since Charles Darwin’s time. (Lorenz
1981, p. 1)
16 S. Pollo
The role of Darwin for the foundations of ethology is crucial, and this
role is not just limited to his theory, but also to the scientific methods he
employed to elaborate that revolutionary theory (Burkhardt 2005).
Stressing the necessary and essential role of Darwin’s theory for the birth
and the development of ethology allows to the paradigm switch that this
new young scientific discipline produces in the understanding of animals
to be fully recognized.
Darwin’s theory is the essential framework within which ethology rose
and continues to flourish, but at its very origins, different methods and
fields of inquiry can be found. As a matter of fact, another open historio-
graphical question regards the other cultural and scientific sources consti-
tuting the basis upon which ethology has been built. Today, ethology can
be regarded at least as the outcome of the hybridization of the classic
study of behavior (Lorenz and Tinbergen) and comparative psychology
(and this hybridization is evident when one looks at some methodologi-
cal flaws caused by the influence of comparative psychology: De Waal
2016). Putting aside these questions, with “ethology” (or “scientific study
of behavior”) I am referring to that field of research organized around the
classic four questions of Tinbergen (Tinbergen 1963) plus the fifth intro-
duced by Burghardt in order to recognize animal minds among the legiti-
mate topics of ethology (Burghardt 1997, 2009).
Darwin’s heritage for ethology can particularly be appreciated by look-
ing at two of his fundamental works: The Descent of Man and The
Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals. In both of them we can rec-
ognize many of the key ideas that will flow into the research program of
ethology and its practice. One of these ideas is the continuity of human
behavior and non-human behavior. Biological mechanisms underlying
human and animal behaviors are the same. Different capacities among
animals (humans included) cannot be regarded as substantial differences,
but merely differences of degree of analogous (or homologous) capacities
and the outcome of different evolutionary stories. Behaviors of humans
and animals share the same biological mechanisms and they are the prod-
uct of evolutionary histories. This well-known paragraph from The
Descent of Man perfectly summarizes those two ideas:
The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable—namely,

that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts,
would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intel-
lectual powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed,
as in man. (Darwin 1981, pp. 71–2)
Human/animal continuationism and historicity also characterize the

capacity that has always been regarded as the most peculiar and unique to
humans: moral faculty. Human moral behavior has biological causes and
is a product of evolution like any other behavior of any other animal.
These ideas elaborated and developed by Charles Darwin are the theoreti-
cal core of ethology and they represent key features of that paradigm
shift. More specifically, I will try to show how that paradigm shift is evi-
dent in a new understanding of the concept of agency both for humans
and animals. In a nutshell, my idea is that ethology dramatically contrib-
uted to the revision and advancement of the notion of agency, making
some interpretation of this notion obsolete and unavailable. Here, a
detailed analysis of the main approaches and theories of agency is not
possible (for a map see Schlosser 2019). The task that can be pursued here
is sketching some ideas that, emerging from ethology, affect (or maybe
should affect) the notion of agency and its analysis. Such influence is
what produces that paradigm shift, and renders some notions of agency,
and ideas connected to such notions, no longer available.
First of all, a clarification of the reasons for linking ethology to the
scientific study and the philosophical analysis is required. These reasons
could be self-evident, but a brief remark could be useful anyway.
Traditionally, agency is defined as the capacity to initiate an action, and
action is defined as something that originates from the subject. In gen-
eral, an observer could consider a movement of my arm an action if I am
trying to grab a cup of coffee. The same observer, on the contrary, could
not regard another movement of an arm as an action if it had been pro-
duced by an involuntary collision with an inattentive passerby. In the first
case, the movement is defined “active,” whereas the second seems to be
clearly “passive”. Ethological research aims at scientifically understanding
behaviors that are events that, at least prima facie, appear to observers as
actions or part of actions. Behaviors are originated by the behaving
18 S. Pollo
organism and therefore they are actions. Of course, some philosophical

approaches to action and agency could identify this conclusion as errone-
ous. Maybe we should have a theory of action before labelling something
as an action. Maybe by scratching on the terrace door to let me know that
he wants to go outside (and looking at the street barking at passing dogs
and howling at ambulance sirens) my dog is not really acting; maybe he
just behaves that way because he is a finely programmed mechanism, as
Descartes believed.
That kind of objection is no longer tenable from a naturalistic approach
to philosophical problems, especially after Darwin and within the frame-
work of Darwinian evolutionary biology. In brief, according to a natural-
ized Darwinian approach to philosophical problems, concepts and
definition come after empirical observation, and they do not precede
experience, and are superimposed to it (for a presentation of philosophi-
cal naturalism: Papineau 2020). Therefore, in other terms, from a natu-
ralized point of view, we should look at behavior to elaborate a notion of
agency, and not look for agency in behaviors. This is a first aspect of the
paradigm shift triggered by Darwin’s theory and ethology (and in general
by evolutionary biology as a whole): a solid methodology embedded in a
solid theoretical framework allows the production of explanations of all
the features of living beings (humans included) recurring just in the
empirical realm and from the bottom. Obviously we can debate what
“naturalism” precisely means and how it should be “applied” in philoso-
phy (De Caro 2004), but after Darwin, non-naturalized philosophical
analyses appear to be completely out of date. This is another face of the
paradigm shift caused by Darwin’s theory: naturalism was the preferable
option before evolutionary theory also, but there was still room for some
kind of non-naturalized hypothesis (think, for example, about teleologi-
cal explanations of life: without Darwin’s explanation, intelligent design
was still a viable option, even if vulnerable to profound criticism: Hume
1990). After Darwin, naturalism, variously declined, is the only accept-
able option for philosophical analysis (Dennett 1995).
4 Animal Agency
From a naturalistic perspective rooted in contemporary biology, accord-
ing the status of agents to “persons”, mostly identified with human
beings, seems to no longer be a tenable view (Frankfurt 1971). In general,
if we recognize the presence of agency in human beings (at least some
human beings) then we should consider its presence (even in different
degrees) more likely in other animals, rather than its absence. This kind
of reasoning is the consequence of logic imposed by Darwinian natural-
ism. The same logic also forces us to reconsider and reframe the issue of
intentionality and, in general, particular mental states connected to
agency and required by it. Identifying a particular meaning of intention-
ality or some specific mental state (i.e., a particular type of belief ) to
define what agency is appears to be a top-down approach that is excluded
by a bottom-up naturalistic methodology. A more promising approach
consists in sticking to the idea that agency is basically met when some-
thing (or someone) initiates a course of action by herself/himself/itself.
According to this view, humans and animals (the most part or maybe all
of them) are capable of agency. For the present purposes the question
whether plants or artificial entities can be agents is left aside.
Humans and animals are capable of agency and ethology provides
insights into its features. Clear consequences for the understanding of
human agency are derived from its Darwinian and ethological under-
standing. The first has already been mentioned, and regards the loss of
uniqueness and specialness for human beings. Humans share the capaci-
ties for agency (like emotions and thoughts—as we will see later on) with
other animals and, like animals, their agency is explained by the Darwinian
understanding of life. In particular, placing human behavior within the
frame of ethology requires the acknowledgement that human behavior
(and therefore agency) is also a product of evolution, and can be explained
by means of evolutionary forces. Human behavior is not the product of a
pure free will, nor is it just the outcome of cultural development.
Famously, sociobiology expanded its aims to also understand human
behavior, and this fact raised a huge amount of controversy (Segerstråle
2000). Beside this controversy, it is without doubt that human behavior
20 S. Pollo
and agency are regulated by the same mechanism explaining animals’

behavior. This fact does not necessarily entail a reductionist account of
human agency, but places human and animal agencies on a continuum.
On one side, the evolutionary explanation abolishes the border
between humans and animals, and on the other side, ethology explains
the mechanism of agency and behavior of animals (and of humans). The
result is (or should be) the recognition of the agentive nature of animals,
and the fact that such nature is not categorically (or even ontologically)
different from the agentive nature of humans. From ethological research
we can affirm the nature of animals as agents and understand how such
agency works. A biologically informed concept of agency joins human
and animals and produces the paradigm shift. We can appreciate the
complexity of human behaviors and at the same time recognize that ani-
mal behaviors are not ontologically separated from that of humans.
Consequences of this paradigm shift for the understanding of human life
are various and profound (and of course, the consequences for moral
ideas and beliefs too), but these consequences are not the subject matter
here (a good place to start exploring the matter: Ruse 1986; Dennett
1995). The issue at stake here is how humans understand animals.
The basic notion of agency and the Darwinian ethological explanation
lead to the recognition of animals as agents not categorically different
from humans. Nonetheless, the categorical difference could be restored
through adopting a not-so-basic and more engaging notion of agency.
Defining agency in terms of certain mental states could reintroduce the
barrier abolished by the basic concept. As a matter of fact, in this case the
development of ethological research also provides evidence and argu-
ments to dissolve the border. As it is well-known, at its very beginning,
ethology (in particular in Tinbergen’s approach: Burkhardt 2005)
excluded the mental states of animals from its research programs. The
reason of this exclusion was not personal skepticism of ethologists toward
the existence of animal minds, but scientific skepticism of the possibility
of making animal minds a proper subject of scientific enquiry. Indeed,
the initial suspicion of ethology about the possibility of scientifically and
rigorously investigating the mental capacities of animals and their link
with behaviors gradually faded away. The founding of “cognitive ethol-
ogy” by Donald Griffin (Griffin 1976) adds a fifth question to Tinbergen’s
classic four, and enlarges the agenda of ethological research to animal

minds. The fifth question—already mentioned above—has been formu-
lated by Burghardt, and it substantially refers to the inquiry into the
“private experience” of animals; that is, their mental life (Burghardt 1997).
Here there is no room to give even a brief account of the massive and
insightful achievements gained by cognitive ethology. A closer and
detailed look at cognitive ethology research would also show how a more
demanding and mentally focused concept of agency would be met by a
huge variety of animals (also by those commonly thought to be driven by
just automatic instincts, such as invertebrates, and not just the smart
cephalopods: Klein and Barron 2016; Godfrey-Smith 2016). In general,
cognitive ethology research testifies the diverse and sophisticated capaci-
ties of animals to plan behaviors and to flexibly adapt to social and envi-
ronmental stimuli, meeting the criteria of more articulated versions of
the concept of agency. Cognitive capacities of animals are sustained and
accompanied by rich emotional lives, as Darwin already clearly recog-
nized and analytically studied. Sophisticated emotional and cognitive
capacities sustain the complex and rich social lives of animals (and cer-
tainly those of social mammals). The study of animals’ social lives reveals
the agentive character of members of many animal species: how could
those sophisticated forms of sociality be explained without acknowledg-
ing the capacity for agency of the animals engaged in them? From cogni-
tive ethological research dealing with animals’ social lives, another
important fact emerges: just like humans animals have personality traits
(and the methodology for assessing them is substantially the same in both
cases) (Carere and Maestripieri 2013).
The recognition of personality in animals by means of ethological
studies strengthens the claim that animals are full-fledged agents. Besides
formal philosophical definitions, the concept of agency as it is commonly
understood in ordinary life seems to embed the idea that agency corre-
sponds also to a style of behaving and experiencing the world. We recog-
nize agency not just because of some basic features characterizing behavior
and its causes, but also because agents are different among themselves,
and we can differentiate one from another through the different ways
they act.
22 S. Pollo
5 eyond Sentience: Agency and Animals’

B
Moral Status
Part of the general paradigm shift produced by Darwin’s theory and
Darwinian evolutionary biology consists in the new understanding of
animals as agents. As I have anticipated, this is a paradigm shift not
because humans consistently denied animal agency before Darwin’s revo-
lution. It is a paradigm shift because, thanks to evolutionary biology and,
in particular, to ethology, we must accept the idea that there is just one
kind of agency within Animalia, and humans do not substantially differ
from other animals in this respect. In conclusion, I want to articulate a
reflection about the consequence of such understanding for our moral
reflection on animals’ moral status and human responsibilities toward
them. The idea is that a full and widespread understanding of animals as
agents could promote further transformations in human/animal relation-
ships across the various contexts within which they take place.
The turn in the philosophical and public debates on the treatment of
animals took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On one
side, philosophers started to consistently regard animal capacities in con-
tinuity with human ones. For example, even if he did not draw any moral
consequence, David Hume, in his Treatise of Human Nature, affirmed
that the very same passions at the core of human nature are shared by
animals. Furthermore, he also recognized that sympathy is a principle
operating in both humans and animals, which makes communication of
sentiments across the species barrier possible. Fifty years later, in 1789
Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, made one of the state-
ments that properly started the modern and contemporary philosophical
ethics debate on animals, in his Principles of moral legislation. Bentham
wrote: “The question is not Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But
Can they suffer?” (Bentham 2007). The capacity of feeling pain and plea-
sure was identified by Bentham as the criterion to have moral status inde-
pendently from species membership.
The recognition of the relevance of suffering for moral consideration is
a key idea of the transformation of morality and law that was ignited by
Enlightenment. As a matter of fact, the Enlightenment, commonly
understood as the “age of reason,” also produced that transformation,

stressing the importance of the emotional and sentimental life of indi-
viduals (Frazer 2010). That change in the understanding of morality pro-
duced the recognition of individual rights and inspired reforms such as
the abolition of slavery (Hunt 2007). Improvement of the treatment of
animals became a topic of public debate, and reforms of human/animal
relationships were demanded on the same grounds; that is, the growing
repugnance for suffering, also that experienced by animals (Ryder 2000a).
Concern for animal suffering led to the birth of the first protectionist
movements and bills against animal abuse (the United Kingdom pio-
neered in both cases with the foundation of the SPCA, now the RSPCA,
and the promulgation of the Martin Act: Ryder 2000a).
In the nineteenth century, in parallel with the growing recognition of
the moral importance of animal suffering, Charles Darwin was working
on his theory. Especially in the second half of the twentieth century, the
appreciation of the moral significance of suffering and Darwin’s theory
finally met. The outcome of that meeting was the founding idea of con-
temporary animal ethics: speciesism. Richard Ryder used this word to
label the moral prejudice of discriminating animals because of their being
members of species other than that of Homo sapiens. To quote the open-
ing statement of the leaflet written by R. Ryder and introducing the con-
cept of speciesism, that concept was made possible because “Since
Darwin, scientists have agreed that there is no magical essential difference
between human and other animals, biologically-speaking” (Ryder
2000b). In the wake of Ryder, in Animal Liberation (Singer 1975) firstly,
and in Practical Ethics later (Singer 1979), Peter Singer elaborated the
most articulated and influential ethical theory to grant animal suffering
equal consideration on the basis of an antispeciesist stance. Singer’s the-
ory is the most evident display of the conjunction of the moral rebuttal
of suffering and Darwin’s view about the continuity between humans and
animals, but it can be said that, in general, contemporary concern for
animals’ moral status is mostly rooted in the same recognition of both of
the moral disvalue of suffering and of the untenability of a strong barrier
between human and non-human suffering.
The widespread importance of the notion of “sentience” as a moral
compass to guide the promotion and enforcement of forms of animal
24 S. Pollo
protection and for the improvement of their welfare in different contexts

(farm, lab, companionships, etc.) is proof of the fact that the recognition
of the value of animal suffering is a part of our societies nowadays. This
claim does not mean that today the vast majority of citizens of Western
societies believe in the moral value of animal suffering. Also, it cannot be
affirmed for sure that society will necessarily progress to a full legal recog-
nition of basic animal rights. This claim means that that recognition
somehow became part of the fabric of our society, and that a sufficient
number of citizens support it in order to keep it alive and try to push
toward its consequences. The fact of it being part of the fabric of our
societies is particularly evident if we pay attention to the Lisbon Treaty;
that is, the “Constitution of Europe.” Article 13 of that Treaty affirms:
In formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture, fisheries, trans-

port, internal market, research and technological development and space
policies, the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient
beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respect-
ing the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member
States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional
heritage. (European Union 2012, my italics)
The moral and legal recognition of animal sentience is inscribed in the

fundamental law of the European Union. Such recognition does not
entail a protection analogous to basic human rights, and is limited by
caveat (“while respecting…”), but it nonetheless represents the admission
of animals under the umbrella of law, and it affirms that their status is not
that just of “things” (see Marita Candela’s contribution in this volume).
My aim here is not to discuss such legal recognition and its implications.
Quoting the Lisbon Treaty was functional to proving the relevance of
animal sentience for our contemporary understanding of animals, and
for the moral and legal consequences of such relevance.
In conclusion, I will try to argue that sentience is not enough. In the
light of my previous analysis about the paradigm shift caused by Darwin’s
theory and ethology, animals’ moral (and legal) status ought not to be
focused just on sentience, but also on agency. Of course, recognition of
animal sentience triggers moral reflection on the inclusion of animals
into the circle of moral respect. The acknowledgement of the emotional

lives of animals is the necessary prerequisite for including them in moral
consideration: the sympathetic faculties embedded in human moral psy-
chology are engaged by animals’ emotions (confirmed by biology and
neuroscience within the framework of evolutionary theory) and fuel
moral reflection on animal moral status (Midgley 1983). Stressing the
moral importance of animal agency does not mean underestimating the
significance of sentience. Recognizing the agentive character of animals
means further pushing their moral consideration.
What can the recognition of agency mean for animal moral status in
the different contexts of human/animal interaction? In very general
terms, my claim is that limiting the recognition of moral status to the
criterion of sentience may lead to understanding animals as simple recep-
tacles of positive or negative mental states. Not surprisingly, Singer’s utili-
tarian theory affirms—not just in metaphorical sense—that sentient
beings (humans included) should be regarded as “cups” filled with inter-
ests. What morally counts is the content, the interests, and not the recipi-
ent, the subjects (Singer 1979). On the contrary, recognizing the agentive
nature of animals can lead to more precisely recognizing the subjectivity
of animals. In other terms, animals should be morally important not only
because of their positive or negative effects, but because of their individu-
ality and subjectivity. Showing this shift of attention with regard to the
concept of animal welfare could make this point clearer.
Animal welfare—mentioned also in the Treaty of Lisbon—is nowadays
the key theoretical concept and practical tool used for protecting animals
involved in different interactions with humans. Here I do not want to
deal with some common allegations against animal welfare, namely that
of being a non-effective means for animal protection since “welfarism”
does not promote the abolition of animal uses such as farming and lab
experiments, but substantially allows the “exploitation” of animals to
continue (Francione 1996). According to that kind of critique, animal
welfare policies are substantially hypocritical since they easily clear human
consciences without really changing anything in human/animal relation-
ships. Here I have no room to reply to this charge, and I just want to
stress the importance of animal welfare practices in a “reformist” approach
26 S. Pollo
to human/animal relationships. Such an approach departs from the

awareness that, as said at the start of this work, human/animal interac-
tions are so various, articulated, and deeply embedded in human forms of
life that any radical abolitionist view is doomed to fail.
Animal welfare is the subject of a great amount of research aimed at
defining and understanding its proper meaning both in general and its
application in different contexts with different species. As a matter of
fact, “animal welfare science” is a proper and universally recognized field
of research (and a remark should be made about the modest importance
generally given to philosophical ethics in that science). Different general
interpretations of the concept of animal welfare can be found in the lit-
erature (Fraser 2006). A general feature seems to characterize many of
those declinations of the concept: they aim to provide guidelines for the
protection and the advancement of animal welfare on the grounds of the
species-specific needs of the animals involved. More precisely, animal
welfare seems to be the combination of the basic fulfillment of some
needs unique to the species and the avoidance of negative mental states
(pain, stress, and so on). Of course, such a combination may grant a basic
(even more than basic) level of welfare protection and promotion.
Nonetheless, those conceptions of welfare can run the risk of underesti-
mating the agentive nature of animals. Identifying animal welfare with
the fulfillment of needs seems to entail an understanding of animals as
“passive.” Animals have needs and humans must satisfy them in order to
improve welfare. On the contrary, the acknowledgement of the agentive
character of animals can amend those conceptions of welfare.
Obviously, in the majority of contexts of human/animal interaction in
which animal welfare is called into question, animals are under human
control. Therefore, the idea of fulfilling their needs represents a call to
responsibility of the humans involved in their care. Nonetheless, animal
welfare is not just something that is “administered” to animals, but some-
thing that necessarily requires also (mostly?) the actions of animals.
Animal welfare is inextricably intertwined with animal behavior; that is,
to animal agency (Wemelsfelder 1997). Understanding and recognizing
the agentive nature of animals allow an improvement of the conceptions
of welfare. On a practical level, this recognition should, for example, lead
to couple quantitative measurement of welfare levels with qualitative
assessments capable of discriminating animal individualities and better

promoting their agencies.
In conclusion, it can be said that, on a more general and theoretical
level, shedding light on animal agency may help to further our debate on
animals’ moral status and human responsibilities toward them. Respecting
the moral value of agency substantially means respecting the freedom and
self-determination of agents. Recognizing that agency is not a human
privilege, but also a feature of non-human animals, should lead to recog-
nizing the moral value of their freedom and respect for it in the different
contexts of animal life and of human/animal relationships.
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3
Animal Detection and Its Role in Our
Attitude towards Other Species
Giorgio Vallortigara
1 Introduction
Anthropomorphism in the way ordinary people interpret the behaviour
of other animals is commonly observed. Behavioural scientists are not
immune in spite of being knowledgeable about the existence of such bias
(e.g. Wynne 2004). Vasconcelos et al. (2012) discussed one remarkable
example. They compared two studies concerning rescue behaviour in dif-
ferent species, reporting basically similar phenomena which were, how-
ever, very differently interpreted by their authors.
Nowbahari et al. (2009) found that Cataglyphis cursor ants actively act
to get nest-mates restrained by a nylon snare in a sand field (control con-
ditions showed that the same behaviour was not shown towards anaesthe-
tised nest-mates, ants from different colonies, sympatric unrelated species
or prey items). Bartal et al. (2011) performed a very similar experiment
showing that rats open a transparent cage to free a cage-mate prisoner
G. Vallortigara (*)
Centre for Mind/Brian Sciences, University of Trento, Rovereto, Italy

32 G. Vallortigara
into it but do not open an empty cage or a cage restraining a neutral

object. There were obvious differences to adapt the methodology to the
two species but nonetheless the design and the results were similar. The
behaviour of ants was interpreted by the authors without any reference to
empathy, simply using the neutral term of rescuing behaviour. The behav-
iour of rats was interpreted as providing evidence for empathy.
I do not intend to comment the specific issue of whether or not the
experiments proved that rats possess empathy. Personally, I share the criti-
cisms and the view of Vasconcelos et al. (2012) according to which empa-
thy remains at present unproven outside humans. What is interesting to
me is why expert scientists should manifest such a theory-laden differ-
ence in lexicon when the very same behavioural evidence is provided by
different species.
It is quite plausible that we empathise and recognise intention of others
on the basis of similarity in behaviour. But the point is that from a
perceptual point of view anyone who looks at the video of the rescue
practices among the ants has the distinct impression that the behaviour of
these animals is intentional (indeed, the subjective feeling is quite more
convincing with the ants than with the rats, whose manoeuvres to open
the cage appear to be rather erratic while, e.g., the removing of pebbles by
ants to disinter their peer companion looks very goal-directed—see to
compare the two videos: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
gkNCvtKfQs http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nyolz2Qf1ms).
I believe two aspects are at stake here. The first concerns the prejudice
of believing that phylogenetic proximity is a measure of the cerebral, and
therefore mental, complexity of a species (Schnell and Vallortigara 2019;
Vallortigara 2020, 2021a). A tendency reinforced by the bad habit of
using statements such as more (or less) evolved species. The nervous system
of ants is not less evolved or primitive with respect to that of rats, it is
different. The second aspect is relative to the cognitive mechanisms asso-
ciated with recognition of animacy and agency, and how they impact our
attribution of mental states to other species.
3 Animal Detection and Its Role in Our Attitude towards Other… 33
2 Misconceptions About Brain Evolution

The issue of brain (and thus, functionally, mind) evolution is something
that probably would need to be better clarified in the rules associated
with the filling of ethical projects that scientists should prepare and sub-
mit according to the rigorous procedures governing animal testing in, for
example, European countries. In my country, for instance, it must be
stated in the project that “it has not been possible to identify an animal
model with lower neurological development.” If neurological develop-
ment here was associated with biological evolution it would be incorrect.
Biological evolution is associated with change, not with progress, and
from this point of view all living organisms are identically evolved. But
even if these statements refer to the level of neurological development as
such they could be a source of misunderstanding.
The claim that there are neurologically (and therefore mentally)
superior or inferior organisms is of course well rooted in common
thinking. It is also associated with the conception that the evolution of
the brain consists in the fact that when a new species appears, new
structures are added that would deposit, like the layers of an onion, on
the old ones. It is famous in this regard the version provided by Paul
MacLean (1949, 1964, 1973) of this hypothesis, which has been widely
disseminated, according to which the brain would comprise an ancient,
reptilian layer, consisting mainly of the basal ganglia, responsible for
controlling instinctive behaviours that mediate fast responses such as
attack and escape; a second layer, developed in “primitive” mammals,
constituted by the limbic system, which would elaborate emotional
reactions and feelings; and finally the outermost and most recent layer,
developed in the “most evolved” mammals, constituted by the neo-cortex,
associated with action planning and rationality, which would reach its
pinnacle of development in the human species. This is a view that flatters
us a lot, because it seems to agree with our intuition of evolution as a
linear and progressive process of which we would represent the apex.
The idea of the triune brain has been spread by legions of science
popularisers, and is used nowadays by alleged experts in psychological
training courses as much as useless as they are expensive. Too bad the
34 G. Vallortigara
hypothesis is completely wrong and in no way reflects the current

consensus among scientists about how the nervous system has evolved.
Let’s try to examine what’s wrong with the idea of the onion brain. The
first thing that doesn’t work is the idea that evolution is a linear progression
of organisms that from simple become complex. Evolution, we shouldn’t
tire of emphasising it, implies change, not progress. The notion that an
animal with a less complex brain would evolve into another species with
a more complex brain by adding new structures, so that, added after
addition, it would lead to the human species, is a caricature of evolutionary
history. All animals living on earth today are the result of an evolutionary
radiation (diversification between species) from common ancestors who
lived long ago. Living animals are therefore all equally “evolved.” These
animals can be more or less close relatives, of course. So, in order to find
a common ancestor with the chicken I have to go back to about three
hundred million years ago, and to find a common ancestor with the frog
to almost five hundred. But this does not mean that the frog is more
primitive or less evolved: the frog I come across in the pond has evolved
from its other ancestors along the course of evolutionary history, and the
fact that the appearance of a particular species is more or less recent does
not guarantee that the animal is very or not very complex. It will certainly
be different, but it makes no sense to say that it is more or less advanced
or evolved than its ancestors.
The evolution of the so-called neocortex, the outermost layer of the
brain, can be considered as an example. The outermost part (more dorsal
it would be proper to say) of the brain or “pallium” is as old in its struc-
ture as the history of vertebrates. It was thought, for example, that while
mammals and reptiles have a representation of sight in the pallium, fish
and amphibians, which have a much older ancestor in common with us,
did not have it. Recently, however, it was discovered (Suryanarayana et al.
2020) that lampreys, which constitute the oldest extant group of verte-
brates, possess a visual area, with a retinotopic organisation (close posi-
tions on the retina are represented nearby in the brain), and a
somatosensory area, in which the surface of the animal’s head and trunk
are represented, in the lateral pallium, the homolog of the cortex. This
means that the organisation of sensorimotor representations of the mam-
malian neo-cortex had already evolved into the common ancestor of
cyclostomes (lampreys and hagfish) and gnathostomes (fish, amphibians,

reptiles, birds and mammals) about 560 million years ago.
It is quite obvious that the architecture of the pallium has evolved in
different forms in the different taxonomic groups. In birds it is organised
in nuclei while in mammals it is organised in laminae. We know that the
laminae of the mammalian brain contain vertical columns of neurons,
and within these columns the neurons communicate with each other both
horizontally and vertically. However, very recent evidence has been pro-
vided that, despite a nucleated organisation, a laminar and columnar-like
architecture is also recognisable in the brain of birds (Stacho et al. 2020).
The fact that people who deal with other things have inaccurate
conceptions about evolution in general and about the evolution of the
brain in particular can be a pity but certainly it is not something for
which they cannot be blamed for. If anything, we should all regret,
scientists and communicators of science, for failing to convey correct
information. More worrying, however, is the fact that similar
misunderstandings are widespread among those who should professionally
deal with the brain and its functions. Psychologist Joseph Cesario with
his collaborators (Cesario et al. 2020) published an interesting article in
which the results of a study are about twenty introductory manuals to
psychology, published between 2009 and 2017. Of these, only fourteen
mention the evolution of the brain, which would be disappointing in
itself, but more importantly only two do not contain the type of errors
concerning brain evolution that I mentioned above. The article reports
some fascinating misunderstandings, for example in a text dedicated to
social cognition we can read: “When new species evolve, this is achieved
by adding new parts of the brain to the existing ones … The frog and the
fish, in other words, they are still within us.” It is worrying that these
views are disseminated among the future professionals of psychology.
3 nimals and Morphological Similarity

A
as Sources of Mental State Attribution
The second aspect that affects our conception and attitudes towards other
species is related to the ways by which we recognise living beings, espe-
cially living beings as intentional agents. Research in neuro-cognitive
36 G. Vallortigara
sciences has revealed that there are quite specific cues that allow us to
recognise the presence of animate creatures in the environment, and these
cues seem to be largely shared among vertebrates. Animacy cues have
been mostly studied in the visual domain, and have been documented in
animals so different as human newborns and infants and newly hatched
chicks or neonate monkeys, thus revealing their innate bases (see for
reviews Rosa-Salva et al. 2015; Di Giorgio et al. 2017; Versace et al. 2018;
Versace and Vallortigara 2015; Lorenzi and Vallortigara 2021; Rosa-Salva
et al. 2020; Vallortigara 2021b). These animacy cues include aspects such
as face-like appearance (Rosa-Salva et al. 2010, 2011; Buiatti et al. 2019;
Sugita 2008; Versace et al. 2020), biological motion (Vallortigara et al.
2005; Vallortigara and Regolin 2006; Simion et al. 2008), self-propelled
motion (Mascalzoni et al. 2010; Di Giorgio et al. 2016a, b), motion
involving changes of speed (Rosa-Salva et al. 2016; Di Giorgio et al.
2021), movement in the direction of elongation of antero-posterior axis
(Hernik et al. 2014; Rosa-Salva et al. 2018). Figure 3.1 shows schemati-
cally some of the animacy detectors that have been identified so far by
parallel comparative work carried out in human neonates and newly
hatched chicks in my lab and in other labs.
This research has also shown that phenomena like pareidolia are not
confined to humans and associated with socio-cultural experiences but
can instead be observed in non-human animals as well (Taubert et al.
2017). What perhaps is special to humans is the fact that mechanisms to
detect the presence of animate entities seem to be hyper-active, possibly
because of the importance and of the intricacies of our social life: we are
indeed hypertrophic animacy and agency detectors (Barrett et al. 2001;
Bloom 2004; Vallortigara 2012) and it has been suggested that the basic
distinction we are predisposed to between animate and non-animate
objects and the hypertrophic development of animate detectors have
been the main sources for the development of sovranaturalistic beliefs,
including religions (e.g. Atran 2002; Boyer 2001; Girotto et al. 2008;
Girotto et al. 2014; Vallortigara 2012). Some aspects of animal behaviour
that tend to be anthropomorphically over-interpreted such as special
interest to corpses as evidence of allegedly explicit understanding of death
(see for a review about cognitive thanatology, Goncalves and Biro 2018)
are easy to account for in terms of the simultaneous maintenance of some
Fig. 3.1 Schematic representation of some of the stimuli used to document

predispositions for static and dynamic features typical of animate objects shown
by visually naïve vertebrates at birth (mainly humans and chicks but evidence is
(continued)
38 G. Vallortigara
animacy cues (e.g. face-like stimuli) and loss of others (self-propelled

motion) in corpses, that would thus elicit interest and curiosity
(Vallortigara 2021a).
Neurobiological research on the sense of animacy has started to reveal
the underlying neural mechanisms in animal models (Lorenzi et al. 2017;
Mayer et al. 2016, 2017a,b) and also, to a more limited extent, in human
newborns (Buiatti et al. 2019; see for a general review Lorenzi and
Vallortigara 2021). The brain areas involved mostly cover the so-called
social neural network, which is largely shared among vertebrates (review
in Rosa-Salva et al. 2020; Lorenzi and Vallortigara 2021). Interestingly
there is also evidence that lack or delay (e.g. for genetic reasons) in the
development of animacy detectors may underlie neurodevelopmental
disorders (e.g. Sgadò et al. 2018; Lorenzi et al. 2019). Human neonates
at high risk of autism seem to be impaired in animacy cues recognition
(Di Giorgio et al. 2016a, b). Conversely, substances that can re-open
critical periods for learning seem to be capable also to make a resurgence
of the transient time-window (Versace et al. 2019) for innate predisposi-
tions (Lorenzi et al. 2020).
also Fig. 3.1 (continued) available for monkeys, see Rosa-Salva et al. 2020 for
details). For each pair of stimuli, the preferred stimulus featuring the predisposed
trait and a control one are shown. From above, stimuli used to test the preference
for hen-like objects (a stuffed junglefowl-like hen versus a scrambled version of a
similar specimen) in newborn chicks. In the following rows a pair of similar stimuli
obtained from stuffed chick models; a stuffed duck with her wings occluded com-
pared to a similar exemplar with the head region occluded; a schematic face-like
stimulus and a non-face control image. The last stimulus pair evokes similar pref-
erences in human newborns and newly hatched chicks. The first two images of
the second panel depict a point light display of a walking hen and a control stimu-
lus with random motion of the same points of light (the silhouette of the hen is
added for illustrative purposes). In the following two rows a schematic represen-
tation of a speed changing stimulus and its speed-constant control; an object that
always moves in the direction of its main body axis and its control stimulus. In the
last row, on the left the sequence of movement of a self-propelled red object hit-
ting and putting in motion a non-self-propelled purple object (the sequence has
to be read from above to below). In this case, chicks preferentially imprint on the
red objects. On the right, both objects appear self-propelled and chicks display no
preferences between the two. Human newborns show similar preferences for
self-propelled objects as well. (See for complete references Rosa-Salva et al. 2021)
It is important to note, however, that we can easily recognise the

presence of animate and intentional agents even in stimuli that lack any
anthropomorphic or zoomorphic appearance. An example is provided by
the seminal experiments by Heider and Simmel (1944) revealing that
when people watch an animation of moving geometric shapes, like circles
and triangles, they effortlessly and spontaneously attribute intentional
movement and goal-directed interactions to the shapes. It is therefore
apparent that the different attitudes shown by scientists (and ordinary
people) with regard to attribution of empathy to rats and ants cannot be
due to basically different or reduced presence of animacy and agency cues
available in the behaviour of the two species, for we actually easily attri-
bute animacy and goals even to simple geometric figures like circles and
triangles. No doubt it could be that not all animacy cues are there or
identically available in the two species, and it could be that their cumula-
tive presence does produce additive effects, for instance a face-like appear-
ance is not so easily recognisable in an ant. Note, however, that face-like
arrangements of stimuli were totally absent in Heider and Simmel’s study,
and that dynamic cues alone seem to suffice to evoke animacy and agency
perception.
I believe we can account for these differences in mental state attribution
by hypothesising that mechanisms to attribute psychological states to
stimuli are different and separated by mechanisms that decide about the
content of these psychological states. In other words, I would conjecture
that animacy and agency cues are at work in an identical fashion with rats
and ants behaviour, allowing us to decide that they are animate objects
and thus obey to the rules of naïve psychology rather than only to those
of naïve physics, as it happens with non-animate, inert objects. However,
even if we attribute psychological states to both (i.e. that rats and ants
“want,” “hope,” “desire,” “suffer,” etc,) we are not ready to accept that the
contents of these mental states would be identical. Similarity in
morphology seems to be the main determinant of similarity in the mental
contents. Thus, although we can recognise that ants, similar to rats,
would actively behave in order to get a conspecific restrained by a pris-
oner condition because they feel somewhat unpleased by the victim con-
ditions and want to get the victim freed on, we are not ready to recognise
that the unpleasentness of ants would be the same (i.e. feels as the same)
40 G. Vallortigara
as that of rats or humans. These animals look so different in morphology

that the content of their psychological states should be also different.
Note that this is different from cognitive essentialism (and eventually
could form the basis for essentialistic attitudes towards different kinds of
animals). Essentialism is the idea that different exemplars share the same
not observable and not specified reality, an essence, in spite of differences
in surface appearance (Gelman 2003, 2004), whereas here I am arguing
that surface appearance is used as a proxy for similarity in mental con-
tent. Also note that I am discussing about mechanisms used by humans
to attribute psychological contents to mental processes of other animals.
I am not committed in any way with the issue as to whether other species,
either ants or rats (or for what matters humans) actually feel something
(for a discussion on this topic see instead Vallortigara 2021b). I am only
discussing the way in which human beings seem to have been built up by
natural selection to attribute mental states to others.
I believe it is useful to carefully consider the evidence that comes from
animal studies with respect to these theoretical issues, particularly those
conducted in species which are phylogenetically very distant from
us (Cimatti and Vallortigara 2015). The ways we, as humans, empathise
force us to seek simpler explanations for complex behaviours for creatures
like ants. Which is good. The next step is however to consider seriously
the possibility that simple explanations also apply to us, human beings.
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4
The Moral Value of Animal Sentience
and Agency
Federico Zuolo
1 Introduction
In recent years animal ethics has undergone a significant change. If first-
generation animal ethicists have addressed such fundamental issues as the
value of non-human lives, animal interests, the moral untenability of
speciesism, and so on, nowadays there has been a switch towards topics
that are less foundational than those concerning the value of animals vis-
à-vis the value of humans. Indeed, in this second wave of animal ethics
there are at least two tendencies that we might call political and differen-
tial. First, theorists are arguing for a political turn (Ahlhaus and Niesen
2015): first-generation animal ethicists asked what individuals ought to
do in their individual lives given the rejection of speciesism, while nowa-
days many animal ethicists are addressing such political questions as the
kind of political changes that societies should have to face the animals
F. Zuolo (*)
Department of Classics, Philosophy and History, University of Genova,
Genoa, Italy

48 F. Zuolo
question. Second, there is an overall increasing attention towards the

multiplicity of contexts in which human-animal relations emerge. If the
first-generation of animal ethics had a possible (but not necessary) libera-
tionist implication, which is implicit in the radical animal rights move-
ment, nowadays multiple approaches (including some animal rights
theories) have argued that such a sweeping implication overlooks many
legitimate and differentiated relations that humans and animals have. In
sum, if first-wave animal ethicists concerned individuals and all-
encompassing rights and duties (what animals are owed, and what should
I do?), building on this, nowadays, animal ethics also concerns collectivi-
ties and contexts (what as a polity should we do, and how should we
address such a specific situation?). These two tendencies notwithstand-
ing, there still are certain issues at the foundational level that need to be
addressed. Indeed, the problem of the basis of equality is still in need of
scrutiny, or so I will argue. To see why and how this foundational issue
has been overlooked and is at the core of some contemporary debates, let
us start from the basics.
Moral status is an elusive notion in animal ethics, as well as more
generally in value theory. A status is a comparative value notion, which
defines the comparative value of a class of individuals with respect to
other classes. If it is to serve normatively, it should be thought of as a
shorthand for a set of information that we should have about a being:
how to regard it and what do to about it. A moral status should tell us
what kind of attitude we should have towards a being and what we are
required or permitted to do. In sum, moral status provides us with evalu-
ative and prescriptive information about a being. But this information is
not freestanding, as if moral status were a property of nature or the
essence of things. Rather, we should think of moral status as providing
the ground for the kind of normative response (evaluative and/or pre-
scriptive) that we should have towards a being. Precisely, if moral status
has to have a purpose—in Zuolo (2016, 2017), I have defended the view
that moral status is a necessary notion against eliminativist accounts
(Horta 2014)—such a purpose should be that of keeping together in the
same notion the correct normative response that we should have and the
grounds for this response. Such a ground is usually a set of information
on the morally relevant features that characterise a certain being. But

what are the most convincing morally relevant features?
The aim of this paper is to discuss the two main competing approaches
in animal ethics to ground moral status, which rely on either sentience or
agency as the ultimate morally relevant feature. After providing a work-
ing definition of these two concepts, I will bring to bear agency and sen-
tience to the fundamental distinction between egalitarian and
non-egalitarian theories. From this vantage point, I will reconstruct and
review the most important perspectives on moral status: Singer’s equal
consideration of interests, Regan’s agency-based equality, Cochrane’s
sentience-based egalitarianism, Kagan’s limited hierarchy, and McMahan’s
proportional inegalitarianism.
I will argue that irrespective of whether we opt for sentience or agency,
equality can be meaningfully attributed only to relatively restricted classes
of beings because, if it is attributed to very general classes, it suffers from
the same problems with the basis of equality as human-based accounts.
Hence, a restricted form of egalitarianism seems the only available pos-
sibility that does not violate a minimal requirement of proportionality.
But this option also faces structural difficulties in properly justifying
equality.
2 Types of Morally Relevant Properties

The way we should treat a being depends on the properties that the being
itself has. There would be no point in treating equally beings that radi-
cally differ in their morally relevant characteristics. But what are the char-
acteristics that matter from a moral point of view? For the sake of
simplicity and coherence with scientific standards, let us leave aside those
characteristics that are not scientifically verifiable (e.g. the possession of a
soul or the Kantian noumenon). Even within this domain, there still are
a number of morally relevant features that we might choose. The further
fundamental distinction is between extrinsic and intrinsic features. The
former are those features that do not pertain to a being per se but that a
being has in virtue of something else. The latter are those features that
pertain—inhere as it were—to the being itself, independently of other
50 F. Zuolo
things. The standard way of characterising the former is by calling them

relations. Although relational approaches pose a fundamental alternative
to approaches based on intrinsic properties and are dealt with in other
contributions to this volume, for the sake of brevity, here I will concen-
trate on approaches based on intrinsic properties.
The alternative on the table is the overall approach that we may label
as the one based on intrinsic properties. By this, I mean the kinds of
properties the possession of which does not depend on there being a rela-
tion with another individual. In other words, intrinsic properties are the
sorts of features that belong to the individual itself: sentience, level of
rationality, agency, autonomy, capacities to act in some way, and so on. It
is worth clarifying that by intrinsic properties I do not mean properties
whose value lies, as it were, in things themselves. Whether there are such
values is an issue that we cannot deal with here. Here we are assuming a
broad naturalistic framework according to which value is usually, although
not necessarily uniquely, bestowed by the valuing capacities of persons.
Within the set of possible intrinsic properties, sentience and agency
have remarkably been the most important ones. This is so for several rea-
sons. First, some of the other features can be reduced to either agency or
sentience. Second, sentience and agency are the cornerstone of the two
most popular approaches in animal ethics (and beyond): consequential-
ism and deontology. As known, in consequentialism, and in particular, in
utilitarianism, welfare is the ultimate and only valuable unit. Only sen-
tient beings can experience welfare. As to deontology, agential capacities
are the focus of moral evaluation and moral life. Third, despite their dif-
ferences, both sentience and agency relate to two fundamental features
that matter from a moral point of view: the capacity to have experiences
(sentience) and the capacity to be an irreducible form of life or be account-
able for one’s decisions (agency). There are other ways to characterise
agency. Here I mention only these two because the former is suitable to
animal ethics and drawn from Regan’s theory, while the latter is more
suitable to full personhood. See below for my working definition of
agency. Unlike sentience and agency, other features, such as mere cogni-
tive capacity, seem less morally relevant and fundamental because mere
cognitive capacity does not directly bear either on the fact of being
affected by what happens or on what one ought to do towards others.
Before proceeding we can now provide two minimal definitions. In

animal ethics, sentience is usually understood in a rather broad sense as
involving the minimal capacity to have attractive or aversive experiences
and the capacity to act upon them. As Broom notes (2004: 5),
a sentient being is one that has some ability: (i) to evaluate the actions of
others in relation to itself and third parties; (ii) to remember some of its
own actions and their consequences; (iii) to assess risks and benefits; (iv) to
have some feelings; and (v) to have some degree of awareness.
It is worth specifying that in a broad understanding of the idea of

sentience, we should not take these features as either separately necessary
or each sufficient to determine sentience. There is still a lot of disagreement
as to how these criteria obtain in specific species of animals, and how they
should be deemed sufficient and/or necessary to guarantee the ascription
of sentience.
In an even less demanding sense, hereafter I will understand sentience
as the mere capacity to have experiences. Of course, this almost always
correlates with other capacities that bear on the capacity to have experi-
ences. After all, sentience itself is an evolutionary mechanism that guar-
antees quite sophisticated advantages (for instance, the capacity to prevent
and elaborate possible aversive events or search for and appreciate posi-
tive events). This means that depending on the kind of sentient being,
sentience is also correlated with a number of other apparatuses. Needless
to say, here we are working at a very abstract level of discourse, which
means not taking into account the fact that the way a being is sentient is
something we most certainly cannot imagine (after all, who knows what
it is like to be a bat?).
Agency is even more controversial a notion than sentience. A minimal
definition of agency holds that agency occurs whenever an individual acts
upon certain preferences, pursues certain goals, and behaves in the world
according to its representations of the world. In such a very inclusive defi-
nition, synthetic entities can also enter. A thicker definition of agency, as
the ones usually employed in the analysis of human morality, regards
agency as a capacity to act rationally and morally. Both definitions are
unsuitable for the domains of non-human animals. But choosing a mid-
dle ground might itself be controversial. Hence, in what follows I will
52 F. Zuolo
understand agency as the capacity to act upon motives and interact with
the environment accordingly. This definition is sufficiently inclusive of
animals but not coincident with sentience. Indeed, although it is proba-
bly the case that many sentient animals are in some sense agents, albeit
minimally, they differ as to the dimension of concern, as we will see
below. To anticipate, approaches focusing on sentience tend to consider
experiences and states of affairs as valuable, while approaches focusing on
agency tend to value individual capacities.
Now it is worth clarifying that the sense of agency I will consider here
is more inclusive than the one outlined by Mark Rowlands (2011), which
focuses on moral subjectivity. Rowlands—as well as DeGrazia, Bekoff,
Pierce, Sapontzis, and others—hold that at least some animals can act
upon moral motives and can be considered moral subjects. Such motiva-
tions (compassion, fairness, empathy) are feelings that drive individuals
(human and non-human) to act in a moral way, even though such indi-
viduals lack higher order capacities to critically reflect on their behavior,
be conscious of the reasons they act upon, and rationally weigh alternatives.
Although it is probably true that animals have some motivation to act
in a manner that we consider morally correct, I do not focus on this trait
in this chapter for the following reasons. First, the idea of moral subjec-
tivity is grounded in a controversial idea of what morality is. Of course,
any conception—whether Kantian or sentimentalist or something else
that considers morality only as the set of actions (or dispositions) that
express higher capacities—is controversial too and cannot be taken for
granted. However, since the purpose of this chapter is not that of debat-
ing what morality is, it is preferable not to employ a controversial idea,
such as animal moral subjectivity. Second, this chapter focuses in particu-
lar on the comparative values of sentience and agency with respect to
equality in considering animals’ status and/or interests. In light of this,
moral subjectivity is ill-suited to be the ground for equal concern because
animals display an even greater wealth of differences with respect to moti-
vations and capacities that make up moral subjectivity than with respect
to sentience and agency.
Now it is time to briefly reconstruct the role of sentience and agency
in animal ethics. As is known, the champion of sentience as the morally
relevant feature is certainly Peter Singer. Although this idea is not new
and can be traced back in the early utilitarians (Bentham) and their pre-
decessors in modern thought (empiricists), only with Singer has there
been such a grounding of moral relevance by sentience. Unsurprisingly,
we can say that the champion of agency as the morally relevant feature in
animal ethics is certainly Tom Regan. His idea that all mammals aged at
least 1 year are subjects-of-a-life is based on the principle that animals of
a sufficiently complex mental development are capable of having memo-
ries, expectations of the future, a sense of themselves, and the capacity to
act in a way that is comparable with the one held by human beings of the
same age.
Although Regan grounds his idea of moral status on the capacity to
have experience, his basis for moral status is a conception of agency.
Indeed, Regan understands the agency of subject-of-a-life in an existen-
tial sense, not in a moral sense. Singer’s account, instead, is grounded in
the idea that consciousness is valuable to the extent that it brings about
valuable experiences.
Hence, Singer’s utilitarianism values the capacities for sentience as a
proxy for the kinds of experiences (of pleasure and pain in particular) that
a being can have, insofar as only the latter are intrinsically valuable; Regan
instead proposes an agency-based conception because his perspective is
closer to a Kantian idea which recognises the intrinsic value of an indi-
vidual’s capacities. If Singer’s account is notoriously committed only to
the equal consideration of interests, Regan’s account made a claim for a
richer set of unconditional basic rights for all subjects-of-a-life. Moreover,
equality plays a different role, predicated upon totally different sites:
while Regan argues for the recognition of equal status of all subjects-of-a-
life, pretty much as we do among human persons, Singer rejects the sta-
tus talk because what matters are interests and the kinds of experiences an
individual can have.
3 Proportionality and the Basis for Equality

Intrinsic properties may demand a number of moral responses. They may
require respect for the life of all those beings which have the relevant char-
acteristics granting a right to life (mere sentience, subjecthood, moral
54 F. Zuolo
agency or others), or they may demand refraining from causing suffering

to a being. Although these first-order moral issues are certainly relevant,
they do not pertain to the present analysis. The normative question that
we have to ask now is whether an approach is egalitarian or inegalitarian.
Equality, as well as inequality, may characterise diverse aspects of a
theory. A theory may demand egalitarian distribution of resources, rights
or other goods. But before this, we should ask the more fundamental
question which concerns the basis of equality. As known, one cannot say
that we should treat equally two things that are completely different in
any relevant respect. The two things need to be equal in some sense in
order to be treated equally in an appropriate manner. The crux of this
argument is that, when it comes to normative issues regarding human
beings or animals, all individuals vary in all the relevant respects. Why
can we say that all human beings are equal? There can be different tradi-
tional answers: human beings are equal before God or they are equally
members of the human species. But, leaving aside the religious response,
one may ask what is so special about being a member of the human spe-
cies. The standard answer is that human beings possess rationality, moral
agency, moral virtues, and so on. But there are two problems with these
answers: first, human beings possess these capacities unequally and this
fact runs counter to the idea that these capacities may be the basis for
equality; second, there are some human beings (the so-called marginal
cases) who possess these capacities at a lower level than some non-human
animals. Hence, mere membership in the human species as a proxy for
the possession of morally relevant capacities cannot be the grounds for
equal treatment. What then should we do about equality? Should we opt
for unconditional egalitarianism? Or are we doomed to unequal treat-
ment across and within species?
This should not come as a provocative question. Indeed, in the
background of both egalitarianism and inegalitarianism lies the old
Aristotelian principle that prescribes that equals should be treated equally
and unequals unequally (Nicomachean Ethics V, 3, 1131 a21–24). But
this principle tells us more than what at first glance seems a mere platitude.
Egalitarian principles (as defined above) are fact-dependent in the following

sense: such principles depend for their normative validity on the fact that
individuals are equal in some sense, together with a higher order

hypothetical prescription of the form: ‘If individuals are equal in such-and-
such a sense, treat them equally in such-and-such a sense’. This hypothetical
prescription is the source of the moral relevance of the fact, and itself
derives in part from the still-higher-order Aristotelian principle enjoining
us to treat equals equally (and unequals unequally) together with norma-
tive claims about the relevance of certain kinds of facts to certain ways of
treating people. (Carter 2013: 25)
This Aristotelian principle is considered a principle of formal equality.

From it, diverse lower-level principles may be drawn. The first might be
called proportional inegalitarianism, and it holds that the moral status of
a being should precisely reflect the underlying properties upon which the
moral status supervenes. This principle takes the idea that only equals
should be treated alike by specifying the class of equals in a narrow sense.
Other accounts are more or less egalitarian depending on how broad and
inclusive they understand the class of equals to be.
Now we are in a position to review the most important accounts in
animal ethics. I will seek to assess their plausibility from the vantage point
of the relation between the type of egalitarian commitment and the kind
of bases of equality to which they appeal (sentience or agency). I will call
them feeble egalitarianism, backdoor egalitarianism, global egalitarianism,
limited hierarchy, and proportional inegalitarianism.
4 Feeble Egalitarianism
Singer’s idea of equal consideration of interests is a form of feeble
egalitarianism, at least in the sense that I here understand egalitarianism.
This seems to be a baffling statement to the extent that Singer has been
credited with being the champion of animal equality. After all, Singer
proposed the equal consideration of interests (ECOI) principle. But my
point is that ECOI pays scarce attention to the basis of equality. To be
truthful, Singer admittedly sidesteps it, but I contend that he errs in
doing so.
56 F. Zuolo
The essence of the principle of equal consideration of interests is that we

give equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those
affected by our actions. (Singer 1993: 21)
However, as I have argued elsewhere (Zuolo 2017, 2020: 52–61), it

should not be taken for granted that the same kind of interests of two
different individuals count equally. This is so not only because we have to
consider the clause of “other things being equal”—after all, the interest in
eating of a starving individual should count more than the same kind of
interest of an individual who has been regularly fed. But, even though we
assume that two interests are similar other things being equal, we still
have to consider their bearers to gauge their relative weight. It is so
because interests are not free-floating entities that are independent of the
sort of individual that holds them. Singer makes ECOI the cornerstone
of his non-discriminatory approach. But can his account be properly
egalitarian, where by properly egalitarian I understand an account which
could provide a basis of equality?
The principle of equal consideration of interests prohibits making our

readiness to consider the interests of others depend on their abilities or
other characteristics, apart from the characteristic of having interests.
(Singer 1993: 22)
I think this is simply unwarranted because the process of equalisation is

simply made in virtue of some things having the same name. Of course,
the interest in not suffering or in being fed has a common basis in all
those animals that have similar bodies and a recent evolutionary path.
But this needs to be explained. There is no (dis)value in nature for events
are (dis)valuable to the extent that we deem them so. We can reliably
presume that the same type of interest of two individuals has the same
weight to the extent that the physical events subvening the interest are
the same. For instance, this occurs if the biochemical events determining
the experience of pain are the same (or at least very similar) in two indi-
viduals. However, we can typically presume this only to the extent that
we consider classes of individuals that are relatively similar. It is true that
at least mammals share a number of biological features in virtue of their
common evolutionary paths. But the mental nature of some of the most
important interests (e.g. pleasure and pain) renders the comparisons that
Singer assumes to be egalitarian unwarranted.
In sum, to presume that two interests of the same type do actually
count as equally weighty, we need two individuals that are relatively simi-
lar in the relevant features. In other words, Singer’s idea that the mere
possession of sentience entitles a being to have its interests considered on
a par with the same types of interests of the other sentient beings does not
provide sufficient grounds for such comparisons. The idea of equal con-
sideration of interests lacks a basis of equality, which cannot be but pro-
vided by some idea of moral status and the ensuing considerations of the
types of individuals whose interests are to be compared.
5 Backdoor Egalitarianism
With this label I refer to Regan’s theory. As stated, Regan attributes equal
status to all individuals who are subjects-of-a-life, namely mammals aged
at least one. But what about those animals (the vast majority) which do
not fall into this class? What is their moral status? Are they right-holders?
Do they have fewer or less weighty rights? Perhaps they should have lesser
worth. This seems to be the most coherent implication of Regan’s egali-
tarian account because his account is based on a range property. Indeed,
the property of being a subject-of-a-life is a property that supervenes
upon variable underlying properties (the mental capacities necessary to
be a subject). Hence, if all subjects-of-a-life are to be counted as equals
insofar as they pass the threshold of subjectivity thus understood, it fol-
lows that those which are not subjects-of-a-life are to be counted
unequally. But Regan is not willing to draw this conclusion for he also
seems committed to inclusion. To deal with this problem, Regan invokes
the principle of caution.
Such a policy [of moral caution] would have us act as if nonmammalian

animals are conscious and are capable of experiencing pain unless a con-
vincing case can be made to the contrary. In the absence of the case to the
contrary, that is, it is not unreasonable to advocate a policy that gives the
benefit of the doubt to animals that, though not mammals, nevertheless
58 F. Zuolo
share relevant anatomical and physiological properties with mammalian

animals (for example, a central nervous system). (Regan 1983: 366)
But if this is so, one may ask what the role of being a subject-of-a-life is.
If it does not provide the basis of equality but only counts as a mere place-
holder for a desirable treatment, then we do not have the grounds for
equal status. In this sense, Regan seems to reintroduce equality from the
backdoor, after having excluded many animals from the attribution of
equality. Backdoor egalitarianism needs to be reformulated in one of the
following ways. Regan should have bitten the bullet and admitted that
those animals that are not subjects-of-a-life are not to be granted equal
status (and rights). But given the notorious troubles of setting a threshold
(subjectivity) which is necessarily exclusive, Regan has probably preferred
to grant inclusivity at the expense of coherence between equality and its
basis. Alternatively, Regan might have changed the basis of his egalitarian
approach so as to switch from an agency-based account to a sentience-
based one. Needless to say, this would have entailed costs and a different
kind of normative implication.
6 Global Egalitarianism
Global egalitarianism is a form of egalitarianism that understands the
class of equals in an extremely inclusive sense. Without considering
Taylor’s (1986) theory, according to which all living beings should be
attributed equal inherent worth (“Subscribing to the principle of species-
impartiality, we now see, means regarding every entity that has a good of
its own as possessing inherent worth—the same inherent worth, since
none is superior to another”) (Taylor 1986: 155), we can now consider
Cochrane’s egalitarian theory. Cochrane wants to provide a basis of equal-
ity that be as inclusive as possible, thus avoiding the troubles of Regan’s
account. He also wants this basis to be as non-controversial as possible.
This means that, unlike the first-generation theories in animal ethics, he
outlines a sentience-based account of animal equality. In so doing, he also
seeks to avoid the notorious problems that egalitarian accounts face. In
particular, he aims to avoid the problem of setting an arbitrary threshold,
which distinguishes those that are to be treated equally from those that
do not merit this consideration by unnaturally dividing the natural vari-
ability of the world. The problem of variability of the morally relevant
features and the problem of arbitrariness of the threshold typically daunt
the egalitarian approaches concerning human beings.
After all, unlike the capacities for personhood or the characteristics based
on cognitive complexity, the possession of interests is “binary.” That is to
say, an individual either possesses interests or does not, making it straight-
forward to explain why the moral worth of humans does not come in
degrees. Of course, this is not to say that there are no difficult cases when
it comes to identifying which individuals have interests and which do not.
[…] But still, these uncertainties do not detract from the fact that some
individuals are sentient and others are not; and thus that some possess
interests, while others do not. Of course, none of this is to deny the obvi-
ous fact that interests are differentiated in numerous ways: individuals
will often have different types and numbers of interests; and even when
individuals have the same interest, it may vary in strength and complexity.
Nonetheless, it is impossible for any individual to be more or less in pos-
session of interests: an individual either has them or does not.
(Cochrane 2018: 24)
Although Cochrane starts from two very plausible desiderata—providing

a real basis of equality and being as inclusive as possible—his attempt fails
for two main reasons. First, the category of having interests is not a natu-
rally binary concept insofar as it is a sort of range property, pretty much
as personhood is. Indeed, the idea of having interests supervenes on a set
of physiological and biological properties (type of nervous system and so
on) that are scalar and not naturally binary. Then, in establishing what
beings possess interests, we face the same kind of problems that we face
when trying to ground equality in such an explicitly non-natural prop-
erty as personhood.
Second, even if we were to admit that the possession of interests is a
property that uncontrovesially cuts across the natural domain, it would
not follow that all those that are holders of interests are so on egalitarian
grounds. Indeed, the natural properties that subvene on the possession of
range properties do vary above the threshold. The problem is analogous
60 F. Zuolo
to that of human equality: if we choose any natural property to ground

human equality (intelligence, moral agency, empathy, and so on) we dis-
cover that humans possess it unequally. In an analogous manner, this goes
with the properties that define the possession of interests.
Finally, we could say that global egalitarianism, even if it proved to be
successful in finding a naturally binary property, would do so in a very
stretched manner because the kinds of interests that it would include vary
too much. If so, then, the role of equal status risks being of little use for
too stretched notions may be morally irrelevant (Zuolo 2019). If there is
to be a sort of minimal correspondence between morally relevant proper-
ties and the kind of moral status they ground, the shared moral status of
very different morally relevant properties cannot but be quite minimal,
thus risking being almost irrelevant at a practical level.
7 Limited Hierarchy
Shelly Kagan (2019) provides a number of arguments to rebut a sweeping
and encompassing egalitarianism for animals. He holds that animals
count morally but that they definitely count much less than people do.
This is so because any assessment of the weight of individuals’ interests or
duties that we have towards them depends on the overall moral status of
such individuals. This holds true not only for Singer’s ECOI principle
but also for other accounts that attribute rights and interests to non-
human animals. Given the faults of wide-ranging egalitarianism, Kagan
favours a hierarchical account of moral status, one that tracks the under-
lying morally relevant features. However, he maintains, doing it in a pro-
portional manner would create an unworkable ladder of too many levels,
which would run counter to our epistemic capacities to work through
such a system. Not only do we not know enough of animals to properly
detect the level of an animal’s moral status, but we also do not have the
cognitive capacities to work out the relevant rules and duties proportion-
ate to each level of moral status. Then, as a matter of practical realism
(Kagan 2019, pp. 282–6), variations in moral status should not be seen
as increasing or decreasing in a proportional manner, as if moral status
were a continuous function, for they should rather be understood as dif-
ferent levels in a step function. Given our epistemic limitations, the
number of steps should be limited (Kagan 2019: 294), thus reflecting our
knowledge of animals’ levels of intelligence. At each step, we should sup-
pose that variations of morally relevant properties within the class do not
count much and should be disregarded from a moral point of view.
This sort of local egalitarianism, within an overall hierarchical
framework, is plausibly realistic in terms of the cognitive operations that
it demands of us. Moreover, although it somewhat resembles traditional
views on animals’ moral status, it does not license most of what we do
towards animals as morally justified. However, as Kagan himself admit-
tedly claims, this is just a “pretense” insofar as we pretend that all persons
are equals, while we know this is not the case because we just do not
know how to count their differences. This is even truer for the other
classes that Kagan envisages (higher mammals such as apes and cetaceans,
other mammals, most birds, fish and reptiles, insects and spiders). Kagan’s
reply to this argument he sets against himself is unconvincing though. He
holds that the steps of moral statuses are not mere fictions, as much as a
speed limit is not a mere fiction. If within the limit variations of speed do
not count, so within the level of moral status, variations do not count
(Kagan 2019: 299–302). However, this argument will not do for the
simple reason that the analogy is misleading: a speed limit is a purely
conventional rule that depends on available technology and cultural hab-
its, the sorts of factors that cannot be appealed to when it comes to such
a fundamental issue like moral status. It is true that speed limits work as
thresholds and, as such, resemble range properties. But the analogy stops
here because range properties are employed to grant equality for some
principled reasons, while speed limits establish thresholds in order to
track possibly troubling behaviors. Hence, local egalitarianism, within
Kagan’s limited hierarchy, seems unwarranted, and the problem of the
basis of equality still stands even in a framework that could be more hos-
pitable to restricted classes of equals.
8 Proportional Inegalitarianism
In accounting for the values of lives, Jeff McMahan outlines the Intrinsic
Potential Account concerning the fortune of an individual. The Intrinsic
Potential Account focuses only on intrinsic potential. To determine
62 F. Zuolo
whether a person is fortunate or unfortunate, we should compare her con-

dition to the range of conditions that would be realistically possible for
her, given the highest psychological capacities she has so far achieved or
that she has had the intrinsic potential to achieve thus far (McMahan
2002: 153).
Beyond its role in making sense of one’s fortune, the Intrinsic Potential
Account also is a theory of the basis of moral status insofar as the consid-
erability of an individual depends on her potential for valuable experi-
ences she could attain given her level of mental development.
This account, which is a refinement of a sentience account because the
ultimate source of value is an individual’s well-being, is strictly scalar to
the extent that it is committed to tracking the variable level of capacities
in a proportional way. It is worth remarking that concerning persons
McMahan puts the Intrinsic Potential Account on hold and adopts an
egalitarian approach because McMahan adopts the Intrinsic Potential
Account only for non-human animals, or at least for most of them.
Egalitarianism for human beings and not for other classes of beings of
similarly relevant size introduces an unjustified asymmetry in an other-
wise thoroughly proportional theory. Indeed, McMahan’s overall
sentience-based account is structurally gradualist and understands classes
of equals only as those individuals which have the same Intrinsic Potential
Account, that is, those individuals that have the very same capacities for
well-being. Hence, to ground equality only for persons, McMahan should
have rather relied on an agency-based account, according to which, for
instance, persons should be considered as equals, despite the variability of
morally relevant properties within the class of equals, because only per-
sons owe moral duties to each other. And in being mutually morally
accountable, they have an underlying reason to presuppose that each per-
son is to be considered as equal. McMahan’s overall welfarist account,
instead, does not afford such a reasoning, and hence egalitarianism for
persons is ungrounded. A coherent implication for McMahan’s approach
should have been to thoroughly imply proportional inegalitarianism for
all individuals, whether persons or non-human animals, according to
their Intrinsic Potential Account. In some passages, McMahan laments
that this would have repugnant implications (McMahan 2002: 155). But
the kind of solution he proposes, we have seen, seems a sort of ad hoc
tinkering. In the concluding section, we will see how such problems

could be addressed. For the time being, it is just worth remarking that the
kind of basis for moral status that McMahan chooses yields unpalatable
implications and his ad hoc solution introduces contradictions.
9 entience and Agency as Bases of (In)

S
Equality: A Guide
In all these theories, there seems to be a tension between the bases of
equality (sentience or agency) and the kind of egalitarian commitment
that they express. Some de facto abandon the need to ground equality
(Singer) by relinquishing its basis so as to let the appropriate moral
response vary according to an individual’s need, while others are commit-
ted to providing a very inclusive basis of equality, thus stretching its scope
too much (Cochrane). Some de facto cut the tie between the basis of
equality and the egalitarian treatment (Regan) by reintroducing previ-
ously excluded animals from the backdoor; others take seriously the
problem of the basis of moral status (Kagan and McMahan) by outlining
more coherent inegalitarian accounts. However, these latter accounts too
have problems with equality, even in restricted classes of individuals.
There seems to be a constant tension between the basis of moral status
and equality. Although accounts proposing variously limited forms of
egalitarianism seem more plausible than very inclusive ones, they also fall
short of a coherent grounding. At a certain point, intuitions urging a
more inclusive approach resurface, and then the connection between
morally relevant features, moral status, and equality collapses.
What I have just said seems to require just a more fine-tuned balance
between the basis of equality and variability of the property among indi-
viduals. But, one may object, there is not a predetermined size that fits for
all, and my admonition may sound like a mere rule of thumb that pro-
vides little guidance. After all, what is the appropriate width of the basis
of equality? A genus or species? Or a restricted range within a species? The
genus seems to pose the problems seen above when discussing Cochrane.
A species seems to provide a more proportional basis, but it has no spe-
cific morally relevant feature that distinguishes it from other similar
64 F. Zuolo
species, at least not in terms of intrinsic properties. A subset within a spe-

cies may be appropriate, but this means embracing a restrictive form of
egalitarianism, which may end up being what we usually consider
inegalitarian.
What these considerations seem to suggest is that these categories in
terms of taxa are elusive or misguiding as to whether we should apply
equal principles or not. Morally relevant features cut across taxa and are
to be defined independently. Moreover, it might be very difficult to define
morally relevant features in a way that is sensitive to species’ diversity and
without imposing parochial human preferences. This does not necessarily
mean that ordinary language should be reformed in order to express mor-
ally relevant features. After all, in ordinary language we do not only aim
to express what is morally relevant. There are many other aspects that are
to be expressed: human likes and dislikes, whether they are morally justi-
fied or not; permissible traditions and habits that involve the use of ani-
mals for certain tasks.
At this point, we seem to face a sort of undecidable situation. Should
one begin outlining a theory from the question of egalitarianism versus
inegalitarianism or from the decision between agency-based theory versus
sentience-based theory? Opting for either path seems to affect the possi-
bilities in the other. To face this, let me conclude by proposing a sort of
method of reflective equilibrium to help navigate this field. This sort of
reflective equilibrium may provide a guideline to assess the plausibility of
a theory’s basis of moral status, in particular when equality is concerned.
It seems reasonable to start from the traditional question of what
fundamentally valuable is. Leaving aside the option of going with a
thorough relational theory, which we have mentioned at the beginning,
one should choose between the traditional dichotomy between welfare
and agency. We have seen how these two options constitute the main
alternatives on the table. Building on this, in virtue of what we know
from science and experience, one should define the kind of morally
relevant properties. This step constitutes the specification of the value
basis with a view to connecting the properties with the position on value.
For instance, a choice for an agency-based theory may further proceed
with specifying whether the basis of moral status is a specific sort of moral
subjectivity or a less committal kind of agency.
The second step is to ask whether one prefers an egalitarian or non-

egalitarian theory. At this stage, it is inevitable to rely on one’s intuitions
about the role of a theory with respect to the consideration that individu-
als merit. Then, we should ask whether the morally relevant properties
chosen at the previous stage may provide a reliable basis for the kind of
treatment that has been chosen. For instance, if an agential set of morally
relevant properties has been preferred as a basis for an egalitarian theory,
we should ask whether this set of properties is a coherent basis of equality.
In assessing this, we should strike a balance between the reliability of the
ensuing kind of moral status and the need for inclusion. (See, for instance,
the case of Regan we have discussed above.) At this point, the theorist
should ask whether one is ready to bear the costs of this choice. For
instance, suppose the agency-based egalitarian theory is coherent but
underinclusive, thus putting many individuals out in the egalitarian
domain. Then, one should ask whether she is ready to bear the costs of
this structure. If not, what should one change? Should one drop the egali-
tarian commitment or revise the basis of moral status? This means going
back to the previous steps. In virtue of the knowledge one has obtained,
then, one can start again pondering the different possibilities at each step.
Needless to say, at each stage there is no conclusive procedure to settle
the question, and it is a matter of gauging the plausibility of one’s intu-
ition with the principles and relevant facts. This procedure is inevitably
coherentist with its pros and cons: there is no deductive argument from
necessary principles that leads to conclusive implications. Rather, the
possibility of erring at each step should be seen as a resource to revise
one’s intuitions, principles, or assessment of relevant facts.
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Broom, D.M. 2004. Sentience and Animal Welfare. Boston: CABI.
Carter, I.F. 2013. Basic Equality and the Site of Egalitarian Justice. Economics
and Philosophy 29: 21–41.
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Cochrane, A. 2018. Sentientist Politics. A Theory of Global Inter-Species Justice.

