Livre - Stability and Security in Africa - 0

Stability and Security
in Africa: The Role of Hard

and Soft Power
Stability and
Security in Africa:
The Role of Hard
and Soft Power
Editor:
Sara Hasnaa Mokaddem

Stability and Security in Africa: The Role of
Hard and Soft Power
Copyright © 2019 by Policy Center for the New South, All rights reserved. No part of
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Editor : Sara Hasnaa Mokaddem, International Relations Specialist, PCNS

Graphic Composition : Youssef Ait El Kadi, Graphic Designer, PCNS
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4 Stability and Security in Africa: The Role of Hard and Soft Power
Sommaire
List of Contributors........................................................................................................7
Scientific Committee ......................................................................................................7
About Al Akhawayn University.....................................................................................8
About The Policy Center for the New South..............................................................9
Foreword........................................................................................................................ 11
Introduction................................................................................................................. 13
Rachid El Houdaigui
Part I: Advocacy for a new polemological paradigm..................... 19
Soft Power and Traditional African Conflict Management.................... 21

I William Zartman
Collective Security in Africa: Appropriation of Strategic Thought...... 43

Abdelhamid Bakkali
Regional conflict system in Africa: an option for analysis..................... 69

Sergio Luiz Cruz Aguilar
Mutualization of Power and Security in Africa: for a Neo-Pragmatic

Approach to the Role of Law ......................................................................... 99
Oumar Kourouma
Stability and Security in Africa: The Role of Hard and Soft Power 5
Part II: Contextualizing hard and soft powers in Africa........... 123
The Role of Hard and Soft Powers in Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria:

A Critical Discourse Analysis........................................................................ 125
Don John O. Omale PhD
At a Crossroads: South Sudan’s Elusive Conflict Resolution

Strategy................................................................................................................. 147
Catherine Bartenge
Smart Power by Small African States in Conflict Resolution............... 171

Bruno Mve Ebang
List of Contributors
• Sergio Aguilar, Professor of international security at São Paulo State University
(UNESP), Brazil.
• Abdelhamid Bakkali, Phd candidate Université Mohamed V – Salé, Graduate
of the Royal College for Higher Military Studies, Morocco.
• Catherine Bartenge, Research Assistant, African Leadership Center of the
Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Kenya.
• Rachid El Houdaigui, Geopolitics and IR Senior Fellow, Policy Center for the
New South, Morocco.
• Bruno Mve Ebang, Permanent Assistant in Political Sciences, Faculty of Law
and Economic Sciences, Omar Bongo University, Gabon.
• Oumar Kourouma, Phd Candidate, Abdelmalek Essaadi University_ Tangiers,
Morocco.
• John Omale, Associate Professor of criminology and security studies- Federal
University, Wukari Taraba State, Nigeria.
• William I. Zartman, Professor Emeritus at the Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, United States
of America.
Scientific Committee
• Abdelhak Bassou, Geopolitics and IR Senior Fellow, Policy Center for the
New South.
• Rachid El Houdaigui, Geopolitics and IR Senior Fellow, Policy Center for the
New South.
• Dr. Jack Kalpakian, Associate Professor/MAISD Coordinator, School of
Humanities and Social Sciences, Al Akhawayn University.
• Dr Nizar Messari, Vice President for Academic Affairs, Al Akhawayn
University.
• Sara Mokaddem, International Relations Specialist, Policy Center for the New
South.
• Dr Ahmed Rhazaoui, Visiting Professor, School of Humanities and Social
Sciences, Al Akhawayn University.
About Al Akhawayn University
Inaugurated in 1995 by His Majesty King Hassan II and Crown Prince

Abdallah bin Abdel-Aziz of Saudi Arabia, Al Akhawayn University redefines
the classic American liberal arts educational experience on an architecturally
stunning modern campus amidst the beauty of Morocco’s Middle Atlas
Mountains.
It boasts:
• A uniquely international common core program for all undergraduate
students, providing the basis for a well-rounded global education.
• Rich academics, in English, encouraging choice and experimentation, in all
schools and programs of study.
• A comfortable, safe, exciting residential student life on campus, featuring
hundreds of University student-run activities, with over 96 percent of
undergraduates living on campus with roommates from around Morocco
and the four corners of the world.
• The peace and pleasures of Ifrane, a center for outdoor exploration of
mountains, streams, lakes, and more, with many entertainment options and
easy access to major cities such as Rabat, Casablanca, Fez, Meknes, and
more.
www.aui.ma
About The Policy Center for the New South
Policy Center for the New South, formerly OCP Policy Center, is a
Moroccan policy-oriented think tank based in Rabat, Morocco, striving to
promote knowledge sharing and to contribute to an enriched reflection on key
economic and international relations issues. By offering a southern perspective
on major regional and global strategic challenges facing developing and emerging
countries, the Policy Center for the New South aims to provide a meaningful
policy-making contribution through its four research programs: Agriculture,
Environment and Food Security, Economic and Social Development,
Commodity Economics and Finance, Geopolitics and International Relations.
On this basis, we are actively engaged in public policy analysis and
consultation while promoting international cooperation for the development
of countries in the southern hemisphere. In this regard, Policy Center for the
New South aims to be an incubator of ideas and a source of forward thinking
for proposed actions on public policies within emerging economies, and more
broadly for all stakeholders engaged in the national and regional growth and
development process. For this purpose, the Think Tank relies on independent
research and a solid network of internal and external leading research fellows.
www.policycenter.ma
Foreword
Defining power is complex and ambiguous but understanding its

elements and implications on national and foreign policies remains
central to the study of international relations. Both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’
powers are employed to pursue political and strategic goals through
military, economic, diplomatic and others ways of conquering hearts
and minds, to create convincing incentives and exercise influence.
Introduced in 1990, the notion of soft power refers to a country’s
ability to spread its influence and effectively persuade without the use of
coercion and traditional force. However, while on the aftermath of the
Cold War this concept exclusively referred to the cultural and economic
force of persuasion of the United States in the international scene,
nowadays, the use of soft power is no longer specific to US foreign
diplomacy. In fact, emerging powers such as China and India are also
using their soft power resources including investments, foreign aid and
cultural products to bring forward their national interests and strategic
goals abroad.
The use of military, economic or diplomatic tools to leverage
diplomatic efforts continues to represent a perennial issue in the field
of international relations. The dichotomy between hard and soft power
has also been revisited and questioned as some argue that a “grey” area
exists where both means are used by states to defend their interests.
The growth of violent extremism and the challenge it represents to
the existing international order has also called for an inclusive and
comprehensive approach that combines hard and soft power tools into
smart power strategies. These mechanisms have been increasingly taken
into account within the African continent, where policy makers do not
only rely on the effect traditional power can have in ending crises and
conflicts.
The promotion of good governance practices, stronger economic
cooperation and the availability of alternative narratives to the extremist
discourse combined with relevant diplomatic tools to promote social
justice and equality, quality education, better infrastructure, social
empowerment and fair job opportunities for the youth is often going
hand in hand with military means in order to find sustainable and
effective solutions to security threats and conflicts.
The Policy Center for the New South in partnership with Al Akhawayn
University organized a call for paper on “Stability and Security in Africa:
the Role of Hard and Soft Power”. Selected contributors were then
invited to a seminar at the University’s campus in Ifrane (Morocco) on
June 19th 2017 to present their findings before the scientific committee.
We are glad that this cooperation has been highly instructive on the
topic and we would like to acknowledge the invaluable input of all the
contributors. We also wish to thank all the participants at the Seminar at
Al Akhawayn University.
Dr. Nizar Messari Dr. Karim El Aynaoui

Vice President for Academic Affairs President
Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane Policy Center for the New South
Introduction
Rachid El Houdaigui
Africa is more relevant than ever in a constantly evolving global context

driven by continuous reconfiguration of geostrategic balances and constant
reshuffling of power dynamics. Since the turn of the millennium, Africa has
embarked on a process of facing up to its own challenges and taking control
of its economic, political and strategic destiny.
This process revolves around three main building blocks: (1) strategic
resilience through consolidating the institutionalization of the African space
via the African Union (AU) through sub-regional organizations on the one
hand, and the establishment of a continental free trade area on the other;
(2) the prioritization of South-South and triangular cooperation; and (3) the
institutionalization of partnerships with international powers.
In the area of security, African leaders have adopted a new vision based on
a common security and defense policy (African Union; 2004; 2005), the African
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and a Peace and Security Council.
This legitimate dynamic nevertheless comes up against structural hurdles
particularly in the “self-pacification” capacity. As such and accounting
for African specificities, this vector needs to be carefully thought out and
implemented in light of factors relating to both Hard and Soft Power.
The Policy Center for the New South and Al Akhawayn University have
done just that, in designing the program for the Ifrane seminar of June 19,
2017. Proceedings of the seminar constitute the substance of this book,
entitled “Stability and Security in Africa: The Role of Hard and Soft Power”.
Discussions on this issue revolve around two major themes:
(1) Advocacy for a new polemological paradigm; and,
(2) Contextualizing hard and soft powers in Africa.
The major challenge concerning the first axis is to develop an uninhibited
appropriation of “strategic thinking” at the African level. In this perspective,
strategic thinking on the continent has opened up in recent years to two
complementary intellectual visions. On the one hand, Africa has the capacity to
mobilize its assets, culture and customary norms as a tool for crisis resolution.
Strategic thinking in general on the other hand, particularly on questions of
security and defense, has gained in quality through a multitude of scientific
approaches and readings adopted by African and non-African researchers.
For believers in the relevance of African soft power in crisis resolution,
the context is right for reviving traditional modes of contribution to national,
regional and continental security. This opportunity opens new paths that are
more adapted to the challenges of our time.
As in any international framework, collective security evolves, seeks and
attempts to find appropriate solutions to contain conflicts. In so doing, it should
undoubtedly draw on the wealth of norms produced by different civilizations
throughout history. In Africa, traditional modes of conflict management are
seen as offering a complement, if not an alternative to international treaty
mechanisms.
William I. Zartman demonstrates that conflict management methods
developed through centuries of practice, derive their effectiveness from the
use of “soft power” as a means to satisfy populations’ security needs. While
avoiding the idealization of these mechanisms, the author provides a critical
evaluation of their modus operandi, taking interaction with the requirements of
modernity into account to better define appropriate development trajectories
in the current context. Zartman concludes that it is possible to transpose “neo-
customary conflict management methods” to the highest level of international
disputes, provided however that African leaders re-appropriate traditional
practices in the service of reconciliation and peaceful dispute-resolution.
The conclusions of W.I. Zartman highlight the importance of traditional
methods. These need to be fostered via research and dissemination based on
the experience of each African region and can be effectively supported by
research centers and organizational resources facilitating the flow of ideas and
actors across Africa through research projects, conferences and knowledge-
sharing platforms. The extent to which international actors present in Africa
can or cannot rely on traditional mechanisms in their intervention framework
must also be determined (N. Bagayoko and F. Koné; 2017). There is, however,
one point where traditional conflict management mechanisms seem the most
effective; that is the preventive aspect. This undoubtedly constitutes their main
strength and could leverage a dual approach to prevention and stabilization as
set forward by the AU.
In seeking to restore strategic studies in Africa at the turn of this century,
African and Africanist researchers and experts agree on the need to deconstruct
post-colonial1 essentialist paradigms on the basis of a “contextualized” reading
of conflict.
1 The term here refers to the period following colonial domination and not to postcolonial theory.
In this respect, Abdelhamid Bakkali pertinently argues for a paradigmatic
rupture with what he calls an “epistemological drift, embodied by the de-
politicization of conflicts in the post-Cold War African context”, arguing
that these interpretation models reduce the genesis of conflicts to colonial
heritage, ethnicity, religion and natural resources. He thus questions theses
arguing that post-Cold War internal wars are less political than cultural (M.
Kaldor), fundamentally ethnic (Kegan J.; 1993) or essentially conducted for
profit. He emphasizes the importance of taking into account political and
social constructs of Africa’s own racist ideology (the Rwandan case) and the
interaction of ethnicity and politicization of violence during elections (the case
of Côte d’Ivoire in 2010-2011). In addition, along with some other researchers
(Autesserre, S.; 2012), he qualifies geopolitics of natural resources as a capital
casus belli (Democratic Republic of Congo). To break with this “irrationality”,
A. Bakkali proposes three ideas: using soft power in conflict resolution in Africa
based on an “assimilated” Clausewitzian conceptual framework; implementing
a systemic approach combining required soft power and secondary yet not
marginal hard power; and thirdly, enhancing African collective security.
For his part, Sergio Aguilar highlights the difficulties encountered by
researchers in their conceptual construction of conflict in Africa. He blames
this on the complexity of situations analyzed, both by diversity of actors and
by multiplicity of factors at play. He agrees for the most part with A. Bakkali
that current paradigms need to be revised. He argues that African conflicts
cannot be identified and understood through linear analysis because this is both
simplistic and reductionist. Aguilar further notes that it is extremely difficult
to explain all possible root causes and dynamics of complex conflicts from a
factual point of view. As such, he suggests aggregating causalism into a broad
notion of “regional dynamics of violence” and applying systematic conflict
analysis to it. Aligning himself with the theory of conflict transformation
(Lederach, J.P.; 2003), the author presents a reading of events that allows the
peaceful transformation of conflicts in Africa. Illustration through case studies
of regional systems in the Great Lakes and North Africa enable him to verify
the relevance of his hypothesis. Sergio Aguilar also stresses that conflict analysis
in Africa would gain in effectiveness with the adoption of an interdisciplinary
and multidisciplinary approach for a better inclusion of recurring factors that
explain the emergence and spread of violence.
Oumar Kourouma is particularly interested in the central role of
international law in the construction of collective security in Africa, notably
within a “power mutualization strategy framework.” His paper examines the
extent to which the law contributes to strengthening Africa’s capacity of
self-pacification, and the effectiveness of the law in crisis regulation. Having
noted that law has become the primary instrument through which integration
processes take place (Weiler Joseph H. 1995) particularly in security matters
under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, Kourouma nevertheless
observes a paradoxical dual use of the law in African geopolitics. International
law is on the one hand, an instrument for formulating and implementing a
collective security strategy in the name of principles of solidarity, pan-
Africanism and efficiency, and on the other hand, a mechanism through which
States, especially leading States, project their power, defend their own interests,
and even, exert influence on other continental States under the pretext of acting
in accordance with the law and on behalf of collective institutions. This, he
considers, is not without consequences on both “stalling and even deadlocking
the construction of a collective African security strategy.” Kourouma suggests
a “neo-pragmatist use of international law” as a way out of this uncertainty of
the law.
As for the second axis, one must immediately note that security threats
on the continent have undergone significant transformation in recent years. A
conjectural analysis indicates that “crisogenic” situations result from rational
processes independent of each other in the order of causality, which eventually
combine and reinforce each other to produce the final situation2. It is indeed
ill-advised to put both crises and conflicts on the same level; for while the
occurrence of crises responds to an internal logic relating to the vicissitudes
of democratic transitions or political rivalry, conflicts on the other hand often
have exogenous causes, partly explained by armed rebellions against a State or
by the irruption of new actors such as armed terrorist groups (notably in the
Sahel and Libya, in Northern Nigeria with Boko Haram and in East Africa with
the Al Shabab). Such crises and conflicts are today a perfect stage for a complex
geopolitical game, both in terms of nature and number of actors involved and
ambiguity of respective preferences: each actor having a multitude of possible
strategies, each fraught with very uncertain risks and rewards.
The continent also faces problems related to nutritional, demographic, and
environmental and piracy crises. The Global Peace Index noted a deterioration
of the security situation in sub-Saharan Africa in June 20173. This decline is
mainly due to new threats outlined above. These have genuine consequences
on the daily lives of African populations and on the future of the continent in
years to come, particularly in the area of security.
The Sahel is a case in point in this regard. A strategic review of the area
effectively brings three realities into line: 1) Ongoing political processes in the
region reveal a failure of democratic transition. For, beyond the political game
2 This is what natural sciences refer to as the “Cournot effect”.

3 http://www.agenceecofin.com/gouvernance-economique/0206-47847-classement-des-pays-d-
afrique-subsaharienne-les-plus-pacifiques-selon-le-global-peaceful-index-gpi
that has taken shape, challenges of a transition are to redefine relationships
between the three pillars of political identity: civil power, military power
and multi-ethnicity. In the case of Mali, for example, this question was very
poorly handled because of Malians’ inability to build a political system based
on alternation and integrating the country’s various ethnic components.
Over time, the status quo allowed for a gradual disintegration of the State’s
competences leading to both a very weak security presence in the north of
the country and an acuity of Tuareg nationalism. 2) Mobility and deployment
of sub-State (armed) actors in the extensive Sahelo-Saharan zone opened
up a breach in the countries’ security arrangements. It is not so much the
immensity of the territory on which these groups evolve that makes it difficult
to neutralize them, as their rooting and the absence of hostility of a large part
of the population towards them (H. Plagnol and F. Loncle ; 2012.). Since it is
enough for the authorities to control water points in a desert area to neutralize
and kill a target. These groups derive their political legitimacy from social
(marriage) and commercial ties and compete with the State for monopoly
on legitimate violence. The cases of Mali, southern Libya, Niger and Nigeria
illustrate this reality very well. The connection between various forms of
insecurity (terrorism, organized crime and irregular migration) is also driven by
a convergence of interests of sub-state actors. An informal financial war based
on predation and crime has therefore taken shape and ensures the prosperity
of network leaders, who in turn distribute dividends to their local and external
allies. 3) Geopolitics of oil and raw materials in the region reveal a game for the
control of deposits, supply and transport routes (oil pipeline). In this context,
the quest for strategic autonomy through diversification of alliances exposes
countries of the region to pressure from major powers, making the desire for
autonomy contrast with the strategic weaknesses of all countries in the region
(weak diplomatic influence, fragility of the military chain of command...).
Nigeria is another classic case of the interaction between hard and soft
powers. John Omale is explicit in this regard in his argument for the relevance
of both hard and soft counter-insurgency powers in the Nigerian context. As
part of the national debate in his country between supporters of coercion
and promoters of dialogue, Omale proposes a course of action based on
three hypotheses: 1) In the case of the Niger Delta crisis and the Boko Haram
insurgency, hard power is used by parties to the conflict; 2) Winning the war
is certainly a prerequisite for stability, but winning the hearts of insurgents
and their supporters is necessary to secure lasting peace; 3) A practical and
constructive model to guide this process must include good governance and
an effective application of soft power. John Omale concludes that “the final
war against any terrorist act or violent conflict must happen in the minds of
the people (soft power approach); and so ‘hard power’ should only be used as
ultimum remedium (the last resort).” 4
The third enlightening case is the conflict in Southern Sudan. Catherine
Bartenge questions the reasons for persistence of the conflict, despite three
agreements signed and involvement of regional organizations and the AU. The
author’s central idea revolves around the vicissitudes of building the Southern
Sudan nation-state. Unmet needs of different actors in nascent political
life contribute to dangerous polarization so; the challenge is to meet these
“universal needs” as a precondition for resolving current crises. C. Bartenge
builds on the work of John Buron (1987) to demonstrate the usefulness of
“cooperative peace” involving all actors in building strategic consensus for
conflict resolution. In practical terms, Southern Sudan requires a clear inclusive
framework and roadmap, she emphasizes, with continued and sustained
commitment from regional bodies such as IGAD.
On a different note combining both hard and soft powers, some authors
use the concept of smart power to “elegantly” define foreign policy objectives.
Bruno Mve Ebang develops a theory to explain the role of small African
states in conflict resolution. This approach is rooted in the conviction of small
states that possess the necessary resources to play a role on the global stage.
Indeed, issues related to status and rank in the international system challenge
the establishment of all States, whether small, medium, large or super large
(Rachid El Houdaigui; 2010). B. Ebang recognizes that small African States
have an essential role to play in resolving conflicts on the continent, providing
they act in accordance with international law and within the framework of
international organizations. This “intelligent way of acting on the international
scene” comes up however against the centrality of world powers in the
regulation of the global geopolitical game.
In light of the above, it appears that the present and future of collective
security in Africa has no other main foundation than the need to go beyond the
predominant classical conception of security. The latter being narrowly limited
to military responses and based on hard power, it is necessary to emphasize soft
power in all its dimensions, putting the individual at the heart of all approaches
but this development cannot take shape without a harmonization of African
perceptions of threat. The goal is to move towards a comprehensive, supportive
and inclusive approach to security.
4 It is in the line, among others, with Nye J.S “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the
American Academy 616, March 2008.
I
Advocacy for
a new polemological
paradigm
Soft Power and Traditional African
Conflict Management
I William Zartman
The current focus on the “soft” side of power brings to the fore the
established behavioral concept of power as the “ability to move a party in an
intended direction,” rather than the material concept of power as the physical
sources of that ability and its confusion with force. Africa, frequently wracked
with hard power conflicts, is also known as the land of palaver, where disputes
are handled judiciously by reconciliation after open discussion, not the peaceful
kingdom but the peaceable kingdom. Traditional conflict management methods
developed by practice over centuries derived their effectiveness from the use
of soft power in a supportive social context. This paper will examine the social
basis and techniques of traditional conflict management in Africa, and will
examine the effects of modernization on these practices, with the view of
evaluating the perspectives for their current revival. What have been traditional
methods of settling conflict and are they still alive? Under what conditions
have they worked, what are their limits, and how can they be expanded?
But why spend time of traditional methods since they belong to a bygone
era? In part, it is because these methods have often been evoked as a contrast to
endemic conflict that plagues present-day Africa. Perhaps these traditions can
contain insights relevant to the reduction of current conflicts. If causes and
methods, limitations and possibilities can be drawn out of endogenous practice,
the next question is to their applicability today. The primary focus here is on
traditional methods of sub-Saharan Africa, although there are similar practices
in North Africa and other Arab societies (Abu Nimer, King-Irani, 2000) and
indeed endogenous practice further away (Faure 2000). There is no implication
that all African societies have the same practices or that war and force are
absent from traditional or contemporary conflict, but rather that an analysis
of such practices—which are indeed frequent throughout the continent—can
illuminate how they work, when they do and why (Lundy & Adjei, 2015, p. 6).
This paper is part of a widening attempt to learn from endogenous knowledge
in many fields (Houtondji 1997; Zartman 2000, 2011, 2017; Mistry & Berardi
2016).
I: Advocacy for a new polemological paradigm
A Word on Power
Since the early 1930s, following a lead given a century earlier by Von
Clausewitz (1832/1976, p l0l), social scientists have had at their disposal a good
working definition of power as the ability of one party to move another in
an intended direction. Originally formulated by Tawney (1931/1952, 159), the
behavioral conceptualization was adopted by a number of disciplines in the
1950s—in decision theory by Herbert Simon (1953), political science by Robert
Dahl (1957), and social psychology by John Thibaut and Harold Kelley (1957).
Their definition is conclusionary, in that, it defined power by its effects, and
it implicitly posed the question of its cause. Previous definitions were limited
and componential, since they equated power either with force or with material
elements such as armaments or even GDP, and they had no direct claim of
effects (e.g. Dahl 1976, 47-48; Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1954). Students of
negotiation and mediation have long followed this behavioral lead into power,
now termed “soft,” since it covers most human interaction.
However, it is also circular: power is defined as an ability, i.e. a power (in
French the two terms are the same word, pouvoir). To avoid this problem and
stay in the behavioral understanding of the relationship, power can best be
defined as an action or exercise by one party intended to produce movement
by another (Habeeb 1988, 15; Bull 1995, 12; Zartman & Rubin 2000, pp. 8-9).
This opens the way for an examination of both what enabled the party to take
the action and what the action produced. The focus here is on causes other
than force, including persuasion, authority, context, rewards and sanctions, and
other elements that are combined under the term “soft power” and contribute
to the effective management and resolution of conflict.
As such, be it noted, soft power has been the focus of students of
negotiation and diplomacy long before the term was resurrected in the twenty-
first century to overcome the exceptional reliance on force in international
relations (de Callères 1716; de Felice 1978; Zartman). Within that focus,
it is particularly important to go back to the contextual conditions that
legitimize given exercises of power and reach ahead to the particular types
of outcomes that these conditions condone. It is the social context —values,
structures, culture, beliefs— that empower particular uses of soft power to be
employed effectively. In these outcomes, the distinction between management
and resolution refers to measures that stop violence but leave the conflict
unresolved and those that deal with the basic issue between the conflicting
parties. With these elements in hand, the analysis can turn to an examination
of traditional African methods of handling conflict, their enabling context and
their effectiveness, and their adaptability to modern conditions.
Soft Power and Traditional African Conflict Management
Indigenous Conflict Management-

Reconciliation
Conflict was as pervasive among Africans as in any groups of human
beings anywhere, and involved all level of social interaction. Domestic
quarrels, theft and murder (from wives to goods to cattle), boundary disputes,
authority contests, and inter-entity relations including wars form the ladder of
conflict, often involving several types at the same time; these levels are useful
for the following discussion to bring out the focus, tactics, and difference in
the exercise of African traditional methods of handling conflict. The common
element in the way these disputes have been handled through traditional justice
is reconciliation (Anstey & Rosoux pending); other terms such as harmony
(Rose, 1992) and reciprocity (Igreja, 2010) are also sometimes used. All
procedures are related to this goal, which means that truth in disputes is less
important than relations and punishment is restorative rather than retributive
(Geertz 1983). This means that fact-finding is important but truth is not
paramount, punishment is involved but restoration is paramount.
The focus on reconciliation derives from a particular notion of conflict
management. The purpose is to erase the infraction or the conflict and restore
the status quo ante, seen as the proper functioning of social relations. It is thus
a backward-looking exercise, based on the notion that the status quo was built
out of appropriate relations that need to be restored. As a result, it is premised
on the perdurance of the status quo and is not designed to handle change; new
conditions must find their place in present relations. The action is rooted in the
consolidation of norms, the fundamental element in conflict prevention, by
following accepted practices and consensual limitations of behavior (Zartman,
2016). The concern with impunity is met by removing or resolving the anti-
social act itself, not by retributive punishment. To understand the specific
practices based on these elements, one must begin by taking each level of
conflict separately: domestic quarrels, personal crimes, land disputes, authority
contests, and intercommunity relations.
Domestic quarrels provide a microcosm of restorative methods. The
conflict is submitted to a council of the entire family where testimonies from
the parties directly involved and all others having something to do with the
situation are aired. Once the situation is fully discussed, a decision representing
a broad consensus is formulated by one or more elders. The goal is to resolve
the dispute without finding fault (or by finding countervailing and canceling
faults) and to reconcile the parties and reintegrate them into the family, which
then supportively closes ranks around them “as a mother hen gathers her
chicks.” (Ohwovoriole, 2011; Phillips, 2011; Uwazie, 2000; Deng, 2000, p.98).
Group context and consensus, reconciliation and reinsertion, and resolution by

integration are the highlighted characteristics. Such family quarrels at the lowest
level of the ladder of disputes contain the characteristics of management that
will be found at all higher levels.
Personal crimes such as theft and murder are more serious breaches of
conduct, against individuals or against society. Again, the goal is restoration or
compensation, for reconciliation between damaged parties and the damager
and reintegration of the errant member back into society.
[T]he overriding concern of the [Buems’] normative order is

to sustain social harmony in the social system. The philosophical
foundation of this worldview is encapsulated in the phrase kanye
ndu nowi, ‘the ingredients of harmony’…translate[d]…into
practical reality through the imposition of ‘intrinsic sanctions,’ the
subtle but persuasive means by which members of the community
are molded into complying with the rules of social control—
the moral code, the normative order, and the belief and value
systems. Intrinsic sanctions are both positive (the psychic rewards
that people receive when they conform to the approved mode of
behavior) and negative (the feeling of moral discomfort that the
people experience when they default).
(Fred-Mensah, 2000, p.35; also Nukunya, 1992, p.81; Radcliffe-
Brown, 1952, p.205; Gluckman, 1965, pp. 202-207).
When an infraction such as a theft or murder takes place, intrinsic sanctions

have proven ineffective, but they still condition the community’s response.
Although chiefs and their councils take decisions at a higher level, they place
the infraction in a holistic context of community welfare and not just within
the limits of the transgressive action (Uwazie, 2000). The chiefs or other
appointed figures can also serve as mediators to sew society back together again
(Udofia, 2011; Hutchinson & Pendle, 2015). Regulatory societies, somewhat
like fraternal lodges, serve a broad range of functions in maintaining social
customs and appropriate behaviors, including initiation into civic behavior,
but they can also act as mediators and decision forums in cases of conflict
within the ethnic group (Kah, 2011); where such institutions do not exist, the
elders can set up their own training sessions in proper behavior and resolution
practices. Restoration and compensation are used to reconstruct the torn social
fabric and put society back together again. Appropriate compensations are
often pre-established for losses of life and property (a cow, a service, etc.),
designed to undo the action, symbolically if restoration to life is not possible,
rather than to punish for it (Evans Pritchard). Amnesty is also possible, under
appropriate conditions (Eselebor, 2015, pp.243-245). However, the infractor is
not merely an object; admission and atonement must accompany the societal
mending. If not, the mending is accomplished by removing the offensive actor,
by ostracism, a harsh action in a world where there are only communities and
no free space in between them (Fred-Mensah, 2000, p. 35).
Land disputes are a frequent occurrence in a world made up of communities
abutting if not overlapping each other, as noted. Land is the platter for society
and its use and ownership are the warp and woof of the social tissue. Whether
the land involves transhumant rights, seasonal grazing vs. farming, tribal vs.
squatters’ or indigenous vs. settler rights, lebensraum vs. sacred sites, it always
ends up as a boundary matter, as well as a matter of occupancy within the
boundaries (Aluaigba 2011; Zartman 2010; Boone 2014). Boundary disputes
can take place within the community as well as between communities, and
conflict resolution procedures can differ greatly between the two. They can
also be both, where an ethnic group has been split by a modern state making
two communities out of one in sovereignty terms but the two reflecting both
the same traditional structures and practices, often commonly held (Hüsken,
2017). Intra-community land disputes resemble matters of theft and murder in
the way they are handled.
Intercommunity boundary disputes involve two communities, each with
its structures and procedures; on each side, there will be a council of elders
and leaders contacting each other. Typically, the reconciliation spirit translates
into a beginning with adoption of measures of confidence- and even security-
building (CBMs and CSBMs) to calm the land before actual negotiations begin
(Ndi 2011; Mbagwa 2015) can undergo training to deal with subsequent border
disputes can take place within the two communities through their regulatory
societies, examining how to make tangible concessions in order to strengthen
their relationship together. If direct conciliatory processes do not succeed,
the disputing parties may invoke a mediator, an elderly sage, possibly from a
neighboring community or a paramount chief, or even an arbitrator, who not
merely reconciles but adjudicates (du nku in Benin; ajwad in Sudan) (Kouassi,
2000; Tubiana, Tanner & Abdul-jalil, 2012). Often, when both groups share the
common value of maintaining their own integrity, a satisfactory solution can be
mediated, although when the internal reconciling practices of each community
differ, joint reconciliation becomes more difficult (Tuso 2000 vs Anon. 2017).
These procedures may produce a substantive result allocating land to
one side or the other or reaffirming previous boundaries. Here, the spirit
may be reconciliation and restorations of good relations between claimants,

