Introduction

There is no denying the dry and

decontextual-
ized manner in which much of science is
taught
nowadays. The various reform movements
in
science education, for example, scientific
liter-
acy, science for everyone, critical thinking,
con-
structivism, and contextual teaching can be
viewed as reactions against the present way
of
delivering and organizing science education.
These movements generally seek to teach
about
science as well as science content. Teaching
about science means to teach about how
science
was developed and how one concept relates
to
another, not the factual content of science
alone.
The idea of contextualizing the material
taught
has become a kind of mantra for the various
re-
form movements. However, the
recommenda-
tions in science education need to include
more
practical strategies for improvement that are
also grounded in sound theoretical considera-
tions (Monk & Osborne, 1997, Nersessian,
1989,
Stinner, 1995). One such strategy that has
demonstrated anecdotal success is the large
con-
text problem approach. In this paper, I
propose
a theoretical framework to use in designing
such
large contexts which I call the Story-Driven
Contextual Approach.

Theoretical
Framework for
Contextual
Science Teaching Theoretical Framework for Contextual Science Teaching

Abstract
The contextual approach to teaching is generally recognized as a reasonable and desirable strategy to enhance
student learning in science. Using several cognitive and learning theories together with various philosophical
considerations, I identify five distinct contexts that are important in engaging learners: the theoretical,
practical, social, historical, and affective. Based on these five contexts, I construct a model for teaching and
learning, named the Story-Driven Contextual Approach (SDCA), in which the story assumes a major role in
engaging the learner affectively. The teacher introduces the SDCA to students by means of a story, encouraging
students to engage actively with the five contexts. In the SDCA, students function as novice researchers and
the teacher as a re-search director.

Keywords
Contextual teaching, contextual, context,
story-driven contextual approach, narrative,
story, theo-
retical, practical, social, historical, affective.
Keywords
Contextual teaching, contextual, context, story-driven contextual approach, narrative, story, theoretical,
practical, social, historical, affective.

Introduction
There is no denying the dry and decontextualized manner in which much of science is taught nowadays.
The various reform movements in science education, for example, scientific literacy, science for everyone,
critical thinking, constructivism, and contextual teaching can be viewed as reactions against the present way of
delivering and organizing science education. These movements generally seek to teach about science as well as
science content. Teaching about science means to teach about how science was developed and how one
concept relates to another, not the factual content of science alone. The idea of contextualizing the material
taught has become a kind of mantra for the various re-form movements. However, the recommendations in
science education need to include more practical strategies for improvement that are also grounded in sound
theoretical considerations (Monk & Osborne, 1997, Nersessian, 1989, Stinner, 1995). One such strategy that
has demonstrated anecdotal success is the large con-text problem approach. In this paper, I propose a
theoretical framework to use in designing such large contexts which I call the Story-Driven Contextual
Approach.
The Nature of School Science
The common observation of science educators
that the textbook is the dominant influence in
most of classroom teaching is borne out by the
TIMSS survey (Schmidt, et al., 1998). The seri-
ous shortcoming of the textbook-centered na-
ture of most of science education served as the
primary motivation for Stinner’s original incep-
tion of the LCPA. In his conclusion about the
overuse of textbooks, Stinner is in agreement
with many others, including, Whitehead (1929),
Siegel (1990), Monk and Osborne (1997), and
Van Berkel, DeVos, Verdonk, and Pilot (2000).
Van Berkel, et al., (2000) call Kuhn’s description
of the dominant methodology in science educa-
tion normal science education. Interestingly,
most of the above listed scholars would essen-
tially agree with Thomas Kuhn’s (1963) charac-
terization of science education but not with his
conclusions that “normal science” education is
a necessary requirement for the successful pro-
duction of scientists. Most of Kuhn’s critics, in
this regard, would agree with the earlier assess-
ment of Whitehead (1929) characterizing the
textbook as “an educational failure”.