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Intrinsic Potential Account. The Journal of Value Inquiry 50: 573–592.
———. 2017. Equality, its Basis and Moral Status. Challenging the Principle of
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Palgrave Macmillan.
5
Affective Animal Ethics: Reflective
Empathy, Attention and Knowledge
Sub Specie Aeternitatis
Elisa Aaltola
1 Introduction
The belief that emotions are a necessary constituent behind moral agency
and decision-making has long roots in Western philosophy. Defending
moral sentimentalism, David Hume famously argued in his A Treatise of
Human Nature (1738) that passions could motivate moral concepts such
as “good” and “bad.” The entwinements between morality and emotions
have been underlined by also some rationalists, such as Baruch Spinoza,
who in his Ethics (1677) maintained that it is through joy that we con-
struct the category of “the good,” and through melancholy the category
of “evil.” Later, for instance, Iris Murdoch has defended emotions as the
foundation of moral agency, as she has posited that emotions colour the
world with normative, moral hues (Murdoch 2003). Contemporary
E. Aaltola (*)
Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science,
University of Turku, Turku, Finland

68 E. Aaltola
philosophical defenders of the moral role of emotions include Martha

Nussbaum (2001), Jesse Prinz (2006) and Patrizia Churchland (2011),
who all echo the Humean belief that it is our affective nature rather than
purely logical ability which has the strongest influence on moral agency.
Such a stance is becoming increasingly common also outside of
philosophy. “The affective turn,” according to which emotions and
affects1 form a necessary foundation for human mentation, has gained
increasing support in fields such as social psychology, cognitive sciences
and neuropsychology. Representing the latter, Lisa Feldman Barrett has
argued that emotions are concepts, which render reality meaningful to
us. Indeed, they are simulations, which construct our take on the world—
what we perceive trees or squirrels to be is partly based on emotion
concepts. Thereby, emotions are not chaotic or blind forces, but rather a
method of conceptualising and making sense of internal and external
phenomena (Barrett et al. 2015; Barrett 2017). This constructivist take
on emotions is supported by many. Lauren Lebois et al. have argued that
emotions are “learned categories of situated conceptualizations” (Lebois
et al. 2015, 3), whereby we construct them on the basis of past experience
and contextual considerations. To add to the list, Christine Wilson-
Mendenhall and Lawrence Barsalou maintain that concepts underlie our
affects and emotions, and indeed constitute and interlace with them, as it
is only after our minds’ effort to categorise reality into a conceptual form,
capable of filtering out stimuli relevant to our coping, that we begin to
have feelings (Wilson-Mendenhall and Barsalou 2016, 547; see also
Barsalou 2009). According to this theory, emotions are, thereby, concepts
influenced by other concepts—we feel anger or love, because we
conceptualise reality in a given manner, and because anger and love in
themselves are concepts, with which to render events meaningful.
Significantly, the implication is that emotions also help to conceptualise
moral matters. Arguably, they are normatively charged concepts, which,
again, strengthen the claim that they are necessary for moral agency; even
if reason helps us to broaden and deepen moral understanding, also
emotions are required, and indeed the two are interwoven.
These considerations are relevant, not only for moral psychology or
moral philosophy in general, but also for the moral psychology of animal
ethics and (more broadly) animal philosophy. If emotions are concepts
5 Affective Animal Ethics: Reflective Empathy, Attention… 69
with normative dimensions, and if indeed they form one necessary bed-
rock of moral agency, also philosophical discussion on the moral status of
nonhuman animals needs to take their role seriously into account.
Rationalist animal ethics, rested solely on, for instance, deontological or
utilitarian analyses, will inevitably fail to offer a holistic account of why
and how we ought to value and treat other animals. This is particularly
poignant on the level of applied animal ethics, as it can be claimed that
purely rational arguments for the better treatment of pigs or cows have
not been adequately adopted into societal practice precisely because the
influence of emotions has remained unaddressed.2
Indeed, empirical studies into attitudes towards animals have revealed
that many struggle with what is termed “the meat paradox,” whereby an
individual holds on to two contradictory conceptual realities. On the one
hand, she believes that animal welfare is of pivotal importance, and on
the other, she keeps consuming products that clearly violate that welfare.
Scholars in psychology have explained this via references to cognitive dis-
sonance and dissociation, within which the concept of a living, minded
animal is separated from the concept of “meat” (See Bratanova et al.
2011; Dowsett et al. 2018; Kunst and Hohle 2016; Loughnan et al.
2014). From a philosophical viewpoint, one can speak of “akrasia”—a
state, in which an individual holds on to a given conception of “the truth”
or “the good,” whilst at the same time acting against that conception.
Classic philosophers, who have discussed akrasia (such as Plato, Aristotle,
Spinoza and Descartes), all point towards the role played by emotions: it
is overlooking the relevance of emotions in our moral decision-making,
which often feeds akrasia. This accentuates the need to pay closer atten-
tion to how emotions impact our normative take on nonhuman animals.
The suggestion here is that it is by taking into account both rational anal-
ysis and emotions that animal ethics becomes more practically persuasive.
Now, instead of examining what type of emotions facilitate the meat
paradox, cognitive dissonance and akrasia, the point of interest in this
paper is the opposite question: which emotion concepts advance our
moral agency in relation to other animals? This chapter analyses what will
be called “reflective empathy” as a morally relevant emotion, and suggests
that its benefit lies in its ability to offer a considered standpoint to our
other emotion concepts. The suggestion will be that reflective empathy
70 E. Aaltola
includes “a meta-perspective,” via which to contemplate the normative

impact of emotions. Thereby, it facilitates evaluation and refinement of
emotion concepts, which render it a particularly potent moral emotion,
capable of supporting both other-directedness and moral cultivation (in
sum, it is the type of a “moral sentiment,” which Hume argued to deserve
further refinement, Hume 1969). Moreover, it will be argued that reflec-
tive empathy benefits from two types of second-order mental states,
attention and knowledge Sub Specie Aeternitatis, both of which deepen
our ability to evaluate and cultivate those emotion concepts relevant to
animal ethics.
2 Reflective Empathy
Empathy falls into various different types, all aimed at identifying the
mental states of other individuals. It ranges for instance from cognitive
empathy (wherein inference and perception are the primary methods of
understanding others) and projective empathy (which utilises imaginative
projection of oneself into the situation of another) to affective empathy
(which consists of affective resonation with the experiences of another).
Therefore, in a state of cognitive empathy, one seeks to remain relatively
affect-neutral and logically infers or perceives what the other is going
through, whilst in projective empathy one imaginatively identifies with
the other, and in a state of affective empathy resonates with the other’s
emotions (on different categories of empathy, see for instance Decety and
Ickes 2009; Aaltola 2018).
The different varieties come with strikingly distinct moral consequences.
For instance, cognitive empathy, unaccompanied by other varieties, has
been argued to enable manipulation and coercion, thus rendering it into
a potential tool of Machiavellian behaviour (de Waal 2008; Smith 2006),
one implication of which is its prevalence among psychopathic individuals
(Blair & Blair 2009; Aaltola 2014). Projective empathy, on the other
hand, faces the risk of replacing the other with one’s own “self,” thus
assimilating the difference of the other into sameness with oneself (this
was a danger mentioned already by Emmanuel Levinas in his critique of
empathy; see Levinas 1961). Affective empathy is arguably necessary for
morality, as it helps us to affectively recognise and flow with the pains and
joys of others, and indeed it was celebrated by Hume, who maintained
that our ability to “reverberate” with others is the most outstanding of
our moral abilities (Hume 1969, 367). Yet, also it faces limitations, as
excessively abundant resonation may hinder one’s ability to recognise the
more hidden, less affective motivations or mental workings of other
beings (see Aaltola 2018). Thus, whilst all of these varieties of empathy
can have significant moral benefits by shedding light onto the experiences
of other individuals, they also come with risks.
In regard to animal ethics, the benefits and risks of these forms of
empathy are noteworthy. Cognitive empathy may facilitate our grasp of
animal mindedness by affording space for rational analysis and relatively
neutral perception of animal behaviour. However, when it becomes the
sole focus, it may narrow one’s ability to affectively engage with hens,
whales, pikes or bees, thus potentially allowing a more Machiavellian,
instrumentalising approach to take a hold, whereby one seeks to use one’s
knowledge of the mental states of animals only in order to benefit from
or govern them (indeed, arguably both animal agriculture and hunting
require cognitive empathy unaccompanied by resonation). From the per-
spective of taking other animals seriously into account as minded, mor-
ally relevant subjects, such an emphasis would be detrimental. Projective
empathy, on the other hand, comes with the risk of substituting animal
distinctiveness with human contents, which again may spark anthropo-
morphic assimilation of nonhuman varieties of life into generic sameness
with human beings. Although humans and other animals share many
mental abilities, sombre moral consideration necessitates one to steer
away from ignoring the differences and specificities of animal minded-
ness, which renders projection potentially problematic. Finally, affective
empathy is arguably necessary for one to take non-human experiences
fully into account, for only resonation allows us to emotively and affec-
tively conceptualise the sufferings and pleasures of the animal world. Yet,
prioritising only such resonation comes with the danger of ignoring
other, less affective mental capacities in other animals, whereby one may,
for instance, reduce dogs into a handful of cheerful emotions whilst over-
looking their complex cognitive abilities.
72 E. Aaltola
Reflective empathy stands as a morally more fruitful option due to the

manner in which it facilitates also critical evaluation of why and with
whom we empathise. Instead of focusing on one primary form of menta-
tion, such as projection or perception, as its foundation, reflective empa-
thy makes use of a wide plethora of different mental capacities. Indeed, it
combines the best elements of the other varieties of empathy: in a state of
reflective empathy, one may simultaneously infer, perceive, imagine and
resonate, and it thus offers a pluralistic approach to understanding the
minds of others. Hence, in the context of nonhuman animals, one com-
bines imagination, resonation, perception and inference3 in order to gain
a more complete view (or create a fuller simulation) of the animals’ per-
spective. In so doing, we avoid the dangers of relying solely on one
method of understanding, and thus for instance anthropomorphism is
evaded through cognitive inference, and Machiavellianism through
imagination and resonation.
Whereas projective empathy finds historical roots in the philosophy of
Adam Smith (2009) and both cognitive and affective empathy in the
writings of Hume (1969),4 reflective empathy as depicted here gains
inspiration from the philosophy of Edith Stein. According to Stein,
empathy is a dynamic process of moving between the perspectives of one-
self and the other. We identify, through embodied interaction or “inter-
subjectivity,” the possible experiences of the other, and explore them by
going back to our own perspective, before reaching out again (Stein
1989). Thereby, empathy consists of movement between the perspectives
of oneself and the other. Interpreting Stein further, it can be claimed that
empathy is movement also within the empathising individual, as she
oscillates between her own “first-order empathy” and her second-order
reflection on what these first-order states consist of, how they link to
other mental states or emotion concepts and how they could be rendered
more comprehensive. Here, we not only, say, resonate with the experi-
ences of the dog or the gorilla, but also step back from resonation and
reflect upon its nature. Hence, reflective empathy is not only movement
between but also within individuals.
The other varieties of empathy and their primary method of knowing
others (resonation, inference, perception and imagination) take place on
the first-order level of mentation. Reflective empathy, on the other hand,
dwells also on the second-order level, where one can map out both (1)
how first-order empathies unfold and what their limitations are and (2)
how one’s emotion concepts, beliefs, moods, attitudes or other mental
contents impact the first-order empathies. In less cumbersome terms,
reflective empathy allows us to notice, how for instance beliefs or emo-
tions influence our ability to resonate with a given group of individuals,
and how one’s empathy could we expand to concern all those beings, who
are minded subjects. Here, one not only constructs simulations or emo-
tion concepts of others, but also on a metalevel investigates how those
simulations and concepts could become more accurate. Such metalevel
reflection provides an answer to a common criticism, according to which
empathy remains inherently biased and thereby offers a poor basis for
moral agency (see Prinz 2011; Bloom 2016). With second-order reflec-
tion, for instance, the cultural prejudices and emotions that distort empa-
thy can be located and replaced with more realistic beliefs and better
adjusted emotions. This follows to some extent Hume’s idea of eradicat-
ing biases by seeking a general point of view (see Rick 2007); however,
the aim is also to simply detect the conceptual sources of biases and
replace them with concepts that are more representative in light of both
everyday experience and scientific knowledge.
The aim of reflective empathy is thereby to scrutinise how background
mental contents impact empathic abilities. In the context of animal eth-
ics, it is a process of elucidating the factors that bear an effect on the first-
order forms of empathy, and of seeking to amend them in a manner that
renders the “empathy concepts” or simulations concerning other animals
more realistic and less biased. The consequence of this process is “an
affective sketch” concerning nonhuman creatures, constantly changing,
and always in need of further reflection and adjustment (Aaltola 2018).
As an example, we may concede that the mental abilities of those animals
used for food tend to be underestimated (Loughnan et al. 2014; Kupsala
et al. 2016), which again compromises empathy towards cows, hens,
sheep and pigs, and we can simultaneously take steps to ensure that we
follow more accurate, scientifically supported views concerning their
mindedness. Moreover, we may grant that such underestimations feed
both biases and emotions such as contempt or disgust, which again can
74 E. Aaltola
hinder empathic processes, and as a result we take action in order to con-

struct and rest on morally more productive emotion concepts.
Reflective empathy feeds cultivation. When noting that given emotions
or beliefs hinder our ability to acknowledge the viewpoints of others, we
seek to change these emotions and beliefs, thereby refining our moral
psychologies. Hence, reflective empathy comes with what Alasdair
MacIntyre famously called for—the willingness to develop one’s moral
abilities and character (see MacIntyre 1984). The relevance of cultivation
goes hand in hand with intersubjectivity, wherein we are willing to change
in relation to and with others (Stein 1989; Zahavi 2007).
Both cultivation and intersubjectivity can be highly beneficial for
animal ethics. As it comes to cultivation, we become willing to alter our
mental landscapes and extend moral psychological abilities so as to give
more serious regard to nonhuman creatures. As it comes to intersubjec-
tivity, we more readily acknowledge animal influence on our own mind-
edness, together with inter-species co-constitution. Both cultivation and
intersubjectivity help to distance us from atomistic individualism, accord-
ing to which beings have essences untouchable by others, and which
arguably restricts moral agency by rendering us unwilling to alter our-
selves in order to better accommodate the existence and flourishing of
others. Anthropocentric beliefs have repeated such atomism in regard to
human-animal relations, thereby suggesting that the “the essence” of
human beings remains beyond the reach of the nonhuman world and
faces no need for alteration in order to support the wellbeing of the latter.
The intersubjective element within reflective empathy urges us to modify
our mental contents in relation to the needs, experiences and perspectives
of other animals, and in this way to cultivate moral ability also in the
context of animal ethics.
To summarise, in a state of reflective empathy, we (1) pay attention to
whether we are inferring, perceiving, imagining or resonating with other
animals (or whether we are empathizing at all) and (2) map out how dif-
ferent beliefs, emotion concepts, dispositions or attitudes may be curtail-
ing one’s willingness to expand empathy towards all minded animals.5
Moreover, we also (3) aim at cultivating our empathic abilities, and in so
doing (4) expose ourselves to intersubjective co-constitution. Arguably,
reflective empathy holds promise of being a highly persuasive moral
method, inviting people to acknowledge the “why” and “how” behind

their moral relation to other animals. Yet, reflective empathy benefits
from the support of also other mental states and emotion concepts. Most
importantly, its “reflective,” second-order nature requires provision.
Besides rational analysis, what does reflection or “the metalevel” consist of?
3 Attention
Attention is a notion introduced in the philosophies of Simone Weil and
Iris Murdoch. It is here argued that reflective empathy benefits from the
refinement of attention—it is via attention that a metalevel perspective
can be achieved, and which helps one to make sense of the emotion con-
cepts, beliefs and attitudes underlying empathy. If we are to become more
empathically capable in regards to foxes, pigeons, platypuses and ele-
phants, it is beneficial to practice attention towards both those animals
and our mental contents concerning them.6
Like reflective empathy, attention stems from a distinction between
first- and second-order mentation. Whilst reflective empathy rests on
making use of both, attention takes place on the second-order level and
refers to one’s ability to note specific mental contents from a metaper-
spective, as if one had taken the metaphoric step back in order to examine
one’s mind. Psychological and cognitive studies manifest that such an
attentive metaperspective allows one to become aware of the contextual-
ity and fluidity of mental states—thereby, one acknowledges that for
instance emotion concepts do not represent permanent, universal truths,
but instead are situated and constantly changing. Through learning such
a perspective, one becomes capable of noting why given mental states
emerge, what those states are and how they may also be transformed
(Teasdale 1999; Langer and Moldoveanu 2000).
Thereby, attention is an affective, meta-level standpoint from which to
note other mental states in all their contextuality and alteration, and
which comprises relative calmness. It is precisely attention with its ability
to support composed focus on the origins and nature of mind’s contents,
which offers a rewarding meta-level for also reflective empathy. Here, one
does not only rationally ponder on the causes and consequences of one’s
76 E. Aaltola
emotion concepts and beliefs concerning other animals (important as

this may be), but also becomes attentively present to these factors, which
arguably facilitates the cultivation of empathy. Mindful attention is par-
ticularly significant, because it strengthens “executive control,” that is the
ability to govern one’s mental states, actions and emotions (Teper et al.
2013), which again is directly related to moral ability. Its benefits stem
from the manner in which it offers a composed position, from which to
observe and direct one’s internal landscapes, including moral motiva-
tions. It is precisely attention which offers a rewarding meta-level for also
reflective empathy. Here, one does not only rationally ponder on the
causes and consequences of one’s emotion concepts and beliefs concern-
ing other animals, but also becomes attentively present to them.
But what is attention in philosophical terms, and how can it be
developed? According to Murdoch, attention is best approached via the
metaphor of vision. Whereas Western philosophy has tended to emphasise
rational will as the starting point of moral enquiries, for Murdoch the
starting point is formed by Plato’s Cave allegory, wherein the prisoners of
a cave, thus-far accustomed to only shadows on the cave’s wall, ought to
learn to notice the metaphoric sun or true reality outside. According to
Murdoch is precisely this that attention enables—it is vision. The key
motive for favouring vision over wilful wanting is that whereas the for-
mer may lead to purely instrumental considerations, eager to benefit
from the world, vision dwells in the world without wanting anything
from it; instead of optimising, it simply observes (Murdoch 1971, 34, 46,
48). Indeed, the aim of attention is “to come to see the world as it is”
(Murdoch 1971, 89). Weil, who greatly influenced Murdoch’s philoso-
phy, was similarly keen to use the Cave allegory as a vehicle to under-
standing the nature of attention (Weil 2002). Both underlined that
attention requires the setting aside of cultural prejudices and habitual
beliefs, and indeed may thus necessitate solitude from social realms—
thus, meta-level observation or vision requires one to become aware of
the “shadows” of, say, culturally constructed doxa.
Practicing attention towards nonhuman animals is straightforward.
The aim would be to acknowledge our own mental states concerning
animals, and how they are constantly unfolding and altering.
Simultaneously, one becomes aware of how, for instance, culturally or
emotively coloured and often strongly anthropocentric presumptions

concerning animality may be. Next to observing the contents of our own
minds, we are to also witness the uniqueness of animal realities (the par-
ticularity, capacities and individuality of pigs and cows), thereby observ-
ing, from a calm, meta-level perspective, their heterogenic ways of being
in the world—their behaviours, physiologies, mental capacities, histories
and perspectives. Such interplay between noting the realities of animals
from afar, and acknowledging our own internal realities concerning them,
strengthens second-order reflection. Here, an instrumentalising approach,
which constantly observes animals with the motive of making use of
them, is replaced with metaphoric vision, which simply witnesses nonhu-
man creatures—the emphasis is on “being” rather than “doing.” In light
of the above research, such attention can broaden animal ethical ability
by advancing executive control, whereby we become aware of not only
how we conceptualise, but also how we act in relation to pigs, salmon,
badgers and ravens.
Murdoch emphasises that attention requires practice; the task is to
eradicate misleading mental contents, including habitual cognitive and
affective processes, and this takes time (Murdoch 1971, 2003). One
method of developing attention is what Murdoch terms “unselfing,”
whereby we avoid self-directed forms of mentation, such as the tendency
to make sense of the world primarily on the bases of one’s own direct
gains. For Murdoch, self-directedness is a source of nothing less than illu-
sions, as it “veils the world” (Murdoch 2003, 175) with one’s own desires,
wants or interests. Simply put, concentrating principally on one’s own
immediate benefits all too easily leads to defining others via them: thus,
instead of witnessing a forest or a pig, we notice potential paper pulp or
bacon. Indeed, Murdoch warns that self-directedness leads into a “small
world” (Murdoch 2003, 175), wherein one ceases to notice the indepen-
dent existence and heterogeneity of life.7 Through ending such pre-
occupation with “the self,” attention flows more readily, as we begin to
observe independent realities internal and external to us. Also Weil talks
of the need to question the primacy of “the self ” and is highly critical of
the manner in which many tend to prioritise their own interests as the
foundation, via which to explain the world and its beings. Weil warns
that the consequences of such preoccupation with “the self ” can be
78 E. Aaltola
dangerous and violent, as the independence of others is denied and

replaced with conceptualisations that reduce those others into utilised
objects. Thus, in order to develop attention, Weil urges us to silence our
“selves” as much as possible: “‘I’ has to be passive. Attention alone—that
attention which is so full that the ‘I’ disappears—is required of me” (Weil
2002, 118; see also Weil 1973, 100).
The relevance of “unselfing,” or avoiding the tendency to conceptualise
reality primarily on the basis of utility, to animal ethics stands as evident,
as our take on animals is often entwined with prioritising human inter-
ests, which again easily leads to defining nonhuman creatures chiefly via
notions of instrumental value. Thereby, conceptualisations concerning
other animals are marked by the primacy of human interests, which veils
animal realities (thus rendering us oblivious to, for instance, their mental
capacities) and restricts us into a small, human-orientated world void of
the complexity of animal life. Here, animals remain the Cartesian
“objects,” whom may, without further moral consideration, be reduced to
resources, and whose independent existence as minded subjects is all too
easily ignored. In order to gain a more attention-filled take on other ani-
mals, capable of noting the intricacies and varieties of animal minded-
ness, we may need to detach from such collective species identities and
human-directedness.
A related route to attention is approaching the world and its beings as
if they were art (Murdoch 2003, 201, 497). Murdoch uses the example of
observing a kestrel in the sky without wanting anything from the bird—
thus, the animal becomes a focus of awe, a form of art, which one beholds
without seeking for an immediate benefit. She explains: “Then suddenly
I observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment everything is altered. The
brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is nothing now
but the kestrel… [we ought to] give attention to nature in order to clear
our minds of selfish care” (Murdoch 1971, 82). Indeed, both Weil and
Murdoch suggest that art (and nature or animals as art) teaches us atten-
tion precisely because we do not wish to use it for any specific purpose—
it is there just to be perceived (Ibid.; Weil 2002, 65). Again, the
implications in the animal context are evident. Approaching nonhuman
animals “as art” may teach attention and second-order reflection both on
their nature and on our own presumptions concerning them. Here, we
witness them as if they were evolution’s art, filled with astounding variety
of characteristics, traits and abilities.
Now, arguably attention can radically enhance reflective empathy, and
thereby advance one’s perception of others. Indeed, neuropsychologists
such as Lisa Feldman Barrett posit that it may help us to reconfigure
emotive conceptualisation (Barrett 2017), which comes with obvious
benefits from the viewpoint of reflective empathy. Weil uses an example,
where one notices a person in the dark, only upon closer inspection to
realise that it is a tree: “We see the same colours; we hear the same sound,
but not in the same way” (Weil 2002, 100). It is precisely this that atten-
tion has to offer to reflective empathy—the ability to witness both our-
selves and others with greater detail, from a meta-level that allows for
calmer scrutiny. Applied to the context of other animals, also they can
appear wholly different when perceived via attention: what previously
manifested as a dull, purely instinctual being can suddenly, as we become
aware of our muddling pre-judgments or misleading emotion concepts,
emerge as a creature with her own history, experiences and a variety of
advanced mental capacities. Murdoch describes how breaking through
self-directed preconceptions reveals “a natural way of experiencing the
interconnectedness of things, their beauty and strangeness, their liveli-
ness in and to our consciousness as ‘ours’, and yet also as independent
witnesses to reality” (Murdoch 2003, 342). It is this that attention can
offer to reflective empathy, and thereby to our ability to understand and
normatively appreciate other animals.
Now, it has to be noted that Weil’s and Murdoch’s philosophy comes
with metaphysical baggage, as both support moral realism and a platonic
notion of an independent “good” (or in Weil’s case, God). Yet, attention
can also be adopted without this baggage as a second-order mental state
that has been empirically explored and affirmed. Indeed, there has been
growing empirical interest in mindful attention, which manifests that it
may increase affective calmness and thereby provide a stable basis, from
which to observe one’s own mental states (Brown and Ryan 2003; Coffey
et al. 2010). Therefore, one does not have to include moral realism into
making use of attention as a vehicle to reflective empathy.
80 E. Aaltola
4 ub Specie Aeternitatis
S
and Holistic Knowledge
Another source of a meta-level perspective, which may advance reflective
empathy, is knowledge Sub Specie Aeternitatis, that is knowledge under
the category of eternity. Briefly defined, in such a state, one observes real-
ity from a general viewpoint, as if one was that reality observing itself.
Baruch Spinoza made this state central to his ethics, and argued that in
Sub Specie Aeternitatis, we perceive with the universe (Spinoza 1996, II).
In order to comprehend such a claim better, it has to be noted that
Spinoza makes a distinction into three kinds of knowledge. The first kind
includes opinion and imagination, and the second comprises ideas that
are commonly held. The third kind of knowledge, on the other hand, is
intuitive, and takes place when we have an adequate idea of the unity or
substance of reality, through which we come to have “adequate knowl-
edge of the essence of things” (Spinoza 1996, II, 122). It is this third kind
of knowledge to which Sub Specie Aeternitatis refers. Also it can be linked
to robust metaphysical notions, but like attention, these notions can be
surpassed by interpreting Spinoza more freely from a contemporary
perspective.
According to an interpretation advocated here, knowledge Sub Specie
Aeternitatis (or what will here be termed “holistic knowledge”) can be
taken to refer to a holistic perspective, where we seek to observe things in
their multitude, relations and unity, as one does when approaching nature
as a vast entity, comprising, for instance, enormous heterogeneity, species
relations and unifying processes. Like attention, also knowledge Sub
Specie Aeternitatis takes place on the second-order level of mentation and
forms a perspective through which to observe also ourselves—thus, when
witnessing nature, we witness ourselves within it, and note how our par-
ticular senses and mental capacities impact our ability to understand, say,
biological events. The second-order nature of holistic knowledge is exem-
plified in how Spinoza discusses moral psychological control in a manner
that bears striking similarity to contemporary discussions on “executive
control.” He argued that the inability to govern one’s affects (a failure he
terms “bondage”) is detrimental to morality (Spinoza 1996, II, 205)
(thus, Spinoza posits that: “Like waves on the sea, driven by contrary
winds, we toss about, not knowing our outcome and fate,” Ibid., II, 189).
Perceiving things under “the category of eternity,” on the other hand,
helps one to find governance, whereby we become more capable of recog-
nising our own emotions and mental limitations, and of following our
moral ideals of human behaviour. Hence, like attention, holistic knowl-
edge facilitates calmness and insight, as our affects, together with our
beliefs, become steadier through reflection.
Knowledge Sub Specie Aeternitatis facilitates not only metalevel
scrutiny, but also the forming of morally productive emotions such as joy.
The latter becomes evident when considering how Spinoza underlined
the links between affects, emotions and reason. All can influence moral
decisions, and thereby all need to be taken into account. In the most
fruitful situation, intuitive reason goes hand in hand with internally
reflected emotions, perfect ideas and particularly joy, and they all lead to
an understanding of what is good. Therefore, in morality both reason and
emotion concepts play an important role (indeed, ultimately joy and “the
good” are viewed by Spinoza to be synonymous: “By good here I under-
stand every kind of joy, and whatever leads to it,” II, 170). This means
that by adopting a holistic perspective onto things, we gain more multi-
layered knowledge of also moral ideals, which again interlinks with vital-
izing joy and the impetus to follow those ideals—thus, reflective empathy
gains a joyful, motivational component, urging us to correct our emotion
concepts and to adopt morally considered approaches to other beings.
Importantly, whilst attention allows us to notice the particular (the
specific, unique realities of ourselves and others), holistic knowledge
guides us to focus on broader relations and unities underlying the par-
ticular. Therefore, whereas attention prioritises the micro-level, holistic
knowledge dwells on the macro-level. Arguably, both are required for
reflective empathy: comprehending the specificity of individuals, and
recognising the wider interrelations between them and the surround-
ing world.
Applied to animal ethics, adopting the meta-perspective Sub Specie
Aeternitatis means that one actively reflects, from a more holistic, general
viewpoint, on animal life. Instead of focusing solely on individual ani-
mals and their particularities, the aim is to also search for unities
82 E. Aaltola
underlying specific individuals more holistically, and here populations,

species and their relations towards both each other and broader environ-
mental and ecological settings emerge as central. Simultaneously, one
cultivates a joyful stance towards animals, which again motivates moral
action on their behalf—as we become more advanced in our rational
knowledge of the complexity and richness of the animal world, joy may
follow by itself and thus vitalise our willingness to consider and empathise
with nonhuman perspectives.
Hence, the benefit of a meta-perspective Sub Specie Aeternitatis is that
it allows us to pay focus on larger wholes and interconnections. In animal
ethics, this offers some counter-balance to individualism, for emphasis is
also on the myriad relations between different animals, populations and
environments—a matter that in the era of the sixth mass extinction is no
small benefit. Animals do not exist only as individuals and when
approached solely as such, their deep embeddedness in wider ecological
surroundings—the very surroundings that are necessary for the thriving
of also individual animals—fade from view. A thorough and practical
take on animal ethics needs to accentuate both individuals and the holis-
tic, environmental and ecological dimensions of animal existence, and
knowledge Sub Specie Aeternitatis allows us to combine these two
dimensions.
Importantly, through such holistic knowledge, one may also witness
human connections to the animal world, and ultimately explore the long,
evolutionary traces of animality within ourselves. Simultaneously as we
remember the environmental, inter-species settings of beers, elks, sheep
and crows, we may also step further away from the type of species soli-
tude which anthropocentric cultures all too easily foster, and which—
again echoing Cartesian thinking—categorically distinguish human
beings from all other animals and nature. With holistic knowledge, one
may note how dogs and pigs have shaped human beings, and how ani-
mality in its incredible abundance lives in our very DNA. Doing so allows
us to locate the human in the animal, and the animal in the human, and
it is precisely this type of second-order awareness of interrelations that
holistic knowledge brings to reflective empathy. Here, we notice how our
own senses, cognition and emotions are shaped by biology, evolutionary
trajectories and embeddedness in our natural, inter-species surroundings,
and (hopefully) become more skilled at refining them in a manner that

betters our empathic grasp of nonhuman animals. This brings us back to
Buddhist philosophy (discussed also by Murdoch), which emphasises the
relativity of separations between different beings and things. It urges us to
“walk with mountains,” and this seemingly absurd suggestion is to remind
us of how all phenomena and creatures are interconnected. In such a
state, we “know our own walking as the walking of the myriad beings
who are with us and within us” (Mazis 2016, 61). When Spinoza’s uni-
verse is looking at itself, it can do so via the human observing wolves, elks
and mountains from afar and yet within oneself.
Another philosopher to have spoken of Sub Specie Aeternitatis was
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who offered a significantly less metaphysical stance
on the phenomenon. According to Wittgenstein, knowledge Sub Specie
Aeternitatis consists of witnessing the world as a “limited whole,” as if
both from within and afar (Wittgenstein 1998, 6.45). Here, witnessing
the planet earth from space comes to mind as an easy example, as one
simultaneously remembers the smallness and vastness of existence. Like
Murdoch and Weil, Wittgenstein himself was keen to use art as an anal-
ogy, whereby Sub Specie Aeternitatis refers to viewing things or objects as
art (Wittgenstein 1984, 7.10.16).8 He also uses an example, where we see
a person doing ordinary things on stage: if she were to do them in another
setting, we would fail to pay notice, but on stage we suddenly focus on
her actions and even awe at them. Thereby, under the category of eternity,
we pay notice to our world as if it was on stage—we notice it from further
away and become captivated by it, whereby ordinary things become
extraordinary and deserving of consideration and wonder.
Like Spinoza, also Wittgenstein argued that such a perspective is the
source of ethics: it is how we look at life as art that transforms it into “a
good life” (Wittgenstein 1984, 7.10.16). Thus, whilst Wittgenstein was
eager to categorise moral matters into the realm of the ineffable and mys-
tical, he did perceive significance in them, and claimed that they could be
mapped out via the sort of meta-mentation provided by knowledge Sub
Specie Aeternitatis. One can see how Wittgenstein’s interpretation of such
meta-mentation is useful for reflective empathy, as perhaps it is precisely
observing both our own ordinary mental states and those of others with
wonder and “on stage,” from further away and more holistically, which
cultivates also our empathic and moral ability.
84 E. Aaltola
Applied to the present context, also the animal world becomes “a

limited whole,” as its distinctiveness is marvelled at both from within and
afar. The aim is to witness animals as if they were on stage, whereby seem-
ingly ordinary creatures become extraordinary and awe-striking. We
observe pigs, bears and cows as if a spotlight had descended onto them,
and do so from a wider perspective, thus remembering the incredible
interrelations and unities that run across the heterogeneity of animal exis-
tence. This supports both reflective empathy and the capacity to pay heed
to the good life of non-human animals.
5 Conclusion
This chapter began with the premise that the role of emotion concepts
needs to be recognised in also animal ethics—how we value and treat
other animals depend partly on how we emotively conceptualise them.
This chapter has argued that one particularly fruitful emotion concept for
animals ethics, which is capable of offering us a tool for evaluating how
our other emotion concepts impact our take on animals, is reflective
empathy. In a state of reflective empathy, one both undergoes first-order
varieties of empathy (resonation, imagination, perception, projection,
etc.) and reflectively observes these from a second-order level, thereby
seeking to amend them, and the emotions and beliefs they are influenced
by. Attention and holistic knowledge Sub Specie Aeternitatis were offered
as two sources of such second-order reflection, and were thus argued to
entwine with reflective empathy.
Reflective empathy, together with attention and holistic knowledge,
renders the theories of animal ethics more persuasive and practically
applicable. First, by locating the role played by emotion concepts, they
allow us to recognise the “why” and “how” of everyday animal ethics.
Second, by teaching us second-order reflection, they point out routes to
refining our affective moral agency in manner that is better able to offer
support for also animal flourishing—something that our contemporary
era of industrial animal farming, dissociation, akrasia and Anthropocene
are in desperate need of.
Notes
1. In this paper, “affects” refer to experiences (qualified by scales of intensity
and valence), and “emotions” to categories of experience (such as “love” or
“anger”).
2. Some explorations into “affective animal ethics” have been made. The
ecofeminist tradition has underlined the relevance of emotions in animal
ethics by focusing attention on the gender politics that has partly fed the
philosophical marginalisation of, say, love and compassion (Donovan
2007). Particularly empathy has been offered as a fruitful basis for animal
ethics, not only from the eco-feminist perspective (Gruen 2015), but also
from the viewpoint of continental philosophy (Acampora 2006) and the
analytic tradition (Aaltola 2018). Yet, applying the relevance of emotions
to everyday animal ethics is still in its infancy and requires considerably
more focus, also in regard to the role played by different varieties of
empathy.
3. Together with further methods such as embodied empathy, with its
prioritisation of somatic interaction—see Zahavi 2007. Social
psychological literature has identified over ten different types of empathy;
see Decety and Ickes 2009.
4. For Hume, what he termed “sympathy” comprised two processes: first, we
note the bodily impressions of another and form an idea (for instance
“suffering”) based on them, and second, that idea again becomes an
impression in ourselves (whereby we begin to undergo suffering) (Hume).
In contemporary terms, the first of these processes is akin to cognitive
empathy, and the second to affective empathy.
5. Lori Gruen’s “entangled empathy,” discussed in animal ethics, bears some
similarities with reflective empathy. According to Gruen, entangled empa-
thy is “a type of caring perception focused on attending to another’s expe-
rience of wellbeing… in which we recognize we are in relationships with
others and are called upon to be responsive and responsible [toward the
other]” (Gruen 2015). Within entangled empathy, focus is on identifying
with the other animal and her context, responding to her emotionally and
cultivating one’s moral perception. The notion of moral cultivation is
shared by both entangled and reflective empathy. However, there are also
key differences. First, the latter of the two prioritises second-order reflec-
tion, and second, it is less married to pre-established moral commitments
86 E. Aaltola
(entangled empathy aims toward a given animal ethic, whereas reflective

empathy leaves the specific content of ethics open).
6. Attention understood as moral love is a close kin to and a constituent of
reflective empathy (see Aaltola 2019).
7. Murdoch’s thoughts echo key tenets of Buddhist philosophy, which also
posit that the construction of “selfhood” and the primacy of one’s own
desires tend to thwart the ability to witness reality. Indeed, Murdoch
makes explicit references to Buddhism and its critique of approaching the
world instrumentally, as if in the Cartesian manner we were “subjects” and
the rest of the world “objects” (Murdoch 2003).
8. Whilst attention requires us to focus on the details of art, with our
metaphoric vision thus moving along the painting’s rough surfaces,
approaching objects as art via Sub Specie Aeternitatis appears to require a
more detached perspective.
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Part II
Transformations in General
Scenarios
6
Perceiving Animals Through Different
Demographic and Cultural Lenses
Pim Martens and Bingtao Su
1 Introduction
It is well-documented that human demographic and personality factors
are associated with people’s attitudes toward animals. A growing body of
evidence shows the relationship between a person’s attitudes toward ani-
mals and their gender (Driscoll 1995; Herzog et al. 1991, 2015; Pifer
et al. 1994), age (Ascione 1992; Kavanagh et al. 2013; Kellert 1985),
household income (Signal and Taylor 2006), humane education (Ascione
and Weber 1996; Furnham et al. 2003; Nicoll et al. 2008), pet ownership
(Driscoll 1992; Martens et al. 2016; Serpell 1996), religion (Bowd and
Bowd 1989; Driscoll 1992; Gilhus 2006), as well as geographic region
(Phillips et al. 2012; Pifer et al. 1994). However, research into the
P. Martens (*)
Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
B. Su
School of Philosophy and Social Development, Shandong University,
Jinan, China

94 P. Martens and B. Su
correlation between public attitudes toward animals and ethical ideolo-

gies is still in its infancy and needs further investigation (Bègue and
Laine 2017).
In the past two decades, a few studies have explored the relationship
between ethical ideology and people’s attitudes toward animals (Galvin
and Herzog 1992; Nickell and Herzog 1996; Su and Martens 2017;
Taylor and Signal 2005; Wuensch et al. 2002). The Ethics Position
Questionnaire (EPQ) (Forsyth 1980) is often used to measure people’s
ethical ideology, and has increasingly become a methodological corner-
stone in studies of ethical decision-making. The EPQ is divided into two
ethical dimensions: idealism and relativism (Forsyth 1980). Idealism
refers to the extent to which one believes that ethical behavior will always
lead to desirable consequences, while relativism refers to the extent to
which people accept the belief that moral decisions should be based on
universal principles (Banas and Parks 2002; Forsyth 1980; Galvin and
Herzog 1992; Wuensch and Poteat 1998). Individuals who score high on
the idealism dimension think that ethical actions will always lead to good
results, while individuals who score high on the relativism dimension
believe that moral decisions should be based on local principles and situ-
ational analysis, rather than universal principles (Forsyth 1980; Galvin
and Herzog 1992; Wuensch and Poteat 1998). Based on the idealism and
relativism scores, Forsyth (1980) further proposed that individuals can be
classified into four ethical categories: situationists (high idealism and
high relativism), absolutists (high idealism and low relativism), subjectiv-
ists (low idealism and high relativism), and exceptionists (low idealism
and low relativism). Situationists accept the belief that it is permissible to
deviate from moral rules when better results can be attained by doing so.
Absolutists admit that moral rules should be followed, even if there may
be benefits to deviating from them. Subjectivists accept the inevitability
of occasional negative outcomes because different individuals have differ-
ent views about moral principles. Exceptionists endorse the statement
that the morality of an action depends on the consequences produced by
it (Ameh and Odusami 2010; Galvin and Herzog 1992).
Building on this classification, Forsyth and Pope (1984) demonstrated
that public attitudes toward animals or animal experiments are related to
their ethical perspectives. For instance, absolutists regarded animal
6 Perceiving Animals Through Different Demographic… 95
experiments as more unethical than did individuals in any other ethical

category. Studies conducted in the United States have investigated the
role of idealism and relativism, showing that individuals who scored
higher on idealism often showed greater moral concern for ways of using
animal, while individuals who scored higher on relativism often showed
less moral concern for animal use (Wuensch and Poteat 1998). Similar
results were also found in a recent study conducted in China (Su and
Martens 2017). These findings indicate that both idealism and relativism
are associated with attitudes toward animals. However, other investiga-
tions conducted in the United States have demonstrated significant cor-
relations between ethical idealism and attitudes toward animals, but
nonsignificant correlations between ethical relativism and attitudes
toward animals (Galvin and Herzog 1992; Nickell and Herzog 1996).
Thus, there is a need to answer the question of how ethical ideologies
relate to attitudes toward animals in different countries with different
cultures.
We assume that idealism may be positively related to people’s concern
for animal welfare in different countries, since the absolute nature of ide-
alistic individuals’ moral principles always have crucial implications for
their concern for others, including animals (Park 2005). However,
whether the correlation between relativism and attitudes toward animals
is also the same in different countries, particularly when comparing
developed and developing countries, still needs further investigation.
People from developed countries already have a high awareness of animal
welfare, and their attitudes toward animals are likely to have been formed
by concern for animal well-being, rather than being based on a cost-
benefit analysis (Wuensch et al. 2002). We, therefore, assumed that rela-
tivism would not be a reliable predictor of attitudes toward animals in
developed countries. However, a Chinese study demonstrated a signifi-
cant correlation between relativism and attitudes toward animals (Su and
Martens 2017). With the booming economy, Chinese people’s awareness
of animal welfare seems to be counteracted by their pursuit of technologi-
cal innovation. Some Chinese people’s awareness of animal welfare is
considered to be poor, and their attitudes toward animals are more likely
to be based on the specific benefits that can be derived from using ani-
mals. Therefore, we hypothesized that the correlation between relativism
and attitudes toward animals would be stronger in developing countries

than in developed countries. In view of the cultural difference between
developed countries (e.g., Netherlands) and certain developing countries
(e.g., China), we hypothesized that human demographics and their inter-
action with ethical ideology might also link to attitudes toward animals,
differently. Additionally, since animal welfare is a new concept in China,
and younger people are more aware of it than older people (Su and
Martens 2017), we hypothesized that age would play a more important
role in Chinese people’s attitudes toward animals, than in those of
Dutch people.
Here, we wanted to find out how ethical ideologies (idealism and rela-
tivism) and their interaction with human demographics relate to atti-
tudes toward animals among Dutch people. Additionally, as Dutch
people have a greater awareness of animal welfare than Chinese people,
and this high awareness in the Netherlands could explain the strong link
between ideologies and attitudes toward animals, we examined whether
the correlation between ethical ideologies and attitudes toward animals
differed between Dutch and Chinese people, by utilizing the same ques-
tionnaire that was used in China (Su and Martens 2017). Religion (Bowd
and Bowd 1989; Driscoll 1992; Gilhus 2006), pet ownership (Costa
et al. 2014; Martens et al. 2016), and meat consumption (Kenyon and
Barker 1998; Loughnan et al. 2010; Povey et al. 2001) have been demon-
strated to be important factors in attitudes toward animals. In order to
verify the reliability of these reports, we investigated whether such vari-
ables also relate to attitudes toward animals among Dutch people. Since
few of the studies of the correlation between ethical ideology and atti-
tudes toward animals that have been published in the literature specifi-
cally explain the differences and key drivers of such correlations between
different countries, the current study can serve as a starting point for
understanding attitudes toward animals and their associated factors in
different countries, and can also help to diversify approaches to alter
human-animal relationships.
2 Methods
2.1 Participants and Procedure
In brief, an online questionnaire was distributed throughout the

Netherlands in November 2015. This study adhered to the ethical guide-
lines of Taylor & Francis policy, and was conducted under protocols
approved by Maastricht University’s Ethical Review Committee Inner
City faculties (ERCIC). In total, 506 responses were obtained from 581
people (among a panel which included 897 people throughout the
Netherlands) who provided their e-mail addresses and received the invi-
tation email with a unique hyperlink to our questionnaire. All the respon-
dents in the present study were 18 years or older and participated in the
“Golden Standard” panel, which was developed by the MOA (Center for
Information-Based Decision Making and Marketing Research) in col-
laboration with CBS (Statistics Netherlands) in the Netherlands. The
mean (± SD) age of all respondents (51.2% male and 48.8% female) was
48.48 (± 16.78) years. The respondents were representative of the Dutch
population aged 18 years or older with respect to gender and age (see
results section). Utilizing a standard “forward-backward” translation pro-
cedure, the English version of the questionnaire was translated into
Dutch, and two Dutch-speaking researchers who had not seen the English
version translated it back into English. The re-translated version was
found to closely match the original one. In the questionnaire, we
explained the purpose of our study to the participants and stated that all
information they provided would be kept completely confidential, and
that personal information would not be released to or viewed by anyone
other than the researchers involved in this project. The Ethics Position
Questionnaire, Animal issue Scale, and Animal Attitude Scale were pre-
sented to each respondent in randomized order. Background information
on the respondents’ is in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Background details of the respondents

n (%)
Gender
Male 259 (51.2)
Female 247 (48.8)
Age
Young (19–44 years) 196 (38.7)
Middle-aged (45–59 years) 152 (30.0)
Old (60 years and older) 158 (31.2)
Highest level of education
Less than grade 12 11 (2.2)
Middle school 146 (28.9)
High school 69 (13.6)
College or technical school 224 (44.3)
University 52 (10.3)
Place of residence
Urban areas 307 (60.7)
Rural areas 199 (39.3)
Housing type
Apartment 143 (28.3)
Semi-detached house 302 (59.7)
Detached house 61 (12.1)
Main source of inspiration
Buddhism 29 (5.7)
Judaism 3 (0.6)
Islam 4 (0.8)
Christianity 114 (22.5)
Taoism 4 (0.8)
Other 19 (3.8)
Pet ownership
Yes 249 (49.2)
No 257 (50.8)
Pet species
Cat 139 (27.5)
Dog 103 (20.4)
Fish 43 (8.5)
Birds 26 (5.1)
Reptiles 8 (1.6)
Rodents 34 (6.7)
Chickens, pigeon, gees, or other poultry 10 (2.0)
Ponies and horses 5 (1.0)
Other 4 (0.8)
Meat-eating frequency
Never 18 (3.6)
(continued)
Table 6.1 (continued)
n (%)
Once a week or less 35 (6.9)
2–3 days a week 125 (24.7)
4–6 days a week 244 (48.2)
Every day 84 (16.6)
Visiting zoo/aquarium
Once a month or more 15 (3.0)
Once every six months 50 (9.9)
Once every year 119 (23.5)
Once every two years or less 233 (46.0)
Never 89 (17.6)
Note: Respondents were divided into three age groups based on the standards
proposed by the World Health Organization in 2010
2.2 Questionnaire
In the first part of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to supply

some background information, including gender, age, highest attained
level of education, place of residence, housing type, main source of inspi-
ration, pet ownership and pet species, meat consumption, and frequency
of visiting zoos/aquariums.
In the second part of the questionnaire, the Ethics Position
Questionnaire (EPQ) was used to determine the respondents’ dominant
ethical ideologies (Rawwas 1996). Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach’s alpha
tests the internal validity and the reliability of a psychometric test/ques-
tionnaire) for the EPQ in the present study was 0.898. The EPQ is a
20-item questionnaire which yields four ethical positions (absolutists,
exceptionists, situationists, and subjectivists) based on two ten-item sub-
scale scores for idealism and relativism (Forsyth 1980). The idealism
dimension asks respondents to indicate their degree of agreement with
items like “One should never psychologically or physically harm another
person” and “The dignity and welfare of the people should be the most
important concern in any society.” Typical items for relativism include
“What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another” and
“No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie is permissible
or not permissible totally depends upon the situation.” Respondents were
asked to respond to statements using 9-point Likert scales, ranging from

1 (completely disagree) to 9 (completely agree). The mean scores of the
idealism subscale (7.27) and the relativism subscale (6.07) in the present
study were used as cut-off values to classify respondents as high or low in
idealism and relativism, respectively.
In the third part of the questionnaire, the Animal Issue Scale (AIS)
(Meng 2009) was used to measure respondents’ attitudes toward animals.
Cronbach’s alpha for the AIS in the present study was 0.922. The AIS, a
43-item scale, includes eight sections (use of animals, disrupting animal
integrity, killing animals, compromising animal welfare, experimenting
on animals, changing animals’ genotypes, animals and the environment,
and societal attitudes toward animals). Respondents were asked to
respond to each question on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1
(extremely acceptable) to 5 (extremely unacceptable). A higher score on
the AIS indicates greater concern for the welfare of animals (Phillips et al.
2012). Examples of items include “Using animals for work”; “Marking
animals by branding or ear notching”; “Depriving animals of their needs
for food and water”; and “Controlling wildlife populations by killing.”
In the fourth part of the questionnaire, the Animal Attitudes Scale
(AAS) (Herzog et al. 1991) was introduced to further examine respon-
dents’ attitudes toward animals. Cronbach’s alpha for the AAS in the
present study was 0.875. The AAS is a 20-item questionnaire, which was
chosen because of its concise design and scientific content. Items 1, 3, 4,
7, 10, 11, 17, 19, and 20 are scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree), while the other items are reverse-scored, from 1 (strongly
agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) according to their meanings. A higher score
on the AAS reflects greater concern for the welfare of animals. Examples
of questions include “4. Wild animals, such as mink and raccoons, should
not be trapped and their skins made into fur coats”; “8. I think it is per-
fectly acceptable for cattle and dogs to be raised for human consump-
tion”; “18. The production of inexpensive meat, eggs, and dairy products
justifies maintaining animals under crowded conditions.”
2.3 Statistical Analysis
How ethical ideologies and their interaction with human demographics

are associated with public attitudes toward animals in the Netherlands
was analyzed with IBM SPSS 24 Statistical software (Armonk, NY, USA).
Given that the data in this study were either normally distributed or con-
verted to normal distribution by log10 transformation, and the Levene
test showed homogeneity of variances, a multivariate analysis (MANOVA)
was performed (after log10 transformation) to determine respondents’
ethical ideologies and demographics that may be associated with their
attitudes toward animals. In order to reduce type-I errors due to repeated
testing, Fisher’s procedure was applied in the analyses across three groups,
and REGWQ correction was used wherever necessary to find the differ-
ences across more than three groups. The model for data responses
included idealism, relativism, gender, age, highest level of education,
place of residence, housing type, main source of inspiration, pet owner-
ship and pet species, meat consumption, and frequency of vising zoos/
aquariums. Only idealism, relativism, gender, and age were considered in
this research, as idealism and relativism were the two variables targeted by
our modelling. Gender and age were used to measure how demographics
related to respondents’ attitudes toward animals. Fisher’s r-to-z transfor-
mation was performed wherever necessary to find the difference between
two groups regarding correlations. In order to identify variables associ-
ated with respondents’ attitudes toward animals, backward linear regres-
sion was carried out to relate responses regarding attitudes toward animals
to demographics and other basic information, such as the main sources
of spiritual inspiration, companion animal species and meat-eating fre-
quency. An alpha value of 0.05 was used for variables to be entered into
the models.
3 Results
3.1 EPQ
In this study, respondents’ mean score for idealism was 7.27 (SD = 1.36),
while the mean score for relativism was 6.07 (SD = 1.35). The scores for
idealism and relativism in the current study were similar to the results of
a recent survey conducted in China (Midealism = 7.26, SD = 1.21,
t(1008) = 0.22, p = 0.83, Mrelativism = 6.07, SD = 1.33, t(1008) = 0.10, p = 0.92)
(Su and Martens 2017). We did not find any significant differences
between male and female respondents regarding either idealism or rela-
tivism. The mean idealism score of middle-aged respondents (7.50 ± 1.28)
was higher than that of young respondents (6.66 ± 1.25) and lower than
that of older respondents (7.81 ± 1.26) (both p < 0.05). As for the score
for relativism, the older respondents (6.39 ± 1.50) scored higher than the
young (5.96 ± 1.90) and middle-aged ones (5.90 ± 1.34) (both p < 0.01).
Situationists made up the largest share of participants (39.3%), followed
by absolutists (38.7%) and exceptionists (16.8%). Subjectivists (5.1%)
were the smallest group in the present study.
4 o Respondents’ Ethical Ideologies

D
and Demographics Relate to Their
Attitude Toward Animals?
4.1 Ethical Ideologies
The multivariate test yielded a significant correlation between respon-

dents’ idealism and their attitudes toward animals (according to AAS and
AIS scores). Respondents with higher scores for ethical idealism showed
greater concern for animal welfare and for the specific animal welfare
issues of “use of animals,” “disrupting animal integrity,” “killing animals,”
“compromising animal welfare,” “experimenting on animals,” “changing
animals’ genotypes,” “harming animals to protect the environment,” and
“harming animals for social purposes” (Table 6.2). Absolutists and
Table 6.2 Summary of multivariate analysis of the effects of ethical idealism, ethical relativism, gender, and age on public
attitudes toward animals (measured by Animal Attitude Scale [AAS] and Animal Issue Scale [AIS])
Relativism
Idealism (I) (R) Gender (G) Age (A) R×A I×R×A
F P F P F p F p F p F P
AAS 12.46 <0.01 2.11 0.15 26.89 <0.01 2.78 0.06 1.29 0.28 3.69 0.03
AIS 31.86 <0.01 0.16 0.69 23.72 <0.01 3.66 0.03 0.97 0.38 0.50 0.61
Use of animals 3.80 0.05 0.34 0.56 3.95 0.05 1.12 0.33 0.47 0.63 2.90 0.06
Disrupting animal integrity 18.21 <0.01 0.92 0.34 3.17 0.08 2.36 0.10 0.17 0.85 0.47 0.62
Killing animals 19.54 <0.01 0.38 0.54 12.73 <0.01 0.08 0.93 3.37 0.04 0.62 0.54
Compromising animal welfare 24.18 <0.01 0.01 0.91 14.01 <0.01 3.33 0.04 0.74 0.48 1.08 0.34
Experimenting on animals 14.39 <0.01 0.09 0.76 13.71 <0.01 3.22 0.04 1.11 0.33 0.09 0.91
Changing animals’ genotypes 3.96 0.05 1.14 0.29 22.44 <0.01 5.19 <0.01 1.49 0.23 0.04 0.96
Harming animals to protect the 18.01 <0.01 0.61 0.43 14.91 <0.01 2.60 0.07 0.04 0.96 1.04 0.35
environment
Harming animals for social purposes 25.92 <0.01 0.06 0.81 4.86 0.03 9.55 <0.01 0.46 0.63 0.10 0.91
Note: df (I) = 1; df (R) = 1; df (G) = 1; df (A) = 2; df (R × A) = 2; df (I × R × A) = 2. The two-way (I × A, I × R, I × G, R × G, G × A),
three-way (I × R × G, I × G × A, R × G × A), and four-way (I × R × G × A) interactions that were not significant were removed
from the final analyses
6 Perceiving Animals Through Different Demographic…
103
situationists showed greater moral concern for animal welfare than excep-
tionists and subjectivists. Yet we did not find any significant correlations
between relativism and respondents’ attitudes toward animals (Table 6.2).
4.2 Human Demographics
Respondents’ gender was significantly associated with their attitudes

toward animals (according to AAS and AIS scores), as women showed
greater concern for the welfare of animals than men (Table 6.2). This dif-
ference was also reflected by women’s greater sensitivity to the treatment
of animals, including “use of animals,” “killing animals,” “compromising
animal welfare,” “experimenting on animals,” “changing animals’ geno-
types,” “harming animals to protect the environment,” and “harming
animals for social purposes” (Table 6.2). Age was also associated with
respondents’ attitudes toward animals, but this was only reflected by the
AIS score. Middle-aged respondents expressed greater concern for animal
welfare and the specific animal welfare issues of “compromising animal
welfare,” “experimenting on animals,” “changing animals’ genotypes,”
and “harming animals for social purposes” than young and older respon-
dents (Table 6.2).
4.3 Interaction Between Ethical Ideologies

and Demographics
The interaction between relativism and age was not associated with
respondents’ attitudes toward animals (according to their AIS and AAS
scores). However, the correlation between relativism and the acceptability
of “killing animals” was stronger when middle-aged respondents were
removed from the analysis (ethical relativism × age). We found that the
idealism by relativism by age interaction was significantly associated with
respondents’ attitudes toward animals (only according to their AAS
scores), with middle-aged absolutists showed the greatest concern for ani-
mal welfare, while young and older subjectivists showed the least concern
for animal welfare (Table 6.2).
4.4 Main Predictors of AIS and AAS Scores
We considered a number of possible demographic variables that might

relate to the AIS scores, from the information we collected from the
Dutch respondents (see Table 6.3 for influential variables). According to
the backward elimination multiple regression analysis, the AIS scores of
respondents who considered their inspiration to come from Christianity
were on average 14.46 points lower than those of respondents who did
not. Female respondents’ AIS scores were 11.43 points higher than those
of their male equivalents. The AIS score of dog owners was 9.85 points
higher than that of non-dog owners (Table 6.3).
Based on the relationships between respondents’ AAS scores and the
possible influential factors (see Table 6.4), we found that the AAS scores
of respondents whose main source of inspiration was Christianity were
10.42 points lower than those of respondents who did not report
Christianity as their main source of inspiration. Female respondents’
mean AAS score was 8.91 points higher than that of male respondents
(Table 6.4).
5 Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate how ethical ideologies and their
interaction with human demographics relate to attitudes toward animals,
as well as whether the correlation between ethical ideologies and attitudes
toward animals is the same in different countries. Our findings showed a
significant correlation between idealism and attitudes toward animals,
while no significant correlation was found between relativism and atti-
tudes toward animals. This result parallels those of previous studies con-
ducted in developed countries (Galvin and Herzog 1992; Nickell and
Herzog 1996), while partly contrasting with a recent study conducted in
China, which reported that public attitudes toward animals were posi-
tively associated with idealism and negatively with relativism (Su and
Martens 2017). Hence, our findings indicate that whereas the correlation
between ethical idealism and attitudes toward animals appears to be
Table 6.3 Important variables influencing the Animal Issue Scale (AIS) score in the
Netherlands
Unstandardized Standardized
Y: Attitudes toward animals coefficients coefficients
(df = 79) B SE Beta t P
(Constant) 103.95 19.08 5.45 0.00
X1: What’s your gender? Male 11.43 3.99 0.31 2.86 0.01
(1); female (2)
X2: What’s your age? 19–44 3.34 2.51 0.15 1.33 0.19
years (1); 45 years and older (2)
X3: What’s your highest level of −1.09 1.57 −0.08 −0.70 0.49
education? High school or
lower (1); college/technical
school. university or above (2)
X4: Do you belong or donate to −0.76 4.81 −0.02 −0.16 0.88
an organization concerned
with improving the welfare of
animals? Yes (1); no (2)
X5: Do you belong or donate to 4.55 5.02 0.13 0.91 0.37
with conservation of the
natural environment? Yes (1);
no (2)
with improving human rights
or health? Yes (1); no (2)
X7: What does your household 2.70 1.76 0.16 1.53 0.13
look like? Single/couple
without children (0); single/
couple with children (1)
X8: Is your current place of 4.77 3.89 0.13 1.23 0.23
residence in an urban area (1);
or a rural area (2)
X9: In what sort of house do you 10.41 5.91 0.21 1.76 0.08
live? Apartment or semi-
detached house (1); detached
house or villa (2)
X10: Do you have a garden? Yes 7.64 5.58 0.15 1.37 0.18
(1); no (2)
X11: What is your main source of −6.01 5.13 −0.14 −1.17 0.25
spiritual inspiration?
Buddhism: no (0); yes (1)
(continued)
Christianity: no (0); yes (1)
X13: What’s your gross household 0.01 1.32 0.00 0.01 0.99
income per month? Average or
below the average income in
the Netherlands (1); twice or
more than twice the average
income in the Netherlands (2)
X14: What pets do you have? 6.95 4.80 0.19 1.45 0.15
Cats: no (0); yes (1)
Dogs: no (0); yes (1)
X16: What pets do you have? −5.50 5.17 −0.13 −1.06 0.29
Fish: no (0); yes (1)
Birds: no (0); yes (1)
Rodents: no (0); yes (1)
Chickens, pigeon, geese: no
(0); yes (1)
Ponies, horses: no (0); yes (1)
X21: How often do you eat meat −5.50 5.41 −0.12 −1.02 0.31
(including fish) every week?
Once a week or never (1); 2 or
more days a week (2)
X22: How often do you visit a −1.26 2.10 −0.08 −0.60 0.55
zoo or aquarium? Once every
six months or more (1); once
every year or less (including
never) (2)
Note: “Standardized coefficients” refer to the partial effect of one predictor after
adjusting for the others
Table 6.4 Important variables influencing the Animal Attitudes Scale (AAS) score
in the Netherlands
(Constant) 71.03 15.67 4.53 0.00
X1: What’s your gender? Male 8.91 3.28 0.33 2.72 0.01
(1); female (2)
X2: What’s your age? 19–44 years −1.27 2.06 −0.08 −0.62 0.54
(1); 45 years and older (2)
X3: What’s your highest level of −0.95 1.29 −0.09 −0.73 0.47
education? High school or
lower (1); college/technical
school. University or above (2)
X4: Do you belong or donate to −3.55 3.95 −0.13 −0.90 0.37
with improving the welfare of
animals? Yes (1); no (2)
with conservation of the
natural environment? Yes (1);
no (2)
with improving human rights
or health? Yes (1); no (2)
X7: What does your household 1.24 1.45 0.10 0.86 0.39
look like? Single/couple
without children (0); single/
couple with children (1)
X8: Is your current place of 0.15 3.19 0.01 0.05 0.96
residence in an urban area
(1)—or a rural area (2)
X9: In what sort of house do you 6.63 4.85 0.18 1.37 0.18
live? Apartment or semi-
detached house (1); detached
house or villa (2)
X10: Do you have a garden? Yes −1.83 4.58 −0.05 −0.40 0.69
(1); no (2)
Buddhism: no (0); yes (1)
(continued)
Christianity: no (0); yes (1)
X13: What’s your gross household −0.61 1.08 −0.08 −0.57 0.57
income per month? Average or
below the average income in
the Netherlands (1); twice or
more than twice the average
income in the Netherlands (2)
Cats: no (0); yes (1)
Dogs: no (0); yes (1)
Fish: no (0); yes (1)
Birds: no (0); yes (1)
Rodents: no (0); yes (1)
Chickens, pigeon, geese: no
(0); yes (1)
Ponies, horses: no (0); yes (1)
X21: How often do you eat meat −6.34 4.44 −0.18 −1.43 0.16
(including fish) every week?
Once a week or never (1); 2 or
more days a week (2)
X22: How often do you visit a −0.32 1.73 −0.03 −0.19 0.85
zoo or aquarium? Once every
six months or more (1); once
every year or less (including
never) (2)
Note: “Standardized coefficients” refer to the partial effect of one predictor after
adjusting for the others
similar in different countries, the correlation between ethical relativism

and attitudes toward animals seems to differ between developed and
developing countries.
5.1 Ethical Ideology
Our results showed that respondents’ concern for animal welfare was
positively associated with their ethical idealism. The more individuals
believed that positive behavior will lead to good consequences, the more
they appreciated animals. This finding is in line with previous research
showing that ethical idealism relates to attitudes toward animals in both
developed (Bègue and Laine 2017; Galvin and Herzog 1992; Wuensch
and Poteat 1998) and developing countries (Su and Martens 2017).
Considering that idealistic individuals are concerned about others’ wel-
fare and believe in the absolute value of moral standards based on their
unselfish concern for others (Park 2005), it is not surprising that greater
concern for animal welfare has always gone together with a higher level of
idealism. Idealistic individuals’ belief that harming others is always avoid-
able may also apply to their concern for animals (Forsyth 1992;
Park 2005).
We found that the correlation between ethical relativism and attitudes
toward animals was not statistically significant, which confirms previous
studies conducted in the United States (Galvin and Herzog 1992; Nickell
and Herzog 1996). However, our result is inconsistent with a previous
Chinese study, which demonstrated that the more individuals disagree
with the existence of universal moral principles, the more they endorse
the view that animals can be sacrificed for human and societal purposes
(Su and Martens 2017). This difference between China and Western
countries might be accounted by their different cultural backgrounds.
Although Chinese Confucianism, which is still influential in contempo-
rary China, requires people to respect animals, it appears that animals are
assumed to have value because they are resources to satisfy human needs
(Blakeley 2003). Therefore, Chinese peoples’ awareness of the concept of
“animal welfare” is considered to be low and they are considered to be
more rational in explaining their attitudes toward animals. The economic
policies in modern Chinese society may also contribute to individuals’

relativist attitudes toward animals. Since 1987, economic success has
become the central task of social development in China (Zhu and Feng
2008). Individuals’ awareness of animal welfare has been overlooked in
the vigorous pursuit of technological innovation and quick profits. This
has led to some Chinese people’s more tolerant attitudes toward animal
experiments, which inevitably involve animal suffering and the reduction
of animal welfare. Therefore, it is plausible that some Chinese people
think there are no universal principles regarding specific animal species,
such as laboratory animals. Generally speaking, most people from devel-
oped countries are more aware of animal welfare and show great concern
for animals (Friedmann 2013; Martens et al. 2016; Pifer et al. 1994).
Their attitudes toward animals may stem from their concern for animal
welfare, rather than from a cost-benefit analysis. In those countries, the
existence of animals might be regarded as more valuable than the benefits
that they bring. As a result, the correlation between relativism and atti-
tudes toward animals can be ignored.
Another interesting finding is that the majority of our respondents
held absolutist or situationist ethical beliefs (i.e., high scores on idealism).
Additionally, we confirmed that idealism is an important determinant of
attitudes toward animals (Nickell and Herzog 1996). Absolutists and
situationists in the present study showed greater concern for animals than
subjectivists and exceptionists, although the situationists scored higher
on the relativism scale than exceptionists. One possible reason is that
absolutists and situationists are less likely to compromise on their values
than subjectivists and exceptionists who view ethical judgement from a
more relativistic perspective (Galvin and Herzog 1992). For instance,
subjectivists and exceptionists may consider that the costs of animal use
(in terms of animal welfare) are justified by the benefits to humans, as
they often base their attitude on ethical cost-benefit analyses (Wuensch
et al. 2002). Accordingly, their attitudes toward animals are not as favor-
able as those of absolutists and situationists. This result can also be sup-
ported by a previous finding, which showed that idealism was more
highly related to belief in caring as an ethical principle than relativism
(Nickell and Herzog 1996). Our findings confirm that the correlation
between idealism and people’s concern for animals was much stronger
than that between relativism and concern for animals (Wuensch and
Poteat 1998). They also imply that idealists can have high scores on both
idealism and relativism, but that idealists tend not to base their attitudes
on cost-benefit analysis (Wuensch et al. 2002), which means that they
question whether the alternative can lead to the best results, and reject
absolute rules. This might explain idealists’ greater concern for animals.
5.2 uman Demographics and Their Interaction

