Basic Tax Issues
Basic Tax Issues
1955
Repository Citation
Blough, Roy, "Basic Tax Issues" (1955). William & Mary Annual Tax Conference. 645.
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Basic Tax Issues
By Roy BLOUGH*
A belief which I am sure we all share and without which this con-
ference would be pointless is that tax policy can and should be better
than it is. I do not doubt that there is some friendly disagreement among
us over what should be regarded as "better" with respect to various pro-
visions of the law, but we would all agree that there ought to be some
changes.
How is a better tax policy to be achieved? Every year fine-sounding
pronouncements issue from one or more of the many existing economic
and political groups to the effect that there must be a thorough-going
reformation of the taxing structure. We must, we are told, cast off the
present faulty tax structure; we must wipe the slate clean and make a
fresh start. It is a stimulating thought: to clean the slate and make a
fresh start; but it is not the way tax policy is made. The tax system is a
going concern in which past, present, and future are part of a continu-
ing institution. Tax policy grows through a succession of changes in
the existing system. In almost every year there are changes, in some
years numerous changes, but rarely is there a really drastic upheaval.
Our most recent revolutionary change was the introduction of the pro-
gressive income tax in 1913, and even that did not appear so drastic at
the time as it eventually became, since it was only after World War I
began that the income and profits taxes assumed a dominating role in
federal taxation.
*Roy Blough: former Principal Director of Economic Affairs for the United
Nations, and now Professor of International Business in the Graduate School of
Business, Columbia University. Author of The Federal Taxing Process.
18 THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF TAXATION
than taxation that could be drawn on freely if it were not for the ad-
verse economic effects of spending them. Taxation for revenue performs
the necessary function of withdrawing spendable funds from private
hands, thus preventing the inflationary results that follow when the
government and its citizens engage in competitive spending for the
same limited supply of goods and services.
When the volume of revenue to be raised increases more rapidly
than the national income, tax rates must rise, or new tax sources must
be tapped, or both. A consequence of rising tax rates is to accentuate
the importance of the decision of tax issues, since the line drawn be-
tween taxability and non-taxability becomes a matter of greater concern.
A consequence of tapping new tax sources is to enlarge the taxable
area, and thus to increase the number of decisions to be made.
What factors determine the amount of revenue set as the goal for
tax legislation? The chief factor in determining the amount to be raised
is the amount being spent. The two amounts, however, need not be
the same. The question whether they should be the same, and if not,
which should be the larger and by how nmuch, are major problems of
budget policy. Traditionally, "sound finance" called for an annually
balanced budget. There are still many people who maintain this to be
the only proper rule. But even they usually allow exceptions. Would it
really have been possible to finance World War II out of current tax
revenues? A few people answer yes to that question, but I wonder if
any of them would have been prepared to accept the levels of taxes that
would have been necessary to achieve the result, or the economic and
political consequences of taxes at those levels. The wartime deficit of
around 21 o billion dollars undoubtedly could have been kept smaller if
there had been the political will to do so. But that is a quite different
matter from no deficit at all.
Be that as it may, we have a federal debt accumulated in World
War I, during the depression years, during World War II, and in recent
years. With this large accumulated debt we face the following question.
Should our revenue goal be high enough to provide for the repayment
of that debt, and, if so, how rapid a repayment? One looks in vain for
any signs that a substantial degree of repayment is politically feasible,
while economically debt repayment could be harmful unless limited
to the changing capacity of the economy to absorb it.
This brings me to an approach to budget policy which has developed
over the last quarter-century and is now accepted by most economists,
and to an increasing extent by members of Congress and other policy
makers. I refer to the use of budget policy as an instrument for eco-
nomic stabilization. In brief, this policy calls for surpluses of revenues
20 THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF TAXATION
On the other hand, social policy must rest on the assumption that
people can be induced to do socially desirable things and to avoid doing
socially undesirable things. The rewards and punishments of the eco-
nomic system have constituted a set of inducements. It is only fair that
those who have done the socially desirable things in response to these
inducements should be rewarded for having done so in comparison
with those who have reacted in socially undesirable ways. In other
words, it is not fair to hold out a carrot to a donkey and then not give
it to him when he has carried the load. There are interpretations of this
idea that would make impossible any change in governmental policy,
which is a palpable absurdity. There would seem to be little unfair-
ness, for example, in taking away gains in excess of the amounts of
anticipated gain that would have been necessary to produce the socially
desirable action. Moreover, it is important to remember that progres-
sive taxation and the possibility of higher rates being imposed at any
time have been one of the "rules of the game" for nearly two gen-
erations.
In summary we have two main ideas influencing our view regarding
the fairness of substantial progression, and they do not point in the same
direction.
Fairness and justice is not the only major consideration that affects
attitudes toward progression. Another is the expected impact of pro-
gression on the economy. This consideration looks to the future effects
of the progressive rate schedule. The most reliable motivation to pro-
ductive economic activity, and one that we have found to be necessary,
is the incentive of profit or other economic gain. In distributing the tax
burden policy makers must have in mind the kinds and amounts of
incentives that are necessary to bring forth the volume and quality of
economic activity required for satisfactory operation of the economy.