One of the currently-dominant areas of re-
search in science education is the nature of sci-
ence. The emphasis on the nature of science
seeks to impart a more accurate picture of sci-
ence as characterized by philosophers of sci-
ence. Universally, research has shown that sci-
ence education does a very poor job at convey-
ing an accurate picture of the nature of science.
What exists, in effect, is a major incompatibility
between the nature of science and the nature of
school science. And, the nature of school sci-
ence can be identified with normal science edu-
cation as defined above.
In Kuhn’s 1963 characterization of normal
science he observes that
The single most striking feature of scientific edu-
cation is that, to an extent quite unknown in
other creative fields, it is conducted through text-
books, works written especially for students.
Even books that compete for adoption in a single
course differ mainly in level and pedagogic detail,
not in substance or conceptual structure. (1963,
pp. 350-351, italics in original)
Furthermore, Kuhn attributes this fact to an
apparent tacit agreement among scientists as to
what should be the elements of a pre-profes-
sional curriculum. Of course, this has led to the
overcrowded curriculum syndrome in which
the favorite topic of nearly everyone “has to be”
included in the curriculum. However, the most
important feature of textbooks, and the only
part that many students pay attention to is the
end of chapter problems. Kuhn claims that
1. The Nature of School Science
The common observation of science educators that the textbook is the dominant influence in most of
classroom teaching is borne out by the TIMSS survey (Schmidt, et al., 1998). The serious shortcoming of the
textbook-centered nature of most of science education served as the primary motivation for Stinner’s original
inception of the LCPA. In his conclusion about the overuse of textbooks, Stinner is in agreement with many
others, including, Whitehead (1929), Siegel (1990), Monk and Osborne (1997), and Van Berkel, DeVos,
Verdonk, and Pilot (2000). Van Berkel, et al., (2000) call Kuhn’s description of the dominant methodology in
science education normal science education.
Interestingly, most of the above listed scholars would essentially agree with Thomas Kuhn’s (1963)
characterization of science education but not with his conclusions that “normal science” education is a
necessary requirement for the successful pro-duction of scientists. Most of Kuhn’s critics, in this regard, would
agree with the earlier assessment of Whitehead (1929) characterizing the textbook as “an educational failure”.
One of the currently-dominant areas of re-search in science education is the nature of science. The emphasis
on the nature of science seeks to impart a more accurate picture of science as characterized by philosophers of
science. Universally, research has shown that science education does a very poor job at conveying an accurate
picture of the nature of science. What exists, in effect, is a major incompatibility between the nature of science
and the nature of school science. And, the nature of school science can be identified with normal science
education as defined above. In Kuhn’s 1963 characterization of normal science he observes that The single
most striking feature of scientific education is that, to an extent quite unknown in other creative fields, it is
conducted through text-books, works written especially for students.
Even books that compete for adoption in a single course differ mainly in level and pedagogic detail, not in
substance or conceptual structure. (1963, pp. 350-351, italics in original) Furthermore, Kuhn attributes this fact
to an apparent tacit agreement among scientists as to what should be the elements of a pre-professional
curriculum. Of course, this has led to the overcrowded curriculum syndrome in which the favorite topic of
nearly everyone “has to be” included in the curriculum. However, the most important feature of textbooks,
and the only part that many students pay attention to is the end of chapter problems. Kuhn claims that these
books exhibit, from the very start, concrete problem-solutions that the profession has come to accept as
paradigms, and they then ask the student either with a pencil and paper or in the laboratory, to solve for
himself problems very closely modelled in method and substance upon those through which the text has led
him. (1963, p. 351) The whole point of this method is to strip all “unnecessary” material and leave only the
bare decontextualized scientific facts, theories, and laws along with the exemplar problems that demonstrate
them. The claim implicit in textbook-centered teaching that the “bare facts” and exemplars are adequate for
obtaining an understanding of science seems to be based on a transmission model of teaching and learning.