H
with Ethical Ideologies
Our results indicate that respondents’ gender and age were independently
related to their attitudes toward animals, although gender played a more
important role in this relationship than age. We also confirmed that
women show greater concern for animals than men (Bègue and Laine
2017; Erlanger and Tsytsarev 2012; Martens et al. 2016). This may be
because women are socialized from birth in a caring and nurturing role,
while men are brought up to be more utilitarian (Herzog et al. 1991).
This may mean that women’s attitudes toward animals are characterized
by humanistic orientation, whereas men’s attitudes are more utilitarian
and tend to be more “thing oriented” (Hills 1989; Kellert and Berry
1987). However, a previous Chinese study reported that gender was not
related to attitudes toward animals (Su and Martens 2017). Both Chinese
women and men’s deep-rooted idea that animals should be respected as
an essential part of society may play a more important role in their atti-
tudes toward animals than differences in personality between women and
men. Hence, it is not surprising that gender failed to associate with atti-
tudes toward animals in China.
The concept of animal welfare was first highlighted by ethological
researchers at universities by the end of 1960s and 1970s in European
countries (in China by the end of 1980s and 1990s) (Bayne et al. 2015;
Niggli 2007), as a result of which age was strongly correlated with atti-
tudes toward animals in both the Netherlands and China. Additionally,
we found that middle-aged Dutch respondents showed the greatest moral
concern for animals, which is inconsistent with previous findings from
China, in which the young respondents showed greater concern for
animals than middle-aged and older ones. Animal welfare as a new phe-
nomenon in China has attracted the attention of the younger genera-
tions, as a result of which they are more aware of it and express greater
concern for it (Littlefair 2006). In the Dutch sample examined in the
present study, there were more middle-aged than younger and older
respondents who belonged to or donated to organizations involved in
improving animal welfare, which means that middle-aged respondents
have more direct access to the knowledge about animals shared in their
communities. We assume this may have contributed to their greater con-
cern for animals.
Although we found no significant interactions between idealism and
relativism, it appears that idealism and relativism coupled with age pre-
dicts a significant amount of variation in attitudes toward animals, indi-
cating that middle-aged absolutists and situationists are likely to express
a greater concern for animals.
5.3 Religion and Pet Ownership
In contrast to some recent studies, which reported that religion was not a
significant predictor of public attitudes toward animals (and animal
products) (Izmirli and Phillips 2011; Phillips et al. 2012), our results
demonstrate a significant negative correlation between Christianity as a
source of inspiration and attitudes toward animals. Specifically, respon-
dents who reported that inspiration source was Christianity showed less
concern for animals than those who reported otherwise. This finding is
partly in line with a previous study reporting negative correlations
between concern for animal welfare and Christianity (Menache 1997).
Our results also demonstrate that respondents who owned a dog as their
companion animal showed more concern for animal welfare. This result
parallels a recent study by Martens et al. (2016), which demonstrated a
strong attachment between companion dogs and their owners, suggest-
ing that pet (in particular dog) ownership is an important predictor of
public attitudes toward animals.
6 Conclusions and Implications

The present study, as well as previous studies conducted in the United
States, found that relativism is not associated with public attitudes toward
animals, suggesting that views about whether universal moral principles
exist or not do not influence Dutch and American people’s attitudes
toward animals. However, these findings are in contrast with a recent
survey in China showing that relativism is negatively associated with
public attitudes toward animals. We assume that this difference may
relate to the generally greater awareness of animal welfare in developed
countries against the poorer awareness in developing countries. These
results also reveal that people from developing countries show more toler-
ant attitudes toward animal use than people from developed countries.
Additionally, our research also confirmed that public attitudes toward
animals were positively associated with idealism in both developed and
developing countries (Galvin and Herzog 1992; Nickell and Herzog
1996; Su and Martens 2017). This finding implies that individuals who
think their ethical behavior will always lead to positive consequences gen-
erally show greater concern for animals.
In addition to idealism and relativism, we also found significant cor-
relations between public attitudes toward animals and demographics
(gender and age), with gender showing a stronger correlation (Galvin and
Herzog 1992; Herzog et al. 1991, 2015; Herzog 2007). This finding is
inconsistent with a previous finding from China showing that the rela-
tionship between human demographics and attitudes toward animals was
significant for age but not for gender (Su and Martens 2017). Here we
have shown, by comparing attitudes toward animals among individuals
from different countries, that idealism and age may be universally corre-
lated with attitudes toward animals, while relativism and gender may not.
We, therefore, predict that an understanding of individual ethical ideolo-
gies and their interaction with human demographics, from cultural and
social perspectives, is vital to improving people’s awareness of animal wel-
fare in different countries.
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7
Animal Welfare in Context: Historical,
Scientific, Ethical, Moral and One
Welfare Perspectives
E. Anne McBride and Stephen Baugh
1 Animal Welfare
When Ruth Harrison wrote “Animal Machines” in 1964, it would have
been difficult to imagine the influence her words would still be having on
the development of animal welfare nearly six decades later. Her descrip-
tive account of intensive farming practices carried out on some farms in
the UK caused a public outcry and focused the attention of scientists and
the general public on the way in which animals are treated. The book
outlined that many practices in the animal production industry were
designed to improve production whatever the cost to the animals and
that many farmers considered animals only as production objects with no
inherent value of their own. The book described farm animal
E. A. McBride (*)
School of Psychology, University of Southampton,
Southampton, UK
S. Baugh
Harper Adams University, Newport, UK
120 E. A. McBride and S. Baugh
management techniques such as beak-trimming, de-horning and the use

of veal crates and battery cages to a public largely unaware that their food
had been produced in a way that demonstrated little concern for the ani-
mal’s well-being (van de Weerd and Sandilands 2008).
As a result of the public response to Harrison’s book, the British gov-
ernment appointed a committee, chaired by Professor F. W. R. Brambell
(The Brambell Committee) to assess the practices described and the way
in which farmed animals were treated in the UK. The Committee
approached the investigation from the perspective of the animal rather
than the farmer and, in 1965, produced a report identifying certain “free-
doms” that they believed all animals should have in order to protect their
welfare and well-being. As a result of the report, the UK government set
up an independent body to advise on farm animal welfare, the Farm
Animal Welfare Advisory Committee, now called the Farm Animal
Welfare Council. It was this committee that transposed the freedoms into
the list format used today across the globe.
The deliberations of the original Brambell committee and the resultant
Five Freedoms have had a significant influence on the development of
what was then a new discipline, namely animal welfare science. The Five
Freedoms were the first attempt to incorporate health status, behaviour
and subjective experiences into the concept of welfare and now are refer-
enced in law, treatises and included in educational materials for a wide
professional and lay audience (Webster 1994). In particular, the Five
Freedoms refer to freedom from hunger, thirst and malnutrition; from
discomfort; from pain, injury or disease, from fear and distress and free-
dom for behavioural expression (Webster 2005). Providing apparently
clear and easily understood targets in the form of “freedoms” and practi-
cal advice to improve welfare, the Five Freedoms have been widely referred
to as aspirational or ideal states.
Although of great influence and importance, many consider a major
shortcoming of the Five Freedoms is that they are unrealistic and unat-
tainable under practical circumstances (Mellor 2016). The “traditional”
welfare science approach that stemmed from the Five Freedoms concen-
trated on developing measures to determine how well an animal is cop-
ing, or rather not coping, with its environment (Broom and Johnson
1993). It was considered that degrees of impairment of biological
7 Animal Welfare in Context: Historical, Scientific, Ethical… 121
functioning could, at least in part, be assessed using tangible measures

such as reproductive performance, growth rates and health status.
Conversely, others felt the notion of degrees of impaired freedom to be
obscure and lacking utility (Mellor and Reid 1994).
Whilst acknowledging the need for behavioural expression, “tradi-
tional” welfare science interpreted this as needing to provide opportuni-
ties to perform normal maintenance behaviours, for example, stand, lie
down, turn around, groom, stretch. This epitomised the second major
shortcoming of the Five Freedoms approach, namely the lack of regard
for animal sentience, cognition and emotional life (affective states)
beyond anxiety and fear. As Mellor and Reid (1994) summarised, the
Five Freedoms approach lacks practical utility and does not differentiate
between the physical/functional and affective elements of welfare. Mellor
and Reid (1994) devised The Five Domains Model in response to these
two concerns. Whilst identifying that some negative experiences are
essential for survival and so cannot, and should not, be eliminated, they
argued that the temporary reduction of these negative experiences does
not necessarily provide positive experiences or result in good welfare.
Their Five Domains approach differentiates between surviving and thriv-
ing, and it incorporates the concept of a “good Quality of Life”. This is
thought to provide a means of assessing the impacts of negative welfare
that is more robust, systematic and comprehensive (Mellor 2016).
Quality of Life (QoL) recognises both the positive and negative experi-
ences to which animals can be exposed (Webster 2016) and suggests that
the balance between the two is relevant in terms of the animal’s welfare.
The term is often used within clinical veterinary medicine, in particular,
in companion animal practice when a discussion between owner and vet-
erinary surgeon is focused on the decision making around euthanasia of
a chronically ill family pet. Often the final decision as to whether to end
a much-loved pet’s life is not entirely a clinical one but has some focus on
the more abstract concept of whether the owner and veterinary surgeon
believe that the animal is still “enjoying” its life. Using a pet dog as an
example, evidence of the animal’s enjoyment of life may include factors
such as whether the animal is eating well and appears to be enjoying its
food, whether the animal is still looking forward to going for walks, or is
indeed physically able to go for walks, and the animal’s positive or
negative interactions with the family, including play. These practical and
often subjective applications of the term QoL highlight its imprecise
nature when trying to assess an animal’s experiences and well-being
(Green and Mellor 2011). So, though a compromise, this is an approach
commonly taken by animal owners and veterinary professionals. However,
within the scientific study of animal welfare, a more accurate definition is
necessary to make this concept quantitatively useful.
The Farm Animal Welfare Council developed the notions of “a life not
worth living”, “a life worth living” and “a good life” (FAWC 2009). Green
and Mellor (2011) built on these notions and formulated a four-tier QoL
scaling system consisting of a central neutral point with two positive cat-
egories above (A life worth living; A good life) and two negative catego-
ries below (A life worth avoiding; A life not worth living). Mellor (2016,
11) postulated that this approach is “more likely to be effective as a moti-
vational framework than as an effective foundation for developing
regulations”.
Webster (2016) suggested that use of the phrase QoL may be counter-
productive and discussed the apparent shortcomings of the concept. He
raised concerns that the essence of QoL relied on interpreting the feelings
of others. This activity is notoriously difficult when humans assess other
human’s feelings and is further complicated when humans attempt to
assess the experiences of other species. Webster (2016, 4) discussed that,
as defined, QoL could be determined through the “algebraic sum of posi-
tive and negative experiences” even though experiences are not expressed
in the same “currency” and so are difficult to weigh against each other in
terms of value or importance to the animal. Instead of offsetting a harm
with a good, Webster suggested that focus would be better aimed at mini-
mising the harm. He went on to question the concept of “a life worth
living” highlighting that this value is assessed by us, not the animal and
thus can be skewed in either direction, depending on the motivations of
the people involved. To return to the veterinary consulting room and the
example of owner and veterinary surgeon discussing the possibility of
euthanasia, owners often need to reflect on their reasons for keeping a
terminally ill, suffering pet alive. Is the motivation in the interests of the
dog or in the interests of the owner?
Ever since Jeremy Bentham (1789) first asked, “The question is not,
can they reason? Nor can they talk? But can they suffer?”, the moral con-
sideration of animals has held some focus on their affective states.
However, it was nearly 200 years before science started to accept that
consideration of an animal’s subjective feelings was both valid and impor-
tant in the overall assessment of its state and thus its welfare (Morton
et al. 1990; Duncan 2004). As Ross and Mason (2017) state, for welfare
interventions to be effective, they should influence an animal’s affective
states in a positive way. Webster (2005, 152) brought together the key
elements of the physical and mental aspects of what it is to have good
welfare in his succinct phrase of the individual being both “fit and feeling
good”. It can be postulated that a core aspect of “feeling good” is to be
able to live in a manner that satisfies the fundamental nature of what it is
to be an animal (Rollin 1993). The importance of domestic and captive
animals being allowed, by humans, to live within natural environments
and to carry out natural behaviours has also been incorporated into the
overall concept of animal welfare (Bracke and Hopster 2006). The term
“naturalness” is often cited in the context of assessing an animal’s well-
being and has been used to evaluate public perception of animal welfare
(Lassen et al. 2006). However, many consider this term and the concept
of an animal living a “natural” life as ambiguous (Yeates 2018) and too
vague to be used to any great effect within animal welfare science or when
assessing moral questions about how we interact with animals. Some
have suggested that a more scientific approach to this concept is required
in order for it to be useful in our consideration of an animal’s welfare.
When applying the concept of naturalness to domesticated species,
further questions become important. How relevant is the concept of a
natural life when applied to a domestic dog that through centuries of
selective breeding has now become reliant on its human owners for sur-
vival? Most of us would not justify withholding veterinary treatment
because it is not natural nor would we allow a dog to attack visitors
because we feel it is displaying normal territorial behaviour. It could be
argued that all animal behaviour, under all circumstances, can be inter-
preted as natural, including an animal’s response to human intervention.
The lack of a clear usable definition or obvious operational approach can
lead to confusion and misuse of the term (Yeates 2018). Yeates (2018)
proposed a more useful definition of “naturalness” and an approach to

assess it scientifically, thereby facilitating appropriate practical decisions
about the animal’s behaviour. He suggested that naturalness could be
used to highlight suffering that requires further assessment and to deter-
mine acceptable thresholds in our interactions with animals. His pro-
posal was that unaffected wild populations should be considered as
natural by definition and, in situations where animals have been impacted
upon by humans, they should be compared to the closest population(s)
of such unaffected conspecifics.
Yet, living a very natural life often comes at a cost (Hermansen et al.
2004). Domestic animals kept in extensive systems often suffer greater
health-related welfare compromises than those in intensive systems.
When we assume responsibility for an animal, we may improve welfare
simply by guaranteeing supplies of food and water, providing effective
health management and protection from predators, but this is not the
case in all farming systems. Consider hill-sheep kept extensively in the
UK. For most of the year, the animals are allowed complete freedom to
roam and behave as they wish, thus approximating as near a natural life
as possible in a commercial farming system (Fig. 7.1).
However, as these animals have low market value, they may not be
provided with supplementary feed, may not be treated when unwell nor
provided with any protection against predators. The hill sheep may have
Fig. 7.1 Extensive sheep hill-farming (courtesy of Gary Farrell)

more freedom to express normal behaviours and a more natural existence

than an intensively produced beef cow, but their level of welfare could be
lower. The cow, although compromised in terms of naturalness, will be
fed regularly with a nutritious diet, vaccinated to prevent many diseases,
treated when unwell and protected from predators. Paradoxically, in
many ways, the cow’s welfare has been improved by a move further away
from a natural existence.
Assessment of the management of an animal at all stages of his/her life
is core to evaluating its welfare. However, applying one concept of welfare
rather than another can lead to different outcomes and thus conclusions
of any degree of welfare impairment and appropriate remedial action.
Consider the beef cow mentioned above, kept in an intensive production
feedlot system (Wasley and Kroeker 2018; Fig. 7.2) as an example.
Assessing these animals from a purely functional, physical perspective
would entail measures of growth rates, reproductive performance, health
parameters and noting the presence or absence of disease. As mentioned
above, from this perspective, the intensive production management sys-
tem could be considered as acceptable or even good in meeting the needs
of the cow. However, when assessing from the perspective of affective
states and naturalness, we would come to a different conclusion. When
Fig. 7.2 Intensive feedlot system for beef cattle (from Addison 2012)
considering how the animal feels, the layman might comment on the
unnaturalness of the environment, the lack of space and grazing oppor-
tunities. One might notice the lack of mental stimulation and the absence
of opportunity to express a wide range of natural behaviour. Those more
knowledgeable of cattle ethology may note the unnatural social group-
ings, and the lack of resources leading to increasing competition between
individuals simply to access feed troughs. This combined with the realisa-
tion of the animal’s lack of control over its circumstances, and the subse-
quent fear and frustration this may cause on a daily basis, would lead one
to reach a diametrically opposed conclusion. From the perspective of feel-
ings and naturalness, the feedlot system no longer appears to be adequate;
indeed, it can be perceived as being far from able to maintain even an
acceptable level of welfare.
To summarise, since the Brambell committee’s report, there have been
a series of developments and refinements in how animal well-being is
conceptualised and assessed. The term “animal welfare” has evolved to
mean different things to different people, both to those involved in the
science of animal welfare and those outside the discipline. This is in part
due to differences in moral and ethical perspectives.
2 Animal Welfare and Ethics

In the arena of animal welfare science, the accepted dominant position of
welfare is the “three-circle framework” related to physical state, mental
state and naturalness. However, how to approach the assessment of ani-
mal welfare in a meaningful and consistent way remains elusive.
Tannenbaum (1991) concluded that the approach a person takes will be
defined by their moral values. These, in turn, are influenced by both per-
sonal experience and cultural norms. So, even if we can agree about what
constitutes the best welfare for an animal, we may disagree about what
other values are relevant and important.
The scientific study of animal welfare is intended to be independent of
ethical considerations, beyond those relating to conducting empirical
and applied research. Yet the science can influence moral discussion, eco-
nomics and law; it will be influential when considering human welfare
and environmental challenges. Though welfare assessment can be carried

out using scientific methodologies in isolation from moral deliberations
(Fraser and Broom 1997), ethical decisions will be relevant, guiding our
judgements about how animals should be treated and the importance of
recognising subjective experiences (Lund et al. 2006). In turn, this can
influence the directions taken by future research, as the earlier historical
outline indicated. So, whilst not interchangeable concepts, there is a
strong bi-directional link between animal welfare and ethics. Consideration
of the welfare of animals begins with the idea that animals are morally
significant. If they are not, then why do we need to consider their wel-
fare? Consideration of ethics helps to broaden the discussion to incorpo-
rate the intentions and the responsibilities of the people involved, the
consequences of any actions and encourage reflection on any rights that
the animals may have.
Animal welfare scientists and animal ethicists have the common goal
of investigating and articulating the way in which we interact with other
animals in order to address the multi-faceted challenges involved.
However, the approach taken by each discipline is markedly different,
each using different language, concepts and assumptions (Fraser 1999).
As discussed above, whilst the study of animal welfare now extends
beyond physical concerns to encompass the animal’s feelings and the eth-
ics concerning the interests of the animal, not all scientists adhere to this
approach. Some believe that welfare is something that can only be “mea-
sured” using defined scientific methodologies and that further ethical
considerations are neither necessary nor sufficient to the improvement of
animal welfare and well-being. Likewise, some animal ethicists engage in
deep philosophical exploration with little reference to empirical scientific
knowledge. This division on both sides needs to be challenged. The strong
link between the science of animal welfare and the moral consideration of
our interactions with animals is both relevant and important. Scientists
and ethicists need to be more holistic in their ruminations and commu-
nication. Such an inter-disciplinary approach to welfare would facilitate
multi-disciplinary teams to undertake fundamental and applied research
and provide transdisciplinary real-world solutions to the benefit of all.
Animal welfare science can provide an evidence base to underpin our
consideration of ethical dilemmas, and moral discussion can expand our

consideration of practices designed to improve welfare.
Public perception of what constitutes good animal welfare often incor-
porates measurable scientific parameters with other broader moral con-
siderations. This multi-dimensional view contrasts with the
one-dimensional view often taken by scientists, that is, the view that sim-
ply eliminating unnecessary suffering and providing sufficient pleasure
constitutes a good life. Lassen et al. (2006) described how laypersons
have a wider range of concerns when considering animal welfare, includ-
ing suffering and its avoidance, the opportunity to live a natural life and
the importance of achieving species-specific potentials. They concluded
(2006, 229) that “ethical discussion of what constitutes a good animal
life must be linked to public discussion of the assessment of farm animal
welfare”. Clearly, this applies to any animal kept in any context for any
purpose.
Weary and Robbins (2019) concur with this and suggest that reference
to and incorporation of the perceptions and understandings of non-
specialists (‘folk’) provides a better framework for the understanding of
the diverse conceptions of welfare. They presented participants with three
definitions of welfare relating to physical states, mental states and natu-
ralness. They showed that the emphasis people place upon each of these
differed dependent on the presenting case. In addition, their findings
highlighted that assessments can also include other factors that do not fit
neatly within the “three-circle framework”. Concepts such as sentience,
consciousness and preferences of the individual animal widen the consid-
erations. These concepts infer the need to focus beyond “the group” of
animals. Rather, it must be recognised that welfare concerns the life expe-
riences of the individual animal.
A further aspect of the lay view is their placing value on meaningful
relationships the animal has with humans, and of the human’s relation-
ship with the animal. Whilst it is undeniable that such relations exist,
researchers have largely ignored them for animals kept for reasons other
than as working companions or pets. Notable exceptions are the bodies
of work conducted over the last 40 years, such as by Coleman and
Hemsworth in the farming sphere; and by Arluke and Herzog in the
laboratory sphere (e.g. Arluke 1987; Hemsworth et al. 1993; Herzog
2002; Birke et al. 2007; Herzog 2010; Coleman et al. 2016). The rela-
tionships between a human and an animal may be neutral, pleasant or
unpleasant for either party. They may be reciprocal or uni-directional,
human->animal or animal->human, and can alter over time, in different
circumstances and when the animal’s perceived role changes. There are
multiple interested parties in the welfare narrative. The consideration of
animal welfare is not always reducible to scientific facts related purely to
the animal and its state, nor just to the addition of ethical perspectives,
but also must incorporate the human sciences: psychology, anthropology
and sociology.
3 Animal Welfare and Context

Although there is general acceptance that animals have moral status, this
does not give rise to a single, widely held view on how we should interact
with them. How the concept of animal welfare is applied differs depen-
dent on multiple variables. These include the species, type (and category)
of animal, the animal’s utility, its value perceived both morally and finan-
cially, the context in which it is kept and the differing human percep-
tions, attitudes and values that we place on these.
Interests in the welfare of animals and how animals should be treated
are influenced by a complex set of personal motivations, and different
stakeholders will evaluate welfare through different frames of reference,
often subjectively. Our perception and attitudes influence our behaviour
which, in turn, directly or indirectly governs the welfare of the animals
with which we interact (Cobb et al. 2020). These perceptions may also
differ when considering “groups” as opposed to individuals.
Herzog et al. (1991) developed the Animal Attitude Scale (AAS), a
20-item questionnaire assessing respondents’ attitudes to animals, with a
high score indicating a pro-welfare attitude. One of the key findings of
the study was that there were significant differences between men and
women, with women tending to demonstrate greater concern about
other species. However, their final concluding comment reminds us of
the complexity of human perception of animal welfare in that approxi-
mately 90% of the individual variation in attitude measures was not
explained by gender nor sex. Although extensively utilised, the AAS did
not differentiate between categories of animal. Taylor and Signal (2009)
developed a scale to identify attitudinal differences between three differ-
ent groups, illustrating diverse groupings of animals defined as pet (com-
panion animal), pest and profit (utility) animals. The Pet, Pest, Profit
(PPP) scale related well to the AAS and, perhaps unsurprisingly, demon-
strated that scores related to “pets” were the highest, followed by those
related to “profit” with “pest” being the lowest. The researchers postulated
that attitudes to animals are generally interpreted as being attitudes to
animals which have value to people, with those considered as pests there-
fore having no, or even detrimental, value to people.
Sims et al. (2007) demonstrated that attitudes about animals and the
way in which they are treated can also vary by the type, or species, of
animal involved. Respondents read one of 26 scenarios describing various
acts of animal abuse. They then responded to 16 questions, rating the
appropriateness of 8 types of punishment. The study showed that partici-
pants focused their attention more on the species of animal, that is, the
victim of the abuse, rather than the type of crime perpetrated or the per-
petrator. The findings of Wilkins et al. (2015) showed that the richness of
an emotional life that participants attributed to animals was influenced
by both the category in which an animal is placed, as Pet, Pest or Use, and
its species. This was true for mammals, birds, fish and invertebrates. For
example, fewer emotions were attributed to fruit flies over honeybees;
and to sheep, pigs and cattle compared to horses, cat and dogs. Our expe-
rience of others can influence our emotional bias and understanding of
an out-group (Pettigrew and Trop 2000). This Contact hypothesis
(Allport 1954) relates to the quality, not simply the quantity of the expe-
rience (Schwartz and Simmons 2001). Wilkins et al. (2015) found that
owners of pet rodents attributed significantly more emotions to labora-
tory mice and wild rats than did non-owners, suggesting the quality effect
of contact may be an influence on other interspecific relations.
Cobb et al. (2020) investigated the importance of the welfare status of
dogs and if the perceived level of welfare varies with context. They looked
at 17 dog contexts which included companion, sporting, assistance, free-
roaming, fighting and wild. The majority of the participants were current
or past dog owners and a few had experience of working dogs as opposed
to only companion dogs. 95% of participants confirmed that canine wel-

fare was important to them, but how they perceived the dogs’ welfare
status varied significantly dependent on context from very high (guide
dogs) to very low (fighting dogs).
These and other studies suggest the lay perspective is fluid when it
comes to considering the animal as an individual organism with its own
physical and emotional needs for a “life worth living”. One influencing
factor may be the wider societal, cultural view. This is commonly expressed
formally in law. In legislation, animal welfare provision is usually linked
to both the species and use of the animal. Farm animals, companion ani-
mals, zoo animals, laboratory animals and wildlife differ in the type and
level of protection that the law provides for them. Taylor and Signal
(2009) suggested that these differences are related to our belief, or lack of
belief in the intrinsic and extrinsic significances of the animal considered.
Intrinsic value relates to animals having an inherent, morally absolute
value. Extrinsic value relates purely to the animal’s worth to humans,
which can be purely financial. Pet animals would fall into the first cate-
gory being perceived as having inherent value, whilst production animals
would fall into the second category having value mostly in terms of their
use to us. Wildlife tends to fall into those deemed “good” with intrinsic
and/or extrinsic worth (e.g. tourism attraction) and those deemed pest
accorded little or no worth of any kind. In general, we tend to place more
intrinsic value on those animals that live closest to us and so give them
greater welfare allowance, that is domesticated species over wildlife and
particularly those we keep as companions. However, applying animal
welfare principles from the perspective of species alone presents moral
and practical difficulties. Treating animals in particular ways based purely
on their membership of a particular species, rather than on the character-
istics they possess would be considered by many to be inconsistent. It
would be difficult to argue from the basis of our scientific knowledge that
a pig’s ability to suffer and their interest in not suffering are any less than
that of a dog’s. Yet, consider the value we place on their basic welfare
requirements and thus our different approaches to the ethics and practice
of their management. It shows a clear disregard for the facts in favour of
the amount of emotional value we place on each species.
Animals that we farm for profit or those that we consider to be pests

tend to be given less welfare allowance than pets, even though the needs
and welfare requirements of a particular species will be constant. It would
be logical to argue that the welfare needs of a rabbit, as a species and as an
individual animal are constant, yet there is legal allowance to treat a pet
rabbit, laboratory rabbit, farmed rabbit and wild rabbit differently in the
UK and elsewhere. Likewise, the UK legally approved means of killing
wild mice using anti-coagulant poisons or sticky traps cannot be consid-
ered acceptable in terms of providing a humane death and would be ille-
gal to use on the same animal if it was kept as pet or in a laboratory
(Mason and Littin 2003).
4 Animal Welfare and Human Well-being

The Human Animal Bond can be very strong and we might expect that
animal welfare and human welfare would often go hand in hand. The
Human Animal Bond has been defined as “the dynamic relationship
between people and animals such that each influences the psychological
and physiological state of the other” (Center for the Human Animal
Bond n.d.). This definition highlights the reciprocal relationship we have
with animals and identifies that for each relationship partner, both wel-
fare and well-being are affected.
Well-being in humans takes many forms and links to how animals can
promote this are equally diverse. Obviously, they provide practical physi-
cal benefits of resources, including food, wool and labour, be that through
their strength or senses, for example, guiding, searching, mine detection.
Further, individual animals of many species can provide us with compan-
ionship, attention and empathy, affording emotional support for us
throughout our lives, particularly when times are hard or human support
is reduced (e.g. Raina et al. 1999; Ratschen et al. 2020). Alongside the
psychological benefits of having close interactions with other species,
their physical presence can also help us maintain our physical health
(McNicholas et al. 2005). Health benefits of close interaction with
friendly animals include lower heart rate and blood pressure, modulation
of the immune system and a better ability to handle stress (Aiba et al.
2012). Positive interactions with animals can increase certain neurotrans-

mitters such as dopamine and beta-endorphins, neurotransmitters shown
to be associated with analgesia, stress relief, pleasure, blood pressure regu-
lation and bonding (Odendaal and Meintjes 2003). The social reformist
and human nurse Florence Nightingale (1820–1910) recognised the
benefits of patients interacting with companion animals and advocated
that the chronically ill should keep “a small pet” for an increased sense of
well-being (Nightingale 1969). The act of caring for an animal and pro-
viding this other living being with a high standard of welfare promotes a
sense of responsibility, usefulness and satisfaction. In return, an animal
can provide a focus for positivity, an opportunity and a prompt to get out
into the world and engage in physical exercise, socialise with others and,
for some, provide a reason to get up in the morning or to continue living
(e.g. Riddick 1985; Scanlon et al. 2021). Animal-assisted interventions
(AAI), discussed in a later chapter, can be beneficial to both the human
recipients and the animal. Direct or indirect interactions with an animal
can help reduce anxiety in the recipient and mediate interactions in ther-
apeutic, educational and other anxiety-provoking contexts (e.g. Cirulli
et al. 2011). The means by which this happens is unclear as research is
beginning to indicate the effectiveness of non-live, biomimetic alterna-
tives (Wells 2005; Clements et al. 2019; Barber et al. 2020).
Many studies have explored the idea that good animal welfare is linked
to productivity in farm animals. The fact that productivity can conse-
quently improve the well-being of the farmer adds a further dimension to
interactions with animals that are normally classed as only having extrin-
sic value. Rushen and de Passile (2015) demonstrated that stockpersons
with positive attitudes towards animals often have animals with increased
productivity. Improved productivity leads to a sense of success and
achievement, financial benefits and an improvement in mental well-
being. Poor productivity can lead to a sense of failure, dissatisfaction and
financial compromise. Depression and a strained economy may lead to
farmers being less likely to comply with veterinary preventative health
measures consequently further impacting negatively on the animal’s wel-
fare. Hansen and Østerås (2019) also hypothesised that there is a link
between how well farmers care for their animals and their own well-being
and stress. They concluded that the lower the farmer’s stress and higher
the occupational well-being, the better the animal welfare. The study pos-
tulated that in order for the farmer to offer good welfare to the animals,
the farmers themselves must thrive in their work. The presence of poor
animal welfare may provide an indication of poor welfare or psychologi-
cal ill health in the owner and could act as an early warning of developing
mental or physical ill health. Identification of poor mental health in a
farmer and the opportunity to provide him/her with timely support and
appropriate care has the potential to also prevent or ameliorate a develop-
ing animal welfare problem. When identifying animal welfare issues and
providing solutions to benefit the animals, the wider view enables care of
the humans surrounding the animals also. Hansen and Østerås (2019)
advised that professionals visiting farms, such as veterinary surgeons and
farm advisors need to pay attention not only to the animal’s welfare but
also to the welfare of the people caring for them. This should hold for all
caretakers regardless of why the animal is kept. A holistic approach to
human and animal welfare is a logical development and is beneficial to
multiple parties.
Not all human-animal interactions are successful for either party or for
the animal alone. This can be for a variety of intrinsic and extrinsic rea-
sons: changes in circumstances, unrealistic expectations, or individual
differences and developmental influences which lead to psychological dif-
ficulties and/or behavioural issues, such as anti-social behaviour includ-
ing human-human aggression.
Identifying situations of poor animal welfare and animal abuse also has
the wider benefit of potentially reducing the incidence of human abuse,
be that in the domestic or wider setting. The link between interpersonal
violence and animal abuse was first discussed in 1963 by Macdonald with
the emergence of a triad of childhood behaviours (fire-setting, enuresis
and animal cruelty) demonstrated as an indicator of later adult human-
directed violence. Further research investigated the link between animal
cruelty and domestic violence, generalised criminal behaviour and cer-
tain conduct disorders (McEwen et al. 2014). Animal abuse is often
related to poverty and social problems within inner-city areas, and focus-
ing on developments that improve animal welfare in these settings has the
potential to support interventions related to wider social issues. For
example, social concerns around homelessness are complex involving
animal welfare issues alongside other significant socio-economic prob-

lems (Scanlon et al. 2020). Integrating animal welfare thinking into com-
munity and social development programmes gives the opportunity to
take an overview approach to welfare for the benefit of people and
animals.
The benefits of providing appropriate care and high standards of wel-
fare for animals go beyond those animals we keep in captive situations in
our homes, farms, zoos and laboratories. Interaction with the wild envi-
ronment and the animals within it has long been shown to be beneficial
to people’s mental and physical health (Shanahan et al. 2016), promoting
psychological restoration (Kaplan 1995), improved mood, improved
attention and reduced stress and anxiety (Hartig et al. 2003). There is
also evidence to suggest that biodiverse natural environments can have
positive impacts for human health and well-being (Clark et al. 2014).
Effective management of the environment ensuring the provision of
appropriate habitats and adequate resources where wild species can thrive
and enjoy a high welfare existence has the added benefit of improving the
welfare of the humans interacting with that environment and the species
that live there. Considering animals to be purely resources, biodiversity
or food and suggesting that an animal’s value to humans is purely instru-
mental is an anthropocentric notion and falls short of recognising the
adjacent benefits to humans. Carlier and Treich (2020) argued that
research within economics has been speciesist in that it largely ignores the
welfare of animals, evidenced in their paper by referring to the very few
works in economics that value animal welfare. They concluded that ani-
mals should receive moral consideration in environmental economics. As
Johansson-Stenman (2018) argued, the conventional, traditional mea-
sures of animal welfare should be extended to include the case that wel-
fare has an intrinsic value in the Social Welfare Function.
5 Animal Welfare and Human Health

The One Health concept grew from an increasing understanding of the
links between human and animal health and advocates for integrated
thinking and approaches. How we apply welfare provision to animals has
significant influences on the health of the animal and, in turn, on the

health of the people interacting with the animal or with the animal’s
products. Zoonotic diseases in our companion animal species that can be
prevented or minimised by providing adequate veterinary healthcare
include the roundworm, Toxocara canis that can cause blindness in chil-
dren, the tapeworm Echinococcus granulosus that can cause Hydatid
Disease in humans and Leptopspirosis, a potentially fatal zoonotic dis-
ease of dogs (Weese and Fulford 2011). Provision of poor welfare for
animals has been shown to produce physiological stress which can in turn
compromise immune function leading to greater susceptibility to disease
(Cockram and Hughes 2011), in particular infectious disease. Disease in
animals does not always show overt clinical signs, and so sub-clinical
animals may not be diagnosed and have the potential to transmit disease
to the humans interacting with them. The presence of sub-clinical disease
can also lead to contaminated animals and animal products entering the
food chain producing a significant threat to human health (Alpigiani
et al. 2016). For example, Alpigiani et al. (2016) discussed Salmonella
enterica and Yersinia enterocolitica in pigs and found that animal-based
measures of welfare, poor human-animal relationships and increased on-
farm mortality were associated with increased Y. enterocolitica.
Increased incidence of disease in animals often leads to an increase in
preventative or therapeutic use of antimicrobials. Within farming sys-
tems, antibacterials have been used routinely in order to maintain or
improve production levels, especially in intensive systems. Increased and
inappropriate usage of antibacterials can in turn encourage antimicrobial
resistance (AR) which is now recognised as a significant threat to the
health of humans across the world (Hudson et al. 2017). Reducing anti-
microbial use on farms has become a global priority. Rather than replac-
ing antimicrobials with other drug-related methods such as “immune
function boosting drugs” and increased use of vaccines and probiotics,
Dawkins (2019) explored whether improving animal welfare could have
a major contribution to improving immune function in animals, thereby
reducing disease and the need for preemptive and therapeutic antimicro-
bial use. Applying higher animal welfare standards as a preventative med-
icine has additional worldwide implications for human health through
the supply of animal products of higher nutritional value, supporting

positive effects on farming sustainability and minimising environmen-
tal damage.
6 A Case Point: COVID-19

At the time of writing in 2020, the UK, as many other countries of the
world, has and is undergoing a series of lockdown measures as a result of
the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak. The pandemic to date has taken
an estimated 1.5 million human lives and has devastated communities
and economies across the world (United Nations 2020). However, it is
not only humans who have suffered. Whilst many have turned to their
animals for comfort and companionship during this extremely challeng-
ing time, a far greater number of animals have suffered as a consequence
of COVID-19. Van Dobbenburgh and De Briyne (2020) and De Briyne
et al. (2020) describe some of the indirect impacts on animal victims.
They discuss how disruptions in the meat trade have meant farmers not
being able to sell their animals resulting in welfare problems due to over-
crowding on farms. Companion animals have been abandoned as a result
of fear of the virus, owners being hospitalised and financial consequences
due to job losses or reduction in hours, as well as having been bought on
impulse and not meeting expectations. Caring for animals and provision
of adequate healthcare has become more difficult in the current circum-
stances due to reduced access to veterinary services and financial compro-
mises, both for owners and rescue charities. Many laboratories have had
to partially or completely shut down leading to concerns about the care
and/or disposal of laboratory animals. Concurrently, the shift in research
focus to developing COVID-19 vaccines and treatment options has cre-
ated a large demand for transgenic mice and ferrets, with its attendant
welfare concerns (Ormandy et al. 2011). During lockdown periods, zoos
were forced to close their doors to the public leading to financial chal-
lenges, rehoming of some animals and the threat of culling should the
situation not improve in time to reverse financial misfortunes. Between
June and November 2020, human cases of COVID-19 were identified
with SARS-CoV-2 variant forms associated with mink kept on farms in
Denmark (World Health Organisation 2020). This resulted in the mass

culling of some 17 million individual animals. This has, once again,
brought the fur industry back into the spotlight with reports of poor
animal welfare standards and overcrowding on farms that some feel are
influential in the development and transmission of the variant strains of
the virus.
However, the connection with animals and animal welfare is deeper
still. Whilst we don’t, at present, know the exact cause of the outbreak,
most researchers believe COVID-19 originated in animals (Mallapaty
2020), probably a bat species (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
n.d.), and our interactions with animals and the welfare standards we
provide for them comes into focus again. The pandemic demonstrates a
clear and current link between animal and human health and welfare.
This pandemic has impacted not only humans but also all who live on
this planet and the planet itself. Whilst differences in animal welfare defi-
nitions and application exist, whilst motivations and self-interests still
influence how animal welfare is practised and whilst the context of ani-
mal use is influential in the way in which we apply welfare principles,
COVID-19 underscores the urgent need for change. We should consider
it to be a priority to achieve the highest acceptable threshold in all the
fields of human-animal interaction in order to provide the maximum
benefit to all living beings and the environment on which we all depend.
7 Summary and Future Directions

The improvement of animal welfare is a joint responsibility across a wide
range of stakeholders which include groups as diverse as the pet industry,
pet owners, researchers, environmental agencies, government depart-
ments, farmers, the food industry, consumers of animal products and
products for animals, and the media in all its forms and types of com-
munication from advertisements to documentaries. In this chapter, the
authors aimed to show how benefits of improvements in animal welfare
can positively influence the welfare of a wide range of humans. Whilst
many researchers in the companion animal and animal-assisted interac-
tions fields have long discussed relationships with animals, especially with
individual animals, and the positive effects on human welfare, few have
considered how poor animal welfare may impact that of the humans
directly involved. Examples include when animals show problematic
behaviour (Oxley et al. 2018; Casey et al. 2009; Lambert et al. 2015) or
“design-related” (pedigree) health issues mean that owner-perceived costs
are higher and their expectations compromised (Packer et al. 2019) or
when animal welfare may be compromised in the workplace, as in rescue
centres or laboratories (Birke et al. 2007; Murphy and Daly 2020), and
on the farm (Peck 2005; Knight-Jones et al. 2017; Crimes and
Enticott 2019).
Tarazona et al. (2020) note how animal welfare is central in our rela-
tionships with animals, beyond simply the direct impacts on the animal
and interacting human. They highlight that indirect effects on culture,
society and environment are important and remind us that humans are
like all other species in terms of the basic concepts of biology, health and
welfare. Returning to the beef cattle example given early in this chapter,
we can see that assessments should not be confined purely to herd or
group health but must consider that of the individual animals, the stock
persons whose own welfare may be compromised physically and psycho-
logically, the effects on the environment and impacts throughout the
food chain to, and including, the consumer.
Regrettably, much research into human and animal welfare, social,
economic, political and ethical issues retain the general perspective of
artificially compartmentalising the interactions between human, animal
and environmental health and welfare (Colonius and Earley 2013). In
contrast, the One Welfare approach conceptualises these fundamental
and essential links (Garcia Pinillos 2018), complementing and extending
the notion of One Health and providing a platform for transdisciplinary
progress. Human attitudes to animals, in their various roles, and to ani-
mal products can affect consumers (Carenzi and Verga 2009) and the
natural world (see e.g. McMichael et al. 2007; Tarazona et al. 2020;
Whitehead and McBride in prep). These attitudes are influenced by
upbringing, societal and cultural beliefs (Serpell 2004) and can be influ-
ential in legislation and help to inform economic practices. It would be
more than prudent, therefore, to reconsider how we view the way in
which we interact with living creatures. We need to evaluate the possible
options we can make in respect of each living being. This must be done
through a comprehensive lens that includes due regard for the interests of
all living beings, communities and populations and the health and sus-
tainability of the natural ecosystems that may be directly or indirectly
affected by our decisions. This is our urgent moral, ethical and scientific
responsibility and challenge.
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8
Survival of the Fittest: When an
Evolutionary Advantage Becomes Such
a Threat to the Welfare of Other Non-
Human Animal Species That it Threatens
Our Own Species
It is interesting to contemplate an entangled bank, clothed with many plants

of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting
about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that
these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and
dependent on each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by
laws acting around us. (Darwin C. 1859)
—Charles Darwin
The original version of this chapter has been revised. The correction to this chapter can be found
at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85277-1_18
J. L. M. Vaarten (*) • N. De Briyne

Federation of Veterinarians of Europe, Brussels, Belgium
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022, 149
corrected publication 2022
150 J. L. M. Vaarten and N. De Briyne
1 Close Relatives
Imagine, Charles Darwin standing there, maybe somewhere near his
house, looking at all these living creatures at the river bank and contem-
plating that, regardless of how different they look, they are all intercon-
nected. What an exciting and intriguing insight he had achieved!
What is not in this quote, but what he also became aware of, and what is
even more intriguing, is that he is not just watching the scene from the
outside but that he belongs to the scene. Just like the plants, worms and
birds, he is part of that scene. He himself, like all of us, is one of all intercon-
nected living creatures, dependent on each other in so complex a manner.
Perhaps you will remember from the books you read at school that
fascinating picture with the history of the earth compressed into one
24-hours day. In that widespread picture, one can see vertebrates emerg-
ing shortly before midday, mammals around eight o’clock in the evening
and mankind only very late, in the last minutes before midnight. Long
before Homo sapiens appeared, uncountable numbers of micro-
organisms, plants and animals populated planet earth. Taking this con-
cept further, the moment we, being late arrivals already, become aware of
the evolutionary process and its driver is not more than a split second
ago. It is relatively recent that Charles Darwin published his famous book
“The Origin of Species By Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation
of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life” wherein he presented the
groundbreaking explanation of the way living creatures, including man,
are interlinked and how they have evolved and continue to evolve.
For most of its existence Homo sapiens has not been so well aware of
the close relation with other living creatures, as we can be today. And if the
idea would have come up earlier, many people would simply have denied
it, unable to comprehend it. Also in Darwin’s time most people thought it
to be impossible. Darwin postponed the presentation of his views for
about 20 years, concerned as he was of the shock it would cause to large
numbers of people. It was in 1858, after he became aware of a paper by
Alfred Wallace suggesting a similar hypothesis as his own, that Darwin
decided not to wait any longer and to publish his theory. Both papers,
parts of Darwin’s work on the origin of species and Wallace’s were sent to
the Linnean Society of London. The two papers were read in the same
meeting of 1 July 1858, however without causing any debate, at least not
8 Survival of the Fittest: When an Evolutionary Advantage… 151
at that moment. Obviously, the scientists gathered in the meeting didn’t

recognize immediately the significance of the just presented groundbreak-
ing hypotheses. Even more, the president of the Linnean Society, when
later reviewing the year said: “The year which has passed… has not, indeed,
been marked by any of those striking discoveries which at once revolutionise, so
to speak, the department of science on which they bear” (Browne 2002).
What a mistake that was. It was about a year later, and after the publica-
tion of the book, that people started to understand the implication of the
ideas and the paradigm shift it contained. The book led to fierce opposi-
tion and villainous cartoons in the newspapers. Charles Darwin was pre-
sented as an idiot. And even nowadays, large numbers of people still have
difficulties to accept Darwin’s theory (Pew Research 2015). For many of
them the notion that Homo sapiens and other species of living creatures
are all little twigs, originating from the same evolutionary tree is difficult
to grasp. The concept is not well compatible with other, often much older
and more widespread ideas people have about the origin of mankind.
But also for people who know, understand and accept Darwin’s theory,
it appears to be difficult to fully grasp and embrace it in all its conse-
quences. Just think, how often aren’t we surprised when research provides
new evidence of similarities between Homo sapiens and other animal
species? Every time such kind of news appears in the media, we are
amazed to read how smart animals are. Isn’t that incredible: a dog reads
the face of its owner (Albuquerque et al. 2016); chimpanzees use twigs as
instruments (Bernstein-Kurtycz et al. 2020); elephants mourn over a
dead family member (Goldenberg and Wittemyer 2019); a crow can
remember human faces (Marzluff et al. 2012).
Would it not be far more astonishing if such similarities would not be
there? Would it not be strange, if mankind who appeared so late in the
evolution, would be completely different and unique in its abilities to
know, think and feel? Especially when it comes to abilities, we wish to
consider as typically human, like reasoning, sympathizing, foreseeing, and
so on; people tend to stay with the idea of a discontinuity between people
and other animals. Apparently, we feel more comfortable with the older,
though non-science-based, thought of us people as a “stand-alone living
being”, absolutely not like other animals. Also amongst scientists, until
recently, comparative studies were mostly limited to areas of anatomy or
physiology. Endowing animals with human emotions has long been a kind
of taboo in the academic world. A special term, anthropo-denial, was

coined for the blindness of people to “more humanlike” characteristics of
other animals, or the animal-like characteristics of ourselves (de Waal 2013).
Not that we couldn’t see the resemblances, we simply did not like to see
them, or as seventeenth-century philosopher Blaise Pascal stated: “Man is
inclined to deny everything that is incomprehensible to him”. Nowadays, in
particular with the progress made over the last decades in genome sequenc-
ing, Darwin’s observation that all plants, birds, insects and worms are
produced by the same laws cannot be denied. Persisting to pretend that
non-human animals are so completely different from humans is a chosen
blindness. We can no longer close our eyes for the very close relationship
we have with, in Darwin’s own words, “our brethren”, the animals.
2 Empathy
One of the traits we like to believe to be typically human is empathy, the
ability to imagine ourselves being in the other’s position and to experi-
ence their feelings. Empathy exists in different forms, such as having the
ability to assume a similar emotional status as another individual, being
concerned about others and taking over someone else’s point of view. Not
all animals are at the same level and certain species are more advanced
than others, but the core of the system is believed to be at least as old as
mammals exist (de Waal 2013). Empathy can be divided into affective
empathy and cognitive empathy. Where affective empathy is the capacity
to respond with an appropriate emotion to another’s mental states, cogni-
tive empathy relates to the capacity to understand another’s perspective
or mental state.
Cognitive empathy is an important factor in our relations with other
people, and also to animals. We naturally pay attention to others, feel
attracted to others and put ourselves in other person’s shoes. Empathy
keeps us busier than we often think. We are extremely interested in other
persons’ emotions. Just look at the popularity of many programmes on
television, such as competitions, challenging journeys and discussions. In
many cases, the concepts for such shows are not much more than an
excuse to show participants’ emotions. Classical dramas and operas are
almost always about emotions. An interesting field of sharing emotions

and feelings is social media. Probably nine out of ten messages that go
viral, do so because senders touch feelings and emotional status.
Empathy goes across species. There are many examples of situations
wherein people are concerned about animals. Almost everyone can think
of situations wherein he or she felt empathy with an animal in trouble.
Many disaster contingency plans contain paragraphs about volunteers
who go to extremes to rescue animals. Also, the other way round, in par-
ticular, pet animals can be very well aware of the emotional status of
people. Specially trained animals are used in animal-assisted therapy to
help people in emotionally difficult situations (Morrison 2007).
We comprehend that animals are very closely related to people; we are
able to understand their physical and emotional status and to think of
how these can be improved. Nevertheless, we often choose to ignore such
thoughts.
3 Dangerous Difference
If we, as Homo sapiens, when compared to other animals, are so similar,
then the question remains how we, as a species, manage to be so forceful,
so dominant over many other species, including other Homo (sub) spe-
cies? How do we succeed to treat and use so many animals just like we
fancy, including animals that by their nature can be very dangerous for
us? It is not because we are bigger or stronger. What is thought to have
enabled Homo sapiens to sit on the top of the global monkey rock is
again a matter of genetic evolution. This evolution—or series of muta-
tions sometimes also called the tree of the knowledge mutations—has
triggered a cognitive revolution (Harari 2015) and created new ways of
thinking. Through this alteration in our genotype and its effects on our
phenotype, we became able to develop very sophisticated ways of com-
munication with each other.
Our way of communication helps us to build large and complicated
networks with others, networks wherein we can join forces. As a conse-
quence of this, we greatly increased our skills to work together towards
shared goals, goals that we can never achieve alone or in small parties. In
particular, through the possibility to exchange information about other

people, for example, who can be trusted or not, we can strengthen our
communities and include persons we have never met (Dunbar 1998).
What is even more, in addition to building extended communities, we
are also able to influence the group members and steer the groups in
almost every direction. The crucial point here is that through such groups,
we can share information, thoughts, myths, opinions that will motivate
members of the group to behave in a certain way. Fear for disasters that
might come over us, desire for happiness and prosperity, and hope for
salvation are effective vehicles to motivate people.
Where, for example, migrating animals form large groups for one spe-
cific purpose, to travel safely together, people can form large groups and
take common actions towards almost every goal that can be imagined:
from overthrowing rulers to travelling to the moon. Common believes
and ideologies, even if entirely imaginary, are strong drivers. It doesn’t
really matter if the ideas can be verified or not. Homo sapiens rules the
world because it is the only animal that can believe in things that exist
purely in its own imagination, such as gods, states, money and human
rights (Harari 2015).
Common believes form the base for sharing values and setting norms
and standards. The possibility to connect depends on the extent to which
communities share norms and values. A typical characteristic of close
groups is that it submits itself to set ideas and gives up the critical powers
of man (Popper 1945). And once accepted, such values appear to be very
stable. Once conventions are agreed upon, they are very difficult to
change. In many closed groups, questioning believes or traditions is a
taboo. From the common values, trust between otherwise not related
individuals arises, which is of great social importance (Fukuyama 1995).
What started as, for example, people working together as hunters to
catch larger preys has grown to nations striving for the same ideology. As
a group, we can be stronger than as individuals. However, at the same
time, many individuals become subject to the group, except those who
manage to steer the group. At the same time that we are members of large
flocks of people, we can also become shepherds guiding that flock into
the direction we like. The formation of large groups that collaborate in
various ways on a broad range of goals makes Homo sapiens very
powerful and dominant over other species. The same can also happen to
members of our own species not considered as being part of our own
groups: a position that is not without risks. In Charles Darwin’s words:
“Animals whom we have made our slaves we do not like to consider our
equals… animals with affections, imitation, fear of death, pain, sorrow
for the death”.
4 Societal Changes
Despite our almost unlimited power to dominate over other species, and
despite anthropo-denial tendencies, there is the empathy that keeps us
back from using the power without restriction. In some people, the drive
for it may be stronger than in others, but there have always been people
who don’t want to go as far as they possibly can—people who do not feel
comfortable with it, and who want to take a different approach. They see
a benefit in empathising with the world around them. In particular, peo-
ple who live in close contact with nature and who recognise their own
dependency upon natural resources tend to be more respectful towards
their living environment. They recognise supreme beings in, for example,
rivers and mountains, or in large trees and feel appreciation and empathy
for the animals in their environment.
In the first part of the twentieth century, enhanced by the world wars,
the world suffered from disastrous food shortages. Farmers could not
keep pace with the needs of the urban, non-food-producing majority.
Demand routinely outstripped supplies and exorbitant food prices con-
founded policymakers and enraged consumers. Much pressure was put
on farmers and the animal health sector to produce more food for lower
prices. The result was industrialisation of farming with larger number of
animals becoming raised faster in confined facilities. This was only pos-
sible due to advances in technology and science. As John Ikerd, Professor
Emeritus from the University of Missouri quoted “We bent nature to
serve our needs. We achieved the economies of large-scale, specialized
production as we applied the principles, strategies, and technologies of
industrialization to farming” (Ikerd 2008; MacKenzie 2015). This indus-
trialisation of animal farmers led to societal criticism.
Over the years, and especially in the last decades, more steps towards
recognising animals as more than inferior creatures, useful to produce
food, to deliver power or to keep us company are being made. The notion
that animals can suffer physically and emotionally is getting firmer feet
on the ground. With our growing knowledge and understanding of ani-
mals, attitudes towards animals are changing. Animal welfare science
leads to a better understanding of what it takes to create good living
conditions, respectively, to remove burdens that affect animal welfare. In
the sixties of the last century—also in response to the thought-provoking
book Animal Machines (Harrison 1964) about severe animal abuses in
poultry and livestock farming—the UK Brambell report declared that
animals kept on farms should have freedom “to stand up, lie down, turn
around, groom themselves and stretch their limbs”, a list that is still
referred to as Brambell’s Five Freedoms. Later on, another report, known
under the same name Five Freedoms, stated that the welfare of an animal
includes its physical and mental state and said that good animal welfare
implies both fitness and a sense of well-being. It concluded that any ani-
mal kept by man, must at least, be protected from unnecessary suffering.
These novels Five Freedoms comprise: Freedom from Hunger and Thirst,
from Discomfort, from Pain Injury or Disease, to Express Normal
Behaviour and from Fear and Distress (Farm Animal Welfare
Committee (FAWC) 2021).
Around the same time as the publication of the Brambell report, in the
middle of the 1960s, the Council of Europe, established in 1949 and
comprising 47 member countries, developed initiatives in the field of ani-
mal welfare. The reason the Council of Europe, which focus is on human
rights, became concerned about animal welfare was because it realized
that the dignity of mankind could not be dissociated from the respect
man owed to his environment and the animals which inhabited it. Topics
addressed in Council of Europe conventions are Protection of Animals
during International Transport (1968), Protection of animals kept for
farming purposes (1976), Protection of animals for Slaughter (1979),
Protection of Vertebrate Animals used for Experimentation and other
Scientific Purposes (1986) and Protection of Pet animals (1987). Member
countries can commit themselves to a specific convention by ratification.
Complementary to the above-mentioned Five Freedoms, 12 criteria

for the assessment of animal welfare have been identified by the Welfare
Quality Project, a research partnership of scientists from Europe and
Latin America funded by the EU. The project developed a standardized
system for assessing animal welfare and to develop practical strategies to
improve animal welfare. The criteria for the assessment of animal welfare
are (1) No prolonged hunger, that is, a sufficient and appropriate diet, (2)
No prolonged thirst, that is, sufficient and accessible water supply, (3)
Comfort around resting, (4) Thermal comfort, that is, neither too hot
nor too cold, (5) Enough space to be able to move around freely, (6) No
physical injuries, (7) Free from disease, with high standards of hygiene
and care, (8) No pain induced by inappropriate management, handling,
slaughter or surgical procedures (e.g. castration, dehorning), (9) Able to
express normal, non-harmful social behaviours (e.g. grooming), (10) Be
able to express other normal behaviours, that is, they should be able to
express species-specific natural behaviours such as foraging, (11) Be han-
dled well in all situations, that is, handlers should promote good human-
animal relationships, (12) Negative emotions such as fear, distress,
frustration or apathy should be avoided, whereas positive emotions such
as security or contentment should be promoted.
In the European Union, a protocol on the protection and welfare of
animals, recognising animals as sentient beings, was added to the 1997
EU Treaty, also called the Treaty of Amsterdam. Ten years later the
Amsterdam Treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Lisbon. In this treaty, in
force since December 2009, the notion that animals are sentient is incor-
porated in the text of the treaty itself. Article 13 of the treaty on the
functioning of the European Union says that: “In formulating and imple-
menting the Union’s agriculture, fisheries, transport, internal market, research
and technological development and space policies, the Union and the Member
States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare
requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative
provisions and customs of the EU countries relating in particular to religious
rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage”. Although the promotion of
animal welfare is not an EU objective as such, the union and its member
states clearly recognise that animals are sentient beings, and that for that
reason the animals’ needs shall be taken into consideration when
legislation is made and implemented in certain areas that might impact

animal welfare.
In 2002, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) adopted a
resolution through which the mandate of the organisation was expanded.
The organisation, established in 1924, added the welfare of animals in its
scope of activities. The welfare of the following categories of animals is
considered by the OIE: animals used in agriculture and aquaculture,
companion animals including “exotic”’ (wild-caught and “non-
traditional”) species, animals used for research, testing and/or teaching
purposes, free-living wildlife, including the issues of their slaughter and
trapping, animals used for sport, recreation and entertainment, including
in circuses and zoos. Also the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO) recognises animal welfare and that animal welfare
practices, despite their evident positive impacts, are insufficiently applied
throughout the sector, both in traditional and modern systems.
A key conceptual change in recent years is the shift towards the promo-
tion of positive animal welfare states (e.g. comfort and pleasure), rather
than simply the avoidance of negative states (e.g. pain, fear and frustra-
tion) (Mellor 2016). The Good Life framework proposes that animals
used by humans should have, at least, a life worth living, with a growing
number having a good life (Webster 2016).
5 Caring for Animals