In addition to incentives, the pattern of taxes affects consumption, sav-
ing, and investment, and these also require consideration. At the same
time it should not be forgotten that a sense of fairness-or, more accu-
rately, a sense of unfairness-itself has a bearing on economic incentives.
If a large and important economic group-whether that group be at
the bottom or the top of the income scale-continues to feel deeply
that the tax system is grossly unfair, their economic behavior may be af-
fected adversely to the smooth and dynamic operation of the economy.
We are thus faced in progression with considerations which lead in
various directions. It is necessary for the public to weigh these consid-
erations and reach a reasonable decision. It is this kind of reasonableness
on which most great issues of government must rest for their proper
decision under our system of government. While, of course, most peo-
BASIC TAX ISSUES
carefully drawn, and oftentimes even then, it will be possible for tax-
payers to derive the benefits without making the special economic con-
tribution for which the exemption or other incentive measure is in-
tended. Moreover, many taxpayers may already have been carrying on
the activity in question without needing any special benefit. It is ob-
viously a waste of public money to give them extra payment for what
they already have found to be profitable.
In the fourth place-and this particularly disturbs me-the whole
philosophy of these incentives is that one should achieve their results by
departing from uniform taxation. There is thus at least a prima facie un-
fairness about the resulting tax structure. In the beginning this unfairness
is not a matter of concern because the policy makers consider the pur-
pose to be achieved more important than any resulting unfairness. As
times goes on, however, memories dim. Then the taxpayers who did not
receive the special benefit are likely to press on grounds of fairness for
an expansion of the benefits to include them; and on the basis of experi-
ence they seem pretty likely to get it, too. If and as this happens, the
force of the stimulus diminishes and the cost to the public treasury is in-
creased. For all four of these reasons I suggest a high degree of restraint
in providing special tax incentives.
Tax Simplification
On at least one occasion the simplification of taxes was the basis for
a tax law. I refer to the Income Tax Act of 1944. The revenue acts of
1940, 1941 and 1942 had greatly increased the tax load and by drastically
lowering the exemptions had changed the income tax from a "class" tax
to a "mass" tax. In addition to applying the traditional income tax com-
plications to many millions of new taxpayers, efforts had been made to
ease the pain of higher rates by introducing a number of provisions
designed to decrease unfairness and prevent hardship. Each of these
provisions added some complication, although to be sure most of them
did not apply to the great majority of taxpayers. What broke the camel's
back was the skip-a-year plan provided in the Revenue Act of 1942,
which required the computation of two years' income and many special
calculations. The resulting very complicated return was to be filed in
March, 1944. Even before the filing date was reached, the protests reach-
ing the Congress were so numerous and vigorous that the taxing com-
mittees promised that once the Revenue Act of 1943 was out of the way,
a bill would be considered to simplify the income tax. On the instruc-
tion of the Committee on Ways and Means, the Treasury and joint
Committee staffs worked out the draft of a bill, in which a number of
provisions improving the fairness of the tax were dropped in the inter-
BASIC TAX ISSUES
great numbers of people are not aware of where their interests lie with
respect to many tax issues. Indeed, they are often not aware of the
existence of the issues. It is no wonder that the political process is not
entirely successful in dealing with the interests of the people.
While I am not happy about the way in which the taxing process
sometimes works-or does not work-I would like to stress that tax
issues must be decided in the political arena. Some people seem to be-
lieve that tax policy can be made a science and that with competent
"experts" it is possible to determine scientifically what the proper tax
structure and rate pattern should be. Such ideas have not always been
discouraged by economists, and they have been stimulated and encour-
aged by people who claim that their own tax proposals are scientific,
in the hope of persuading policy makers to adopt them. But it is funda-
mental that science has no way of determining what kind of a society
people ought to prefer and accordingly cannot determine what policy
ought to be.
This does not mean that scientific study has no part in the policy
making process. There is great need for such study. Many mistakes in
policy decisions grow out of ignorance regarding the effects of various
tax measures and regarding what would be in the best interest of dif-
ferent groups of people. What is needed is an integration of the scien-
tific approach-that of bringing to bear more adequate knowledge-
into a process which gives full recognition to that play of political forces
on which in a democratic society we must rely for the determination of
tax policy.
One final word. I have indicated my belief in the inevitability and
the desirability of the decision of tax issues on the basis of the operation
of political forces, given a well-informed electorate and Congress. But
legislation is not all there is to taxation. The administrative and judicial
sides are also highly important-in bridging gaps in the legislation, in
applying the law to the specific situation of each taxpayer, and in fully
and uniformly enforcing the law. The play of political forces and politi-
cal pressures is completely out of place in the administrative and judicial
stages of taxation, and any signs of the political factor should give rise
to the most vigorous reaction by tax students and tax practitioners alike.
The proper forum for political action is the legislature-and also the
executive branch in so far as it participates in the legislative process. To
extend the area of political action to the administrative and judicial
branches of government can only result in undermining and destroying
the whole policy-making process.