but the actual result tends to allocation of land, possibly with compensation
through whatever usage or payment arrangements that may be devised, a
good negotiation procedure. Trade-offs between ownership and usufruct may
be invoked. Propriety over the land may be reaffirmed or established, but in
exchange, the owner allows the other party passage, as to a sacred shrine or
spot in the other’s territory, or exploitation, as in the extraction of farmed or
mined goods (Ndo 2011, 42; Danso & Osei-Tutu 2015, 126). Nonetheless,
lest it appear that these procedures will always arrive at a chummy result,
there is always the possibility of war, announced, declared, and then fought
wholeheartedly (Masina 2000, 175). War is always a strong manager of conflict
and threat of war is itself an important source of soft power before the conflict
harshens.
Authority conflicts were probably the least successfully reconciled by
traditional conflict management because they represented a breakdown of
the system in its own terms (Fonkem 2015, 315). Usually the tribal structure
was durable and resistant to challenge, but when it broke down, the system
for managing the conflict itself would also break down; authority disputes
mark the limits of the system (and incidentally mark the limits of the modern
colonially installed legal system and its post-independence successor as well).
As in any political structure, there were rules and mechanisms for succession
(even where, as in the postcolonial period, the procedure for succession was
strongman takeover), but there were bound to be exceptions and unclarities
in the rules. In modern practices, elections are the ultimate procedure for
resolving authority conflict, and so they were in tradition in African conflict
management, but the rules of the procedures were more open to challenge. As
usual, the conflict went to community councils, consensual mediators, higher
authorities, and then alliances within and among communities. Nevertheless,
succession contests split councils, divide authorities, and roil alliances, until all
that is left is war.
Resolution by these devices allowed for little compromise: someone had
to be chief. Even when one candidate or incumbent passed away, usually a
definitive resolving mechanism, the conflict could continue or be renewed
over the succession (Zartman & Nuameh 2005). The Dagbon (Dagomba)
chieftainship conflict in northern Ghana has lasted over two centuries with
creative persistence (Danso & Osei-Tutu 2015; Brewoo & Abdallah 2015;
Nuameh 2000; Ahorsu & Gebe 2011; Davenport n.d.). One device that permits
an innovative solution is withdrawal of a faction into a new territory and
establishment as a new community (Fred-Mensah 2000, 39; Wilson-Fall 2000,
61; Kouassi 2000, 73). African history is full of stories of the putative ruler
who migrated like a queen bee with all her suite to set up a new kinship group
in a new land. Walking away is an established conflict management mechanism,

and in notable African cases, is a motor of history. In present-day Africa, there
is not much free land to walk away to, but the Ishaak and Dir clans did walk
away from Somalia to resurrect Somaliland, the Nuer and the Dinka walked
away from their fight with Sudan to turn to a fight against each other, and the
Eritreans ran away from Ethiopia to restore an old kinship community. The
first was done with little violence and was not internationally recognized, the
second decades of violence, recognition and dismay, and the third with much
hard power followed by recognition, for whatever lesson one might want to
draw.
Inter-community relations involve the “highest” level of conflict, taking
place between unrelated ethnic groups or larger multi-community entities. The
substance of such disputes can involve some of the issues already discussed,
including boundaries, withdrawal, and even domestic quarrels (e g in cross-tribal
marriages [Hutchinson & Pendle 2015; Kuassi, Fall 2000]). These conflicts did
end up in war on occasion, but characteristically efforts were made to retain
good, neighborly relations (including specifically cross-tribal marriages, still
practiced). “Close though the tongue is to the teeth, they sometimes clash”
for the Yoruba; “Conflict is inevitable between two close friends” among the
Yoruba (Ajibade 2015, 222, 225); “Today’s enemies were yesterday’s friends
and should not forget the good days together before” for the Nweh (Fonkem
2015, 317).
The reference in the proverbs is to intercommunity conflicts that are
not considered existential for the parties, who rather seek to overcome their
differences in a way to preserve the entities involved and to reconcile them
so that their integrity is preserved and they can resume whatever normal
relations involve them. By the same token, procedures to manage them at
the intercommunity level have the same characteristics as intracommunity
management. Elders in council, full hearings, restitution, appeals to principles
of harmony, rituals of reconciliation, establishment of kinship are principal
traditional ingredients of conflict management even at the “highest” level of
separateness (Mbagwa, 2015, p.63). If it sounds too good to be true, it must
be noted that these practices were established on the job over centuries and
maintained by repeated usage. Like any repeated human activity, they broke
down often enough to be human but worked consistently enough to be
maintained and institutionalized.
Indigenous Sources of Power

So what has been the power basis for these conflict management and
even resolution activities? If reconciliation is the thrust of traditional African
conflict management, the source of power lies in the consensual moral basis
of the action that makes it accepted, participatory, authoritative, and legitimate.
African social philosophies from kanye ndu nowi in West Africa to umbutu
in southern Africa (discussed below) have undergirded systems of conflict
management that stand in deep contrast to Western notions of retributive
justice and punishment, in which crime tends to be considered as an incident
to be judged by legal standards that allocate sentences according to the severity
of the offense. Justice in the African traditional system is seen in terms of
collective harmony, and in the West, in terms of individual accountability. It is
interesting that African traditional practices do not bring to light any particular
practical insights, but merely emphasize uprightness in the pursuit of harmony.
In a “Letter to the Warring Tribes,” in the eighteenth century in present-day
Mali, Sayid al-Mukhtar ibn Ahmed ibn Abu Bakr an-Kunti al-Kabir, much in
the style of the Quran, emphasized the moral qualities of a peacemaker rather
than laying out a conflict management process (also much like Western writing
on negotiation before the twentieth century on process analysis [de Calières
1716; de Felice 1978).
The other element then that is common to all of these levels of conflict, and
the procedures for their management, is the basic component of community.
This element is capital in the traditional African experience in that it provides
a distinctive normative construct and socio-political condition as a base for
practical methods of handling conflict. Hence, pre-modern African life conflict
management techniques were posited on the existence of a kinship community
that defined social relations. Underlying this moral order as an enabling factor
is the Community, the social organization that provides the institutional
basis for actions that would otherwise tear apart its structure and impede its
functions. A person’s existence was conceived in terms of the community: I am
because we are (umuntu ngumuntu mgabantu in Nguni [South Africa]). This
is the constructed opposite of the Western individualist notion of “We are
because I am” (although the relation between the two could be constructively
debated) or cognito ergo sum, the most individualistic statement that contains
no reference to community at all. The syllogism is encapsulated in the Bantu
term of ubuntu, “that one can be a person only through others. It is only in
the spirit of ubuntu, with its emphasis of working together, that problems can
be solved” (Masina 2000, 170-171; Mbagwu 2015, 59), or kanye ndu wi for the
Buems. Conflict is bad only to the extent that it hurts the community; if not,
we could live with it, like hunger.
A community can come in many sizes contained in the notion of an extended

family—from a small, genealogically related group to a tribe or nation—
but one where beliefs/values and kinship relations are shared. The primary
evolutionary answer regarding reasons for cooperative solidarity is found in
kinship (Hamilton 1964), providing a special kind of altruism in which benefit
does not incur to the individual directly, but through the group. The senior
figures, family councils, decisions, integration, exclusion, confidence-building
and all the other measures, which seem so exemplary, only have meaning,
legitimacy and effectiveness within a given kinship community. Tongue and
teeth have a mouth to keep them working together, and without it, they are
merely meat and dentures. “Kinship manages conflict” (Lundy & Adjei 2015,
4). Kinship relations can be imagined and mythologized to provide a credible
reference to legitimize behavior. In strict genealogical terms, African kinship
provides only imagined communities, since real ancestry is from long ago
(Anderson 1983); the original ancestor is far enough away and his descendants
intermarried enough to be only mythologically related. Nevertheless, that only
reinforces the cognitive element that legitimizes the management of conflict.
Impact of Modernization
Yet there are two limitations —internal and external— on the provision of
even imagined kinship communities. Internally, community practices contain
specific contents that are hard to perpetuate and replicate. Indigenous methods
involve folklore, proverbs, rituals, songs, symbolic practices, atonement and
forgiveness, ancestors, age grades, oaths, ceremonies, regulatory societies,
fetishes and magic that play many roles in the management of conflict, including
convocation, validation and solutions themselves (Houtondji 1997; Masina
2000; Benjamin & Adebayo 2015; Alaiya 2015; Mbagwu 2015; Hutchinson &
Pendle 2015). Perhaps the most important indigenous ingredient is time, the
pace of the process; as an African friend remarked, “one thing we have a lot
of in Africa is time.” These are the cobwebs that hold the community and its
practices together and the community is only as solid as they are. It has taken a
longtime to put such elements in place, and although they are resilient, they are
hard to replace if destroyed.
Thus, traditional African conflict management is basically conservative,
aimed at absorbing the changes and challenges inherent in new or unusual
events. It is not peaceful change, it is peaceful restoration. That is an admirable
goal in many types of conflict situations, but it falls short when the conflict
comes from basic alternations in the structure and relations of the elements.
The community has no answers to meet the new demands because it does not
understand the questions. Inter-generational conflicts, changing ethnic groups,

disruptions to “knowing one’s place,” emergence of drug-trafficking warlords,
eruptions of the disinherited, religious “crusades,” among others, are conflicts
where putting the pieces back together again may simply no longer be possible:
they just don’t fit any longer.
In terms of external context, modernization has damaged the community
(Ashford, 2005). It began with colonization and the introduction of competing
economic, legal and conflict management systems, but also with the introduction
of different higher belief systems—notably Christianity and Islam— that
competed with the mythology of the kinship groups. Beyond these forces of
formal competition, with traditional practices and beliefs came challenges to
the structure of the community. Wage labor, migration, schooling including
school graduates and school leavers, science, and indeed conflict itself have
weakened the eminence of chiefs, dispersed the availability of councils, upset
the importance of rituals, ruptured the assurance of identities, undermined
authority of mythologies, and left the community a wraith of its former self.
Possibly worse yet, when some of its elements remained, they have been taken
over by the conditions of modernization that have destroyed their content.
When conciliators sought to involve traditional elders in rebuilding state and
society in Somalia, they found that the elders observed that power comes out
of a gun and so they merely followed the warlords, whose dominance they were
supposed to counterbalance (Menkhaus, 2000). When the customary system
holds the authority and identity in a society, its conciliatory adjudication can be
effective but when that authority is challenged and identity dispersed, or more,
if ignored, power is on a different level and elders can only heed and heel.
This means that indigenous conflict management has lost not only its
capabilities, but also its enabling meaning. Atonement and reinsertion mean
nothing if there is no community tissue to remend. Win-win solutions with other
communities have no mutual referents if the social structures are dispersed. It
is not the specific practices that are outmoded; reconciliation, mediation, ADR,
positive-sum solutions, among others, are common practice, anywhere. Many
of the actual practices are standard conflict management devices in all societies.
Hearings before councils of elders, efforts to reconcile narratives, search for
win-win solutions, mediation among parties, even the hotly debated topic of
restorative vs. retributive justice (Anstey & Rosoux, 2017) are all characteristics
of contemporary peacemaking. However, they must rest on a social basis and
reflect shared values, and these have been scattered if not shattered.
Curiously perhaps, in an age of democratization, if the collective element
of community has been subverted by modernization, its authoritarian element
has been reinforced, in the important area of land disputes. Throughout
colonial times and afterward, tribal lands, the “corporately held endowment
of a descent-based community,” have been under a chiefly jurisdiction “in
allocating access to farmland and in adjudicating land-related disputes arising
over boundaries, inheritance, and transactions” (Boone, 2014, pp. 35-36, pp.
37-51). Less curiously, therefore, the chief ’s authority over land issues made
him the prime organizer for political parties in election times; the chief, like
any good party boss, became the authoritarian base of community identity but
also of democratization, writ “ethnic competition” in Africa. Boone (2014)
terms this authority and its land tenure regimes “neo-customary,” in which the
community becomes dependent on the chief rather than the reverse.
However, the neo-customary is customary more in form than in practice.
The chief acts as an adjudicating authority rather than as the agent of a
participating community, adjudicating rather than reconciling (Aluigba,
2011). The community is there, in name more than in function, riven by the
disturbances of modernism mentioned. The elders work for the state, if
only by delegation of reinforcing authority, and so lose respect (Kah, 2015).
In electoral and democratizing regimes, the customary chief ’s usefulness in
delivering votes allows him to claim greater unimpeded jurisdiction in local
disputes, if only to reinforce his authority over the community in electoral
times. Every silver lining has its cloud, however, such newfound usefulness
can also undermine the impartiality and standing of the chief (Osaghae, 2000;
Kah, 2011).
In a second area of conflict, domestic quarrels and personal crimes, neo-
customary practices are still followed but tend to run afoul of modernity,
both in their functioning and in their effects. Councils and chiefs, with a large
measure of public and stakeholder participation, often work well to manage
interpersonal conflicts from marriage to murder where conflict analysis,
atonement and reconciliation are more important than punishment, and where
time is deployed as an adjunct to these values, literally closeted back in the
manners of another era. But here, traditional practice runs into problems.
Within its exercise, which often depends on use of rituals, sacrifices and oaths
and appeals to ancestors, modern religion weakens such effects and prevents
parts of the community from participating; ancestors, oaths and sacrifices
are denounced as pagan and in some countries their use is prohibited by law.
Once the conflict has been handled traditionally, civil authorities come in to
apply modern law, which seeks punishment, eschew reconciliation, establishes
guilt, punishes oathing, and renders judgment, nullifying and contradicting
the customary process and result (Adesina, 2015). Or, as some complain, the
state—possibly in an effort to bridge the gap—institutes a commission of
inquiry, which then finds its own facts and files its report, without further
incidence, or with political manipulation from the outside.
Contemporary Conflict Management-Revival

Yet, indigenous conflict management practices are not dead, and even
where they are in disuse, an analytical argument can be made for their revival.
Even if traditional practices are no longer directly appropriate, the spirit of
traditional methods may be applicable to situations of change. To re-empower
these institutions and practices, community has to be rebuilt where it has been
undercut, strengthened where it has been bypassed, and recognized by state
authorities as legitimate peacemakers. A number of elements support these
observations:
1. If the traditional imagined kinship community is weakened by
modernization, the remedy could be its succession by a modern imagined
kinship community. The African political project is to create a state nation
to encompass and modernize the component traditional nations or ethnic
groups of the country. In some cases, the state-nation comes with a nationally
accepted founding father such as Leopold Sedar Senghor in Senegal and Nelson
Mandela in South Africa; few of the fathers of other countries have become
the subject of consensual idolization, which does take time and charisma. The
traditional community was manageably small but it is harder to instill a notion
—even a myth— of kinship in a national community of millions. Making a
state-nation out of a state of many traditional nations has proven beyond the
current capability of most African polities, and even a much vaunted nation-
state as Somalia fell apart into its segments when the common enemy —
Ethiopia— itself fell into turmoil. Efforts to instill a new imagined community
have, on occasion, provoked the resurgence of the traditional nations—tribes
or ethnic communities, in Ivory Coast and Chad for example, but such efforts
take time, aided by propitious conditions and events, and are worth the effort.5
Community building is facilitated by other common characteristics, notably
a shared religion, which can revive the notion of reconciliation and be even
more unifying than the traditional religions it replaces. “National community”-
building helps legitimize modern legal practices but also neo-customary
institution, and even a cooperative relation between the two. Community at
any level empowers the management of conflict.
2. Despite the encroachments and vulnerabilities mentioned above,
“modern” versions of traditional communities at a subnational level have
shown a good deal of resilience and persistence in a number of areas.6 They fill
5 Studies have shown that the most propitious conditions involve a single dominant ethnic group
(Senegal, Tunisia) or many small ones (Tanzania) and the least stable is one where two ethic groups are
predominant and close in size (South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi).
6 A few years ago in Ghana, I visited the chief of a tribe in a ceremonial setting and traditional dress,
who happened to have been the head of the economics department in a major New England university
but came to fill his duty when called. The situation is not unique.
functional social and political as well as identity needs, particularly when they
involve stable rural populations. When local communities can keep domestic
quarrels within the purview of extended family conflict management, it is best
for the state to leave them there and not see them escalate to the courts, where
reconciliation is not the goal and the healing embrace of the community is
bypassed or even shattered. The common attitude is to question not only the
effectiveness of state interference, but its very legitimacy in local disputes.
Longevity has given neo-customary measures great authority; newly imposed
modern legal measures themselves are a source of conflict. In these situations,
observers and practitioners of neo-customary conflict resolution plead for
recognition and for space. Many types of interpersonal conflicts can be handled
traditionally, without meeting the modern requirements of decisional justice
but by building wider conflict management as conciliatory justice.
3. In some areas of activity, most importantly in land ownership matters,
the state is forced to consider traditional practices. Property and border issues
are perennial matters of conflict, and time-honored measures have been
established to handle them. Governments recognize the functional utility of
customary authorities (and are obliged to admit their identity importance in
democratic politics). That recognition is a necessary condition for the useful
functioning of neo-customary communities. In most of Africa, neo-customary
authorities allocate land, but as individuals are theoretically able to take their
decisions to a higher level, in courts or in politics (Boone 2014), the result is
a lengthened process, a rupture in local relations, and a loss of legitimacy for
both the neo-customary and the modern legal procedures. Where such modern
procedures can be held in check, the danger of land issues reaching the national
level is minimized; where not, land issues can become the source of insurrection
and civil war. In Sudan and South Sudan, Eastern Congo, Sierra Leone, and
Ivory Coast, from the 1990s to the present, murderous civil war as in Sudan
and South Sudan, Eastern Congo, Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast (Autesserre
2010; Peters 2011; Haaland 1969; Reno 2007, 2011). A firmer authority, usually
involving traditional practices, was required for conflict prevention.
When indigenous mechanisms are allowed space and time to run their course,
there is an opportunity for a more satisfying and stable result. Recognized,
these practices can return to wider acceptance and participation, and contribute
to dealing with conflict at its base, avoiding dangers of escalation to higher
instances and wider involvement. Even in serious conflict situations, they can
create pockets of reconciliation that soften the conflict dynamics. Intertribal
dialogue and even marriage in South Sudan (Vleeshouwers 2016; Menkhaus
2008; Hutchinson & Pendle 2015), interfaith, women’s and student dialogue
in Liberia (Toure, 2002), reconciliation (judiya [sic]) through elders’ mediation
and adjudication in Darfur (Tubiana, Tanner & Abdul-jalil 2012), and spirit-
based reconciliation proceedings in Mozambique (Igreja, 2010) are examples

of traditional conflict management in heavy conflict areas; in these and others
instances, the traditional procedures were effective in handling local disputes
but often ran into either state or factional interference that circumscribed or
undercut their work. Such work is most effective where it can be isolated from
the larger conflict, but even where it cannot, it can often resist interference and
make a difference.
4. In some places, countries have ventured into modernizing traditional
practice by appointing their own peace committees, modeling on customary
practice but extended, enlarged, formalized and modernized in various other
ways. They tend to meet complaints that they lack experience and longstanding
roots, but they do perpetuate community control over peacemaking and gain
experience on the job. Commentators frequently call for training, so that
the participation that characterized past practices can return. Similarly, well-
meaning Western conflict management experts have, on occasion, sought
funding for traditional practices (e.g. the ajawid, or independent elders who
perform intertribal mediation in Sudan) to provide resources for wider
practice, but at the same time subjecting supported activities to Western
donors’ requirements of accountability and success (Chauzal, 2015). Even
more noteworthy have been President Umaru Yar’ Adua’s amnesty program
for the Niger Delta in 2009 and the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) Conflict Prevention Framework inaugurated in 2008 that
incorporate traditional methods and practices (Bolaji, 2011).
Such experiences, both positive and negative, have been recorded in the
Tiv area of north-central Nigeria (Aluaigba, 2011), in the Cross Rivers region
of Nigeria and Cameroon (Kah 2011), in Western Cameroon (Ndi, 2011), in
Kenya (Boone, 2012), in Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe (Boone and Kriger, 2010),
in Wajir in Kenya (Abdi 2015; Menkhaus 2008), in Abyie in Sudan (for the
moment) (Deng 1986, 2003), in Nigeria (Odziobogo & Didiugwu 2015), among
the Nuer (Hutchinson & Penle, 2015), and in West African states’ conflicts in
general (Bolaji, 2011), among others. Using traditional methods, local councils
of elders drawn from the community have resolved low-level conflicts and
fostered reconciliation.
One Western procedure into which African traditional practices might
seem to fit is Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), where the outcomes are
subject to negotiation rather than to judgment (Danso & Osei-Tutu 2015, 121,
125; Asogwa 2015, 143-144). Anthropologists have claimed that justice for the
weak is less well served by ADR, where power between lawyers comes into play
rather than a judge’s or jury’s verdict or elders’ reconciliation (Nader, 1989).
However, it may be that the similar procedures can work to bring together their
different philosophical basis (Kolawole & Kolawole 2015, 269-278).

5. Finally, in much of Africa the biggest domestic threat is burgeoning
jihadi gangsterism that feeds on other problems such as unemployment,
corruption, and spiritual vacuity. Although Islam is now well rooted in over half
of the continent, it is often cited as a foreign religion that has helped destroy
the affective basis of the community—its “’assabiya” (solidarity) to borrow
an Arabic term. Where community spirit and organization has nonetheless
persisted, the dangers of takeover by radical Islam have been reduced;
where they have not, there is also room for community reconstruction, even
incorporating a more customary form of Islam such as sufi sects (turuk) and
official Islamic associations, as a firebreak against radicalism (Elisher 2017).
There are large areas of Somalia where communities have held together and
not fallen victim to al-Shabab; Tuareg solidarity in some places held its own
again al-Qaeda in the Arab Maghreb (AQIM) or Ansar Dine in Mali and Niger;
national Islamic associations in Niger and Chad and the turuq in Senegal have
made remarkably impervious to AQIM and other radical encroachment.
Conclusion
Soft power is available in any society when built on the social context
that legitimizes and empowers it. Some societies have a tradition of past
practices that have grown out of their social norms and values and have been
honed by long periods of use and refinement to sharpen their efficiency.
Traditional conflict management has been the active ingredient of whatever
harmony existed in precolonial African relations and it has continued, to some
extent, despite debilitating circumstances into the present time. Difficulties of
content and context have weakened beliefs and practices, yet to large parts of
the African population they remain. In many situations, notably conflicts of
land use and ownership and in interpersonal disputes, they have often proven
their worth; chiefly, authority is frequently more compelling and acceptable
than modern judicial and legal proceedings although it runs up against the
positivism of modern law. African experts complain not about the irrelevance
of their heritage, but about the interference of new norms and practices—
the run to pastors, priests and imams for counsel and advice, the refuge in
civil or criminal law—and even politics—for judgments and justifications.
Fundamentally, there is competition between the basic sources of power in
the form of authority and legitimacy, and the conflict between the two sources
—tradition in the community vs. law in the state— is fought not over practical
results in dealing with conflict, but over the enabling legitimacy of one system
or the other, a conflict over the source of the power to manage conflict rather
than its results.
There is an obvious response to the contradictory logic of this situation:
Instead of completing the modernization process by crowding out the
customary practices that work, with all the compounded conflict that it entails,
give them space and respect! Using customary practices and venues can help
indigenous systems work for themselves, rather than taxing government with
conflicts often impervious to legal methods of judgment than to traditional
measures of reconciliation. In the process, use of traditional councils will help
return them to practice and relevance, while insulating government from local
disputes that untended at the local level by local methods can rise to overthrow
state systems. Coopting traditional venues and enrolling their practices actively
in a modern context is another option, but care must be taken not to tame the
neo-customary role to modern demands, which delegitimizes it. This is the
practice accorded to the post of chieftain, which has found new usefulness by
being incorporated into contemporary politics. A third option is to build new
institutions of civil society that adopt customary values and the best of the
customary methods, notably the participation of stakeholders and the search
for conciliation to erase conflict.
There is certainly room for a translation of neo-customary conflict

management methods to the highest level of international disputes. The
event is doubtlessly rare, but the spirit needs to and can be cultivated. It
takes a de Gaulle and Adenauer to launch, personally as well as nationally,
a real reconciliation after a history of conflict (Rosoux, 2001); DeKlerk and
Mandela did it nationally even if not personally (Sisk, 1995). Yet the spirit
of reconciliation participation, time, and building an overarching sense of
community are necessary elements in peacemaking if conflict is to be more
than managed but truly resolved and transformed. On the other hand, it is hard
to imagine Afwerki and Meles in East Africa or Mohammed VI and Bouteflika
in North Africa or Salva Kiir and Riek Machar in South Sudan seeking personal
as well as national reconciliations, despite all the Ubuntu or solh that might be
pumped into the process. Like all ideals, it remains a real and guiding inspiration
but not a sine qua non, in Africa any more than elsewhere.
But on the continental level, the Union of all African states, dedicated
to finding African solutions for African problems, would do well focus on
the principles of reconciliation that are its inheritance. On the model of the
Millennial Summit of the United Nations on the universal level, African leaders
should take stock of their own traditional spirit and practices and then meet to
reaffirm their commitment to the spirit of reconciliation and their readoption
of many of its practices to guide their relations. It is a pertinent challenge
for the African Union to uphold the ideal of reconciliation and peaceful,
accommodative resolution of conflicts before the eyes of its members and
pursue it, so that the Union can meet its own cultural standards and serve as a
model for other regional organizations (Deng & Zartman 2002).
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I am grateful to Dr MaryJane Deeb of the Library of Congress for bringing this

Letter to my attention.
Studies have shown that the most propitious conditions involve a single dominant
ethnic group (Senegal, Tunisia) or many small ones (Tanzania) and the least stable is
one where two ethic groups are predominant and close in size (South Sudan, Rwanda,
Burundi).
A few years ago in Ghana, I visited the chief of a tribe in a ceremonial setting and
traditional dress, who happened to have been the head of the economics department
in a major New England university but came to fill his duty when called. The situation
is not unique.
Collective Security in Africa:
Appropriation of Strategic
Thought
Abdelhamid Bakkali
Introduction
More than any other part of the world in our post-Cold War era, Africa
is often described in a hyperbolic rhetoric of endemic conflict and insecurity.
Despite pro-active pan-Africanism seeking to re-establish security and
promote development - this was at the origin of the transition from the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU), apocalyptic
prophecies such as in Robert Kaplan’s “The Coming Anarchy,” abound. In the
same vein, Joseph Nye ranks Africa in the last third of the post-cold-war-world,
a world of permanent crises and instability. These damaging stigmatizations
have, for a long time, fueled crude Afro-pessimism, to say the least.
According to Africa’s Pulse, published by the World Bank, Africa’s economy
is growing at a sustained rate of nearly 5%, despite weak global growth and
stagnant or even falling commodity prices. Despite this resilience and a
downward trend in the number of conflicts, outdated analytical perspectives
continue to shape the collective imagination about Africa and produce biased
geopolitical representations. The result is a strong Afro-skepticism, centering
on its ability to transform itself into a highly promising emerging continent.
In essence, Africa does not need an external intellectual or scientific
chaperon to find its own way, as other civilizations have. It needs to develop
its own strategic thinking; an epistemological introspection of sorts that
guarantees a proper understanding of opportunities, challenges and threats,
a better identification of subsequent means to be implemented, as well as a
judicious selection of courses to be pursued. Needless to say, that those lengthy
periods of imposed forced marches have always been detrimental to Africa.
The present study aims to contribute to this meta-epistemological and
praxeological debate. To this end, it intends to initially deconstruct the authority
of certain conflict and crisis analysis models in Africa, which have become
obsolete. The purpose is to demonstrate that these models have become an
ineffective paradigm from a cognitive point of view, and a counterproductive
paradigm from a pragmatic point of view. Alternatively, a polemology classic
(Carl Von Clausewitz) is proposed as the theoretical foundation for a new
paradigm suited to the conflict and insecurity that plague Africa. Wrongfully
labeled as a champion of hard power (absolute war), Clausewitz offers a
theorization of conflict that could opportunely stimulate the use of soft power,
through anticipation and transformation.
Next, the focus will be on one of the aspects that make African polemos
complicated but certainly not unique. It is about the interweaving of
asymmetrical threats7 in the logic of mutualization of resources and communion
of interests. This provides an opportunity to understand the legal and strategic
issues and challenges involved in such joint ventures. It also suggests that the
era of piecemeal responses is over. It is therefore time for systemic approaches
with particular emphasis on soft power and a sufficient mix of hard power;
namely smart power made in Africa and for Africa.
Lastly, Africa’s institutional response to collective security will be studied.
First, by focusing on its organization as well as its functioning and then by
trying to identify a few of its shortcomings. It is essentially an ambitious
solution, which comes as a catharsis, following the black decade of the 1990s.
It nevertheless suffers from a glaring gap between established objectives,
allocated resources and African geopolitical realities.
I. Conflict and Insecurity in Africa:

Advocating for a New Polemological
Paradigm
1. African Polemology: A Paradigm Crisis
Emancipation for Africa today is equivalent to embracing an Afro-African

strategic reflection. It is time for this “young” continent to organize itself so
7 “Asymmetry is a dialectic of will, hypothetical (threat) or factual (hostilities), where an infra-state

entity (or constellation of entities), organized and driven by a political or profit-making objective, indirectly
fights against an adversary of a different nature (State or coalition of States) in such a way as to render
inoperative the latter’s superiority in capability, by concealing its own weakness. The resolution is generally
sought over the long term by non-conventional actions, but does not exclude a transition to regular
military operations as the ultimate step in asymmetric combat”: Definition proposed by the author in his
PhD thesis (pending defense).
Collective Security in Africa: Appropriation of Strategic Thought
that it is no longer stranded in the face of outsiders’ tyranny of wills and of

all sorts of tribulations. This attitude warrants dogged determination, backed
by critical reflection, aimed at adequately connecting Africa to the pace of
globalization. However, it is by no means a question of returning to yesteryear’s
debates about the epistemological status to be ascribed to “African thought” in
the context of its discursive rationality. Rather, it is a question of developing
perfect autonomy of thought and above all, informed decision-making focused
on addressing the challenges facing the continent through African capabilities.
The economic and human development performance of some African
countries over the past decade has been at odds with African fatalism and
advocates Afro-optimism. Aside from all exaggeration, the enthusiasm of
some development specialists should be noted as a sign that this century will be
Africa’s. Africa is on the cusp of a historical crossroad along the long journey
of its destiny. Will African nations naively let their own fate be trodden by the
footsteps of others, failing to become the masters’ of their destiny? Or will
they seize post-Cold War opportunities and conscientiously choose the path
of their own destiny?
There are several indications that Africa could follow Asia’s lead on the
path of emergence. The current dynamic echoes a capitalization on the painful
experiences of the 1990s. In peacekeeping alone, there has been a significant
improvement in the engagement of African countries, with more than 50 per
cent of UN peacekeepers deployed in Africa hailing from African countries.
This new geopolitical and geostrategic situation requires a radical paradigm
shift. Paradigm is understood here in the meaning originally given by Thomas
Kuhn. It refers to the set of assumptions or representations accepted by a
community, society or scientific group, which guides both thought and action.
Kuhn points out that every paradigm has a fixed period of validity that ends
in a “paradigmatic crisis.” This inevitable moment occurs when the paradigm
can no longer provide sustainable explanations or guide appropriate action.
At this critical time, the community is called upon to develop a new and more
appropriate paradigm8.
The paradigm shift phase brings about two major challenges. First,
challenging the foundations of the old paradigm requires a great deal of
freedom of mind to detect, verify and justify in order to adopt a new paradigm.
The second challenge is to convince the community of the relevance of the
8 KUHN, T., «The Structure of Scientific Revolutions», French translation Laure Meyer, Ed.
Flammarion, 1972, p. 25.
new paradigm9.
The beginning of the 21st century is a historical moment for Africa, not
only for bringing about change but also for embarking on a paradigmatic
revolution. The latter should break with the essentialist approaches entrenched
since independence. Such grievances reduce the complexity of African
geopolitics to unique factors such as colonial heritage, ethnicity, religion and
natural resources. These approaches have run their course. They have reached
the end of their explanatory and praxeological potential. In other words, they
have reached their paradigmatic crisis.
Africa needs to develop its own paradigm in this regard, with intellectual
rigor and a methodological approach that avoids the selective tunnel effect,
which occurs when limiting oneself exclusively to what one wishes to consider.
It should stray away from a confirmatory approach that only chooses to focus
on those aspects that support pre-defined hypotheses.
Nonetheless, as the old saying goes, “don’t throw the baby out with the
bathwater.” Thus, it is necessary to first prove how the current paradigm is
no longer sufficient to explain the diptych of insecurity and conflictuality that
underpins Africa’s underdevelopment, and to what extent it renders African
action ineffective or even counterproductive. To do so, we need to identify the
disruptions that have marked the evolution of this paradigm since the end of
the Cold War.
In fact, and throughout the Cold War, conflict in Africa was strongly
steeped in the dialectic of encircling and counter-encircling by two antagonistic
blocs. Diplomatic, economic and military support from the United States
of America, the Soviet Union and their allies, has been tied to a struggle to
dominate and influence. In this respect, Africa was no exception. Europe, Asia
and Latin America were also transcended by their own iron curtains. Thus,
some authoritarian regimes were kept in power to play specific roles in the
global battle, while others succumbed to putsches fomented or encouraged by
extra-continental powers.
As the East-West antagonism ended, Africa lost its strategic value as a
firewall. There was a gradual withdrawal from the African scene in the 1990s
to other priority areas, notably Eastern Europe and Central Asia. As a result,
humanitarian missions were cancelled, intelligence posts closed and military
and economic aid reduced or even stopped.
9 Galileo was guillotined by the church when he proposed a new heliocentric paradigm in 1633 instead
of the old geocentric one. Descartes self-censured himself, preferring to postpone the publication, until
1637, of his treatise “Method of Discourse” which was a plea in favor of Galileo.
Losing this strategic revenue stream, which had put many socio-economic
grievances on hold for a long time, profoundly weakened a number of regimes
that were artificially maintained by these external support measures. Indeed,
most of these regimes were unable to survive the popular insurrections,
subversive actions and civil wars that ensued. Dramatic events in Liberia,
Somalia, Zaire, Rwanda and Ethiopia should be seen in this light.
This was compounded by economic crises and reduced public support, now
provided on a piecemeal basis. Foreign public aid dropped by 21% between
the end of the Cold War and the mid-1990s. Instead, it became a tool for
interference in the internal affairs of African states with donors now redirecting
their public aid according to efforts made in terms of good governance.
Polemological analyses in this context have three major shortcomings:
decontextualisation, culturalist essentialism and mercantilist reductionism.
From this emerges a certain irrationality inherent to the de-politicization of
war. According to these frameworks, African conflicts no longer correspond to
Clausewitzian logic, which states that “War is a simple continuation of politics
by other means.” Conflicts are thus reduced to criminal activities, carried out
purely for profit. Admittedly, natural resources can often be the cause of
conflicts, but they are only very rarely the main casus belli. Ethnological studies
have shown that natural resources were not at the heart of conflicts in the
Democratic Republic of Congo10.
The epistemological drift, embodied by the de-politicization of conflicts in
post-Cold War Africa, led to the development of highly controversial theories.
This is particularly the case with Mary Kaldor’s thesis that post-Cold War
internal wars are fundamentally different from those of the past, in that the
political dimension has faded in favor of cultural issues. In the same vein, other
authors raise the stakes on African polemos, believing they have detected major
strategic breakthroughs and advocating theories of war transformation11 and
war ethinicization12. The Rwandan conflict in this perspective is reduced to
a dialectic of wills between enemy communities, Tutsis and Hutus, against a
backdrop of atavistic ethnic division. These approaches deny the political and
social construction of Africa’s own racist ideology. African genocides are thus,
killings and barbarities devoid of any political dimension and insulated from
instrumentalization.
An analysis of the interaction between ethnicity and politicization of
10 AUTESSERRE, S., « Dangerous tales: Dominant narratives on the Congo and their unintended
consequences », African Affairs, Vol. 111, April 2012, p. 5.
11 VAN CREVELD, M., « The Transformation of War. The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed
Conflict Since CLAUSEWITZ», Ed. The Free Press, New York, 1991, p. 47.
12 KEGAN, J., « A History of Warfare », Ed. Random House, New York, 1993, p. vii.
violence is also relevant. Atrocities that accompanied elections (e.g. Côte

d’Ivoire in 2010-2011, with more than 3000 dead and millions displaced) further
exacerbate this point. Thus, while some elections were relatively calm (Comoros
Islands, Benin, Senegal, etc.), others were more deadly and plunged countries
into chronic chaotic situations. Elsewhere, it is constitutional revisions with the
purpose of altering the number or duration of terms of office that triggered
popular protests.
On another level, the primary expression of electoral violence often
takes on an ethno-identity aspect. However, it is in fact combined with locally
specific considerations, such as the struggle for access to resources (water, land,
minerals...). This challenges the reductive and simplistic nature of exclusively
ethnic interpretations. On a cultural level, intra-state violence is increasingly
described as religious. Religion does play an important role in conflicts and
crises, but it is rarely the main cause. Religious conflicts are most often the
violent outcome of an irreconcilable rivalry between elites over political issues
in the pursuit of power. The latter might be economic, material, intangible, etc.
Finally, the analysis of conflicts in Africa suffers from another pitfall, a
form of polemological determinism in this case. African crises are thus placed
on different cognitive planes involving the development of atypical theories.
Conflicts across Africa are by no means unique or unprecedented when
compared to what is happening elsewhere in the Balkans, Mexico, Afghanistan
or in Brazilian favelas.
In short, existing frameworks suggest that insecurity and instability in
Africa are sui generis and that their fatality is unavoidable due to the burden
of history. These are barbaric, guided by a natural impulse for blind violence,
awakened by cultural urges or driven by pure profit-making intentions. Likewise,
violence appears to be disconnected from any political consideration or foreign
instrumentalization, when it is not reduced to fundamentally criminal activities.
It must, however, be recognized that this perspective is attractive because
of its simplicity and universalism. Indeed, it can be applied mutatis mutandis
to any African crisis. However, can it be applied to the whole chaotic rimland
that diagonally surrounds the globe from Latin America to Southeast Asia and
of which Africa is only one component?
In short, the current paradigm is based on linear causality, focusing mainly
on the nature of the triggering event and its consequences. Admittedly, the
strength of this approach is that it is directly operational to circumscribe
symptomatic consequences; however, it places decision-makers in reactive
postures carrying the risk of decision-making paralysis, under the weight of an
incompressible flow of uncertainties and hazards, in a sort of operational mist.
2. Which Alternative Paradigm?
To answer this central question, let us empirically refocus our conceptual

thinking. This can only be achieved by going back to the Cold War era. As a
matter of fact, the balance of nuclear terror prevented East-West antagonism
from turning into a mutually destructive confrontation. It as such served as a
stabilizing factor insofar as the number of conventional wars steadily decreased;
paradoxically however, it also served as a highly destabilizing factor, fostering
indirect strategies in each other’s areas of influence by means of asymmetrical
conflicts (claimant or subversive)13. Such actions resulted in situations of neither
peace nor war that Polemology attaches to the generic notion of Crisis14.
So and contrary to the hypothetical oracle of “end of history”, the Cold
War end did not put an end to this crisis process. There has been an upsurge
in international crises of asymmetrical types since then: Gabon 1990, Rwanda
1991, Yugoslavia 1991, Zaire 1991, Somalia 1992, the attacks of 11 September
2001, the Revolutions of Colors, the Arab Spring and even an African Spring
(expression used by the newspaper Libération when reporting on the Burkinabe
revolution).
On the whole, if it is agreed that the Cold War reinforced subversive and
claim-type crises as the dominant form of conflict in the absence of interstate
war, one could assume that the end of the Cold War enshrined the Asymmetrical
Crisis (in all its forms: claimant, subversive and predatory) as a form of conflict
in its own right. Viewed in absolute terms, a crisis is no longer a mere prelude
to war but a contentious process that purports to have conceptual autonomy.
Beyond this conceptual autonomy, a crisis situation could even claim Weber’s
status as a polemological ideal-type in dichotomy with an irenic situation
(peace) in which war and conflict would only be forms of materialization.
By favoring this procedural approach, one is led to embrace crisis in a
global way, bringing full meaning to interactions among various geopolitical
actors. Such an approach fosters situational intelligence among decision-
makers, denying unpredictability to a crisis, which now becomes a series of
installation, incubation and evolution phases that are easily identifiable15.
13 See André Beaufre, “Introduction à la stratégie”, Ed. Pluriel, 1963. (In particular Chapter IV: Indirect
strategy).
14 MORIN, E., « Pour une crisologie », In Communications, 25, 1976, La notion de crise; Freund Julien,
« Observation sur deux catégories de la dynamique polémogène. De la crise au conflit», In Communications,
25, 1976, La notion de crise.
15 Thomas HOBBES (pioneering polemologist) proposes a metaphor in his Leviathan that sheds light
mutatis mutandis on this procedural dynamic: “Just as the nature of bad weather does not lie in one or two
showers, but in a trend that goes in this direction, for a large number of consecutive days, so the nature
of war does not consist in an effective fight, but in a proven disposition, going in this direction until such
time as there is assurances to the contrary. All other times are called peace”: HOBBES, “Leviathan”, trad.
Tricaud, (online http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/hobbes_thomas last accessed 28.06.2017).
As such, Edgar Morin opened the way to the possibility of a modeling

of Crisis when he invoked, in 1976, the second principle of thermodynamics
(entropy) to describe crisis fatality:
“We cannot conceive of an organization without antagonism

[nor complementarity], but this antagonism potentially carries
within it the disintegration of the system. This is one of the
angles from which we can consider the second principle of
thermodynamics. All interrelationships and organizations are
maintained by immobilizing or mobilizing binding energies to
compensate and control opposition and dissociation forces.
Increased entropy implies energy/organizational degradation,
which releases antagonisms, which in turn lead to disintegration
and dispersion. Consequently the second principle states that
a system can only evolve in the direction of disorganization. In
other words, any system carries its own potential disintegration
within itself since it carries antagonism, and the second principle
sentences it to dispersion in the long term (obviously, if nothing is
done to maintain entropy at required levels, editor’s note)”16.
This is the only way to avoid stalling over the asymmetrical hiccup of
decisive battle, which emanated from hard power, with no clear winner to
prevail and impose political will, as is the case with conventional adversaries.
Stalemate is inherent to asymmetrical logic (a sort of strategic jujitsu) based on
combat avoidance, counter-use of enemy energy, attrition by circumvention
and long-term planning of indirect actions such as guerrillas, terrorism or non-
violent struggle as used in the past by Gandhi, Mandela and Martin Luther
King.
As a paradigmatic alternative, the conceptual work developed in the early
19th century by Prussian General Carl Philip Gottlieb Von Clausewitz provides
a solid foundation for the structuring of effective counter asymmetrical
strategies. And while not disputing his position as head of the pantheon of
strategic thinkers, other theorists and practitioners do support and fertilize his
conceptual construct, e.g. Sun Tzu and André Beaufre17.
Nevertheless, the aim is not to seek miraculous recipes for a programmed
16 MORIN, E., « Pour une crisologie », op. cit. p. 152.

17 Other thinkers worth a visit include Mao Zedong, Joseph Gallieni, Hubert Lyautey, David Galula
and Roger Trinquier.
victory from these luminaries, but only the mechanics of an eclectic software
that enables orderly strategic thinking in an asymmetrical context and
appropriate tunings for African crises.
The limited scope of this contribution does not allow an in-depth treatment
of counter asymmetry in the African context according to the proposed new
paradigm, by combining the works of the various thinkers mentioned above.
As such, this study remains limited to Von Clausewitz, given his originality and
relevance.
As a collateral benefit, it is worth noting the potential ease with which
defense forces can transform to adapt to asymmetrical threats; since the
majority of armed forces embody in their doctrines, to varying degrees, the
principles of war developed by Von Clausewitz.
In this respect, Von Clausewitz rightly considers that “war has its own
grammar but not its own logic”18; nevertheless, its logic is always the same:
to be a political tool that serves to impose one’s will on the enemy, in other
words, one’s own existential representation. Thus, grammar (who does what,
against whom, with what, in spite of whom, etc.) changes along the waves of
civilization. Consequently, none can dispute Clausewitz’s metaphor describing
war as a “true chameleon” changing “in nature with each particular case”19.
Von Clausewitz also achieved the philosophical development of a timeless
and universal framework that exonerates Africa from any polemological
stigmatization. This is the concept of “trinity”, which states:
“[War is] made of a wonderful trinity. It contains the original

violence of its element, made of hatred, hostility and chance, which
operate as a natural blind instinct; the interplay of probability and
chance, which make it a free game of the mind; and its subordinate
nature as a political instrument, by which it belongs to sheer
intellect.
Of these characteristics, the first is that of the people, the
second that of the general and his army and the third that of the
State. Passions unleashed in war must first exist among peoples;
attainment of courage and talent in the game of probability
depends on the qualities of general and army; political objectives
are the sole prerogative of the state”.20
18 CLAUSEWITZ, C. « De la guerre » (1832), Éd. Perrin, 1999, p. 289.

19 CLAUSEWITZ, C, op. cit., p. 48.
20 Ibid.
Two observations are in order. First, the fundamental trinity of war (made
of violence, the free game of the mind and pure intellect) applies to all types
of actors (state, infra or supra state). The derived triptych of people, army and
government is only an operational version. Second, the combination of the
three poles of the trinity shapes the DNA of the war envisaged for each of the
belligerents. It may point towards one of the poles but never identify with it.
A distinction is made between wars that are fundamentally political (generally
tinged with soft power), those that are purely military (hard power) or those of
a popular nature (a hybrid war of sorts).
However, stopping at this level will amputate Clausewitz’s thinking from
one of its fundamental pillars. A groundbreaking concept in polemological
theorization, namely: “polarity”21. Conceptually, it is a bridge between the
Clausewitzian22 philosophical antechamber and the operational universe it
developed by integrating a set of related conceptual tools, such as genius of
war, fog, friction, rise to the extremes, center of gravity, peak of the attack,
primacy of defense over attack, the decisive role of the counter-offensive,
intelligence, surprise, the role of the people, alliances, and so on.
All African crises whether classical (state-to-state), asymmetrical (state versus
violent non-state actors or these against each other) or hybrid (combinations
of the two: symmetrical and asymmetrical) are addressed by the Clausewitzian
paradigm. As a result, Africa should be treated polemologically in the same
way as other geopolitical blocs. The only caveat in designing peacekeeping or
peace-building strategies is to address contextual particularities of each crisis.
As Clausewitz warns: “The first, most important, most decisive act of judgment
of a statesman or commander-in-chief is the appreciation of the type of war
he undertakes, so as not to take it for what it is not and not to make it what the
nature of its circumstances forbids it to be”23.
One could object to this plea for the adoption of a Clausewitzian paradigm
for the development of an Afro-centric strategic thinking, with a plethora
of grievances of imposture, irrelevance, out-datedness and even conceptual
hypertrophy of this 19th century theoretician-strategist’s thought. These will
not be referred to the works of erudite scholars in this field (among others
21 Ibid. p. 41. “The principle of polarity is only valid if it applies to a single object, where the positive
magnitude and its opposite, the negative one, cancel each other out. In a battle, each of the two sides wants
to triumph; this is a true polarity, because the victory of one destroys the other. But if we are talking about
two different things, which have a third term in common, it is not these things but their relationships,
which enter into polarity”.
22 Clausewitz was a determined opponent of the Algerian approach to war to make it more predictable, as
advocated by his contemporaries such as Von Bülow or Jomini. Thus, thanks to romantic idealism, defined
in reaction to empirical and materialistic rationalism of the thinking of the Cartesian Enlightenment,
Clausewitz succeeded in solving his theoretical problem of subsuming the different types of war into a
single ideal-type to constitute its essence.
23 CLAUSEWITZ, C, op. cit., p. 48.
R. Aron, G. Chaliand, T. Derbent), but just reminded that Clausewitz was a

keen observer of several popular wars against Napoleon, that set the standard
(Spanish guerillas 1808-1814, Avenchean guerillas, Tyrolean and Russian
Cossack guerillas during the Russian campaign in 1812, etc.). He was also an
activist engaged alongside Gneisenau and Scharnhorst in the national struggle
against French occupation of Prussia. Even more so as in the course on the
“small war” he taught at the Berlin Military Academy, the part he devoted to
“people in arms” in his posthumous work “On War,” has not taken a wrinkle.24
But above all, it is his profound influence on the pioneering theorists
of contemporary asymmetrical strategy (Lenin, Mao and Giap)25 that settles
this debate on the validity of the Clausewitzian paradigm. Thus, fertilized by
Clausewitz’ theory26, Leninism is merely a militarization of the proletarian
class’s struggle for the acquisition of power, theorized by Marxism through
legal means (suffrages)! While Mao and Giap, whose long suspected intellectual
connivance with Clausewitz27, was proved by recent academic work, have only
operationalized Leninism. This is accomplished through the implementation of
concepts such as the decisive role of the people, the political nature of people’s
war, genius of war, the prevalence of defense over attack, the combination of
strategic defense and tactical attack in people’s wars, and so on.
Nevertheless, in essence, what is Von Clausewitz’s original contribution to
asymmetrical crisis management?
In fact, the Clausewitz trinity allows a very precise anatomy of asymmetrical
dialectic. According to Von Clausewitz’s paradigm, asymmetrical struggle
(both violent and non-violent) consists of setting up a parallel trinity aimed at
undoing the social contract underlying the State trinity, strategically paralyzing
its political pole, preventing it from effectively using its defense and security
pole, and removing its support from the “population” pole, such are the major
challenges of asymmetrical struggles. It is with this in mind that the famous
formula “winning hearts and minds” was coined, inherited from an era of
colonial pacification and now flourishing in contemporary counterinsurgency
doctrines (COIN).
Hence, and thanks to Clausewitz Trinity, it is needless to insist on the
counter-productivity of an exclusive use of legitimate violence in counter-
asymmetrical warfare. Force is necessary; but is in itself insufficient. This
24 See preface by Gérard CHALIAND to Carl Von Clausewitz, “De la guerre”, Éd. Perrin, 1999.
LAURENT MURAWIEC.
25 See ARON, R., “Penser la guerre, CLAUSEWITZ”, Volume I & II, Éd. Gallimard, Paris, 1976;
DERBENT, T., “VON CLAUSEWITZ et la guerre populaire”, Éd. Aden, Belgium, 2004.
26 The intellectual contact between Clausewitz and Lenin, then head of the Bolshevik party, was during
the latter’s exile in Switzerland.
27 See ARON, R., op. cit.
emanation of hard power, within a legal framework has the role of creating
the necessary conditions to restore the initial social contract; whereas it
should be supplemented, according to a global approach with a sufficient
multifaceted dose of soft power through economic, social, cultural, religious,
ideological, diplomatic and other levers. Counter asymmetrical combat (or anti-
asymmetrical in the case of proactive posture) is basically two-headed: a true
asymmetrical Janus.
At this level of analysis, it must be recognized that the appropriation of
strategic reflection does not only involve conceptual abstraction; it requires
taking into account African geopolitical realities. These are dominated by an
interweaving of different asymmetrical shapes.
II. Polemological Hybridity of African

Conflicts and Crises
1. Geopolitics of African Polemological Hybridity
Africa resembles a chaotic continuum at the crossroads of all contemporary

security challenges. These include (among others), state failure, terrorism,
transnational banditry, rebellions, illicit trafficking of all kinds (weapons,
drugs, human trafficking, etc.). Worse still, these evils seem to aggregate in
vicious cycles of instability and conflict, which once initiated, spread and self-
regenerate indefinitely thanks to the security vacuum they create.
Southern Africa, the Sahelo-Saharan strip and some North African pockets
provide clear examples of the severity of insecurity reached, but also of the
intertwining of threats as a factor of contagion and escalation. In this respect,
it should be noted that piracy is no longer the prerogative of the Horn of
Africa, drug trafficking is no longer that of West Africa, and terrorism is no
longer that of the Sahel alone. Everywhere, terrorism, rebellion and trafficking
in arms, drugs and human beings converge in a combination of hybridization
that make it difficult to decipher the actions and agendas of the various actors
involved.
A polyptych of common insecurity lies in the background. It focuses
mainly on the deficiencies of the State’s institutional structures, the collapse of
security and defense forces, which are not particularly professional, and socio-
economic fragility. It is here that indicators required to develop a soft power
crisis management system aimed at prevention need be identified and cross-
referenced. Early warning can thus be activated as soon as a State is powerless,

even partially to provide for the needs of its population and/or to establish its
authority on its territory.
This diagnosis is at odds with the pseudo-paradigm that once advocated
the African consecration of the principle of inviolability of borders inherited
from decolonization as the original sin of the continent. Admittedly, territorial
rivalries, particularly over borders, were long the most frequently mentioned
casus belli, but over the past two decades, there has been a fundamental intra-
state shift in conflict. As a result, States fall like fruits rotten from within, in the
wake of serious predatory, claimant or subversive disorders.
An undeniable corollary of this dynamic is contagion. This often takes
on a transnational dimension to infect an entire sub-region. The interweaving
of various asymmetrical threats and the interweaving of state threats with
asymmetrical threats give African crises and conflicts a hybrid dimension.
Neologisms with composite connotations thus appear. They express the
awareness of this convergence, as do the notions of narcoterrorism and narco-
insurgency. It is worth noting that this phenomenon has accelerated since the
end of the Cold War, due to the scarcity of budgets earmarked for subsidizing
“small proxy wars”, resulting in a proliferation of joint ventures based on a
combination of political violence and criminal activity.
The recognition of this collusion as a major threat to international security
is now on the agenda of the UN Security Council. This is, in any case, reflected
in Resolution/CS 2253 (2015), which highlights, from the preamble, its concern
and preoccupation that “terrorists benefit from transnational organized crime,
including trafficking in arms, drugs as well as objects and human beings, and
from the illicit trade in natural resources....”.
In this respect, it must be acknowledged that practically no conflict or crisis
in Africa has escaped the collusion of non-state actors often encouraged or
instrumentalized by states, with organized crime. This geo-strategic mutation
requires the integration of the criminal dimension into conflict management
on the one hand, and the adoption of a “conflict system” approach focusing
on combating the necrosis of public institutions, safeguarding the capacity
advantage of target states and protecting populations against subversive
alienation on the other.
First, however, it is necessary to define the concept of “asymmetry”, which
is blurred by a plethora of approximate proposals. On this account, there is a
consensus regarding the nature of parties involved, where it is accepted that
at least one of the parties to the conflict must be non-state. This consensus
is not inherently beneficial, since it fuels a fundamental divergence in the

motivation of these non-state actors. Some studies, for example, focus only
on subversive or claimant groups, while others associate so-called predatory
groups by extension28.
Indeed, the latter are distinguished by two fundamental attributes: motivation
and rationality. Predators, mainly criminal organizations, are motivated by the
pursuit of profit through the generation and trafficking of illicit goods and
services. As far as rationality is concerned, they have no rational reason in
principle to attack the stability and integrity of States. On the contrary, they
usually seek to drastically reduce the level of violence in order to operate with
a small footprint.
Paradoxically, this dichotomy (political/irrationality motivation versus
lucrative/rationality motivation) is misleading. It is empirically possible to
accept a hypothesis attributing a meta-motivation to criminal entities in pursuit
of a particular form of power. Such authority, termed as informal power (or
grey power), flees and avoids legitimate political authority in areas where it is
effective, and challenges it or even supplants it in areas where it is fading.
Legally, while it is generally accepted that the Law of Armed Conflict is
applicable to subversive and claimant actors, it is not so with regard to predatory
activities of criminal origin even when they reach endemic levels, as is the
case in Mali29. Only domestic law applies in this case, and this in conjunction
with International Human Rights Law (IHRL). This does not detract from
predators’ ability to be full-fledged geopolitical actors, as they can profoundly
influence the dynamics of conflicts and their outcomes.
For the purposes of this contribution, we adopt the definition of
geopolitics proposed by Yves Lacoste30 as a method for studying conflicts of
power and/or influence in a given territory between actors with contradictory
representations. Geography is considered topographically as well as human
dimensions. The study provides a systemic theoretical framework for dealing
holistically with conflict situations, embracing both internal and contextual
dynamics. To do so, we need only to analyze the geopolitical grammar in its
elementary parts, as suggested by François Thual31, to determine the tendency
of contingencies and dialectics between the different actors: Who does what?
With whom? Against whom? In spite of who? Where? When? How? Why? ...
28 Cf. FRANCART, L. et VILBOUX,N.,« L’adaptation nécessaire à notre outil de défense et à celui

de nos partenaires européens pour faire face aux menaces asymétriques », Eurodécision, 2003, pp. 9-36.
29 TREMBLAY, T., “Le droit international humanitaire confronté aux réalités contemporaines : les
insurrections criminelles peuvent-elles être qualifiées de conflits armés? “, Thesis directed by Professor
Yves Sandoz at the Academy of International Humanitarian Law in Geneva, 2011.
30 LACOSTE, Y., (dir.) “Dictionnaire de géopolitique”, ed. Flammarion, Paris, 1993, p. 51.
31 THUAL, F. « Méthodes de la géopolitique: apprendre à déchiffrer l’actualité», ed. Ellipses, 1996, p.34.
The development of this geopolitical approach could not take place but
in theory. For this reason, the Sahel-Saharan region was selected as a frame
of reference where the interweaving of asymmetry and organized crime has
reached endemic proportions. To support this observation, it is sufficient to
mention the participation of AQIM executive (subversive entity) Abdelkarim
Targui known as the Touareg (claimant entity), to a summit organized in Guinea
Bissau in October 2010 by Colombian drug traffickers (criminal entity)32.
Confronted with this entanglement of various spheres, it is advisable to
analyze their nature and interactions.
2. The stakes of polemological hybridity of African