In contrast to dominating animals and using animals for our benefit, we
can also care for the animals around us. Probably as long as people keep
animals, they care for their animals. The earliest domestications can be
traced to a period of history when humans began transitioning from rely-
ing primarily on food gathered in the wild to farming. Domestication of
dogs can be traced back at least 12,000 years. Among the first animals
domesticated for use as a food source were sheep, whose domestication
occurred between 12,000 and 9000 B.C. Goat domestication began
somewhat later, probably about 8000 B.C. while pig and cattle domesti-
cation came a few thousand years later. Generally, pig and cattle domes-
tication occurred in communities that were more settled than those that
travelled around. Horse domestication most probably dates back to about

5000 B.C. in Kazakhstan and 4000 B.C. in the Eurasian Steppes region.
Cat domestication began about 5500 B.C. Some other species, while
never being fully domesticated, have been employed to serve human pur-
poses. For example, there is evidence of elephants being used for heavy
work in India as early as 2000 B.C. They might have been used in the
South Asia region for thousands of years earlier than that.
The first known veterinary practice came into being in 9000 BC in the
Middle East. Shepherds used rudimentary medical skills to treat their
animals, including the dogs that watched over their herds. Thousands of
years later, in Egypt between 4000 and 3000 BC, medical treatment of
animals became more common but was still largely undeveloped (Ramirez
and Froment 2018). In approximately 1900 BC, someone captured the
first written accounts of veterinary medicine in four sacred Hindu texts.
Within these texts, two distinct writings outlined the fields of human and
animal medicine. The Shalihotra Samhita, dating from the third-century
BC is an early Indian veterinary paper that describes equine and elephant
anatomy, physiology, surgery and diseases with their curative and preven-
tive measures. The Egyptian Papyrus of Kahun (Twelfth Dynasty of Egypt)
is the first extant record of veterinary medicine (Thrusfield 2017).
Apart from these historical resources, there also are several stories and
legends about people helping animals. A well-known example is about
Androclus a runaway slave in the Roman Empire. When he takes shelter
in a cave, he encounters a wounded lion from whose paw he removes a
large thorn. Later on, Androclus is imprisoned and sent to Rome where
he, as a fugitive slave, is condemned to face the wild animals in Circus
Maximus. In the arena, he meets the same lion, which then shows its
friendship and affection towards Androclus. A schematic representation
of Androclus and the lion now forms the logo of the faculty of veterinary
medicine at Utrecht University.
6 Veterinary Medicine
Veterinary medicine as a science-based profession dates back to the eigh-
teenth century, the age of the enlightenment. During the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, the importance of the horse in both agricul-
tural and military terms increased rapidly. People became more and more
interested to keep their animals fit and healthy. At the same time, on the
countryside recurring outbreaks of infectious diseases like rinderpest had
a devastating impact on cattle populations. As a consequence, milk pro-
duction decreased and chronic shortages of manure to fertilize the land
occurred, all having a further negatively impact on crop production,
leading to poverty and famine for large groups of people.
It was Claude Bourgelat, born in Lyon (France) in 1712, a lawyer and
keen horseman who realised that in that time existing treatments based
on empiricism, traditions and superstition, and passed on from one gen-
eration to the next, often were inadequate if not counterproductive. In
1750, he wrote a book on animal medicine in which he considered the
idea of founding a veterinary school focussing on horses and horse dis-
ease. The decision on the establishment of a broader veterinary school
was pushed forward by another important person of that time, Henri-
Léonard Bertin. Bertin had a more comprehensive view on the needs of
the developing agricultural society. He recognized the societal divisions
of the time and was convinced that it would be difficult to get public
funding for a school that would only train in the care for horses. Bertin
provided Bourgelat with extra physiocratic reasons for the establishment
of a school. On 4 August 1761, the Council of State of the French king
Louis XV decided to fund an establishment with the aim to teach “pub-
licly the principles and the method of curing diseases of cattle, which will
gradually provide the agriculture of the Kingdom with the means to pro-
vide for the conservation of cattle in the places where the epidemic is
destroying the countryside” (Rinderpest was the first infectious animal
disease that could be eradicated completely. In 2011, the world was
declared free of rinderpest).
7 Liberal and Regulated Profession

Nowadays, veterinary medicine, like for example medicine and the notar-
ial profession, is considered as one of the liberal professions. The word
liberal or free refers to the independence with which the veterinarian is
expected to do his/her job. The word profession and also professionalism
originate from medieval Latin professare, meaning taking a vow or testi-
fying voluntarily and openly that one engages oneself to a certain attitude
or conduct. Also nowadays, in many countries vows or oaths are taken
when new graduates enter the profession. For example, in the UK when
a person is registered by the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons as a
member of the veterinary profession and licenced to practice veterinary
medicine, he or she declares: “I promise and solemnly declare that I will
pursue the work of my profession with integrity and accept my responsibilities
to the public, my clients, the profession and the Royal College of Veterinary
Surgeons, and that, above all, my constant endeavour will be to ensure the
health and welfare of animals committed to my care”.
In France, veterinarians declare the oath that is named after Claude
Bourgelat: “I promise and I swear before the Council of the Order of
Veterinarians to conform my professional conduct to the rules prescribed by
the code of ethics and to observe in all circumstances the principles of correct-
ness and justice. I take this oath to have at all times and in all places the
constant concern for the dignity and honor of the veterinary profession”. In
addition to ensuring the health and welfare of animals and obeying codes
of ethics, the dignity or image of the profession is an important factor of
these oaths. Society and individual clients should be able to have confi-
dence in the quality of the work of veterinarians.
In the EU legislation, the liberal professions are defined as professions
which are those practised on the basis of relevant professional qualifica-
tions in a personal, responsible and professionally independent capacity
by those providing intellectual and conceptual services in the interest of
the client and the public. Whereas this definition says “Liberal Professions
are exercised for the benefit of both the client ànd the public”, it will be
clear that the exercise of these professions is not free from tensions.
Individual clients and the general public may have different interests.
This situation becomes even more complicated when in the case of veteri-
nary medicine “for the benefit of the animal” is added to the equation.
What is for the benefit of the animal is not necessary for the benefit of its
owner or the benefit of society. Veterinary medicine and conflicting inter-
ests are inextricably connected with each other. Dealing with dilemmas is
a natural part of the practice of veterinary medicine. It is a constant chal-
lenge for the profession, operating in a free market, to deal with all dilem-
mas and to make the right choices. At the same time, the combination of
knowledge and skills together with balancing the interests at stake in an
ethical way is what lifts the profession above the technical level and what
makes the profession so unique and valuable. This is one of the reasons
why the veterinary profession is a regulated profession. To protect ani-
mals, animal owners and the public against unqualified or substandard
veterinary medicine, the access to the profession and the exercise of it are
made subject to specific pre-conditions. Only persons in possession of
the necessary qualifications can be licenced to practice, and if circum-
stances so require, licences can also be withdrawn.
In general, the regulation of the profession falls under the responsibil-
ity of the country’s competent authorities and is based in the national
legislation. However, in most cases, the implementation of the legislation
is delegated back to the profession itself. The idea behind this delegation
is that the veterinary professionals themselves are best placed to decide
what is to be considered as Good Veterinary Practice. Questions like: was
this examination, diagnosis, treatment and so on correct, given the cir-
cumstances and the state of art in veterinary medicine, are best answered
by professional peers. Special conditions to guarantee objective and inde-
pendent decisions have to be set.
In most countries an autonomous veterinary professional body, the
veterinary statutory body or licensing body is responsible for setting and
applying standards for good veterinary practice and professional conduct.
It is a requirement laid down in the World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code, which is agreed upon by
the 182 OIE member countries.
8 Evolving Standards
Veterinary medicine is a profession with a vocation that is fulfilled in
society. Veterinarians may enjoy their work, but they would rapidly be
without if there would not be a demand for it: animal owners who wish
to have their animals examined and treated, consumers who wish to be
assured that the animal products they consume are safe, traders in ani-
mals who want the health of the animals to be assessed and certified, the
general public with its interest in the health and welfare of animals and
possible consequences for public health and so on.
Veterinary medicine evolved with the evolutions in our society. Starting
off as cattle and horse medicine, it evolved towards treating all farm ani-
mals including public health issues, with an important focus in the last
decades on companion animal medicines. Veterinary medicine also
changed from a male profession to a very much female-oriented profes-
sion (FVE 2018).
Until some decades ago the way farm animal veterinarians performed
their duties was not always well visible for the outer world. In general
veterinarians and animal keepers together decided what they believed
would be the optimal solution for the issue at stake. For farm animals, the
focus was on animal health and productivity. The general public was not
much involved and preferred to trust that everything would be fine.
This attitude began to change in the 1960s. Certainly, after a few high-
profile publications, society got more interested in the welfare of farm
animals. Animal welfare organizations became more active with regard to
the welfare of these animals. They became more critical of what was
accepted as “regular” practices. Production habits and systems that had
crept into animal husbandry over the years, primarily for the purpose of
improving production efficiency, were critically scrutinised. After, for
many years, food safety and production efficiency had been the dominant
factors, interest in the way in which these goals were achieved and what
that meant for the animals involved started to grow steadily. The idea that
if animals weren’t sick and grew quickly, they would be fine, lost ground.
Also, the suggestion that interventions such as tail docking and beak
trimming, since they resulted in less tail biting and cannibalism, was
better for the animals themselves became refuted. More and more the
idea that an animal is not simply a means of production but a living being
with feelings, a sentient being, became more and more accepted.
The position of the veterinary profession evolved along with the soci-
etal change. Nowadays, animal welfare is seen as a “common good” and a
societal expectation. Veterinarians are expected to promote and ensure
the welfare of animals under their care by using their scientific knowledge
and skills in ethical reasoning and advocacy. Several veterinarians have
played a pioneering role and advocated a better welfare for animals.
Collaboration with animal welfare organizations increased. The place of
animal welfare in veterinary training has also grown substantially. Since
2011 the mission of the Federation of Veterinarians of Europe is “The
European veterinary profession, embodied by FVE, strives to enhance animal
health, animal welfare, public health and the protection of the environment
by promoting the veterinary profession” and “Together with its members,
FVE aims to support veterinarians in delivering their professional responsi-
bilities to the best possible standard, and that this expertise is recognised and
valued by society”.
In its European Veterinary Code of Conduct FVE states the following:
“Veterinarians shall respect animals as sentient beings. Veterinarians shall
have knowledge of animal health and welfare science, ethics and law.
Veterinarians shall ensure/restore the welfare of the animals under their care
in whichever section of the veterinary profession they work, bearing in mind
the five freedoms and promoting positive welfare. Animals should experience
both a good life and a humane death without unnecessary suffering”. These
statements are followed by several recommendations, giving more precise
advices on the professional conduct of veterinarians towards the animals
under their care.
In 2012, given ongoing scientific developments and society’s expecta-
tions, the Federation of Veterinarians of Europe (FVE) partnered with
the European Association of Establishments for Veterinary Education
(EAEVE), which is the accrediting body for veterinary education estab-
lishments within Europe, to examine animal welfare in the context of
European veterinary education. In 2013, both associations agreed on a
model curriculum in animal welfare science, ethics and law. That docu-
ment adopted six competences every veterinarian should have on the day
of graduation (Day-1 competences), expressed in 34 learning objectives.

The 2013 model curriculum is now part of the EAEVE/FVE veterinary
school evaluation and accreditation system which ensures that the agreed-
upon benchmark for educational levels is met. In 2019, a follow-up sur-
vey was done to monitor the evolution of animal welfare teaching in
Europe. Overall results showed that the teaching of animal welfare sci-
ence, ethics and law has increased in response to growing societal needs,
and that welfare is more and more internally embedded in the profession,
which is reflected in the curriculum (De Briyne et al. 2020).
The increasing importance of animal welfare in veterinary education is
also recognised by the setting up of the European College of Animal
Welfare and Behavioural Medicine (ECAWBM 2021). The Animal
Welfare Science, Ethics and Law speciality was recognised in 2011 by the
European Board of Veterinary Specialisation (EBVS) and has grown to,
at present, more than 120 veterinary specialists. Similar veterinary spe-
cialisation colleges exist in North America, Australia and New Zealand.
Also in 2012, The World Organisation for Animal health OIE published
recommendations on the competencies of graduating veterinarians to
assure high quality of national veterinary services. The document includes
a section on animal welfare, that says: “Animal welfare refers to the state of
the animal, it means how an animal is coping with the conditions in which
it lives. Good animal welfare requires disease prevention and veterinary treat-
ment, appropriate shelter (when relevant), management, nutrition, humane
handling, and humane slaughter/killing. Veterinarians should be the leading
advocates for the welfare of all animals, recognizing the key contribution that
animals make to human society through food production, companionship,
biomedical research and education”. Specific learning objectives for this
competency include the Day 1 veterinary graduate being able to: explain
animal welfare and the related responsibilities of owners, handlers, veteri-
narians and others responsible for the care of animals; identify animal
welfare problems and participate in corrective actions; know where to
find up-to-date and reliable information regarding local, national and
international animal welfare regulations/standards in order to describe
humane methods for: animal production; transport; slaughter for human
consumption and killing for disease control purposes.
In 2020, the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA), the

Federation of Veterinarians of Europe (FVE) and the Canadian Veterinary
Medical Association (CVMA) revised its existing statement on animal
welfare (FVE 2020) recognising that sentient animals are capable of expe-
riencing positive physical and emotional states (or feelings), including
but not limited to comfort and pleasure, as well as negative states, such as
pain, fear and frustration.
9 Epilogue
In the previous sections we discussed the relation between human and
non-human animals, a connection that is underlined by Darwin’s evolu-
tion theory. Although differences between species may be more striking,
similarities are generally greater and more numerous. These similarities
go beyond mere anatomical or physiological parallels. Properties that we
like to consider as typically human are also present in animals, for exam-
ple: empathy, the ability to imagine ourselves being in the other’s position
and to experience their feelings.
There are also areas where Homo sapiens differs from other animals,
such as the ability to form large communities to collaborate on all kinds
of common goals. Through the spread of, often abstract, believes, fears,
hopes, and so on, people can be motivated to follow the group, and to
adhere to its norms and believes, including the attitude towards other
animal species. Such groups can become very powerful, dominate other
animal species and ruthlessly ignore their interests and needs.
We also looked at ongoing societal changes regarding the welfare of
animals. In recent decades, societal interest in the way animals are kept
has grown. International organisations and institutions have both fol-
lowed and reinforced this development, for example by including animal
welfare in their mandate or by establishing a legal framework for the
protection of animal welfare. A key conceptual change is the shift towards
the promotion of positive animal welfare states instead of avoiding nega-
tive states. Also in the field encouraging steps forward are made, although
there still is a long way to go.
Then we took a closer look into the history of caring for sick animals
and the special role veterinarian plays here. Emerging as a profession in
the eighteenth century, the veterinary medicine is considered as one of
the liberal professions, professions where different interests (individual
and society) are at stake and where the practitioner is committed to fol-
low certain ethical principles. Where at the beginning, the focus was on
treating sick animals, other related responsibilities followed, such as dis-
ease prevention, food hygiene and public health matters, and animal
welfare.
Nowadays, the practice of veterinary medicine is regulated. The admis-
sion to the profession and the practice of veterinary medicine are depen-
dent on certain requirements. The veterinarian can be subject to
disciplinary measures, up to a withdrawal of the licence to practise. The
profession itself plays a leading role in the setting and implementation of
professional standards. Minimum requirements for pre- and post-
graduate training, codes of conduct, guidelines for good veterinary prac-
tice, and formularia for the use of medicines, are some clear examples.
Research, education and specialization of veterinarians in the field of ani-
mal welfare together with awareness and advocacy campaigns contribute
to a better understanding of how the welfare of animals shall be assured.
Looking to the future there is an increasing attention for the ecosys-
tems, biodiversity and climate change. Criticism on unsustainable animal
husbandry practices, including practices that cause low animal welfare, is
growing. Even though animals don’t seem to play an important role in
the spread of the virus SARS-CoV-2, a connection between pandemics
like the current one and the way people and animals live together on the
planet cannot be denied. Over time veterinarians have evolved to a regu-
lated, liberal profession that combines science and skills with ethics.
Balancing different interests of people and animals is at the heart of their
daily responsibilities. Caring for the health and welfare of animals and
people is in their genes so to speak. A next step in their evolution that
could be crucial for the future of the profession is a stronger ability to
guide societal changes rather than closely following them. Inspiring peo-
ple to no longer considering animals, on which we are dependent in so
complex a manner, as slaves, but only as our fellow brethren and
companions would be a great aspiration. No better recognition for the

work of Charles Darwin, and tremendously helpful for all animal species,
not the least our own.
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9
A Proposal for a Multi-Dimensional
Profile of the Animal Researcher
Augusto Vitale
1 Introduction
Tora Holmberg wrote that working with non-human animals (from now
on “animals”) in a laboratory context entails to deal with both an emo-
tional and a corporeal dimension (Holmberg 2011). This is true, but
within and beyond these two dimensions we can identify other aspects
that influence, characterise and describe the practice of animal experi-
mentation. A researcher working today with an animal model should, in
my opinion, at least be aware of these different factors, and being open
and available to the ways these factors can influence and characterise his/
her work. Although these factors, sometimes because not easily controlled
and kept constant, could be thought of as detrimental to scientific meth-
odology, this should not be necessarily so. Instead, they should be seen as
A. Vitale (*)
Center for Behavioural Sciences and Mental Health, Istituto Superiore di
Sanità, Rome, Italy
172 A. Vitale
an occasion of growth, a possibility to render more complex (in a stimu-

lating way) and comprehensive approaches to animal experimentation.
In this contribution, I will try to discuss those elements whose knowl-
edge and awareness can, in my opinion, enrich the perception researchers
can have of their work with animals, and the perception society could
have of scientists using animal models for research. Nowadays, a desirable
and functional communication between science and society requires,
from the scientists’ point of view, a will to consider the different motiva-
tions and consequences related to the use of animals in research and to be
open to discuss with the public, aiming at a higher level of transparency
(McLeod and Hobson-West 2015; Pound and Blaug 2016). This per-
spective, obviously, requires also from the public a will to listen without
prejudices those motivations and reasons which underline animal
experiments.
From an ethical point of view, I would like to point out that my inten-
tion is not to discuss whether the use of animals in laboratory research is
morally justifiable or not, although it is obviously a crucial issue. What I
would like to do instead is to argue within the practice of using animals
for research purposes. I will try to offer a multi-dimensional portrait of
the researcher who is working with animal models: the scenario in which
I want to present my observations considers the use of animals in research
morally justifiable, always within certain limits and framed in a defensi-
ble harm/benefit analysis (Pollo and Vitale 2020, but see also Eggel and
Grimm 2018). The ethical choices the researchers have to do then are
related to the invasiveness of their procedures, and how to take into
account the capability of animals to experience pain and sufferance. It is
worth to point out that nowadays, mainly in the scientific community,
animal experimentation is considered both necessary and permissible.
However, we have also to reflect on the fact that not always what is per-
missible is automatically necessary (Duffy 2015).
But, first of all, let me frame the practice of animal experimentation in
terms of methodologies and numbers.
9 A Proposal for a Multi-Dimensional Profile of the Animal… 173
2 Animal Experimentation
Animal experimentation is the use of animals to produce animal models
to be studied mainly in a laboratory setting.
By the time of writing of this contribution, animal experimentation is
still a very relevant feature of biomedical and toxicological studies, if only
in quantitative terms. The last data made available by the Member States
of the EU reports a total of about 8.921.758 million of animals utilised
in research laboratories in the year 2018 (https://ec.europa.eu/environ-
ment/chemicals/lab_animals/reports_en.htm). These figures mark a
decrease of animals used, in comparison with previous years (although
the relative numbers of non-human primates, NHP is increasing), with
mice still being by far the species mostly used (52% of the total), followed
by fishes (26%) and rats (9%), whereas cats, dogs and NHP occupy the
last place (0.3%). The main purpose was research (74%) of which 46%
of all uses were carried out for basic research and 28% for translational
and applied research. A further 18% of animal use was for regulatory
purposes to satisfy legislative requirements. Other purposes are character-
ised by smaller numbers, such as protection of the natural environment
in the interest of the health or welfare of humans and animals, preserva-
tion of species, higher education, forensic enquiries.
The aims of animal experimentation therefore occupy a continuum
from “basic research”, where the focus is on improving our knowledge of
a particular biological phenomenon, to “applied or “translational”
research, where the scope is to prevent and/or treat a particular disease.
A possible definition of animal model can be the following: “An ani-
mal with a disease either the same as or like a disease in humans”, and
“Animal models are used to study the development and progression of
diseases and to test new treatments before they are given to humans”
(https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/
animal-model). These definitions imply that different species from ours
can be used to better understand different aspects of human diseases,
and/or potential treatments are tested on another species to prevent nega-
tive effects on our species.
174 A. Vitale
Animal models provide different information in relation to the kind of

questions asked. In literature (and in practice) three different kinds of
animal models can be described in terms of their validity: “face”, “con-
struct”, “predictive”. In the first case the chosen model will replicate
symptoms of a particular pathology; in the second case the model aims at
describing and better understand the mechanisms underlying a particular
disease; finally, using a model with predictive validity will predict cur-
rently unknown aspects of the disease in humans, or will help to find
treatment for a particular condition. For example, if the condition to be
studied is Parkinson’s disease, a model with a good face validity will rep-
licate the signs of this syndrome, such as tremor and rigidity of move-
ments. A model with a relevant construct validity will enquire, for
example, about the mechanisms involving dopamine cells when the dis-
ease develops. The predictive validity of an animal model, in this case,
will then improve our knowledge on possible cures for this disease
(Osborne and Lutz 2013; Van Kampen and Robertson 2017). It is obvi-
ous that the researcher must be able to distinguish among these different
possibilities, in order not to ask the right question to the wrong model.
And is also probable that most of the time a particular animal model will
have just one strong kind of validity.
Opponents of animal experiments often claim that one of the major
conceptual and biological problems of animal models is the differences
between species: “a human is not a 70kg mouse!” This is very true (see,
e.g., Mestas and Hughes 2004; Demetrius 2005). Not even a chimpan-
zee, with whom we share about 99% of the genome, is equal to a human
being. The point is that researchers utilising animal models are scarcely
interested in differences, but much more in similarities. I believe that the
concept of animal models is a Darwinian one. Charles Darwin has con-
vincingly proposed that the number of common biological characteristics
between two species is related to the time past from the existence of a
common ancestor of those two species. So, therefore, a macaque and a
human have more characteristics in common than a mouse and a human,
because the common ancestor to all primates lived in more recent times
than the common ancestor between mice and humans. That is why
Darwin has much to do with the basic theory that justifies the use of
animal model in biomedical and toxicological studies. This concept
should be, and as matter of fact is, part of the cultural curriculum of ani-
mal researchers: to feel comfortable and being informed on the Darwinian
point of view of their scientific practice is essential.
3 nimal Researcher as Part

A
of the Scientific Community
We recently sent out questionnaires to researchers working in different
EU Member States, with different species in different areas of research,
enquiring about motivational processes underlying experimental work
with animals (Borgi et al. in press). Among the reasons for choosing a
particular species to create an animal model, the most important one was
the validity of the chosen model, that is, the link between the scientific
question addressed and the chosen methodology to answer. This was
valid for different fields of enquiry as well as for researchers of different
nationalities. It can then be said that this is then a very strong and shared
principle within the scientific community working with animal models.
Therefore, the scientific correctness of the research with animals is very
well present in the very practice of animal experiments, and it could not
be different and appears a very obvious thing to say. As said before, this
has to do with the recognition of the particular kind of validity we are
looking for in that particular animal model.
Beyond the correct importance that researchers attribute to the coher-
ence between the question asked and the model utilised, the use of ani-
mals in research is not free of weaknesses and issues which can undermine
the scientific validity of this practice. For example, many publications
now call for a more precise and informative description of the planning
of the experiments and the statistics used (Ioannidis et al. 2014; Curtis
et al. 2015: Smith et al. 2018). The National Center for the 3Rs in
London (https://www.nc3rs.org.uk/) has recently published the revised
version of the ARRIVE Guidelines in which a strong emphasis is now
given to the need to report exactly the experimental plan, the statistics
used in detail, in order to improve reproducibility of experiments, and
scientific credibility, as well as translational power to humans.
176 A. Vitale
It is my opinion then that the scientific issue at stake in using animals

as models is not the fact that a mouse is too different from a human to
justify animal experiments, but rather the fact that we need animal
research done in a proper methodological way. To belong to the scientific
community, it means to go along the rules that are understood as good
practice. It is sometimes a silent agreement, and in this respect, statistic
science represents a good example, such as the agreed level of probability
for significance of results. In the case of animal experimentation, not
adhering to these rules means to poorly serve the scientific community
the researcher is part of, but not only. Apart from the dissatisfaction of
the public which requires (like in many other professions) a good level of
professionality, basically to return tax-payers’ money to society, badly
planned and conducted experiments raise also ethical issues, in relation
to the waste and misuse of animals utilised in those particular experi-
ments. Therefore, the researchers have to stick to rules that constitute
what is understood as acceptable experimental science, that is, the model
chosen has to adhere to the questions posed, the statistics have to be right
and the results have to reproducible.
Among the different dimensions that characterise the work of the ani-
mal researcher, it therefore can be said that the scientific one is the most
obvious and, let say, “automatic” one. However, this dimension touches
other spheres of interest such as, as indicated before, ethical and norma-
tive issues. Surely, the last one has now become in the last years a promi-
nent feature of the daily work with animals in research laboratories.
4 nimal Researcher as a Part

A
of a Legal Community
The Directive 2010/63/EU regulates the use of animals in scientific pro-
cedures in the EU Member States (European Commission 2010), provid-
ing for an adequate level of welfare. Ten years have passed since the
publication of this set of norms, updating the previous Directive EU
86/609, and it still represents a significant change in relation to the legal
protection of animals used in research laboratories. For example, the
number of articles from the previous version is more than doubled, and
some actions needed to protect the level of welfare of experimental ani-
mals have become mandatory, instead of being just suggested as previ-
ously indicated.
One of the main, and welcome, new emphasis on the Directive
2010/63/EU is the attention towards the application of the 3Rs Principle,
published by William Russell and Rex Burch in 1959. The two authors
introduced a series of recommendations, a sort of methodological recipe,
which any researcher should follow when planning an experiment involv-
ing animals. These recommendations are collectively indicated as “The
Principle of the 3Rs”. The first “R” is intended as “Replacement”, that is,
first of all, the researcher must evaluate the possibility to substitute his/
her animal model with a non-sentient being or in vitro and in silico mod-
els; the second “R” is for “Reduction”, suggesting he/she must try as
much as possible to reduce the number of individuals used in a particular
experimental protocol, without compromising statistical power; finally,
the third “R” stands for “Refinement”, where the researchers must try as
much as possible to reduce the amount of sufferance and distress experi-
enced by the animal during all of its life in captivity, including the daily
life outside a particular experimental protocol (Russel and Burch 1959).
The Principle, which was just mentioned in the previous Directive, is
now understood as the methodological backbone of the Directive
2010/63/EU. Its application is explicitly called for in different articles of
the normative text, and the ignorance of the Principle is not permitted: it
must be part of the cultural and methodological curriculum of anyone
involved with animal research. However, the 3Rs Principle is not only a
methodological technique, although this is what the two authors mainly
intended, but asks for a shift of paradigm regarding animal research. The
story of the Principle can help in better understanding this aspect, also in
relation to my suggestion to widen the approach to animal experimenta-
tion by the scientific community.
In the 50s’, Charles Hume, President of the University Federation of
Animal Welfare (UFAW), realised the need to fill a gap between the world
of laboratory technicians and a view of the animals beyond just as means
to conduct a scientific experiment. This broader view was termed as a
“humanist” point of view. The idea was to contribute to the development
178 A. Vitale
of a particular research protocol with elements from other disciplines,

such as anthropology and philosophy. Animals had then to be perceived
as beings able to experience positive and/or negative mental states. Hume
was dreaming of a new experimental science, in which scientific practice
would be strictly linked with humanist values. Therefore, he was propos-
ing to widen the role of animal researchers in the laboratories as just
technicians applying a particular experimental procedure. William
Russell (a brilliant and open-minded zoology graduated from Oxford)
and Rex Burch (his assistant) embraced such mission, and in 1959 pub-
lished the book “The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique”.
The book went unnoticed for some years but then from the 90s’ on, its
value became more and more evident, and now the Principle is an inte-
gral part of the norms regulating animal experiments in the Member
States of EU (Tannenbaum and Bennett 2015; Kirk 2018).
The important issue in the “philosophy” of Russell and Burch’s book is
the contrast between “Inhumanity” and “humanity”. The two authors
emphasise the concept of “humanity”, as a goal to go for when planning
a scientific experiment with the use of animal models, by diminishing
and when possible eliminating inhumanity. The important point made is
that “inhumanity” and “humanity” are descriptive and not normative
terms, and the general aim is “to promote humane behavior towards wild
and domestic animals in Britain and abroad so as to reduce the sum total
of pain and fear inflicted on animals by man” (p. 14). The concepts of
“inhumanity” and “humanity” do not themselves express value judge-
ments but are strictly descriptive and empirical, and refer to objectively
verifiable and measurable aspects of the treatment of animals. This posi-
tion is in line with the “philosophy” of the Directive 2010/63, which
does not deal with the ethical rights or wrongs of the use of animals, but
aims at protecting the ones still used (that is why the 3Rs Principle is so
prominent in the normative text) and, more modestly, agrees with my
intent of discussing the practice of animal experimentation within an
ethically acceptable framework justifying their use.
In my opinion using the Principle of the “3Rs” as a sort of forma men-
tis, help the researcher to abandon the purely scientific domain of his/her
work with animals (as a part of the scientific community) and enter,
through a legal requirement (as part of a legal community), an ethical
domain which implies a correct consideration of animals beyond the

mere concept of means to pursue a scientific result. Furthermore, in term
of relation between science and society (see later in this manuscript), the
“3Rs” Principle is an effective tool in trying to harmonise the needs of
scientific research and the continuously growing demands from the pub-
lic of respect towards animals.
Another strong legal requirement, which borders with the ethical
dimension of animal experimentation, is the analysis of the cost/benefit
ratio. In the Directive 2010/63, the article 18 specifies the conditions
under which a permit to do animal research is granted. Comma 2.d
recites the need to verify “a harm-benefit analysis of the project, to assess
whether the harm to the animals in terms of suffering, pain and distress
is justified by the expected outcome taking in to account ethical consid-
erations, and may ultimately benefit human beings, animals or the envi-
ronment” (European Commission 2010). This concept is linked with a
utilitarian view of animal experiments, where benefits must outweigh the
costs (Foex 2007; Pollo and Vitale 2020). The benefits are intended as the
tangible possibility to prevent, diagnose and cure, of human illness (as
well as improving basic knowledge on a biological phenomenon), whereas
the costs are the real and potential pain and sufferance inflicted upon
experimental animals. The harm/benefit analysis is at the core of the jus-
tification for caging animals and subjecting them to different procedures,
which vary in their level of invasiveness. The harm/benefit analysis has
been modelled in a very effective way by Patrick Bateson in his “Cube of
decisions”, published in 1986. After all these years, the cube still offers a
stimulating way to reason on the feasibility of a particular research, in a
way that has much to do with harm/benefit analysis. The cube requires
moving along three vectors (from low to high values), when evaluating
the characteristics of a particular animal research: (i) harms inflicted to
animals; (ii) scientific quality: (iii) benefits to humans (Bateson 1986).
Moving along the three vectors will determine the feasibility of a certain
project, for example: a project with low benefit value, but with high level
of harms to animals will occupy a “dark” section of the cube, where proj-
ects should not be carried out.
However, Eggel and Grimm (2018) suggest to reflect on different con-
cepts related to a harm/benefit analysis, such as “outcome”, “benefit” or
180 A. Vitale
“prospective benefit assessment”. For example, one of the issues the two
authors present is the notion that our understanding of the harm/benefit
analysis identifies outcome with potential benefits for society: the con-
cern here is that this conviction is too simplistic in relation to the com-
plex nature of scientific research, where the relationship between outcome
of research and societal benefits is not linear. They propose a more realis-
tic analysis of the potential societal benefit of a particular research,
through a careful retrospective systematic review of similar researches.
Finally, their proposal is to replace the concept of “harm/benefit analysis”
with “harm/knowledge analysis”. For sure, we should consider the harm/
benefit analysis as something dynamic. Both terms do and must change
with time, and have to reflect the progress in basic and applied research,
as well as in animal welfare science, and in our relationship with other
animals (see Davies et al. 2017).
To take into account both the “3Rs” Principle and to perform an
appropriate harm/benefit analysis is then required by law, and therefore
the researcher who complies with these requirements re-affirms his/her
membership to a legal community in relation to animal experiments.
However, those two concepts require also a different consideration of the
animal, and not only a dot on a graph. In the spirit of Russel and Burch,
a “humanistic” approach is now called for, and this attitude overlaps with
ethical issues related to animals’ ability to experience pain and /or
sufferance.
5 The Researcher as Ethical Agent

The researcher working on animal models brings with him/her a signifi-
cant ethical weight. In other words, the practice of animal experimenta-
tion, in the near totality of cases, imposes some degree of sufferance on
the experimental subjects. As said before, I am not here interested in
discussing the ethical aspect related to the decision to use animals in
research or not. What I am interested in is the ethical perspective which
accompanies the practice of using animals in research. Having said that,
to underline again the interactions between different aspects of animal
experiments, the analysis of the harm/benefit ratio includes the
possibility to avoid the use of animal subjects altogether, but we are any-
way reasoning within the justification of using the animals as possible
reliable models for human pathologies, and the ethical justification to do
so. However, this justification works within certain limits, and the harm/
benefit analysis does indeed explore these limits.
However, an important point I am in favour of is that researchers
should be aware of the different theories related to the ethical issue of
using animals or not (such as the works of Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and
so on…see, e.g., Beauchamp and Frey 2011) and, as matter of fact, it is
actually required by law that this knowledge should be part of educa-
tional curriculum of who is involved with animal research.
We go back then to the main issue of this section, that is, to apply
invasive procedures on animals who can experience pain and sufferance.
Jeremy Bentham notoriously said: “The question is not, Can they reason?
nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” The Directive 2010/63/EU
protects animals who are considered “sentient”, that is, able to feel pain
and sufferance. It is obvious to say that the main issue here is the term
“sentient”, and how this is related to the suffering of experimental ani-
mals. “Sentience” is perhaps one of the most slippery concepts in behav-
ioural biology. There are many different definitions, and is a term that
encounters significant difficulties when we need to think experiments
able to clarify its meaning. In short, it can be said that sentience is the
capacity of feeling (Somme 2011), that is, the ability to feel and have
subjective experiences (this issue is very well discussed in other sections of
the present volume). It is also argued that sentience can also be intended
as the whole experience of an animal in its own environment, as well as
its own body. The main reference, in this case, is the famous Thomas
Nagel’s article “What is it like to be a bat?” (Nagel 1974). But, although
in theoretical terms it remains a topic of major importance, it does not
take much to admit that animals (with degrees) are able to suffer beyond
the physical sensation of pain. There are many ethological observations
that strongly suggest that animals are able to anticipate, remember, avoid
and be afraid of painful situations (Dunlop et al. 2006; Kirkden and
Pajor 2006; Monclus et al. 2009). Therefore we have, at least, to give the
animals the benefit of doubt, and we can again cite Jeremy Bentham: “If
we behave towards animals thinking that they are able to feel pain and/or
182 A. Vitale
sufferance, and if we are wrong in this belief, we do not cause them suf-
ferance; on the contrary, if we treat them thinking that they do not feel
pain and/or sufferance, if we are wrong, we are likely to cause a great deal
of discomfort”. But, actually, this is what we do. If it was not, there would
not be the Directive 2010/63/EU, for example, and there would be no
laws against cruelty to animals. If we adhere to this idea, then it is clear
that sentient animals have welfare interests that need to be protected.
Some animals are then considered to be especially vulnerable in certain
conditions, for example NHP, and therefore they are afforded special pro-
tection (see article 8 of the Directive 2010/63/EU on NHP).
Humans are entitled to live a healthy and long life, but the other ani-
mals have the right to aim for a life avoiding unnecessary sufferance. The
important issue here is, obviously, how to weigh one claim against the
other. The harm/benefit analysis is required by law but, in my opinion, is
also touching ethical issues related to how to treat experimental animals,
and what kind of consideration the researchers have to offer to them.
Researchers must be updated in, for example, new ways of understanding
and considering animal suffering, in relation to particular species and the
experience of particular individuals.
When carrying out experimental procedures of animals, the research-
ers have methodological tools that can be used to assess the ethical issues
of their experiments. The main tools, as just pointed out, are the harm/
benefit analysis and the application of the 3Rs Principle (Baertschi and
Gyger 2011). In particular, considering the “R” of “Refinement”, the
amount of harms can be reduced by providing adequate housing and
working in a way to promote positive emotions. This can be challenging
because nowadays we know much more about external stimuli causing
negative emotions (fear, stress …) than positive ones (happiness, com-
fort …) (the very definition and description of positive emotions in non-
human animals are still problematic, see, e.g., Boissy et al. 2007; Proctor
and Garter 2015). However, Refinement is crucial in diminishing the
quantity of harms during the carrying out of a particular experimental
protocol. To shorten the duration of a procedure (time spent on a restrain-
ing chair, lowering the foot-shock level, or reducing the repetition of
behavioural tests on the same subject…) can significantly reduce the level
of invasiveness of a particular protocol. All of this requires the researchers
to acquire, and maintain, a solid knowledge (as much as possible) of what

constitutes pain and/or sufferance in different animal species.
In terms of harming animals during experiments, a personal dimen-
sion can influence the researcher’s preference and/or choice. Some
researchers would not work with particular species like NHP (too similar
to us) or dogs (as humans we share an evolutionary and affective story
with them) (Borgi et al. in press). Personal feelings about particular ani-
mals get in the way of scientific methodology. Therefore, we have some
normative requests to consider a certain level of harms admissible or not
when inflicted upon experimental animals, and these are guided by the
ever-evolving knowledge of what it means pain and/or sufferance for a
particular animal, and often grounded on personal attitudes towards a
particular species rather than another. These different components are, in
my opinion, equally valuable in the practice of animal experimentation,
to be taken into account seriously as part of the knowledge and awareness
of an animal researcher, and as part of his/her relationship with experi-
mental subjects.
6 Researcher as Relational Subject

What is, or should be, the relationship between the researcher and his/her
research subject? A series of articles can be found in the literature describ-
ing the passage from considering an animal a biological subject to becom-
ing just a number on a graph (Holmberg 2008; Duffy 2015; Svendsen
2016). Nevertheless, research animals cannot be considered to be just
bodies on which to put in practice particular experimental procedures,
but part of a significant relationship: the researcher and the mouse, for
example, depend on each other within this complex relationship
(Holmberg 2008). Donna Haraway talks about “meeting of species”
when it comes to animal experimentation, where humans should work
out how to limit the inequality of the relationship between, for example,
a researcher and an experimental mouse (Haraway 2007). However, in
my opinion, the context of animal experimentation cannot imply a rela-
tionship of equality between human and non-humans. Animal experi-
mentation is a case in which humans deliberately use non-human animals
184 A. Vitale
for their benefit: nobody asked the mouse if it wants to be there: does the
mouse want to be part of that relationship? Animal experimentation is by
its own nature, anthropocentric and speciesist, and there is no equality
we can aim for.
We can think of some interesting questions that can be asked regarding
the relationship between the researchers and the experimental subjects.
For example: “Is the researcher likely to develop a bond with the subjects
of his/her experiments?”, and “Is it advisable for a researcher to develop
such bond?” (Vitale 2011). I think that these questions are very much
context-related, and it depends very much on the personality of the
researcher, his/her attitudes, character and so on. Nevertheless, I can try
to offer some general thoughts that I think could be interesting to further
a deeper discussion on this issue.
I think, first of all, that a sentimental bond between researchers and
animals in a laboratory setting has a lot to do with the kind of species is
under observation. NHP, for example, due to their phylogenetic close-
ness to humans, are more likely to inspire attachment than, let say, a
mouse. It is easier, in this case, to transfer human emotions and feelings
in the experimental subject, through a process of anthropomorfisation
(consciously or unconsciously). It is easier to attribute personality to a
monkey than a rat (although the literature on animal personality now
includes many different species, see, e.g., for a review, Gosling 2008). A
macaque is more likely to go through a process of “humanisation” during
its life in a laboratory, than a mouse or a fish, and this transformation can
be a vehicle towards a process of bonding between the researcher and the
experimental animal. This is not to say that this process cannot happen
with other species as well (in our laboratory there is a rat which is a mas-
cot of the group, with its own name and not used in experimental
protocols).
Is to have feelings for the experimental subjects a bad thing? Holmberg
suggests that emotions such as love or the feeling of friendship towards
experimental are actually “intrinsic dimensions” (her words) of the rela-
tionship between researchers and animals in the laboratory setting
(Holmberg 2011). I would like to move this line of thought forward, in
saying that the feeling of friendship can be an added value to the quality
of animal experimentation. For example, to name animals, a common
practice in NHP laboratories (especially in the case of behavioural studies

where the number of experimental subjects is limited) naming can be a
vehicle for a better consideration of welfare problems. The “named” ani-
mal becomes like a person, and he/she becomes less animal and more
human, while acquiring a distinct personality (or, better, his/her person-
ality becomes more evident…). In our laboratory, where we studied dif-
ferent aspects of the behaviour of a captive colony of common marmosets
(Callithrix jacchus), we encouraged students to choose names for the
experimental subjects. That would automatically facilitate the develop-
ment of a bond between the human and the animal, and therefore pos-
sibly a sort of attention to protect the physical and psychological
well-being of that particular individual. Needless to say, those animals
who are experiencing a good level of welfare provide sounder and often
less variable data (Poole 1997).
This is all good, but a series of difficulties arise from this sentimental
perspective. I am a primatologist and, as said before, to develop a senti-
mental bond with a macaque is one thing, with a zebrafish is another
altogether. Then, for a researcher growing affectionate with a particular
individual could result in a conflicting psychological situation when that
individual goes under invasive procedures. Thirdly, all of this could be
seen as an exercise of hypocrisy: “would you stick electrodes in the skull
of someone you care for?” (…and it is not even for its own good!). This
is a remark that must be taken into consideration, with lines of reasoning
belonging to the field of animal ethics, of which I am not expert enough
to discuss here.
Finally, I do believe then that potential feelings leading to a sentimen-
tal bond between researcher and experimental subject should be culti-
vated, leading to animal experimentation of a better quality. It is a
dimension not to be discarded as “unscientific” or “un-objective”, but
instead enriching this particular scientific practice.
7 Researcher as Member of Society

“Scientific procedure cannot be claimed to be set apart from society”
(Holmberg and Ideland 2012).
186 A. Vitale
The scientist is a member of society. The days in which the scientific

community regarded itself as a separated group of experts from the rest of
the world, while searching for the Holy Grail of Scientific Truth, are well
passed by. Fortunately today, researchers working with animal models are
much more available to discuss in public their motivations and activities.
Furthermore, as indicated by Michel and Birke (1994), researchers should
be able to engage in moral argument in public discussion about using
animal models.
The researcher working with animal models has a responsibility
towards the public from different angles. This responsibility can also be
fulfilled through transparency. Transparency opens a gate of communica-
tion and trust between the scientific community and the general public,
and I have always thought that a researcher should be able to explain and
justify what he or she is doing in a research laboratory using animals. But
still, sometimes the relationship between public and animal researchers is
troublesome (researchers sometimes are still afraid of exposing themselves
to the public, for fear of retaliation from the intransigent sectors of the
protectionist movement). However, in the context of animal research,
many initiatives have been developed to improve the relationship between
researchers and members of the general public, and to try to understand
its nature. For example, “Understanding Animal Research” (UAR;
https://www.understandinganimalresearch.org.uk/) provides informa-
tion and educational materials on animal research based on thorough
research and understanding of the historical and scientific facts. UAR
seeks to engage with and inform many sectors to share its vision. Key
stakeholders include members of the public, the media, policy makers,
schools and the scientific research community. However, animal research
remains a sensitive topic especially dealing with specific areas of research
and the use of particular species (like the use of the macaques in the neu-
roscientific research in Italy in recent times). In some cases, the reaction
of scientists is to reinforce the gap between them and the rest of society.
For example, in a recent survey among British scientists, academics
referred to colleagues and/or public critical of the use of animal in research
and their treatment as “others”: this attitude looked like an attempt to
distance their concept of science and its procedures from who was not
part of their community (Michel and Birke 2016). To me, this is not the
way to go.
Preliminary results from a questionnaire sent to animal researchers in
selected EU Member States have confirmed the impression of a continu-
ous existing gap between scientific community and the general public
(Borgi et al. in press). For example, when asked about the importance of
different factors in determining the choice of a particular species for a
particular study, the opinion of the parents, friends and general public
was considered of little or non-existent relevance. In a paper dedicated to
the relationship between scientist and general public in Sweden, the
authors introduced the concept of “selective openness and technologies
of secrets” (Holmberg and Ideland 2012). What the two authors argue is
that a certain kind of selective openness leads to a status quo in the debate
of animal experimentation, characterised by the public being misled and
misinformed. Through this mechanism, and a nearly non-existent public
debate on animal experimentation, this scientific practice can maintain a
sort of independence and autonomy from public scrutiny and analysis.
This interpretation of the relationship between animal researchers and
society is undoubtedly interesting, but I would like to think that the situ-
ation has now improved somehow in recent times. As a matter of fact, in
the context of animal research, many models have been developed to
understand the nature and improve the relationship between general
public and scientists (and we have seen above the UAR’s program).
To communicate about animal research is not just spreading scientific
results through the media. Instead, effective communication requires
educating both the public and the scientists (and of communicators and
politicians too), requires a mutual process of dialogue and education,
involving the general public, scientists, communicators and decision-
makers (Pollo, pers comm). To find a way to put into practice this bi-
directional, for example, more could be discussed about the aim and the
methodology and the ethical angles of animal research. In this case, dif-
ferent scientists, in different contexts with different audiences, should
think more beyond just trying to educate the public and convince them
that they are right.
Transparent communication is then perhaps the best way to promote
public understanding. Animal researchers must feel the responsibility to
188 A. Vitale
support, promote and work on public awareness. They must work towards
inspiring a sense of trust in their work or, at least, to be open for discus-
sion with people who do not share their point of view. There is some
evidence that leads to a decreased targeting and harassment of individu-
als. Furthermore, it also increases the level of pride and satisfaction in the
job (the latest point appears to be particularly true for technical staff)
(MacArthur Clark et al. 2019).
Obviously, trust in science is a major issue here. It is a major issue both
in doing science and in dealing with the general public. The second case
is of pivotal importance in the understanding of science by non-scientists.
People depend on the knowledge of scientists to form an opinion on, for
example, health issues and then take decisions. From the scientists, it has
been suggested that expertise, integrity and benevolence are fundamental
attitudinal aspects that can support the trust of general public in scien-
tists’ practices (Hendriks et al. 2016; see also Cardew 2020).
8 Conclusions
What I have been trying to propose here is a welcome change of para-
digm concerning the figure of researchers involved in laboratory animal
studies. I have indicated different dimensions of awareness and knowl-
edge that should, in my opinion, be part of the cultural, practical and
attitudinal curriculum of the contemporary animal researcher. It is also
interesting to notice how the different aspects I have identified are inter-
connected among them. For example, adhering to the law requires
researcher to consider animals like sentient beings. To consider animals
sentient beings calls for procedures that avoid unnecessary suffering to
other living beings. In this case, law and ethics of research go hand in
hand. It is also very possible that such change is on its way already.
It could be said that all of the aspects I discussed about in this contri-
bution can be easily be represented in a comprehensive and efficient ethi-
cal committee, or Animal Welfare Body. Very likely this is already like so
in many cases. What I instead call for is for researchers using animal
models, to be at least aware of the different dimensions of their activity. I
understand clearly that it is just unreal to expect of researcher to be an
expert of animal ethics as well as social dimension of science: it is simply

too much to ask for. Nevertheless, I also think that to delegate completely
to experts or members of the ethical committees the knowledge and
information on specific issues related to animal experimentation is not
totally satisfactory at this time.
The aim of this contribution is not to propose an omni-comprehensive
role for scientists working with animal models: the reality of science-
making today simply does not allow for that. My intention was just to
suggest a sort of mental “Renaissance” kind of attitude, where there is an
awareness of what it means to work with animal models today, and the
willingness to embrace and work on such complexity, in order to improve
the quality of its own work, the level of acceptability by society and, last
but not least, the welfare of the animal subjects.
References
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Bateson, Patrick. 1986. When to Experiment on Animals. New Scientist
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10
The Two Sides of the Non-Human-
Animal Bond: Reflections on Using
and Abusing Companion Animals
Michał Piotr Pręgowski, Karin Hediger,
and Marie-José Enders-Slegers
1 Introduction
Humans and other animals have been living together for many thousands
of years and the roles animals played in the lives of humans have been
diverse, ranging from being feared to being eaten, being seen as deities
and spawn of evil, and being cherished as companions and detested as
pests. Co-evolution of humans and animals was an ongoing process of
M. P. Pręgowski (*)
Department of Administration and Social Sciences, Warsaw University of
Technology, Warsaw, Poland
K. Hediger
Faculty of Psychology, Open University, Heerlen, The Netherlands
Faculty of Psychology, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
M.-J. Enders-Slegers
Faculty of Psychology, Open University, Heerlen, The Netherlands
193
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022
194 M. P. Pręgowski et al.
changes in the roles humans and other species played in each other’s lives.
Some species, such as dogs, cats, and horses, were subsequently domesti-
cated (Zeder 2012). In our chapter we will focus on the continuously
changing relationship between humans and companion animals and the
theories explaining this relationship. These theories, developed in the
Western world, apply first and foremost to its cultures and societies and,
with the growth of scientific knowledge about animal sentience, animal
emotions and cognitions (de Waal and Preston 2017), our uses of ani-
mals, and our ideas about what is abusive to them, are adjusting.
Nowadays, more than 60% of the families in the Western world have one
or more companion animals and most of these animals are considered
family members (Walsh 2009). Pet ownership as well as the use of animal-
assisted interventions are growing fast (Enders-Slegers et al. 2019). The
way companion animals are held or taken care of is diverse and influ-
enced by many factors that also are subject to epoch-related changes:
culture, economics, education, environmental circumstances, and so on.
The same epoch-related changes impact the way animal-assisted inter-
ventions are carried out. Guidelines, if present, are not legally binding
and many are still developing. Animal well-being during animal-assisted
interventions has mostly been overlooked in the recent past, while the
focus has been on human well-being.
Schicktanz (2006) describes the predominant way people look at the
bond between humans and companion animals as rather ambiguous.
Asymmetry and ambivalence are two core concepts that characterize the
human-animal relationship in contemporary Western society. Usually,
the human is the dominant party and in control, and is ambivalent in
feeling and behavior, depending on what animal and what relation to the
animal he/she has. On one hand, he adores his companion animal and
takes good care of the animal he lives with; on the other, he will detest
and destroy the mice and rats that try to live with him in his house.
Schicktanz (2006) mentions three ideal types of human-companion ani-
mal relationships: the patronage model, the friendship model, and the
partnership model. In the patronage model humans are prudent and wise
masters of all animals; think of a farmer taking care of his pigs. In the
friendship model humans have formed friendships with particular ani-
mals but not with all animals, for example the friendship with dogs or
10 The Two Sides of the Non-Human-Animal Bond: Reflections… 195
cats while disliking or even hating mice and rats. In the partnership
model humans respect all animals as equal partners and even doubt
sometimes if owning a companion animal is respectful toward the ani-
mal. Based on these models, it is interesting to ask the question about the
type of relationship prevalent in animal-assisted interventions as well as
in human service. Is it partnership, or is the animal merely serving human
purposes and satisfying their ambitions? What about the relationship
between assistance dogs and their disabled humans? And can military
dogs—undoubtedly cherished and respected in the ranks—even be called
companion animals?
Thanks to many years of research on emotions (Panksepp 1998; Hare
and Tomasello 2006) and cognitions (Miklósi et al. 2004) of dogs and
other animals (de Waal and Preston 2017), humans shift their attention
more and more toward animal welfare, realizing the interdependence
between humans and animals and the human and animal health and
well-being, as reflected by the One Health concept—that is, “the collab-
orative efforts of multiple disciplines working locally, nationally, and
globally, to attain optimal health for people, animals and our environ-
ment” (American Veterinary Medical Association One Health Initiative
Task Force, 2021). Under such circumstances the human-animal bond
perspective was born. In our chapter we use this perspective to look at
various forms of actual using and abusing animals.
2 The Human-Animal Bond

Humans and animals have always lived together, and although the rela-
tionship as well as the way society perceives animals is changing over time,
we have examples describing strong bonds between humans and animals
throughout time since humans began to domesticate animals. The human-
animal bond is described in many ways in literature as well as in research
reports, and there is a growing interest in the scientific community to
investigate this bond as well as its underlying mechanisms. Interestingly,
currently there is no generally accepted definition of the human-animal
bond. The American Veterinary Medical Association’s Committee on the
Human–Animal Bond defines it as “a mutually beneficial and dynamic
relationship between people and other animals that is influenced by

behaviors that are essential to the health and well-being of both. This
includes, but is not limited to, emotional, psychological, and physical
interactions of people, other animals, and the environment” (Journal of
the American Veterinary Medical Association 1998).
Three main concepts explain and help us understand why animals and
humans are attracted and attuned toward each other and form deeply
rooted bonds: the social support theory, attachment theory, and the bio-
philia hypothesis. The biophilia hypothesis was introduced by Edward
O. Wilson in 1984 and describes the need of humans to understand and
relate with nature (Wilson, 1984). This interest in nature and in animals
is thought to increase the probability of survival and therefore established
itself as innate behavior through evolution. Increasing research documents
the innate interest of children in animals (DeLoache et al. 2011; Wedl and
Kotrschal 2009) and their preferences for animals over other stimuli
(DeLoache et al. 2011; LoBue et al. 2013). Other research documents an
innate tendency for biological motion (Simion et al. 2008) and the ten-
dency of adult humans to focus on animals (New et al. 2007). Biophilia is
a concept explaining why people turn toward animals but it does not
explain the intensive relationship necessary to speak of a bond. Biophilia
does not mean that humans are instinctively kind to animals, but that
they are attuned to animals (Fine et al. 2019) and it includes aspects of
love, care, and dominance, as well as disgust and fear. To understand the
bond between humans and animals, the concept of attachment is relevant.
The attachment theory was developed by Bowlby (1969) describing innate
behaviors with relevant survival functions: protection and stress regula-
tion by maintaining proximity to another person. An attachment is dis-
tinguished from other forms of social relationships by four characteristics:
(1) maintaining physical closeness with an attachment figure, (2) distress
in case of separation from the attachment figure, (3) the use of the attach-
ment figure as safe haven during danger, and (4) using the attachment
figure as secure base to explore. Interestingly, it is shown that these char-
acteristics are also fulfilled within human-animal relationships and that
humans can form attachments with companion animals (Julius et al.
2013; Kurdek 2008, 2009a, 2009b) and vice versa (Solomon et al. 2019).
The phenomenon of interspecies attachment is based on a complex
interconnectedness of humans and animals, including similar brain net-

works (based on evolutionary continuity) involving emotion, reward and
affiliation (Stoeckel et al. 2014), and a shared social toolbox (Kotrschal
2013) building the basis for meaningful social interactions and the possi-
bility to form reciprocal social relationships (Julius et al. 2013). This
explains why animals can offer social support for humans (Bonas et al.,
2000; McNicholas and Collis 2006).
Animals are an important part of our social environment and can com-
plement human relationships. Some of the most important health-related
factors lie in our social relationships and social support by others (Holt-
Lunstad et al. 2015; Sbarra & Coan, 2018). It is therefore not surprising
that companion animals have a noticeable impact on human health
(Headey and Grabka 2007). Having a companion animal is associated
with lowered mortality as well as reduced cardiovascular risk (Kramer
et al. 2019; Levine et al. 2013; Mubanga et al. 2017), although some
studies do not find such relationships between pet ownership and
improved health (e.g., Ding et al. 2018; Miyake et al. 2020). The causal-
ity of this relationship is not clear yet and some authors point out that
healthier people are more likely to own companion animals. However, it
might be the strength of the bond that mediates these effects (Chur-
Hansen et al. 2009). For example, in families with more conflicts, the
bond to companion animals was stronger, leading the authors to think of
them as “social buffers” (Applebaum et al., 2021). Looking at pictures of
faces of human and canine family members leads to similar brain
responses in areas relevant for social cognition closely related to affection
and emotion (Shinozaki et al. 2007). Moreover, guardians have a stronger
neuronal activation in areas relevant for attention if the bond with the
animal is stronger (Hayama et al. 2016). Such effects are more and more
intentionally used by integrating animals in settings in human care and
with therapeutic aims, which is subsumed as animal-assisted
interventions.
Interacting with animals is characterized by predominantly nonverbal
communication. For this reason animals can sometimes be more effective
than human therapists, teachers, or just friends and family alone, and
might even enhance the effect of a conventional intervention (Bernstein
et al. 2000; Marr et al. 2000; Wesley et al. 2009). For example,
companion animals can provide close physical contact that therapists or

teachers cannot provide due to social norms. The presence of an animal
changes the role of the patient from the only one in need to one who is
able to care for another living being.
All these described impacts of animals on human health and well-
being represent an important aspect of One Health. One Health recog-
nizes the inextricable linkage of humans, animals, and their environment
and refers to the added value in terms of human and animal health and
well-being that is achieved by the collaborative effort of multiple disci-
plines (Zinsstag, Schelling, Walter-Toews, Whittaker, & Tanner, 2015).
Discussing the human-animal bond in the light of One Health means
that if humans form emotional relationships with animals and if they
integrate animals into interventions with educational or therapeutic aims
in an ethically informed way, it should generate added value in the health
and well-being of humans and animals (Hediger et al. 2020; Hediger
et al. 2019). As already described before, until recently the research in the
field of the human-animal bond and animal-assisted interventions was
predominantly centered on the human patient. The body of research
looking at the effects on the involved animal is small. Initial studies cover
the effects of animal-assisted interventions on dogs (Glenk 2017), horses
(De Santis et al. 2017), and guinea pigs (Wirth et al. 2020). More research
and more discussions about animal welfare are needed, and knowledge
on how the interventions impact involved animals is necessary. Working
with animals for therapeutic or educational purposes can only be ethi-
cally justified if the total benefit for both the client and the animal exceeds
the potentially negative impact on the animal (Hediger et al. 2020).
3 sing Animals Within Companion Animal

U
Relationship
and Animal-Assisted Interventions
As stated earlier, many households in the world have companion animals.
The roles and relations of animals to their humans are different due to
cultural, environmental, economic, and relational diversities within the
families they live in (Herzog 2011). Not only do many humans sleep
with their dogs or cats in bed (Chomel and Sun 2011), they spend a lot
of money on food, checkups at the veterinarian, and toys for the health
and well-being of the companion animal (Franklin 1999; Schaffer 2009).
On the other hand, many people leave their dog and cat alone at home
when working, ignoring social, emotional, and behavioral needs of these
animals. Or, when getting older and vulnerable, some guardians are no
longer able to provide adequate care for the companion animal (Enders-
Slegers & Hediger, 2019) and the companion animal’s health and needs
might be neglected. Is it “use”? Is it “abuse”? These examples illustrate a
double moral standard and the ambivalence in the human-animal rela-
tionship in which the point of departure, for the most part, is human
needs, and those of the animal are forgotten.
Research confirms that companion animals have positive effects on our
emotional and social well-being in daily life (Janssens et al. 2020; Mueller
et al. 2018) as well as on our physical health (Friedmann & Krause-
Parello, 2018). Many studies confirmed the positive effects of having an
assistance animal on the quality of life of humans with physical or emo-
tional challenges such as autism, blindness, or posttraumatic stress (e.g.,
Mills & Hall 2014; Audretsch et al, 2015; Glintborg & Hansen 2017).
Numerous studies confirm the positive effects of animals in animal-
assisted therapies, education, coaching, counseling, or activities for chil-
dren and adolescents with autism (Germone et al. 2019; Wijker et al.
2020), elderly people with dementia (Olsen et al. 2016), psychiatric
patients (Nurenberg et al. 2015; Kovacs, Dijke & Enders-Slegers, 2020),
and people suffering from depression and anxiety (Wilson et al., 2017).
Animals are therefore increasingly trained and selected for such tasks.
Moreover, horses and dogs are trained for police and army work all over
the world. There are avalanche dogs, bomb sniffing rats, dogs that are
trained to identify cancer, and nowadays even COVID-19 or medical
alert and detection dogs for people with threatening medical conditions
such as diabetes or narcolepsy. Animals are housed in institutions such as
nursing homes or special schools. Do people care enough about the well-
being of the animals involved in all these situations and interventions just
mentioned? They may work long hours, sometimes 24 hours, seven days
a week. Are people aware of nonhuman emotions, cognitions,
vulnerability? Are these actively recognized? Are humans taking them

into account when using animals for their causes? If so, how is animal
well-being guaranteed? The distinction between use and abuse might be
very thin. In the next paragraph we will explore this further.
4 Abusing Animals
The many ways in which companion animals serve humans make it very
difficult to think straight about the relationship people share with them.
There are moral, legal, and social confusions about what even constitutes
abuse—and such confusions function at local, national, and interna-
tional levels. Furthermore, it seems as if conflicts arise even in basic con-
siderations about the nature of our relationship with companion animals:
where does “use” end and “abuse” begin? What types of treatment of
companion animals are ethical, and which are not?
As mentioned previously, the bond between human and nonhuman
animals is characterized by asymmetry and ambivalence. In his seminal
book “Dominance and Affection: The Making of Pets,” Tuan (1984)
described our relationship with companion animals as driven by oppos-
ing, co-occurring states: kindness and cruelty. Humans love these crea-
tures, Tuan states, but do not abstain from molding them to fit their own
fickle preferences—often at the cost of the well-being and quality of life
of these animals. Our affection to companion animals is therefore deeply
intertwined with welfare issues. This notion can be observed already at
the stage of breeding domesticated animals. In an ongoing struggle
between fashion and function, people shape animals to match their own
expectations and their own perceptions of (nonhuman) beauty. In con-
temporary world, fashion seems to be prevalent (Tuan 1984; cf. Ghirlanda
et al. 2013). A tendency to select companion animals for cuteness and a
juvenile look seems to be ubiquitous across cultures—but it is also the
culprit of many health and welfare issues. A particularly glaring example
can be found in dogs: selecting for neoteny ushered in the popularity of
brachycephalic (i.e., short-muzzled) breeds such as pugs, Boston Terriers,
bulldogs, boxers, as well as Cavalier King Charles spaniels among others.
Their body conformation, perceived as cute by many humans, is
responsible for a variety of adverse medical conditions influencing day-

to-day welfare. These conditions include respiratory problems and inabil-
ity to effectively blink, making the eye prone to injury and ailments—but
perhaps the most disturbing and well-known example of “cruelty by
affection” concerns the Cavalier King Charles spaniels. Their dispropor-
tionate skulls are often too small for the brain, leading to overcrowding
the base of the skull and putting pressure on the spinal cord. Dogs with
such conditions are sentenced to recurrent or permanent suffering and
simultaneously experience low quality of life. Should the breeders be con-
sidered cruel, then—as Tuan (1984) implies—or are dog fanciers merely
oblivious, failing the animals they love by lacking in knowledge and
insight? Yet even if the latter is true, a certain kind of ignorance possibly
constitutes abuse rather than merely neglect.
Perhaps the problem lies in how the distinction between these two
types of harm is made. As Arluke (2006) rightly pointed out, abuse is
typically linked to intent and considered more serious than neglect. An
abusive act is deliberate, while the lack of direct intentions is labeled
neglect. Furthermore, attributing higher importance to abuse over neglect
can certainly be traced down in legal systems of many countries, includ-
ing the United States of America and Poland among others. Furthermore,
as Arluke (2006) urges, abuse is stereotypically linked to serious or fatal
injuries, while neglect is mostly linked to hardship for animals (Arluke,
2006: 199). Such distinction is obviously false—brachycephalic dog
breed conditions mentioned previously are certainly more than hardship,
and the suffering caused by these ailments can be very intense. The same
can be said of animal hoarding—that is, keeping a large number of ani-
mals without the ability to care for them properly—which in many cases
leads to starvation, disease, or death (Patronek 1999). Neglect is also far
more common than abuse, with some estimates suggesting a 9 to 1 ratio
(Solot 1997). In a recent Polish study, small mammal veterinarians asked
about professional experiences with animal abuse indicated that outright
abuse is a rare sight, but witnessing effects of various forms of neglect is
common (Pręgowski 2016; Pręgowski and Cieślik 2020).
The aforementioned dysfunctional distinction between “more serious”
abuse and “less serious” neglect is perpetuated and reinforced by the mass
media and their penchant for emotionally engaging, dramatic content.
Reports of animal abuse tend to focus on the extreme, leading to ignoring

more routine cruelty (Arluke, 2006: 200). A prototypical media image of
the abused animal is that of a victim subjected to beating, kicking, throw-
ing, or being tortured otherwise, and the perpetrator’s image spurs public
outrage and moral panic. Reports are devoid of an in-depth look into the
experiences of the victim. When animal hoarding is reported, the focus is
even more anthropocentric, oriented either towards sympathy and justi-
fications of human actions (hoarder as the Good Samaritan) or towards
condemnation and labelling (hoarder as crazy, clueless, deranged) (Arluke
et al. 2002; Vaca-Guzman and Arluke 2005). Both the suffering of the
animals and the long-term effects of neglect are typically left in the back-
ground of the story (Arluke, 2006, pp. 200–201). This leads to gaps in
social understanding of animal abuse, animal neglect, and the
in-between.
One way to approach such gaps is to take a different angle. Analyzing
abuse and neglect can be less anthropocentric thanks to the adoption
of the human-animal bond perspective, allowing us to analyze these
issues by focusing predominantly on the victim rather than the perpe-
trator. We propose such an animal- and bond-centered approach in our
classification of three major types of animal abuse. These types are as
follows.
1. Abuse caused by individual perpetrator(s), further divided into:

a. Direct abuse—acts of violence driven by the intent to harm or kill
an animal or animals.
b. Indirect abuse—harm to animal or animals as a result of ignorance,
disinterest, negligence, as well as lack of general awareness or
detachment from reality.
2. Abuse as the outcome of decisions by authorities and other entities, further
divided into:
a. Abuse originating in legislation—defined as a way to treat,
approach, or handle companion animal or animals that is consid-
ered abusive and prohibited in some legal contexts but permitted
by law in other contexts.
b. Abuse originating in decision-making—harm to companion ani-

mals as a consequence of large- and small-scale choices made by
institutions and organizations.
3. Circumstantial abuse, understood as harm to animal(s) as a result of
unpredictable, external circumstances.
In line with the focus of our article, we use this classification for compan-
ion animals rather than livestock and wild animals, although many forms
of violence and abuse are omnipresent and are experienced by these ani-
mals as well. Moreover, in many cases what is abusive to companion ani-
mals jeopardizes human well-being as well, because it has effects on the
human-animal bond per se. In our view, negative impacts on the human-
animal bond can be valid for each type of abuse presented above.
4.1 irect Abuse Caused by Individual