The transmission model treats information as a commodity that can be transmitted unchanged from the
teacher to the mind of the student through the process of “telling”. This view goes back at least to John Locke
in the seventeenth century. Locke, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690/1959), metaphorically
speaks of the mind as a tabula rasa, a clean slate, which is “written” on by the sensory experience of listening
to the teacher speak. Learning theory has departed radically from this traditional form during the last quarter
of the twentieth century. In the vein of Locke's metaphor, today the mind of the learner is seen not as a clean
slate, but rather a slate on which much is already “written”, where the learner himself or herself “writes” new
words and phrases in appropriate spots and re-arranges phrases to make room for new ones. Current
educational literature tends to utilize the term “traditional” to embody all those elements of practice and
theory that warrant criticism. I will also use the term with that connotation, however, I do not mean to imply
that there is nothing about past practice that warrants continuation or emulation. The constructivist
movement has produced the main opposition to this “traditional” view of learning. Von Glasersfeld, a major
proponent of constructivism, states the essence of the constructivist philosophy when he writes: “Knowledge
is the result of an individual subject’s constructive activity, not a commodity that somehow resides outside the
knower and can be conveyed or instilled by diligent perception or linguistic communication” (1990, p. 37).
Learning is, in this view, a sense-making activity by the learner whereby she or he tries to accommodate new
information to existing mental structures. New information is always connected to similar information where
conceptual overlap or context is the dominant factor. By this path of reasoning one arrives at the im-portance
of context to the learning process, since information cannot exist in isolation in long-term memory and, even in
the reasoning process, there are constant attempts to make connections among concepts.

The Contextual Approach

In view of the preceding discussion, it is
reason-
able to view the process of endeavoring to
learn
as an attempt to find appropriate and
desirable
contexts into which to fit new knowledge.
Psy-
chologist Barbara Rogoff describes context
as
“the integral aspect of cognitive events”
(1984),
so that cognition and context are inseparable.
The current view of cognitive psychology
about
the importance of context is strongly
expressed
by Ryan Tweney when he writes that,
“cognition
is contextually dependent and must be de-
scribed in that context before it is understood
at
all” (1992). But what does the word
“context”
convey in the science-educational setting?
Baker, O’Neil, and Linn explain two
different
usages of the word “context”:
… the term context has different and somewhat
conflicting meanings. Some proponents use
context to denote domain specificity. Perfor-
mance in this context would presumably show
deep expertise. On the other hand, context has
4 S. Klassen
been used to signal tasks with authenticity for the
learner. The adjective authentic is used to denote
… tasks that contain true-to-life problems or that
embed … skills in applied contexts. (1994, p.
335)
Baker, O'Neil, and Linn see the knowledge-
cen-
tered and the activity-centered contexts as
somehow incompatible. But in the
constructiv-
ist view, knowledge development proceeds
as an
activity of the learner. Hence, the argument
can
be made that the two meanings of context
are
not contradictory, but rather complementary
(Koul & Dana, 1997; Rogoff, 1984). This is
also
born out in research reported by Ebenezer
and
Gaskell (1995) who draw on the insight of
Mar-
ton (1981) when they write that
… we often find variation in conceptions not
only between children but also within the same
individual. Depending on the context, children
may exhibit qualitatively different conceptions of
the very same phenomenon. Thus meanings are
context dependent. Conceptions are, therefore,
not characteristics of an individual; rather they
are characteristics of the relations between an in-
dividual, content, and context. Learning is both
context and content dependent. (Ebenezer &
Gaskell, 1995, p. 2)
Baker, O’Neil, and Linn’s dual meaning of
con-
text—domain-specific and authentic—
correlate
with Ebenezer and Gaskell’s “content” and
“context”. The domain-specific context
relates
to disciplinary knowledge that the learner
wishes to acquire, and the true-to-life context
relates to the learner’s use of practical
abilities in
the process of acquiring knowledge or in
apply-
ing that knowledge.