insecurity
In a study of the links between terrorism and organized crime in the

Sahel region33, the co-authors demonstrated that when these two phenomena
are embedded in the same geographical space, three types of relationships
(conflict, coexistence or collaboration) develop, depending on the compatibility
of the specific interests of each party. Admittedly, a group’s interest plays a
predominant role in its behavior, but a decisive factor is the representation
it makes of itself. Representation is understood in its lacostian sense, as an
original element of the geopolitical approach that defines the way in which a
social group conceives or perceives its identity, its essence and its vital space all
in a logic of alterity with other groups.
Empirically, we can deduce that representations polarize conflicting
relationships into two heterogeneous, but nonetheless, intrinsically
complementary tendencies. On the one hand, rivalry disappears and gives way
to collusion based on a need for logistical pooling to optimize returns from
crime and illicit trafficking and on the other hand, rivalry intensifies around
the control of strategic territories and networks and/ or of securing illicit
revenue streams. This is all the more so since these relationships are not in
any way permanent, but forged in the name of ideals that are otherwise highly
circumstantial.
In any case, and despite this volatile state of affairs, entanglement presents
a major difficulty to conflict crisis management. Should leaders of warring
groups be involved as political actors in a peace process or should they be
32 Reported by Laurence Aida Ammour in her article “Security cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel:
Algeria’s Ambivalence”; African Security Newsletter n°18; CESA February 2015.
33 ALDA, E.,and SALA, J., « Links Between Terrorism, Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the
Sahel Region ». International Journal of Security &Development, 2014 pp. 1-9.
excluded for criminal implications? Distinguishing between the two is far

from a simple semantic problem. As such, how should Ançar-Dine’s chiefs
be considered when they convoy across West Africa for the benefit of South
American traffickers, or take hostages there, etc.? Should they be considered as
political partners or organized criminals? If they fall into the first category, it is
quite legitimate to involve them in conflict resolution and it is naturally justified
for mediation and humanitarian NGOs to engage with them; however if they
constitute criminal gangs, they become justifiable targets for law enforcement
forces.
It therefore appears untenable that the two spheres be treated separately.
Such an approach is misleading, since it does not reflect the revolution brought
about by globalization, liberating human, financial and informational flows,
etc., thanks to the boom in communications and transport. This revolution has
nullified old factors of territorial partitioning, freeing up interaction between
increasing numbers of non-state actors accustomed to acting separately in the
former Cold War order.
Asymmetrical conflicts, unlike those of a conventional nature, are not
resolved by a decisive battle in which two armored masses, supported by a fireball
heavily fed by artillery and aviation weapon systems, are measured in a theatre
of operations with defined fronts and lines. The outcome of a conventional
battle can be decisive and can allow one of the belligerents to impose their will
on the adversary (their conditions for peace). This is by no means the case in
asymmetrical conflicts, which derive their grammar from another logic based
fundamentally on avoiding combat, attrition by circumventing and long-term
planning of terrorist or guerrilla actions.
In view of the above, it is more appropriate to refer to an “adversarial
system” in the case of asymmetry and organized crime, since hostilities take the
form of sets of conflicts of varying intensity and scope that are the breeding
ground for organized violence. While these may be motivated by different
considerations and manifest in different forms, and may be linked or even de-
compartmentalized according to circumstances, they feed on each other and
eventually articulate themselves according to power relations and alliances.
Asymmetrical conflict systems develop around underground ecosystems,
offering opportunities for survival or prosperity to the various actors:
unpunished circulation of violent actors and illicit goods (weapons, drugs, raw
materials, smuggling, illegal migration, hostage ransom, etc.). Like any system,
each asymmetrical conflict is characterized by its own operational matrix. The
latter is defined by its focal points, its fields of influence and its dynamics.
Mali, particularly its northern region, is one of the focal points of the
Sahelo-Saharan conflict system, at the core of where Islamists, separatists,

drug trafficking, smugglings, and arms-trafficking ecosystems overlap. This
extends beyond Malian borders to southern parts of Algeria and Libya, and to
neighboring areas in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania. In early 2012, even
before the loss of the towns of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, the Malian Ministry
of Defense officially declared that the Malian Armed and Security Forces
were facing, in violent fighting, a heterogeneous mix of attackers comprising
“fighters from the Azawad National Liberation Movement, AQIM, Ançar-
Dine, Libyan reinforcements and drug traffickers”34.
The value of using a “conflict system” approach is to take advantage
of a holistic approach but also to direct response planning towards a set of
strategies that are complementary and adapted to the challenges posed by each
conflict subsystem.
Accelerating necrosis of public institutions is the major danger resulting
from the intertwining of asymmetry and organized crime. As such, political
actors and security officials are bribed with the objective of criminal
instrumentalization of key sectors of the target state. This increases the risk
of criminalization of state institutions through the infiltration of political and
security officials35.
In the same vein, Mali offers another relevant illustration, the first
manifestations of which date back to 1962 and then later to 1970 and 1990.
The resurgence of the Tuareg problem with the scale it has reached since 2012
is mainly the result of the new cash-rich prospects offered by the control of
trafficking corridors across the region.36. In this respect, it is worth recalling
the conclusions of a report by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and
Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), published in 201037. It shows that the African
route from Latin America, via West Africa (Benin, Gambia, Guinea Bissau,
etc.) to the Iberian Peninsula, has overtaken the other two routes: West Indies-
Azores-Iberian Peninsula and South America-Cap Verde-Canary Islands-
Europe, where stricter monitoring measures were implemented.
Accordingly, drug traffickers rely mainly on the infiltration of political and
security circles to prepare their installation and facilitate the rise of their illicit
trade. They take advantage of the greed of certain elites in search of wealth,
34 Communiqué of the Malian Minister of Defence and Veterans Affairs, published on 11 March
2012, Url: http://maliactu.net/tessalit-mali-communique-du-ministre-de-la-defense-et-des-anciens-
combattants.
35 SHELLEY, L.,« Dirty Entanglements Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism », George Mason University,
Virginia, 2014.
36 ZEÏNI, M., “Challenges and security issues in Mali: what governance for tomorrow? “Forum of
Religious Leaders of Mali, Bamako, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December 2012, p. 24.
37 « Cocaine : a European Union perspective in the global context», Europol, Lisbon, April 2010
(https://www.europol.europa.eu).
prestige or more power, by financing their political designs where “drug

networks seem to have penetrated the highest levels of the State through high
ranking civilian and military officials before spreading to the political class”38.
On the other hand, violence replaces corruption and cooptation in case
of failure to dissuade public authorities from responding. In this regard, it is
worth recalling that “the assassination of the President of Guinea Bissau and
the head of the army in early 2009 is undoubtedly linked to cocaine shipments...
The sheer magnitude of this activity constitutes not only a security threat,
but also a real risk of distortion of the regional economy, investment flows,
development and democratic progress”39.
Another major challenge is the creation of capacity imbalances between
the target State and asymmetrical actors. Indeed, thanks to the financial
windfall from various trafficking activities, asymmetrical groups can afford
the necessary combat equipment in terms of mobility, weapons, ammunition,
communications, encryption and decryption, night observation and other
means. Worse still, there is nothing to prevent them from acquiring NBC
weapons or paying for the services of foreign combatants or mercenaries
to outsource certain tasks requiring a higher level of technical expertise,
particularly in the field of cyber-terrorism to attack the financial systems of a
target State or allied countries. For example, it should be noted that in January
2008, “Malian law enforcement agencies successfully seized 750 kilograms of
cocaine. This cargo represented 16% of Mali’s 2007 military budget”40.
Finally, contributions from organized crime groups allows asymmetrical
actors to develop their political roots and bribe the population. Organized
crime’s contribution is made gradually according to the life cycle of these
actors. In the preliminary phase, where the group is still operating underground,
financial and logistical needs are relatively small. At this stage, organized crime
contributes in several ways: supply of weapons, forged documents, currency,
protection, propaganda support, etc. Later, when the asymmetrical group
engages in open struggle, organized crime plays the role of a privileged ally,
since the establishment of parallel institutions requires significant financial
resources, in addition to logistical support for operations.
In short, thanks to their financial power, asymmetrical actors (subversive,
claimant and predatory) can destabilize a State at any time, provoke a change in
the current regime, its institutions and elites, plunge it into civil war by sustaining
38 “Drugs at the heart of ATT’s power: the real reason for his downfall”, L’Inter de Bamako, May 6,
2013.
39 O’REGAN, D., “Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons Learned from Latin America and the
Caribbean” African Security Bulletin No. 5, Centre for Strategic Studies of Africa, Washington, D.C., July
2010, p. 5.
40 Ibid.
rebellions, collapse its economy or question its democratic foundations and so

forth.
To address these various threats, Africa has the most elaborate regional
collective security system in the world. Nevertheless, its operationalization is
difficult to launch under the weight of structural and cyclical constraints.
III. Collective Security in Africa: Inadequacy

of an Ambitious Response
1. The African Peace and Security Architecture: an

ambitious institutional response
It would be an aberration to attribute the regionalization of collective

security in Africa to the new African Union (AU). In fact, Articles 52 and 53
of the OAU Charter provided, in line with the provisions of Chapter VIII of
the United Nations (UN) Charter, the possibility of implementing regional
agreements to resolve local conflicts peacefully and the option of developing
peace enforcement mechanisms.
However, the antagonism of the Cold War had long prevented the
implementation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, in both Africa and
elsewhere. To this, one should add a certain skepticism about the OAU’s still
fragile capacity to impose or restore peace; as well as the risk that regional
powers may direct these activities to the service of their own interests.
The 1990s, nevertheless, marked an important turning point in Africa’s
appropriation of its collective security. Indeed, this period saw major crises
emerge, particularly in Rwanda and Somalia combined with the disengagement
of powers traditionally contributing to peace support operations (PSOs), for
various reasons including erosion of domestic political support and declining
defense-budgets.
The idea of structural reform of the OAU, put forward in Sirte (1999)
and later implemented by the Constitution of the African Union in 2002, is
therefore but a positive reaction to the painful experiences of the macabre
1990s. Proactive pan-Africanism has in this regard sought to address crisis
and conflict prevention and resolution. The AU has thus equipped itself with
a normative, legal and institutional framework enabling it to intervene in all
types of conflicts and to consider a wide range of actions, both peaceful and
coercive. This regional collective security mechanism is known as the African
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

The approach to crisis management has evolved significantly. No longer
confined to a narrow declination of manu-militari interventions, it is now
part of a global approach based on the triptych of security, development and
peace. As stated in the AU Constitutive Act, “the scourge of conflict in Africa
constitutes a major obstacle to its socio-economic development, hence the need
to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation
of its integration and development agenda”.
The AU has also undergone a radical doctrinary break with the defunct
organization. The principle of non-interference, enshrined in the OAU Charter,
was called into question in favor of a new “duty of non-indifference” (Article
4 of the AU Constitutive Act) in the event of serious threats to populations or
humanitarian emergencies (genocides).
In addition to this comprehensive approach to collective security, the AU
should be credited with the speed with which it established the institutional
pillars of its security policy, which are permanent and not ad hoc organs.
These are the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Council of the Wise,
the Continental Early Warning System (SCAR), the Peace Fund, the Military
Committee and the African Standby Force (ASF). In accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity, the latter is composed of five regional brigades
provided by each of the Regional Economic Communities (Southern, Eastern,
Northern, Western and Central Africa).
2. Collective security in Africa: A semi failure due to a

gap between objectives and reality
A decade and a half after the adoption of APSA, Africa is still a chaotic
continuum more volatile yet than it was at the end of the Cold War. This
in no way conceals efforts expended, unfortunately with mixed results. The
Balkan precedent of widespread banditry (weapons, drugs, etc.) and terrorism
openly defying Europe’s security and defense policies, show time and again that
such a failure is by no means the prerogative of Africa alone. Nevertheless,
the African case is endemic because of a glaring gap between established
objectives, resources and modalities to achieve them and constraining realities
on the ground.
Indeed, an effective APSA depends first on the operationalization of
SCAR, which is responsible, together with its regional correspondents, for
sounding the alarm before a crisis erupts. This requires member states to accept
warning indicators based on precise criteria for assessing potentially critical
situations. Not surprisingly and despite its undeniable virtues, the functioning
of SCAR stumbles on the reluctance of States that consider it as an instrument
of interference in their internal affairs.
As for the armed wing of APSA, the ASF, it suffers from considerable
regional disparity in terms of the ramp-up of brigades on standby. Regional
rivalries partially explain delays with a slight advantage for the Regional
Economic Communities of West, South and East Africa, to the disadvantage
of those in the North and Central Africa.
This is true even for the most successful case, namely ECOWAS as its
brigade (ECOBRIG) has regularly found itself unable to carry out complex
missions, as called for in the ASF’s action plan. As a result, missions initiated
at the regional level quickly revert to United Nations control. So, from a large
intervention force the ASF is bound to confine itself to a secondary role of
entry into theatre before handing over to the UN for complex phases, such as
crisis recovery and reconstruction.
In addition, it is the glaring lack of funds, capacity and logistics that
represent APSA’s Achilles heel. This aspect concerns the difficulty of raising
sufficient, qualified and properly equipped troops, and the lack of strategic
planning and appropriate logistical support. This is substantiated by looking
at any PSO. For example, the African Mission in Burundi, operating with an
annual budget of $110 million while the AU’s overall budget is of only $32
million, and the AU Peace Fund that is supposed to finance it through African
contributions is severely under-funded.
There is, thus, a strong dependence on foreign actors (EU, NATO,
United States of America, France, Germany, etc.) for funding PSOs, resulting
in selective interventions according to donor agendas. In turn, it is the very
substance of APSA, i.e. the appropriation by Africans of their collective
security that is fundamentally called into question.
In spring 2013, following the difficulties encountered at the beginning of
the Malian crisis, the AU launched the Immediate Crisis Response Capacity
(CARIC). This mechanism, based on the voluntary participation of 13
countries, is an alternative solution for responding to emergencies in the event
of an ASF deficiency. The successful results of the Amani Africa II exercise,
testing ASF’s certification, could however accelerate the dissolution of this
mechanism.
APSA also appears as a somewhat slow-moving institutional framework
for actions that by virtue of the transnational nature of threats abounding
across the continent, tend to go beyond the peacekeeping framework.
Regional cooperation in the fight against terrorism stands out for the
multiplicity and complexity of its mechanisms. Examples include the Joint
Staff Committee, the Nouakchott Process and the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS). Despite their connection to APSA, these
mechanisms lack in compatibility, complementarity and interoperability.
The G5-Sahel or the CBLT, while being ad hoc entities, are now each in
their own operational area, a highly beneficial framework for the establishment
of regional security and defense operations. It is however up to the AU to
officially recognize the G5-Sahel as part of the operationalization of APSA
in the Sahel-Saharan region. Such recognition stumbles upon the difficulty of
defining the nature of the relationship between the continental institution and
the regional mechanism: is it a relationship of subordination or subsidiarity?
A solution to this structural difficulty must therefore be found, and it must be
one that will not trap APSA in a strategic deadlock as time passes nor as threats
persist.
Conclusion
Ultimately, Africa suffers from endemic conflict and insecurity, but also
and above all from strategic shortsightedness because of inadequate analytical
models. Yet, as sailors say, there is no favorable wind for he who knows not
where he is going. Paraphrasing this, there is no effective crisis and conflict
management without a relevant paradigm to judiciously guide perceptions,
representations and actions.
This requires first abandoning colonial-era clichés of linear causality and
then building on a solid foundation of philosophically thought-out neo-
polemological science that is as universal as it is timeless. Africa does not need
to reinvent the wheel nor be chaperoned by any external power in this regard; it
is sufficient to actualize the interpretation of the conceptual construct of one
of the classical polemologists, in this case, Carl Von Clausewitz. The present
contribution acts as a prolegomena in this regard.
Analyzed in the light of this new paradigm, African conflict and insecurity
are characterized by a nurturing interweaving of asymmetrical threats in the
face of an extinction of traditional inter-state conflict. Asymmetrical threats
are also widely spreading through transnational contagion. This new grammar
of conflict and insecurity in turn requires integrated smart power responses
resulting from a judicious mix of soft power and hard power.
The African Peace and Security Architecture, as an institutional framework
adopted by Africa in the wake of the heavy bloodshed of the 1990s, deserves
to be thoroughly analyzed. It is clear that this ambitious Afro-centric initiative
suffers from a glaring gap between objectives, resources and realities in a
continent that is slowly emerging from its strategic torpor. Notwithstanding
this, we should rejoice in the fact that it constitutes, on many levels, a revolution
in the regionalization of collective security.
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Regional conflict system in Africa:
an option for analysis
Sergio Luiz Cruz Aguilar
Conflicts are seen as a complex phenomenon. In Africa, some of them

extend over long periods and are considered intractable. Being complex,
African conflicts cannot be understood through a simplifying and reductionist
approach of a linear analysis, which is normally done when we turn to the
various paradigms in the field of conflicts and peace studies. That is why the
systemic conflict analysis and, in some cases, the regional conflict system
analysis can be useful to better understand the dynamics involved in various
armed quarrels in the continent. Conflicts have to be deeply analyzed in order
to enable all actors involved to better manage, resolve or transform them.
This paper starts from the assumption that systemic conflict analysis provides
a richer and deeper level of analysis as basis for conflict transformation. The
paper aims to reinforce the potential of regional conflict system analysis
to provide a better view of the conflicts in Africa. Based on second hand
sources, this paper addresses some theoretical points and uses the conflicts
in the Great Lakes, understood as a regional conflict system, to suggest how
useful the systemic analysis would be to find better mechanisms to deal with
these ‘intractable,’ ‘protracted,’ and ‘complex’ conflicts.
Introduction
The notion of complexity came from natural sciences such as biology,
physics and chemistry and has been used to bring insights into the nature
and working of social systems in an adapted form (Hendrick, 2009, p. 4).
Its conceptualization from a sociological standpoint has been criticized for
attempting to bring into a sociological context a theory where the causality
could be mathematically measured as opposed to simply observed. However,
considering social situations as a network of elements, which interact and
mutually influence each other, the theory proved to be important in studying
social conflicts to an extent that it takes into account their inter-causality. Within
this social system, each element can be part of more than one system (sub-
systems), forcing all systems to interact in a dynamical process where slight
perturbations could lead to bifurcation with unpredictable results (Hendrick,
2009, p. 8; Boulding, 1962, p. 24).
In International Relations, the systemic approach has existed since the
1950s41 and soon later, scholars suggested another scheme focusing the attention
on partially self-contained subsystems in geographical areas (McClelland, 1966,
p. 25).
McClelland (1966, p. 20) stressed that “the knowledge of other complex
systems, we can expect to find a number of characteristics in the structure and
the operations of the international system.” From this point, he presented,
in general terms, how complex systems work to discuss the use of theory of
international system.
Burton started from the assumption that “world society is comprised of
sets of relationships,” which “differ in character as well as in spread.” There
are “exchanges and transactions confined to the members,” in each separate
set of relationships, and each set “can be abstracted from the whole […] but
some of the operations of one set affect others.” In this sense, he suggested,
“one means of analyzing world society, or a problem or a region within it, is to
examine separately some of these networks of different, but overlapping and
interacting relationships.” He justified that the breakdown of the whole into
sets of relationships serves to simplify its examination and, methodologically,
it makes it possible to advance orderly and gradually toward details without
losing a perspective of the whole (Burton, 1968, p. 4-5).
Despite the fact that transformations of international systems have been
studied for decades42, the use of complex systems in the field of conflict
41 See for example Kaplan, 1957.

42 See for example Hass, 1964; Herz, 1951; Herz, 1959; McNeil, 1965.
Regional conflict system in Africa: an option for analysis
analysis is relatively new. The paradigms that exist do not provide answers to
the kind of questions that have been raised regarding conflicts, especially those
that emerged after the Cold War. With some conflicts considered as a complex
phenomenon and some of them described as ‘protracted’ and ‘intractable’, they
require a non-linear approach that the systemic conflict analysis can provide.
Using insights of complex systems, the theory of conflict transformation
(coined by Lederach) was built on the idea that interacting systems are at
the root of conflicts. There are a number of systems interacting and when a
contradiction exists between any of them, a conflict is created. Each system, and
the conflict as a whole, presents relationships, issues and priorities. Different
systems can provide different perspectives on the specific issue. So, issues,
priorities and interactions should be understood as not to divert the focus
from the main problem at stake. One useful way is to use multiple lenses to
improve the understanding of the issues as well as the interactions within and
between the systems (Lederach, 2003, 1995, 1997). The main aim of conflict
transformation is to deeply alter the conflict parties’ relationships in order to
avoid reoccurrence of violence.
Consequently, systemic conflict transformation focuses less on changing
the structural patterns that cause violence and more on relationships between
agents. It highlights constructive and destructive agents of change (in global,
regional, state, conflict parties, and elite or individual levels) and, by doing
that, it can be used as theoretical framework, giving insight to outside actors in
regards to a way to move forward their actions in the conflict (Lederach, 2003,
p. 14).
Conflict transformation starts from a systemic analysis considering three
different levels. The first level is the immediate situation, the outbreak of
violence, and the second level takes into consideration the root causes of the
immediate problems and tries to find a deeper meaning to violence. The third
level aims to find long-term solutions through the analysis of the framework
and context of the issue that shed light on a potential way towards peace.
Transforming conflict means to achieve positive peace, the end of structural
violence for long lasting peace.43
This paper does not address solutions for conflicts. Meanwhile, using
complexity theory and systemic conflict analysis, the intractable nature of some
conflicts in Africa can be explained. Most of the African conflicts present
complex characteristics and interactions between the systems involved which
are influenced by visible and non-visible factors such as ethnicity, religion,
identity, culture, resources, grievances and mistrust, among others. The system
43 For positive and negative peace, see Galtung, 1996.
dynamics can create unpredictability of the outcomes, which cannot be

analyzed in a linear manner. Moreover, in some of them a regional conflict
system can be identified, reinforcing the need for a systemic analysis.
The purpose of this article is to emphasize how an analysis based on
complexity and systemic approach can better provide the archetype of
African conflicts and, therefore, can offer a deep and sharp analysis. Conflict
analysis is the basis of research and strategy formation that are indispensable
for interventions in conflictive situations. Despite some scholars’ fall back
on simulation using computer models as a tool to substantiate interactions
and their effects in order to anticipate consequences and, thus, to propose
intervention strategies, our focus is on qualitative conflict analysis. This, because
we understand that poor analysis leads to problematic interventions, some of
which end up strengthening conflict instead of transforming it. Whatever the
type of intervention, whether it is planned focusing on immediate cessation of
violence or aiming to achieve long-term peace, it has to start from an accurate
analysis, otherwise it will not present the desired outcomes.
Complexity is seen as:
1) science, “the study of self-regulated dynamical systems - of their dynamics
– from the most diverse disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives”;
2) method “of thought and education inspired by the advances of what has
become known to us through the particular research on nonlinear dynamics,
self-organization and emergence”; and
3) worldview, “the attempt for a new look at the world and at its relations, at
man and at its place in society, in life and in the world” (Díaz, 2004, p. 50).
This paper uses a complexity and systemic approach as a method which
permits it to benefit from the following advantages: to identify all systems
present in the conflict studied and their boundaries; to select systems which are
relevant (i.e. limiting the analysis to the systems that have direct relations with
the conflict); to identify relations, issues and priorities in each sub-system and
in a system as a whole; and to comprehend the dynamics that operate within
and between these systems and sub-systems.
The first part of the paper provides a theoretical framework centered on
systemic conflict analysis, including regional conflict system approach. The
second part presents the Great Lakes regional system where a protracted and
intractable conflict is still on going in Africa as an example to reinforce the
need for systemic analysis. Finally, we present some considerations regarding
the analysis of African conflicts and regional systemic approach.
Characteristics of complex conflict systemic analysis

It is important to define the concepts used in this paper since it is difficult to
give a clear cut meaning of some terms because terminology is often confusing
with the same terms used in different ways.
Conflict and violence often occur together. There is conflict without
violence when the issue is addressed in an appropriate and timely manner.
However, this paper uses conflict in the sense of violent (armed) conflict
that appears when inconsistency between the goals of different groups or
individuals leads to violent behavior and hatred, or when hatred already exists
between groups due to historical factors and, consequently, even the smallest
contradictions can generate violence, which can explain the resurgence of
conflict after a long period of peace.
Protracted conflict, according to Azar (1991, p. 93), is characterized by “the
prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs
as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and
economic participation.” It endures over time because the root causes of
violence have not been tackled and attitudes to create non-violent behavior are
often ignored.
Despite the fact that some authors differentiate between management,
containment and settlement of conflicts (Ramsbotham; Woodhouse; Miall,
2011, p. 31), this paper uses the term ‘management’ to cover the whole gamut
of conflict handling, including preventive actions, peacekeeping actions
(containment/alleviation of intensity), and agreements (settlement/peace-
making).
Conflict resolution implies that a conflict is solvable. This idea highlights
a comprehensive sense that all its deep-rooted sources are treated (Azar, 1991,
p. 31).
Conflict transformation goes beyond resolution and implies “a deep
transformation in the institutions and discourses that reproduce violence, as
well as in the conflict parties themselves and their relationships” (Azar, 1991, p.
31-32). Consequently, it works over a comprehensive and long-term approach
to social change in situations of violence, and necessitates the involvement of
all actors present in the conflict and the empowerment of civil society.
System connotes relationships between units, which are of the same ‘set’,
i.e., they have features in common that enable a particular relationship (Burton,
1968, p. 6). Complex systems can be characterized by many elements interacting
in different ways reproducing a set of relationships that influence each other
and create unpredictable outcomes at the macro level. Moreover, these intricate
inter-relationships of elements within a complex system give rise to multiple
chains of dependencies (Walby, 2004). One specific characteristic of a system
is that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, i.e., different parts put
together produce a different effect than the part would do on its own because
of the way they interact (Ropers, 2008, p. 2).
In general, complex systems have a consistent set of characteristics. They are
self-organized, “agents interact within a system without any external governing
agency and in the process produce new order,” due to “adjustments made to
disturbing conditions according to negative feedback effects” (Hendrick, 2009;
McClelland, 1966, p. 22). Emergence is the processes that creates new order
together with self-organization, the result of “the whole of the system, deriving
from its component activities and their structure,” where feedback plays a key
role in the emergence of new order (Mitleton-Kelly, 2005, p.19). Negative
feedback plays a regulating role tending to maintain stability in the system and
positive feedback has reinforcing or amplifying effects that “lead to the filling
in, over time, of complex system with additional special purpose subsystems”
(McClelland, 1966, p. 22; Hendrick, 2009). Therefore, systems operate far
from equilibrium and are susceptible to perturbations when accidental factors
may play a role with new “couplings” of reactions occurring in one particular
system but not in another (Hendrick, 2009). The causal connections in these
systems are nonlinear (not proportional) and the “developments are extremely
sensitive to initial conditions i.e. a slight difference in any aspect of the situation
from which such a process begins can result in widely different trajectories as
the difference becomes amplified through positive feedback.” In a complex
system “the larger the population of subsystems in a system, the greater is
to organize specialized subsystems for the purposes of guidance, control,
coordination and information-processing” (McClelland, 1966, p. 23). As open
systems, they exchange energy and information with their environment and
their agents “interact in such a way that they adapt to the behavior of other
agents, who in turn adapt” in a dynamic of interaction between them and
with their environment causing changes and responding to these changes
(Hendrick, 2009, p. 7). There are boundaries of exchange between subsystems
and the system and “how much autonomy subsystems have in allocating their
activities at the boundary […] is an important element in the performance
of the system” (McClelland, 1966, p. 23). “The development of a complex
system within the environment, and in relation to other complex systems, can
be tracked in what are termed ‘fitness landscapes’” that can be constructed
“by tracking interactions over time, observe how the environment is affected
and responds to the changes that are occurring” (Hendrick, 2009, p. 7, author
emphasis). Equifinality, “the ability of a complex system to establish multiple,
alternative routes for its operations” because the system “is not restricted
in its performance to single relationship patterns among its subsystems”
(McClelland, 1966, p. 23). Finally, “a basic change in either the structure or
the processes of a system will tend to bring about changes in the structure,
processes, and relationships of subsystem.” At the same time, “a basic change
in a subsystem may bring about changes in other subsystems and/or in a whole
system” (McClelland, 1966, p. 23).
From this set of characteristics, it is interesting to highlight the concept
of emergence, which indicates that macro-properties emerge from micro-
interactions, i.e. “macro-level outcomes are the result of numerous micro-level
interactions” constituting “something new in kind and not predictable from
a study of the agents or components of the system.” As Hendrick pointed
out, “the interactions among interdependent but individual agents within the
system […] account for the surprising events that defy prediction through the
simple models used at the moment” (2009, p. 10).
Thereby, a multilevel qualitative analysis should be used in order to
understand the process where existing structures, key actors and key factors
interact in all systems of the conflict. Mapping of a conflict at the macro-level
involves a general view of the conflict at the state, regional or international
level, depending on the type of conflict that has being analyzed.44 On the
meso-level, the focus should be directed to the identification of the conflict
archetype, meaning specifically the armed groups that are at the heart of
the conflict, their needs, interests and positions, using again an analysis of
structure and agency between actors. On the micro-level, the focus should be
the micro-scale conflicts within the state, the micro-level rivalries that exist and
sometimes remain active even when civil wars are formally ended, and which
are often over land, resources and power but can be aggravated by civilian
arms ownership, inter-ethnic rivalry and internal migration, among others
(Autesserre, 2010; Gray; Roos, 2012).
If conflicts are understood as being complex, they require a systemic analysis
because it is a method that: emphasizes the importance of relationships and
effects each party has on each other in all the different subsystems; highlights
the boundaries of a conflict as well as the dynamics within it; provides a
possibility to take into consideration invisible (or ‘irrational’) factors such as
needs, grievances, hatred, mistrust, interests and roles of all actors involved;
identifies the fundamental structure of the conflict, making it more transparent
and less complex to understand; and, finally, enables both internal and external
44 According to Wehr, macro analysis of a conflict requires the understanding of five overarching
aspects (history, actors, context, issues and dynamics), the relationship, agency and structures between
these five aspects and a deeper analysis of the values, needs and interests of the conflict parties (Wehr,
1979).
actors to visualize the conflict better.45