D
Perpetrator(s)
Subject to a myriad of academic inquiries and countless media reports,

direct abuse is the most visible and perhaps the best understood type of
abuse. Direct abuse means actively harming an animal and includes phys-
ical, sexual, and emotional/psychological harm done directly to an ani-
mal or animals. Acts of direct abuse are performed willfully and on
purpose, and include what Brown (1988) and Ascione (1993) call acts of
commission—in contrast to the acts of omission, that is failing to act.
Examples of direct physical abuse entail acts such as pushing, thrashing,
kicking, striking with a tool, and performing similar acts leading to injury
and/or death. Direct sexual abuse includes sex with an animal, as well as
other forms of sexual misconduct aimed at particular animals. Direct
psychological harm to the animal can be defined as distress experienced
by the animal through aggressive human behavior such as yelling. The
last example indicates that forms of direct abuse vary in severity and
impact, with physical and sexual forms typically less difficult to verify and
their effects easier to evaluate than emotional/psychological abuse. Using
the example of perpetrator and observers, Ascione (1993) also points out
that perceptions of seriousness of abuse are prone to be subjective (e.g.,
views of the perpetrator, legal authorities, general public, and the media),
and that cultural sensitivity is necessary in judgments of acceptability
(Ascione 1993, pp. 227–229).
It should be underlined that direct abuse of companion animals is
typically immersed in family dynamics (Jegatheesan et al. 2020). A con-
siderable body of academic research on cross-species violence shows that
such abuse is often linked with child and spouse abuse, and other forms
of family violence (Boat 1995; Ascione 1998; Ascione 2001; Faver and
Strand 2003; Monsalve et al. 2017; Williams et al. 2008). Direct abuse of
animals by children is strongly connected with their own experiences of
abuse (Felthous 1980; Kellert and Felthous 1985; Ascione 1993; Ascione
et al. 1997; Flynn 1999). Although the so-called graduation hypothe-
sis—the situation where abusing animals in childhood and adolescence
leads to abusing humans in adulthood—has not been proven (see e.g.,
Arluke et al. 1999; Wright & Hensley, 2003; Hensley et al. 2009), it is
still worth noting that animal abuse is a marker of other sinister experi-
ences in children’s lives (Gullone 2011). Most recent inquiries into the
relationship between direct abuse of companion animals with children’s
abuse and family violence emphasize the need of a systemic, all-encom-
passing approach to the problem (Jegatheesan et al. 2020).
4.2 Indirect Abuse by Individual Perpetrators
Indirect abuse revolves around previously mentioned acts of omission

which deprive the companion animal of what is necessary for its well-
being, good health, and overall welfare. Malnourishment, lack of sanita-
tion, or necessary veterinary care, as well as overcrowding animals are
some of the examples of indirect abuse. Calling these “acts of omission”
is not sufficiently exhaustive, however, as acting implies a conscious deci-
sion. “Taking away” is certainly an act, but “not providing” can also be
the outcome of ignorance, oblivion, and similar states. Approaching indi-
rect abuse with the victim-first attitude leads to emphasizing the effect
rather than the intent. In this mold, malicious decisions to deprive the
animal of food, water, or other indispensable resources and deprivation
occurring due to mental health issues of the guardian are both indirect
abuse of the animal.
The category of indirect abuse encompasses behaviors typically labeled

as animal neglect. Arluke (2006) reminds that severe neglect can result in
prolonged suffering, starvation, and gruesome death, as witnessed in
most animal hoarding cases (Patronek 1999; Frost et al. 2000; Patronek
2001). To emphasize the gravity of the phenomenon, some researchers,
including Vaca-Guzman and Arluke (2005), called it “passive cruelty.” It
should be noted, however, that not all forms of animal neglect are as
extreme as hoarding, but they still constitute indirect abuse.
Perhaps the most complicated type of indirect abuse, one with formi-
dable ethical charge, concerns some forms of inappropriate use of ani-
mals in animal-assisted interventions as well as health hazards of
companion animal breeding, briefly discussed previously with the exam-
ple of brachycephalic dogs. Whether or not the culprit is human ambi-
tion or lack of adequate education, the bottom line of animal suffering
remains intact. Adhering to international standards and best practices
and cultivating the drive for continuing education, even at the cost of
one’s aspirations and goals, are necessary and should be obligatory.
4.3 Abuse Originating in Legislation
There are numerous animals working in military forces, law enforcement,

and other uniformed services across the globe. Such animals typically fall
into the “animals used for special purposes” category, and undergo pro-
fessional training subjected to legal regulations typically separated from
general animal welfare laws. Such distinction is seen as necessary consid-
ering the methods of training: many law enforcement dogs, for example,
are trained to track suspects, chase, and even bite them, and the training
for controlled aggression often includes physical confrontation. Striking
the animal with an object, pushing it, or kicking would be easily labeled
abusive under ordinary circumstances but is not considered abusive by
the law once the “special purposes” notion is used. Within a human-
animal bond framework, with its point of departure of human and ani-
mal well-being, the outcome for the animal is the same and therefore
both acts are equally abusive.
The number of animals subjected to training methods mentioned

above is noteworthy. In the first decade of the 2000s, American uni-
formed services alone used approximately 1500 dogs to protect the per-
sonnel and equipment and to detect threats to safety and security
(Burghardt, 2003). From an animal welfare standpoint, the day-to-day
work of animals is equally important as training; they may be exposed to
heavy stressors which in turn lead to health problems. Dogs working for
uniformed services, for example, are known to develop canine post-
traumatic stress disorder (C-PTSD). This phenomenon is said to be first
observed in the 1980s. In 2014, it was estimated that up to 10% of the
US military dogs deployed in combat settings had developed C-PTSD
(Brait, 2015). Its prevalence in dogs used for law enforcement or prison
services awaits further research, as does investigating effects in other spe-
cial purposes animals, such as police horses.
The problem of legally authorized abuse merits an in-depth discussion.
Aside from controversies related to training and daily work, the length of
exposition to heavy, human-induced stressors, counted both in hours per
day and in years of service, is of particular importance. Furthermore,
“special purposes” may also include service and assistance animals, often
expected to work with humans day and night, as well as laboratory ani-
mals, among others. The well-being of these nonhumans certainly raises
a number of ethical questions as well.
4.4 Abuse Originating in Decision-Making
While legislation may open doors to systemic abuse of certain animals by

indicating special circumstances under which such abuse may take place,
the general problem may also be traced to everyday functioning of orga-
nizations and institutions, their decisions, and particular policies.
Animal-unfriendly regulations of nursing homes and homeless shelters
would be an example of abuse originating in decision-making. Forced
separation from the guardian causes psychological distress for the animal
and may also lead to health deterioration or even death, depending on
circumstances. Furthermore, such separation is problematic from the
bond perspective, and typically detrimental to the health and well-being
of the humans as well.
Policies similar to those implemented in many nursing homes and

homeless shelters can be also found in institutions supporting victims of
domestic violence. Many of these institutions do not allow companion
animals on the premises, forcing the victims to face a dilemma of leaving
the abuser or prolonging the stay for the sake of the animal. The institu-
tion rejecting nonhuman companions does not cause any direct harm,
but is responsible for indirect abuse. Yet again, rigid policies may influ-
ence human well-being and health—early research findings indicated
that many battered women indeed chose the latter solution of staying
with their abuser, risking further abuse (Ascione et al. 1997; Flynn 2000).
Large-scale decisions which concern a large number of people and
their animals may also jeopardize the human-animal bond. Such impact
may be limited mostly to the times of crises when authorities are prone to
making suboptimal decisions due to lack of preparation and acting
impromptu instead. One of the most disturbing cases of animal abuse
originating in decision-making occurred in Japan after the Fukushima
nuclear disaster in 2011. The catastrophe led to the order of evacuation
of thousands of human residents out of the exclusion zone. Their ani-
mals, however, were to be left behind. As Itoh (2018) reports, as many as
90% of these animals subsequently died either due to radiation exposure
or starvation. Many companion animal guardians struggled with the
obligation to leave animals behind and many returned to the radioactive
area to take care of them, risking their own health (Kajiwara 2020). Their
dedication is a testament of the strength of the human-animal bond that
was neglected, at least temporarily, by the Japanese authorities. Their
hasty decisions gradually led to citizen backlash across Japan and ushered
in a public discussion on the necessity of a different approach, the so-
called companion animal-first outlook (Kajiwara and Mouer 2016;
Kajiwara 2020). As the Japanese example disturbingly reminds, the insti-
tutional approach to companion animals as family members is not as set
in stone as people may believe. Authorities may not hesitate to drop it in
times of crisis, opening the possibility of abuse and misery.
4.5 Circumstantial Abuse
Awareness of the species-related welfare and implementing adequate

knowledge in practice appear to be sufficient to avoid most instances of
companion animal abuse—this, however, does not factor into the unfore-
seen circumstances in which the guardian and the animal may find them-
selves. For example, deteriorating economic and/or health conditions of
the human may lead to displacement and potential separation with his or
her animal, something that the guardian never intended to do. However,
while circumstances may be unforeseen, not all of them are unforesee-
able—and the animal-oriented approach urges us to take into account as
many potential complications as possible. In animal-assisted interven-
tions, for example, responsible handlers should have an outlined plan in
case their animal co-worker becomes ill or injured, and cannot partici-
pate in animal-assisted intervention sessions. The same planning is neces-
sary in relation to animal aging and subsequent retirement from
interventions. In both instances, the lack of planning may lead to com-
promising physical and psychological welfare of the animal, and the pres-
sure on the unprepared handler can be high if income issues are at stake.
A different type of consideration—gathering sufficient information and
weighing up the pros and cons—is essential for responsible guardianship,
both in relation to animal health (e.g., genetic disorders of the animals)
as well as human-animal lifestyle compatibility (e.g., human interest in
physical activity vs. animal needs). Responsible guardianship is not
merely about the relationship as it is here and now, but also about plan-
ning ahead—something the animals cannot be responsible for.
5 Discussion and Conclusions

The human-animal bond has many faces and animal well-being depends
on many factors that influence the relationship between humans and
companion animals. This is also the case between professionals and the
animals involved in interventions they offer, as well as between humans
and their service animals. The line between “use” and “abuse” can be very
thin, and there is now an increasing awareness about human impact on

animal welfare. Science is clear and unequivocal about the sentience of
companion animals, their emotions, and cognitions, and society contin-
ues to better understand what is needed for their well-being. However, as
stated before, animal welfare is dependent on cultural, economic, envi-
ronmental, and educational determinants with the consequence that the
conceptualization of use and abuse within the human-animal bond is
always ambiguous and differs across countries, cultures, societies, and
disciplines. Furthermore, interpretations depend on the individuals
involved in the bond and their experiences as well.
A One Health framework might be a way to address this complicated
topic by emphasizing the interdependence of health and well-being of
both animals and humans. Efforts are needed to improve the tools to
measure the welfare of animals, since the term “animal welfare” also has
several definitions (Fraser 2009; Broom 2011). We emphasize using the
One Health framework when looking at companion animal guardianship
as well as when involving animals in assisting people with mental or
physical challenges in order to define “use and abuse” of animals in a
more transparent way. This requires an interdisciplinary approach and
mutual interest from both scientists and practitioners—based on open-
ness, collaboration, and common terminology.
The typology proposed in our chapter to describe use and abuse of
animals serves as an invitation for discussion and further exploration. The
categories of abuse are not exclusive—more than one type of abuse may
be occurring at a time. Indirect abuse, for example, may be intertwined
with circumstantial abuse just like in the Fukushima example. Our aim
was therefore to highlight different aspects of the human-animal bond
and to provide new insights on the complexity of using and abusing ani-
mals, as well as the consequences. We emphasize the need to use a bond-
centered approach with a One Health perspective when addressing the
relationship between humans and other species.
Acknowledgments Karin Hediger received support from an Ambizione grant

from the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant PZ00P1_174082).
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Part III
Transformations in Cases and
Contexts
11
Farms, Landscapes, Food
and Relationships
Pasqualino Santori and Clemens Driessen
1 Introduction
Many public concerns over animal farming have led to policy measures
(air treatment, improved housing) that in turn have led to an increase in
the scale of farm operations. Whereas arguably it was, at least in part, also
a growing sense of the lack of contact between farmers and their animals
that with many consumers generated unease over animal products. Large
scale intensive farmers can be found to argue their animals couldn’t care
less about humans: What is important is to provide the animals what
they need, the appropriate conditions for production.
This chapter offers a particular ‘cross European’ perspective on
transformations in human-animal relations on farms. Or actually two
P. Santori
Institute of Bioethics for Veterinary and Agri-food, Rome, Italy
C. Driessen (*)
Cultural Geography, Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands
222 P. Santori and C. Driessen
European perspectives, where one author (Santori) is closely involved in

Italian rural farming practice as a breeder and veterinarian for over 30
years as well as chairman for over 20 years of the Bioethics Committee for
Veterinary and Agri-food issues, the other (Driessen) as a philosopher
and cultural geographer who has studied transformations in dairy and pig
farming in the Netherlands over the last 15 years. Through these perspec-
tives, we offer an account of the various dimensions of the transforma-
tions in human-animal relations that can be discerned on farms. And we
conclude by developing an argument of possible ways forward, with a
view on connecting experiences—or perhaps rather keeping these experi-
ences in a productive tension. In writing this paper, we found our views
to not just add up to a single overview of developments in different geo-
graphical regions, but also to diverge on how to describe what is at stake
and how to engage with possible ways forward.
In short, Santori has a decades long intimate experience with rural life
in Italy, but does not want to produce an ethnographic account of living
with animals on the farm, but rather offer rational bioethical arguments
in favour of promoting a broad societal understanding of rural lives.
Whereas Driessen is also versed in formal bioethics but feels it to be
important to draw on more close experiences of life on farms to get a
sense of what is transforming. Perhaps Driessen is just seeking ways to
evoke romanticized, nostalgic accounts of a premodern ‘countryside’ that
in fact was a modern urban imaginary from the get go (Landry et al.
1999)? While Santori is concerned with the plight of small farmers in
remote regions whose hardships that they share with the animals on their
farms are worsened by ignorant urban consumers without a proper sense
of what it means to care for animals? By presenting our accounts together
in this chapter, this could be read as a conversation not just on changing
human-animal relations on farms, but also on how to represent these,
how to contemplate on what may be lost—and gained—in these trans-
formations, and on the difficulties in engaging with these concerns in the
name of policy measures, when what is called for is perhaps not just radi-
cal change in modes of animal use, but also/more a matter of broader
cultural transformations in how we appreciate food, farmers, animals and
rural life.
11 Farms, Landscapes, Food and Relationships 223
2 F actors Determining Human-Animal

Relations on Farms?
Setting up our discussion, we first of all discuss a range of different ways
in which to categorize different types of farms and the human-animal
relations that they are based on, and that they (re-)produce. On farms,
the relations between humans and animals appear to be in transforma-
tion. How to characterize and understand this transformation is not so
clear. What are key determining factors? When do gradual changes entail
a larger transformation, a tipping point that changes the character of
what a farmer is, and how farmers relate to a cow, a pig, a chicken or
multitudes of them?
2.1 Species and Scale
Of course, a major determinant of the kind of relation farmers, or farm

workers, may have with the animals they use is determined by the species
and the type of product being produced. Dairy cows have a very different
life from cattle reared for meat. Laying hens tend to live longer than
broiler chickens. Mink are wild animals that are not interacted with
much. Sheep when extensively farmed can live lives that are remote from
farmers and at the same time intimately bound with landscapes (Rebanks
2015). And even within species the relation farmers may have with for
instance sows used to produce piglets is different, in some ways more
personal and involving more time, than the relation with fattening pigs.
And within species and products, different breeds can be used in different
ways, where for example Frisian Holstein cattle can survive under inten-
sive conditions. Beyond a single direction ‘relation’ defined by the experi-
ences of humans on these farms, for example the few minutes that
industrial farmers spend with each individual pig in the six months
needed for these to grow to their slaughter weight, there is also the ques-
tion of whether and if at all the pigs take part in this relation, and can be
seen to relate to particular humans on the farm.
For each of these species and products, a major factor is an increasing
scale of production. Throughout the world a relentless growth in the
number of animals that is bred on a single farm has occurred as part of an

ongoing intensification of production in which external inputs (feed, fer-
tilizer, antibiotics as growth inducing feed additive, chicks, baby piglets,
etc.) are bought on markets, and the output, fattened pigs, is slaughtered
and packed in large meat packing plants. This scale evidently has effects
on the type of relation farmers may have with their animals. In many
places, these production sites are even no longer designated as ‘farm’, but
for example Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), often
critiqued as ‘Factory farms’ as the sites of systemic abuse of animals,
which however is increasingly difficult to establish (Fiber-Ostrow and
Lovell 2016).
Some key notions with strong public connotations are associated with
a smaller scale of working and an associated combination of rural life and
production with ‘family farms’ that resist a more capital intensive and
industrial type of organization. There is a question of course whether this
difference in scale and organization entails a genuine difference in the
relations between farmers/farm workers and the animals. The ‘family’ as
a unit that owns a farm, and lives next to the production facilities, can be
found to operate production facilities with 30,000 pigs or a million lay-
ing hens in the ‘backyard’. In practice, many of these family farms may
also be to some extent ‘vertically integrated’, whereby large conglomer-
ates own the entire production process and the farms are merely sites
where the animals are fattened, whose ownership is retained by the sup-
plier and buyer of the finished animal. This reduces the independence
and freedom to decide on how to manage their animals, including their
time and relation with them. In the Netherlands, this form of production
is for instance dominant in the veal calf industry. But also in for instance
dairy farming it may be difficult to farm without having a close relation
with a dairy cooperative, many of which have become global corporate
behemoths. Here one can discern a ‘peasant’ mode of farming with little
capital inputs, that is distinct from an entrepreneurial mode, in which for
instance cattle is bought from external suppliers rather than bred on the
farm (cf. Ploeg 2008). There is a sense in which smaller scale farms allow
farmers to know their animals in more intimate ways. As one Dutch dairy
farmer explained: ‘120 cows I can still remember as individuals, I recog-
nize them and have their characteristics in my head, at 140 this is no
longer the case’. However, in all these forms of production, there still can
be an experience by farmers and farm workers of these animals as sentient
beings, whereby the subjectivity of animals can be experienced as pro-
foundly present, haunting even, as for instance the feeling of thousands
of pigs watching your every movement (Blanchette 2020). Or when pig
farms are (regularly) flooded and farmers are forced to individually shoot
their animals (Stoddard and Hovorka 2019).
2.2 Tools, Technologies and Automation
To a large extent, the scale of operation as discussed in the section above

is enabled and determined by particular material conditions and techno-
logical innovations. But besides this ‘effect’, there are various ways in
which material and technological changes on farms change the relations
that farmers and their animals develop. De Krom (2015) for instance
describes how ‘stockpersons’ as he calls them develop an ambivalent,
instrumental yet caring, relationship with animals such as sows, who in
turn respond to the material conditions of the farm. This means as part
of farming practices the everyday practical work around these sows allows
them to be sensorily attuned to their bodily conditions and behaviour.
The material set-up of the farm makes for certain routinized interactions
that facilitate the particular form of care that farmers perceive as their role
in maintaining health, productivity and welfare. In the shift from indi-
vidual confinement of sows to group housing, De Krom found a series of
changes both in how pigs learn to behave in relation to each other, and
how farmers learn to detect changes in feeding and other behaviour.
There are some paradoxical dynamics, whereby for instance individual
housed sows were more easily recognized for always being in the same
place, affording a more personal relation than in group housing (Krom
2015). Another major factor that configures the relations between ani-
mals and humans on sites of animal production is the use of automation.
On the one hand, this is part of processes of intensification, industrializa-
tion and growing capital inputs as sketched above. But more intricate
dynamics also occur, for instance when milking robots allow older farm-
ers to continue their practice when their workload becomes more
manageable. Many forms of automation, automatic feeders for individ-

ual feeding of pigs, robots for milking cows, produce a major increase in
data on individual animals, and thereby starting to mediate how farmers
know their animals: as data points that can be managed ‘by exception’.
One only needs to check on the slow growing pig or the cow that the
system reports to have udder inflammation. At the same time, this does
not necessarily mean the ‘distance’ between farmers and their animals is
increased. As for instance milking robots were found by farmers to quali-
tatively change their relation with the cows, while also the dynamics
within the ‘herd’ changes: farmers report less stress and more relaxed
responses to their presence among the cows (Driessen and Heutinck 2015).
In the Netherlands, arguably in the wake of automation, there seems
to be a growing interest in offering choice to animals, for dairy cows
whether to go out grazing or stay indoors. Meanwhile there are also
efforts to harness the natural tendencies of animals to optimize produc-
tion facilities: for example the ‘pig toilet’ that collects manure in a part of
the confined area, utilizing the preference for cleanliness and designated
areas to poo and pee. Dairy farmers have en masse adopted ‘cow brushes’
that allow cows to maintain their hides by standing next to an automated
device. The use of remotely controlled one-way gates allows farmers to
use the exploratory urge of pigs to sort them individually while they are
kept in group housing. One Dutch pig farmer explained he had installed
this to make them all move during the night themselves, to be waiting
outside on a designated morning for the truck to be collected for slaugh-
ter. This farmer explained how the sight of pigs waiting and the sense of
making them complicit in their own demise made him feel bad and led
him to discontinue this set-up. Here the affective relations, not with indi-
vidual pigs but with them as a collective, can influence the material con-
figuration under which they are kept.
2.3 Welfare Regulations and Marketing Norms
On one hand technological developments on farms can seem driven by

expanding capital and growing roles for large corporations—which in
turn can be seen as central in producing the conditions for animal
suffering (Gunderson 2013). Lowering costs, increasing efficiency,

optimizing capital inputs and growing corporate control of farming
practices all do not favour the quality of animal lives nor that of their
relation with farmers. Meanwhile, especially in for instance the jurisdiction
of the European Union, welfare regulations have become increasingly
prominent in defining how animals can be kept and thereby structure the
conditions under which farmers interact with animals. Battery cages for
laying hens for instance have been formally banned in the European
Union since 2012. Some farmers could be heard to lament the associated
loss of the ability to systematically inspect all the cages and thereby pro-
vide individual care for the animals. And even though after these types of
bans of close confinement, farmers can be heard to look back realizing
former practices were overly cruel, questions can remain on whether the
new situation is in every respect an improvement.
There are of course common typologies of production systems that
come with strict conditions under which the animals can be kept: free
range chickens, free range with outdoor access, pasture fed cows (that
according to the marketing based regulations are allowed to graze on a
meadow minimally 6 hours a day, 120 days a year). For all legally allowed
production systems, specific, often quite detailed welfare regulations have
been developed. Often these are defined in terms of the material condi-
tions provided to the animals: adequate water and feed, a minimum space
requirement such as one square meter per pig of 110 kg. In practice,
establishing and maintaining these regulations creates a dynamic of its
own. It matters a great deal how animal welfare is actually assessed on
farms (Roe et al. 2011). When marketing and consumer preferences are
central in defining welfare, that gets defined in ways that are easily com-
modified and packaged (Buller and Roe 2014). However, what is crucial
in these situations is that human-animal relations that ensue on farms can
be considered central in determining the welfare of animals that can be
achieved on them (Waiblinger et al. 2006). This makes understanding
animal welfare, and ongoing transformations on farms with respect to
this relation, a central concern.
Various developments can be discerned in a country such as the
Netherlands, where increasing scales, modernization and automation are
sought to be combined with animal welfare measures. One development
is the production of intermediate spaces that blend characteristics of

indoor and outdoor, creating simulated versions of outside conditions in
an indoor setting that can be controlled and automated: the ‘cow garden’
and the indoor chicken ‘forest’ type space. What these developments
entail in practice is contentious. On the one hand these can claim to offer
‘organic’ or ‘free range’ conditions in a controlled environment and can
achieve associated welfare claims; whereas the scale and level of automa-
tion leaves open questions on the type of care that can be maintained.
Meanwhile farmers are experimenting with ways of rearing and using
animals in ways that they sense their consumers or non-farming neigh-
bours appreciate: for instance farmers that are creating ‘family herds’ and
use ‘foster mothers’ in order to avoid separating calves from their moth-
ers, or at least to avoid confining them individually.
Notwithstanding the ambivalences and nuances in these developments,
in general, farms can be seen as developing towards larger scale, more
intensive, more automated forms—whereby the relations between
farmers and their animals are transforming. How to characterize and
evaluate these changing relations?
3 ow to Think About the Directions

H
of Human-Animal Relations on Farms?
Should we see these shifts as part of a broader changing culture of relating
to animals? What is the role in this of disparities in income between rural
and urban; and what may be considered a growing rift between consum-
ers and producers? And is it informative to frame these changes in even
broader terms—as capitalism (Blanchette 2018; Emel and Neo 2015), or
modernity (Giedion 2013)? Or what happens if we delve into the details
of shifting experiences and various categories of farmers and their animals
that we could discern. Within these resulting categories of farms, there
appear to be different ways of characterizing and appreciating human-
animal relations. This results in a mixed discourse that may use registers
of care, alienation, exploitation, tradition, bond, attunement and techno-
logical mediation.
3.1 Technological Futures and Genuine Traditions?
In Italy, or actually more or less everywhere, a distinction is made between

traditional and intensive breeding, often finding an ideological contrast
that is the only thing that is grasped by public opinion. Actually, I
(Pasqualino) believe, a distinction should be made between true tradition
and tradition invented for commercial purposes and between intensity
due to genetic and technological developments but in which the animal
is considered as such and farms, that must be considered industrial, where
genetics and technology may not differ but the mental approach of the
breeder and his entourage are completely different. In this case, the ani-
mal is seen as a transformation machine while respecting the welfare
rules. Once again, only the consumer can intervene and not the possible
morality of the farmer who in these cases is culturally involved in the idea
of technological ‘progress’. Much of this depends on how technologies
intervene in livestock farming and agriculture in general. Often the rela-
tionship between the user and the producer of new technologies is too
much mediated by apparatuses, economic development prospects that
tend to be managerial and sometimes even ideological visions of agricul-
ture. The figure of the farmer as an entrepreneur who risks his capital by
putting his work and that of his employees, as well as the zoo-
anthropological relationship with his animals is seen as a mere executor
directed in his choices by regulations and public economic
contributions.
A greater direct contact between the world of research and the world
of agricultural production made with maximum transparency and public
visibility would benefit an overall improvement of the system and could
also bring to the attention of the consumer this aspect of the food pro-
duction chain that he feeds with his consumption.
3.2 Culture That Does Not Know How

A
to Value Animals
It is to be thought that a large part of the phenomenon in which farmers—

for instance in rural Italy—are less and less in a position to care for their
animals is attributable to intellectual inattention towards animals.

Widening the horizon to a broader scope than that of farm animals and
therefore to animals living in the homes of citizens of richer countries,
some data are objective and measurable. The number of animals of wild
species kept in captivity is much higher than in the past and this is clearly
maltreatment. Even more evident should be the condition of continuous
suffering imposed, deliberately but at the same time without particular
public awareness, on dogs and cats with breed-related diseases such as
brachycephalus dogs, whose skulls have been bred in a way that results in
them having constant trouble breathing (British Veterinary Association
n.d.). In a society where people with a high interest and even love for
animals cannot find what is highly problematic when it is present in their
own homes, it is difficult to create the vision of a correct relationship
between the purchase of the final product of food and the long and com-
plex breeding conditions far up in the chain of production (Evans and
Miele 2012).
As an undercurrent of these developments and categorizations,
arguably a profound transformation has occurred. On this point, I
[Pasqualino] must say that I have a certain emotional involvement,
perhaps not very academic, as a breeder and veterinarian. Over the years,
I have seen the increasing difficulties of breeders and farmed animals.
Many farms have been progressively closed often with the economic
bankruptcy of entrepreneurs and the average life of animals has
progressively decreased. Both things, but above all the first, are not at the
centre of the public debate. The animal welfare policies, although positive
and necessary, in my opinion, are unable to transform the trend, in fact
somehow confirm it by identifying a new element of operations in
breeding, the result of new areas of research and with the assignment of
tasks to specialized technicians. In the meantime, the production price
policies are always the same with the continuous erosion of the profitability
of the farms in the less suitable areas. On the contrary, in the most suited
areas to breeding there is the problem of pollution produced by the farms
themselves which have grown due to the commercial success they have
achieved.
3.3 onsumer Awareness, Animal Welfare

C
and Farmer-animal Relations
The progressive and excessive industrialization of livestock farms and the

consequent treatment of the animals as ‘production machines’ worry the
Italian and European citizens, but the animal welfare policies, meritori-
ously developed over the last few decades, have not been fully understood
by consumers. Expressions such as ‘animal welfare’ in this sense are mis-
leading, because the well-being we are talking about is very different from
that of the well-known human ‘wellness centres’, suggesting flourishing
or even luxury. Consumers in the European Union are regularly asked in
Eurobarometer surveys what their views are on animal welfare, or what
their ‘willingness is to pay for animal welfare and the environment’ (Law
2009). But they are never morally involved with regard to their responsi-
bilities; this has not configured them as experiencing a position of genu-
ine engagement. The problem, however, is much wider than the one
directly related to food of animal origin, even if the ethical problem
remains greater for them. The food that consumers inevitably have to buy
in order to live has a long journey to make, which we call the supply
chain. Consumer information is insufficient and this has been talked
about for years.
Everything points to the fact that the situation will remain as it is if the
consumer does not take on an active attitude. We believe that this is a
pressing reason to acquire an active attitude and be critical, and not just
for reasons of health or food quality, but also due to ethical issues. By
buying one food item instead of another, you are endorsing genuine mis-
deeds. The consumption of food compared to other consumption has
different characteristics because food is indispensable to survive and
because it is permeated with injustices in the various stages of production
to use. The producers, that is the people who work, the animals on the
farms and the natural environment that is involved are so vulnerable and
weak that they are subjected to harassment that can only be countered
with the strong participation of consumers, that would need to become
true judges of what occurs throughout the supply chain.
The lack of information provided is accompanied by a lack of interest

in really knowing about food production, beyond ideological stances for
or against this and that. After all, in rich countries, the food has never
been so abundant, varied and cheap in all of history and the general pub-
lic does not get that the situation could get worse in the future as well as
being unjust at the moment. The long supply chain makes the analysis of
the steps difficult but also the short supply chain requires the moral con-
cerns that cannot be encapsulated in the price-quality ratio alone. We
believe that the citizen-consumer has not only the right to be informed,
but also the duty to seek information, and the moral responsibility for the
practical fallout of his choices about the life of the vulnerable and unrec-
ognized part of the supply chain. Human beings working in agriculture
(generally the poorest half of the world’s population living in the coun-
tryside), animals from increasingly industrialized farms and the natural
environment, even though with different ethical values and with different
power relationships between them, suffer the same fate: they are unknown
and unrecognized in their not very bucolic condition. Very often for the
farmers and other humans involved in agricultural production in remote
rural areas this means low income, a lot of intense work and no security.
What is needed to improve conditions on these farms, both for humans
and animals, is a genuine paradigm shift, a change in our mental approach,
and the initiation of a cultural debate on what is inherent in the human
biological condition such as eating, but which in rich countries is now
taken for granted but for gastronomic refinement and elite products.
Proactive attention to the purchase of food and consumers who actively
take responsibility for their choices could have the practical effect of gen-
erating a virtuous cycle on the upstream elements, whereby farmers
become eager not to disappoint those who judge them. Better dividing
the profits towards the weaker parts does not necessarily have to increase
prices but this possibility should not be ruled out, as for the population,
the rich, spending on food has a much lesser impact on income than in
the past and that the poorer populations live in rural areas from where,
for a long time now, the trend has consolidated to leave rural areas and in
many cases become urban poor with other socio-economic problems to
prioritize.
3.4 Rethinking ‘Food Quality’ as Relational
Can the conditions on farms, and the plights of farmers, farm workers
and animals, be an occasion to reflect on the concept of the food chain as
a relationship of co-responsibility and interdependence? Can this chain
be the site of a true exercise of human solidarity, renewing the biological
link between human beings and the life of the planet? Can food—expe-
rienced as entangled with lively relations—provide moral and aesthetic
satisfaction other than just satiating oneself or enjoying the sense of the
taste or respect the dictates of a fashion? What is at stake is just moral
requirements in the evaluation of a new form of ‘quality’.
In fact, the problem of the economic and social difficulty of food
producers is not only of breeders but also of agricultural producers in
general, in Europe and all over the world. The poorest part of the world’s
population lives in the rural area and the phenomenon of abandonment
of the countryside is increasingly evident. I don’t think we can really
change things if we don’t have the willingness of the citizen-consumer to
be involved and responsible. At least in Italy, however, there is a tendency
to make the consumer think that all his sense of responsibility can be
reduced to reading quality labels that proliferate on the basis of food,
health, ethical choices, and so on but without knowing or even trying to
know what has happened over the millennia since the fundamental polit-
ical event in human history: the changes in the social order produced by
the domestication of animals and plants (Scott 2017). From which fol-
lows the current society and all its problems. Add to this that with regard
to the consumption of products of animal origin it is difficult to make
in-depth ethical assessments on the relationship between humans and
animals because it is very easy to fall into the simplistic and misleading
contrast between omnivores and vegans. So what to do? I believe that
beyond the description of the state of the art, it is necessary to define a
possible future work perspective that can make an increased consider-
ation of animals truly possible.
4 onclusion: How to Interpret

C
Farmer-Animal Relations
What may be ways to draw on particular notions to describe the
relationships that the farmers struggling in rural areas have with their
animals? Especially also as it relates to the landscapes and (human and
nonhuman) communities they live in. How to describe the role of
humans and animals as active and agential, shaping and being shaped by
landscapes, traditions, and so on? And can we consider these still as valid
groundings of contemporary human-animal relations, or are these
traditional relations about to disappear and no longer experienced as
economically meaningful—or, is this buying into notions of progress and
improvement that precludes seeing the complexities and blends of
technology and tradition, intimate relations and intensification?
John Berger, a critic of modern human-animal relations as (re-)
produced in zoos, toys, urban pets, and industrial farming, wrote about
his small scale traditional farmer neighbours in a village in the French
Massif Central. The oft quoted bit sets up the misunderstanding of
farmer-animal relations as a form of urban alienation: ‘A peasant becomes
fond of his pig and is glad to salt away its pork. What is significant, and
is so difficult for the urban stranger to understand, is that the two
statements in that sentence are connected by an and not by a but’
(Berger 2009).
I, (Clemens) have been wondering about the underlying—or is it
overarching, or somehow thereby overly abstracting?—question of
whether this form of relating is still something we can do in modernity.
Or how actually to ask this question. Is this a form of life urban moderns
still somehow have ‘access’ to, or could recreate, and if not, how did we
lose it? Is this premodern form of farming in an intimate connection with
animals a relation that we should hold up as an ideal, a model for under-
standing where farming is going?
We could understand it in terms of tradition, heritage, small scale, or
non-capitalist. Where the knowledge of how to manage animals in a par-
ticular landscape creates a fiercely independent position for farmers
embedded in local communities (Rebanks 2015; Laurie 2020).
Here the relation between the farmer and animal, and the actively
mutual character of this relation, is key to understand what it means to
farm. The landscape and the kind of food it affords structures the rela-
tions between animals and humans, in a mutually beneficial relation that
is not defined by total control, but by to some extent shared vulnerability,
even when power is not symmetrically distributed. This type of relation
can be characterized in terms of care (Harbers 2002; Mol et al. 2015),
emphasizing interdependencies, the need to be responsive and specific,
and based on benevolence—however of a kind that is not selfless. There
is the unavoidable question of exploitation, a condition perhaps shared
between humans and animals (Porcher 2011), or whether the animals
can be conceived as performing labour even in a collaborative vein
(Porcher 2017). There are questions of the extent to which the relation
involves attunement by farmers and their animals, resulting in synchron-
icity of movement and embodiment of knowing each other (Despret and
Meuret 2016).
It remains open what are key concepts and relevant aspects, how to
understand what is at stake in changing human-animal relations on
farms. Is it about the position in the house/household (Tsing 2012) or
village/community of the animals? Does it derive from the personal rela-
tions possible in small scale farming operations, the naming of individual
animals (Fudge 2017) and knowing their idiosyncratic characters? Or is
it about the embodied relations and the materiality of the care and the
landscape that structures these relationships, the seasonality of the rela-
tion, the collective experience of butchering, preparing and eating as a
communal practice? Does this include how animal lives are part of par-
ticular village or regional metabolisms, based on a socioecological logic of
exchange and sharing, while gathering together an extended family or
community at particular moments in the year (cf. Ibáñez Martín & Mol
forthcoming).
This premodern ideal, of farming animals in ways that make ecological
sense, does not massively pollute water, soil, contribute to climate change,
and is somehow meaningfully part of landscapes, seems far removed from
current industrial farming.
In a world of rich countries where meat consumption is expected to
decrease for health reasons and also to reduce the impact of global
warming on the environment, a more widespread presence of animals on

the territory and closer to citizens and consumers may not create condi-
tions of pollution, but it could be to protect the territory, maintain soil
fertility with the use of manure and also with the agricultural production
of fodder that allows crop rotation.
The anthrozoological and bioethical attention of human beings who
are consumers of products of animal origin that catch the link between
solar radiation collected from grasses growing on fertile soil without pol-
lution and eaten by animals that perceive only—or in the main—positive
sensations during their life should not be seen as much more ecological
than a fully vegan option?
5 Coda
Clemens presses Pasqualino one more time for an account of what it is
like to live with animals. Eager to evocatively describe the meaning of
farmer-animal relations that seem about to disappear. Pasqualino sighs:
You want me to do anthropology. I will not. I want to do bioethics. I
believe that farmers are—or should be—an integral part of society and
that there is no specific peasant culture. Farmers are not aliens, but nor-
mal citizens. The difference is their work, they know something that con-
sumers don’t know. There is no attention to the real conditions for
producing food, but mainly prejudice. Alright, if you want lived experi-
ence, if you want to know what it’s like to live on a small farm and care
for animals—amidst all the ambiguities and difficulties and dilemmas
and impossibilities. Here, perhaps the best way is a work of fiction:
‘Bloody Milk’ (‘Petit paysan’)—a film about a small farmer caught up in
an extreme situation, that exemplifies the everyday minor challenges that
add up. Here’s what Pasqualino wrote about the film:
To live in close contact with animals, there is nothing better than being a
dairy cow farmer. The day is marked by a series of human and animal needs
that absorb and bind for all 24 hours. The drama, or rather the contempo-
rary dramas of this film, if caught, would help to recover the distance
between the ways of being human in the city and in the countryside and
understand the difficulties that the latter endured more or less from the
beginning of the Neolithic. In the film, a young man loses much more than
his job, and the means to exercise it. He loses the possibility of remaining
loyal to his animals, and in order to defend his cows, which depend on him
in all respects, he ends up breaking rules which, in addition to being laws,
are also common sense rules that prevent the spread of illnesses. There are
no completely guilty or innocent behaviours, the drama is simply inevita-
ble and it is important to be able to watch it at least as an audience in
the cinema.
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12
Biotechnologies and Animals:
The Impact of Genetic Engineering
on Human-Animal Relationships
Susanna Pietropaolo
1 Introduction
In recent years, a wide range of biotechnologies involving living animals
has been developed in several fields. Among them, the manipulations of
animal genomes for biomedical research are probably the most relevant
ones, and have critical ethical implications. Indeed, procedures such as
selective breeding of animals for specific traits or cloning of individuals
have a strong impact not only on our society, but on our general approach
to animals. On the one hand, negative terms like “eugenics” have often
been associated with these types of manipulations and are often inter-
preted by the general audience as an aberrant use of human “supremacy”
over the other animals. On the other hand, these and other genetic
manipulations have enhanced enormously our knowledge of biological
systems, including our understanding of the genetics of animal and
S. Pietropaolo (*)
University Bordeaux, CNRS, EPHE, INCIA, Bordeaux, France
242 S. Pietropaolo
human behaviour, as well as of several human pathologies, an issue of

obvious primordial relevance.
Gene-targeting techniques, for instance, have been fundamental in
understanding the basic role of a plethora of genes, and in designing
genetic animal models for a myriad of human pathologies. These animal
models obtained through biotechnological interventions have been and
still are a necessary step for pre-clinical research, thus allowing the inves-
tigation of molecular etiopathological mechanisms and the design of
novel therapies for subsequent clinical research. At the same time, the use
of genetically modified animals has promoted the human view of animals
as “tools” to improve the quality of life of human beings. The spread of
research involving mutant mice has been so massive, in both research and
industrial laboratories, that it may have somehow made us forget their
original nature as living beings, aggravating the mutant mice’s exploita-
tion by humans. According to some authors (Ryder 1975), this approach
could be considered as a form of speciesism, inducing a sort of discrimi-
nation similar to racism. Genetic manipulations are also associated with
litter culling and selective killing of individuals that do not carry the
mutation of interest or are not further necessary for experimental work;
these actions can be regarded as intrinsically wrong, if animals are meant
to have rights (Regan 1984).
These ethical implications of biotechnologies and their impact on
human-animal relationships are common to the general use of animals by
humans; in addition to these, some specific aspects relate to the applica-
tion of biotechnologies only. For instance, introducing artificial genetic
mutations in animals may have unexpected effects, as they do not undergo
Darwinian natural selection, thus promoting the view of biotechnologies
as a way of “messing up” nature. Furthermore, the development of bio-
technologies has led to the discovery that sequences of the human genome
can be found in other animals, thus potentially lending further support
to the argument that sacrificing the non-human for the sake of the
human-animal relationship should not be legitimate (Hoeyer and Koch
2006). Indeed, biotechnologies applied to animals are often beneficial to
humans and their research, but may have deleterious effects on animals’
well-being, inducing pathological phenotypes of various degrees of sever-
ity. The concept of “deleterious phenotypes”—though mostly considered
12 Biotechnologies and Animals: The Impact of Genetic… 243
in its physical implications, for example, reduced body growth or devel-

opment—is indeed an important part of regular assessment of research
projects by national ethical committees and requires specific legal authori-
sations for experimentation. Nonetheless, these genetically induced del-
eterious phenotypes often include conditions of emotional sufferance,
and/or behavioural alterations, as it typically occurs in the case of animal
models of neuropsychiatric and neurological disorders. These studies are,
therefore, characterised by the specific ethical dilemma of being based on
the assumption that the animals can model human mental sufferance
(e.g., depression, anxiety, drug addiction) by sharing similar highly devel-
oped neuronal functions and dysfunctions (Cassaday 2015), and con-
comitantly harming these human-like functions for research purposes.
Biotechnologies involving animal genes have developed rapidly
through technical advances that appear increasingly sophisticated: the
use of optogenetic approaches or the most recent Crisp/CAS9 methods
are excellent examples of this advancement. These tools are leading to
discoveries that are dramatically improving our knowledge of human
physio-pathology, discoveries that are especially evident in the last fron-
tier of scientific research, that is, the understanding of human brain func-
tioning and related dysfunctions. At the same time, these manipulations
risk to exacerbate the view of animals as “tools”, enhancing the ability of
humans to control animals’ behaviour and brain functionality and pos-
sibly suggesting an approach to laboratory animals as “robotic units”
under a sort of human remote control.
The present chapter intends to highlight the conflicting ethical aspects
of the use of biotechnologies in biomedical research on animals, with a
focus on genetic manipulations in laboratory species. Examples of the
most relevant technologies manipulating animal genomes will be intro-
duced, with an extensive discussion of their major contradictory ethical
implications and their impact on animal-human relationships. The effects
of selected major applications of these biotechnologies on the way humans
see animals will also be described, with an emphasis on biomedical
research and neuroscience in particular. The chapter will conclude with a
discussion of the strategies that may contribute to solve some of the major
ethical problems related to the application of these technologies to ani-
mals, thus suggesting novel directions for future biomedical researchers.
244 S. Pietropaolo
2 thical Implications of Genetic

E
Technologies in Biological Research
on Animals
Rodents, that is, rats and mice, are the animals most widely used in
biomedical research, mice being the species of choice for most studies
based on genetic modifications. Overall, rodents provide a good trade-
off between the complexity of physiological functions necessary to
meet the scientific objectives of biomedical research and the need to
minimise ethical concerns, excluding animals with higher phylogenetic
positions and increased capacity of suffering, according to current leg-
islation on animal experimentation and animal protection. Hence, the
preferential use of rodents for biomedical technologies can be (maybe
surprisingly) viewed as a strategy promoting replacement for the use of
higher animals (Cassaday 2015), and therefore benefiting from the ful-
filment of one of the 3R principles (i.e., Reduction, Refinement,
Replacement; (Russell 1959)).
Nonetheless, this potential ethical advantage is counterbalanced by the
impressive increase in the number of laboratory animals used in biomedi-
cal research stimulated by the rapid progress in the development of genet-
ically modified mouse lines and the success of their use for research, thus
violating the Reduction principle of the same 3R approach (Blakemore
et al. 2012). A conflicting ethical nature therefore characterised already
the choice of the species used for biotechnologies; such ethical conflict
seems a constant characteristic of the applications of all major types of
biotechnologies used for biomedical research on animals, that is, selective
breeding or genetic engineering.
2.1 Selective Breeding
Selective breeding (also called artificial selection) is a process used by

humans since ancient times; it is based on manipulations of animal
breeding to selectively develop particular phenotypic traits by inter-
crossing individuals with the characteristics of interest across several gen-
erations. The result is a line of animals with established (selected) traits
that will be inherited by the next generations in a stable manner. The

selective breeding approach has been applied in a wide variety of animal
species, including farm, pet, and laboratory animals for several commer-
cial, industrial, and scientific purposes and can focus on the selection of
both physical and behavioural phenotypes. The ethical implications of
selective breeding are multiple as are their effects on human-animal
relationships.
The first feeling that selective breeding may induce in a layperson is an
unpleasant association with a sort of “eugenic” approach: selective breed-
ing, especially when applied to farm animals or pets, can be intuitively
associated with the idea of breeding the best to the best, selecting for
"superior" qualities, with considerable culling of the other individuals
considered as “inferior”. Hence, selective breeding obviously brings
together two concepts that are ethically difficult to accept by many, that
is, the idea that a rational, planned killing of animals is acceptable and
that humans have the right to improve the genetics made by nature for
their own advantage. Furthermore, since such an advantage has immedi-
ate commercial implications, that is, increased sales of selected farm or
pet animals, the ethical conflict generated by selective breeding becomes
unacceptable to some.
This feeling is exacerbated by the fact that some forms of selective
breeding seemed to be applied for the mere “pleasure” of humans, as in
the case of dog species bred for traits that make them physically more
attractive as companions but that are often accompanied by health prob-
lems (Nicholas et al. 2010), for example, the case of French bulldogs,
with their particular facial “baby-like” characteristics, but also their severe
cardiovascular and eye problems. In the case of companion or pet ani-
mals, selective breeding may then promote the human view of animals as
either “toys” or objects with high commercial value (as the pedigree mar-
ket confirms…) that can be collected by humans as status symbols
(Redmalm 2014). Animals with extreme physical characteristics are then
subjected to the whims of fashion, and may become highly popular
among humans despite their serious health problems (Sandoe et al. 2017).
As shown by the example of dogs, the price paid at the animal welfare
level can be high, and selective breeding to enhance some traits over oth-
ers can induce not only severe physical health problems but also aberrant
246 S. Pietropaolo
behaviours. For example, it has been reported that roosters bred for fast
growth or heavy muscles kill hens after mating, as a consequence of the
alienation due to their inability to perform species-typical courtship ritu-
als (Grandin 2005). Conversely, selective breeding can also have benefi-
cial effects on animal welfare, for example, increasing the resistance/
adaptability of animals to captivity or breeding conditions and reducing
their levels of stress. These animal welfare benefits are in turn translated
into advantages for humans, as reduced stress and increased adaptability
are known to enhance the quality of the outcomes of animal breeding, for
example, providing higher-quality meat or more reliable scientific results.
Selective breeding has also contributed to our understanding of the
genetics of animal behaviour, through so-called psychogenetic selection.
This is a type of selective breeding that has been widely applied to labora-
tory rodents; it is typically based on the genetic selection of performances
in a particular behavioural test to create animal lines or strains that show
consistent, usually divergent, patterns of behaviour over generations.
Well-known examples of this approach are the Roman High- and Low-
avoidance rat lines, bred since the 1960s (Bignami 1965; Broadhurst and
Bignami 1965) according to their performance in the two-way active
avoidance learning test. Low-avoidance rats show not only poor learning
but also increased stress responses (e.g., freezing behaviour, ACTH, cor-
ticosterone, and prolactin secretion) and anxiety (Steimer and Driscoll
2003), and adopt a more passive (or reactive) coping style when con-
fronted with a novel environment (Driscoll et al. 1998; Steimer and
Driscoll 2005). In contrast, High-avoidance rats are less responsive to
stress, and show little anxiety in novel situations and tend to be impulsive
and novelty seekers (Steimer and Driscoll 2003). Indeed, an important
implication of selected breeding studies is the discovery that psychoge-
netic selection also influences physiological characteristics, not only those
more closely associated with certain behavioural responses, for example
stress hormones, but also immune functions (Koolhaas 2008). Studies in
laboratory mice have, for instance, demonstrated that differences in
inherited behavioural traits can explain inter-individual differences in the
propensity to develop tumours, through alterations in angiogenesis and
the functionality of Natural Killer cells (Vegas et al. 2006). Hence,
psychogenetic selection has important implications for studying the rela-

tionship between personality traits and the susceptibility to stress and
illness (Mcewen and Stellar 1993).
Hence, psychogenetic selection provides a useful tool to study the bio-
logical bases of personality (Driscoll et al. 2010; Giorgi et al. 2007) and
their implications in health and disease (Mcewen and Stellar 1993).
Selective breeding of laboratory animals has in fact critically contributed
to research on animal personalities, a topic that is of great scientific rele-
vance per se and that can somehow give back to animals a central and
active role in the relationship with humans. In this regard, the applica-
tion of psychogenetic breeding to study the complexity of animal person-
alities somehow puts humans back at an equal level of importance with
the other animals, in contrast to the anthropocentric view commonly
associated with animal biotechnologies. Indeed, studies of behavioural
genetics have demonstrated that in animals, exactly as in humans, some
patterns of individual phenotypic characteristics show high consistency
over a lifetime, and can therefore be classified as temperaments or person-
alities, defining specific ways of coping with the surrounding environ-
ment and life events (Gosling 2001). Recognising in animals the presence
of certain personalities equivalent to humans (e.g., categorised as “shy,”
“aggressive,” “impulsive,” “anxious”) can therefore improve our consider-
ation of animal dignity and of their rights as complex well-beings, thus
enriching our relationship with them.
Finally, selective breeding can be a powerful tool to investigate impor-
tant processes and major biological phenomena involving animals. It is
interesting to remark that the term “selective breeding” was coined by
Charles Darwin (Darwin 1859), who was interested in "artificial selec-
tion" as an illustration of his proposed wider theory on natural selection.
Darwin noted that many domesticated animals (as well as plants) had
special properties that were developed intentionally by humans through
the selection of desirable versus undesirable characteristics (Chapters IV
and VI of “On the Origin of Species”). Darwin argued that the fact that
humans with their weaknesses can achieve so much by artificial selection
can only further support the existence of the more powerful process of
natural selection and provide evidence supporting the evolutionary theory.
248 S. Pietropaolo
2.2 enetic Engineering: Transgenesis,

G
Gene-targeting, and CRISPR/Cas9
Genetic engineering includes all techniques leading to genetically modi-

fied organisms, that is, organisms in which the genome has been modi-
fied in a way that cannot occur naturally through mating and/or natural
recombination. Originally, transgenic mammals, most commonly includ-
ing mice, rabbits, pigs, goats, and cattle, were created through a tech-
nique called pronuclear microinjection (Kumar et al. 2009). During this
process, a transgene—a linear DNA construct containing the gene of
interest coupled to its regulatory elements—was directly transferred into
the pronucleus of a single-celled zygote. Because transgene integration is
a random event, and the insertion site of the transgene may interfere with
critical genes, the embryo may fail to normally develop. Even if the trans-
gene successfully integrates into genomic DNA, its expression may be
more or less successful depending on the location of integration. With
approximately 15% of microinjected livestock embryos resulting in live
offspring, and a success rate of less than 1% of those embryos resulting in
transgenic offspring, it is evident that transgenic animal production
requires a high number of animals and a massive culling of non-transgenic
offspring, with all the related ethical implications discussed above.
The use of large numbers of animals has been partially reduced by the
introduction of other methods for creating transgenic mammals, that is,
through embryonic stem cells (ESCs) or somatic cell nuclear transfer
(SCNT) cloning techniques (Capecchi 1990; Capecchi 1989; Thomas
and Capecchi 1987). Somatic stem or stem-like cells grown in vitro can
be transfected with a transgene taking advantage of the natural homolo-
gous recombination process between the mutated DNA sequence and
the cognate DNA sequence of the recipient cell. Subsequently, by includ-
ing a selective marker on the construct (e.g., antibiotic resistance), selec-
tion can be applied to eliminate the non-transgenic cells. Additionally,
populations of cells containing the transgene can be screened for colonies
with a specific site of integration, if the goal is to disrupt a target gene
through the insertion of the transgene. Mouse ESCs are then used to
generate transgenic animals by injecting the modified cells into a blasto-
cyst to form a chimera.
Additional gene editing tools have been further developed, more

recently. The clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeat
(CRISPR)-associated nuclease Cas9 (CRISPR/Cas9) system was devel-
oped from a bacterial defence mechanism, whereby the Cas9 endonucle-
ase is guided to a specific region in dsDNA by small guide RNAs (gRNA),
resulting in cleavage at that site (Vesikansa 2018). If a transgene is injected
along with the gRNA and mRNA for Cas9, homologous recombination
can occur, effectively swapping out a region of genomic DNA for the
construct. This has the potential to make allelic changes without relying
on selective breeding, which can affect closely linked genes that carry
desirable traits, or replacing a mutated gene sequence for a functional
sequence, or vice versa. It is now possible to make down-to-single-
nucleotide changes, whether via insertion, deletion, or substitution
(Vesikansa 2018).
These major improvements in efficiency in creating genetically modi-
fied organisms have markedly contributed to reduce the costs of these
technologies in terms of animal lives: fewer embryos are now needed to
create live, transgenic offspring, which results in a reduction in the num-
ber of egg donors—usually, super-ovulated females need to be sacrificed
to collect the ova for SCNT or zygotes, if naturally mated. Furthermore,
by increasing the success rate of live-born transgenic offspring, fewer ani-
mals are sacrificed. This has an obvious ethical benefit and positive impact
on animal welfare, addressing at least two of the 3R principles: although
suitable replacements are not available in this case, technological advance-
ments have indeed refined the methods and reduced the number of donor
and recipient animals.
The gene-targeting techniques have enabled researchers to conduct
site-specific modifications to the genome and knock-out/-in specific
genes (Capecchi 1989). Indeed, the immense power of these biotech-
nologies is that the investigator chooses both which genes to modify and
how to modify them, keeping virtually complete control over the way in
which the gene's DNA sequence or surrounding regulatory elements are
modified (Capecchi 2000). This technology, therefore, permits evaluat-
ing deliberately selected gene functions in the intact animal and a system-
atic dissection of the most complex biological processes. Because nearly
all biological phenomena are mediated or influenced by genes, this
250 S. Pietropaolo
technology has had an enormous impact on all areas of biological research

in animals, including the study of cancer, immunology, neurobiology,
and genetic diseases.
It is therefore not surprising that biotechnologies for the creation of
genetically modified organisms have raised so many ethical concerns and
have had a strong influence on the human-animal relationship. Firstly,
the idea of “playing god” is more easily associated with these genetic
modifications than with others, as they allow humans to create “new”
animals, at least from the genetic point of view, rather than only selecting
some of them, as in the case of selective breeding. This ethical concern is
therefore associated with the philosophical acceptability of changing “the
nature” of animals and morally accepting the supremacy of human over
animal life. According to some authors, in order to consider the nature of
an animal, we must take into account the Aristotelian concept of telos
which describes the essence and purpose of a creature (Rollin 2003). It
has been argued that altering the animals’ telos is morally permissible, as
long as we are careful to accommodate the animals’ interests (Rollin
2003). According to other authors, animal interests and welfare may not
be the only factors to be taken into consideration when establishing ethi-
cal limits to biotechnologies. For example, some authors have argued that
genetic engineering requires us to expand our existing notions of animal
ethics to include concepts of animal dignity, integrity (Ortiz 2004), and
the intrinsic value of animals (Verhoog 1992). In particular, it should be
considered that animals have an intrinsic value, which is separate from
their value to humans. This approach is well reflected by the results of
several public opinion surveys, where participants often state to be con-
cerned about the nature of animals and worried about how it can be
negatively affected by bioengineering (Macnaghten 2004). Another view
suggested by other authors argues that genetic engineering may damage
the human-animal relationship because of the increasingly imbalanced
distribution of power between humans and animals (Schicktanz 2006).
This imbalance has been termed asymmetry and is raised as a concern in
human-animal relationships together with the ambivalence towards ani-
mals (Schicktanz 2006).
It should be underlined that the ethical acceptability of gene-editing
techniques is not independent of the type of animal species used for these
studies; for instance, the genetic engineering of mice, that is, pest ani-
mals, is often perceived by humans as more morally acceptable than the
use of pigs, which is, in turn, perceived as more acceptable than that of
primates. This approach can be itself criticised as a form of sentientism,
which can be considered as discriminating as speciesism (Wurbel 2009),
since judgements of sentience can be confounded by prejudice based on
species, that is, the subjective human perception of intelligence of certain
species over others.
Another major ethical concern generated by the use of genetically
modified animals relies on its potential negative effects on animal welfare.
These include both direct effects of the genetic manipulations on the
mutated organisms or indirect effects due to interactions between the
mutated organisms and others that are genetically intact. Examples of the
most relevant direct effects include the possible presence of deleterious
phenotypes resulting in severe health problems or behavioural altera-
tions, as shown by animal models of human pathologies (an issue further
discussed in depth in section 3.2). Such direct effects are mostly inten-
tional, as they are necessary to reproduce the pathological conditions
observed in patients. Nonetheless, accidental negative effects of genetic
mutation have also been described, as in the case of the enhanced inter-
male aggression levels displayed by transgenic mice for interferon-β, due
to the fact that the transgene integration caused a disruption (was it a
deletion or a disruption because the transgene inserted in the middle of
the gene?) in the gene encoding monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), an
enzyme that degrades serotonin and norepinephrine (Cases et al. 1995).
Hence, the indirect negative effects on animal welfare are mostly unin-
tentional, and they should be considered somehow undesired side effects
of an extensive use of genetically modifying technologies on animals.
This is the case of the risk that genetically modified animals may carry,
and therefore transfer, antibiotic resistance to other organisms (including
humans through the food chain), a consequence of the use of antibiotics
in the early stages of the genetic modification process; such risk appears
minimal but has not been ruled out by the major regulatory institutions
(Food Safety Departement 2005).
Another example of indirect negative effect of genetically modified
organisms is their potential threat to biodiversity. In the evolutionary
252 S. Pietropaolo
history of species, spontaneous mutations submit the organism to a

period of adaptation to a new gene, and the transformation of a single
element reflects on the group as a whole. In the case of human-induced
mutations, an exogenous gene is inserted into a receptive organism, thus
abruptly interfering with the original network of pre-existing genes, pos-
sibly altering epistatic relations and feedback mechanisms that in turn
can induce other unintended alterations in the host genome (Grisolia
2005). As a consequence, the exogenous modification of an organism
may reduce its adaptability to the surrounding environment, as the mod-
ification was not the result of a long evolutionary process, as in the case
of naturally occurring mutations (Grisolia 2005). Furthermore, genetic
mutations induced by humans could endanger biodiversity interfering
with natural selection and evolutionary mechanisms, for example,
impacting on genetic diversity and integrity of wild species.
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the threat to biodiversity is not an
exclusive risk of genetically modified organisms, as it characterises all
human activities (Grisolia 2005). Conversely, the risk is minimised by
the strict control that is generally exerted over the spread of genetically
modified species into the wild. Instead, it is evident how other human
activities, such as extensive commercial fishing and farming, or industrial
exploitation, have already induced dramatic changes in the natural co-
existence of species and their biodiversity. Hence, some authors support
the idea that the criticisms of the use of biotechnologies, considered as an
insult to nature, would be better directed to these other human activities
which do not lead to equivalent benefits (Grisolia 2005). Indeed, the
advances allowed by the use of genetically modified animals are undoubt-
edly numerous and of immense importance. They do not concern only
human health and knowledge, as in the case of biomedical research or the
study of animal behaviour, but also animal welfare, as in the case of
genetically modified animals created to directly improve the health of the
animals themselves—for example, improving their resistance to disease.
As farming practices get more and more intensive, concerns of disease
prevalence and spread of zoonoses from livestock to animal handlers
become increasingly important, as well as concerns about the potential
increase in antibiotic resistance in bacteria pathogenic to humans or live-
stock induced by the widespread use of antibiotics. These legitimate
concerns can be addressed in part by using genetically modified animals

with increased resistance to disease, which would decrease the spread of
disease among animals and reduce the frequency of "jump-over events"
towards humans, while simultaneously decreasing the need for antibiot-
ics. These genetically modified animals not only allow limiting the spread
of diseases, for example, types of viral flu that can cause serious illness in
both intensively farmed animals and humans, but they also improve ani-
mal welfare indirectly by avoiding the need for mass culling of cohoused
animals, which is sometimes the only viable way to prevent epidemic
disease transmission.
Finally, the same biodiversity that is supposedly threatened by genetic
engineering could instead be preserved by these biotechnologies, as dem-
onstrated by their applications in conservation programmes on endan-
gered species. An example of this approach is provided by the application
of cloning techniques to endangered or even extinct species (Lee 2001).
In a more long-term view, gene-editing technologies including CRISPR
could be used by ecologists to splice in a DNA sequence designed to
handicap an invasive species, or to help a native species adapt to a chang-
ing climate, thus solving several problems for humans (also avoiding the
environmental impact of pesticides or other invasive interventions) and
concomitantly rescuing the balance among animal species (Redford et al.
2013). These latter applications of biotechnologies to “change” wildlife
are obviously the subject of intense discussion (Redford et al. 2013), as
they induce contradictory feelings among scientists and laypeople alike
(Kohl et al. 2019; Thomas et al. 2013); nonetheless, it is undeniable that
genetic technologies are likely to deeply transform the prospects for
maintaining biodiversity into the future.
2.3 Optogenetics
The optogenetic approach, though part of genetic engineering technolo-

gies, can be associated with some specific ethical concerns regarding
animal-human relationships that deserve a separate discussion.
Optogenetics is an approach recently brought to neurobiology, combin-
ing both high-speed response and genetic targeting, based on a family of
254 S. Pietropaolo
fast light-responsive microbial opsins including halorhodopsins (e.g.,