In considering context, it would be useful to
construct a working definition to guide
further
considerations. The word context
originates
from the Latin contextus, denoting the
connec-
tion of words or coherence (Merriam-
Webster,
2003). Originally, “context” was used, in
the
linguistic sense, to mean “the parts of a dis-
course that surround a word or passage and
can
throw light on its meaning” (Merriam-
Webster,
2003). Often the words “environment” and
“setting” are used as synonyms for context.
Us-
ing the meaning and connotations of
“context”,
“environment”, and “setting”, I propose a
defi-
nition of “context” as the entities that
connect to
or surround a focal entity and contribute to
the
meaningfulness of the whole. The “focal
entity”
in the formal definition would be either a
scien-
tific understanding or ability, either a
concept or
a skill. Meaningfulness then arises out of
fac-
tors like familiarity, social interaction,
activity,
reflection, logical relation, emotional
response,
and so on, and, in the sense of the definition,
these constitute a context for a concept or
skill.
2. The Contextual Approach
In view of the preceding discussion, it is reason-able to view the process of endeavoring to learn as an
attempt to find appropriate and desirable contexts into which to fit new knowledge. Psychologist Barbara
Rogoff describes context as “the integral aspect of cognitive events” (1984), so that cognition and context are
inseparable. The current view of cognitive psychology about the importance of context is strongly expressed by
Ryan Tweney when he writes that, “cognition is contextually dependent and must be de-scribed in that context
before it is understood at all” (1992). But what does the word “context” convey in the science-educational
setting? Baker, O’Neil, and Linn explain two different usages of the word “context”: … the term context has
different and somewhat conflicting meanings. Some proponents use context to denote domain specificity.
Performance in this context would presumably show deep expertise. On the other hand, context has
4 S. Klassen been used to signal tasks with authenticity for the learner. The adjective authentic is used to
denote … tasks that contain true-to-life problems or that embed … skills in applied contexts. (1994, p. 335)
Baker, O'Neil, and Linn see the knowledge-centered and the activity-centered contexts as somehow
incompatible. But in the constructivist view, knowledge development proceeds as an activity of the learner.
Hence, the argument can be made that the two meanings of context are not contradictory, but rather
complementary (Koul & Dana, 1997; Rogoff, 1984). This is also born out in research reported by Ebenezer and
Gaskell (1995) who draw on the insight of Mar-ton (1981) when they write that … we often find variation in
conceptions not only between children but also within the same individual. Depending on the context, children
may exhibit qualitatively different conceptions of the very same phenomenon. Thus meanings are context
dependent. Conceptions are, therefore, not characteristics of an individual; rather they are characteristics of
the relations between an in-dividual, content, and context. Learning is both context and content dependent.
(Ebenezer & Gaskell, 1995, p. 2) Baker, O’Neil, and Linn’s dual meaning of con-text—domain-specific and
authentic—correlate with Ebenezer and Gaskell’s “content” and “context”. The domain-specific context relates
to disciplinary knowledge that the learner wishes to acquire, and the true-to-life context relates to the
learner’s use of practical abilities in the process of acquiring knowledge or in applying that knowledge. In
considering context, it would be useful to construct a working definition to guide further considerations. The
word context originates from the Latin contextus, denoting the connection of words or coherence (Merriam-
Webster, 2003). Originally, “context” was used, in the linguistic sense, to mean “the parts of a dis-course that
surround a word or passage and can throw light on its meaning” (Merriam-Webster, 2003). Often the words
“environment” and “setting” are used as synonyms for context. Using the meaning and connotations of
“context”, “environment”, and “setting”, I propose a definition of “context” as the entities that connect to or
surround a focal entity and contribute to the meaningfulness of the whole. The “focal entity” in the formal
definition would be either a scientific understanding or ability, either a concept or a skill. Meaningfulness then
arises out of fac-tors like familiarity, social interaction, activity, reflection, logical relation, emotional response,
and so on, and, in the sense of the definition, these constitute a context for a concept or skill.