According to systemic thinking, patterns and interdependence should
be mapped in order to determine conflict dynamics and development, i.e. to
identify relationships (intra and inter group), dynamics, issues and drivers.
Regional conflict systems are found in different parts of the world.
Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1998, p. 625) identified fifteen regional conflict
complexes between 1989 and 1997, among them six were located in Africa
(Southern Africa, Central Africa West, Central Africa East, Horn of Africa,
West Africa and Sahel). They conceptualized these complexes as,
“situations where neighbouring countries experience internal

or interstate conflicts, and with significant links between the
conflicts. These links may be so substantial that changes in conflict
dynamics or the resolution of one conflict will have an effect on a
neighbouring conflict”(1998, p. 623).
As advanced by Ansorg, regional conflict systems are characterized “by

their complexity of actors, causes, structural conditions and dynamics”
(2011, p. 175). It emerges because of “confrontational interaction between
two or more collective actors within a particular geographical space.” Rubin,
Armstrong and Ntegeye highlighted that regional conflict is formed when “sets
of violent conflicts – each originating in a particular state or sub-region –
that form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other throughout a broader
region” (apud Ansorg, 2011, p. 179). These types of conflict present a bias to
be more protracted and obdurate.
Regional approach in International Relations and peace and conflict studies
has been used for decades. However, both classical theories and relatively
new paradigms (e.g. Copenhagen School’ regional complexes and Adler and
Barnett’s security communities46) fail to deal with hostile interactions between
different actors, mainly non-state groups. From the mid-1990s, works on
regional security dynamics appeared, both in quantitative and qualitative
studies, focusing on different perspectives. However, as Ansorg pointed out,
there is still a need for studies that can better detect “the causes, structures
and dynamics that lead to the emergence and diffusion of regional conflict
45 In the field of conflict resolution, a systemic understanding of the conflict renders intervention
easier, showing potentials of action in peacebuilding and providing a good framework to setting up
effective interventions (Wils at al, 2006).
46 See Deutsch, 1968; Adler; Barnett, 1998.
systems” (Ansorg, 2011, p. 183).47

In Africa, some contemporary armed conflicts can be encompassed in
regional conflict systems such as Central North Africa (CAR, Chad, Sudan)
(Giroux; Lanz; Sguaitamatti, 2009), Mano River region (Marchal, 2002), the
Great Lakes (Rubin et al., 2001; Prunier, 2009) and the Horn of Africa (Lunn,
2008). These systems took shape as a result of the interplay between structural
factors and conflict dynamics, activated by catalyzing events, i.e. conflicts were
facilitated by specific structural conditions that have come to the fore through
a series of key events.
The general idea starts from existing structural preconditions, including
normative frameworks, specific incentives, geographic pre-conditions, specific
political environment, etc., in which conflict dynamics (actions and events) are
triggered in some way, emerging a regionalized conflict. In a systemic approach,
while regional conflicts are result of structural conditions, these structures are
shaped by regionalized wars. Therefore, the analysis focuses on relationship
between structures, dynamics and outcomes.
In the 1970s, Azar suggested to analyze ‘process dynamics’ according to
three groups of determinants, which are (1) ‘communal actions and strategies’,
(2)‘state actions and strategies’ and (3) ‘built-in mechanisms of conflict’
attempting to analyze conflicts into a pluralist framework that would be more
suitable for explaining prevalent patterns (Azar, 1990). In such a way, dynamics
have to be viewed according to the interactions between different actors,
strategies, actions and events involved in conflicts, as well as their various
inter-linkages across state boundaries (see Giroux, Lanz, Sguaitamatti, 2009;
Herbst, 2000; Kaldor, 2001; Buzan; Wæver, 2003). Therefore, regional conflict
system is formed by conflictive dynamics set in motion by catalyzing events
that happen in certain structural conditions.
Based on what was aforementioned, conflict analysis is the study of the
profile, causes, actors, issues and dynamics of conflict. It has to be carried
out at various levels (individual, community, local, regional, national, and
international). However, the appropriate focus for the analysis should be
identified because issues and dynamics may vary at different levels. Systematic
linkages between the different levels should be established to understand how
they affect each other.
Profile means context and encompasses a brief history of conflict, the
identification of political, economic, military and socio-cultural characteristics
in which the conflict operates, including geography, population, political
47 The author presents an extensive list of studies and their approaches.
and economic structure, social networks, armed forces and groups, natural
resources, important infrastructure, etc.
Conflict causes (also named sources) encompass all factors that contribute
to violence. They can be structural, which may create the pre-conditions for
conflict, and proximate, i.e., factors that lead to the conflict or its escalation.
Some key issues have to be identified, including the relative importance they
represent for the different parties involved in the conflict. Some triggers – key
acts or events - can be present, affecting positively or negatively the conflict, i.e.,
leading to (or may lead to) its escalation/de-escalation. They can be provoked
by the actors (e.g. military coup, external intervention, etc.) or by the nature
(e.g. earthquake, flood, dry, etc.).
Actors are all those engaged or being affected by conflict, including
individuals, groups and institutions, both internal and external. They differ
according to their needs48, goals, interests49, values50, positions and capacities.
They can be distinguished according to the level they operate as well as the
actions undertaken to promote conflict or peace.
Dynamics are the result of actors’ interactions with the environment
and with each other that occur in different temporal and spatial patterns.
Consequently, understanding the history of a conflict helps in identifying its
phases and the key events affecting the conflict in each of its phases.
It is important to highlight that the purpose of the analysis determines
who should conduct it, how it will be done and what sources and techniques
have to be used.
Characteristics of African conflicts – why they are

complex
Some African regions are constituted of a dynamic and complex network
of political and economic interactions with heavy implications on governance,
security and violence. Among several cases, we highlighted the Great Lakes
region.
It is difficult to categorize conflicts as interstate or intrastate in this region
since they affect each other somehow and their epicenter shifts from one place
to another, from time to time and encompass different issues. Furthermore,
48 Understood in its material (food, shelter, water, pasture, etc.) and immaterial (identity, belonging,
etc.) dimensions.
49 Understood as material or monetary claims. They can be associate to physical survival requirements
and socially justifiable, especially when there is a presence of marginalised groups.
50 Include issues linked to people’s free choices to exercise their culture, ideology, religion, language, etc.
interactions within these regions involve multiple and interlocking local,

national, regional and international actors.
For the purpose of a regional conflict system approach, a generic analytical
framework has to be designed in three pillars:
• structures - built over time, in which the conflict causes are present
(pre-existing or approximate);
• dynamics – interactions between several relevant actors according to
their needs, goals, interests, values, positions, capacities, incentives,
strategies and calculations, which can be activated or exacerbated by
triggers (key actions and events);
• and, outcomes - the result of interactions between structure and
dynamics, which act as outputs that impact the structure and dynamics,
nourishing them (positively or negatively) and modifying them, creating
a ‘new order’ in a continuous process.
Figure 1: Regional Conflict System – General Framework
Structures
Most of African states emerged from the decolonization process. Therefore,
they were highly influenced by the bipolarity of the international system during
the Cold War. Consequently, in general, African countries have fundamental
problems that emanate from postcolonial challenges to state building. As
a result, they present some structural features, such as weak infrastructure,
social inequality, collapsed social services, structural violence and inability to

guarantee security of the citizens, among others. Weak economic structures,
poor terms of trade and wide poverty, generate illegal or parallel economic
structures and networks, causing political instability. Identity division (in some
regions transnational identity groups), with actual or perceived inequalities and
grievances between groups, is often used by political elites as a way to keep
power. Bad governance is present, including economic mismanagement, debt
burdens, unpopular policies and the inability of the governments to manage
multi-ethnic societies to ensure equitable access to natural resources and equal
opportunities to access political power, and to implement the rule of law.
Governments’ inability to guarantee security of the citizens combined with
structural violence, proliferation of small arms, security and defense forces’
violent posture led to recurring conflicts created by an imbalance in power and
a breakdown of social relationships (Ades; Chua, 1997; Easterly; Levine, 1998;
Arsong, 2011).
Conflicts provoked by interactions in these structures generate a vicious
circle where military spending increases simultaneously as foreign investments
disappear, trade and all economic sectors collapse and the infrastructure
degrades, increasing the initial causes of the conflict and adding new ones.
With the disintegration of structures, states loss the monopoly of violence,
consequently, privatization of violence, instability and insecurity increase and,
in a spillover effect, affect the whole region.
Issues (factors)
The issues that become sources of violence vary from a case to another, but
some of them are common in African conflicts. In this way, regional networks,
trans-border ethnic links, regional support for rebel groups, refugee flows, use
of land and natural resources were selected to exemplify regional dynamics,
despite not limited to them.
1. Networks
Historically, Africa consists of several networks, which operate through

porous borders. These networks add new features in the traditional
interconnectivity between neighbors and often are related to economic gains.
In some African countries and regions, they are linked to the global demand
for valuable resources. Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand presented among the
characteristics of regional conflict, transnational policy (trans-border alliances
between different political groups), economy (illegal trade in and smuggling
of valuable goods), military (arms trading, mercenary migration, and regional
military alliances) and social (ethnic kinship or diasporas). Instability and

conflicts often result from the inability of government borders control and
socio-economic systems, which would forbid these networks from operating
(Pugh, 2003).
However, these networks and their interaction do not threaten a state and
regional security if they are not connected with other issues. Cross-border
smuggling of human and goods, for example, will further escalate a conflict if
they involve or are connected to transnational ethnic identities, armed groups,
or the financing of these armed groups, etc.
2. Trans-border ethnic links
The presence of diverse ethnic groups in a specific country or region is

a secular characteristic of Africa, intensifying social divisions and tensions.
Regional identity and ethnic factors in the diffusion of militant violence is a
feature in many conflicts in Africa and happen in different ways, such as insecure
feeling because of violent conditions in a neighboring country; solidarity with
a similar ethnic group in a neighboring country; grievances between ethnic
majority and minority within one country or region linked with political inability
to manage multi-ethnic societies; fight for secession; mobilization of ethnic or
identity groups by charismatic leaders, among others (Lake; Rothchild, 1998;
Brown, 1993; Weiner, 1992; Gleditsch, 2006; Atzili, 2006).
3. Support for rebel groups
Regarding rebel groups, different behavior patterns can be found: groups

which are supported by neighboring states; groups that are supported or, at
least, tolerated on neighboring states’ territory; neighboring governments and
rebel groups helping themselves exploit resources of a neighboring state; rebel
groups using external bases to hide and recover from fighting taking advantage
of the neighboring state’s weakness; neighboring governments supporting
rebel groups in order to weaken rival groups and/or rival governments; and
states with several structural problems but militarily involved in neighboring
countries, supporting or acting against rebel groups (Montague, 2002; Nest;
Grignon; Kisangani, 2006; Salehyan, 2007; Salehyan, 2008).
4. Refugee flows
Large inflow of refugees from neighboring countries associated with

economic and political weakness of the host countries often means: changes
in the ethnic and social structures; economic rivalries growth relating to

competition over resources such as food, land and jobs; tensions and/or
conflicts between local population and refugee communities; and instability
growth in general impacting states, governments and other ethnic communities
(Weiner, 1992, 1996). Furthermore, militarization of refugees (arms smuggling,
recruitment and training, military activities) can occur within the regional
conflict systems for the purposes of rebellion (Zolberg; Suhrke; Aguayo, 1989;
Muggah, 2006).
However, whether refugee flow can be dangerous for security and result
in a regional conflict system or not, has to be associated with other factors
(Lischer, 2005, 2003; Weiner, 1992). As an example, the massive refugee flow
from Rwanda to Burundi that occurred in the 1990s caused tensions in a whole
region because it was associated with ethnic factors and the conflict that was
on going in the latter (Ansorg, 2011). After the 1994 Tutsi genocide in Rwanda,
Hutus fled to the DRC provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu, formed
alliances with DRC Hutus and Mayi-Mayi groups against the DRC Tutsis, and
created various armed groups to defend themselves.
Massive refugee flows can lead to regional instability, extending the
networks of rebel groups, and enabling transnational diffusion of combatants,
weapons and ideologies, which, sometimes, can create new conflicts in host
countries (Salehyan, 2007; Atzili, 2006). Because of the genocide in Rwanda,
Hutus fled to the DRC with their arms and created an armed group, the Forces
Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), which has been destabilizing
the eastern DRC.
5. Land Access
Land use and land access are structural causes of conflict within African
countries, normally manipulated by elites for political purposes. In Rwanda,
unequal access to land was one of the causes of the 1994 genocide. The
complex process of interactions between different types of environmental
scarcities, demographic pressure, inequitable access to and shortage of land
resources, resource depletion or degradation, and distribution of ranches and
fields in productive wet valleys to men of influence or to rural relatives of
the elites, resulted in a cycle of poverty, and dissatisfaction with the State.
During the process, the rhetoric developed in the 1980s of the rich (abakire,
in Kinyarwanda language) versus the poor (abakene, in Kinyarwanda language)
shifted to Hutu versus Tutsi in the 1990s (Gasana, 2002).
However, land issues, including water, pastoral areas, etc., often become
the source of regional conflict when associated with flow of internal displaced
persons (IDPs) and refugees, which adds new challenges to redistribution

of resources by states. With conflicts, people get away from their homes
and cross borders, often seeking refuge on areas of the same ethnicity. So,
conflicts change land access patterns adding new fuel to the conflict. When this
movement is associated to ethnic groups or clans, land disputes become the
heart of conflicts at community, state and regional levels.
6. Natural resources
Fighting for resources is another traditional source of conflict, formerly

between states, today involving a multiplicity of actors. Public and private,
internal and external, legal and illegal exploitation of natural resources is
an issue present in parts of Africa and often redound in personal gains, for
companies or specific communities, in detriment of the countries’ populations
(Callaghy; Kassimir; Latham, 2001).
Therefore, natural resources are in themselves sources of conflict. The
DRC is an example of how mineral dependence (coltan, zinc, iron, gold,
diamond, etc.) and its (mis-)exploitation generate and maintain the conflict.
This situation can also be considered one of the main sources of the Great
Lakes conflict system (Montague, 2002. Ansorg, 2011). However, this issue
becomes more important when exploitation is the main or unique cause of the
conflict and/or illegal exploitation results in the financing of armed groups in
conflict (Le Billon, 2001).
In African regional conflict systems, exploitation of natural resources is
linked with interstate interests over shared natural resources and illegal cross-
border activities operated by several smuggling networks or directly by armed
groups, and used to finance armed groups. Even if they start as politically
motivated movements, over time most of the groups secure economic interests
to guarantee their survival (Ansorg, 2011). Civilians in these areas are often
forced to participate in the complex networks of trade in valuable commodities,
theft and slavery, as there is no alternative source of income after those long
periods of civil wars and instability.
Actors
Multiple actors interact on these structures in complex relations, competing
for political, economic (resources), security control, etc., influencing each
other. These interactions are in constant flux, modifying the challenges and
issues at stake in the conflict, and often occur in an asymmetric way. Therefore,
they make conflict unstable and difficult to predict, alternating phases of high
and low level of violence and peace (or at least the absence of armed conflict),
characterizing the conflicts as protracted and, sometimes, intractable.

State and private actors exist into these larger conflict structures where the
scope of public authority is limited. When transnational actors are present and
interlinked through political alliances, ethnic groups, refugee flows, smuggling
and trafficking, etc., conflict within one country could potentiality spread to
its direct neighboring country and escalate the violence if it is not managed or
prevented properly (Githaiga, 2011; Esty et all 1995.; Lake; 1998).
Dynamics
Escalating (charismatic personalities, refugee flows, transnational alliances
between state and non-state actors and economies, etc.) or de-escalating
(peacekeeping operations, international/regional interventions, sanctions, etc.)
factors can influence the system’s dynamics. Furthermore, within the regional
conflict systems, escalating (emergence of new groups, new alliances, etc.)
and de-escalating factors (peacekeeping operations, peace agreements, etc.)
influence regional dynamics.
The Great Lakes as Regional Conflict System

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), an
inter-governmental organization established in May 2007, has twelve member
States: Angola; Burundi; Central African Republic; Republic of Congo;
Democratic Republic of Congo; Kenya; Uganda; Rwanda; Republic of South
Sudan; Sudan; Tanzania; and Zambia. The organization was established “based
on the recognition that political instability and conflicts in these countries have
a considerable regional dimension,” that “these conflicts constituted a major
threat to international peace and security” and thus, they “require a concerted
effort in order to promote sustainable peace and development” (ICGLR, 2016).
This paper centers its focus on conflict dynamics in Burundi, DRC, Uganda
and Rwanda to exemplify a regional conflict system, although the dynamics
encompass the entire region in different ways and levels.
The conflicts within the region are primarily internal and the main actors
are mostly ethnic armed groups. While there are dozens of these armed groups,
some of them are responsible for the majority of the clashes occurring. Like
most of intrastate conflicts, secondary actors may be involved in different
subsystems, affecting the conflict and the other actors in some way. Normally,
there are also tertiary parties acting as facilitators of change, mediators,
observers, such as international organizations, agencies and funds, NGOs,
international peacekeeping operations and/or political missions, etc.
In this general framework, some key actors may be listed in the conflicts in
Burundi, DRC, Uganda and Rwanda after the genocide in the last, used here
as the key event which triggered the formation of a regional conflict system in
the Great Lakes.
Table 1: Conflicts Actors

Secondary
Country Nature Primary Actors Tertiary Actors
Actors
FARCD - Armed Neighbor- Uganda, Rwanda,
Military Groups (RDC, CNDP, ing armed Burundi, Angola,
Conflict M23, Mayi-Mayi, groups Zimbabwe,
ALIR, FDD, FNL, Namibia,
FDLR, LRA, ADF,
DRC etc.)
Ethno-so- Ethnical groups Neighbor- UN, AU, NGOs, In-
cio-political Political parties ing ethnical ternational Agencies
conflict groups
Rwandan Armed Neighbor- Uganda, Burundi,
Military Forces, RPF ing armed DRC, UN
Conflict Interahamwe, FDLR, groups (UNAMIR),
Impuzamugambi Belgium, France, AU
Rwanda Ethno-so- Hutus X Tutsis Neighbor- International
cio-political Political parties ing ethnical Agencies
conflict groups
UPDF (former NRA) Tribal AU, UN, US,
Military LRA, NRM, ADF, militias Burundi, Rwanda,
Conflict WNBF, NALU Neighbor- DRC,
ing armed
Uganda groups
Ethno-so- Ethnical groups Neighbor- International
cio-political Political parties ing ethnical Agencies, South
conflict groups Sudan, CAR
Military Army (Tutsi) X Hutus Neighbor- UN, AU, Uganda,
Conflict rebels (CNDD-FDD, ing armed DRC, Rwanda
PALIPEHUTU-FNL) groups International
Agencies
Burundi
Ethno-so- Hutus, Tutsis, Twa Neighbor-
cio-political Political parties ing ethnical
conflict groups
Great Lakes’ countries, in general, have all (or most of) problems that
emanated from colonial period, as well as the common structural features
aforementioned. However, the main source of protracted conflicts in Burundi,
DRC, Uganda and Rwanda is the struggle for political power. Since ethnic
manipulation is a fundamental requirement to achieve and/or maintain power,
the nature of the conflict acquires an ethnic dimension. The ethnic character
of conflicts is also rooted in struggles for access to resources, including rich
natural resources or simply agricultural or pastoral land. The deeply rooted
historical violence and animosity between ethnic groups generate fear, distrust,
and violence at all levels. Fear of extermination by adversaries led to armed
group formations and some of them conduct pre-emptive attacks in the name
of self-defense, even against government forces when necessary. Therefore,
the nature of the conflicts has a military dimension. Different civil wars since
independence times, generate ‘a culture of violence’, i.e. the use of violence
to resolve disputes, which spread at multiple levels of society, from state to
communities and families, and can distinguish the conflicts in these Great Lakes’
countries from other recent war and post-war contexts in Africa. Therefore,
the nature of the conflicts also has an ethno-social dimension.
Despite the normal presence of several interests and issues, some may be
highlighted as the major ones for each actor involved in the conflicts.
Dynamics
The process of conflict regionalization in the Great Lakes is historically
rooted. However, the current regional conflict system was catalyzed by the 1994
genocide in Rwanda, and subsequently took shape as a result of events such as
the inflow of refugees into different countries, formation and disappearance
of groups, the increasing trans-border activities of armed groups, and the
collapse of old alliances and formation of new ones. The dynamics were more
active in the DRC.
Rwandan armed groups Ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (ex-FAR) and
Interahamwe became collectively known as the Armée pour la Libération du
Rwanda (ALIR), the main group of foreign fighters operating in the DRC.
The group received support from the DRC government and operated in
close cooperation with the Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC) and Burundian
Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD). It had two wings: ALIR I
that included the majority of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, based in North
and South Kivu and Maniema provinces; and ALIR II that operated in the
South Kivu and Katanga provinces, encompassed younger members recruited
in Tanzania who did not participate in the Rwandan genocide.51
51 The ALIR I failed to attempt to invade Rwanda in May 2001 (UN, S/2002/341, 2002).
The Burundian armed groups FDD and Forces Nationales pour la

Libération (FNL), which were very active within the country, extended their
presence in the DRC. The FDD fought alongside the FAC in Katanga province,
and undertook joint operations with ALIR and Mayi-Mayi groups in South
Kivu (UN, S/2002/341, 2002). The FNL was a ‘Rwasa faction’ of the Parti
pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU), which established bases
in east DRC and alliances with Interahamwe and Mayi-Mayi groups.52
The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) was formed by Uganda and
Rwanda in August 1998, composed of former ADFL53 members, including
many Banyamulenge. The group took the town of Goma in its campaign
against Kabila who managed to halt the RCD’s advance with foreign states’
assistance. Fracture lines in the RCD led to the formation of RCD-Kisangani
(RCD-K), the older faction became known as RCD-Goma, and both were
used by Uganda and Rwanda as their proxy rebel forces. Later, tensions within
the RCD-K created the RCD-National, RCD-Original, RCD-Authentique and
RCD-Movement for Liberation (RCD-ML) (UN, UNHCR, 2010). In the Ituri
province, a branch of the RCD split into the Union des Patriotes Congolaises
(UPC), a Hema militia, and the Front Nationalise et Intégratif (FNI), a
Lendu armed group. New tensions within these groups created the Force de
Résistance Patriotique en Ituri (FRPI), a Southern Lendu group, and the Parti
pour l’Unité et la Sauvegarde de l’Intégrité du Congo (PUSIC), a Southern
Hema group (Oga, 2009). The Rwandan-supported RCD continued to be the
primary Tutsi force aligned also with Burundi (SAIIA, 1999). A split in the
RCD-Goma created the RCD-Congo, which broke off in June 2002. In 2003,
the RCD became a Congolese political party.
The Ugandan armed groups, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) and West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) remained
operational and active in the DRC even with the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement. The ADF was formed in the late 1990s by Muslim Ugandans who
merged with the remnants of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
(NALU) (West, 2015). The group established a link with the LRA, and received
support from the government of Sudan (Pike, 2015). The ADF was combatted
by the FAC. However, the group remained active especially in the North Kivu
and Ituri provinces (Katombe; Mvano, 2014; Rebels…, 2013; Nord-Kivu…,
2015).
52 The FDD was the armed wing of the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD)
and became a political party in 2005 (Alusala, 2005).
53 The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) was formed by a
coalition of Rwandan, Ugandan, Burundian and Congolese dissidents who toppled President Mobutu and
brought Laurent Kabila to power in the First Congo War (1996-1997) (AI, 1998).
Within this framework, there were the Mayi-Mayi groups - community-

based fighters which defend their local territory-, a distinctly Congolese
phenomenon. The military capacity and political orientation of these groups
varies considerably and changes rapidly. They have differences and constantly
shift alliances to achieve their interests.54
The FDLR, the primary remnant Rwandan Hutu rebel group in the eastern
DRC, was formed in September 2000 to oppose the Tutsi rule and influence in
the region. The group was composed by former members of the Interahamwe
and backed by President Kabila, who used the group as a proxy force against
the RCD and Rwandan army operating within the DRC. In 2002, FDLR units
moved into the Kivus and continuously attacked Tutsi forces in both eastern
DRC and Rwandan territory (ICG, 2003, p. 6). From January 2009, the DRC
and Rwanda have jointly operated against the FDLR (Rwandan …, 2009).
The Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), a Tutsi political
armed militia established in the Kivu region in December 2006, engaged in the
armed conflict against the DRC government (HRW, 2007; Prunier, 2009). In
2012, former CNDP soldiers formed the March 23 Movement, also known as
the Congolese Revolutionary Army, sponsored by the Rwandan government.
The group faced the FAC and Intervention Brigade of UN Organization
Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and surrendered in November
2013 (Harding, 2013).
While the ethnicity issue is not sufficient to trigger conflict, in some regions
it is the strongest conflict driver (Wimmer, 1997). The ethnic distribution of
Hutus and Tutsis has been manipulated, for their own ends, by Rwandan,
Burundian, Ugandan and Congolese elites since independence. The region has
a cyclical and recurring history of localized ethnic violence and mass killings.
Tutsi politicians and civilians’ massacre by the Rwandan Army (December
1963 to January 1964) was repeated in 1994. The denial of citizenship to
the Banyarwanda community is one of the sources of the conflict in DRC.55
The Tutsi-speaking groups (Banyamulenge) in the DRC-Kivu never had their
position recognized within the Congolese society56 Tutsi-Hutu division in
Burundi led to the Hutus massacre in 1972.
54 Some Mayi-Mayi groups have sided with the Government of the DRC (e.g. the two groups led
by Generals Padiri and Dunia in South and North Kivu), others with the Government of Rwanda (e.g.
Mudundu 40 and MLAZ). Factions have collaborated with different rebel groups, as well as with the
foreign armed groups (UN, 2002, p. 11).
55 Banyarwanda are the Rwandan colonials or nationals who emigrated to DRC between the end of
World War I and 1960. They acquired Congolese citizenship at independence from Belgium in 1960 which
was revoked in 1981 (Nest; Grigno; Kisangani, 2006).
56 Banyamulenge is how the ethnic Tutsi concentrated on the High Plateau of South Kivu (DRC), close
to the Burundi-Congo-Rwanda border, is called.
Forced migration changes dynamics. In the Great Lakes, refugees from

Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and Uganda sought shelter within similar ethnic
groups in neighboring countries. Rwandan Hutu refugees upset the precarious
balance of power in DRC-south Kivu populated by Banyamulenge. When
Ugandan troops withdrew from the DRC-Ituri province, refugees from the
DRC, mainly Hema and Lendu people, who have close relationships with the
Ugandan ethnic groups, flew to Uganda (Nest; Grigno; Kisangani, 2006).
The economic and social impact of refugees in the host country is often
politically manipulated, causing a constant source of insecurity. In former Zaire,
President Mobutu earned the loyalty of the Banyamulenge alternating threat
to deport them with participation in political and economic life. In Uganda,
the Banyarwanda refugees were deprived of social independence and faced
great internal prejudice even after they had allied with National Resistance
Army (NRA) elements against President Obote. Refugees have triggered wars
between the countries of asylum and those of origin, e.g. the invasion of
Rwanda by Uganda in 1990.
The 2002 UN Report regarding armed groups in DRC highlighted their
dynamism. Alliances within and between groups are constantly shifting and
although some of them present long-term interests (normally linked to political
objectives), the dynamics are often linked to short-term goals and needs
(mainly economic or security objectives). Parties compete against each other
and simultaneously they are also subject to internal leadership struggles. They
change locations and strength in the course of victory or defeat in military
actions (UN, 2002). A retaliatory conflict spiral often is present in which each
party responds to the opponents’ immediate or past behavior. Accumulated or
recent feelings dictate the reaction of each party leading to conflict escalation
(Pruitt; Kim; Rubin, 2004).
Figure 2: Conflict Dynamics
Conclusion
African countries partly differ in terms of their history, levels of
development and stability, and presence of war and peace, but they have some
similarities that may explain their interconnected violent conflicts.
In general terms, historical and colonial legacy, extreme poverty, lack of basic
infrastructure and social services, weak democracy, bad governance, disputes
for land and natural resources, polarization along identity and ethnicity, lack of
border controls, trans-border ethnic communities, cross-border migration and
trade, forced migration, external interventions, statehood and clientelism, fluid
loyalties between leaders, struggle over state power and material resources, can
be listed (but not limited to) as sources of instability and armed conflicts.
African conflicts are often composed of many actors and relationships
interacting in structures, which give them complex characteristics, and, in some
cases, a protracted and intractable nature. Such characteristics pose difficulties
to those who work on their scientific analysis. Furthermore, conflict resolution
in Africa has failed to establish peace in most recent struggles. This can be
explained due to a tendency to over-simplify conflicts. Some conflicts are so
connected that they cannot be understood in isolation but according to regional
dynamics of violence.
Since regional system emerged because of the conflicts complexity, the
analysis should avoid simplistic approaches. A regional systemic approach is
a promising way for addressing these conflicts since it allows conclusions on
the dynamics of violence and the interaction between structural and triggering
factors. It can be done by comparing different case studies within a region,
and establishing their inter-connections. The regional conflict system approach
permits the detection of the structural framing conditions and underlying
causes, actors’ dynamics in space and time, factors that contribute to the
formation and spread of conflict into a region, and the outcomes that refuel
the system and keep them open.
Regional conflict system analysis leads to a more comprehensive
understanding of the causes, structural conditions and dynamic interactions
within regions, allowing it to find practical policies and strategies to ‘transform’
the conflicts.
This is the main objective of the conflict transformation theory, a
comprehensive analysis that results in an appropriate intervention by outside
mediators, peacekeepers, peacebuilders, etc., rebuilding and transforming
structures and social relationships.
From a factual point of view, it is extremely difficult to explain all possible

root causes and dynamics of complex conflicts. There upon, we use the
examples of regional systems in the Great Lakes and central-northern Africa
to reinforce the need to analyze comprehensively and systemically all contexts,
factors, actors and dynamics involved in conflictive processes, how inter-states
and intra-state tensions are linked to each other and the consequences.
Moreover, a good analysis improves the resolution/transformation
actions. Thus, the analysis of African conflicts will be improved if it includes
the interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary studies which would permit it to
integrate different aspects (economic, political, social, military, ethnic, etc.) that
might account for the emergence and diffusion of violence. Mixed teams with
local professionals who have a better grasp of the internal characteristics and
who are able to provide an external overview and approach of the conflict can
help to develop a better understanding of the conflict and provide the best
approaches to manage it.
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University Press.
Mutualization of Power and
Security in Africa: for a Neo-
Pragmatic Approach to the Role of
Law
Oumar Kourouma
Based on a critical and prospective approach, this contribution analyzes

the contradictory (idealistic and realistic) dual use of international law in the
elaboration of collective security in Africa in particular within the strategic
framework of “Power Mutualization”. Faced with the impacts of this dual
use in terms of delaying and even deadlocking the construction of Africa’s
collective security strategy and in view of the continent’s security challenges
in the 21st century, it suggests a third way, that of a neo-pragmatist use of
international law.
Introduction
Law has since the second half of the 20th century become the main
instrument for integration processes (Weiler Joseph H.; 1995), particularly in
the field of security in light of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.
In Africa, the question of collective security is an essential concern since the
advent of African States (Benot Yves; 1969; 113-114). Already in 1967, Kenyan
political scientist Ali Mazrui presented the problem of “Pax Africana” as the
Peace “that is protected and maintained by Africa herself ”. (Mazrui 1967:203).
It is the crucial problematic of “Africa’s capacity for self-pacification” (Mazrui
Ali; 1979) that he articulates in the following terms: « Now that the imperial
order is coming to an end, who is to keep the peace in Africa? I took the view
that self-government implied, above all, self-policing» (Mazrui Ali; 1979).
These questions are still very relevant, in the sense that while Africa has
seen considerable reduction in traditional forms of insecurity (e.g. conflicts
of independence, protracted civil wars and inter-state conflicts) since the late
1990s (Yabi Gilles Olakounlé; 2016), insecurity on the continent has taken on
new and diverse forms in terms of individual security. Insecurity due to crises
of political and economic governance, exacerbation of religious identity issues
(violent political Islamism), environmental upheavals and conflicts outside the
continent particularly in the Middle East, is on the rise. This transformation of
security challenges is however occurring in an international context marked by
the disengagement of external actors vis-à-vis African security issues (Harsch
Esnest; 2003).
Africa is mobilizing its juridico-institutional apparatus to face this situation.
Since the advent of the African Union (2002), African leaders have taken on
a new stance, increasingly turned towards “self-reliance by the continent”,
expressing their “determination to remedy the scourge of conflicts in Africa in
a collective, global and decisive way” (Harsh Esnest; 2003), adopting a common
security and defense policy (African Union; 2004; 2005), creating a Peace and
Security Architecture (APSA), culminating in a Peace and Security Council
(Lecoutre Delphine; 2009), but above all integrating power as a crucial factor in
the implementation of their actions (Chouala Yves Alexandre; 2005). This new
dynamic that we have termed “Strategy of legal-institutional mutualization of
power” (Kourouma Oumar (2); 2016) is the continent’s attempt to answer the
thorny questions raised by Mazrui.
Mutualization of Power and Security in Africa: for a Neo-Pragmatic Approach to the Role of Law
Therefore, in this study57 we will highlight the dual use of international law,
both as an instrument for the formulation and implementation of collective
security strategy (idealistic use of the law)58 and a tool for the individual exercise
of power by States (realistic use of the law). Confronted with the impact of
this contradictory dual use of the law, in terms of delaying or even deadlocking
the construction of the African collective security strategy, we will propose a
new path, that of a neo-pragmatic use of international law.
I. The Power of some at the service of all by

the Law: Legal idealism
Mutualization of Power is the process through which African States intend
to put the Power of some of them at the service of all by means of legal-
institutional tools. As such, the «mutualization of power strategy» is understood
as «un proceso de reconocimiento jurídico-institucional de las facultades de
actuación y de influencia de los estados lideres africanos como instrumento
de defensa y de afirmación eficaz del continente [...]»59 (Kourouma Oumar
(2); 2016:135). It is one dimension of the “administrative continentalization”
(Tchicaya Blaise; 2014:16-17) of Africa that is being deployed through
the progressive institutionalization and harmonization of major strategic
orientations of African states in various fundamental areas such as security. It
incorporates power as a key factor in African integration60, in particular that
of certain African States of whom Alpha Omar Konaré (former Chairperson
of the AU Commission) says: “We must recognize that there is a locomotive
and wagons in any common undertaking; we must admit that there are leading
countries whose share in the distribution of responsibilities should be greater
than that of others. This is the reality. We need to [...] translate [this vision] into
behavior to move towards our major goals” (Delcourte Delphine; 2004: 141).
It is in the same perspective that Cillier, Schünemann and Moyer speak of the
“Big Five” that are Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria and Ethiopia “[whom]
57 This study is a continuation of our recent work on African International Relations and International
Law (Kourouma Oumar 2016 (1); 2016 (2), in the tradition of Ali Mazrui, Luc Sindjoun, Yves Alexandres
Chouala and Joseph-marie Bipoun Woum (Mazrui Ali 1967; Sindjoun Luc; 2002; Sindoun Luc and
Vennesson; 2006; Chouala Yves Alexandres; 2005).
58 It is important to stress that the African Commission on International Law was enshrined in
the African Union’s Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact of January 2005. This undoubtedly
establishes a close link between African common security strategies and the legal instrument (See text:
https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/documents/32066-doc-pacte_de_non-agression_adopte-
abuja-31jan2005.pdf)
59 “A process of legal-institutional recognition of the power of action and influence of leading African
states as an instrument for the effective defense and affirmation of the continent...” (Author’s translation).
60 Contrary to the European theoretical and practical tradition in this matter which built on the
theoretical level in response to realistic theory and on the practical level against the European history of
the first half of the 20th century, excluded the Power Factor from integration processes (see Vennesson,
and Sindjoun, 2000: 918-920; Kourouma Oumar; 2016).
will inevitably shape the future of the continent because of [...] their historical
role as regional leaders”. (Cillier, Schünemann and Moyer; 2015: 1). In addition
to these states, Morocco, Kenya (and Senegal as an essentially symbolic power)
have grown in influence in African international relations. It is these States that
we qualify as emerging average African powers (Barbara Brand; 2011: 20-23)
or three-headed Powers61 (See figure 1), because of the three different types of
behavior they adopt in the African international system (Kourouma Oumar (2)
2016:139; Kourouma Oumar (1) 2015:129).
Since the advent of the AU, these states have played a leading role in the
construction of a “Pax africana” (Mazrui Ali; 1967), a “new security order”
through the establishment of legal-institutional instruments, notably those of
the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which in a break with
the sovereignist and egalitarian tradition of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) recognize and legitimize their Powers as a tool for collective action
(Chouala Yves Alexandre; 2005). This security architecture is based on the
very structure of the African international system (see Figure 2) made up of
sub-regions, each supported by a limited number of leading states that exercise
a certain “benign hegemony62” (Kapuchan Charles; 1998; Luntumbue Michel;
2013 ; Sindjoun Luc, 2000 : 153-156).
The principal institutional instrument of this construction is the Peace and
Security Council of the AU (PSC) which - although inspired by pan-Africanist
ideals of solidarity, security and common defense (Kouvibidila; 2011: 74;
Tchikaya Blaise; 2014: 94) and in the institutional continuity of OAU conflict
prevention, management and resolution mechanism - is part of a new conflict
resolution paradigm in Africa. While giving an important place to anticipation
and prevention of conflicts using peaceful means such as the Council of the
Wise (Article2 §2, Article 3-b and Article 4-a of the Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of the PSC, 2002), this paradigm inaugurates a new era in
African integration based on a realistic approach to conflict resolution that
integrates Force and therefore Power as an indispensable tool (Chouala Yves
61 The African Three Headed Power model is a tool that we proposed in our April 2016 article on
Nigeria and South Africa (see Bibliography). It starts from the observation of the configuration of
the African international system which is composed of three levels, namely: sub-regional, regional and
global environment. In each of these levels, African powers adopt their own behaviour. Thus on the sub-
regional level, countries like South Africa and Nigeria ensure a benign hegemony relying on institutional
frameworks, on the regional or continental level they are relatively more important powers than the other
States but without hegemony, whereas on the global level they are emerging middle powers. The situation
in the Maghreb and East Africa remains characterized by a breakdown of power with the absence of a
predominant state, with several states seeking instead to project themselves directly onto the continental
scene. As for Central Africa, it is not very representative on the continental power distribution spectrum,
because no State in this sub-region has a visible strategy of sub-regional domination. Tchad’s case requires
that it be part of an observable time horizon.
62 It should be noted that this construction of the Pax africana based on sub-regional subdivisions and
driven by leading states suggests Ali Mazrui’s idea of “Begnin colonization” according to which failed
states in Africa should be administered (in a benign way) by pivotal states, leading powers in their sub-
regions (Mazrui Ali; 1994).
Alexandre 2005:288). Power in question is essentially that of leading states,

in the sense that they are the members of the AU capable of meeting the
criteria for membership in the PSC because of their capacity, their continued
involvement in Peacekeeping Operations, their experience and their financial
contribution (Article 5 §2 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the
PSC, 2002). As a result, although one cannot formally speak of permanent PSC
membership, an analysis of the institution’s texts leads us to recognize the de
facto existence of such members, insofar as the protocol for the establishment
of the PSC provides for the election of five (5) members for three years (Article
5 §1-b of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the PSC, 2002), with
the possibility of automatic re-election, without defined limits “in order to
ensure continuity” (Article 5 §3-b of the Protocol relating to the Establishment
of the PSC, 2002).
The role given to Power in the legal-institutional construct of collective
security in Africa is also reflected in the institution of a right of intervention to
the AU or a right of its member States to request such an intervention (Article
4 (j and k) of the Protocol on the Establishment of the PSC, Article 4 (h and J)
of the Constitutive Act of the AU). As “the use of armed force to impose the
will of the one who intervenes against an adversary who refuses to submit to
it” (Amstutz Mark R.; 1995:242), intervention is undoubtedly one of the most
important moments in the practice of collective power in institutionalization,
thus overriding certain traditional principles of African international order, e.g.
non-interference in the internal affairs of a state and respect for sovereignty, in
spite of their continued “fetishization”.
These principal legal-institutional instruments are tools for the deployment
of politico-military capacities of African powers at the service of collective
security. It is thus that peacekeeping and security actions of various leading
African States can be implemented at sub-regional and continental levels. The
first is Nigeria, the major West African actor (in comparison with other West
African states) in stabilizing the sub-region to the extent that some authors
such as Lutumbue, speak of “pax nigeriana” in West Africa (Lutumbue Michel;
2013: 13) or Nigeria as the “boss or policeman” of West Africa (Véron Jean-
Bernard; 2006). This is indeed attributable to the important role played by
the country in stabilizing the West African sub-region after the Cold War, in
particular through its military interventions in conflicts in Liberia and Sierra
Leone, within the institutional framework of the Economic Community of
West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the armed
arm of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nigeria
has spent over US$8 billion on operations in these two countries (Osuntokun
Jide; 2013). The same is true of conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, where
Nigeria has come to the fore despite criticism (Lutumbue Michel; 2013;
Darracq Vincent; 2011). Recent diplomatic and military pressure on Gambian

President Yahya Djamé reaffirms the predominance of Nigeria, which along
with Senegal remained the spearhead of post-electoral conflict resolution in
that country (Mojeed Musikilu (Premium Times) ; 2017)63. Nigeria’s action in
favor of peace and security extends to the entire continent, notably within
the framework of AU and UN diplomatic-military operations (Véron Jean-
Bernard; 2006; Luntumbue; 2013; Tamekamta Alphonse Zozime; 2016:53-
54) or in the struggle of the States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission
against Boko Haram, that it leads. It is so that Daniel Bach very early spoke
of an African pax nigeriana (Bach C. Daniel; 2007). Nigeria’s institutional and
organizational limitations however impact the true affirmation of its leadership
in light of its immense potential (Cillier, Moyer and Schünemann, 2015; Daniel
C. Bach; 2006). Other States that can also be listed here are South Africa,
Ethiopia, Algeria and Kenya.
The end of apartheid in South Africa in the 1990s also marked the
country’s return to the international, continental and sub-regional scene (the
main integration organization of which is the Southern African Development
Community (SADC)) as an African three-headed power (Kourouma Oumar (1);
2016) similar to Nigeria. Against this backdrop, the country being a unipolar
power largely predominant on the economic, political and military levels in
its sub-region, quickly positioned itself as an important actor in boosting the
integration of institutions in its sub-region and on the continent (Vennesson
Pascal and Sindjoun Luc; 2000). South African maintenance of peace and
security actions are primarily diplomatic and often within the framework of
African sub-regional and continental international organizations. Under various
presidencies since Nelson Mandela, the country played an important role in the
resolution of several conflicts on the continent, notably in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (2002), Côte d’Ivoire, Comoros, Sudan, Ethiopia/Eritrea,
Sierra Leone, Liberia (Véron Jean-Bernard; 2006: 167-168; Darracq Vincent;
2011). Military tool activation was not long in coming. This first occurred
through armed intervention in Lesotho and beyond under the umbrella of the
United Nations, notably in Congo and Burundi.
While Ethiopia and Kenya cannot be compared to the first two countries
because of the limited scope for intervention in their East African sub-region,
their role in stabilizing the latter particularly in Somalia or in combating the
“violence of Somali political Islam movements” is worth noting (through the
Combined Joint Task Force -Horn of Africa), as well as in the establishment
of the East African component of the African Standby Force all within the
63 The success of Guinean-Mauritanian diplomatic action for a peaceful settlement of the conflict must
be essentially linked to the military pressure exerted by Senegal, Nigeria, etc...
framework of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD),

the most advanced security integration organization in East Africa (Elowson
Camilla and Albuquerque Adriana Lins); 2016). Algeria, although very present
on the continent, does not have a truly functional sub-regional institutional
foundation in the Arab Maghreb Union. The country, in the name of the
principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other states, has yet to engage
in military intervention abroad by sending troops, even within a multinational
institutional framework (Laurence Aida Ammour; 2013:4; Berkani Mohamed;
2015). This does not however prevent it from participating in a number of
security mechanisms in the Mediterranean and Africa, where it is a key player,
particularly in the fight against “violent political Islamism”, or in the provision
of logistics and financial resources. In this context, the country positions itself
at the heart of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which
leads for another four years starting in January 2017.
The first part of this discussion highlighted the central role of international
law in the construction of a collective security strategy in Africa. While this use
of international law is an expression of a realistic collective transformation,
it is still rooted in an idealism that seeks to place the power of a few States at
the service of all others and of collective security. This no doubt conceals a
strategic instrumentalist behavior by these States vis-à-vis international law in
Africa. That is to say the utilization of collective legal-institutional mechanisms
to advance their own influence.
II. The Security of all for the Power of some

through the Law
What lies behind the rhetoric and actions of leading African states when
they claim to act on behalf of continental or sub-regional institutions and in
accordance with legal rules? A few answers to this thorny question are given
in the work of political scientist Detlef Nolte of the German Institute for
Global and Areas studies (GIGA) and Australian Barbara Marques. According
to the former, “regional alliance and institutionalization policies are part of
the strategic resources of middle powers eager to secure their political space
and are a means of containing the influence of other more powerful or
competing states” (Detlef Nolte; 2010). In a similar vein, Barbara Marques
begins by presenting the characteristics of average powers in general. She
notes their activism within international organizations and their practice of
strategic institutionalism and “Niche diplomacy” in this respect (Barbara
Marque; 2011) (see Figures 3). She subsequently highlights the features that
distinguish emerging middle powers (including some leading African states)
from traditional middle powers. These include a tendency to dominate, direct

and actively participate in the integration dynamics of their region (Barbara
Marques; 2011: 11-.35). In an adaptation of this work to the context of
African international relations (Sindjoun Luc; 2002), we have proposed the
“three-headed power” model to characterize three different types of strategic
behavior of African leadership states. While some of these states behave as
hegemonic powers at the sub-regional level (a mild, cooperative or benign
hegemony), they appear to be major powers relative to the other states on the
continental scene and remain emerging average powers on the global scene.
This is observed in the behavior of countries such as Nigeria and South Africa
(Kourouma Oumar (1); 2016). It therefore appears that even if these behaviors
are part of a framework of interdependence, the latter does not prevent them
from being the expression of an affirmation of power of less vulnerable states
in relation to others (Hassner Pierre; 1974); the affirmation of a profoundly
realistic policy, “under the guise of moral objectives for humanitarian, pacifist
or economic purposes” (STRUYE DE SWIELANDE, T; 2009).
The structure of inter-African relations calls upon us to put into perspective
any idea of a neutral (formalistic) use of international law in the construction
of a collective security strategy in Africa solely for the benefit of all. After
all, “[...] is legal formalism [not this] state of international law marked by the
primacy of appearances over reality, the determination of rules [or their use]
without consideration of actual conditions [such as] the structure of States
and international relations [...]. It is a mixture of cynicism and illusionism”
(Chaumont Charles; 344-345). While these words of French jurist Charles
Chaumont, concern above all classical international law, one may well wonder
whether international law as practiced in inter-African relations has not already
espoused such a form, particularly in the field of collective security?
Critical examination of the Peace and Security Council’s creation process,
its organization and functioning reveals that this institution is one of the means
of disguising the policy and prestige objectives of many leading African states.
The PSC was launched in 2004 during a phase (1999-2000) of considerable
renewed interest among African leaders in continental institutions, seeking
to revitalize them (Kouvibiala; 2011: 199-263). This dynamic was first and
foremost driven by a small group of states including Libya, South Africa,
Algeria, Senegal, Ethiopia and Nigeria. This is not without repercussions on its
legal instruments, which content themselves with recognizing and legitimizing
the power of these leading states (Tchikaya Blaise; 2014: 103). It is in this sense
that the articles (mentioned above) on eligibility criteria for AU member states
to the Peace and Security Council should be read and understood, while it may
at first glance be seen as an affirmation of pragmatism or a break with OAU’s
old sovereignist-egalitarian order. This recognition-legitimization translates

however, at the functional level into a growing hold of these States over the
institution in defense of their own interests. Continuing to lead the PSC since its
inception in 200464, Algeria seeks to occupy a highly strategic decision-making
body to promote its policy of African influence, as in inter-Maghreb disputes.
This instrumentalization of the organ by Algeria and other African powers
occurs under the guise of asserting AU positions or applying the founding
texts of the institution. Thus, an analysis of report No. 81 of June 2016 of the
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) reveals a bitter struggle between Morocco
and its supporters (including France, the United States of America and Senegal
as non-permanent members of the Security Council) on one hand and Algeria
and its supporters on the other, during the 10th annual consultative meeting
between the PSC and the United Nations (UN) Security Council in May 2016
in New York. Algeria and its supporters wanted a discussion of the Sahara
issue during this meeting to reaffirm the “AU position” on the issue, namely
independence of this territory. The agenda of the 10th annual consultative
meeting however, did not mention the issue. It is along these lines that PSC
Chairperson, Mr P.J. Molefe of Botswana, stated in a communiqué of 23 May
2016 that “the AU PSC stressed the need for the two Councils to initiate a
joint discussion on issues that remain taboo, including the situation in the
Sahara” (ISS Report N°81; June 2016: 20). In the same spirit, the PSC insists
that African States admitted to the Security Council defend the organization’s
common positions on the main issues concerning Africa, in accordance with
their commitments towards the AU. It bases its position on Article 3-d of
the AU Constitutive Act as well as on a UN General Assembly decision that
“[...] reiterates that member States of the UN Security Council have a special
responsibility to ensure that the decisions of the PSC are reflected in the
decision-making process [of the UN Security Council] on matters of concern
for peace and security in Africa” (Report No. 81 ISS; June 2016:8). The PSC’s
decision of 23 April 2016 on the role of African non-permanent UN SC
member states sought to confirm this obligation, requesting the three African
states to report to the PSC on how they intend to defend its decisions within the
UN SC. Going further, it envisaged the establishment of a “legal mechanism
for the accountability of the three States and criteria for approval of African
candidatures to the UN SC” (ISS Report N°81; June 2016: 9). This issue arose
following separate votes by non-permanent African members of the Security
Council (Angola, Egypt and Senegal) in April 201665. While this issue proved
to be highly important and strategic in Africa, particularly in terms of security,
64 Despite attempts by other leading states including Nigeria to oust it, the country has been able to
maintain itself thanks to a substantial diplomatic deployment. This demonstrates its strong interest in
continuing to control this body which has proved very useful in its strategy of African influence.
65 Egypt and Senegal voted in favour of the resolution renewing the mandate of the United Nations
Mission in the Sahara. A position in Morocco’s favour. Angola abstained (ISS Report; 2016: 20).
by putting AU credibility at risk66, it also reveals the strategic institutionalism

of a few states seeking to use continental institutions to implement their own
agenda. These include Algeria and other supporters of Polisario, who seek to
compel states that do not share their approaches (such as Senegal) to submit
to them in the name of continental legal instruments (ISS Report No. 81; June
2016: 10). Thus, ideals of collective security are held hostage to the political
realism of states masquerading behind the law. The recent post-election crisis
in the Gambia is also highly illustrative: involvement of leading West African
states such as Senegal and Nigeria and use of force (coercive and military),
based on fundamental electoral, human rights and peace and security AU and
ECOWAS texts (Fabricius Peter; 2017), conceals the geopolitical claims of the
first (Senegal) seeing an opportunity to get rid of a neighboring leader (Yahya
Djamé, former Gambian president), too long cumbersome (Cherruau Pierre;
2012; Sène Ibrahima; 2016), and an act of affirmation by the second, Nigeria,
in its role as first “policeman”. More broadly, analyzing the engagement of
States in peacekeeping and security operations on the continent, and the
degree of involvement depending on the situation, reveals that these, beyond
expressing determination of African actors to meet their obligations under
legal texts, aim to achieve more realistic objectives, such as the improvement
of armies and affirmation of States on the continental and international
stage (Gouriellec Sonia; 2016). Chad’s new dynamism is very striking in this
respect. Indeed, while this country cannot yet be considered a true leading
African state67 in the Central African sub-region or on the continent, it can
nevertheless use African institutional frameworks, particularly those dedicated
to peace and security, to exert real influence. Recent support received by its
former Foreign Minister, Moussa Faki Mahamat, in his election as head of the
AU Commission, translates according to many analysts (Seidik Abba; 2017) as
recognition of the military push in the fight against “violent political Islamism”
in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. The country has thus made the issue of
security its’ “Niche diplomacy” and is asserting itself as an essential actor in
these two regions (Sahel and Lake Chad Basin). Use of multilateral institutions
allows the Chadian army to bring visibility to the country as a main actor in the
maintenance of peace and security in these areas, to benefit from the training,
expertise and financial support of foreign armies e.g. France68 or the United
66 African differences during the vote on resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011 on the creation of a no-fly
zone in Libya have undermined the credibility of the Pan-African Organization.
67 Unlike some authors who venture to consider Chad as “a military power on the continent”, we believe
that the country is just beginning as an influential actor on the continent. It has neither the economic,
demographic or military weight of a Nigeria, among other states (See GDP, Demography and military
expenditure), nor the cultural influence of Nigeria (cinema) or Senegal. But the country has some influence
because of the leadership of its leaders.
68 It is in this sense that a report by the French National Assembly placed Chad at the heart of the French
security system as a “Centre of gravity” and a key player in peacekeeping in the Sahel and the Central
African Republic, with whom it is necessary to cooperate. (FROMION MM. Yves and ROUILLARD
Gwendal ; 2014).
States of America (African Committee of ANAJ-IHEDN; 2016; Le Monde