NpHR) and channelrhodopsins (e.g., ChR2) (for review, see (Zhang
et al. 2011)). These microbial opsins are single component transmem-
brane conductance regulators encompassing light sensitivity and fast
membrane potential control within a single open reading frame, which
can be used to achieve fast bidirectional control of specific cell types in
freely moving animals (Airan et al. 2007; Arenkiel et al. 2007; Gradinaru
et al. 2007). Optogenetic approaches in rodents have allowed investigat-
ing in depth the brain circuits involved in the physiological control of a
variety of behaviours, as well as in the pathological development of neu-
rological or neuropsychiatric diseases. For example, behavioural deficits
in psychiatric diseases such as autism and schizophrenia have been
hypothesised to arise from elevations in the cellular balance of excitation
and inhibition (E/I balance) within neural microcircuitry. This hypothe-
sis has become susceptible to direct testing, thanks to optogenetic tools
exploring the circuit physiology associated with cellular E/I balance in
freely moving rodents (Yizhar et al. 2011). Indeed, optogenetics allows us
to understand the real mechanisms underlying animal (including human)
behaviours by assessing the effects of stimulation or inhibition of specific
neuronal circuits through light-based manipulations.
On the one hand, optogenetics is expected to advance our knowledge
of common substrates of human and other animals’ behaviours, thus
reducing the “anthropocentric” gap commonly induced by genetic engi-
neering technologies. Optogenetic approaches could also contribute to
reduce the notion of the uniqueness of human beings, further demon-
strating that certain human psychiatric pathologies are “only” a result of
dysfunctioning brain circuits and may be induced in animals as well. On
the other hand, the impressive real-time control humans can deliberately
exert on animals’ behaviour through optogenetic techniques may pro-
mote a view of animals as “automatable” organisms that can be artificially
animated, hiding their original nature as living beings with their own
identity. This impression, which is mostly emotionally based and is obvi-
ously out of the scope of optogenetic studies, may find support through
the viewing of the several videos available from scientific publications in
which optogenetics is used and an impressively rapid and precise control
of certain behaviours in laboratory mice is shown, for example, stopping
or promoting movement through the optogenetic modulation of motor

control circuits (Aravanis et al. 2007), or eliciting predatory-like attacks
upon both natural and artificial prey by optogenetic stimulation of the
central amygdala (Han et al. 2017). The viewing of these filmed experi-
ments provides a direct experience of the power of optogenetic tools, and
it may leave the viewer with the unpleasant feeling of witnessing an ani-
mal being under human remote control. Therefore, if we consider the
ethical discussion on the telos and animal nature mentioned earlier (Rollin
2003), it could be argued that optogenetics is less acceptable morally
than other gene-targeting techniques because it may affect not only the
animal “essence” but also its “interests”. Furthermore, presently we do
not have the slightest idea of the short- and long-term effects that induc-
ing certain behaviours through optogenetic control may have on animal
welfare: does a mouse who was induced to attack or to move by optoge-
netic control suffer consequences, for example in terms of stress or anxi-
ety levels? This is an issue not specifically addressed in the present chapter
and one that may be interesting to investigate in the future.
3 Implications of Genetic Technologies

in Animal Biomedical Research: How Can
They Change the Human View
of Animals?
The ideas and concepts discussed so far have highlighted the complexity
of the ethical implications of the different types of genetic engineering
approaches to research on animals. Some of these biotechnologies have
induced a profound change in the way humans view other animal spe-
cies, both in a general and specific way. The general implications of bio-
technologies have already been discussed in the previous sections; issues
that are more specific to biomedical research and that may result in the
emergence of novel ways of considering animals are now introduced. On
the one hand, all examples described below are problematic from an ethi-
cal point of view, starting from a basic conflictual assumption: an animal
is similar enough to humans to justify its experimental use for human
256 S. Pietropaolo
medical needs, but is sufficiently different in sentience and capacity for

suffering for allowing the necessary experimental procedures (Cassaday
2015). On the other hand, it may be argued that all these applications of
biotechnologies comply with the ethical guidelines on medical research
arising from the 1947 Nuremberg Code, requiring that experiments be
based on results of animal experiments to minimise unnecessary human
suffering (Cassaday 2015). The need for a balance between these ethical
conflicts seems to point in favour of animal medical research, as sug-
gested by public surveys reporting that applications of genetic engineer-
ing to animals are generally better perceived and judged as more morally
acceptable when their purpose concerns biomedical research rather than
other fields, for example, food production (Schuppli and Weary 2010).
3.1 nimals as “Bioreactors” or

A
Xenotransplant Donors
An important application of transgenic technology is the use of geneti-

cally modified animals as “bioreactors” to produce human pharmaceuti-
cals. Transgenic goats, sheep, rabbits, and hen eggs have all been used to
produce large quantities of pharmaceuticals for human use where expres-
sion of biologically active proteins in recombinant bacterial or yeast sys-
tems has failed. The human antithrombin III, an anticoagulant plasma
protein, produced in the milk of transgenic goats was the first animal
product approved for human use (Edmunds et al. 1998). This plasma
protein must be purified from human blood and administered to patients
suffering from antithrombin deficiency, but the yield of human plasma-
derived antithrombin is low, creating a serious supply problem. Therefore,
transgenic goats secreting human antithrombin in their milk provide an
example of a cost-effective way to produce a necessary biopharmaceuti-
cal. Similarly, vaccines produced in the animal milk could be distributed
cheaply and made more accessible to people around the world, avoiding
the problematic issues related to their production, transportation, and
injection (Hug 2008). Milk is not the only product used to make bio-
pharmaceuticals, as transgenic mammals are not the only ones that can
be used as bioreactors: for example, hen eggs have been used to produce
recombinant proteins in the albumin, for example, human interferons

(Rapp et al. 2003) and monoclonal antibodies (Zhu et al. 2005), poten-
tially providing a method for producing large quantities of proteins for
vaccine use.
The use of animals as bioreactors consists of taking advantage of an
animal's “natural” function, that is, producing milk or eggs, to provide a
beneficial product to humans. Strictly speaking, the ethical implications
of genetic engineering to produce animals that can be used as bioreactors
do not appear to be different from those related to the exploitation of
animals for the same products for food through classical “non-genetic”
interventions. As in the case of the classical use of animals for meat pro-
duction, the goal of genetic engineering can also be to produce animals
that are themselves the beneficial product to be exploited by humans. The
use of transgenic animals as organ donors for xenotransplantation repre-
sents a good example of this approach.
It is a well-known fact that the demand for human organs for trans-
plant far outweighs the supply and certain animals, for example pigs, can
serve as a pool for xenograft organs for humans, though differences in
cell-surface antigens between the two species pose a great risk of rejec-
tion. Hence, engineering pigs by knocking out the enzymes producing
some of these animal-specific antigens, for example, α-1,3-galactose, and/
or inducing the transgenic expression of human surface antigens, can
markedly increase the viability of xenografts (Ramsoondar et al. 2003).
The ultimate goal of these manipulations would be the production of
genetically modified pigs that would function as a universal donor, one
not requiring the long-term use of anti-rejection immunosuppressive
drugs. Nonetheless, at this stage we cannot know whether creating a sin-
gle line of animals carrying several modifications may cause deleterious
effects, compromising the health of animals and/or the quality of the
tissue to be transplanted (Garas et al. 2015).
As mentioned before, the ethical implications of the use of genetically
modified animals as bioreactors or xenotransplant donors should not dif-
fer fundamentally from those affecting the exploitation of genetically
non-modified animals for food use, since in both cases animals are bred
for the human use of their products (e.g., milk or eggs) or killed for their
organs or meat. Yet, there is a somehow relevant emotional implication
258 S. Pietropaolo
that additionally affects the use of these genetic biotechnologies in bio-

medical research: it regards the creation of organisms that “mix” animal
and human characteristics and that, as in the case of xenotransplants, can
lead to humans “consisting of other animals’ parts”. This emotional con-
cern seems therefore related more to the preoccupation about altering
human integrity than about changing the nature of the other animals.
This view could be criticised in that human “uniqueness” or integrity are
concepts that lack a univocal interpretation; one could argue, for instance,
that human beings are already a mixture of other animals, as they are the
result of species evolution. Thus, exaggerating the importance of human
integrity may be interpreted as the expression of an anthropocentric view.
3.2 Animals as Models of Human Pathologies
One of the most important and promising uses of genetically modified

animals is to create models to study human pathologies. As genetic fac-
tors playing a role in a variety of pathologies are continuously discovered,
genetic mutations have been implemented in several species in order to
understand the molecular mechanisms involved in the etiopathology of
human diseases as well as to identify novel therapies. A large variety of
pathologies have been investigated through genetic animal models, espe-
cially mammals, including cancer and immune and cardiovascular
pathologies, only to mention some major examples. While virtually any-
one would applaud the aim of relieving human suffering, the moral
acceptability of the use of non-human animals in reaching this aim can
be a matter of controversy. As addressed earlier in this chapter, the use of
animal models to study human pathologies could be considered contra-
dictory precisely because we consider the use of human beings in such
experiments morally impermissible. If the use of animal models is mor-
ally justified, there must be a relevant difference between human beings
and the animals used in these experiments that justifies the differential
treatment. Yet, the larger the difference between animals and humans,
the less will be the validity of animals as good models for human condi-
tions. According to some authors, this logical, philosophical, and ethical
dilemma affects the use of animals in biomedical research, and becomes
especially relevant when we consider neuroscientific and neurobehav-

ioural studies (de Castro and Olsson 2015).
Firstly, it is the type of disease studied in neuroscience that may
enhance the relevance of ethical concerns on the use of animals in this
field of biomedical research, as these pathologies include cognitive and
emotional alterations that we know have a severe impact on the life qual-
ity of an individual. According to some authors, if behavioural neurosci-
ence demonstrates that animals have cognitive abilities, emotional
feelings, and social fear, we cannot treat them at the same time as if they
are not conscious (Bovenkerk and Kaldewaij 2015). Furthermore, when
we study neurobehavioural disorders we create negative experiences in
the model animals, and we should consider the possibility that they may
be even more overwhelmed by these states than us (Bovenkerk and
Kaldewaij 2015). While many of these considerations may apply to other
areas of biomedical research, these issues seem to become particularly
relevant when sentience is the direct object of study, as in the case of
neurobehavioural research on animal models (Cassaday 2015). This
problem is exacerbated in the case of disorders that might have been
avoided, as such situations are accompanied by the so-called human cul-
pability factor, that is, a specific ethical concern affecting the use of ani-
mal research to alleviate human suffering that could have been avoided
through behavioural change. This is the case of disorders that are often
perceived as self-inflicted problems, such as drug addiction, obesity, alco-
hol consumption, or even stress-induced pathologies (e.g., (Lund et al.
2014)). This argument has overlooked important factors, including the
genetic bases of these pathologies as well as the fact that several environ-
mental factors, that is, low-educational levels or adverse rearing environ-
ment can be crucial in these pathologies and are not exclusively the
product of a deliberate choice of the individual.
Secondly, it is the subject of neuroscience research, the brain, which
may exacerbate the ethical concerns on the use of genetically modified
animals in this biomedical domain. Experimental interventions affecting
the central nervous system are indeed perceived as more ethically dubious
than studies on other organs, maybe because the brain is indeed more
identifiable with the human sense of self while its manipulation is more
easily associated with deep and severe suffering; nevertheless, this is, once
260 S. Pietropaolo
again, quite an irrational form of criticism to neuroscientific research

since biomedical research targeting other systems may result in suffering
and distress just as, or even more than, neuroscientific studies. Therefore,
ethical reflections and related guidelines should be general and not spe-
cific to the organ system or behavioural domain, as already suggested
(Cassaday 2015).
4 ovel Directions for Future Researchers:

N
Back to the Animal
This chapter has provided so far an overview of the major ethical con-
cerns related to the use of genetic engineering in animal research and its
consequences on the general view we have of the other animals surround-
ing us. I have underlined the fact that the most rational and scientific-
based concern among those described here is the ethical one focusing on
the impact of genetic technologies on animal welfare, while the other
arguments are mainly psychologically or culturally based. Therefore, I
firmly believe that the efforts of future researchers should focus on this
concern, and that their investigations should bring back to the fore the
central role that the animal has.
One of the major criticisms raised against the use of biotechnologies is
that it induces a troubling shift in all human-animal relationships, as “it
increasingly makes us neglect the living being behind the animal machine
responsible for producing desired molecular products,” and, instead, it
advances our self-understanding as “creator” or “designer” (Schicktanz
2006). This imbalanced human-animal relationship could then be coun-
terbalanced by research considering the centrality of animals as living
beings, that is, taking into account the complexity of animal welfare/
biology and the role of non-genetic factors in modulating animal health.
As anthropomorphism provides an unreliable basis from which to gauge
animal welfare, research on laboratory animal behaviour is essential to an
understanding of the normal behavioural repertoire (Barnard 2007), and
in turn provides evidence for evolutionarily salient welfare (Ohl and van
der Staay 2012).
Increasing animal welfare, in turn, enhances the validity of genetically

modified animals for all human uses, especially as animal models of
pathologies. Improving the scientific validity of animal models also
enhances their moral acceptability, thus ameliorating the ethical costs-
benefits balance related to the use of animals in biomedical research and,
therefore, the quality of human-animal relationships. Biomedical research
on genetically engineered animals is also often criticised because of the
lack of consistent, replicable results within and between laboratories.
Thus, the ethical acceptability of this research could benefit from (i) ame-
liorating the quality of the studies on genetic animal models, including
the evaluation of factors that may influence their validity, for example,
environmental influences and genetic background of the mutations (ii)
promoting dissemination of the scientific results obtained from multiple
laboratories, and (iii) encouraging data sharing and the publication of
negative findings (de Castro and Olsson 2015).
4.1 he Importance of Behavioural Analysis

T
and Ethological Approach
Behavioural analysis is of primordial importance in the case of genetically

modified animals, even when behavioural modifications are not the ulti-
mate goal of the genetic modifications. In that case, a behavioural evalu-
ation is necessary to identify welfare problems that may be induced by
genetic manipulations, such as the presence of self-injurious or stereo-
typic home-cage behaviours, or of cognitive, motor, or emotional altera-
tions. The evaluation of animal welfare can particularly benefit from the
recent advances in behavioural neuroscience allowing to measure subjec-
tive experiences. Two relevant examples of these advances are the use of
cognitive bias to assess animal welfare in several species, including labora-
tory rodents (Burman and Mendl 2018; Paul et al. 2020; Trimmer et al.
2013), and the development of a face expression scale to assess pain in
mice (Matsumiya et al. 2012; Mogil et al. 2020; Sotocinal et al. 2011).
These approaches may have considerable potential to help quantify sub-
jective harm in genetically modified animals, and could complement the
262 S. Pietropaolo
more classical measurements of animal health to refine the management

of ethical issues in animal research.
An extensive behavioural analysis is also needed in the case of genetic
animal models of human neuropsychiatric or neurological pathologies,
involving behavioural abnormalities (Branchi and Ricceri 2002). Too
often the testing of these animal models is limited to the behaviour of
interest, that is, the one typically altered in the considered pathology. As
a consequence, other behavioural changes that may be induced by the
genetic mutation are overlooked and could instead have a critical role in
confounding the desired behavioural phenotype (Crawley 2007).
Similarly, multiple tests assessing the same behaviours should be con-
ducted to confirm the robustness (and therefore the replicability) of the
behavioural alterations of a genetically modified animal model (Crawley
1999). Incomplete or inappropriate behaviour analysis can indeed explain
a major part of the discrepancies affecting much of the available scientific
literature on the behavioural validity of certain genetic mouse models
used in neuroscience research. In general, we witness an impressive
increase in the number of studies using genetic mouse models of neuro-
pathologies, exacerbating the competition among research groups and
pushing further the commercial interests of pharmaceutical companies.
As a consequence of this rush, we may note a dangerous tendency of
some neuroscientists to draw a straight line to directly connect genes to a
behaviour/pathology, sometimes totally overlooking the main element
that stands in between, that is, the animal. Hence, drawing the attention
back to the animal with its biology and ethology can only be beneficial
for animals, humans, and biomedical research.
4.2 ot Only Genes: The Importance

N
of the Environment
Focusing the attention of researchers on the animal should not only

regard its behaviour, but also the other factors that characterise the ani-
mal as an organism. The single-minded search for genetic causal factors
may sometimes lead scientists to almost forget that the genetically modi-
fied animals they use have not only genetic mutations, but also a sex, an
age, a genetic background of their own, and an environment surrounding

them. As a consequence, until recent guidelines were developed (Crusio
et al. 2009), it was not unusual to find scientific articles, even published
in high-ranked journals, presenting data from a transgenic mouse line
without mentioning whether they were obtained from male or female
subjects, or describing the animals’ rearing conditions.
Multiple experiments have demonstrated that the impact of genetic
mutations can indeed be strongly modulated by the strain used as genetic
background, by the sex of the subjects, and their environmental condi-
tions (Crusio 1996, 2004). For example, being reared by more than one
mother, a procedure that is not uncommon in many laboratory animal
facilities can induce profound effects on brain and behavioural in labora-
tory mice (Branchi 2009) and even eliminate the pathological pheno-
types of some genetic mouse models (Oddi et al. 2015). The inclusion of
environmental factors is highly important not only to assess the validity
of genetic animal models of human pathologies, but also to investigate
more in depth the complex processes involved in the behavioural genetics
of both animals and humans. For example, many of the selective breed-
ing experiments as well as the personality studies mentioned in section 2
have shown the importance of gene-environment interactions in estab-
lishing the divergent behavioural patterns (Steimer et al. 1998), depend-
ing also on the specific life phases of an animal (Steimer and Driscoll 2003).
5 Concluding Remarks
While until recently the main limits to genetic engineering were techni-
cal, that is, what is possible to do, they have now become mainly ethical,
that is, what is acceptable to do (Lassen et al. 2006). These ethical limita-
tions should be drawn avoiding as much as possible arguments based on
irrationality or built upon an unspecified technological scepticism or cul-
tural criticism. They should instead focus on the understanding of animal
biology alone and within the context of its relationship with humans.
An animal’s nature is not a fixed entity, but a snapshot of a constantly
dynamic, developing process of evolution (Rollin 2003). There is nothing
wrong in itself with humans participating in that process, as they have
264 S. Pietropaolo
done with domestication. It is estimated that 40% of flowering plants

and 70% of grasses represent new species created by humans through
hybridisation, cultivation, and other means of artificial selection. Hence,
we could reasonably argue that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with
genetically engineering animals. Biotechnologies as such are indeed nei-
ther good nor bad, and they have the potential to alleviate or aggravate
the impact of human control over animals and the environment, to
improve animal and human health or to endanger their welfare, to pro-
mote biodiversity or to put it at risk.
The challenge is thus to develop and manage biotechnologies for the
benefit of humankind and the environment. To this end, an interdisci-
plinary approach is necessary, requiring the collaborative work of scien-
tists from several research fields, for example, conservationists, veterinaries,
neuroscientists, ethologists, ecologists, and geneticists. These scientific
efforts should then be taken into account by the work of legislative organ-
isms and biotechnological industries. Ethical measures and safety moni-
toring should have their foundations in scientific and not in ideological
reasoning. Emotional and pessimistic approaches towards innovative
technologies should be avoided as much as possible in the future, as they
can induce us to miss important opportunities, modify the perception of
real risks and prevent efficient measures against them (Ciliberti and
Molinelli 2005).
Acknowledgements S. Pietropaolo received funding from CNRS and Bordeaux

University; her research on mouse models of human neuropathologies is funded
by the Association “Autour de Williams” and the “Fondation Pour l’Audition
(FPA RD-2020-8)”.
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13
Coexisting with Wild Nonhuman
Primates in a Brazilian Semiarid Habitat
Noemi Spagnoletti
1 Introduction
The human-nonhuman primate (hereafter primates) interface is an
increasingly relevant theme in primatological research (McLennan et al.
2017; McKinney and Dore 2018). Factors related to human presence
and activities affect primates’ behaviour, ecology and abundance. Thus,
assessing the synergistic interactions between human and primates is of
great importance in order to identify the nature of the human-primates
relationships and use this knowledge in various contexts as, for example,
to find strategy to decelerate the worldwide loss of biodiversity, primates
included (Fuentes and Hockings 2010). According to Riley and Ellwanger
(2013), as the human population and its relative impact continue to
grow, the context in which human and wild primates interacts will
continue to expand. Thus, studies that focus on this interface are timely
N. Spagnoletti (*)
Department of Experimental Psychology, Institute of Psychology, University of
São Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil
Associazione Primatologi Italiani, Rome, Italy
273
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022
274 N. Spagnoletti
and will be so indefinitely. Ethnoprimatology (Sponsel 1997) is a disci-

pline that bridges cultural anthropology and primatology, exploring the
interface between human and primates and the implication these inter-
connections have for conservation (Fuentes and Wolfe 2002; AA.VV. 2010,
2018). In several contexts, ethnoprimatological approaches may be cru-
cial to ensure the future survival of species occupying today ecotones
between anthropogenic (e.g., farmland) and natural habitats (Hill 2002;
Lee 2010). Recent estimates indicate that approximately 60% of the 504
primate species from 16 families are threatened with extinction, with the
primary causal factor being unsustainable human practices (Estrada et al.
2017). In such context, the attention to the human dimension makes the
ethnoprimatological approach well suited for assessing how humans and
primates can sustainably coexist into the future (Dore et al. 2017; Setchell
et al. 2017).
In 2005, in Fazenda Boa Vista (FBV), researchers of the EthoCebus
project (see Visalberghi and Fragaszy 2013) have started to study a pop-
ulation of wild capuchins that routinely use stones as tools to crack
open hard palm nuts and other shelled foods (Spagnoletti et al. 2011).
Since then, several scientific publications have been produced and a
special attention has been given to these extraordinary capuchin popu-
lation due to the fact that the cultural tradition of these monkeys has
important implications for the understanding of human evolution
(Haslam et al. 2009; see also the website www.ip.usp.br/site/ethocebus)
and may have also major implications for biodiversity conservation as
recently stated for the culture of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes verus;
IUCN, 2020).
In FBV, although capuchins usually spend most of their time on the
hills, they sometimes crop-raid, and the EthoCebus project, or the farm
owner who hosts the project, have had to reimburse for monkey dam-
ages. In the meanwhile, the overall region has been affected by environ-
mental degradation and erosion processes especially due to the large
expansion of intensive agriculture, with consequence restriction of a large
part of the native forest where such monkeys’ population live (Presotto
et al. 2020). In a recent study, Presotto and co-authors compared the
coverage of natural vegetation and the expansion of intensive agriculture
13 Coexisting with Wild Nonhuman Primates in a Brazilian… 275
with the use of satellite images from 1987, 2000 and 2017. They also
analysed the risk that the behavioural traditions of the bearded capuchins
disappear in Piauí and Maranhão, two states where, for 30 years, there
has been a major plan to expand legal and illegal agriculture, with harm-
ful effects for the conservation of animal and plant biodiversity. Results
showed that intensive agriculture increased by more than 350% from
2000 to 2017. Even worse, the predictions are that by 2034 both semi-
arid areas and mangrove forests will further decrease. Consequently, these
environmental variations will modify the ecological conditions for the
use of tools with a concrete risk that this tradition will disappear in such
areas (Presotto et al. 2020). In such context, the need to understand the
relationships between the local community and the capuchin monkeys is
being crucial in order to develop a focused conservation strategy and to
protect the tool use traditions of this unique primate population.
Historically, much of the research on human–primate interactions
has focused on conflict, particularly resulting from crop foraging (e.g.,
McLennan et al. 2017; Paterson and Wallis 2005). This predominant
focus has obscured the mechanisms that promote coexistence or toler-
ance, even if recently the appreciation of more complex relationships,
including the positive interactions, is gradually growing (Frank 2016).
Moreover, studies focusing on the transformation of these relationships
are very rare (see this book). This chapter describes the socio-economic
characteristics of a rural human community that coexist with a wild
population of bearded capuchin monkeys (Sapajus libidinosus) in a
non-protected area of Piauí, North-eastern Brazil. Here, humans are
part of the primates’ ecosystem and capuchin monkeys interact with
them in various ways, including crop-raiding (Spagnoletti et al. 2017).
Modification of natural habitat and presence of crops in the capuchin’s
home-range attracts these primates to search and to explore alternative
human food, as reported for other populations of capuchins that feed on
corns, sugarcane, eucalyptus and also Pinus spp., sometimes causing sig-
nificant damage for the farmers (Koehler and Firowski 1994; Lacerda
2013; Liebsch and Mikich 2015). Data from Spagnoletti et al. (2017)
showed that in Boa Vista Region (hereafter BVR), farmers have a positive
attitude toward the capuchins and their perceptions of wildlife behaviour
276 N. Spagnoletti
were generally accurate. The main crops usually planted in the BVR are
corn (Zea mays), followed by rice (Oryza sp.), beans (Phaseolus sp.), man-
ioc (Manihot esculenta) and a few fruiting plants. The main use of the
corn crop in the region is food production for domestic animals. The
impact of wildlife varied in relation to the field’s location (close or far
from the house/forest edge), number of foraging individuals, and time
spent foraging, as well as plant growth patterns. Vertebrates consumed
between 23% and 100% of the crops. Among them, capuchins con-
sumed the majority of crop losses and birds consumed up to a third.
About 80% of farmers used active vigilance to avoid raids by the mon-
keys, such as employing dogs, fire, screams, slingshots, rifle noises, gen-
eral noises or throwing rocks. However, 12% (N = 15) referred to alternate
and nonviolent solutions such as “planting near the house”, “planting
larger crops”, “sharing the crops with the monkeys”, “harvest sooner”,
“not planting corn”, “taming the monkeys”. The assessment of the socio-
economic characteristics of the communities that coexist with the wild-
life can give important details on the framework in which a non-conflictual
relationship takes place.
2 Study Area
The study took place in the Boa Vista Region, an area of about 110 km2
situated in the semiarid ecotone Cerrado/Caatinga of the southern State
of Piauí. The nearest town Gilbués is 32 km far, while the capital Teresina
is about 800 km faraway. The study area includes the Fazenda Boa Vista
(13 km2; 9°39′36″S, 45°25′10″W) where a population of capuchins
monkeys that use tools has been studied since 2005 (Visalberghi and
Fragaszy 2013).
3 Local Community Interviews

Data were collected in two periods. A pilot study was carried in December
2012 to define the study area and survey all the households present.
Positions of the households were geo-localised on satellite images
(WorldView-2, DigitalGlobe) using a GPS device (Garmin GPSmap

60CSx). During the pilot study I visited the farms with the help of the
local field assistant Jozimar da Silva Oliveira in order to inform the resi-
dents about the goals of the study, how the results would be used and
who was funding it, following the São Paulo University Code of Practice
on Ethical Standards. Interviewees were also notified that sensitive infor-
mation and personal characteristics would not be included in any reports
or publications, against informant wishes (Christensen 1992).
Effectiveness of the semi-structured interview was tested during the pilot
study, mainly to verify if the terms used, as well as the overall questions,
were sufficiently clear for the respondents to understand. The test was
carried out with a small sample of people (N = 7) living outside the study
area but characterised by the same socio-economic conditions of people
living in BVR. Pilot tests were extremely useful because they allowed for
the modification of unclear words or sentences, and for the addition of
some local expressions, making the questions “closer” and easier for
respondents.
The second data collection took place between April and June 2013. A
semi-structured interview (Bernard 1988) was directed to young and
adult residents up to 17 years old. Each interview was directed in
Portuguese and contained 29 open questions and 2 structured sections
(see Spagnoletti et al. 2017 for more details on the interviews). The inter-
view aimed to record the socio-demographic characteristics of the respon-
dents (i.e., sex, age, profession, length of residency, highest level of formal
education, income) and some socio-economic indicator (farm size, house
ownership and size, presence of bathroom and/or household appliances,
communication devices, type of vehicle used for transport). One inter-
viewer (NS) and one local assistant administered the questionnaire by
scheduling visits to each house according to farmer’s schedule and/or
availability. Interviews were tape-recorded and were subsequently tran-
scribed as file text documents. Results of the interviews concerning the
local community perceptions on crop-raiding by wildlife have been pub-
lished in Spagnoletti et al. (2017) and are summarised here in the discus-
sion. In this chapter, I present the results of local community
socio-economic characteristics.
278 N. Spagnoletti
4 Results of the Interviews

In December 2012 during a one-week survey, the entire area of BVR was
explored and ten specific locations belonging to the study area were
defined: Boa Vista, Brejão, Lagoa Grande, Cedro, Barra do saltão, Baixa de
coco, Saltão, Xingu, Boimorto, Cedro. Locations were defined according to
existing local names. The size of the total study area was approximately
60 km2. In this region, 49 households have been censused, for a total of
48 families, since 1 family was owner of 2 houses (see Fig. 13.1).
During April–June 2013, 37 out of 48 families (77.1%) took part in
the study for a total of 77 people interviewed in 23 days. Of the eleven
families who did not participate, two were never found in the house, two
had moved to live elsewhere, and seven families were unwilling to partici-
pate, apparently because they were in trouble with those families that give
Fig. 13.1 Study area showing the 49 households present. (Image courtesy of
Alison Howard)
hospitality to the EthoCebus Project, and therefore this study. In this

regard, it might be important to note that the same families, who have
not participated in this study, in the past, had not permitted researchers
to follow the monkeys when they went on their property. Interviews were
comprised of 50.6% of men (N = 39) and 49.4% of women (N = 38)
between the ages of 17 and 81 (Fig. 13.2).
Approximately 42% of participants (N = 32) were born in the same
locality they were living at the time of the interview, while 58% (N = 45)
had arrived there as children or after marrying, or for some other reason,
such as employment. Concerning education, 22.1% of interviewees were
illiterate (N = 17) and 48.1% had not completed mandatory/primary
school (N = 37), whereas 16.9% completed fundamental education
(N = 13), 11.7% completed High School (N = 9) and 1.3% completed
graduate program (N = 1).
Life of local community members was based on subsistence economy.
The main occupation of respondents was farming. In fact, the 62.3%
(N = 40♂; N = 8♀) managed a small farm with a few cattle, and during
the rainy season (October–April), the main activity was to cultivate small
pieces of land with corn, manioc, beans and rice. The size of family land
varied between 12 and 960 hectares (N respondents = 49, aver-
age = 224.8 ha). Of the remaining interviewed, 15.6% were housewives
25%
W
20%
M
15%
10%
5%
0%
<20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 >80
Age classes
Fig. 13.2 Sex and age classes of interviewed. W=woman; M=man

280 N. Spagnoletti
(N = 12♀), 6.5% were retired (N = 2♂; N = 3♀), 5.2% were field research
assistants (N = 3♂; N = 1♀), 2.6% were students (N = 2♀), 2.6% were
teachers (N = 1♂; N = 1♀), and 5.2% performed another type of service
such as healthcare assistance (N = 1♀), small bar owner (N = 1♀), snack
seller (N = 1♀), or self-employment (N = 1♂). Overall, the income of
81.7% of respondents was derived from farm activities (Fig. 13.3), some-
times with the addition of government allowance or retirement pension.
Table 13.1 shows some characteristics of the 36 houses of the respon-
dent families. Houses had about 5 rooms (average 5.3 room; min = 1,
max = 10) and hosted about 4 people (average 3.97 people; min = 1;
max = 8). An indoor restroom facility was absent in 88.9% of the houses.
These families usually have a straw bathroom with a shower outside the
main house. Water is mainly (75.5%) from a ground supply, whereas
2.4% had water access from an artesian well and 16.6% families used
water directly from the natural watercourses. However, 5.5% of families
did not have direct access to water and procured it from their neighbours.
Nowadays, the main vehicle used for transportation is a motorbike
(43.7%), followed by horse or donkey (29.2%). Eight families (16.6%)
did not have any vehicle. However, five families had a car and they
Only farm activities

2.8%
2.8% Farm activities plus government
5.6%
allowance
4.2% Farm activities plus retirement
28.2% pension
2.8% Farm activities plus other services
4.2% Farm activities plus retirement
pension plus other services
Employment
9.9%
Other activities
Parents dependent
19.7%
19.7% Government allowance plus other
services
Only government allowance
Fig. 13.3 Interviewed income (N = 71)

Table 13.1 Characteristics of the 36 houses belonging to respondents
Bathroom Absent Present
32 4
Water supply Surface water Ground water Artesian well Absent
6 27 1 2
Vehicle used for transporta None horse or donkey motorbike car
8 14 21 5
Communication devices Absent Cellphone
26 10
# of appliances Absent 1 applianceb 2 appliancesc 3 appliancesd 4 or 5 appliancese
5 3 6 8 14
a
Total is more than 36 because in some households a combination of the following can be used: horses, motorbikes,
and cars
b
refrigerators or radios
c
televisions and refrigerators
d
televisions, refrigerators and water pumps
e
televisions, refrigerators, water pumps plus a mixer, a washing machine, a freezer, a stereo or a machine to clean rice
13 Coexisting with Wild Nonhuman Primates in a Brazilian…
281
282 N. Spagnoletti
usually organised transportation for people, shopping, wood or anything

else need to be transported from countryside to town and vice versa.
Electricity was introduced in the overall region in late 2012. Still, 13.9%
of the families did not have access to electricity and 72.2% did not use
any electronic device to communicate, whereas 27.8% of families have at
least one cellphone. Thus, phone service was practically absent in the
overall region, and people could only make phone calls by climbing to
the top of the morros, or only using a cellular phone when in the closest
town, Gilbués. Finally, since the connection of electricity arrived the
same year of the study, the families had started recently to acquire elec-
tronic devices and useful home appliances, such as refrigerators, water
pumps and televisions. Six months after the introduction of electricity,
86.1% of the total households possessed at least one of these appliances.
5 Conclusion
Tufted capuchins may substitute a diet composed of naturally distributed
resources for anthropogenic food items, especially in areas where the
plantations are extensive. In Brazil, the studies on the exploitation of
plantations of pine (Pinus spp.) and eucalyptus (Eucalyptus spp) by tufted
capuchin monkeys have yielded information about the damage done by
capuchins and subsequent conflict with the farmers in areas of industrial
agriculture and/or where the plantation is extensive (Liebsch and Mikich
2015). In these areas, damage caused by capuchins stripping the bark
from trees to consume the phloem is economically significant (Mikich
and Liebsch 2017), and many producers see the capuchins as pests (Rocha
2000; Vilanova et al. 2005). Usually, the damage to forest plantations is
related to the low quality of the remaining surrounding native forest
patches.
The present study described the socio-economic characteristics of the
local human communities of BVR that share space with capuchin mon-
keys. In the BVR, the economy is based on subsistence agriculture.
Mainly there are small farmers, whose livelihoods are based on a combi-
nation of on-farm and off-farm activities. The income of most families
does not depend on a salary, while some families rely on retirement
pension or on government funding programme such as the family allow-

ance (Bolsa familia). The illiteracy rate remains high in the area (about
three persons out of four were illiterate or did not complete compulsory
school), although the number of young people who have completed
compulsory school or who continue to study is on the rise. Sewage sys-
tems are absent, and water is obtained mainly from ground wells.
Although electricity was introduced recently, families have already started
to use electronic devices such as televisions and refrigerators. Still, com-
munication access is practically absent and phone signal is lacking in the
region. Transport is mainly by motorbike or horse, yet some people reach
town by foot, bus or carpool.
Although capuchins forage flexibly on anthropogenic crops, in a soci-
ety like the community of BVR relying on subsistence agriculture, their
impact is perceived to be moderate overall. This study confirms how pri-
mate behaviour in shared landscapes does not always conflict with human
interests and how understanding the socio-demographic and economic
characteristics of human populations sharing space with capuchin mon-
keys allows us to identify the human local context in which to assess
primates behaviour from a cost-benefit perspective without making prior
assumptions concerning the nature of humans–animal interactions.
Moreover, a peaceful coexistence between humans and monkeys favours
conservation actions targeted toward protection of the capuchins and
their habitat. Such actions need to take into account the socio-economic
local conditions such as the low level of literacy and education. According
to the data gathered in the present study, and in order to reach both
young and adult population, the first community-based project titled
“We are all Primates! A community initiative involving rural schools to
promote primate conservation in a semiarid habitat of Brazil” has been
carried out in the municipality of Gilbués in 2015. During this project
more than 120 people has been involved, including local students and
visiting researchers. All the participants had the opportunity to observe
the EthoCebus project field research, to walk into the forest, and to
observe capuchin monkeys in the wild. During the meeting the short
documentary, entitled “Humans and capuchin monkeys in Brazilian
sertão: knowing to preserve” (Spagnoletti and Peternelli 2015) was pre-
sented to scholars and their families. The documentary describes in
284 N. Spagnoletti
Portuguese the Brazilian semi-arid habitat where the tool-using capuchin

monkeys live and the scientific knowledge generated by the EthoCebus
research project. Since then, the documentary has been projected in
Gilbués local schools and in the main city square, but also in outreach
international events. It was the first time that students from rural schools
of Gilbués had experiences with non-formal education. All teachers
appreciated the proposed activities and enthusiastically participated and
encouraged their students. Moreover, they were interested in collaborat-
ing again for future projects. Students were shy at the beginning, but
excitedly looked forward to future classes. In addition, as reported by
some parents, they were playing our activities even in our absence. Finally,
the large participation of family members in the final event was an impor-
tant result, confirming that the project was successful. These kinds of
activities are necessary to increase the local perception of natural resources
and are one of the ways to involve the community in environmental
issues, especially where farmers coexist positively with capuchin mon-
keys, as demonstrated in the community of this study. Without a clear
understanding of the human-primates relationships, similar conservation
actions are likely to fail or be ineffective. Protected areas in BVR are
absent and the region is highly affected by anthropic influence (Izar et al.
2012). Human factors at BVR are part of capuchins monkeys’ ecosystem,
influencing their conservation, ecology and behaviour. Furthermore, in
the past years, 540 hectares of forest immediately adjacent to capuchins’
home range was cleared for soybean farming, livestock, and biodiesel fuel
production, and the overall flora and fauna are threatened by the rapid
expansion of lucrative agriculture. In fact, the growth of large projects to
produce grains in the semi-arid Cerrado/Caatinga ecosystem has increased
by more than 350% from 2000 to 2017. Even worse, the predictions are
that by 2034 the semiarid areas will further decrease (Presotto et al.
2020). Consequently, the agricultural conversion of natural forested areas
will modify the ecological conditions where tool user capuchin monkeys
live with a concrete risk that this tradition will disappear in such areas.
Will these changes modify the relationships between humans and wild-
life, especially the capuchin monkeys? How the current coexistence will
be transformed? Will the primate populations disappear in these remote
areas and/or will crop-raiding by capuchins and other wildlife become
more intensive? Unfortunately, if the Presotto et al. (2020) predictions

will be confirmed, it is hard to imagine a future where people will coexist
pacifically with the wildlife. It is more plausible that the huge deforesta-
tion due to the increase of intensive agriculture will negatively affect the
wildlife populations and will cause a high degradation of the natural
habitats with direct consequences on the abundance of natural food
resources available and the increase of human-related food consumption
by the wildlife.
So far, the lack of public engagement regarding the value of semiarid
habitats, and, in general, the few conservation programs toward these
biomes, puts both the human community and the population of capu-
chin monkeys at extreme risk. In such context, an interdisciplinary
approach based on both ecological and ethnographic methods (see this
study but also Spagnoletti et al. 2017) is highly recommended because it
allows to understand the impact of the wildlife on the local community
and what characterises a sustainable human-primate coexistence in the
twenty-first century and beyond (McLennan et al. 2017). The ethnopri-
matological approach used in this study has been useful to assess the
socio-economic context of the rural community and can be considered a
worthwhile method, in perspective of a long-term field research program
aiming to support sustainable, social, environmental and economic
development processes. Nowadays, it is recognised that to fully under-
stand primate behaviour, our research objectives and practice cannot be
disengaged from the human dimension (Riley 2018). Indeed, the eth-
noprimatological research can be considered a valuable tool for institu-
tional support and capacity-building for local conservation and
development policies. Similar results applied in a different context can be
effective in order to discuss how to preserve key or threatened species and
how to ensure a sustainable and healthy primates’ population, humans
included.
Acknowledgements I am grateful to my field assistants Jozimar da Silva Oliveira

and Marina F. de Oliveira for their precious help and the EthoCebus Project
team and Family M for their constant support. Many thanks also to Dr Allison
Howard from University of Georgia who provided the map. This project was
funded by CAPES and CNPq program “Science Without Borders-Young Talent
286 N. Spagnoletti
Research fellow (#017/2012), and by BIOTA/FAPESP research grant

#2013/19219-2. With the approval of the Research Ethical Committee of the
Institute of Psychology, São Paolo University (333067; number CAAE:
14337013.9.0000.5561).
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14
Companionship and Wellbeing: Benefits
and Challenges of Human-Pet
Relationships
Marta Borgi and Francesca Cirulli
1 Animals in the Human Family and Society

“Farm animals, lab animals, sport horses...”: our language when we refer
to some animals often focuses on their exploitation and on the benefits
humans get from them, for example, animals as a source of food, used in
biomedical research or for recreational activities. When we refer to some
animals as “pets,” are we implying their use for any purpose? A pet can be
defined, in a neutral manner, as an animal that lives with humans.
Another largely used term is “companion animal,” which, again, implies
that we keep them in our home with the final aim of getting companion-
ship. Some may argue that a fish in the fish tank is not really anyone’s
companion. However, this term well adapts to domestic species, such as
dogs and cats, which we treat kindly, consider as members of the family
M. Borgi (*) • F. Cirulli

Center for Behavioral Sciences and Mental Health,
Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Rome, Italy
e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]
290 M. Borgi and F. Cirulli
and our “best friends,” and with whom we share our time and financial
resources. Differently from other species, companion animals thus appear
to represent an emotional—rather than an economical—resource, pro-
viding humans with support, comfort and companionship.
Although traditions and taboos may suppress the public expression of
human affection, and although some people will never develop an indi-
vidual social relationship with a dog or a cat, the association between us
humans and these species is one of the few cross-cultural features com-
mon to most human societies (Podberscek et al. 2000; Miklósi 2015).
Pets can be considered, in fact, as integral members of almost every
human society around the world, although, at present, the forms and
manifestations of their association with humans vary widely, depending
on ecological conditions and cultural and social features (Mills and De
Keuster 2009). In industrialised countries (although, still, this picture
may vary depending on level of urbanisation, historical traditions and
economic factors), a significant proportion of dogs and cats are associated
with (and owned by) a human family, which, in many cases, provides the
animal with regular care and shelter, and contributes in various other
ways to the wellbeing of the animal. Pets are commonly kept in the fam-
ily house, which thus provides the physical (shelter) and social environ-
ment for them. Since this large population (which we can refer to as
“family animals”) is the focus of our chapter, we will not discuss here
other forms of cohabitations and relations, such as in the case of “free-
ranging animals” and “shelter animals.”
More in particular, this chapter aims to examine the history and the
characteristics of human-pet relationships and the potential of these spe-
cies, especially of dogs, for providing emotional and physical opportuni-
ties to enrich the lives of their “owners” and of many frail subjects (as in
the context of animal-assisted programmes). Hence, we won’t consider
here wild animals kept at home for ornamental or other purposes (fishes,
birds, turtles, snakes, etc.), and we will use the terms “pets,” “family ani-
mals” and “companion animals” interchangeably as referred to domestic
species with whom we form social relationships, the most common being
dogs and cats. Even the term “owner” has been challenged, as it appears
to consider animals as a property (among others, “human caregiver” has
been proposed instead) and such a vocabulary shift underlies our need to
14 Companionship and Wellbeing: Benefits and Challenges… 291
elevate the discourse about these species and, in turn, improve our treat-
ment of them.
2 og Domestication: The History

D
of a Long-Lasting Bond
The dog domestication process represents a model on how domestic ani-
mal species (e.g. cats, goats and horses) became able to be responsive to
human referential signals and to successfully engage in interspecific com-
municative interactions with humans (Miklósi and Soproni 2006).
Behavioural data from the literature indeed provide evidence that the
emergence of differences in the performance of domestic and non-
domestic species was due, at least to some extent, to domestication (e.g.
Miklósi et al. 2003; Hare and Tomasello 2005; Bräuer et al. 2006), along
with socialisation in a human environment (Udell et al. 2010; Barrera
et al. 2011).
Although we cannot here give a full account of the many different
theories explaining the events and mechanisms that led to the domestica-
tion of dogs, as biologists we hope this brief description will help readers
put the study of dog (and of our relationships with them) in the context
of evolution, that is, as a Darwinian process that made these animals
adapted to humans and human captive environments (anthropogenic
niche) and that includes forms of natural selection (Price 1984). We
believe this information is relevant, not only since it can provide a model
of early human-animal interactions, but also since this long-lasting evo-
lutionary process provides a fundamental clue on how selection pressures
have equipped these animals with the abilities necessary for cooperating
and communicating with humans and for adjusting their behaviour to
that of their human partners, all elements forming the basis of the human-
animal bond.
Giving a relatively straightforward evolutionary description of the dog
domestication process is possible only by combining different (and non-
exclusive) theories (Miklósi 2015). Proto-domestication and early domes-
tication are thought to date back to 50,000-25,000 years ago and have
been linked to a “population-based selection.” At that time, scavenging

canine (wolf ) populations were able to utilise a novel and easy-to-exploit
food source provided by the activity of humans and, as a result of this
induced modification in the environment, underwent changes in mor-
phological (e.g. smaller size), physiological and behavioural traits
(Coppinger and Coppinger 2001). However, until wolves associated with
human hunters, it is unlikely that enough food was provided from
humans to prevent these animals to complete their diet by additional
hunting on their own and, hence, come into contact with conspecifics.
It’s only when the transition of human societies from hunting and gather-
ing to agriculture occurred (about 15,000-10,000 years ago) that the
enduring presence of humans in the form of villages provided natural
barriers, isolating the “wild” from the “anthropogenic” populations of
proto-domesticated wolves (Coppinger and Coppinger 2001). At this
point, when humans provided a permanent habitat for dogs, the domes-
tication speeded up and an “individual-based selection” is hypothesised
to have occurred. From that point on, cubs may have been adopted and
dogs might have accompanied humans in different activities (including
hunting, which was still a source of food supply) and in their migration
routes. Early dog populations started to follow changes in human lifestyle
and this caused a rapid diversification of dogs. The rapid technical changes
during the Neolithic revolution (around 7000-5000 years ago) indeed
caused the emergence of morphologically and behaviourally distinct ani-
mals early selected for various working roles (“breed-based selection”),
while only during late domestication (around 3000-2000 years ago)
humans further bred dogs for selected qualities that would better enable
them to perform specific duties. However, it is likely that most of these
early dog breeds do not have any direct descendent in recent populations
and that the typical dog breeds we observe today have been partially rec-
reated during a process (started about 200 years ago) in which dog breeds
were developed and maintained in strict reproductive isolation
(Miklósi 2015).
Due to domestication, dogs have greatly diverged from wolves, both
behaviourally and morphologically. Although a high social attentiveness,
tolerance and cooperativeness were already present in wolves (and have
provided a good basis for human-dog cooperation to evolve), most
behavioural and cognitive differences observed between dogs and wolves

reflect an improved capability of dogs to accept humans as social partners
(Range and Virányi 2015). Dogs’ increased tractability (meant as indi-
vidual dogs being easier to control, handle and be directed by humans)
has been recently suggested to make a crucial contribution to this funda-
mental difference (Ujfalussy et al. 2020).
Dogs now show a unique and remarkable ability for reading human
communicative gestures (e.g. pointing) and utilising them (e.g. to locate
things in their environment or to go where directed) in comparison to
either non-human primates or wolves (Anderson et al. 1995; Santos and
Hauser 1999; Vick and Anderson 2003; Soproni et al. 2001, 2002; Call
et al. 2003; Miklósi et al. 2003; Gácsi et al. 2004) and such abilities are
thought to have been instrumental to the evolution of the dog (Hare
et al. 2002; Miklósi 2015) .
Dogs’ unusual communicative ability has been hypothesised to have
emerged as a correlated by-product of selection against fear and aggres-
sion towards humans, instead of being a result of direct selection, as pre-
viously hypothesised. This view was supported by research with an
experimental fox population selectively bred over 45 years to approach
humans fearlessly and non-aggressively (i.e. experimentally domesticated)
showing that selection for tameness/docility is enough on its own to lead
to a heritable change in social cognitive abilities (Hare et al. 2005).
The socio-cognitive evolution that has occurred during the long asso-
ciation with humans has placed dogs in a new adaptive space in which
they have been able to interact with humans as comfortably as with their
conspecifics, and has laid the foundation for the establishment of the
human-dog bond. The affiliative aspects of the human-dog relationship
have been interpreted as a form of social attachment, similarly to what is
observed between human caregivers (typically the mother) and infants: it
is based on dependency and is specific in its focus, endures over time and
results in one individual seeking and maintaining proximity to another
individual. The evidence provided by the Nagasawa’s team suggests that
dogs’ acquisition of social cognitive systems involved in social attachment
in humans may have contributed to the establishment of a human-animal
bond that presents not only behavioural but also neurohormonal simi-
larities with the mother-infant relationship (Nagasawa et al. 2015). Their
experiments have nicely demonstrated that the concentration of oxytocin

in the urine of dog owners is positively correlated with the amount of
reciprocal gaze with their dog, which might indicate the existence of
inter-species attachment behaviour and mutual behavioural regulation
(Nagasawa et al. 2009, 2015).
In addition to what was previously discussed, the farm fox experiment
on silver foxes proved that selecting for a “friendly” behaviour can “neo-
tenize” adult temperament and morphology, by altering the genes con-
trolling systems modulating both fear and aggression (Belyaev 1979;
Hare et al. 2005; Trut et al. 2009). The retention of youthful dependency
that makes domestic animals look and behave like puppies even after
sexual maturity (also known as neoteny) tends to elicit strong feelings of
affection and powerful emotional responses in humans and is considered
one of the causes behind our motivational drive to pet-keeping and pet-
caretaking (Archer 1997; Borgi et al. 2014; Borgi and Cirulli 2016).
To conclude it is important to notice that, although the manifestation
and form of dog attachment to humans share important functional fea-
tures with human infant-parent attachment, the human-dog relationship
presents mixed elements of both filial and adult attachment, supporting
the notion that our social relationship with dogs is comparable to a rela-
tionship we have with very close friends (Miklósi 2015). Indeed, most of
the properties that a relationship should have in order to be characterised
as friendship (Silk 2002; Brent et al. 2014) are traceable in the human-
pet association: intimacy, companionship, trust, loyalty, commitment,
affection, acceptance, sympathy, concern for the other’s welfare, as well as
time spent together and maintenance of the pair bond after long separa-
tions. Many owners live closely with their pets, sharing with them their
domestic space and financial resources and viewing them as psychological-
kin and equal members of the family. The relationship between humans
and their companion animals does not exclude asymmetry (dominant or
parental) in certain contexts, but it certainly includes the possibility of
being an equal collaborative partner (Miklósi 2015). “Friendship” thus
appears to be the most suitable word to describe close human-pet rela-
tionships, which implies the formation of a social bond that serves analo-
gous emotional and adaptive functions as human-human friendships
(Borgi and Cirulli 2016).
3 he Bond with Domestic Animals and Its

T
Potential to Ameliorate Human
WellBeing: The “Pet Effect”
The body of evidence showing that a close relationship with a pet animal
is associated with significant health effects in people is rapidly growing.
Although in different studies the relationship between owning a pet and
health may be explained by an indirect effect (such as the association
between dog ownership and the number/duration of recreational walks),
more direct effects of human-animal contacts have been reported, albeit
only investigated in the short term. The most cited outcomes include
reduced stress, lowered heart rate and blood pressure and increased socio-
emotional functioning. Companion animals, especially dogs, may also
indirectly benefit human health by serving as catalysts for human-human
social relationships (i.e. from incidental social interaction and getting to
know people, to the formation of new friendships, Wood et al. 2015), in
this way enhancing socially supportive networks and reducing loneliness
and isolation.
A growing body of research indicates that, not only having a pet, but
also brief (but regular) interactions with animals can lead to a variety of
benefits for the person involved (O’Haire 2010; Fine 2015; Wells 2019).
This evidence has led to an extensive use of animals in various therapeu-
tic/activity programmes (also known as Animal-Assisted Interventions;
AAIs), which involve positive interactions between domestic animals and
individuals with physical and/or emotional needs. The term AAIs encom-
passes: i) animal-assisted therapy, a goal-directed intervention in which a
specifically trained animal is an integral part of the treatment process; ii)
animal-assisted education, an intervention with specific educational pur-
poses; and iii) animal-assisted activities, a more informal but yet planned
intervention with motivational and/or recreational purposes (Cirulli
et al. 2011; Cirulli and Borgi 2018; Borgi et al. 2020).
In the context of the Biophilia framework it has been stated that
humans possess a predisposition to be attracted by the activities of other
animals (Wilson 1984) and attention to animals alone is thought to be
sufficient to explain some of the benefits of human-animal interactions
and of AAIs, since things that tend to focus and absorb people’s attention
in non-threatening ways are also known to exert a calming or de-arousing
influence. The presence of an animal, or even the mere observation of
animals, can buffer physiological and psychological responses to stress
and anxiety. As an example, a transient decrease in blood pressure and
heart rate and in cortisol levels has been observed both in adults and
children in the presence of a companion dog as well as while interacting
with friendly but unknown dogs. Animals can indeed have a profound
calming effect on humans, and the general assumption underlying AAIs
is the non-judgmental and non-threatening nature of the companion
animal’s support which can promote a climate of “safety” and contribute
to a positive perception of a situation. Animals may thus help people to
cope with mildly stressful activities (e.g. visit to the doctor’s office or
reading aloud) and also with a major stressful experience, like hospitalisa-
tion, with measurable physiological effects such as decrease in blood pres-
sure and heart rate (Cirulli et al. 2011).
Moreover, by being able to respond affectionately to human attentions
and to elicit pro-social behaviours and positive affect, animals, especially
dogs, may possess a unique capacity to serve as an emotional bridge to
mediate interactions in otherwise awkward and uncomfortable therapeu-
tic contexts. The need for attention and affiliation already exists in the
basic behavioural patterns of many living organisms and it can cross the
species barrier (Odendaal 2000). The current claims for success, where
animals are used to assist in therapy, are mainly based on the ability of
animals to fulfil such needs and this is particularly important for indi-
viduals lacking support from family members or close friends. Companion
animals somehow possess the ability to reconnect such people with the
outside world, breaking down the barriers of isolation that make them
refractory to conventional forms of treatment. The presence of an animal,
particularly a dog, is able to act as an “ice-breaker”: it catalyses commu-
nication and enhances opportunities for social exchange and shared
interests which, in turn, can promote a feeling of social integration
(McNicholas and Collis 2000), an aspect particularly important for chil-
dren with atypical development and with physical disabilities and for
people experiencing social discrimination and isolation.
In humans, negative affective states, such as depression, are associated

with premature mortality and increased risk of coronary heart disease,
type 2 diabetes and disability. By contrast, positive affective states, such as
those arising from close social relationships, are protective (Steptoe et al.
2005). In order to study the mechanisms underlying human-animal
bonding and its effects on stress and arousal, the role of selected physio-
logical indices involved in arousal and affiliative behaviours has been
explored (e.g. beta-endorphin, oxytocin, prolactin, phenylethylamine,
dopamine and cortisol; Odendaal and Meintjes 2003). In non-human
mammals, the neuropeptide oxytocin has been repeatedly shown to
increase social approach behaviour and pair bonding. In particular, cen-
tral nervous oxytocin reduces behavioural and neuroendocrine responses
to social stress and is suggested to mediate the rewarding aspects of attach-
ment in highly social species. Starting from the evidence that oxytocin
and human-animal interactions effects largely overlap, it has been pro-
posed that the activation of the oxytocin system plays a key role in the
majority of the reported psychophysiological effects of human-animal
interaction (Beetz et al. 2012). Coherently, direct reports of a release of
oxytocin in humans in response to interaction with bonded pets are accu-
mulating (Powell et al. 2019), as well as evidence of oxytocin’s promotion
of positive social behaviours in animals towards humans (Kis et al. 2014;
Romero et al. 2014).
Dogs’ ability to develop a complex communication system with
humans (see previous paragraph) makes these animals particularly suitable
to facilitate social interactions and communication. Dogs are highly
interactive and provide opportunities for physical, recreational and social
activities and their attitude to be trained has led them to be the most used
animals to study the beneficial effects of pets for people of all ages
(O’Haire 2010; Fine 2015; Wells 2019). As an example, taking advan-
tage of their extreme predictability and friendliness, dogs are being
involved in a number of interventions designed to mitigate the effects of
institutionalisation in geriatric patients. Dog-assisted interventions, par-
ticularly dog visiting programmes, have indeed shown a positive impact
on social, behavioural, psychological, physiological and physical out-
comes among older adults (Gee et al. 2017; Olsen et al. 2016), including
a clinical relevant decrease of depression symptoms (Borgi et al. 2020).
Intervention strategies based on exploiting the emotional aspects of the

relationship with a dog were also shown to represent an effective tool to
dampen withdrawal of children with autism by targeting some of the core
symptoms of this disorder (Berry et al. 2013; O’Haire 2017). Dog-
assisted interventions have become increasingly popular also in educa-
tional settings to improve students’ attention and discipline, promote
student-teacher relationships, prompt creative activities, teach humane
attitudes and responsibility for a living being, as well as motivate students
with learning problems and other difficulties (Brelsford et al. 2017;
Correale et al. 2017).
Although the evidence underlying the beneficial influence of interac-
tion with animals, especially dogs, for human health is growing, this field
still suffers for some methodological weakness. However, a growing num-
ber of studies is starting to address the mechanisms behind the human-
animal bond and the so-called pet effect, contributing to a rapidly
expanding, interdisciplinary and promising body of research which can
enrich our knowledge on this unique trans-species social relationship.
4 A Less Studied Species: The Domestic Cat

The last decades of ethological research established the notion that dogs
can be regarded as the prototype of the “companion animal.” In the pre-
vious paragraphs we have briefly described how selective pressures have
created/enhanced those socio-cognitive attributes of the dog that have
made this species the most successful in co-existing with humans. By
contrast, although nowadays the mutual relationship between humans
and cats is widespread and cats are one of the most popular companion
animal in many human societies, the role of cats as companions still
remains rather under-investigated and we know little about the details of
the cat-human relationship. Even research on the origin of the domestic
cat, the history of ancient cats and how their dispersal occurred during
domestication lags far behind such research on dogs (Callaway 2016).
Domestication of cats has been estimated to have begun about 10,000
years ago, at the dawn of agriculture (Vigne et al. 2004), but this is still
enigmatic. We know that the cat has long been important for our
grain-storing ancestors as a rodent-control agent. In some societies, it has

been object of symbolic value and sacred (as among Egyptians which may
have tamed wild cats about 6000 years ago; Van Neer et al. 2014) and
only later became a companion animal. A recent study analysed ancient
DNA of geographically and temporally widespread archaeological cat
remains finding that both the Near Eastern and Egyptian populations of
Felis silvestris lybica contributed to the gene pool of the domestic cat at
different historical times (Ottoni et al. 2017; Ottoni and Neer 2020).
Cats expanded with early farming communities to the eastern
Mediterranean, while, thousands of years later Egyptian cats rapidly
spread throughout the Old World along human maritime and terrestrial
routes of trade and connectivity, finding themselves in a wide range of
environments. It has been suggested that grain stockpiles associated with
the early farming communities attracted rodents, which in turn drew
wild cats; even sea-faring people probably kept cats to maintain rodents
under control (Callaway 2016). After experimenting the benefit of hav-
ing cats around, humans might have begun to tame these animals, while
directed breeding of cats occurred only later than with most other domes-
ticated animals.
At present companion/family cats are the largest single sub-set of the
cat population; they are owned by human families and have their needs
consistently met by a human carer. Another population is represented by
individuals living within human environments (e.g. cities) and directly or
indirectly provided for by humans without being owned by them; other
cats live a life largely or wholly independent of humans (Farnworth 2015).
There is still active debate over whether the family cat is truly a domestic
animal—that is, its behaviour and anatomy are clearly distinct from those of
wild relatives. Indeed, across its evolutionary history, the behaviour of the
cat's wild ancestor has not undergone substantial modifications and has
resulted in today's domestic cat retaining most of the ancient repertoire of
behaviours. As an example, even individuals who rely on human support for
feeding—and that thus do not necessitate hunting for survival—still are
efficient predators when having the opportunity.
While the behavioural repertoire of the cat has not dramatically altered
across its evolutionary history, human expectations have radically changed
across the same period and the role of cats in households became less and
less concerned with their ability as pest-controller than it was with their
companionship (Farnworth 2015). As a matter of fact, it has been
observed that affiliative behaviour towards people, an important preadap-
tation to domestication, is widely distributed throughout small cats
(Felidae) (Cameron-Beaumont et al. 2002) and there is some evidence
consistent with a model of cat domestication that posits selective pressure
on some behaviours (e.g. meows; Nicastro 2004) based on human per-
ceptual biases. Moreover, there is now compelling evidence that cats may
display distinct attachment styles towards human caregivers (Edwards
et al. 2007; Vitale et al. 2019; but see Potter and Mills 2015) and may
develop complex idiosyncratic and time-structured interactions (Wedl
et al. 2011). Cats follow visual cues given by humans (pointing with arm:
Miklósi et al. 2005; cueing with gazing: Pongrácz et al. 2019), are able to
reproduce actions demonstrated by a human model (Fugazza et al. 2020)
and they can also recognize auditory stimuli of their owner (Saito and
Shinozuka 2013). Cats have shown a unique pattern of response to
human cues (Pongrácz and Onofer 2020) and to employ a variety of
human-directed behaviours, including attention-seeking vocalisations
(e.g. meows; Yeon et al. 2011). As an example, the vertical “tail up” is one
visual signal that has long been associated with affiliative behaviour
between cats and with intention to interact amicably (Bradshaw and
Cameron-Beaumont 2000; Cafazzo and Natoli 2009); the same signal is
used when cats (re-)establish contact with their owners.
Notwithstanding the above mentioned evidence, research on the ben-
efits of interacting with pets for human health has so far rather neglected
cats as object of investigation and these animals are rarely included in
AAIs. Cats can apparently be a source of emotional support to their own-
ers, especially those with strong attachment to their animals (Stammbach
and Turner 1999), and the few studies on the benefits of interacting with
cats showed promising, though preliminary, results (e.g. enhanced social-
isation, social adaptive functioning and improved depressive symptoms
in frail elderly patients; Barak et al. 2001; Stasi et al. 2004). It is impor-
tant to notice that the undeniable difficulty when it comes to move com-
panion cats in other location than the home of the owner (for testing or
for AAIs) is one of the reasons why the cat-human relationship is less
studied than dog-human interactions. Cats could thus be better employed
in programmes carried out in institutions (such as nursing homes) as resi-

dent animals. In this case, these animals can well adapt to a familiar envi-
ronment and can roam freely from room to room and interact
spontaneously with patients/users.
There are other reasons why cats are not considered completely well
suited to represent the “ideal” companion animal, as well as an important
adjunct in therapy. Human relationships with cats are complex and the
value human societies place upon individual cats has resulted in the
development of a generally ambivalent view of cats, which may also
depend on the degree of expression of some behaviours, such as preda-
tion, and human-directed affiliative behaviours (i.e. level of socialisation)
(Farnworth 2015). While our companion animal is generally considered
as a much loved member of the family, free-living cats are considered one
of the world's most invasive pest species. Moreover, there is still popular
beliefs about cats being “selfish” and “unfaithful,” though compelling evi-
dence are now available on cats possessing high levels of socio-cognitive
abilities (Shreve and Udell 2015), with some features (like friendliness,
playfulness) particularly relevant for the successful cat-human relation-
ship (Turner 2000). Since, at present, cats have an important role as com-
panion animals, it would be worthy to study cat behaviour, in particular
cats’ socio-cognitive abilities, with similar thoroughness as with dogs,
since this information may help to improve research on the effect of ani-
mals for human wellbeing, as well as cat welfare.
5 nimal Welfare in the Context