3. Contexts that are Important to Science Learning

The contexts relevant to learning could be viewed either from the perspective of the curriculum and the
teacher or from the perspective of the student—originating either with the knowledge being taught or with
the way students learn that knowledge. The scientific knowledge being taught may be broken into theoretical
and experimental components, or, at a simpler level, into logical and practical com-ponents, in the same way
that scientific research breaks into two separate, but complementary, streams. From the point of view of the
student, “science in context illuminates the theoretical practices of science” (Koul & Dana, 1997, p. 132) and
furthermore, having the opportunity for hands-on science investigation will help guard against “giving up
science before it starts getting interesting” (Koul & Dana, 1997, p. 132). Arthur Stinner has characterized the
theoretical and experimental as the logical and evidential aspects of teaching, two components of his LEP or
“Logical-Evidential-Psychological” model of teaching and learning (Stinner, 1992, 1995). The LEP model was
developed primarily to address the problem of textbook-centered science education.

The Practical Context

The first context important for teaching and
learning that will be considered, in detail, is
the
practical context. The term “practical” is
used
here in the sense expressed by Derek Hodson
(1993) who used it to refer to hands-on
student
laboratory work. Often, laboratory work is
de-
fined, after Hegerty-Hazel (1990), as “a
form of
practical work taking place in a purposely as-
signed environment where students engage
in
planned learning experiences … [and]
interact
with materials to observe and understand
phe-
nomena” (p. 4). What counts as practical
work
is relatively uncontroversial, but what the
pur-
poses of practical work should be is open to
a
number of differing opinions (Hodson, 1993;
Lazarowitz & Tamir, 1994). Hodson (1993)
cat-
egorizes the various objectives into five
broad
areas: to teach 1) laboratory skills and 2)
scien-
tific attitudes, 3) stimulate interest, and
enhance
learning of 4) the scientific content and 5)
the
nature of scientific methodology.
Categorizing
objectives in a general sense such as done by
Hodson is one approach to understanding the
purposes.
The traditional laboratory concentrates pri-
marily on what Hodson (1993) categorizes as
la-
boratory skills and secondarily on improved
content knowledge. The objective of
providing
improved understanding of the nature of sci-
ence methodology, in Hodson’s terms, is a
re-
cent addition to objectives in the university
la-
boratory. Moreover, the more traditional
stu-
dent laboratory approaches have tended not
to
emphasize the psychological aspects of
practical
work, like motivation and interest.
Contempo-
rary developments in pedagogy have
confirmed
that the psychological or affective domain
has a
profound effect on learning. As an aspect of
practical work, the infusion of motivational
ele-
ments seems to flow naturally from sound
ped-
agogical and philosophical principles. A de-
tailed discussion of the affective context is
re-
served for a later section.
An alternative way to categorize practical
work is by means of a methodological
spectrum.
For example, Stinner (1995) divides
laboratory
activities into three types: type I—
instantiation
types of experiments that operate in “cook-
book” style; type II—research style
experiments
that attempt to answer questions not familiar
to
students in an open-ended approach; and
type
III—thought experiments that attempt to
illu-
minate questions about theory by
constructing
hypothetical experiments or arguments that
support or disprove various fundamental hy-
potheses about nature. In a somewhat
similar
fashion, Roth and Roychoudhury list four
cate-
gories of laboratory activities on a scale of
in-
creasing “openness”:
0 Problem area, methods of solution, and cor-
rect interpretation given or obvious. Includes
observation and experience labs, or labs designed
to teach new techniques.
1 Lab manual poses the problems; describes
ways and means by which the student can dis-
cover relations he doesn’t already know.
2 Problems are posed by the lab manual, but
methods and answers are left open.