Diplomatique; July 2004) but also to ensure internal stability, by giving work
to an army formed by former militiamen and rebels (Gouriellec Sonia; 2016).
This analysis can be extended to leading states in East Africa, e.g. Kenya
and Ethiopia, whom for their own internal security and influence make use of
sub-regional and continental institutions dedicated to security issues. IGAD,
the AU and the United Nations have thus become privileged instruments for
their strategic military projection in the sub-region, legitimizing their power
by recognizing their role as stabilizers (Elowson Camilla and Albuquerque
Adriana Lins 2016), often under criticism and protest from other states in the
sub-region (Gandin Clara; 2012).
This strategic utilization by States of international security law and
institutions in Africa has a negative impact on the process of building Africa’s
collective security strategy. Instrumentalization of the PSC by Algeria and other
States reduces, if not blocks the possibilities of a settlement of the dispute
over the Sahara or of genuine cooperation between actors of the Maghreb and
Sahel areas, particularly on security matters. It also poses serious credibility
problems to this Council vis-à-vis internal African and external actors; as it is
seen as a tool in the hands of a small group of relatively powerful States.
Similar observations can also be made for mechanisms in East or West
Africa. Indeed, the dynamism of Ethiopia and Kenya within IGAD can
only be properly understood in view of internal security challenges in these
countries and conflicting relations they maintain with other states (Ethiopia-
Eritrea, Ethiopia-Somalia...) of their space. Hence the current difficulties in
establishing the East African component of the African Standby Force (ASF).
In West Africa, while involvement of Senegal and Nigeria, under ECOWAS
banner, played a decisive role in the departure of President Djamé, it also
created a climate of mistrust towards Senegal in the sub-region and in sub-
regional institutions insofar as a new war was about to be provoked while a
political solution remained open.
This second stage of our analysis reveals the existence of a blatant gap
between idealistic discourse of collective security based on the law and realism
of legal strategic uses and that of institutions for purposes specific to States,
and likely to have negative impacts on security situations on the continent. This
often contradictory dual use of the law reveals not only its indeterminacy, but
also the possibility of a more attentive use to better face ongoing challenges.
III. For a pragmatic use of the law to serve

collective security in Africa
The double use of legal instruments in African international relations or
the possibility that the same legal and institutional instruments serve different
and even opposing causes, leads us to underline the importance of political
considerations specific to state actors and above all the fact that legal decisions
are primarily political choices. There is thus no criterion, as Koskenniemi notes
that is independent of what states accept as such. [...] Choice remains open and
can only be made through indeterminate legal decision, that is to say a decision
that the very premises of the law qualify as subjective, political” (Koskenniemi
Martti; 2007: 74). This Koskinemian “decisionism” does not however lead
the author “[to] challenge the idea that there can be a serious, intentional and
successful use of international law. [Although] this use necessarily [is] political
and contingent. It is rather a Wébérien “decisionism”, in defense of the Ethics
of Responsibility (Jouannet Emmanuel; 2007:34), and not Carl Schmitt’s which
seems to nourish “the vitalism of power or an apology of war” (Jouannet
Emmanuelle; 2007:38; Bibeau-Picard Gabriel; 2013: 20-30). This posture
leads international law discourse analyst (Koskenniemi) to the realization
that it is through the technique of balancing interests, the use of equity or a
differentiated sense of justice that a solution can be found in so-called legal
conflicts (Koskenniemi Martti; 2007:74-75). Thus, far from pronouncing the
end of international law through his critical and de-constructivist approach, the
author opens a perspective of possibilities, a pragmatic way in which political
wisdom makes sense in the application of international law. This is where we
feel it is important to orient ourselves towards a new, pragmatic use of African
international law in the service of collective security.
As such, we note that to be pragmatic in the common sense of the term “is
to choose according to the effectiveness of one’s actions rather than absolute
respect for principles. It [is being] more concerned with concrete results than
with doctrine.
In philosophy, pragmatism is a typically American way of thinking. It
views knowledge in terms of effectiveness and not absolute truth” (Dortier
Jean-François; 2007: 666). As a result in international law, American doctrine
is characterized by the importance given to the search for efficiency, by its
eclecticism, by its awareness of reality and by its demystification of forms
(Delabie Lucie; 2011). For us however, it is not a question of adopting an
American approach to international law, as this has shown its limits (Delabie
Lucie; 2011: 265-267). Pragmatism in the use of African international law as
we envisage it is based on “African awareness”, which is at the origin of the
transformation of OAU into AU, a new vision marked by the determination

of Africans to face up to the challenges of the continent. It is in the name of
this “reborn African consciousness” that it was deemed necessary to recognize
the driving force of certain African States (which show dynamism in common
affairs), to institutionalize and legitimize their power for the effectiveness of
African collective action and to recognize a right of intervention to the AU.
All this to the detriment of traditional principles of African international
order, namely sovereign equality of States, inviolability of borders and non-
interference. While these principles are not expressly called into question,
they cannot continue to be conceived and interpreted as they were in
the early 1960s. They must be read in the context of current demands, of
transformations in African reality, of new or pressing challenges to Africa’s
economic development, security and affirmation on the world stage. From
this new pragmatist perspective, neither formalism nor anti-formalism can
be rewarded, but the search for an effective solution, a “solution of balance
of interests”, likely to favor a peaceful settlement of disputes, to allow the
implementation of legal-institutional tools of strategic projection by going
beyond traditional principles. The behavior of West African ECOWAS States
with regard to Morocco’s application for membership, to the detriment of the
current legal framework (in particular Resolution CMlRES.464 (XXVI) of the
OAU Council of Ministers of 1976 taken up by the ECOWAS Revised Treaty
of 1993)69 is highly illustrative of this perception of law as an instrument for
achieving major strategic objectives, and not as an element established forever.
On the other hand this new moment in African international law is a “Moment
of Criticism”. It implies in fact a “critical approach” inspired by Gregory
Biyogo’s “Revenist Philosophy”, itself inspired by Richard Rorty’s “Neo-
pragmatism” and Jacques Derrida’s “Deconstruction”. For the Gabonese
philosopher, ‘revenism’ as a Neo-pragmatist and Deconstructivist philosophy
calls for “the abandonment of two tenacious illusions, that of stability and
that of transparency of pronouncements ([.....] (here one can speak of sacred
principles and rules of international law, a sacralization that aims to satisfy the
strategic interests of States, to justify logics of domination)...), which are in fact
superstitious beliefs” (Biyogo Gregory ; V. :IV, 2006 : 203). ‘Revenism’ is on the
political level an invitation “to abandon what is considered non-variable, [...],
non-performing in order to increase the usage of critical discussion [...]” (Biyogo
Gregory; V. IV, 2006: 204). In the domain of African legal practice analysis,
this critical moment seeks to reveal ongoing attempts to confiscate collective
strategies for the benefit of one or a few African states or external actors. It
69 By means of this resolution, African States decided:”... that there shall be five regions of the OAU,
namely, the North, West, Centre, East and South regions”. The West African region was defined as the
space comprising the following sixteen (16) States: “Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia (dean), Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone and Togo. This division was taken up by ECOWAS in Article 1 of its 1993 Revised Treaty.
highlights the excesses or risks of excesses resulting from an instrumentalist

use of the law in African international relations; and thus helps prevent future
failures of collective initiatives in the making through the legal-institutional
tool. This can only succeed by maintaining a critical re-reading of the history
of international law in Africa, because the adoption of revenist epistemology
is also a “rejection of any occultation or relegation of the historical process of
creation and utilization of international law in Africa”.
The analysis carried out in the first two parts of this study has enabled
us to see how the practice of law without rigorous criticism leads to the
production of patterns of domination likely to compromise the construction
of a collective security strategy. Hence, the neo-Pragmatic path of international
law as a critical approach announces, for the practice of international law in
Africa, an exit from “forgetting oneself ” towards one’s “own reinvention”
(Biyogo Gregory ; V. II, 2006 : 206). This implies a transition in terms of the
legal-institutional construction of collective security, from the deconstruction
of legal dogmatism (that of sovereignty, intangibility of borders, self-
determination as a one-way principle) to the elaboration of new normative
horizons more in tune to current continental challenges, such as the fight
against asymmetrical, transnational and trans-regional threats (on land, at
sea and in cyberspace) and the establishment of a common defense system.
This de-fetichised law becomes an instrument that embodies the profound
awareness of States of the inseparability of their security challenges and their
existence in a “security complex” (Buzan Bary ; 2007 : 190), compelling them
to move towards the construction “of an integrated whole whose members are
convinced that the resolution of their common differences can and must be
achieved only by peaceful and institutional means without recourse to physical
force” (Battistella Dario ; 2015 : 502), that is to say within the framework of a
“security community” (Deutch Karl 1998 : 3). However, since this dynamic is
part of a process of mutualization of powers as described above, it will have
to go beyond the framework of a Deutchian security community to become
a “strategic projection community”. The latter being understood as “a highly
integrated and largely pacified group, acting as an instrument for international
affirmation and defense of the collective interests of its members”.
In this non-exhaustive study, a critical and prospective approach was used

to highlight70 the central role of international law in building collective security
in Africa, particularly in the context of “power mutualization”. We have thus
critically illustrated that international law plays a dual contradictory (idealistic
and realistic) role in this process, in the sense that it serves on the one hand
to put the power of leading states at the service of collective security in the
name of solidarity, pan-Africanism and efficiency; on the other hand, it is
through it that these same states try to harness their power, defend their self-
interest and even exert influence on other states in Africa under the guise
of acting in accordance with the law and on behalf of collective institutions.
This indeterminacy of the law and the contradictory use which results from it,
lead to a delay or even a deadlock in deepening the strategy of mutualization
of powers in the field of security. Hence the need for a new way of using
international law that is attentive to Africa’s current security challenges.
Founded on the principle of primacy of politics over law (observed from
the indeterminacy of law) and the ethics of responsibility, this approach
seeks to make law an instrument for the quest for a “solution to balance
interests or shared interests”. It denotes a neo-pragmatic usage of the legal
instrument in the service of collective security. This neo-pragmatist moment
should be understood as a time for de-dogmatization of classical principles of
international law in Africa, of an effective and contextualized use of the law,
materializing the awareness of States of the inseparability of their security
challenges and of the need to evolve towards a “community of security” and
above all, a “community of strategic projection”, because of the mutualization
of powers underlying the process of African integration.
70 This approach is also inspired by the conclusions of the work of the Belgian Internationalist critic
Vincent Chapeau, who proposed a new methodological approach to critical theorists. This is a three-
dimensional approach, including that of a schizophrenic relationship with the law, which consists of
criticism and at the same time action, while assuming this contradiction. It is therefore a matter of
breaking out of the radical opposition between antiformalism and formalism or between Criticism and
Positivism, using the contributions of the two theoretical currents: the critical moment being the moment
of Consciousness (in the use of the law) and the positivist moment offering the opportunity to act
through the law, the moment of action. (Chapeau Vincent, le droit international francophone est-il en
retard ou ne veut-il tout simplement pas venir? in Bachand, Rémi - “ L’état des théories critiques dans
le monde francophone. Comparative Trajectories: International Relations and International Law”. 2011.
Accessed November 12, 2017. URL: http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/mp3/01_chapaux.mp3. Chapeau’s
proposal basically shows the critical approach implemented within the Ecole critique de Reims (and its
successors at the Université Libre de Bruxelles), that of critical Positivism (Corten Olivier. The discourse
of international law. For a critical Positivism. Paris. A. Pedone. 2009 ; BENCHIKH Madjid, CHARVIN
Robert and DEMICHEL Francine. Critical introduction to international law. Lyon. Presses Universitaires
de Lyon. 1986; CHAUMONT Charles. 1970. Cours général de Droit international, Académie de Droit
International, “Recueil des Cours”, vol. 1 - 1970, pp. 335-527, A.W. Sijthoff). While we share certain
orientations of this School, particularly in its critical dimension (sociological analysis of international law,
highlighting contradictions, sociopolitical context analysis of the emergence of the law, power relations,
uses of international law), we nevertheless remain reserved about some of its positivist considerations
(BENCHIKH Madjid, CHARVIN Robert and DEMICHEL Francine; 1986 : 59).
Annexes
Figure 1: Three-headed power model (a tool for studying the

behavior of emerging African powers)
Source: the author.
Sub-region
• Power considerations: Geography, Demography, Miltary, Economy,
Technology, Politics, Leader
• Benign hegemony
Africa
• Non-hegemonic Superior power
Global
• Emerging middle power
Figure 2: The African international system and power

distribution (this configuration could undergo a metamorphosis
with the effective integration of Morocco into ECOWAS)
Global Environment;
North Africa – without hegemony;
Central Africa – without hegemony;
East Africa – without hegemony;
West Africa – with hegemony;
Southern Africa – with hegemony;
Highly integrated sub-region

Moderately integrated sub-region
Weakly integrated sub-region
Low influence
High influence
Balanced Influence
Figure 3: Characteristics of average powers according to the

paradigm of dyadic multivectoriality
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II
Contextualizing hard
and soft powers in
Africa
The Role of Hard and Soft Powers in Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria: A Critical Discourse Analysis
The Role of Hard and Soft Powers

in Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria:
A Critical Discourse Analysis
Don John O. Omale PhD
Nigeria is a complex African nation with a crowded ethno-religious

and political space where “logos and egos” get in the way of effective
ethno-religious cohesion; political and inter party relations. The outcome
of these complexities manifests itself in violent conflicts such as the
Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency, which are complex
and dynamic. More often than not, the use of “brute force” or hard
power is used by both parties involved in the conflicts. For instance, on
the 22nd of December 2016 the Nigerian Military declared that it has
decimated the Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency with her
“Operation Crocodile Tears,” and “Operation Lafya Dole,” respectively.
The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a group of separatists, were
also decimated by the “Operation Python Dance.” Good news! But as a
Nigerian musician puts it “after the Reggaes comes the Blues,” because
there is a difference between winning the war and winning the peace. So
if we win the wars we also need to win the hearts. This paper therefore
reviews relevant policy documents, official communication and technical
papers on conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction strategies
in Nigeria. With an eye of a restorative criminologist, this author analyzes
how “war-war” (hard power) and “jaw-jaw” (soft power) models could help
in the security and stability of Nigeria with special focus on the Presidential
Amnesty in the Niger Delta (PAIND), and the Presidential Initiative in the
North East (PINE). The methodology is basically theoretical and discourse
analytic (DA).
II: Contextualizing hard and soft powers in Africa
Introduction
Issues of conflict and violence are topics, which should interest all of us.
However, whether they interest us or not, they deeply and sometimes sadly
involve and concern us rather intimately because, the report of a conflict or
violence usually elicits our anger and challenges our humanity. Therefore, a
complete or total disinterested attitude towards conflict and violence is thus,
not easy to achieve. This is because our sense of inner security or personal
safety may be threatened, and our personal feelings for violence prevention
and justice (justice for the victim, justice for the offender and justice for
the community) are aroused. For instance, since the 9/11, 2001 attacks, and
its wide outpouring of sympathy, America now mainly uses its hard power
resources on the world stage, such as stiffer immigration laws and classification
of some countries as “axis of evil”, diminishing its soft power atrophy. Hence,
the concept of conflict and violence interests international relations experts,
policy makers, academicians, criminal justice practitioners, peace builders and
the general public. All of these groups though share common interest in the
substance of conflict and violence may be committed to different orientations
and ways of thinking and dealing with them-hard power or soft power; or both.
Power has historically been focused on “strength in war,” where factors
such as population, land and mineral deposits, economic strength, political
stability, and military might were of supreme importance (Nye, 1990). If a state
had a strong navy, a well-trained army, and economic power, it would likely be
able to compel, coerce, or bribe its citizenry and neighbors into compliance
with its objectives. For instance, some commentators in Nigeria have argued
that the proliferation of violent conflicts in the country began following the
democratic governance in 1999. It was argued that the democratic space gave
opportunities to people with all shades of opinions and ideologies to spring up
as this could not have occurred during the military era. Unfortunately, applying
hard power resources could also encourage citizens and neighbors to balance
against a powerful state because resources of power could produce fear and
opposition. As Nye (2004) observes, there was a “paradox that those most
endowed with power do not always get the outcomes they want.” Effective
power then, as USAF Major Hackbarth, (2008) said, is “the production of
intended effects.”
Therefore, to get the intended effects, power must be observed in context.
Hence, McLean & McMillan (2003), and Ichihara (2006) argue that power
depends not only on resources, but also upon the relational interplay between
the wielder, the target, and the why. In some cases, they argued, certain
resources are unable to be exercised towards a goal. In others, resources
produce unintended effects. In yet others, the use of one resource may get
the same outcome as another, but at a significantly higher price. This could
be a higher price due to the inefficient choice of resource to expend or
simply because a party the influencer wished to influence was less inclined
to be influenced and fought back. As a result, it is important to look at the
different types of power, and the different resources, that may be used to
accomplish a state’s goals. Moreover, counter-insurgency (COIN: which is the
focus of this paper) is a comprehensive civilian and military effort taken to
defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. This paper therefore
argues for the relevance of both hard and soft powers as they relate to the
counter-insurgency operations in the Nigerian context. The eclectic discourse
is relevant just as public opinions are divided as to the appropriate type of
power necessary to counter-insurgency in the country. Some public opinions
in Nigeria hold that terrorists or insurgents are created by the political class
through blocked opportunities. Others have argued that since terrorists use
force (actual or threatened) in order to awake action and make certain groups
(e.g political class in the case of Nigeria) do something they would have not
done otherwise, brutal force or hard power is appropriate because the victims
of the insurgency are rarely the ones that provoked the reaction. Indeed, those
dying in a bomb attack didn’t personally ignore or block the opportunities of
the insurgents/terrorists. Whatever side of the argument we belong, this paper
argues that post-war and post-conflict reconstruction is very suitable for soft
power and for all sides to engage with established culture of peace, norms, and
active citizenship necessary for resettlement and safeguards. It takes people
not at war to embrace a process such as post-conflict reconstruction. Hence,
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) or restorative justice (RJ)
mechanisms are resources of soft power that have operated across countless
jurisdictions. The understanding of soft power in this paper, thus, has been
subjected to multiple interpretations such as the restorative justice principles
in addition to an overview of the concept of soft power as proposed by Nye
and other scholars (e.g. Ogunnubi and Amao, 2016; Hackbarth, 2008 amongst
others). The paper also takes a critical discourse analysis of the debilitating
factors that might impinge on the usefulness of both hard and soft powers as
resources of conflict prevention in the African context.
Methodology and Theoretical Perspective

According to Marianne Jorgensen and Louise Philips (2001), a discourse
is a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect
of the world), which in this case, is the world of power, conflict and violence.
Discourse Analysis Perspective is chosen for this paper because it is a research
method based on social constructions of power, ideology, violence and conflict

in the Nigerian context as it relates to counter-insurgency operations. Discourse
analysis focuses on these patterns in relation to how we can understand the
challenge of national identities in Nigeria and what consequences the division
and diversity of the worldviews of Nigerians might have on national security
and social stability. This is imperative because of the ways in which expert
knowledge on counter-insurgency in Nigeria is conveyed in the mass media
and the implications for questions of power and sustainable democracy. The
aim of using Discourse Analysis therefore is to carry out critical research,
that is, to investigate and analyze power relations in the Nigerian society and
to formulate normative perspectives from which a critique of such violent
relations can be made with an eye on the possibilities for social change and
lessons for the international community.
According to Wang (2008), the definition of power should not only take
into account the ability of the power subject, but also the extent of acceptance
in the power object in the forms of credibility and legitimacy. If culture, political
values, and foreign policy are seen by others to be in contrast to accepted norms,
attraction can turn into repulsion. According to Nye (2006), attraction can also
turn to repulsion if states have a significant disparity between what they say
and what they do. Legitimacy and credibility, therefore, form the foundation
of power (whether hard or soft power), and lacking them makes governance
increasingly difficult. For instance, the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS, 2007:1) argues that, having “legitimacy can…reduce opposition
to and the costs of using hard power.” CSIS (2007:6) further argued that it
is better to bolster and maintain legitimacy in power, because “cooperation
is always a matter of degree, and it is profoundly influenced by attraction.”
Therefore, there is no value in increasing repulsion through illegitimate acts.
Hence, Nye separates power into two forms, hard and soft. Nye (2003:74)
says, hard power is “when someone does something he would otherwise not
do but for force or inducement,” (i.e. the use of sticks and carrots). Wilson
(2008:144) adds that hard power, rooted in the neorealist tradition, “focuses on
military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions to enforce
national interests.” Hard power resources include aircraft carriers, bombers,
and armored tanks as well as the economic might to crush another’s economy
or control its markets. Hard power can also come from economic resources
that translate into military might (Kennedy, 1989). Kennedy argues that, it
was allied military and economic hard power that crushed the Axis of Evil
in the World War II. Similarly, in the Nigeria-Biafra war of the 1960s it was
the Nigerian military and the blockades of food supply to the Biafra army
that led to their surrender. In the Zaki-Biam crisis in Benue State, Nigeria and
the Odi massacre in River State, Nigeria in the early 2000s, it was the use of
military power by former President Olusegun Obasanjo that brought the crises
under control. In American politics, as evidenced by high defense spending and
President Donald Trump’s campaign promises, the hammer of hard power is
extremely projected. Similarly, in the face of threat of terrorism facing the UK
and the twin terror attacks in Manchester and London in 2017, the UK Prime
Minister, Theresa May said: “Enough is enough,” and that “things need to
change… If our human rights laws get in the way of doing it, we will change
the law so we can do it.” The problem with hard power rhetoric such as this is
that, as an old adage goes, “if all we have is a hammer, everything looks like a
nail.” To this extent, hard power proponents are increasingly seeing the need to
use both hard and soft power in certain context.
Nye (2008) therefore summarized soft power in a variety of definitions
such as, “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than
coercion or payment; the ability of a country to attract other countries by ideas,
values and ideology; the ability of a country to let another country think what
it thinks.” Nye’s idea of soft power draws from the ability of a state to derive
acquiescence through its power of attraction. According to him, soft power is
the “ability to affect the behavior of others by influencing their preferences”
and “the ability to entice and attract” others without having to deploy hard
power threats. As he argues, “If I can get you to want to do what I want, then
I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do” (Nye 2008:95).
Soft power thus is “getting others to want the outcomes you want” through
co-optation rather than coercion (Nye, 2004:5). More than simply “influence”
or “persuasion,” soft power is “the ability to entice and attract” others without
having to use hard power threats or enticements (Nye 2008). It entails being
able to set the agenda in order to shape the preferences of other actors. The
ultimate benefit of soft power is to make others more likely to cooperate
because they want to, thus reducing the need for and reducing the cost of hard
power’s carrots and sticks.
However, some critics of soft power argue that its resources are slower,
more diffuse, and more cumbersome to wield than hard power resources (see
Nye 2004:1). Other critics add that soft power is analytically vague, intangible,
lacks a relational target and its effect is hard to define. They argue that while
results of an airstrike are obvious, “it may not be clear whether soft power has
substantial influence on a particular policy outcome” (see Ichihara, 2008:198).
Some neorealist critics argue that soft power may simply be the “halo of hard
power” or the “gleam on the sword” (Womack 2005:3). Thus, hard power
resources, in their opinion, are more important for coping with inter-state
relations and geo-political events like terrorism and insurgency. However, other
commentators have argued that soft power is more appropriate in this age
of insecurity from non-traditional sources (of human security) like terrorism,
which is becoming more prominent in global context and especially in the

developing world and the meta-geography of terrorism which has redefined
geopolitics globally. Intelligence gathering, rather than military prowess, and
the ability to build consensus and coalitions through attractive ideas (which are
elements of soft power) are more appropriate in countering terrorism since
the struggle is no longer over territories or on territories but instead a clash
of beliefs and ideologies that crisscross territories through social networks.
Hence, Johan Galtung argues that the use of military warfare (hard power)
in countering terrorism certainly will achieve what he calls “negative peace”
(the prevention or absence of personal violence), but the use of soft power
is aimed at achieving “positive peace” (dealing with root causes of violence).
In view of this dilemma, some commentators have begun to look at the
intersection between hard and soft power (a synergy that leads to) what Nye
(2008) calls “smart power.” Nye (2008:107) wrote that smart power, “will
include a soft dimension of attraction as well as the hard dimensions of
coercion and inducement.” To Wilson (2008), smart power is “the capacity of
an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are
mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes are advanced effectively and
efficiently.” He finds that smart power is evermore necessary because world
populations are more informed and better recognize raw applications of either
hard or soft power.
The Nigeria Case Studies

1. Niger Delta Militancy and the Presidential Amnesty in
the Niger Delta (PAIND)
Causes of the Militancy-History/Origin

A review by Oshod (2010) shows that the Niger Delta region of Nigeria
comprises the Ijaws, Efiks, Ibibios, Itsekiris, Urhobos, Kwales, Isokos, and
Edo ethnic groups among others. The region has the highest mineral crude oil
deposit and exploration in the country since the 1930s. The people have been
peaceful until their claim to suffering oppression, exploitation and degradation
of their lands due to the crude oil exploration by the different international oil
companies, such as (but not limited to) Shell, Mobil, Chevron, Total, and Agip..
The activities of the Nigeria Federal Government Oil exploration started in the
Niger Delta region in the late 1930s and oil was found in commercial quantity
in 1956 at the village of Oloibiri. Since then, oil production has increased
significantly and Sir Henry Willink’s Commission (1958) recommended
that the Niger Delta region deserves special developmental attention by the
Federal Government of Nigeria. Consequently, the Federal Government
established the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1960 to handle
the developmental needs and challenges of the region. The NDDB achieved
little, if nothing, before it faded away following the military coups in 1966 and
the outbreak of the Nigeria civil war in 1967.
Following independence in 1960, the founding fathers of Nigeria agreed to
have a “true” federalism. In this respect, the 1963 constitution was fashioned
to reflect some of the tenets of true federalism. For instance, it included a
provision for the payment of 50% derivation (of rents and royalties from
mineral resources) to the regions from where such mineral resources were
obtained. However, when the military took over the government in 1966, it
opted for a unitary system of government and abolished the 50% derivation
in 1969 in addition to dismantling the regional governments, replacing them
with 12 “states” governments and increasing the number gradually to 36 before
handing over power to Olusegun Obasanjo- a democratically elected regime in
May 1999. Crude oil has been the major source of government revenue after the
sharp increase in crude oil prices in 1973/74 and the rapid increase of Nigeria’s
crude oil production. By the mid 1970s, oil had become the mainstay of the
economy, accounting for over 85% of federally collected revenue and over 95%
of foreign exchange revenue. Despite the revenue income from the region, the
terrain is extremely difficult and a substantial portion of the region falls under
the “world’s fragile ecosystem.” Many communities live along creeks and are
accessible only by boats. The riverine communities are particularly vulnerable
to climatic changes and man-made disasters (floods, sea encroachment,
oil pollution, piracy, hostage taking, communal conflicts, etc). The region
remained neglected and impoverished despite the negative consequences of oil
exploration and production activities. Successive military regimes dominated
by military generals who were not from the Niger Delta region did not deem it
fit to tackle the development and environmental problems of the oil producing
areas or allocate a good percentage of the revenue accruing from oil to the oil-
producing states to address these problems (see Ogunshola Oshod, 2010 for
further reading).
The agitation to draw government’s attention to their plights have been led
by Isaac Boro in the 1960s who was killed; and in the 1990s by an environmental
activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was subsequently arrested, prosecuted and
executed alongside the other Ogoni activists in 1995 by a former Head of State,
General Sani Abacha. This non-violent agitation for economic sovereignty
over the oil resources and the “Ogoni Bill of Rights,” in the Niger Delta
turned violent when the Ogoni Nine including Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa, leader
of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), were killed
on November 10th, 1995. Since then, other violent and militant groups such
as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and the
Niger Delta Avengers have been involved in warfare, oil pipe line vandalism,
illegal oil bunkering, kidnapping and hostage takings of oil and gas expatriates,
amongst others.
The Amnesty Programme-Impact and Effect
In a bid to actualize the Niger Delta Peace Plan, the former President of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Shehu Musa Yar Adua offered presidential
amnesty in April 2009 to the militants of the Niger Delta who were willing to
drop their guns. The Amnesty Programme was expected to end in 2015 but was
extended to 2017 by President Mohammed Buhari, who won election in 2015.
The objectives of the Amnesty Programme include:
Infrastructural Development Programme: This includes the multi-
million dollars contracts for the dredging of inland water ways of the lower
Niger which terminates at the Niger Delta, the multi-million dollars contracts
for road constructions in the Niger Delta, the construction of the Niger
Delta University and multi-million dollars contracts for the Brass-Nembe
Liquidified Natural Gas (LNG) projects aimed at creating potential economic
and employment opportunities for the rehabilitation and reintegration of the
ex-combatants.
Human Capacity Development Programme: According to the
coordinator of the Presidential Amnesty Programme, Brig. Gen. Paul Boroh,
about 23 of the ex-militants were rehabilitated and trained to become electrical
engineers as of October 2016. Similarly, about 38 have graduated from the
83rd Pilot Course at Royal Jordanian Air Academy, while others were enrolled
in universities in the United Kingdom, Russia, South Africa and the United
States. According to Onuoha Uke (2016), a parade of some of the graduates
on July 29th, 2016, at the Nigerian High Commission in London, showed that
many made First Class honours in professional and competitive courses such
as Public Relations, Telecommunication and Networking Engineering as well
as Mechanical Engineering and Robotic System, and 18 others graduated with
Second Class Upper division in UK universities as well as First Class graduates,
produced by the programme in other countries. These feats show that militants
could actually rise above violent agitation and crimes to excel in noble causes
and endeavours to become change agents.
Poverty Reduction and Alleviation Programmes: Many others were
enrolled at local and national training programmes and over 30,000 ex-militants
in Niger Delta also collect monthly allowance of about 30,000 naira under the
Presidential Amnesty Programme.
2. Boko Haram Insurgency and the Presidential Initiative

in the North East (PINE)
Causes of the Insurgency-History/Origin

Politics and religion have been implicated as major causes of Boko
Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram, popularly translated as
“Western education is evil,” has an official Arabic name, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna
Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, which means “People Committed to the Propagation
of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad,” while its factional group, “Ansaru,”
are known in their official Arabic name as, Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi
Biladis Sudan, meaning “Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black
Africa.” Boko Haram is also known as “Yussifiya” sect; so-named after its
leader Mohammed Yussuf whose ideology is seen as advocating a return to
the “most conservative fundamental elements” of Islam in its “pure, strictest
form,” which includes Wahhaabism, sometimes also referred to as Salafiyyism
(Zarabozo, 2006: 187). Mohammed Yussuf ’s notion of “purity” and teachings
were inspired by the works of Ibn Taymiyya, a fourteenth century Islamic legal
scholar who preached Islamic fundamentalism and is considered a “major
theorist” for radical groups in the Middle East (Johnson, 2011), after whom
Yussuf named his mosque in Maiduguri.
The Nigerian security agents killed Mohammed Yussuf in 2009 after the
police clamped down on sect members who were ignoring a law requiring
motorcyclists to wear helmets in Borno State, which sparked a furious backlash.
Police stations and government offices in Borno were burned to the ground,
and hundreds of criminals released in a prison break. As the violence spread
across northern Nigeria, the government and army reacted with force (hard
power); Yussuf was captured and shot dead in police custody on allegation
of attempting to escape. Five days of fighting left about 800 people dead.
Consequentially, since the killing of Mohammed Yussuf, Boko Haram has
become notorious for raiding towns and villages, burning homes and churches,
looting banks and police stations, kidnapping and killing thousands of people.
Boko Haram insurgents and Shekau (the new leader) cite Yussuf ’s death as
one of the main factors driving the insurgency in northern Nigeria but there are
conflicting accounts over precise date and conditions under which the group
known as Boko Haram was first established. Obene (2012), a retired senior
Nigeria military officer suggested that the group has existed in some form or
another since 1995, while others have written that it was founded in 2003 or
2004. Madike (2011) for instance, contends that the group began in 1995 as
shabaab under the leadership of a conservative Islamist Lawan Abubakar, who
later left for Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia for further studies.
Gusau (2009 cited in Hassan, 2013) suggests that the origins of the group can
be traced to a group of evangelical Muslim students who dropped out of the
University of Maiduguri circa 2002, as students from various local universities
and technical institutes withdrew from school and joined the group for radical
Quranic instruction.
Similarly, Anyadike (2013:16) argues that, Boko Haram’s origin seems to lie
in a group of radical Islamist youths who worshipped at the Alhaji Muhammadu
Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri. Mohammed Yussuf, who also worshipped there,
was expelled from the mosque by moderate Muslim clerics for propagating
his radical views. Hence in 2002, an offshoot of this youth group (not yet
known as Boko Haram) declared the city and the Islamic establishment to be
intolerably corrupt and irredeemable. The group declared that it was embarking
on hijra (a withdrawal along the lines of the Prophet Muhammad’s withdrawal
from Mecca to Medina). They moved from Maiduguri to a village called
Kanama, Yobe state, near the border with Niger Republic, to set up a separatist
community run on hard-line Islamic principles. Its leader, Mohammed Ali,
espoused antistate ideology and called on other Muslims to join the group and
return to a life under “true” Islamic law (Sharia), with the aim of making a
better society away from the corrupt establishment.
What is not clear in the historical metamorphosis of Boko Haram remains
the identification of the real predecessor to late Mohammed Yussuf, the
contemporary Boko Haram leader. Was it Lawan Abubakar as mentioned in
Madike (2011) or Mohammed Ali as Anyadike (2013) would argue? In any
case, Muhammed Yussuf to whom Boko Haram is now generally ascribed to,
according to the competing narratives, only assumed leadership after Lawan
Abubakar’s departure to Medina. He then “indoctrinated the sect with his own
teachings, which he claimed were based on purity” (Adibe, 2012: 50 cited in
Anyadike 2013).
Meanwhile, Ola (2012) and Sodipo (2013) argue that the group grew out
of revivalist Islamist projects in northern Nigeria dating back to the Sokoto
Jihad at the turn of the nineteenth century. Therefore, the notion of jihad
in northern Nigeria has long historical roots. For instance, from 1802 to
1812, Usman dan Fodio launched a jihad and ultimately founded the Sokoto
Caliphate that spanned from northern Nigeria to parts of the Niger Republic.
Dan Fodio’s social and political revolution was against what he perceived as
greed and violation of shariah law by African Muslim elites. The Caliphate also
represented an Islamic banner of resistance to colonial conquest, the rejection
of secular government, and the regional networking of Islamic movements
in Nigeria and beyond. Boko Haram was also inspired by movements such as
the ‘Yan Izala’ (Salafist Renewalist), led by figures like Abubakar Gumi and his
Jamaat Izalat al-Bidaa waIqamat as Sunna, and the Radical Islamist movement
(the Muslim Brothers), led by Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky of Kaduna. Sodipo
(2013) further argued that these radical Islamists inspired many northern
Nigerian Muslims who were motivated by the Iranian revolution of 1979,
which led to the emergence of an Islamic government.
Hence, Isichei’s (1987) account appears to link Boko Haram’s origins back
to the Maitatsine uprisings of the early 1980s, which left thousands dead and
cut a path of destruction across five northern Nigerian states. The Maitatsine
movement took its name from an Islamic preacher, Muhammadu Marwa,
who moved from his native Cameroon to northern Nigeria around 1945. His
polemical sermons, aimed at both religious and political authorities, earned
Marwa the sobriquet “Maitatsine” (in Hausa, “he who curses”), as well as the
ire of British colonial authorities who had him deported. Maitatsine eventually
returned to Nigeria sometime after its independence and, by the early 1970s,
had gathered large and increasingly militant followers; the Yan Tatsine
(“followers of Maitatsine”), of youths, unemployed migrants, and others who
felt that the official Islamic hierarchy was unresponsive to their needs. Security
forces killed Maitatsine during a December 1980 insurrection in Kano, but his
followers rose up again in 1982, 1984, and 1985. Both Yan Tatsine and Boko
Haram can be described as fanatical Islamic sects whose beliefs are not held by
the majority of moderate Nigerian Muslims. In their denunciation of Western
civilization, both also came to reject the legitimacy of the secular Nigerian
state, invariably described as dagut (“evil”) and unworthy of allegiance and
ended up waging war against it in an effort to replace it with a “purified”
Islamic regime. Their envisaged “pure” shari’a state would ostensibly be both
more transparent and just than the existing democratic order (Pham, 2012).
These events are unfortunate because, in the Nigerian context, it so happens
that to some poor, illiterate and unemployed Nigerians the “meaning and
purpose” of life is centrally located in their ethnic and religious identity which
they often stand to defend.
Hence in the early stages, the Boko Haram sect was widely known to
have mobilized its membership from women and children, school drop-outs
and unemployed university and polytechnic graduates (popularly known as
“Talakawas” - the commoners- in Hausa language), most of who tore up their
certificates while student members withdrew from school. Okereke (2012:6)
posits that “these recruits were indoctrinated by Mohammed Yussuf to believe
that their state of hopelessness was caused by government which imposed
Western education on them and failed to manage the resources of the country
to their benefits.”
The PINE Programme-Expected Impact and Effect