A
of Animal-assisted Interventions
Notwithstanding the increasing scientific interest on AAIs, few studies
have tested the stress experienced by animals involved in these interven-
tions. During AAIs animals can be submitted to work stressors including
work load, the requirement to suppress emotions, as well as the request to
relate with unfamiliar human subjects. This latter aspect appears particu-
larly relevant in the context of AAIs, since the establishment of a healthy
and successful relationship between the patient and the animal represents
the key point for achieving therapeutic goals, and can have consequences
both for the animal’s welfare and for the human’s safety (De Santis
et al. 2017).
Thanks to their trainability and ability to communicate effectively—
and form a bond—with human beings, dogs are the pet animals most
commonly involved in AAIs. However, even after specific training, these
animals can still experience discomfort and stress in the context of AAIs.
Involvement in these interventions requires accepting close contacts with
human unfamiliar subjects and working in unfamiliar environments
(such as hospitals, schools, etc.), which exposes them to various environ-
mental stimuli that could cause discomfort, such as wheelchairs, crutches,
sudden noises and so on (Iannuzzi and Rowan 1991; Serpell et al. 2010;
Mongillo et al. 2015; Ng et al. 2015; Glenk 2017).
Many of the studies that assessed the welfare of dogs employed in AAIs
were conducted as part of visiting programmes, in which the animals
were introduced into nursing homes, schools or hospitals, and in both
individual and group settings, with both adult and child patients/users
(Marinelli et al. 2009; Palestrini et al. 2017; Pirrone et al. 2017;
McCullough et al. 2018; Haubenhofer and Kirchengast 2006, 2007;
King et al. 2011; Glenk et al. 2013, 2014; Ng et al. 2014). The wide
heterogeneity of the methodologies used for assessing animal welfare, the
variety of clients/users involved and the different ways of carrying out the
therapeutic session and the activities proposed make it very difficult to
draw definitive conclusions on the impact of AAIs on the wellbeing of
dogs (Glenk 2017). In general, the activities proposed in the context of
AAIs do not seem to cause high levels of stress in animals, as evidenced in
the majority of published studies. The few protocols correlating stress-
related behaviours and physiological parameters in dogs involved in AAIs
have shown that the behavioural manifestations of stress are not always
directly correlated to circulating cortisol levels (McCullough et al. 2018;
Glenk et al. 2014; Ng et al. 2014). Interestingly, some studies have shown
that positive human physical interaction (e.g. dog petting) can cause a
state of relaxation in the animal (increased parasympathetic activity and
lower heart rate; Kuhne et al. 2014).
More in general, the research carried out so far underlines the impor-
tance of combining the behavioural observations and physiological
measures with an assessment of environmental characteristics (e.g. tem-

perature, work space), as well as of individual characteristics, such as ani-
mals’ age and experience in AAIs, users’ age, gender and medical
condition. As an example, a higher frequency of stress-related behaviours
following a therapeutic session was observed in dogs with a few years of
experience in AAIs and younger than 6 years (King et al. 2011), and fol-
lowing sessions with children (compared to sessions with adult patients/
users; Marinelli et al. 2009). The growing familiarity with users during
the course of the intervention may be an additional factor that affects the
animal's response, as demonstrated by another study (Glenk et al. 2014).
While the literature on the welfare of “therapeutic” dogs is rapidly grow-
ing, the same field of investigation on cats is lacking, also due to the fact
that these animals are not commonly involved in AAIs, as previously
described. Another reason for the scarcity of studies monitoring discom-
fort/stress in cats is that these animals can be easily stressed when handled
during physiological assessments (e.g. blood sample).
To conclude, we would like to point out that, similarly to what
observed in humans, “therapeutic” animals (which can be considered a
special type of working animals) can experience “work stressors” with
negative and durable effects, such as impaired psychological functioning
(e.g. depression-like symptoms) (Hausberger et al. 2009). In the context
of AAIs, monitoring and guaranteeing animal welfare have not only ethi-
cal but also practical implications: the success of AAIs strongly depends
on the establishment of a human-animal relationship, which is consid-
ered as positive and healthy for both, a condition not achieved when the
animal is stressed or is in discomfort. By contrast, some studies have
shown that positive human-animal interactions can induce beneficial
effects in both, as evidenced by the variation of some physiological
parameters underlying pro-social behaviours, including cortisol and oxy-
tocin (Odendaal and Meintjes 2003). In order to assess and improve the
welfare of animals involved in AAIs, additional studies addressing the
relationship between behavioural and physiological responses, and the
role of environmental factors, are needed. Future studies should use a
multidimensional approach for monitoring animal welfare during both
therapeutic and recreational sessions, ultimately helping professionals to
develop better interventions, taking into consideration the animal’s per-

spective (De Santis et al. 2017).
6 nimal Welfare: Consequences

A
and Challenges
of the Human-Animal Bond
AAIs represent an interesting case study on how human-pet interac-
tions—and the use of pets for the benefits of people—can affect animal
behaviour and wellbeing. Activities performed during AAIs and interac-
tions with humans can indeed be a source of discomfort for the animal,
even when they are meant to create a benefit for the client/user. A funda-
mental element capable to affect profoundly animal welfare has to do
with the housing conditions. This can be particularly relevant in the case
of horses which spend most of their time alone and enclosed in box stalls.
Horses are fundamental social animals and spend most of their time graz-
ing with their own herd. Current standards for horse keeping are mainly
based upon human management needs, rather than on horse’s ethological
needs (De Santis et al. 2017).
These same concepts can be applied also to pets we keep in our homes.
Many ethical concerns related to the keeping of pet animals have been
raised so far, such as indoor confinement, neutering, euthanising and
selective breeding to cite some of the many examples (for other ethical
issues see the chapter “Use, abuse and bonds” in this volume). Among
researchers, veterinarians, regulators and the public there is a shift in the
priorities, from minimising pain and distress as primary goals of refine-
ment when working with—or keeping—animals to emphasizing the pro-
motion of positive affective states, culminating in the concept of positive
animal welfare that can be achieved only by guaranteeing ecological,
ethological and ethically sound environments for animals. Here, we want
to take a further step and highlight that, in the case of pet animals, the
concept of positive welfare should include the dimension of having a
good relationship with their “relevant” human. The most recent literature
is in line with this reasoning, pointing to a mutual regulation of affective
states, with a main role played by the neuropeptide oxytocin, promot-

ing the development of the so-called attachment bond (see “Dog domes-
tication” paragraph).
While we can improve and enrich the lives of our companion ani-
mals—and should take responsibility to do so—through their ability to
move our emotions and promote attachment behaviour, pets in turn have
direct effects on our health. As we have already underlined, activation of
the oxytocinergic system results in the strengthening of the human-
animal bond, but the effects of increased levels of this neuropeptide could
possibly extend to increased social behaviour towards other animals,
other members of the family or even neighbours/friends. We have
described this mechanism as the “extended village effect,” that is an
increase in social interactions mediated by pets (Borgi and Cirulli 2016).
Given the reported negative effects of social isolation on human’s health,
this mechanism is likely to have a positive impact on the health of people
living with pets, but, indirectly, also on those immediately interacting
with them. This adds on to the very well-documented beneficial effects
that dogs exert, for example, on the cardiovascular system of their human
carers as an indirect benefit of walking and improved lifestyle. Another
example of pet’s effects on our health has to do with the protection from
allergic reactions. Past research has shown that exposure to pets, particu-
larly dogs, during infancy may prevent people from developing allergies.
Other research findings indicate that early life dog exposure can affect
our gut microbes, which might indicate one mechanism through which
they might positively affect our immune system as well as our brains.
This bidirectional (positive) emotional dimension of the human-
animal relationship should become the foundation of our concern for the
welfare of domestic animals and help us revising and expanding the con-
cept of One Health to refine the relationship with our pets and character-
ise the broader implications of this relationship. The core of the One
Health concept is indeed the complex interconnectedness and interde-
pendence of all living species and the environment, which calls for the
huge responsibility that humans, as the dominant species, should take on
to ensure people’s and planetary health (Amuasi et al. 2020).
The One Health concept has been viewed as a worldwide strategy for
expanding interdisciplinary collaborations and communications in all
aspects of health care for humans, animals and the environment. The
term One Health first appeared in 2003, when it was adopted by several
groups working across human and animal health, and subsequently by
policy-makers, clinicians and researchers (Cassidy 2018). It was initiated
by fears about the emergence and spread of zoonotic diseases passing
between humans and other animals, a problem that has been posed in a
dramatic way during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In the context of the human-companion animal relations, the One
Health concept has been mostly employed in order to promote respon-
sible pet ownership and prevent negative aspects of the human-animal
bond (including hygienic practices, extreme breeding, feeding practices,
housing, anthropomorphism), which may result in an increased risk of
zoonotic infections, as well as lead to mental and physical challenges for
the biology of the animal (Overgaauw et al. 2020). Here we would like to
take a new path, highlighting the positive, rather than the negative,
aspects of the human-animal bond. Indeed, pets undoubtedly have a
positive effect on human health and wellbeing, and there is increasing
awareness that the same physiological regulations activated by pets and
promoting health in humans are hijacked by our companion animals and
promote their wellbeing when living or interacting with us. The One
Health concept can help re-positioning our pets at the same level as we
are, suggesting that our health and wellbeing, and that of animals, includ-
ing pets, are all intrinsically dependent on each other.
Moreover, research on species that have evolved side-by-side with
humans for thousands of years could be critical for understanding our
broader relationship with the natural environment (Bowler et al. 2010).
Nature relatedness has been linked with psychological wellbeing, empa-
thy and pro-environment attitudes (Prescott et al. 2018). The sum of
existing research indicates that a close experience with nature can lead to
more environment-conscious behaviours as previous research indicates
that urbanisation results in a disconnection from nature (Logan and
Selhub 2012). Pets represent a fundamental link that can restore this
biophilic response to the natural environment. It is important that future
research actively explores the basic mechanisms underlying human-
animal relationships, promoting nature relatedness and shaping behav-
iours that can foster environmental conscious attitudes. This should
ultimately result in a global One Health attitude encompassing our spe-

cies, our domestic animals and the whole planet considered as a
unique entity from which the future of our species is dependent upon.
7 Conclusions
This book represents an important resource on the ethical issues related
to animal moral/legal status and human-animal relationships. An up-to-
date and in-depth discussion of the welfare of companion animals should
consider a number of factors, including whether people’s relation with
(and attitudes towards) pets in different cultures is beneficial or disadvan-
tageous for the animal, how to achieve peaceful and healthy human-
animal cohabitation in urban contexts, how to guarantee the welfare of
animals kept in human environments as well as of those involved in AAIs.
At present, data are scattered and we believe a clearer picture can be
achieved only through a transdisciplinary collaboration and the collec-
tion of comparable observational data on the biology and behaviour of
both family and working animals. We encourage research from different
disciplines to enrich assessments of companion animal welfare with
robust measures of positive affective states and with measures of animals’
attitudes, preferences and personality. In the case of pets, this approach
should encompass the human-animal relational dimension. Indeed, there
is scarce information on how the relational dimension (relationship with
other companion animals and the quality of the relationship with the
human family) impact on the welfare of companion animals. We believe
this approach can help to push the care and practices of research includ-
ing companion animals towards an increased focus on positive (and rela-
tional) animal welfare.
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15
Human-Wildlife Coexistence
in the Urban Domain: Promoting
Welfare Through Effective
Management, Responsibility
and the Recognition of Mutual Interest
Oliver Adrian Wookey
1 Introduction
Animal welfare is a value that is increasingly recognised as something
worthy of protection. This is part of a shift away from appreciating ani-
mals only for their value to humans in an objective sense, and their utili-
tarian value as a means for profit. As animal welfare science gains increased
understanding of, and is able to validly prove the existence of, animal
sentience—the ability of an animal to experience pain, pleasure, fear,
stress and other emotions that we humans similarly experience—it is able
to validly submit that many aspects of animal treatment in society are
detrimental to animal welfare. The seriousness of this can be seen by its
inclusion in national legislation of many countries, as well as the refer-
ence made to it by Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
O. A. Wookey (*)
ICALP (International Center for Animal Law and Policy), Universitat
Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
318 O. A. Wookey
European Union (TFEU) as an element to be taken into consideration

when dealing with animals. This has been an enormous step forward in
terms of better treatment for animals, as it means that policies, supported
by relevant and verified science, may then be established to ensure that
welfare requirements are met.
If animal welfare is to be taken seriously as an element worthy of con-
sideration in itself, as is increasingly demanded by society, it is imperative
that it be accounted for across all interactions with animals. The impor-
tance of this cannot be overstated: the credibility of animal welfare as a
legitimate concern depends on it. Many of these interactions take place
in the urban environment, to which we will now draw our attention.
2 he Human-Animal Relationship
T
in the Urban Domain
The relationship between humans and animals in the urban domain is
truly fascinating, encompassing a range of voluntary and involuntary,
direct and indirect, positive and negative interactions. To clarify, urban-
isation is the process of human populations moving from rural environ-
ments into towns and cities, creating infrastructure and augmenting
social, economic and political opportunities, and it has been a key aspect
of developing societies. Urban environments, ranging from city centres
and derelict buildings to public parks and private gardens, continue to
expand in size and density and sprawl into rural areas, and have proven
attractive to various species of wildlife by meeting their basic needs and,
in certain cases, enabling them to adapt, evolve and thrive. While the
range of species vary depending on geography, level of urbanisation and
the surrounding environment, research has determined common charac-
teristics of successful urban wildlife: they may utilise human food sources,
they are typically omnivorous, they are often strong competitors, they
may have a higher level of human tolerance and they can change their
behaviour and adapt to major environmental disturbances (The Urban
Wildlife Working Group 2012).
15 Human-Wildlife Coexistence in the Urban Domain… 319
Investigation into this relationship reveals a complex web of interac-

tion, with each and every species of this urban ecosystem entangled in a
frenzy of cause and effect. Many urban dwellers are scavengers that sub-
sist off of refuse thrown away by humans, such as rodents and small birds.
Others prey on smaller animals: in this way, urban wildlife such as birds
of prey, cats and foxes in themselves provide some level of pest control. In
the UK, the peregrine falcon—the world’s fastest bird—has even been
brought back from virtual extinction, enjoying London’s Tate Modern,
Battersea Power Station and the Houses of Parliament for several years
now due to abundant food sources and tall buildings that provide
predator-free shelter (Goode 2015). In many ways this provides benefit
to human health: Chimney Swifts are invaluable for controlling mosqui-
tos, and dung beetles in New York have been proved to prevent disease
spread to humans. Certain species are key for waste disposal, such as
predatory and scavenging birds (Pomeroy 1975; Markandya et al. 2008,
as cited in Soulsbury & White 2015), especially in developing countries.
Bees are common in urban parks and gardens and, as prime pollinators,
they are vital for pollinating our plants and crops, which are vital for our
food and agriculture industry. As well as being crucial for our health,
many urban species are, in themselves, useful as indicators of human
health: feral pigeons can serve as a warning sign for various environmen-
tal toxins, with pigeons having been used in studies for monitoring the
presence of lead and cadmium (Nam and Lee 2006, as cited by Adams
and Lindsey 2010). Even on a superficial level, birds and butterflies
finesse the harshness of the urban scene with a touch of natural delicacy,
while at its profoundest, the presence of any nonhuman creature may
serve to remind us of the wider world and wilderness lying beyond the
immediate and the everyday.
While human-animal conviviality in the urban environment is a phe-
nomenon to which we are accustomed, it is clear that it confers many
benefits beyond the mere sight of natural scenery and the life it fosters.
However, this harmony and mutual benefit is not without conflict and
suffering. In fact, investigation into the detrimental effects of urban con-
ditions on the wildlife that inhabit them reveals an extensive amount of
death and suffering resulting from anthropogenic activity. Light pollu-
tion, for example, presents a major threat to wildlife, and despite there
320 O. A. Wookey
being little known of its full impact, it has a devastating effect on many
species and alters entire ecosystems. The glare from artificial lighting can
disrupt mating patterns and night time breeding rituals of amphibians.
Artificial lights are also causing a decline in insect populations, which has
a knock-on effect on food webs and the success of all populations, due to
their role as pollinators. Heavily lit urban areas cause migrating birds to
stray off route and into dense, built-up cities where fatal collisions with
buildings are inevitable. Urban buildings in alone are an immense cause
of bird fatalities, due to the inability of birds to perceive windows as a
barrier, or due to the mirror effect, which reflects greenery, thus appear-
ing to be a safe habitat to be flown into (Adams and Lindsey 2010). This
is not limited to high-rises, as even residential building windows are esti-
mated to account for one million annual bird deaths in the US (Adams
and Lindsey 2010).
Another global and major threat to urban animals comes in the form
of vehicle collisions. This is in fact the second largest cause of anthropo-
genic mortality for vertebrates, behind legal harvesting (Hill et al. 2019,
as cited in Schwartz et al. 2020). It is estimated that over a million verte-
brates are killed daily on US roads (Erickson et al. 2005; Loss et al. 2014,
as cited in Schwartz et al. 2020). In fact, in parts of the globe where
annual estimates have been calculated, there is not a country with a
wildlife-vehicle collision count below the millions (Schwartz, A.L.W.,
Shilling, F.M. & Perkins, S.E). Roads are increasingly carving through
natural landscapes and animal habitats, with expectations that at least
25 million kilometres of new roads will be built globally by 2050
(Laurance et al. 2014, as cited in Schwartz et al. 2020). The effect on dif-
ferent species can vary; while roads account for 6% of the deaths of small
rodents in Spain (Ruiz-Capillas et al. 2015, as cited in Schwartz et al.
2020), populations of Blanding’s turtles (Beaudry et al. 2008, as cited in
Schwartz et al. 2020), spotted salamanders (Gibbs and Shriver 2005, as
cited in Schwartz et al. 2020) and jaguars (Cullen et al. 2016, as cited in
Schwartz et al. 2020) have been found to be under threat of extinction
due to roadways (Schwartz et al. 2020).
Unfortunately, these are just a few of the anthropogenic causes of
urban animal fatalities; other activities that contribute to extensive ani-
mal mortality include chemical runoff, noise pollution, pesticides and
threats from other invasive species. The examples and statistics provided
only scratch the surface. Threats to wildlife welfare present clear cause for
concern, as well as sufficient reason to address these issues. Yet while it is
wildlife that clearly bears the brunt of urban coexistence, it is not to say
that threats to human welfare aren’t also inherent to this relationship.
Indeed, as our habitats continue to merge, sharing living space with ani-
mals has to an extent interwoven the health of humans and nonhuman
animals, meaning that the health of one has the potential to seriously
impact the health of the other.
It is well documented that many species could at any time be carrying
infectious diseases that could potentially be transmitted to humans, with
the probability of this occurring increasing among denser populations.
An immediate danger to widespread human health may come from an
animal in the form of a zoonosis: an infectious disease that has been
transmitted between a non-human animal and a human. Zoonoses may
take the form of bacteria, a virus, a fungus or a parasite, and many well-
known cases include bird flu, bovine flu, ringworm and plague, to name
only a few. The chance of zoonoses is also increased by the relocation of
wildlife, as when an animal is relocated there is always a chance it may be
carrying a disease or parasite into a previously unaffected population
(Adams and Lindsey 2010). Take the case of feral pigeons. A ‘feral’ species
is one that has escaped from direct human control and consequently
established free-ranging populations (Adams and Lindsey 2010). Feral
pigeons have adapted to urban environments, and research carried out by
Haag-Wackernagel and Moch (2004) found them to harbour sixty differ-
ent human pathogenic organisms, and documented 176 transmissions of
illness to humans between 1941 and 2003 (Adams and Lindsey 2010).
In some cases there exists the more immediate danger of physical
attack. In certain parts of America, for example, predatory mammals
such as coyotes, cougars and bears are increasingly encountered in urban
environments, and clearly pose a threat to locals, with many unsure of
how to conduct themselves in such circumstances. However, while con-
flict can arise from any sort of defensive or territorial aggression by wild-
life, it most often results in only minor or no injury to humans (Soulsbury
and White 2015), and fatalities or serious injuries resulting from urban
wildlife are very rare (Mayer 2013, as cited in Soulsbury and White
322 O. A. Wookey
2015). More concerning perhaps are the consequences of attacks on the

attitudes and perception of urban wildlife, which can be dramatically
negative (Cassidy and Mills 2012, as cited in Soulsbury and White 2015),
and a significant proportion of people still fear attack by urban wildlife
(Harrison 1998, as cited in Soulsbury and White 2015). There is also
often a significant perceived threat of urban wildlife attack on domestic
pets (Harrison 1998; König 2008; Spacapan 2013, as cited in Soulsbury
and White 2015), even though surveys have shown relatively few pets are
killed (Harris 1981, as cited in Soulsbury and White 2015).
A further concern is damage to property caused by urban wildlife.
Clear evidence of this are the nationwide statistics of the US from
1994–2003 showing damage caused in urban environments amounting
to $550.8 million of damage to resources: 73,084 cases by racoons;
56,081 by coyotes; 45,958 by beavers; 36,943 by deer; 34,808 by geese;
28,975 by squirrels; 21,871 by opossums; 20,635 by foxes, and; 19,228
by blackbirds (Adams and Lindsey 2010). The trend of the damage dur-
ing this ten-year period was showed to increase each year. An additional
1993 study of deer deaths by vehicles in the US found that in 1991, even
when conservatively estimated, there were not only 726,000 deer deaths,
211 human fatalities and 29,000 human injuries, but a phenomenal $1.1
billion in property damage (Conover et al. 1995; Romin and Bissonette
1996, as cited by Adams and Lindsey 2010). Even annual control costs
for a single pigeon are estimated at $9 (Pimentel et al. 2002, as cited by
Adams and Lindsey 2010). On top of this, there exist ‘hidden’ costs such
as diminished psychosocial wellbeing, disruption of livelihoods and food
insecurities, which are very difficult to properly assess (Barua et al. 2013,
as cited in Soulsbury and White 2015).
3 Effective Management
of the Human-Animal Relationship
As this situation is a contemporary reality, and a threat to the welfare of
both humans and animals—the inevitable chaotic shadow to our urban
order—it must be asked how the situation can be effectively managed.
How may order be increased in this complex web of cause and effect that
is human and animal cohabitation in urban environments? It must again
be reinforced that there is no simple solution, and responses must account
for the specifics of each environment. Nature abhors a vacuum, and ani-
mals will find what is to be found, whether it is food or shelter. This is not
something that will go away, nor can it be eradicated, and is most threat-
ening when not dealt with. In light of this, there are key elements to an
effective approach, all of which align with the view that prevention of
conflict and caution against danger are by far the best means of reducing
negative outcomes.
Study is a fundamental aspect of successful management. In the US,
the Urban Wildlife Working Group studies urban wildlife so as to under-
stand the stressors on wildlife populations, species interactions and
sources of human-wildlife conflict. It argues that it is important to study
this in order to preserve biodiversity, maintain ecosystem function, reduce
property damage, foster safe neighbourhoods and encourage positive
associations with wildlife, all of which are key elements in being able to
effectively manage the human-animal relationship in urban environ-
ments. Scientists believe that its study helps us to appreciate the impacts
of urbanisation at ecosystem level and to gain deeper understanding of
how behaviour and demography of urban wildlife are influenced by alter-
ations to native habitat (The Urban Wildlife Working Group 2012).
A crucial part of study is surveillance, as it enables public health
authorities to monitor the impact of noteworthy conditions, measure
disease trends, assess the effectiveness of control and prevention
measures,and identify populations or geographic areas at high risk
(Adams and Lindsey 2010). These elements are prerequisite for measures
such as the appropriate allocation resources, the formulation of preven-
tion strategies and the development of public health policies (Adams and
Lindsey 2010). Take the aforementioned topic of bird collisions with
buildings, causing between 365 and 988 million bird deaths in the US
alone (Dunn 1993, Borden et al. 2010, Kummer and Bayne 2015, as
cited in Basilio et al. 2020). Following studies, papers published on the
topic identify various factors that contribute to higher death rates, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the proximity of glass panes to urban green areas
and artificial feeders (Dunn 1993, Borden et al. 2010, Kummer and
324 O. A. Wookey
Bayne 2015, as cited in Basilio et al. 2020), the amount of continuous

glass panes a building has (Cusa et al. 2015, as cited in Basilio et al. 2020)
and whether the glass is reflective or translucent (Klem and Saenger 2013,
Klem 2015, Kummer et al. 2016a, as cited in Basilio et al. 2020).
The information gathered through surveillance and study can then be
used as a basis for effective management, which includes developing
guidelines and best practices for progress. An excellent example of effec-
tive guidelines is the Bird-Friendly Development Guidelines produced by
the city of Toronto in 2007, detailing strategies to make new and existing
buildings less dangerous to migratory birds. These were accompanied by
two further documents that support the application of the Toronto Green
Standard (Toronto Green Standard (TGS) V3. 2019)—the city’s sustain-
able design requirements for private and city-owned developments. The
first of these deals with glass windows, and clearly sets out the problems
they cause for birds and the solutions available (City of Toronto 2016).
The second of these deals with effective lighting, and highlights the far-
reaching impact of urban lighting on nocturnal animals, wildlife mating
instincts and migrating birds (City of Toronto 2017). The guidelines
have since become an award-winning document, and have been copied
by various North American cities—a true testament to their success.
Study and surveillance also enable the elimination of wildlife manage-
ment practices that have proven to be harmful to animal welfare, as well
as ineffective in achieving their purpose. A notorious example of these is
animal culling. Culling entails the non-selective killing of a species. It
presents many problems: not only has it often proved to be an ineffective
method of population control, but it poses serious animal welfare threats
that could be avoided through alternative, and more effective, methods of
control, and thus undermines animal sentience as a value worthy of pro-
tection. Compelling evidence for the shortcomings of indiscriminate
culling can be found when investigating its implementation in the UK as
a means for reducing the spread of bovine TB from badgers to cattle. The
issue has been a contentious one, however studies have shown that badger
culling is unlikely to contribute positively, or cost-effectively, to the con-
trol of cattle TB in Britain (Geisler and Ares 2018). In fact, the study
found that bovine-TB increased in areas surrounding cull sites, as the
culling disrupted the territorial behaviour of badgers, thus causing them

to range more widely both inside and outside cull areas (Geisler and Ares
2018). Following an eight-year field trial, the Independent Scientific
Group concluded that bovine TB could be controlled and ultimately
eradicated by cattle-based measures alone (McCulloch and Reiss 2017b).
While in this case culling has been argued to be an economically viable
method of population control when accounting for the cattle saved by
the badger cull, the Defra value for money assessment advises caution on
the considerable uncertainty regarding its conclusion that in this case the
benefits of culling outweigh the costs (Defra 2016, as cited in McCulloch
and Reiss 2017b). On top of this, culling by free shooting presents a seri-
ous threat to animal welfare, failing to discriminate between healthy and
unhealthy animals. The British Veterinary Association withdrew support
for this method based on lack of humaneness, although it did, indeed,
continue to support the culling by cage trapping and shooting (McCulloch
and Reiss 2017b).
There have in fact been many cases proving the ineffectiveness of this
method. A study of culling feral cats in Australia found that there were
great populations of cats in cull sites after the cull, where more cats moved
in once dominant dwellers had been removed (Lazenby et al. 2015). A
case of dog culling in Bali proved ineffective and harmful in comparison
with its earlier policy of mass vaccination (Riley 2019), which saw effec-
tive improvement, as rabies can be brought under control as long as a
high proportion of the dog population can be reached with vaccination
(Townsend et al. 2013). These methods have proven to not only be inef-
fective, but also to cause further danger and conflict. This means they are
not only a waste of time, money, resources, but also exacerbate the issue,
further reinforcing the need to manage wildlife issues effectively. And so,
with clear evidence against its use, the question becomes whether policy
will change in order to reflect this.
Shifting focus, a positive response to surveying and understanding
urban wildlife has been the development of welfare-friendly urban infra-
structure. Regarding the extortionate number of road deaths, there have
been some fantastic creations and effective modifications to existing
structures, ranging from culverts built under roads that transverse water
to divert fish in Oregon, US; rope canopy bridges in Brisbane to allow
326 O. A. Wookey
possums and gliders to cross the notoriously dangerous Compton Road;

an underpass in Massachusetts for salamanders; a five meter high bridge
on Christmas Island that diverts thousands of crabs to where they habitu-
ally breed while avoiding busy roadways; and even passages built to keep
baby turtles, commonly lured to their deaths by artificial light they mis-
take for the moon, from straying away from the beach onto roads and
into gutters (Holder 2018). While these are some of the more impressive
feats to address legitimate cases of animal mortality, even something as
simple as ensuring adequate fencing can effectively prevent many fatali-
ties. It goes without saying that such infrastructure must be monitored
for its value to be determined, and to influence future construction
(Clevenger and Waltho 2005, as cited in Beben 2016).
Clearly, the study, surveillance and management of wildlife are key to
limiting disharmony and disquiet in urban landscapes. Beyond this,
however, is the equally pertinent issue of managing individuals, which
could be considered comparatively more difficult (Adams and Lindsey
2010). Human attitudes towards wildlife can be unpredictable, as opin-
ions on urban wildlife are shaped by an array of highly personal aspects,
including, but not limited to, psychological, sociological and economic
factors; levels of care and respect; personal preference and prejudice; and
a mixture of rational and irrational judgment. This is to an extent under-
standable: an inability to control or predict wildlife behaviour enhances
human perception of risk (Armfield 2007, Johansson and Karlsson 2011,
as cited by Bridge and Harris 2020). Effectively addressing the needs of
individuals is therefore crucial. This entails raising awareness of the exis-
tence of a problem by providing clear, concise information, reducing mis-
information and imbuing a greater sense of responsibility in individuals,
empowering them to make changes for the better—a challenge which
spans far beyond, but is essential to, the present topic. Personnel, time,
resources and funding can only be stretched so far, and without public
cooperation, the individual playing their role, work from above is unfor-
tunately undermined.
It is imperative that information on how to act appropriately is made
available to the public. This can be as simple as providing specific behav-
iour guidelines. For example, when it comes to limiting nuisance and
damage on one’s own property, there are certain simple measures any
individual can take to ensure utmost prevention: securing and locking

outdoor bins; keeping pets indoors at night, especially cats during migra-
tory bird season; using birdfeeders specifically designed to not to spill or
to be unusable for non-target species; regularly disposing of fruit fallen
from trees; and making oneself aware of any wildlife-borne diseases in
your region that could affect oneself or ones pet (The Urban Wildlife
Working Group). Conflicts between pets and urban wildlife occur, but
they are not random, most often occurring at night (Grubbs and
Krausman 2009, as cited in Soulsbury and White 2015) and during cer-
tain seasons (Lukasik and Alexander 2011, as cited in Soulsbury & White
2015), thus appropriate management of risk would certainly reduce con-
flict in many situations (Soulsbury and White 2015).
This also includes limiting misinformation, the freedom from which
enables individuals to have an informed perspective on urban wildlife
issues. Physical contact with humans resulting in injury or death evokes
strong emotional reactions and intense media coverage (Dickman 2010,
as cited by Bridge and Harris 2020) often focusing on the consequences
of predator attacks while ignoring the low probability of these attacks
occurring (Bruskotter and Wilson 2014, as cited by Bridge and Harris
2020). A current challenge, for example, is to address the moral panic
spread by the British media whenever a child is bitten by a fox (Bridge
and Harris 2020). Research shows that fox encounters are rare, that bites
typically do not cause extensive damage, and are a result not of predatory
but investigative behaviour (Bridge and Harris 2020). Yet, such instances
generate extensive media interest and misinformation (Bridge and Harris
2020). Indeed, media plays a critical role in shaping public opinions
about incidents involving predators (Siemer et al. 2014, Bombieri et al.
2018a, as cited by Bridge and Harris 2020), yet often amplifies public
perceptions of risk (Alexander and Quinn 2011, Frank and Glikman
2019, as cited by Bridge and Harris 2020), spreads moral panic (Gröling
2016, as cited by Bridges & Harris 2020) and causes people to overlook
a species’ aesthetic, ecological or economic benefits (Bruskotter and
Wilson 2014, as cited by Bridge and Harris 2020).
Indeed, the public should be encouraged to understand the positive
elements of sharing space with wildlife. Take green spaces for example.
Green spaces are areas that inevitably and indiscriminately attract many
328 O. A. Wookey
species of wildlife. Many people take delight in turning their own gardens
into a wildlife paradise, planting flora that attract fauna, enjoying the
sight of playful creatures, willingly contributing towards the revival of bee
populations and providing food to help certain animals fatten up before
hibernation or a harsh winter. Green spaces and the biodiversity they
foster play a key role in the success of the urban environment, creating
myriad benefits for the humans that populate them. Beyond the pleasure
of walking through a park to the tune of birds chirping, the sight of squir-
rels chasing and families of ducks paddling downstream, research has
proven green spaces to be of great psychological benefit to humans.
According to the first ever full assessment of the UK’s natural environ-
ment, looking after green spaces would result in £30 bn a year in health
and welfare benefits (De Zylva et al. 2020). Research has shown that
viewing scenes of nature is related with enhanced mental alertness, atten-
tion and cognitive performance. In addition to enhanced wellbeing, they
offer valuable environmental, educational and entertainment benefits to
citizens and especially children, while also fostering an appreciation for
conservation, as public parks and open space expose people to nature in
their own backyards (The Urban Wildlife Working Group 2012). Indeed,
a study carried out with residents of retirement communities found that
99% of those asked indicated that living within pleasant landscaped
grounds was either essential or important to them (Frumkin 2001).
As the benefits of urban wildlife are typically harder to quantify than
human-wildlife conflicts, research in this area has been limited (Soulsbury
and White 2015). It is also unfortunate that public health policy tends to
focus on lifestyle change at the individual level, with the potential trans-
formative capacity of natural environments in enhancing population
health remaining a neglected and relatively untapped area (Maller et al.
2006, as cited in Soulsbury and White 2015). Yet a positive attitude plays
a key role in determining the extent to which individuals act responsibly
towards the issue. The benefit of generating positive public perspective
can be seen by the case of the human-bat conflict in Austin, which was
largely resolved by an expertly organised educational campaign led by the
private organisation Bat Conservation International (Adams and Lindsey
2010). The Congress Avenue Bridge in Austin, Texas, is home to around
1.5 million female Mexican free-tailed bats and their offspring during the
spring and summer months, which use the bridge as a safe space from
predators to conserve energy, consume and digest prey, and for social
interaction and information exchange (Adams and Lindsey 2010). In the
1980s, when the bats first colonised the bridge, public reaction was far
from positive, as they are historically feared creatures (Bat Conservation
International website, as cited by Adams and Lindsey 2010). However,
an educational campaign managed to shift this perspective by educating
locals, highlighting the fact that on a typical summer night, bats would
eat 10,000 to 20,000 pounds of insects, and that, contrary to popular
belief, less than 1% of all bats are infected with rabies (Bat Conservation
International website, as cited by Adams and Lindsey 2010). Since then,
the bridge has become a popular tourist destination, with around 100,000
summertime visitors coming to see the bats fly, and is even reported to
generate $8 million in annual revenue (Adams and Lindsey 2010). This
is an excellent example of how an effective education campaign shifted
public perspective from one of nuisance to interest, and even turned it
into an advantage in terms of enjoyment and revenue.
The effective combination of these measures makes for a more peace-
ful, conflict-free coexistence between humans and wildlife in urban envi-
ronments. A fascinating case that truly demonstrates this is the generally
peaceful coexistence of humans and leopards in Mumbai, India. Mumbai
has a population of around 20 million humans, and also contains an
enormous protected urban forest spanning 104 squared kilometres,
which is home to over 1000 species of plants and animals. Leopards also
form part of this ecosystem, with as many as 21 of them captured on
footage in slums, residential complexes and schools in 2012 (Sanjay
Gandhi National Park). According to a Sanjay Gandhi National Park
wildlife researcher and conservationist, around 90% of their diet consists
of dogs, rodents and wild boar, with stray dogs—attracted by the garbage
dumped on the edge of the park—accounting for 60% (Sanjay Gandhi
National Park 2020). Leopards are the most adaptable of the four large
cats in India, occupying a diverse range of habitat types from pristine
protected forests to edges of urban landscapes (Athreya et al. 2013, as
cited in Kshettry et al. 2017). According to India’s leading expert on
330 O. A. Wookey
leopard-human conflict, the presence of leopards living alongside humans

is a case of two highly adaptable species sharing space, and the adivasis
(ethnic and tribal groups of India) have always lived with them and see
the animal as part of their cultural identity (Sanjay Gandhi National Park
2020). Following some of the most intense encounters between humans
and leopards in the early 2000s, several factors that contributed towards
these conflicts were identified. One of these was the policy of relocation:
relocating leopards away from their home range meant that the emptied
area attracted other leopards that were unfamiliar with the area. This
worsened as the process of trapping negatively affected their behaviour;
trapped leopards were so traumatised by the process that increased con-
flict occurred in the unfamiliar area into which they were released, as they
struggled to return to their home range (Sanjay Gandhi National Park
2020). In India, leopards appear in Schedule 1 of the Indian Wildlife
Protection Act, which means they receive absolute protection, and
offenses against them are met with the severest punishments. With the
legal mandate to manage human-leopard interactions, the Forest
Department has since reached out to various stakeholders to create col-
laborations that have emerged as a vital strategy for managing human-
leopard interactions and preventing conflict in the SGNP landscape
(Sanjay Gandhi National Park 2020). Guidelines were published by the
Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change, which stopped
the practice of trapping (with the exception of extreme circumstances),
which has since led to a drastic drop in conflicts. A project was also estab-
lished in 2011 by the Forests Department as a way to directly address
public pressure. The ‘Mumbaikars for SGNP’ project, composed of wild-
life biologists and volunteers, conducts research, assists in the manage-
ment of human-leopard interactions and engages with a range of
stakeholders to help them adopt steps to reduce risks of conflict (Sanjay
Gandhi National Park 2020). The project also initiated the Living with
Leopards Network, composed of interested residents and representative
of groups, providing regular workshops about SGNP and human-leop-
ard interactions, as well as preparing the public with procedures to follow
during a leopard-related emergency (Sanjay Gandhi National Park 2020).
While this is clearly only a brief outline of the issue, in this case we see
an effective collaboration of the aforementioned elements: effective study
and surveillance in order to understand the issue at hand; a resulting shift

in management policy at the realisation of poor handling methods and
exacerbation of conflict; effective policymaking by way of publishing
guidelines; and the involvement of individuals by raising awareness and
educating the public on managing encounters. Again, this is an extreme
case, but the effective management of a case as extreme as this should,
without doubt, put into perspective our ability to manage the majority of
urban conflicts that present nowhere near such a level of physical threat.
4 Concluding Remarks
Can the relationship between humans and animals in the urban environ-
ment be said to be one of fellow brethren? The notion itself is, indeed, a
powerful one; it suggests brotherhood, unity, almost a familial relation-
ship. It may even be reasonable to suggest that such closeness infers some
sort of duty, obligation, of humans towards animals. That may, indeed,
be something worth striving for. It is clear that there are, in an objective
sense, grounds for labelling the relationship as such. In the urban domain
there is clear mutual interest, a shared objective; the health and welfare of
both humans and animals are to a large extent dependant on the other, as
well as the health of the planet we all share. While on the surface level we
have distanced ourselves from our evolutionary origins, at the core we
share the same fundamental instincts—to survive, to shelter, to perpetu-
ate life—and the biological tools of adaptation and evolution that enable
us to do this so successfully. In a practical sense, animal welfare science
progresses and continues to raise the bar, as it should, and much progress
is being made in this area. Study is ongoing, and we see the work of indi-
viduals and organisations, policy and lawmakers, across the spectrum of
animal welfare concerns across the many interactions between humans
and animals. However, is it realistic to use the term brethren to describe
our current relationship? Is this an accurate way of describing the human
and animal relationship in the urban environment?
Perhaps the appropriateness of the term comes down to the extent to
which we recognise mutual interest, to which we use the knowledge we,
as humans and policymakers, have, to act in the best interests of animals,
332 O. A. Wookey
and the extent to which we do what is within our means to protect them,
which in the case of urban wildlife, as it has been established, means to
further understanding and order and minimise conflict and chaos. This
goes beyond just the conflict between humans and animal, extending to
the conflict between policies due to a lack of scientific basis that inhibit
progress; the conflict between attitudes and interests resulting from pub-
lic misinformation that generate fear and feed dissonance; the moral con-
flict that occurs when choice of respecting animal sentience, recognised
as a value in itself, is determined by the pleasure or convenience of an
individual.
Just beyond the urban fringe, in the state of nature whence urban ani-
mals come, animals are killing each other as brutal a fashion as any. Why
is it important for us to treat them any differently? Allusion to the harsh-
ness of the state of nature, red in tooth and claw (Tennyson 1984), is often
used as an argument to justify harm to animals resulting from human
behaviour. However, to this the answer is simple. The urban environment
is our expression of order, our way of separating ourselves from the chaos
that is the state of nature, by which moral concern and development have
enabled us to progress from the uncompromising savagery of raw, unfet-
tered, albeit neutral, nature. The abidance of rule and reason, and the
foundation of moral thought upon which human societies are built, with
which they are able to thrive, defines us, and this must be extended to
those affected by our behaviour, above all to the most vulnerable.
Against the sheer enormity of animal deaths and suffering perpetuated
by humans and human activity on a daily basis, the deaths of small urban
creatures that silently, unknowingly amass may not seem a priority. But it
is our own urban surroundings over which we have control as individu-
als. Perhaps it is for this reason that we should, in fact, be worrying about
these local casualties. Taking simple steps in our daily life to carefully deal
with the animals on our doorstep, and to take care of our immediate sur-
roundings, will undoubtedly have a more direct and effective impact on
animal welfare. Moreover, taking responsibility in one area of interaction
could, indeed, be a key step towards increasing the sense of responsibility
towards animals in other areas also. The prerequisites of responsibility
surround us: information to make us aware, policies to guide our behav-
iour, experts to aid us and laws to deter undesirable behaviours. As study
increases, global communication improves, and ethical demands of
animal welfare increase, ignorance of and indifference towards these

issues become increasingly less acceptable. The extent to which the term
brethren may be used thus ultimately depends on how much individuals
are able to transcend personal interest in the interest of the whole—
humans, animals and planet.
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Part IV
Recognising Transformations
16
Political Representation of Animals’
Voices
Robert Garner
1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to explore various dimensions of the debate about the
political representation of animals. In the first place, it locates the repre-
sentation of animals within the broader terrain of the political turn in
animal ethics. Following this, this chapter considers the normative case
for animal representation—and the consequences for democratic the-
ory—and reviews the alternative means whereby it can be operationalised.
This chapter concludes by outlining possible future research agendas.
Fundamental questions underlying the analysis in this chapter are
what are the benefits to animals of political representation or democratic
inclusion, to what extent ought animals be politically represented, what
form should this representation take and what are the alternatives to
R. Garner (*)
School of History, Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester,
Leicester, UK
342 R. Garner
democratic inclusion? The first step is to note the flaws in the current
anthropocentric system of representation before going on to consider
possible anthropocentric tweaks and, more substantially, the justification
for, and the viability of, an alternative, non-anthropocentric account.
2 Democracy and the Political Turn

The political representation of animals is a significant part of the so-called
Political Turn in Animal Ethics (Garner and O’Sullivan 2016; Cochrane
et al. 2016; Milligan 2015; Wissenburg and Schlosberg 2014; Wyckoff
2014). As Donaldson and Kymlicka (unpublished: 5) have pointed out,
animal ethicists and advocates have focused primarily on challenging the
claim that the capacities of animals justify using and exploiting them, but
have virtually ignored the possibility of challenging the assumption that
these capacities exclude animals from being members of the polis. One of
the distinctive features of the political turn in animal ethics is precisely
that it does engage with this second, previously ignored, claim.
For some, political representation represents the entirety of the politi-
cal turn. The starting point is the question: why it is that, despite forty or
so years of convincing arguments for the moral considerability of ani-
mals, so little has actually changed in the way they are treated in practice?
A convincing answer is the classic utilitarian argument that the interests
of animals are more likely to be taken into account if there is a formal
institutional arena where these interests can be made to count. That is, as
long as decision-makers only have to take account of the interests of
humans in the political arena then not much will change.
This limiting of the scope of the political turn to political representa-
tion is, however, illegitimate. Broadly speaking, the political turn is about
the use of political concepts, ideas and theories to engage with the debate
about what we owe to animals morally. Using this definition, it becomes
apparent that this is not limited to the concepts of democracy and politi-
cal representation. In the first place, political turn thinkers have con-
ceived of our obligations to animals in terms of the political concept of
justice as opposed to morality (Cochrane 2010; Garner 2013; Nussbaum
16 Political Representation of Animals’ Voices 343
2006). Above all, the inclusion of animals as beneficiaries of justice neces-

sitates the state’s involvement in the protection of animal interests because
the focus of the political theorist is directed not at voluntary personal
lifestyles but at the state’s coercive power. Here, the state’s role is con-
tested. Some, such as Cochrane (2016), assume that the state’s neutrality
and authority make it a valid target for animal activism. Others, however,
question the state’s neutrality and reach by adopting a neo-Marxist
account in which the empirical fact of the commercial ownership of ani-
mals, coupled with the power that economic interests can exercise over
the state, is a (perhaps fatal) impediment to the achievement of the
upholding of the interests—and rights—animals have in avoiding suffer-
ing and death (Francione 1995; Schmitz 2016).
Other dimensions of the political turn focus not so much on what
might be described as procedurally oriented normative work (that seeks
to advocate particular means of achieving objectives worked out in con-
ventional animal ethics), but on what might be described as outcome-
oriented, normative work (which seeks to utilise political thinking in
order to assist, or even determine, judgements about how animals ought
to be treated). One example of this approach is the avoidance of first
principles in preference to a consistent application of established, and
non-controversial, norms (O’Sullivan 2011; Smith 2012). Another
involves the embellishment of traditional animal ethics by the employ-
ment of relationships. That is, our moral obligations to animals are not,
or not only, determined by their cognitive capacities, but also by relation-
ships that we have with them. The work of Donaldson and Kymlicka
(2011) has given relational ethics a political twist by situating relations
between humans and animals within the context of group differentiated
rights utilised in the political philosophy literature on citizenship. Finally,
there has been a focus on the contribution that political pragmatism can
make to the animal ethics debate. Here, most notably, my own work
(Garner 2013) seeks to employ the distinction between ideal and non-
ideal theory, current within political philosophy, to throw light on animal
ethics. Traditional animal ethicists adopt ideal theory which focuses on
the extent to which a theory of morality approximates to the truth in so
far as normative arguments can arrive at such a determinate answer. Seen
344 R. Garner
as a political prescription, the theories of animal ethicists can also be

judged in relation to their feasibility, and in terms of the steps that are
needed to secure them. This is where non-ideal theory comes into play.
3 Anthropocentric Political Representation

In conventional democratic theory and practice, the relationship between
democracy and the degree of protection afforded to nonhuman animals
is a contingent one. This is because democracy, as it is conventionally
conceived, is anthropocentric, or human-centred. The degree to which
the interests of animals are advocated in the political arena is entirely
dependent upon how far human beings want them to be. Animals are
therefore only incorporated indirectly. Clearly, in many political jurisdic-
tions, the extent to which animal interests have thought to matter has
increased in recent years, and this changing climate has been coupled
with, and is no doubt partly explained by, the emergence of a revitalised
and radicalised animal protection movement (Garner 2004, Chap. 2). It
is not beyond the realm of possibility that, at some point in the future, it
might become unacceptable for humans to exploit animals and for this to
be reflected in the collective decisions of democratically elected legisla-
tures and executives.
The problem with this anthropocentric system of representation is that
animals are dependent on the whim of humans for their well-being.
There is absolutely no guarantee that any particular democratically elected
legislature or executive is going to be concerned enough about the inter-
ests of animals to consider prioritising their interests. Concern about the
well-being of animals may have increased, and it is undoubtedly the case
that, in many countries, animals are treated significantly better than they
were a few decades ago. However, the gap between the objectives of the
animal rights movement and the way in which animals continue to be
exploited in farms and laboratories is stark.
What can be said about the consistent failure of political institutions
in democratic countries to adequately promote the interests of animals?
We could say, initially, that the political system merely reflects the
dominant animal welfare ethic—according to which the interests of ani-

mals matter but humans remain morally more important (Garner 2013:
Chap. 5). If one accepts this ethic, then there is not a problem to con-
sider: political systems, broadly speaking, do reflect this ethic more or less
accurately. If we reject the animal welfare ethic, then this initial response
is not acceptable. What then? One response is to point to the undemo-
cratic character of Western liberal democracies where economic interests,
including those who benefit from exploiting animals, usurp the demo-
cratic process (see, e.g. Lyons 2013). Such an analysis suggests that the
problem is not so much democracy as a concept but rather the way in
which democracy is operationalised. There is a great deal to be said for
this analysis. Empirical analysis of power is central to political science and
the centre-piece of the debate is a critique, from a Marxist or elitist per-
spective of the pluralist theory of power which holds that political deci-
sions in Western democracies more or less reflect the interests of the
pressure group universe (Lukes 2005).
4 eforming the Anthropocentric Model

R
of Representation
Reforming, rather than abolishing, the anthropocentric system of repre-
sentation is one response to the inadequacies in the present system of
representation. In the first place, a change, in Britain and other countries
which operate a first-past-the-post electoral system, to a more propor-
tional electoral system would benefit smaller parties who represent minor-
ity interests and concerns. It is clearly one way in which smaller green and
animal parties would have greater influence (Smith 2003: 111–13). The
relative success of the Dutch Party for the Animals is a striking illustra-
tion of the more conducive political environment provided by a propor-
tional electoral system (Krouwell and Lucardie 2008). In the last three
General Elections, the party has held two (out of 150) seats in the Dutch
lower house of parliament despite never achieving more than 2% of the
vote in the three elections since 2006.
346 R. Garner
An alternative reform, emphasised by Vink (2020), is the establish-

ment of state objectives on animal protection within the constitutions of
liberal democracies. Vink recognises that such provisions (which exist
already in the constitutions of some liberal democracies) are not ideal
because they are only aspirational and have little legal force. Nevertheless,
they do provide a notice that animal interests are important and this can
influence legislators. As a result, they are a useful first step towards the
achievement of fundamental legal rights for animals, the goal that Vink
thinks is the ideal way in which animals can be enfranchised (see below).
A more substantial reform involves the adoption of a more deliberative
system of representation. In conventional democratic theory and prac-
tice, an aggregative approach is the norm whereby decisions are made
merely by counting pre-existing preferences in elections or referendums.
Little attention is given to the process by which those preferences are
arrived at. By contrast, deliberative democracy theorists argue that a more
legitimate version of democracy must focus on the generation of prefer-
ences. It is argued that detailed discussion amongst small, but inclusive,
groups of people, where they get the opportunity to hear expert testimo-
nies, tends to produce outcomes that are more consensual, empathetic,
more informed and therefore just (see, e.g. Gutmann and Thompson
1996). More to the point, it has been claimed that deliberative democ-
racy is also likely to produce more ecologically desirable outcomes than
the conventional aggregative form of democracy (Dryzek 1990; Eckersley
2000; Goodin 2003; Smith 2003). It is worth speculating how far this
assertion is valid in the case of debate and decision-making in the case of
animals.
The case for regarding a deliberative form of democracy as conducive
to environmental protection, and the protection of animals, is based on a
number of factors. The first is that those who seek to protect animals
would probably get a better hearing in an inclusive deliberative environ-
ment than in traditional campaigning, where some animal advocates and
some positions in the debate are invariably excluded. Second, genuine
deliberation involves the advancement of arguments by citizens about
what is right, and in the general or public interest, and not about what is
in the self-interest of participants. This will help to promote the moral
dimension of arguments which, of course, is central to debates about the
treatment of animals. One can contrast genuine deliberation here with

the dominance of powerful vested interests which, it is said, is prevalent
in traditional interest group politics, and not least in animal protection
politics. Third, the degree of empathy encouraged by deliberation will
surely benefit those who want to promote the interests of nonhumans
who, of course, are not themselves part of the deliberation. That is, one
can see how the empathy facilitated by deliberation might be extended
beyond humans to include other species (see Goodin 2003, 2005).
Finally, the case for the efficacy of deliberative democracy (from an ani-
mal protection point of view) is also based on the claim that the debate
and reflection involved in deliberation have an epistemic function, elicit-
ing greater understanding of an issue thereby reducing the negative influ-
ence of the media and vested interests.
Although there have been some practical attempts to put deliberative
democracy into practice, it remains primarily an abstract theory. In the
small number of deliberative cases involving animals that have been con-
ducted, there is some evidence that the provision of information, in par-
ticular, has changed the positions of participants, and the direction of the
change has usually been in the direction of the advocacy of greater pro-
tection for animals (Garner 2018). For example, in a series of citizens’
juries conducted by the EU-funded Welfare Quality project on farm ani-
mal welfare it was reported that many of the participants knew very little
about the way animals are raised for food and were shocked when they
were told about the reality of factory farming. As a result, there was a
tendency for participants to adopt a negative attitude to intensive animal
agriculture that was not there before (Miele et al. 2011: 113).
A similar finding is elicited from a deliberative exercise on openness in
animal research conducted, in 2013, by the polling organisation Ipsos
MORI (2013). It is apparent that participants knew very little about
animal research and its regulation and that attitudes to the level of scru-
tiny of those who use animals in laboratories should be exposed to harden
when participants were told about cases where animals had been mis-
treated. Initially, after hearing factual information and the case for and
against animal research, the participants became more favourably inclined
towards animal research (Ipsos MORI 2013: 24). However, when pre-
sented with undercover footage of misdemeanours in laboratories
348 R. Garner
provided by the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, ‘partici-

pants became very angry about malpractice’ (2013: 4) and ‘many reverted
to an oppositional stance in relation to animal research’ (2013: 25). As a
result, participants were much more willing to consider more rigorous
scrutiny including insisting that license applications be subject to exter-
nal scrutiny, and even that CCTV be placed in laboratories to be screened
in public, an idea that gained ‘much support’ (2013: 6, 42–44).
In terms of the utility of deliberative democracy to the well-being of
animals, two general points can be made. First, it is more difficult to
frame animal protection as a public (human) interest concern than it is
for environmentalism where environmental degradation has a significant
impact on human well-being as well as the nonhuman world. Sometimes,
as in the case, for instance, of the environmental and human-health con-
sequences of factory farming, human and animal interests might coin-
cide. More often than not, though, the exploitation of animals has,
sometimes enormous, human benefits. The use of animals in scientific
research, for instance, arguably has significant public health benefits to
humans (and other animals) as well as economic benefits. In such situa-
tions, the degree of empathy required to side with the interests of the
animal may be too much of an obstacle.
The second general point is that even if the provision of full, and
unmediated, provision of information is true—and there is some evi-
dence for it (see, e.g. Elstub 2014, p. 179; Goodin 2008: 38–63; Luskin
et al. 2002)—it should be pointed out that this can be separated from the
deliberation process itself. That is, one could endeavour to provide com-
prehensive and balanced information on an issue without requiring those
making a decision to then deliberate about it. Indeed, if it can be shown
that a ‘correct’ assessment of comprehensive information is more likely to
emerge from a panel of experts, then—if the epistemic function of delib-
eration is all we are concerned about—we would be duty bound to prefer
this process over democratic deliberation (Freeman 2000: 387; Lafont
2006: 8–9).
It is also important, second, to distinguish between the impact of fac-
tual knowledge and that of norms. Facts, of course, do play some part in
the animal ethics debate. The claim that animal experimentation does
produce significant human benefits, for instance, can be put to a rigorous
test within a deliberative arena, and, in addition, it is plausible to claim

that attitudes to factory farming can be influenced by information about
exactly how animals are kept within intensive husbandry systems, and
scientific evidence on the impact on them of confinement. However, the
debate about the moral status of animals (and many other issues too) is
not, of course, entirely, or even mainly, dependent upon facts. Facts are
rarely, if ever, decisive in a normative debate where intractable moral con-
flicts, represented by incommensurable frames, are unlikely to find an
easy resolution (Button and Mattson 1999: 622). Thus, for example,
even if animal experimentation does produce significant benefits to
humans—vital, life-saving, benefits even—an animal rights advocate
would still regard the use of animals as illegitimate, regarding the benefits
as ill-gotten.
There is little evidence from the small number of deliberative ‘experi-
ments’ involving animal issues, however, of a value transformation
amongst the participants; that the process converts them to an animal
rights position. And, of course, this highlights the anthropocentric nature
of deliberation. It is humans who are deciding what matters and why. The
relationship between animal protection and democracy, albeit of a more
conducive deliberative variety, therefore remains contingent. There is
some arrogance involved in the claim that were people in possession of all
the—empirical and normative—information then they are sure to be
converted to an animal protection point of view. My own examination of
deliberative exercises involving animal issues confirms that there was no
evidence of a shift in values, and that shifts of opinion were less likely to
occur when partisans (those with strong views on an issue) were involved
(Garner 2018).
5 Non-Anthropocentric Theory
A
of Representation
The conclusion we could reach at this point is that animal advocates are
just going to have to accept that democracy is contingent, or, alterna-
tively, reject democracy altogether. I suspect that at least some of those
350 R. Garner
who undertake direct action on behalf of animals do, unconsciously per-

haps, take the latter position, despairing at the unwillingness of demo-
cratic institutions to reach conclusions they think are morally mandatory.
Democracy is a procedure, a method of making decisions, but there is no
guarantee that this procedure will produce outcomes that we might
desire. In this sense, for those who regard the outcome—the abolition of
animal exploitation—as the chief imperative then then there would seem
little reason for them not to support a dictator who has a benevolent
attitude to animals. There are, here, parallels in the calls, most notably
heard in the 1970s, for authoritarian solutions to the perceived urgency
of the ecological crisis in the 1970s (Heilbroner 1974: Ophuls 1973).
For many, it remains the case that democracy is regarded as the most
effective device available to adjudicate between contested values. For
example, for every person who values a freer society, there will be one who
values a more equal one. Given that values are contested, there needs to be
some device to decide which goal, for now at least, predominates. A dem-
ocratic system would then, of course, give those who lost out the chance
to refight, and possibly win, the argument at some time in the future. The
same scenario can be envisaged in the case of animal protection. The nor-
mative argument that animals are, more or less, our moral equals and
thereby entitled to a right to life may not be widely accepted but a demo-
cratic system allows animal advocates to continue to argue their case.
At this point, it is important to recognise that the theory of democracy
so far articulated is anthropocentric. Within it, the representation of ani-
mal interests is only indirectly achieved through the wishes of humans.
Democracy exists for humans. Only humans count politically. This raises
the question of whether a political system that does not directly incorpo-
rate the interests of animals is entitled to describe itself as a genuine
democracy. To understand what is meant by ‘directly incorporate’ here it
is necessary to make a distinction between a weak and a strong version of
anthropocentrism. The contingent relationship between democracy and
animal protection, described above, exists because we are assuming the
validity of an anthropocentric, or human-centred, theory of democracy,
one in which only human preferences regarding animals are promoted.
That is, democracy is made for, and operated by, humans. Only
humans count.
An alternative version of democracy is non-anthropocentric where the

interests of animals are incorporated directly. Of course, all democratic
theory must be anthropocentric in the sense that the interests of animals
must be identified and articulated by humans. Nevertheless, it is possible
to distinguish between an objective account of the interests animals have
(irrespective of the degree to which they conflict with human interests),
on the one hand, and the extent to which humans want these objective
interests to be promoted, on the other. The latter is an anthropocentric
(in a strong sense) account. It provides a fragile basis on which to base a
campaign for the better treatment of animals precisely because it is con-
tingent upon enough humans wanting this outcome. The weak version of
anthropocentrism is significantly different. It is not inconceivable to
imagine us being able to ‘surmise’ the interests of animals, even if they
cannot tell us themselves (Goodin 2003: 215). These interests, or what
Vink (2020: 7) refers to as an animal’s ‘consideration right’, can then be
promoted by humans with a fiduciary responsibility or duty towards ani-
mals. The crucial point is that these interests are considered whether or
not there is any wider immediate public support for them, and whether
or not they clash with important human interests.
6 J ustifying a Non-Anthropocentric Theory

of Democracy
It is, of course, one thing to point to the benefits, to animals, of a non-
anthropocentric theory of democracy, but quite another to justify the
inclusion of animals in the demos in a non-contingent way. There are
strong grounds for this latter claim. The enfranchisement of animals can
be justified by the employment of a principle current in democratic the-
ory and does not require an engagement with contentious debates, relat-
ing to the moral status of animals, current within the field of animal
ethics. This is the so-called all-affected principle, which is regarded by
many democratic theorists (and green political theorists) as the only pos-
sible solution to the boundary problem in political democratic theory.
That is, when asked who is to count as a member of the polis, one
352 R. Garner
convincing answer is all of those who are affected by decisions taken by

that polis. This principle allows for the inclusion of animals if and when
their interests are affected by decisions made. It is clear that many politi-
cal decisions that are made do impact, often detrimentally and often pro-
foundly, upon animals. Therefore, it follows that animals (more
specifically, humans acting for animals) ought to have a say in the making
of those decisions.
Assessing such a conclusion, of course, requires, firstly, a defence of the
principle in general. Whilst many political theorists do accept it as
valid—see, for instance, Goodin (2007: 47–50) and Dahl (1979: 19)—
others do not. Perhaps the most significant objection to the all-affected
principle in general is that its coverage is likely to be extremely, and per-
haps unrealistically, wide. In this sense, as Dahl (1970: 67) notes, it
‘unlocks Pandora’s box’. There is, firstly, the supranational implication of
the all-affected principle. Here, it might be claimed, with some justifica-
tion, that a decision taken in one country (such as the United States) will
literally affect everyone on the planet. Put more dramatically, Goodin
(2007: 55) paints a scenario where: ‘Virtually (maybe literally) everyone
in the world—and indeed everyone in all possible future worlds… should
be entitled to vote on any proposal’. The all-affected principle therefore
translates into ‘a genuinely global, timeless democracy’.
The all-affected principle will arguably be unrealistically wide even if
the democratic constituency only includes currently living humans. If
one takes the principle to its logical conclusion, of course, it extends
much wider than this. For one thing, it must include, as Goodin indi-
cated above, future generations, whose interests will be affected by deci-
sions we take now. Crucially, too, it must also include animals, since the
decisions humans take clearly have an—often devastating—impact on
the lives of animals. The coverage of the all-affected principle, however, is
seemingly even wider than this. If entry to the democratic arena does not
depend upon the possession of some necessary capacities (rationality,
agency, competence, etc.) then it logically follows that everything—ani-
mate or inanimate—whose interests are affected by a collective decision
would be entitled to have these interests represented. This would clearly
expand the democratic arena even further.
One way of limiting the scope of the all-affected principle is to qualify

the meaning of being ‘affected’. One way of doing this is to adopt what
Miller (2009) calls the ‘coercion’ principle. Here, the democratic bound-
ary should be extended to include all those who will be coerced by its
decisions and not just affected. Clearly, animals still qualify because they
are coerced into serving our needs, whether it is for our desire to eat their
flesh, or our desire to use them as laboratory tools. Another method of
limiting the all-affected principle is to introduce sentience as a qualifying
characteristic. This would enable us to include many, although not all,
nonhuman animals but would exclude other, non-sentient, entities.
Limiting the all-affected principle in this way would seem justified
since only sentient beings have the capacity to be aware of the affect col-
lective decisions have on their interests. This move, of course, reintro-
duces a moral dimension to the debate (and so the incorporation of
animals is not achieved entirely by democratic theoretical means) which,
as we shall see below, is a weakness of Donaldson and Kymlicka’s posi-
tion. However, the enfranchisement position (duly limited as suggested)
requires only that animals be sentient. This is a capacity that few would
want to deny that animals possess.
7 Types of Incorporation
A key question, of course, is to ask what a non-anthropocentric, or inter-
species, theory of democracy would look like. The key distinction to
make here is between legal and political forms of enfranchisement. Here,
I am adopting a broad definition of enfranchisement indicating, as Vink
(2020: 11) points out, ‘some type of political or legal recognition of non-
human animals in basic institutional structures, not (just) in the narrow
sense of extending voting rights to non-human animals’. In terms of nar-
row political enfranchisement, it is important to identify two distinct
versions: the citizenship model developed by Donaldson and Kymlicka
(2011) and the more general political enfranchisement model as sug-
gested initially by green political theorists.
In a rich and innovative analysis, applying Kymlicka’s long-held advo-
cacy of group-differentiated rights, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that
354 R. Garner
it is useful to map our obligations to animals through the utilisation of

citizenship theory. In other words, the moral worth of animals is cashed
out, at least in part, through their membership of political communities.
They envisage three categories of animals, informed by a relational ethic
based on citizenship theory. Of greatest import is the category of domes-
ticated animals (to be contrasted with liminal animals, who do not have
the rights of full citizenship, and wild animals who are equivalent to sepa-
rate sovereign communities). Domesticated animals, those who are part
of our societies, are equivalent to co-citizens, and have certain particular
rights because of their relational status with humans. The interests of
domesticated animals, then, are incorporated into the polity by Donaldson
and Kymlicka in their role as citizens.
Whilst Donaldson and Kymlicka’s account is innovative and has
undoubtedly progressed the political turn in animal ethics, it might be
challenged as the most appropriate means of incorporating animals into
the polis. The major problem is that it is indebted to contentious moral
arguments employed in traditional animal ethics. The relational approach
Donaldson and Kymlicka employ plays a relatively small role in their
analysis. This is because their starting point is the acceptance, as a base-
line, of a traditional abolitionist animal rights agenda—based on a
capacity-oriented ethic (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: Chap. 2). That
is, they accept that animals have a right to life and liberty which ‘prohib-
its harming them, killing them, confining them, owing them, and enslav-
ing them’ (p. 40). This has the effect of ruling out of account the
domestication of animals for exploitative human purposes.
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s acceptance of a considerable moral status
for animals, gleaned from the animal ethics literature, is central to their
enterprise, for without such an account there would not be a case for
according citizenship status to them. This is because animals can hardly
be regarded as citizens if they are considered morally inferior and as
resources for humans to exploit. That is, to justify regarding animals as
citizens requires engagement with a capacity-oriented approach central to
traditional animal ethics.
Even if it is accepted that animals do have the moral status attributed
to them by abolitionist animal rights discourse, it is by no means obvious
that they can qualify as citizens, at least if a traditional definition of the
concept is adopted. Traditionally, citizenship has been held to be appli-

cable only to those who are self-reflective about their own good and about
social norms and who are able to participate in the co-authoring of laws
(Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 103). It therefore requires responsibili-
ties as well as the distribution of rights. Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011:
55) themselves recognise this and because animals are not self-reflective
moral agents seek to revise the characteristics necessary for citizenship.
Whether or not Donaldson and Kymlicka’s revision of the terms of
citizenship is successful—and some commentators have claimed that it
stretches the meaning of citizenship far too wide (Hinchcliffe 2015)—is
one thing. What is equally important is that even Donalson and
Kymlicka’s revised qualification-test for citizenship requires a level of cog-
nitive competence that is contentious. According to this revised version,
animals have a good, but they do not need to have the capacity to under-
stand or reflect on it. This good, they argue, can be communicated by
animals to human companions in a number of ways. The revised version
requires animals to ‘exhibit norm responsiveness and intersubjective rec-
ognition in actual interactions’ and this, in turn, is dependent on etho-
logical evidence that animals ‘experience and act on the basis of moral
emotions such as love, trust and empathy, engage in a variety of co-
operative tasks requiring impulse control or delayed gratification, are
socialised into norms of behaviour which can subsequently be modified,
resisted and/or renegotiated, and exercise self-restraint and self-sacrifice
out of concern for others, fear of consequences, or even a sense of fairness’
(Donaldson and Kymlicka 2014: 34). The revised version of citizenship
envisaged by Donaldson and Kymlicka, therefore, depends upon certain
(disputed) capacities, as Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011: 108) recognise,
namely: to ‘have and communicate a subjective good’, to ‘comply with
schemes of social cooperation’ and to ‘participate as agents in social life’.
An alternative means whereby animals can be politically enfranchised
is one in which the interests of animals are represented, in legislatures and
executives, by human proxies or trustees. One advantage of this version
of political enfranchisement is that it does not require that we demon-
strate that animals have the necessary capacities to be citizens, since
human proxies can represent their interests. Political theorists have devel-
oped, sometimes ingenious, schemes in which humans act as proxies for
356 R. Garner
excluded, so-called mute, interests such as future generations and nature

whose representatives are allocated some seats in legislative assemblies
and counter-majoritarian devices are suggested to impede the will of the
majority (examples of the former are Dobson 1998, Ekeli 2005, and
Mills 1996. Examples of the latter are Ekeli 2009; Eckersley 1999;
Hayward 2005; Kates 2013; Thompson 2010). The same could be envis-
aged for animals. Operationalising this principle would require institu-
tional reform whereby some humans are elected (possibly by a constituency
made up of organisations concerned about the well-being of animals) to
represent the interests of animals. Crucially, this representation would
take place irrespective of the level of concern for animals in wider human
society.
8 olitical or Legal Enfranchisement:

P
An Assessment
An alternative approach is to reject the political enfranchisement of ani-
mals in favour of assigning sentient animals fundamental legal rights
(legal enfranchisement) to be protected through the constitutional
arrangements of liberal democratic states (Vink 2020, Chap. 6). These
fundamental legal rights—which could include, as is common in the case
of humans, the right to life and maybe even the right to liberty—would
create legally binding duties for humans (either as private individuals or
as members of legislatures and executives) to respect.
Vink (2020: Chap. 4), for one, argues that political enfranchisement is
not an optimum model for representing animals’ interests. One major
problem, she suggests, relates to the fact that animals cannot act politi-
cally and therefore cannot instruct and control hypothetical representa-
tives. As a result, there are democratic costs because animal trustees are
not directly elected. In addition, unaccountable animal trustees might
not only fail to represent the interests of animals well but also potentially
abuse their political power. Here, institutional safeguards might be the
answer. These could be the screening of animal representatives—perhaps
by those in the animal advocacy movement—or by appointing or
electing them for one term only or by making them accountable to a

commission especially set up for the purpose. However, Vink argues that
none of these measures ‘can guarantee’ that animal trustees will represent
the interests of animals well.
Another issue is the problem of determining how much political power
animal trustees should have. Too much—for example by giving them a
veto power—and human interests might be disregarded; too little—for
example by giving them merely an advisory role—and the interests of
animals are likely to be neglected. Giving animal trustees equal represen-
tation is contentious not least because it does not account for the increased
weight that human political agency demands. Any other weighting seems
arbitrary with little normative justification. Yet another problem is that
nonhuman animal species, of course, have different interests which may,
at times, conflict, and it is not clear how animal trustees would take this
into account.
The problems associated with fulfilling the consideration right of ani-
mals through the political route leads Vink to advocate a legal route
instead. However, a number of points can be made in defence of a politi-
cal route. In the first place, it is inconceivable that any institutionalisation
of animal trustees would lead to the disregarding of human interests. In
more general terms, there is a good case for arguing that Vink’s expecta-
tions are too high. Institution building is difficult and invariably imper-
fect when it involves the representation of human interests and the same
could be expected of an attempt to incorporate the role of animal trustees
into liberal democratic political systems. It does not mean, however, that,
with experience, problems cannot be ironed out and the system improved.
Conversely, Vink’s characterisation of the legal enfranchisement of ani-
mals underestimates the difficulties that are associated with such a move.
First, it requires, unlike the political enfranchisement model, a—highly
contentious—acceptance that animals actually do have fundamental
rights. Vink (2020: 277–284) spends some time, as a result, seeking to
defend an interest-based theory of animal rights. Much of the work here
is being done by conventional moral philosophy whereas the political
enfranchisement model, which requires only that animals are sentient, has
a stronger claim to be part of a genuine political (or legal) turn in animal
ethics. Second, whilst legal limitations on the legislature and executive are
358 R. Garner
certainly consistent with the liberal part of liberal democracy, there is a

long-standing debate about how democratic such a move is (see, for
instance, Waldron 1999, Chap. 13). Third, to adopt a parochial position
for a moment, the constitutional route is not appropriate for a country
such as the UK which does not have a codified constitution.
Fourth, it is important to note that constitutions do not merely confer
legitimacy but are bodies of rules which are themselves judged for their
legitimacy. Put simply, a constitution is only legitimate when it reflects
widely held beliefs and values. Therefore, the legal route is not somehow
independent of human endorsement. Rather, to include the protection of
animals within a constitutional settlement will not work unless there is
sufficient political support for granting animals fundamental rights such
as the right to life. Finally, it is not clear why we have to regard the legal
and political enfranchisement of animals as mutually exclusive. Is there
not scope for both?
9 Conclusion
This chapter has sketched out some of the dimensions of the relationship
between animal protection and the concept of democracy. Such an analy-
sis is a central, albeit not the only, component of the political turn in
animal ethics. It might be thought this political turn is unnecessary.
Might it not be preferable to continue to argue for an enhanced moral
status for animals in the hope that it will be taken on board by democratic
politics? However, the case for favouring enfranchising animals is based
on the classic utilitarian argument that their interests are more likely to be
taken into account if there is a formal institutional arena where these
interests can be made to count. In defence of this utilitarian argument, it
can be pointed out that, despite the widespread recognition that animals
are sentient and are morally considerable, their interests have not been
regarded as particularly important by existing democratic systems. Indeed,
animals are arguably exploited more severely, and in greater numbers,
than ever before, despite a recognition that they matter morally.
Of course, much remains to be done to demonstrate the workability of
the enfranchisement model. Future research requires, above all,
institutional building to demonstrate that the inclusion of animals is

coherent and realistic. Vink’s book (2020) is an important first step here.
In addition, as this chapter has sought to show, the creation of an inter-
species democracy is a very radical step. As a result, research also needs to
focus on the viability and benefits, to animals, of intermediary steps
whether that be deliberative democracy or state objectives enshrined in
constitutions.
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17
Animal Law: What Is Left to be Said
by the Law About Animals
Marita Giménez-Candela
1 Introduction
Animals have always been with us. Since the dawn of humanity, animal
presence has been constant, not only as a fact but primarily for their rela-
tion with human beings: a relation never broken, always changing and
definitely fascinating (Pollo 2016, 23; Wilcox and Rutherford 2018;
Serpell 1996). The reflections of thinkers and philosophers on animals
and man’s relation to them goes back centuries, and publications on this
subject constitute their own independent and abundant part of the bibli-
ography on, for example, the sciences of Antiquity (Alexandridis et al.
2008; Gilhus 2006; Toynbee 1996; Dierauer 1977).
This point alone leads to thoughts about the importance that animals
have had in our lives and in the development of our history; a history that
both animals and us have weaved and enriched with our contributions.
M. Giménez-Candela (*)
ICALP (International Center for Animal Law and Policy), Universitat
Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
364 M. Giménez-Candela
However, in this story, the role of animals has only ever been as necessary
extras. Perhaps it is no exaggeration to state that the instrumental concep-
tion that society has had of animals has amounted to an imperturbably
anthropocentric view of events, in which animals have always been voice-
less witnesses, vectors for divinity, companions in war, comforts to pet,
means of consumption for different cultures and social conceptions.
Always present and always set aside, except recently, and above all in the
West, where debate on their legal condition and the uses we make of
them has caused us to consider the deeper aspects of their nature and
needs, and to compromise more for their interests, which, of course, has
come about in more recent times.
When it has not been totally silent, in recent times the law has acted
reservedly towards animals (Giménez-Candela 2015, 149–183). For cen-
turies, much of what has had to be said about the legal condition of ani-
mals and of their role in social life has been said. Aside from this, there
have only been sporadic, albeit interesting, incursions in the animal world
and debates for the purpose of human needs that always end up being
more important than reflections on the introduction of animals into
social life and the legal system (Favre 2004, 87–97; Giménez-Candela
2019b, 159).
The law—which plays its specific role of regulating realities—has made
the “person” the central nucleus for attributing obligations and responsi-
bilities, separating itself from the Aristotelian notion that the rational
man with the ability to express himself is the prominent subject of the
law. The common thread of this notion, which causes ripples in the con-
cept of the person (united with the human being) as something immove-
able, pervades all Western legal thinking to its core.
These days, the relation between animals and the law is getting
narrower. Legal stances on animals are beginning to change, even though
at the fundamental level the categorisation of animals as “things” of
property and the refusal to reconsider, and perhaps broaden, the
application of the term “person” to animals themselves, persist.
17 Animal Law: What Is Left to be Said by the Law About Animals 365
2 Animals in Historical Sources

The idea of animals as beings that experience emotions, pain, suffering,
happiness, pleasure, as any other being does, does not feel like a novelty
these days, but a scientific fact proven for centuries.
The perception that animals feel is found in certain writings from
Antiquity. Reading book VIII.1 of Pliny’s Natural History (Rome, 23
AD—Stabia, 79 AD), which is dedicated to elephants, Pliny, following in
the footsteps of Aristotle, affirms NH.I.1.1: “The elephant is the largest
of them all, and in intelligence approaches the nearest to man. It under-
stands the language of its country… It is sensible alike of the pleasures of
love and glory, and, to a degree that is rare among men even, possesses
notions of honesty, prudence and equity”; 5.11: “[the elephant] is said to
have so much mildness towards animals with less strength, that in a mov-
ing herd of sheep, the elephant parts the crowd with his trunk, so that it
would not unknowingly harm them. Not unless they are excited, would
do they harm, and they always walk in packs, never one wandering along
from the rest. When they are surrounded by cavalry, they place the sick,
tired and wounded in the centre of the pack, and, just as if they were
under orders and well disciplined, they rotate among themselves to hold
the front line”. This is only an example of what was deduced in CI AD
from the simple observation of animals and respect felt for them as part
of nature, which constitutes a distinguishing feature throughout the
whole Age of Antiquity. I will not go any further here on this aspect, but
I would like to highlight that respect for animals was diluted and lost in
the following centuries, until science began to interest itself again in
restoring objective studies on animal sentience.
Classifying animals with different perspectives and angles has been a
constant throughout history (Onida 2015, 360). These days, the widest
classification is that which divides animals into animals for companion-
ship, for production, for experimentation and in shows, which is nothing
more than a reflection of “use” that we make of animals. It is a classifica-
tion marked strongly by economics and, for this reason, it is the classifica-
tion employed most by Animal Welfare Science (Fraser 2008) and in
fundamentally European Animal Welfare legislation (Simonin and

Gavinelli 2019, 59–70; Villalba 2015; Brels 2017, 151–228).
Another classification, from Roman roots, of scholastic nature (Gai.2,
14–16) and perpetuated in the majority of the continental and Latin-
American Codes (Giglio 2012, 3) is that which splits from the distinction
between domestic, endangered and wild animals, among those that
include animals that are fished and hunted, as well as exotic animals,
coming from faraway lands, for which man has always felt an irresistible
attraction. Although there exist variants, this classification works along-
side an eminently rural economy, that of the culture of Antiquity that saw
it birthed (Ritvo 2002, 403–406; Kalof 2013; Kitchell 2014; Campbell
2014). For this reason, because this vision of animals is connected with
the role that animals play in the life of the land (Bodson 1997, 339;
Gilhus 2006, 12), in the concept of domestic animals, beasts of burden
are equally included (oxen, donkeys, mules), with those that serve as food
(cows, pigs, goats, rabbits or chickens), as well as with those that guarded
the home (dogs) and cleared the area of rodents (cats), and dogs were
used for company and cats certainly, in their own way.
Beyond this typological classification, which is reflected by all classical
authors and, of course, in Justinian’s Digest and, by consequence, in all
the contemporary Codes, there have been certain attempts to classify ani-
mals by natural observation (to which we will not refer right now). So,
the anthropocentric and economic perspective repeats itself, with some
variation (Dierauer 1977, 100, 178 and 253). In reality, it would not be
necessary to classify animals; classic Antiquity shows reluctance towards
doing so, from the belief that animals formed a part of a respected nature
known as the scala naturae (Wildberger 2008, 49). In fact, if we follow
the Roman jurisprudential texts of the classical era there is a total absence
of animal classification.
If one were to examine the Roman sources without prejudice, one
would be presented with an entirely different picture regarding the legal
treatment of animals (Onida 2012). The Romans considered animals,
from a natural point of view, as a legal object on which laws, and above
all property laws, could be based, and that could be objects of trade. Until
recent decades, there have not been great changes in this approach.
However, the common reproach that in Rome animals were considered
to be material without life, and that the notion of ownership over animals
is the starting point of animal cruelty or, at least, of the inferiority of
animals and their lack of recognition by contemporary law (Francione
1995; Regan 2004; Wise 2000; Rocha Santana 2018) can easily be
refuted, not only for its serious inaccuracy but also for forgetting the
“natural” notion of Law (ius naturale) that is common also to animals, at
least in the often-contested opinion of Ulpian (D.1,1,1,3) (e.g., Filip-
Fröschl 1994, 21–35; Onida 2012, 110).
After reviewing the sources, one can conclude that the Romans
considered animals—respecting their essence as living beings—as res sui
generis. The animals appear in texts as compared with lifeless objects, and
are considered to be living beings, frequently uncontrollable and with
special attributes, like the need to feed themselves, the capacity to
reproduce or the possibility to move of their own volition. Furthermore,
it is also clear from the classical texts that animals were differentiated in
themselves by their basic needs. For this, the legal treatment of the animal
has always been accompanied with the difficulty of encompassing (and
containing) the animal phenomenon within the legal concepts. Ordering
animals in legal categories often means ignoring their natural
characteristics. For this reason alone Roman private law hardly did this,
in contrast to current private law, which still insists upon it.
Notwithstanding the previous observations, our difficulty of
encompassing the animal phenomenon and, in spite of this, the need to
provide legal rules to be able to order their relation with human beings in
conformity with organised society, has led to framing them—almost
naturally—in the realm of property, which we always mistakenly consider
to be an immutable institution destined to never change. This could not
be more imprecise; property, as with the majority of relationships,
categories and legal institutions, is destined to change and to adapt to
specific and variable circumstances of the society to which the regulation
corresponds (Shermaier 2017, 50ff.).
The ownership over animals and the consideration of them to be
things—which constitutes a real legal dogma—began to break in through
philosophical, not legal, thinking, as the law did not see the need to
change this relation of domination between man and animal, given that
society continued to be identical in itself: essentially rural and
anthropocentric. However, leaving aside the fundamental critical thought

of humanism (Boudou 2016; Gontier 2007, 5ff.) and of the Enlightenment
(De Fontenay 1998; Guichet 2006) on animals (the imprints of which
have made themselves known in philosophical thought and in society),
two centuries later—specifically in the 1980s and in the dawn of the
twenty-first century—changes in legal systems have indeed come about
that have drawn into question whether animals should be things. The
factors that explain these changes, the so-called animal turn (Ritvo 2007,
118), are of a different entity and nature, and this turn also presents vari-
ants that can be found temporally as much as geographically.
3 Welfare, Sentience and the Law

It was in the United Kingdom’s Common Law that the first animal
protection law was passed in 1822 (Richard Martin’s Act to Prevent the
Cruel and Improper Treatment of Cattle). This broadened its reach until
the Animal Protection Act was established in 1911, which for decades
remained in force and relatively intact, until finally being substituted in
2006 for the Animal Welfare Act that, for the first time, imposed a duty
of care on the owners of companion animals. The novelty of this legal
formula lies in the fact that the owners of companion animals are not
only obliged by law to satisfy the basic needs of their companion animals,
such as the need for water and food, but that the law imposes the require-
ment of veterinary attention, and that the animal lives in a suitable envi-
ronment for its needs—something that the 1911 Act stipulated only for
farmed animals.
Legally speaking, it is to the United Kingdom that EU owes; the
creation of the term Animal Welfare, its manner of application through
the so-called Five Freedoms and, in recent decades, the use of the term
“sentient beings” as a standard of treating animals, recognising their
capability for not only experiencing physical pain, but for suffering, as
well as for pleasure and joy. Essentially, the United Kingdom has played
a crucial role in the creation of the current standards that govern Animal
Welfare in Europe. In the 60s, the publication of Ruth Harrison’s book
Animal Machines (Harrison 1964) had an immediate impact on society

by warning of the precarious living conditions of farmed animals in
intensive systems. The book was a wake-up call and the social response it
generated led to the English government ordering the establishment of a
Scientific Commission that was to produce a technical report on the
living conditions of farmed animals. As a result, it published a report in
1965 presented by Professor Roger Brambell, known as the “Brambell
Report”, which set out Animal Welfare through five requirements that
ensured not only the physical integrity of animals, but the mental aspect,
as well as respect for their unique characteristics, their ways of life and
behaviour according to their animal natures (Brambell 1965). From this
date onwards, it can be said that the treatment of animals and the defence
of their interests and respect for their behaviour (their “culture”) have
permeated the academic vision and public policy to the benefit of
animals—a change that has never been looked back on (Wookey 2018a,
b, 11–17, 29–50). As a result of the “Brambell Report”, in 1965 the
British Government created the Farm Animal Welfare Advisory
Committee, which in 1979 became the Farm Animal Welfare Committee,
as a body responsible for the establishment and development of Animal
Welfare policies, conducted through five principles that constitute
Animal Welfare standards and are known as The Five Freedoms (FAWC
1979). While European law does not comply with this English
perseverance, this evolution of English law has its own origins, and the
EU has certainly been heavily influenced by it (Giménez-Candela 2019;
Villalba 2015).
Animal sentience is not as obvious for the legislator, and perhaps it
may be worth taking the time to consider the possible implications, its
introduction into legal texts up until now and what could be hoped for
from an adequate collaboration between scientists and jurists. Animal
Welfare Science, driven by the increasingly stronger verification of the
sentience of animals (Brambell 1965, 13–15, 84–86), opens a front of
discussion that has ever more intensely puts into question whether ani-
mals can only be objects of Law, and has begun to consolidate that ani-
mals, as sentient beings, are destined to be subjects of the law, through
the recognition that they are living beings endowed with sensibility
(Peters 2016a, 3ff.). It is in this area that we must identify the changes
introduced by certain European civil codes through the affirmation of
animals’ capacity to feel. The support in this realm of European Animal
Welfare legislation has been decisive. In no other way could one judge the
influence that art. 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) has had, in spite of the limitations that the same article
imposes in the second part of its composition (Alonso García 2010,
1427–1510; Wartemberg 2015, 363–370). However, it has been the but-
tress for arguing the change of legal status of animals, beginning with the
French Civil Code (see infra 5.d). In effect, this reform has been a wake-
up call for other continental codes, which have continued linking together
the pertinent reforms in their respective texts (see infra, 5e and 5f ).
One of the great challenges undertaken by the EU in terms of animal
protection has been to tie animal welfare regulation to the affirmation of
animal sentience. Since the first regulations on animal welfare, the EU
has effectively held sentience as the standard for declaring animals to be
“sentient beings” and, as a result of this, for applying the corresponding
public policies that, over the course of 40 years, have turned the EU into
a body of supranational ambit endowed with a legislative corpus, which
constitutes a model that has inspired many countries.
Sentience—the capacity to feel, perceive and experience—is
fundamental in the debate on the welfare of animals, as it sets out the
central question of whether animals suffer during life and during death,
and the repercussions that result from this, as much in the ethical ambit
regarding the treatment that we afford them, as in the legal rules that
dictate such treatment. In other words, if sentience is the fundamental
inspiration for all regulations adopted by the member states of the EU, as
well as by many other countries, the debate will revolve around how this
scientific criterion has been applied to legal regulation.
Animal sentience is generally understood as an objective criterion but
open to study and modification; advances in the biosciences are incon-
clusive but continue to provide new information that allows:
• a clearer understanding of what sentience is, and its relation with

animal welfare,
• a greater array of animals with sentience, where it can be proved that
each can experience pain, suffering, and positive emotions and
sentiments,
• the determination of our responsibility regarding how we meet our
obligations towards the animals with which we interact; essentially,
how we give legal form to the protection of the interests of animals,
while also offering protection for human interests.
Sentience implies a certain level of awareness, but awareness of oneself,

being, as it is, a complex issue, has also been revised in light of the results
that the most up-to-date science has been able to achieve. In this sense,
one understands the relevance of the Cambridge Declaration on
Consciousness (made public in 2012) for broadening scientific discourse
on animal sentience that, in a special case of scientific results permeating
the social realm, has spread to improve public knowledge on the similar-
ity between animals and the human being specifically in terms of
sentience.
Science affirms that fully developed vertebrate animals and some
invertebrates are sentient, but that neither humans nor non-humans are
sentient in the primary stages of their development, or whether they even
feel cerebral damage. In a similar sense, when we refer to feelings, I would
like to specify that experiencing feelings constitutes a valiant adaptation
mechanism, afforded by nature to both humans and non-humans, and
constitutes an important aspect of welfare. In this sense, it is worth men-
tioning that the term welfare refers to all animals, not only to sentient
animals.
Animal sentience is a concept that, as it has been said, in addition to
having experienced a notable development in the scientific realm—which
has opened the way for genuine debates—has also sparked a particular
interest and development in the social and public realm. In the way that
it constitutes one of the greater worries that bothers the individual these
days, society notably exteriorises its desire that the living conditions of
animals—what is scientifically known as welfare—correspond to their
capacity to feel. This permeation of sentience in the public realm has

taken the form of public demonstrations (collecting signatures, the
rejection of abuse, social media campaigns) that have propagated the
creation of important changes in the legal system. The legislature has not
even been able to resist meeting the social demands—driven by formal
requests—for changes in legislation, revolving around the improvement
of the condition of animals and its adaptation of the category of sentient
beings. This has broken a long tradition of silence, negation and igno-
rance on the sincere consideration of animals and their ethical and moral
value and, aside from this, is an awareness that is constantly growing and
that demands the adaptation of legislation on animals to new scientific
parameters.
I am referring in particular to the process we call the “De-objectification”
of animals, which reveals itself in the changes experienced by the legal
status of animals since the 80s in central European countries, adopting a
negative form: “animals are not things” and, in the first decade of the new
millennium, adopting, more coherently with scientific advances, an affir-
mative form: “they are sentient beings”, or the linguistic turn: “they are
living beings endowed with sensibility”. This has transformed the cate-
gory of ownership of animals in the primary European Civil Codes and
also begins to show itself in the Latin-American Civil Codes in the form
of changes or proposals for change.
Therefore, in the legal realm, animal sentience has up to now projected
itself into the following normative and doctrinal fields:
• In EU legislation on animal welfare, on certain species and groups of

animals classified by an economic criterion of production animals,
experimentation animals, animals for fur, animals in shows, compan-
ion animals, the transport of animals (e.g., Sowery 2018, 55–99; Offor
2020, 239–262)
• In the Civil Codes, in terms of property, in the rules on marital
separation or divorce and in the obligations in terms of seizure and
confiscation (see infra, 5)
• In the Constitutions, adopting the form of protecting the dignity
intrinsic to animals, or a better integration of animals in the area of
environmental protection (see infra, 6)
• In the court rulings of the European Union and in the rulings of courts
in certain member states of the EU and of other countries outside the
EU (e.g., Hadjyianni 2019, 128–161; Driessen 2017, 547–585).
4 Article 13 TFEU
Since the beginning of the 90s, the category of animals as sentient beings
has been introduced firstly by declarations, then in protocols, and finally
in an article of the treaties of the European Community and now of the
European Union (Alonso García 2010, 1427–1510; Wartemberg 2015,
363–370). Since 2009, article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) has essentially stipulated, without distinction
between the area of law to which it applies (e.g., Civil Law, Common
Law) that:
In formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture, fisheries,

transport, internal market, research and technological development and
space policies, the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are
sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals,
while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of
the Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions
and regional heritage. (European Union 2012)
The general principles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European

Union include in a restrictive sense animal welfare as a general principle
of EU Law, in as much as it is mentioned in Title II of the TFEU (provi-
sions having general application). In fact, the second preliminary clause
of Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 22 September 2010 on the protection of animals used for scientific
purposes, reiterates, “animal welfare is a value of the Union that is
enshrined in Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union” (European Union 2010). It elevates animal welfare to a “value of
the Union”, which is not only recognised but also “enshrined” by the
TFEU. What it is saying is that it is inalienable for member states, and
that their domestic regulation must keep animal welfare in mind.
At the same time, the third preliminary clause clarifies that “on 23
March 1998 the Council adopted Decision 1999/575/EC concerning
the conclusion by the Community of the European Convention for the
protection of vertebrate animals used for experimental and other scien-
tific purposes” (European Union 1999). By integrating this as part of the
Convention, the EU has recognised the international importance of the
protection and welfare of animals used for scientific purposes. As such,
this principle of protection positions itself in a general hierarchy, for
which it refers to community policies, included the interior market (arti-
cle 26 TFEU and following) and, in particular, the free movement of
goods (article 28 TFEU and following), the approximation or harmoni-
sation of national legislation (article 114 TFEU), as well as investigation
and development (article 179 TFEU and following).
In principal, this means that the aforementioned sectorial policies, and
specifically those relating to animal experimentation, must clearly bear in
mind the welfare needs of animals as sentient beings. In this respect, it is
worth pointing out that, according to prevailing jurisprudence of the Court
of Justice of the European Union, the general principles of EU Law (includ-
ing the aspects set out in article 13 TFEU) prevail as super-principles, not
only of the community sources and the law deriving from them (regula-
tions, directives, decisions), but also of the derived (or that can be derived)
regulations and principles of subsequent rules of the TFEU and, in particu-
lar, of the regulations relating to the provisions for approximating and har-
monising national legislation contained in article 114 TFEU.
In fact, with the passing of the Treaty on European Union and the
TFEU, the exception to the principle of the single market and of free
competition has been permanently abandoned in favour of a compen-
dium of general rules that highlight the gradual transition of the European
Union from a predominantly economic community to a truly political
and social union. This means that the general principles, like those that
appear in article 13, are not mere programmatic principles but genuinely
mandatory principles; general rules that thoroughly guide the political
and administrative discretions of the European Union, as well as the
interpretative role of the jurisdictional community organ.
In other words, when article 13 TFEU requires that the Union and its
member states thoroughly bear in mind the welfare needs of animals as
sentient beings, it means that the interpretation of the other treaty provi-
sions, and particularly article 114 TFEU, must not only be compatible
with this declaration, but must be in strict accordance with it, whereby in
cases to the contrary, the interpretation would not be legitimate. Therefore
in the public policies of the EU (especially those relating to internal com-
merce, investigation and transport), article 13 TFEU entails not only a
negative limit but also a positive parameter that must be borne in mind.
5 De-Objectification
As I have already covered on previous occasions (e.g., Giménez-Candela
2017a, b, 2018b), the movement to de-objectify animals is a reality that
has begun with the private law in most European countries: Austria (Civil
Code, 1988), Germany (Civil Code, 1990), the Netherlands (Civil Code,
1992), Moldova (Civil Code, 2002), Switzerland (Civil Code, 2003),
Lichtenstein (Property Law, 2003), Catalonia (Regional Civil Code,
2006) the Czech Republic (Civil Code, 2012), France (Civil Code, 2015)
and Portugal (Civil Code, 2016). The legislature has modified the legal
condition of animals by limiting itself to a negative expression (“no
things”) or configuring the category in a positive way (“living beings
endowed with sensibility”).
At the end of the 80s and during the 90s, Austria, Germany and
Switzerland (Peters 2016, 363–387) undoubtedly led this movement that
we have called the “De-objectification” of animals, with a substantial
amount of criticism due to the difficulty involved in the practical applica-
tion of this negative category (Obergfell 2016, 394 and 396).
5.1 Austria
The Austrian Civil Code (ABGB, Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch)

broadly defines the concept of thing in article §285: “All that differs from
the person and serves for the use of man is considered a thing in the legal
sense” (unofficial translation). In this way, the concept encompasses both
corporal and non-corporal things. To this paragraph was added §285a,
which expressis verbis separates animals from the concept of things:

“Animals are not things; they are protected by special laws. The orders
referred to things are applied to animals if there is no alternate provision”
(unofficial translation). To complement this rule, in the field of regulat-
ing compensation a new paragraph about the costs of recovery of an
injured animal was simultaneously added, § 1332 ABGB. Here it says:
“If an animal is injured, they are owed the actual costs of recovery or of
intent to recover, even when this exceeds the value of the animal, so long
as the legal owner of the animal has covered the costs in place of the
injured party” (unofficial translation). Afterwards, the Austrian legislator
changed the enforcement regulation in the sense of the exemption from
seizure of animals (EO, Exekutionsordnung), but it was done—by con-
sequence of the change introduced in the BGB—within the framework
of a broad modification in the year 1996. Effectively, in paragraph § 250
(4), it determined the exemption from seizure of domestic animals that
are not to be sold. In contrast to the German regulation, which will be
examined a little later, it contains a clause of harshness in favour of the
creditor, and is limited to the exemption of seizure up to a value of
750 euros.
5.2 Germany
At the time of the Austrian reform, the German legislature also began a
reform relating to the legal status of animals in the German Civil Code
(BGB, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). The fact that Germany dealt with this
topic was to be expected, as Germany had already made vast changes in
the field of animal protection. A new version of the animal protection law
came into force in 1986. Through the “Law for the improvement of the
legal condition of animals in Civil Law”, Germany also modified the
Civil Code (BGB), and the regulations of the BGB are very similar to
those in Austria. The title of the first book, Chap. 2, was broadened to
include animals, with what remains of the following form: things, ani-
mals. A1 § 90, in which things are defined, was added § 90a: “Animals
are not things. They are protected by special laws. The following orders,
valid for things, must be applied to them, as long as another thing is not
planned”(unofficial translation). It is interesting to observe that, in a dif-

ferent way to how this reform was addressed in Austrian law, the BGB
signals special treatment for animals, making reference to the rights and
duties of the owner, such as in the third chapter, assigned to property.
According to § 903: “(Powers of the owner) The owner of a thing can
make use of it as they like, so long as this does not contravene the law or
the rights of a third party, and can exclude all others from intervention.
The owner of an animal must observe the special provisions for the pro-
tection of animals when exercising their power” (unofficial translation).
It agrees to mark an important reform brought about in the area of com-
pensation, so complements itself in paragraph § 251 BGB, which regu-
lates compensation in cash and, in part two, limits the obligation of
restitution to adequate costs through a similar regulation as that of
Austria, but with greater scope and weight. According to § 251 BGB:
“(1) If restitution is not possible, or is insufficient for the compensation
of the creditor, the liable party must compensate the creditor with money.
(2) The liable party may compensate the creditor with money when res-
titution is only possible with a disproportionate amount. The expenses
arising for the recovery of an animal are not disproportionate even when
they considerably exceed its value” (unofficial translation). With its
meticulous recognition, the German legislature at the same time intro-
duced rules adapted to the new condition of animals in the rules govern-
ing forced execution, and changed the order of civil procedure as follows.
The § 765 of the ZPO (Zivilprozessordnung), which regulates the sup-
pression of forced execution measures in extreme cases, is broadened
through the following precision instruments, which are a call to the exer-
cise of responsibility that human beings have in respect to animals, in
coherence with the spirit that impregnates German animal protection
legislation that, as it is well known, began with National-Socialism (Pluda
2018). According to § 765a ZPO, “If the measure affects an animal, the
Enforcement Court must bear in mind, in its evaluation, the responsibil-
ity of man in relation to animals” (unofficial translation).
The new § 811c ZPO refers to the exemption of animals from seizure
in the following terms: “(1) Animals kept in the domestic environment
and not for profit are not subjects of the pledge. (2) At the request of the
creditor, the Enforcement Court will permit the pledge due to the high
value of the animal, if the exemption from seizure will for the creditor be
of excessive harshness, not justifiable in the appreciation of the interest of
the defence of animals nor the legitimate interest of the debtor” (unoffi-
cial translation). At the same time, it suppresses the rule of § 811 No. 14
ZPO, which prohibits the seizure of animals with a value of less than 500
marks (~ 250 € or £220).
5.3 Switzerland
A legal change came into effect in 2003 that set a landmark in the history
of the country—a change in the corresponding article of the Swiss Civil
Code established that animals were not things. Of course, this change
had a visible effect in the law of damages, and in the law of successions
and title deeds—something that has involved more than few discussions
on whether the term “dignity”, introduced in the Constitution in 1993,
is applied equally and with the same value to human beings as it is to
animals (Michel and Schneider Kassayeh 2011, 1–42). In coherence with
this, article 641a of the Civil Code (ZGB, Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch)
established that animals are not things (“Tiere sind keine Sachen”). It is
interesting to observe that this article is composed of two parts: in the
first, the legislator refers to the contents of property and general princi-
ples (Art. 641 ZGB Inhalt des Eigentums/I. Im Allgemeinen) and in the
second, refers to the contents of property and, separately, to animals (Art.
641a ZGB Inhalt des Eigentums/II. Tiere). Far from being a purely mate-
rial distinction, this in my opinion reflects a new position for animals
that, already seen mentioned by the title, are separate from things.
5.4 France
In 2005, the “Antoine Report” suggested to the legislature the creation of

a third category of goods that would be animals, positioned between
those of moveable and immoveable. The justification made by the
“Antoine Report” (which had an impressive receipt, being based on reli-
able data on contemporary concerns for animals that had been removed
from enquiry by legal operators, distinguished members of animal pro-

tection associations, and comparative law) was based on the following
reasoning: “animals are living beings endowed with sensibility”. This
could also be claimed for human beings, with the difference with human
beings being that, although animals are protected from acts of cruelty
and mistreatment through the dispositions of Criminal Code, they con-
tinue to be considered as with things of unlimited use, ownable and
whose value is measured by the material value of the market (Reigné
2015, 402). This idea—rigorously demonstrated by the “Antoine
Report”—directly and openly conflicts with the affective value that
French society attributes animals (and especially companion animals)
and in terms of the respect afforded to animals as part of nature, which
constitutes a character unique to French culture—refined—without any
doubt for the writings of the representatives of the Enlightenment in the
eighteenth century, who have so greatly contributed to the change in
man’s perception, as a citizen, central to decisions made about our
world—a post-revolutionary world. It is well known that animals have
not been exempt from this profound transformation. It is, however,
advisable that the philosophical consideration does not transcend the
entire legal realm. Evidence for this, without further remission, is the
Napoleonic Code, which loyally follows the criteria of the Roman inclu-
sion of animals (and of slaves) under the legal status of things in property.
However, the author of the report affirms with clarity that these premises,
this legal situation of animals, is not sustainable in contemporary society,
and therefore derives from this the proposal of changing said statute, as
well as creating a category of animals separate to that of things. Although
the creation of this separate category relating to animals has not been
achieved, immediately after the publication of the report of reference,
France, with the distinct academic impulse demonstrated by the distin-
guished jurist Jean Pierre Marguénaud, set off on a path of progressive
admission, within academic and political circles, that the Civil Code
must be modernised in regard to animals. “The Glavany Amendment”
(2014) consecrates the insertion of animal in art. 2 of the 2015-177 Law
of 16th February 2015 (“relating to the modernisation and simplification
of the right and procedures in the domains of justice and domestic
affairs”), which was crystallised by the modification of art. 515-14 that
declares: “Les animaux sont des êtres vivants doués de sensibilité. Sous
réserve des lois qui les protègent, les animaux sont soumis au régime des
biens”, just as in the consequent reforms of articles 522, 524, 528, 533,
564, and 2051, that result in the eradication of both direct and indirect
references to animals as moveable or immoveable things in the Civil Code
(Lelanchon 2018, 72–79). As it has already been observed (Marguénaud
2014, 15ff.) from a strictly civil law point of view, the new provisions
relating to animals continue to be found in Book II, relating to things
and the different forms of property. This does not close the debate on the
legal status of animals, but has instead facilitated a process of discussion
and reforms that strongly indicate that animals, defined now in the Civil
Code as living beings endowed with sensibility, do not figure in the cat-
egory of things, of which there are abundant examples not only in aca-
demic literature but in recent French jurisprudence also. To show just
one example, following the reform of art. 515-14 of the Civil Code, art.
528, which affirms (including after the modifying reform of the Law of
6th January 1999) that “sont meubles par leur nature les animaux et les
corps qui peuvent se transporter d’un lieu à un autre, soit qu’ils se meu-
vent par eux-mêmes, soit qu’ils ne puissent changer de place que par
l’effet d’une forcé étrangère”, has been modified. In effect, following the
2015 reform, animals no longer figure as “meubles par destination”, as
France has eliminated the risk of the assimilation of animals with things
through a consequent reform of articles related to these categories. An
even more significant example is the elimination of animals from article
524, which, with all its historic Roman weight and agricultural nature,
and unaltered during the nineteenth century, mentions animals linked to
cultivation and rural life such as “les pigeons de colombiers, les lapins de
garennes, les poisons de certaines eaux…, mais aussi les ustensiles ara-
toires, les semences, les ruches à miel…” among “immeubles par destina-
tion”. Currently, the agricultural tools and the facilities in which they are
kept are still in the cited article, but the mentions of animals have disap-
peared. It no longer speaks of “des pigeons, des lapins, des poissons”, and
therefore it would be inconsistent to say that these animals, even though
kept by the landowner (in hutches, in birdhouses, in hives), are immov-
able things “par destination”. Therefore, in France, the legislator has not
managed to change the “summa divisio” persons-things—this remains a
calculated ambiguity that will possibly not cause a fracture between eco-
nomic operators linked to agricultural and farming operatives. This
highly criticised solution of compromise has begun to reveal its weak-
nesses, through the critique of theories of Law as much as by the applica-
tion of new criteria for animals consecrated by the Civil Code through
the most recent rulings of the French courts. It is possible that it has only
been a transitory compromise.
5.5 Portugal
On 22nd December 2016, the Portuguese parliament unanimously

passed that animals would no longer be things in property, such as they
had come to be regulated up until this point by the Civil Code in their
respective articles, among others: 1302, 1318 and 1323, of book III,
referred to as “direito das Coisas”, in accordance with the Roman tradi-
tion that has been expressed in the vast majority of the European and
Latin-American continental Codes and has been recognised by the Civil
Law treaties (Menezes Cordeiro 2016). In this sense, Portugal was up
until this date no exception to the rules of ownership over animals, con-
sidered as moveable things—the dominant legal status in occidental legal
systems. The process of this important reform of the legal condition of
animals has been a long journey, culminating in the success of a proposal
that, as we see, displays original characteristics in comparison with other
reforms of animals’ legal status undertaken by other countries in the 90s,
the twentieth century and in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
With this reform, Portugal finds itself in a significant place regarding the
transposition of the latest advances in Animal Welfare Science into a legal
text that solidly affirms that animals are sentient beings (Giménez-
Candela 2016, 1–4; Reis Moreira 2018, 80–91). The initial proposal to
modify the Civil Code was presented on 13th May 2016 by PAN
(Persons, Animals, Nature), Socialist Party (PS), the Left Block (BE) and
the Social Democrat Party (PSD). The final draft received an absolute
majority of votes following the debate in the Commission of Constitutional
Affairs, Rights, Liberties and Guarantees (Comissão de Assuntos
Constitucionais, Direitos, Liberdades e Garantias). The proposal was
passed by all the parties, without exception (PAN, PSD, PS, BE, CDE
and CDS-PP), in favour of the recognition of animals as sentient beings,
which was to be included in a separate section of the Civil Code, distin-
guished from the book on the rules of property; this amounts to the
establishment of a special legal regime for animals. Therefore, the modi-
fication of the legal status of animals is reflected by article 1 in Law
8/2017 of 3rd March, which reads: “A presente lei estabelece um estatuto
jurídico dos animais, reconhecendo a sua natureza de seres vivos dotados
de sensibilidade” (Diario da Republica 2017). Such a modification does
not immediately imply the attribution of legal personality to animals,
but—and it is here that lies one of the most important aspects of the
reform—entails a new classification and the creation of a new legal con-
cept that places animals in a legal category “a se”, which is none other
than that of “Animals” (e.g., Patrao Neves and Araujo 2018). Essentially,
the Portuguese Civil Code recognises that animals do not fit as things in
the classification of things in property and, for this reason, it has created
a third legal figure—that of animals. This is not to be confused with
things or human beings that, legally, we tend to call “persons” (Giménez-
Candela 2018, 5–28). In itself it is nothing more than an abstraction
categorised by the representation with which something (a society, an
entity, a collective desire, a human being) acts in law (Brozek 2017, 8ff),
hence the great expansion of the concept of “person” in the legal realm
(Augsberg 2016, 338ff). From then on, animals appear as beings endowed
with sensibility in the Portuguese Civil Code. This entails, among other
things, their recognition as part of an independent legal category that
additionally means the possibility of compensation in case of death or
injuries to the animal, the establishment of the role of a carer for animals
in the case of divorce, and the inability to seize companion animals. The
aforementioned amendment has entailed a systematic reorganisation of
the Civil Code that takes the following form: Subtitle I-A has been added
to Book I of Title II, under the denomination “Animals”, which inte-
grates articles 201-B and 201-D. Overall, the reform of the Portuguese
Civil Code opens an important door for legal reflection, going further
than other animal reforms undertaken by other European and Latin-
American Civil codes (especially that undertaken by Colombia in 2015)
by not limiting itself to the “negative” expression of the concept “they are
not things”, but configuring the category in a positive way (“living beings
endowed with sensibility”) and modifying the legal condition of animals
by separating them from the condition of things in property (Correia
Mendonça 2018, 1–10).
5.6 Spain
On the 14th February 2017, the process of reforming the legal status of
animals in the civil code began in the Spanish parliament. This also
included corresponding amendments in the mortgage law and in the
Civil Procedure Rules, which aimed at changing the consideration of ani-
mals to living beings endowed with sensibility, instead of as things. The
preceding reflections set out the “De-objectification” of animals in our
civil code in line with the request voted for unanimously by the parlia-
ment on the 14th February 2017 (and that they then unanimously voted
in favour of ) urging the government to reform the civil code. The formu-
lated proposal sets out three fundamental elements:
• The creation of a “sui generis” category relating to animals within the

civil code that considers them to be what they are: living beings
endowed with sensibility. Consequently, a detailed adaptation of the
civil code article is proposed, where the mention of animals is sepa-
rated from that of things in property, without limits to their condition
as being “sentient beings” as recognised by science and European ani-
mal welfare legislation, which obliges us—as a member state of the
EU—to adapt our legislation to this reality.
• The possibility of establishing, in the case of family conflict (divorce or
separation) a regime in which companion animals benefit from treat-
ment in harmony with a respect for their welfare and the desires of
family members to share the animals that has lived with them prior to
the separation or divorce through custody.
• The adaptation of the article relating to the Civil Procedure Rules,
referring to the inability to seize companion animals (Giménez-
Candela 2018, 7–47).
Before the formalities of approving the reform were completed, it was

interrupted by the call for general elections on the 28th April 2019, caus-
ing a halt to the necessary de-objectification of animals in the civil field,
and is now going through a period of uncertainty and expectations for a
reform that still remains necessary. The fact that the animal legal status
reform in the civil code has not been passed is, in my opinion, one more
step on a journey that it will be hard not to resume. The new legislature,
which began in 2018, has among its legislative projects pending approval
the change of the legal status of animals in the Civil Code. The propitiat-
ing elements remain in force. Society has changed its attitude towards
animals, science is increasingly offering consolidating evidence in favour
of animal sentience, the de-objectification movement is a global reality
perceptible in many countries and, lastly, animal welfare legislation
remains active and binds Spain as a member state that cannot disregard
its obligations (Giménez-Candela 2019, 7–18).
6 Constitutionalisation
Some provisions related to animals are enshrined in the constitutions of
the following European countries: Switzerland (1973), Slovenia (1991),
Germany (2002), Luxembourg (2007) and Austria (2013) (e.g., Le Bot
2018; Eisen 2017, 909–954).
Animal protection is a national objective of Switzerland, Germany and
Austria (Staatszielbestimmung). The influx of the changes of animal legal
status has been reflected in the undertaking of corresponding constitu-
tional modifications in the aforementioned countries, having reformed
their respective constitutions with the objective of including animal pro-
tection as a fundamental value.
Switzerland must be considered to be the absolute precursor and
pioneering country in this ambit (Goetschel 1989). By 1893, the Swiss
nation had already voted in favour of a constitutional prohibition of cer-
tain methods of slaughter without stunning before exsanguination.
Therefore, Switzerland was the first country in the world that imposed
the obligation of stunning animals before slaughter, for which reason
ritual slaughter continues to be prohibited. Switzerland was also the first
European country to include animal welfare as a specific theme in its

constitution, doing so as early as 1973, as can be seen in article 80 of the
Federal Constitution.
But what is truly outstanding is that in 1992 a second constitutional
order reinforced the position of animal welfare in a very unique way. As
a result of a national referendum, Switzerland had to amend the
Constitution by adding an order that obliged the legislature to pass laws
on the use of genetic and reproductive material of animals, plants and
other organisms, and in doing so, to bear in mind the dignity of other
living beings, including that of animals, as we have already mentioned.
A reference to the dignity of creatures (“Würde der Kreatur”) as a
governing principle of the treatment and consideration that is owed to
them appears in art. 120.2 of the Swiss Constitution of 18th April 1999
(Sitter-Liver 2012, 29–51). This notion was renewed in 2008, transformed
into “dignity of animals”, in the Swiss Animal Protection Act, which had
been completely revised (Tierschutzgesetz 2008). Article 1 provides: “The
purpose of this act is to protect the dignity and welfare of animals”.
Article 3a specifies “Dignity: Intrinsic value of animals, which has to be
respected when dealing with them. The dignity of the animal is not being
respected if the distress imposed on it cannot be justified by overriding
interests. In particular, distress is present if pain, suffering or damages are
inflicted upon the animal, if fear is caused or the animal is subject to
humiliation, if the appearance or features are significantly altered or if it
is unduly instrumentalised” (unofficial translation).
It can be affirmed that the reference to dignity as an intrinsic attribute
of animals (Burgat 2002, 197; Richter 2007, 319) forms part of the phil-
osophical background and moral teleology unique to Central European
thought (Brenner 2012, 53; Sitter-Liver 2012, 29). This, by contrast,
with help also from the discussion generated by the Kantian consider-
ation on animals (Korsgaard 2012, 6), sees a decline in expressions such
as “dignity of creature”, “dignity of creation”, “fellow creature
(“Mitgeschöpfte”), which form part not only of the mental horizon of
Central Europe but of the normative lexicon of constitutional orders and
of the respective codes. This is therefore the breeding ground that explains
the Austrian reform of the ABGB that declares animals “non-things” and,
almost as a planned concatenation, the same reform then introduced in

Germany (Ammann et al. 2015) as well as in Switzerland, as we have seen.
As expected, the modification of animals’ legal status of animals was
passed in both Austria and Germany in a very controversial way. On the
one hand, it amounted to a great advance in the field of animal protec-
tion, as animals were not considered a thing. On the other hand, there
was harsh criticism of the lack of content for and sense in these regula-
tions. In fact, with all the difficulties that come with the practical applica-
tion of a negative concept such as “not things” (nicht Sachen), up until
now the German Civil Doctrine has referred to animals as “Mitgeschöpfe”,
which means creatures that share our fate (Obergfell 2016, 388ff). This
conception of respect for animals is that which has driven Germany to
include animals in its constitution.
This Constitutionalisation of animals in Germany has made the
country a role model on the topic of animal protection. This change came
about through art. 20 of the Constitution (Grundgesetz, GG) referring
to the protection of the natural heritage of life (“Schutz der natürlichen
Lebensgrundlagen”) in 2002. Article 20a proclaims: “[Protection of the
natural foundations of life and animals] Mindful also of its responsibility
toward future generations, the state shall protect the natural foundations
of life and animals by legislation and, in accordance with law and justice,
by executive and judicial action, all within the framework of the consti-
tutional order”(unofficial translation).
The origin, birth and development of this change are very interesting
and have produced an enormous amount of critical academic literature
and tenacious support for the principles established by the Constitution
by which the state assumes the responsibility of future generations to care
for the environment and animals (e.g. Schulze-Fielitz 2006, 288ff;
Bubnoff 2001). It is without a doubt a paradigmatic article with a large
amount of legislative skill, and it is worth dedicating some comments
to this.
Worries about the changes that industrial society has been producing
regarding the conservation of the environment—the fruit of philosophic
speculation in the nineteenth century (Engels 1845)—started to gestate
firmly in Germany in the 60s (e.g., Hermand 1991, 39ff: Kloepfer et al.
1994, 9ff.) as a reflection of manifest anxiety among intellectuals of all
tendencies faced with a change that had previously only been a theory
but was then being produced on a factual level (Carson 1962; Meadows
et al. 1972). Such change concentrated commitment for the protection
of the natural bases of life in the state, which was substituting traditional
state objectives for conserving peace, the exercise of power within the
state boundaries and the organisation of the democratic state that, up
until the nineteenth century (Engels 1845), had constituted the funda-
mental objectives that are now recognised and assumed by the modern
state (Steinberg 1988, 41ff; Murswieck 1995, 15ff; Calliess 2001, 65
and 96ff).
Of course in Germany, such a change was not produced without
abundant discussion, and caused the search for a consensus among
politicians, jurists and social forces (Klein 1991, 729ff; Brönnecke 1999),
even more so when adding the so-called Tierschutzsprinzip (principle of
animal protection) was proposed (Thiele 2001; Caspar and Schröter
2003, 12ff: Fielenbach 2005, 189ff.). The avalanche of letters and requests
manifesting preventive reservations against the inclusion of animals in
the Constitution due to an alleged respect for religious freedom, and
which reached the Supreme Court, is well known, and determined that
within a few months, there would be a change of direction in the report
and the extension of Article 20a GG (Grundgesetz) on animals as a
“minor solution” (“kleine Lösung”), which, like the principle of
environmental care, was faced with the generally accepted resistance. An
international commitment was mediated involving Germany in its
conception and promotion (Kley-Struller 1995, 507ff; Tzung-Jen 1996;
Bartholomäi 1997; Schink 1997, 221ff; Streinz 1993, 319ff; Westphal
2000, 339ff; Hasso 2001, 873ff; Epiney 2005). Therefore, indirectly, the
inclusion of animals and of their protection in the Grundgesetz (GG)
became imperative (Braun 2003, 488–493; Faller 2005).
The Constitutionalisation of animals in Austria came about rapidly.
The debate started in 2004, but animal protection became a national
objective in 2013. In this respect, § 2 of the Federal Constitutional Law
in Sustainability proclaims: “[The Republic of Austria (federal, state and
municipal governments) is committed to animal welfare]” (unofficial
translation).
7 Globalisation
These days, the relation between animals and the law is getting narrower.
Legal stances on animals are beginning to change, even though at the
fundamental level the categorisation of animals as “things” of property
and the refusal to reconsider, and perhaps broaden, the application of the
term “person” to animals themselves, persist. But, against all settled logic,
this has been done in India, as dolphins have been qualified as “non-
human persons” (Government of India 2013). For those who find this
idea strange, I would like to remind them that for many centuries the
term “person” has been applied to entities totally unrelated to being
human, but instead with heritage, activities and functions.
In addition to some important legal changes (see supra 4, 5 and 6), in
Europe there has been the development of literature, discussions and the
birth of animal protection groups, but only moderate scientific and aca-
demic reflection up until now (Peters 2016, 382ff). Outside of Europe,
two main lines of interpretation have concurrently opened up: of prop-
erty, on the one hand, and of procedural action on the other. I am here
referring to the announcement of David Favre’s theory of Living Property
(Favre 2010, 1021ff), and Steven Wise’s Non-Human Rights Project
(Wise 2000), with its concession of Habeas Corpus to certain chimpan-
zees in Argentinian courts (De Baggis 2017, 1–17).
Animal welfare has come to be a subject of increased attention. The
worries of our society have seemingly come to be focused on questions
about which they were completely indifferent hardly a decade ago. Society
increasingly demands a greater respect for that which, with a certain
amount of imprecision, is known among us as “animal rights” (e.g.,
Francione 2000) or, more precisely, “animal welfare” (e.g., Regan 1989,
2004; Cohen and Regan 2001; Singer 2002, 2006). Our society is begin-
ning to demand not only that domesticated animals receive dignified
treatment and that abandonment and mistreatment end, but that ani-
mals enjoy increased consideration by way of treatment adequate for
their condition as sentient, living beings and, while the debate is not yet
widespread in Europe, that animals’ own position as an object of law
increases with greater legal consistency.
The division between countries also reveals itself as a division of

traditions of greater or lesser respect for animal welfare. The EU itself,
which was born as an economically based union, nonetheless recognises
the status of animals as sentient beings that form part of our environmental
surroundings, in an article of its constitution. The Treaty of Lisbon has
further insisted on the qualification of animals as sentient beings, leaving
the door open for legislative development that, one hopes, would be in
line with this qualification. However, paradoxically, the European direc-
tives on the topic of animal welfare tend to be applied by agricultural
ministries, where the animal is always considered a “product” (Giménez-
Candela 2019, 166–167).
In France, since the 70s, a great group of intellectuals (one active
member of which being Marguerite Yourcenar, member of the French
Academy) has provoked many conversations and conferences on animal
rights, up to the point that the conditions for animals crossed the bound-
aries of speculative theory and became an urgent political issue which no
longer made reference to “animal protection”, but instead prioritised
human-animal relationships and considered animals as sentient beings,
distinguishable from inanimate objects (Giménez-Candela 2019, 167).
The law has dealt with animals through codification—within the logic
of the ownership of things—in the way that it has covered the most fun-
damental necessities of their lives: as products, the methods of their trans-
port and investigation, their companionship and their part in shows for
human entertainment. As well as this, the law has concerned itself with
animals in their means as a source of responsibility. In conflicts of inter-
est, consideration for animals has been measured or included. For this
reason, in a paradoxical context such as that of our globalised society,
certain aspects of European legislation that have until now only been the
subject of insufficient theoretical consideration, should be prioritised.
The animal and law binomial should include (a) establishing a legal defi-
nition of animal, which separates it from the idea of “thing” or “product”;
(b) considering animal welfare as a predicament of sustainable develop-
ment; (c) normatively protecting the unnecessary suffering of animals
(farmed or used in experiments); (d) provoking sector-based studies
intended for different areas of interest: legal, social, economic, veterinary;
(e) collaboration between agents potentially involved in animal welfare:
public administrators, protection societies and economic agents respon-

sible for transport, feeding, slaughter or scientific and technical
experimentation.
Another matter, in my opinion, is the response of the law to animal
abuse through the criminal law. It is the mission of a constitutional and
democratic state to provide sanctions when faced with behaviours that
question the efficacy of the punitive faculty that concern it (Requejo
Conde 2015, 1–26; Ríos Corbacho 2015, 1–21). This is a mandate in
which the question of proprietorship over animals naturally plays a role
(Wohlers 2016, 426), but the punishment for animal abuse is tied to the
behaviours that the law deems to be illicit and over which the state
assumes a particular mission of vigilance in favour of the most vulnerable
(Roxin 1966, 377, 383). However, critical thought has revisited the ini-
tial consideration of a universal respect for animals and the desire to pro-
tect them in the face of abuse and aggression many times over the
centuries, in order to provoke the question of attributing them a legal
position better than that of property. To put it in other terms, philosophy
(Regan 2004), Ethics (Singer 2002), anthropology, history and, recently,
animal welfare science have questioned whether animals should remain
tied to the status of things of property and, also, whether this status justi-
fies not only their use, but also the limitless abuse towards their lives and
physical integrity (Boisseau-Sowinski 2013).
This being said, it remains obvious that, these days, the question of the
legal status of animals and its eventual change, specifically in civil codes,
has gone from a question that only interested and mobilised defence
movements for animals, to a question that concerns science and legal
language regarding animals as sentient beings, concerning society as a
whole. This has resulted in the development of a new awareness, of con-
cerns regarding the organisation of the state that assumes responsibility
for animal welfare (which is also a concern of EU law), and of concerns
regarding the economy and education in respect to animals at all levels of
teaching.
The animal question is a global question, as evidenced by taking a look
at the evolution of animal law (Favre 2005; Tischler and Frasch 2019,
303–340; Wagman and Liebman 2011): an emerging legal discipline
that increasingly affirms itself as an instrument that facilitates the “turn”
that law requires in order to open itself to new perspectives and cross new
frontiers (Peters 2019; Blattner 2019). This, in my opinion, can be sum-
marised as follows: the de-objectification of animals, the
Constitutionalisation of animals and the globalisation of animals.
8 Conclusion
By way of conclusive reflection, I will formulate some prospective
solutions about the role that corresponds to us who, as demanded by our
profession, assume the responsibility of particular vigilance over animals
and the regulations that can guarantee greater protection of their inter-
ests. The following points can be summarily set out as follows:
1. Scientists and jurists must work together for the welfare of animals.
Each one of us provides a combination of varying abilities and knowl-
edge regarding the adequate level of protection and care that animals
must be afforded.
2. A legal discussion on animal welfare is different to a discussion based
on science. In science, the discussion deals with how to describe and
understand the optimal conditions for animal welfare. Science is also
necessary for describing the consequences of the various living condi-
tions on animals if animals are provided with conditions below the
welfare level required for their species. The legal discussions on animal
welfare are not about the optimal living conditions with which we
provide them, but on the conditions that are so deficient as to amount
to a punishable act (fines and prison sentences), or a violation of civil
or administrative regulation (fines and the revocation of licences) for
keeping animals in conditions below the established standards.
There generally exists a considerable difference between the optimal

living conditions, and those that may be criminally punishable in line
with animal welfare. It is therefore advisable to distinguish between gen-
eral prohibitions against cruelty—those that protect all animals—and the
responsibilities of owners regarding the animals within their proprietor-
ship. In other words, the obligation to criminally defend animals from
mistreatment, as with any vulnerable being, constitutes an obligation

corresponding to each state, while the obligation to carry out good treat-
ment towards animals is a consequence of the responsibility that comes
with proprietorship of humans over animals.
While science is centred on the animal, the creation of law brings into
play the balance of many differing and diverse factors. Law is, to a large
extent, the result of a political process and the exercise of power, whose
exercise is attributed to many diverse actors and voices. Some will argue
over the economic consequences, and others over the emotional conse-
quences. Some human beings make financial or political contributions so
as to be heard more clearly, and others will form public groups of voters
to argue in favour of certain legal positions. Initiatives take on many
forms. In other words, the political process cannot ignore the values of
society, which are changeable, for example, the protection of endangered
species, the welfare of animals, the control of water pollution or child
labour. The socially acceptable levels of animal welfare, just like the ques-
tion of the contamination levels of water, are ultimately political ques-
tions customisable for each country, and the differences that can be seen
in the world around us suggest that the political responses are not, nor
could they be, the same in each country.
The generation of law and of laws is the art of achieving a compromise
between opposing views within the political arena of a given state. For
example, in the realm of production animals, it must be asked whether
the criminal threshold for the breeding of laying hens is ten birds per bat-
tery cage, or perhaps three, or whether the cage should be illegal. Science
can be of significant help in these types of considerations and debates, as
it can provide verified and corroborated information on the aforemen-
tioned consequences for animal welfare so as to define the various alter-
natives to regulation that could be presented to the politicians responsible.
Instead, the legal debate on public policies is about what is socially unac-
ceptable. In areas such as the welfare of production animals, or of animals
in public shows, the role of animal welfare science experts is, and has
been, decisive, yet is out of the question today, and seemingly, a respon-
sibility recognised by the same professional collectives involved. But if
the question is on the conditions that are acceptable for the use of ani-
mals, then the role of veterinarians is even more important, due to the
conditions, including the nature of the possible suffering, which is not as

obvious for the public or for politicians. There is a genuine need for cor-
roborated and reliable scientific information, for it is of the utmost
importance for outlining an adequately solid and reliable legal plan that
will effectively protect animals.
There still remains a lot for us to learn in terms of what non-human
animals want and need from us, on the workings of the most complicated
aspects of their organisms and of their sentience, and also on how we
must treat animals of each species. Animal welfare science must continue
to carry out an important role in determining how we achieve our ethical
and moral responsibilities, and how we legally regulate the lives of the
animals with which we interact, with a basis in practical and normative
recognition of sentience.
Acknowledgements I thank for careful reading, editing and very helpful criti-
cism my colleagues Raffaela Cersosimo and Oliver Wookey for their help in
finishing the English version of this chapter.
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Correction to: Survival of the Fittest:
When an Evolutionary Advantage
Becomes Such a Threat to the Welfare
of Other Non-Human Animal Species
That it Threatens Our Own Species
Correction to:
Chapter 8 in: A. Vitale, S. Pollo (eds.), Human/Animal Relationships
in Transformation, The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85277-1_8
The original version of this chapter title has been revised from “The Two
Sides of the Human-Animal Bond: Reflections on Using and Abusing
Animals” to “Survival of the Fittest: When an Evolutionary Advantage
Becomes Such a Threat to the Welfare of Other Non-Human Animal
Species That it Threatens Our Own Species”.
The updated version of this chapter can be found at

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85277-1_8
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 C1


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THE PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

ANIMAL ETHICS SERIES

For further information or to submit a proposal for consideration, please

More information about this series at

ISSN 2634-6672 ISSN 2634-6680 (electronic)

Cover illustration: Maram_shutterstock.com

Ethics of Human/Animal Relationships is a growing field of academic

Rome, Italy Augusto Vitale

we have witnessed the growth of academic courses, as well as university

The new Palgrave Macmillan Series on Animal Ethics is the result of a

kind in the world. It aims to demonstrate rigorous intellectual enquiry

Oxford, UK Andrew Linzey

Part I Philosophy and Ethics of Human Animal/

2 Darwinian Biology and the New Understanding

3 Animal Detection and Its Role in Our Attitude towards

4 The Moral Value of Animal Sentience and Agency 47

5 Affective Animal Ethics: Reflective Empathy, Attention

Part II Transformations in General Scenarios 91

6 Perceiving Animals Through Different Demographic and

7 Animal Welfare in Context: Historical, Scientific, Ethical,

8 Survival of the Fittest: When an Evolutionary Advantage

9 A Proposal for a Multi-Dimensional Profile of

10 The Two Sides of the Non-Human-­Animal Bond:

Part III Transformations in Cases and Contexts 219

11 Farms, Landscapes, Food and Relationships221

12 Biotechnologies and Animals: The Impact of Genetic

13 Coexisting with Wild Nonhuman Primates in a Brazilian

14 Companionship and Wellbeing: Benefits and Challenges

15 Human-Wildlife Coexistence in the Urban Domain:

Part IV Recognising Transformations 339

16 Political Representation of Animals’ Voices341

17 Animal Law: What Is Left to be Said by the Law About

Elisa Aaltola is a philosopher, specialized in animal and environmental

Marta Borgi is a researcher at the Istituto Superiore di Sanità in Rome,

to play with humans, contributed to a documentary on back-bred dedo-

ventions and human-animal interactions. She is endowed chair of

developmental disorders, with a special emphasis on Fragile X syndrome

in Rome, Italy. She co-edited the special issue “Primates in anthropogenic

Superiore di Sanità, Rome. He was President of the Italian Association of

Fig. 3.1 Schematic representation of some of the stimuli used to

the left the sequence of movement of a self-propelled red

Table 6.1 Background details of the respondents 98

During the last decades human/non-human animals relationships have

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 1

reasoning the question of which feature of a subject should be recognised

role of the scientist at the intersection of the different dimensions of

“One-­Health” and its application both to humans and animals. Another

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 9

whereby “civilization” must be understood to include the human under-

Using words like “fellow brethren,” “slaves,” and “companion” Charles

but they shall not be understood as part of an effort to write a chapter in

2  umans and Animals: A Short History

those ideas three general premises about human/animal relationships and

jeopardizing their welfare and chances of survival) as in the case of all

creationist view represented in the biblical tale of the creation of the

Ethology, the comparative study of behavior, is easy to define: it is the dis-

The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable—namely,

Human/animal continuationism and historicity also characterize the

organism and therefore they are actions. Of course, some philosophical

and agency are regulated by the same mechanism explaining animals’

Rome, Italy Augusto Vitale

Oxford, UK Andrew Linzey

Part I Philosophy and Ethics of Human Animal/

2 Darwinian Biology and the New Understanding

3 Animal Detection and Its Role in Our Attitude towards

4 The Moral Value of Animal Sentience and Agency 47

5 Affective Animal Ethics: Reflective Empathy, Attention

Part II Transformations in General Scenarios 91

6 Perceiving Animals Through Different Demographic and

7 Animal Welfare in Context: Historical, Scientific, Ethical,

8 Survival of the Fittest: When an Evolutionary Advantage

9 A Proposal for a Multi-Dimensional Profile of

10 The Two Sides of the Non-Human-Animal Bond:

Part III Transformations in Cases and Contexts 219

11 Farms, Landscapes, Food and Relationships221

12 Biotechnologies and Animals: The Impact of Genetic

13 Coexisting with Wild Nonhuman Primates in a Brazilian

14 Companionship and Wellbeing: Benefits and Challenges

15 Human-Wildlife Coexistence in the Urban Domain:

Part IV Recognising Transformations 339

16 Political Representation of Animals’ Voices341

17 Animal Law: What Is Left to be Said by the Law About

Table 6.1 Background details of the respondents 98

“One-Health” and its application both to humans and animals. Another

2 umans and Animals: A Short History

5 eyond Sentience: Agency and Animals’

2 Misconceptions About Brain Evolution

3 nimals and Morphological Similarity

2 Types of Morally Relevant Properties

3 Proportionality and the Basis for Equality

9 entience and Agency as Bases of (In)

The second step is to ask whether one prefers an egalitarian or non-