3 Problems, answers, and method are left open.
The student is confronted with raw phenom-
ena. (Roth & Roychoudhury, 1993, p. 129)
Approaches such as those by Roth and Roy-
choudhury or Stinner tend to be practical
inso-
far that they concentrate on the degree of en-
gagement of students in practical work. In
their
view, all student practical work lies on a
spec-
trum whose one extreme is represented by
in-
stantiation or cookbook type experiments
and
the other extreme by student research work.
Another way to characterize this spectrum is
by
the degree to which student practical work is
like “real” science. Cookbook labs are not at
all
like scientists’ science, whereas student re-
search, if teacher-directed, can be very much
like “real” science. This type of
categorization
scheme lends itself to the development of the
large context, which, itself, is an open-ended
or
research-like approach.
The student, however, sees practical work
from a completely different perspective than
the
4. The Practical Context
The first context important for teaching and learning that will be considered, in detail, is the practical context.
The term “practical” is used here in the sense expressed by Derek Hodson (1993) who used it to refer to hands-
on student laboratory work. Often, laboratory work is de-fined, after Hegerty-Hazel (1990), as “a form of
practical work taking place in a purposely as-signed environment where students engage in planned learning
experiences … [and] interact with materials to observe and understand phenomena” (p. 4). What counts as
practical work is relatively uncontroversial, but what the purposes of practical work should be is open to a
number of differing opinions (Hodson, 1993; Lazarowitz & Tamir, 1994). Hodson (1993) categorizes the various
objectives into five broad areas: to teach 1) laboratory skills and 2) scientific attitudes, 3) stimulate interest,
and enhance learning of 4) the scientific content and 5) the nature of scientific methodology. Categorizing
objectives in a general sense such as done by Hodson is one approach to understanding the purposes. The
traditional laboratory concentrates primarily on what Hodson (1993) categorizes as laboratory skills and
secondarily on improved content knowledge. The objective of providing improved understanding of the nature
of science methodology, in Hodson’s terms, is a re-cent addition to objectives in the university laboratory.
Moreover, the more traditional student laboratory approaches have tended not to emphasize the
psychological aspects of practical work, like motivation and interest. Contemporary developments in pedagogy
have confirmed that the psychological or affective domain has a profound effect on learning. As an aspect of
practical work, the infusion of motivational elements seems to flow naturally from sound pedagogical and
philosophical principles. A de-tailed discussion of the affective context is re-served for a later section. An
alternative way to categorize practical work is by means of a methodological spectrum. For example, Stinner
(1995) divides laboratory activities into three types: type I—instantiation types of experiments that operate in
“cook-book” style; type II—research style experiments that attempt to answer questions not familiar to
students in an open-ended approach; and type III—thought experiments that attempt to illuminate questions
about theory by constructing hypothetical experiments or arguments that support or disprove various
fundamental hypotheses about nature. In a somewhat similar fashion, Roth and Roychoudhury list four
categories of laboratory activities on a scale of in-creasing “openness”: 0 Problem area, methods of solution,
and correct interpretation given or obvious. Includes observation and experience labs, or labs designed to
teach new techniques. 1 Lab manual poses the problems; describes ways and means by which the student can
dis-cover relations he doesn’t already know. 2 Problems are posed by the lab manual, but methods and
answers are left open. 3 Problems, answers, and method are left open. The student is confronted with raw
phenomena. (Roth & Roychoudhury, 1993, p. 129) Approaches such as those by Roth and Roychoudhury or
Stinner tend to be practical insofar that they concentrate on the degree of engagement of students in practical
work. In their view, all student practical work lies on a spectrum whose one extreme is represented by
instantiation or cookbook type experiments and the other extreme by student research work. Another way to
characterize this spectrum is by the degree to which student practical work is like “real” science. Cookbook
labs are not at all like scientists’ science, whereas student re-search, if teacher-directed, can be very much like
“real” science. This type of categorization scheme lends itself to the development of the large context, which,
itself, is an open-ended or research-like approach.
5. Task Isolation versus Contextualization
In the face of the challenge that reforming student practical work represents, it is a temptation to simplify the
work and break it into components that represent the constituent objectives. The tendency towards task
isolation can be seen as a holdover from behavioral psychology. However, developments in psychology and
philosophy in the latter half of the twentieth century show task isolation to be an unjustified tac-tic, rooted in
behaviorism. Behaviorism, at least partly, grew out of an empiricist philosophy of science, which held that all
knowledge originates in experience. The empiricist view has its origins in Aristotle’s notion, as stated by
medieval scholars, nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu-“There is nothing in the mind except what has
passed through the senses.” If one accepts Aristotle’s dictum, then it follows that the mind merely consists of
representations of sensory stimuli, which are the result of verbal teaching and reading. The implication of this
early empiricist view is that knowledge can be transferred intact from teacher to student through the senses.
John Locke was a major proponent of early empiricism. What the student learns, in the empiricist view, is an
exact representation, or at least a subset, of what the teacher conveys, since no further processing is involved
beyond the sensory transduction of information. An implication of the empiricist-behaviorist view is that
knowledge can be “atomized” or broken up into small, simple steps that are easy to teach and learn. The
atomistic view of knowledge follows from the assumption that knowledge-based sensory stimuli are associated
on a one-to-one basis with the cognitive representations of these knowledge items. The relationship of one
mental knowledge-representation to another cannot be changed at the cognitive level in the behavioristic
view. The influential Harvard psychologist, B. F. Skinner, developed and popularized the atomistic view of
knowledge and wrote: “The whole process of be-coming competent in any field must be divided into a very
large number of very small steps, and reinforcement must be contingent upon the accomplishment of each
step” (Skinner, 1954, p. 94). The sequence of knowledge presentation becomes very important under the
assumption that knowledge can be atomized and assimilated piecemeal. If knowledge is structured by the
brain in the order that it is received (with no
Contextual Science Teaching 7 further internal re-processing), then relation-ships must be pre-formed in order
for that knowledge to make sense. The sense-making, sequential, logical structure of knowledge must be pre-
programmed into the process. Learning is thus viewed as a linear sequential process. Skinner details the
formula for successful learning in the linear sequential view: If a learner attains the objectives subordinate to a
higher objective, his probability of learning the latter has been shown to be very high; if he misses one or more
of the subordinate objectives, his probability of learning the higher one drops to near zero. (1965, p. 30)
Finding out if the learner has missed learning objectives is the short-range objective of traditional science
instruction and has resulted in the familiar teach-test-teach-test sequence. As a result of the atomistic view of
learning the component skills or knowledge items may be mastered independently and out of context as long
as they are in the correct logical sequence. The contextualization of knowledge runs counter to the
presuppositions of behaviorism since any contextual factors are either irrelevant to the items being taught or
interfere with a narrow and clear presentation of the knowledge item. It should be no surprise, then, that the
behavioristic view of learning has been characterized as having two central assumptions—those of de-
composability and decontextualization (Res-nick & Resnick, 1992). Traditional instruction values simple factual
recall through rote memorization. Simple facts that are memorized verbatim by the student may be
regurgitated on a test and come back to the teacher unchanged. Strike and Posner reject rote learning, stating
that the task of learning is primarily one of relating what one has encountered … to one’s current ideas… . To
learn an idea any other way is to ac-quire a piece of verbal behaviour which one emits to a stimulus, rather
than to understand an idea which one can employ in an intellectually productive way. (1985, p. 212) Strike and
Posner’s criticism of traditional teaching and learning is typical of the view that has brought about
dissatisfaction with traditional instruction, which, to a large degree, relies on simple factual recall. The factors
that led to these criticisms and to the abandonment of some of the traditional presuppositions and methods
grew out of a psychological and philosophical paradigm shift around the 1970’s. The shift generally moved
from the empiricist-be-haviorist dominated paradigm to one based on cognitive psychology, constructivism,
and the philosophical positions of philosophers of science, such as Thomas Kuhn.