After the protracted insurgency in the North East of Nigeria by Boko
Haram, a Presidential Marshall Plan for the rehabilitation, reconstruction and
redevelopment of the area was launched in Maiduguri on November 15th
2014 by former President Goodluck Jonathan who expressed the Federal
Government’s determination to liberate all territories occupied by Boko Haram
insurgents in the Northeast. The objective of PINE is to create a strong
infrastructure base needed to reposition the North East region and empower its
numerous industries, notably the agricultural one among others. According to
recent situational analysis conducted through the National Economic Strategic
Team (NEST), growth potentials in the region are extremely capped by the
huge pre-existing infrastructural deficits, in addition to the destruction of the
existing infrastructure in the region by the Boko Haram crisis. The Presidential
Initiative for the Northeast’s Long Term Plan (2015-2020) includes:
• The Ecology and Great Green Wall (GGW) Programme: This
programme is to counter desertification, amongst other opportunities
for the affected northern states. Desertification is one of the major
environmental challenges in Nigeria threatening the livelihoods of
over 40 million people. The most affected States are Adamawa, Bauchi,
Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe and Yobe.
Boko Haram affects some of these States and these States constitute
about 35% of the country’s total land. The programme involves, among
others, the establishment of green wall or shelter belt from Kebbi state
in Northwest to Borno state in the Northeast, a distance of 1,500km
and 15km across, the promotion of dry land agricultural technology
and the development of agro-based industries, the provision of water
for irrigation and domestic uses, the development of grazing resources,
the promotion of alternative and sustainable sources of energy (such as
provision of 157 solar and wind powered boreholes to ameliorate the
impact of drought), the promotion of alternative means of livelihoods
(such as procurement and distribution of 200,000 improved date palm
seedlings to farmers to enhance their income and establishment of
138ha vegetable garden), the creation of job opportunities (for instance,
498 youths trained and engaged as forest guards, about 50,610 engaged
in planting and other related activities, about 1,099 engaged in drilling
of boreholes ). The GGW programme, which has been implemented
since 2013, is an international project managed by the National Agency
for the Great Green Wall. It involves local community participation to
ensure the success of the programme as similarly recorded in other
countries such as Senegal and Mauritania. According to the National
Agency for the Great Green Wall, the programme is a people-oriented
project that hopes to positively impact the welfare of the citizenry of

northern Nigeria.
• The Counter Violent Extremism (CVE), and the De-Radicalization
Programme: This programme is hosted by the Office of National
Security Adviser (ONSA) with technical support from the European
Union Technical Assistance to Nigeria’s Evolving Security Challenges
(EUTANS). It seeks to identify the underlying causes of radicalization
(social, cultural, religious and economic) and develop strategies that
provide solution packages and disseminate the right messages to the
population through strategic communication and training of imams and
other religious leaders. The Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) and the
De-Radicalization Programme is very imperative because the rise of
violent extremist forces against the state has, in recent times, become
more ideological in nature. Boko Haram, in particular, objects to what
it considers the corrupting influence of Western civilization and seeks
to restore Nigeria (starting with the Muslim North) to a strict Islamic
state while Islamic scholars who hold different opinions are decried as
hypocrites and infidels. The group has successfully recruited members
from the public by targeting disaffected youths with limited knowledge
of Islam and vulnerable Muslims searching for meanings and hope.
To this extent, in order to truly root out the deep-seated ideology and
issues that have contributed to the Boko Haram insurgency, a holistic
approach to countering violent extremism must be adopted. Regional
collaboration on CVE and de-radicalization programme is imperative
because even if Boko Haram have been defeated as alleged by the
Nigerian Military, extremist ideology could live on, and other groups,
or remnants of Boko Haram itself could pick up where it left off.
• Other key programme elements include: Presidential Committee
on Distribution of Relief Materials, Victims Support Fund, the Safe
School Initiative, Operation Safe Corridor Initiative, Mass Housing,
Vocational and Entrepreneurial Training Skills, infrastructural
development, agricultural revitalization, health sector reforms,
educational transformation, good governance, regional planning
& strategic growth management, safety and security enhancement,
promotion of entrepreneurship & job creation for youth /women
empowerment, international trade & market development; amongst
others.
Discussion and Analysis

Nigeria and Africa in general face a threat from ideological and political
groups that could derail the difficult but promising journey towards prosperity
and economic stability. In Nigeria for instance, not since the experience with
civil war in the 1960s has the country been confronted by existential threat
of Boko Haram, the Niger Delta militancy and separatists’ agitations that
shake the national economy and unity of the country. The initial presentation
of the Boko Haram threat for instance, was different from previous threats
encountered. This knowledge gap in the warfare led the Federal Government
of Nigeria to apply old solutions of hard power to new problems, thereby
complicating the conflict environment further.
Hence, I have argued in some of my writings and academic presentations
(see Omale, 2006, 2012), that we have yet to discover a culture which does not
have retributive traditions (hard power). Nor is there a culture without some
deep-seated restorative traditions (soft power). So, why is it so difficult for
leaders to use more soft power? The response I often get from some leaders is
that “if the insurgents stop using their weapons, there will be no more violence,
but if the military put down their weapons today, there would be no more
peace.” In view of this complex understanding, I urge more and more people
in contemporary times to look within their existing cultures to find models and
traditions that can be adapted to suit a culturally sensitive dispute resolution
and reconciliation process. This international trend of looking ‘within’ or
‘inwards’ for dispute resolution, peace and reconciliation mechanisms, is a new
and developing one which ought to be encouraged especially in Africa. Thus,
I have advanced the Afro-centric historical evidence aim at re-building the
African (soft power) restorative traditions in light of the emerging restorative
justice paradigm (see Omale, 2006, 2012).
However, in spite of the truth of the age long and deep–seated restorative
(soft power) traditions in most cultures of the world, the most recent retributive
or hard power traditions are mistakenly seen to have survival value. This
perhaps is because, restorative or soft power traditions or cultures which were
regarded as ‘timid’ and weak in fighting back imported hard power traditions
and cultures were often wiped out by the more determinedly retributive or hard
power cultures. We must guide against what Byrne and Marx (2011) call the
‘fallacy of novelty’: the assumption that new means (of power) are invariably
better than the old ones; or, the ‘vanguard fallacy’: which is the assumption
that, if the leading players (like America and Russia) are doing it, it must be the
way to go without due consideration to our cultural context. Military power
and technology will inherently be attractive to the industrial society. It is risky
to be against military power and technology in industrial society, because

military innovation and technology became synonymous with progress. Hence,
to be opposed to military power and technology is to be a heretic, to be old-
fashioned, backwards, resistant to change, regressive, and out of touch with
reality. However, the central factor driving the fads and fashions of hard power
and military technologies in an industrialized society is the private sector
through its lobbying for an increased militarization and privatization in crime
control industries and creation of conflicts around the world; as strategies for
marketing/sales outlets.
Yet, in the contemporary world, I would argue that, retributive or hard
power emotions have less survival value because retributive or hard power
emotions are more likely to get us into trouble than out of it, as individuals,
groups and nations. Our increased reliance on hard power will lead us
further down a potentially treacherous road, an increased reliance on both
coercive surveillance and coercive control strategies. Coercive power does
not specifically address the social and ideological features that cause specific
locations to generate high volumes of crime and violence, but it is worth
considering whether similar or greater violence prevention and control policy
can be realized by using this money on proven soft power strategies: such
as improving the education systems, de-radicalization of violent extremists,
creating jobs and vocational training programmes, improving housing, and
family life, and relative reduction in poverty. Non-improvement of these social
“slopes in our societies, may result to mega-slippery,” because a hungry man
will always commit crime or become violent (with or without military force).
If we could control ourselves, we would not need any hard power.
For instance, what kind of a society would we have if people are only and
increasingly controlled by their physical environment (because they fear the
force of law), and not by their moral conscience? A society that is based on
external control is unreliable and has failed morally. We can effectively police
ourselves if we are happy and not hungry. Hence, Jefferson argued that ”a
society is doomed where people obey the law because they fear the law and not
as a matter of conscience.”
In this sense, using excessive force and foregoing human rights often plays
into the hands of terrorists. Research evidence on this by the Institute for Security
Studies (ISS) South Africa shows that high-handedness of security forces in
some countries against suspected terrorists have been counterproductive in the
fight against terrorism in those countries.
Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in The Horn of Africa, for instance,
use government’s heavy-handedness to justify their actions of “Violence
begets violence.” In Kenya, the research by ISS found that, former members of
extremist groups overwhelmingly pointed to abuses committed by the state as
a major factor in signing up. It is a similar story in Mali, where youths that were
previously involved in ‘jihadist’ groups blamed the state’s inability to protect
its population, alongside abuses committed against that population, as a major
spur to recruitment.
Hence, Anton du Plessis, Executive Director at the ISS argues that
experience shows that by doing counterterrorism properly, by using the criminal
justice system legitimately, States are actually able to gather more evidence and
intelligence into terrorist activities. This is how States can penetrate terrorist
networks and funding streams. We lose that edge by going for a hard power
approach. A crucial aspect to this is international cooperation, which is vital in
combating transnational terrorism. Countries cannot work with or trust other
countries that act extra-judicially or unlawfully.
To conclude, through the twenty-first century, we are more likely to find
the restorative or soft power approach a more valuable resource than the
retributive or hard power approach. Even though, the hegemonic powers
and cultural forces in the contemporary world communicate just the opposite
message. The knowledge we need to learn is what has the status quo been in
African traditions for dispute resolution? This Afro-historical knowledge of
power dynamics in conflict prevention is imperative because according to an
Italian philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 BC- 43 BC), “not to know what
happened before one was born is to remain a child forever.” To this extent,
examining afro centric power dynamics in history as per the idea of restorative
or soft power will offer a backdrop for our understanding of peace, security
and stability in Africa. A historical review of the power dynamics might also
help us to understand what factors influenced the move away from restorative
or soft power traditions in favor of the hard power model and why we might,
in recent times, want to move back towards the principles and philosophy of
soft power in our current social context globally. In traditional Africa, Africans
have always believed that when people throw stones at us, it is because we are
a good tree full of fruits. They see a lot of harvest in us. We don’t go down to
their level by throwing stones back at them, but throw them our fruits so our
seeds may inspire them to change their ways.
In spite of the danger of over reliance on hard power in African warfare,
it is obvious that for the past thousands years, military priorities have played a
significant role in development globally.
For example, many early African and European cities were designed so
that they could be defended against invaders, with a central area surrounded
by city walls. Many inventors, such as Archimedes and Leonardo da Vinci,

worked at developing more potent weapons. On the other hand, military
technologies have repeatedly transformed the nature of warfare. The machine
gun, for example, developed in the latter half of the 1800s, made it possible
to overwhelm an opponent armed only with rifles. The British military used
machine guns in defeating much larger forces in many of its colonial wars. In
World War I, the machine gun gave a decisive advantage to the defence, and
millions of men were killed in futile attempts to storm positions defended
by machine guns. The development of the armored tank, in contrast, was a
great advantage to the attacking side, used most decisively in early German
victories in World War II. Thus, in the contemporary world engulfed with the
geopolitics of wars, threats to peace, insecurity, instability, arms proliferation
and terrorist financing, the sustainability of a solely soft power and altruistic
philosophy of Africans is a matter for further research.
Conclusion
I have argued in Omale (2010), that there are some political, traditional,
and community leaders in Nigeria who, because of greed and grievances, seek
political attention to become relevant in the eyes of national government (what
I call Aso Rock relevance: Nigeria’s equivalence of the White House) and then
incite youths to initiate religious, political, ethnic or violent conflict in their
communities, before pretending afterwards to be the only most influential
group who have the clout to stop the violence. In addition, with the level of
poverty among the youths in Nigeria, it is usually not difficult for unscrupulous
ethnic, community, religious and political leaders to mobilise, manipulate, and
channel their youths, who are often induced with petty rewards and false
promises, to commit violence acts based on the personal interests of such
leaders. Therefore, policy practitioners and peace advocates in Africa are urged
to dwell less on military warfare in the resolution of “home grown” insurgency,
but instead aim to metamorphose ex- militants/insurgents into ‘Agents of
Change’ in divided societies. The author is arguing that any constructive peace
project should hold Peace and Community Reintegration Action Workshops
through training, organizing and mobilizing community leaders, and militants/
insurgents in order to bring them and community leaders together based on the
theories of ‘reintegrative shaming’ and ‘interactive ritual’; so as to “connect”
them and the community and to “challenge” future negative behaviour for
“positive change.”
An effective solution to a protracted problem should be about tackling the
problem with evidence-based models, and not about making the problem easier
to live with. The Niger-Delta and the Boko Haram problems, like other conflict
societies in developing countries, are about protracted and intergenerational
dispute. They are about ‘Fundamentum Omnius Cultus Animae’: that is, the
soul of all improvement is the improvement of the soul. One best-practice
model to deal with these kinds of problems is good governance and effective
application of soft power in both pre conflict and post conflict settings.
Similarly, the Psychology of Cognitive Behaviour Reversal Training (CBRT)
aimed at providing fundamental trainings on Alternative Dispute Resolution,
Active Citizenship; Behaviour Modification and Victim Empathy to the
militants, as well as traditional leaders of the respective communities to which
the militants must return cannot be overemphasized.
In this sense, it is anticipated that a holistic implementation of the
Presidential Initiative for the North-East (PINE), the Presidential Amnesty
in the Niger Delta (PAIND) and the Anti-Corruption crusade by President
Mohammed Buhari might put an end to (at least the political element) of the
Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria.
Holistic implementation of the Presidential Initiatives and programmes are
imperative because it is one thing to disperse the Niger Delta militants from
the creeks, and the Boko Haram insurgents from Sambisa forest using the hard
power; and it is another thing to win the hearts of both the insurgents and their
sympathizers. Hence, I conclude that the final war against any terrorist act or
violent conflict must happen in the minds of the people (soft power approach);
and so “hard power” should only be used as the ultimum remedium-(the last
resort). That is what Nye (2008) calls ‘smart power’.
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At a Crossroads: South Sudan’s
Elusive Conflict Resolution
Strategy
Catherine Bartenge
This paper presents the historical perspectives of South-Sudan’s

conflict over the years between 1955 to 1972, 1985 to 2005 and the recent
2013 conflict after independence in 2011. It also examines the contextual
background and analyzes the conflict. This analysis show-cases how the
conflict resolution process in South-Sudan is a complex one and why there
is a need to address the structural challenges faced by the country in order
to put an end to the intermittent civil war. A conflict that has cost the
loss of life and resulted in a huge degree of human rights violations for
children, women and local communities as a whole. The central argument
of this paper is that conflict resolution in South-Sudan is elusive since
even with the three peace agreements that have been signed to resolve the
conflict, which included the involvement of regional organizations, the AU,
and numerous other different actors, the challenge still persists. The paper
will demonstrate how the state has used both hard and soft power to deal
with conflicts in the area and what needs to be done to rebuild peace in the
new state. It concludes with stating the viable options available in the case
of South-Sudan’s Conflict.
Introduction
The challenge of conflict resolution, whether in situations of violence or
conflict situations that have not yet degenerated into violence, is one that has
consumed the attention of scholars not just in Africa, but the world community
as a whole.71 This is evident by the Sustainable Development Goals developed
in March 2016 by the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SGD Indicators
(IAEG-SDGs) which identifies Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions as
Goal 16 to be achieved by 2030. Conflict Resolution has been described as
a fundamental element for development since there cannot be development
without peace and vice versa.
This paper is divided into four parts; the first section gives the contextual
background and analysis of the Conflict in South-Sudan over the years up
until the recent 2013 conflict. The second part demonstrates the use of power
employed by South-Sudan to resolve the conflict, the third and fourth sections
showcases recommendations to resolving the conflicts and the conclusion
respectively. This paper argues that conflict resolution in South Sudan is
complex and elusive and requires the unraveling of structural challenges and
resolution of grievances by all actors into the larger scheme of the peace and
development process. In addition, the paper uses John Burton’s basic needs
theory, which asserts that there are universal needs that have to be met or
satisfied in society as a pre-condition for preventing and addressing destructive
conflicts. It offers a key entry into conflict resolution and peace building
Methodologically, the paper is a product of information gathered mainly
through journal articles, the AU commission of inquiry report on South-
Sudan, and the IGAD mediation reports on issues in South-Sudan. The author
has worked closely with the gender advisor to the African Union Commission
of inquiry to South-Sudan and Gender Specialist for the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Assessment Mission to South-
Sudan including other scholars and academics working on the South-Sudanese
conflict, who have been shedding light on some of the issues the country is
facing to date.
71 Funmi Olonisakin, “ECOWAS:”From Economic Integration to peace building”: Edited by Thomas

Jaye, Dauda Garuba and Stella Amadi. “CODESRIA 2011.
At a Crossroads: South Sudan’s Elusive Conflict Resolution Strategy
Contextual background and analysis of

South-Sudan Conflict
The South-Sudan conflict is complex and elusive. This conflict is caused
by both political and structural challenges that are not easily addressed by
basic conflict resolution practice. These challenges hinder the path to conflict
resolution that would bring long lasting stability to the new state. Its 2011
independence was a major breakthrough for the nation, the country had
experienced protracted civil wars from 1983-200572. The movement that led to
this moment was one of the longest insurgencies on the African Continent.73
In 2013, the new state had barely stabilized; it found itself in another major
armed conflict that destroyed the country’s hope to find peace.
Historically, the armed violence was between the north and the south but
the recent form of conflict is entirely ethnic, the conflict is between the Dinka
and the Nuers of Southern Sudan. Additionally, many issues contributing to
this conflict originate from earlier conflicts before independence. Civil War
broke out in Sudan between the north and the south in 1955, shortly before
independence in 1956. Decades later, in 2014, President Kiir and Machar signed
a new agreement to resolve the crisis in South-Sudan.74 Under the agreement,
the two principle protagonists in the conflict for the first time agreed to a
transitional government of national unity and for an all-inclusive peace
process bringing together the government, the SPLM/A in opposition, former
detainees, political parties, civil society, and faith-based leaders.75 Nevertheless,
President Kiir afterward claimed that he had signed the agreement under duress
as Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn had threatened to arrest
him if he did not.76
A special commission of the African Union held in October 2015
concluded that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed
by the government of South Sudan “pursuant to or in furtherance of a state
policy,” and by opposition forces, too, while famine continued to spread, the
state went effectively bankrupt, the economy collapsing, and the inflation rates
reaching triple digits.77
72 Aleksi Ylonen, “Security regionalism and flaws of externally forged peace in Sudan: The IGAD
Peace process and its aftermath’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 14; 2(2014):13.
Peace process and its aftermath’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 14; 3(2014):13.
74 Jok Madut Jok & Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, ‘Sudan’s Prolonged Second Civil War and the
Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities’, African Studies Review, 42:2, (1999), 125-130
Peace process and its aftermath’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 14; 10(2014):13
76 Kisiangani Emmanuel “Reviewing options for peace in South-Sudan” East Africa Report, Institute
for Security Studies (2015) Issue 1
77 Andrew N. Natsios “South-Sudan cannot be allowed to collapse” New york times ( January 2017)
The key grievances of this conflict are centered on political administration

of the south and the desire for a federal system or separation.78 This has its
roots in a colonial administration structure that had run northern and southern
Sudan as different entities, leading to different degrees and forms of socio-
economic development between the north and the south, with the south being
largely neglected.79 This first civil war only ended in 1972 with the signing
of the Addis Ababa Agreement, which provided the south with a degree
of autonomy.80 Koul Bol Deng (2013) writes “Tribal war in South-Sudan is
unavoidable.” Comparing the current regime with the Addis Ababa Agreement
of 1972, Deng asserts that the institutions under which the government is, were
established during the regional government, and the ministerial compound
that currently represents most of the ministries in South Sudan was built
during that agreement as well as the University of Juba, some schools and the
current hospital.81In 1983, however, the Addis Ababa agreement was broken
by the north, leading to a second civil war that lasted until the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.82 This agreement led to the
secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011 with over 98 percent of the
population voting to secede,83 that led to its independence.
In 2013, the new state broke into conflict, the recent conflict is entirely
political, and it involves the government of President Salva Kiir and his former
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) and what has now
been termed the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army –In Opposition
(SPLM/A-OI).84 At the grassroots level, the armed forces across the southern
border have engaged into an ethnic conflict between the Dinka (Mostly Kiir’s
supporters) and the Nuer (mostly Machar’s supporters).85 Over the past three
years, more than three million South Sudanese civilians have been displaced
inside the country or have fled abroad because of fighting and atrocities —
78 AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report of the African Union Commission
of Inquiry on South Sudan, (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 October 2014), 21, 24, 26, 29-30; Emmanuel
Kisiangani, ‘Reviewing options for peace in South Sudan’, East Africa Report, Institute for Security
Studies, 1, (March 2015), 6-7
79 James Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts: Sudan and South Sudan’s Bitter and Incomplete
Divorce, (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2014), Kindle edition, 3, 10-11, 117; John Young, The Fate of Sudan:
The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Pro-cess, (London: Zed Books, 2012), Kindle Edition,
2-3, 19-20
80 AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 21-22, 29, 30
81 K Bol Deng, Tribal war in South-Sudan is unavoidable in 2014-2015,www.southsudan.com/tribal-
war-in-sudan-is-unavodable-in-2014-2015
82 Copnall, Poisonous Thorn, 3; Shadrack Wanjala Nasong’o & Godwin Rapando Murunga, ‘Lack of
Consensus on Constitutive Fundamentals: Roots of the Sudanese Civil War and Prospects for Settlement’,
African and Asian Studies, 4:1-2, (2005), 66-67
83 Robert Gerenge,
84 Øystein Rolandsen, ‘Another civil war in South Sudan: the failure of Guerrilla Government?’, Journal
of East African Studies, 9:1, (2015), 163-164
85 AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 24, 26; International Crisis Group (ICG),
‘Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts’, Africa Report, 223, (29 January 2015), 10
including over 340,000 to Uganda over the past six months.86 In the midst of
all this conflict, women and children are being violated physically with cases of
rape, domestic violence, child abduction, and carjacking of families.
In the summer of 2015, mediators from the East African organization
known as IGAD imposed a peace settlement, with support from the United
Nations, the United States and the European Union.87 The deal obviously failed
because the peace settlement was imposed by external forces without a wide
range of local support.88 In July 2016, fighting erupted again in Juba between
the forces of Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar. Mr. Machar fled abroad after being
hunted down by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (S.P.L.A.)89.The conflict
has since taken on even more ethnic and tribal dimensions, and caused more
mass atrocities, most recently in Equatoria, a southern province.90
As these political conflicts continue to manifest in South-Sudan, unequal
distribution of resources including land, high levels of poverty, low income
levels, exclusion/marginalization, and leadership challenges are some of the
deep structural grievances the state is facing at the moment. This is because
some of the issues captured in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
were not addressed accordingly translating to the conflict in 2013 until now.91
The rate of corruption is exceedingly high and is practiced by government
officials who seem to have impunity from any civil or criminal misconduct.92
In order to mitigate the situation, the president issued official letters to nearly
76 South Sudanese, most of them were reported to have been government
officials.93 There has never been any action taken by the president or the Anti-
Corruption Commission, this was in relation to the 4 billion that got wasted and
no accountability has been pursued. Millions of South Sudanese are dying of
hunger, lack of services such as health, education, roads, sanitation, electricity
and clean drinking water at the expense of the government’s corruption and
86 Sudan Tribune, ‘South Sudan forms transitional government of national unity’, (28 April 2016),
Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article58800. Accessed: 27 July 2016
87 AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 21
88 ICG 2015, ‘Merging conflicts’, 10; Rolandsen, ‘Another civil war’, 163
89 AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report,24, 27-28, 34, 45-47; Gerenge, ‘South
Sudan’s conflict’, 95-101; Rolandsen, ‘Another civil war’, 165
90 Liesl Louw-Vaudran, ‘China’s role in South Sudan a learning curve.’ ISS Today, (14 December
2015). Available online: https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/chinas-role-in-south-sudan-a-learning-curve.
Access: 28 December 2015.
91 South Sudan NGO Forum, ‘3W: Operational Presence - National NGOs,’ 2015, Available online:
http://southsudanngoforum.org/3w-nngo/. Access: 29 December 2015.
92 World Bank. ‘Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan: Improving Life for South Sudan’s 8.3
Million People’, (2013), Available online: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/05/28/
multi-donor-trust-fund-for-south-sudan-improving-life-for-south-sudan-s-8-3-million-people. Access: 3
January 2016
93 OCHA, ‘South Sudan: Operational Presence (3W: Who does What, Where’, (December 2015),
Available online: http://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-county-level-operational-presence-
3w-who-does-what-where-dec-2015. Access: 19 February 2016
self-interests that are beneficial to them.94 The example of South-Sudan, in this

regard, is no different from Kenya, which has had electoral violence manifest
as a result of historical grievances and the inequitable distribution of resources,
notably land. Equally, a culture of authoritarianism and negative ethnicity
where government officials have been mired in corruption scandals of over
791 million Kenya shillings where those responsible are walking Scott-free
further illustrates the similarity. This clearly shows that government officials
appear to be above the law even as the president has refused to take part.
As a result, the conflict that arises is driven by different grievances from
different groups of people in society and the peace process becomes limited
to addressing the broad range of needs and grievances across the South-Sudan
state. As John Burton (1987) argued, when an individual or group is denied
its fundamental need for identity, security, recognition or equal participation
within society, protracted conflict is inevitable. To resolve such conflict, it is
essential that needs under threat be identified and relationships restructured
for the social system re-calibrated in a way that accommodates needs of all
individuals and groups without any bias.
The use of power in the South-Sudan Conflict

South-Sudan is a military state that has primarily settled to use brutal
force to resolve the current conflict facing the country. The ruling party is
largely managed through military principles with little or no mechanism to
promote democracy.95 As Joseph Nye (1997), describes it, the SS government
relies on military and economic resources to gain forceful political leverage
to achieve desired outcomes. He goes further to say that entails a search for a
more sophisticated mode of foreign policy behavior. It is for this reason that
South Sudan has opted to use hard power as a form of diplomacy by allowing
to avail a lot of arms in the wrong hands. The continued dominance of the
SPLM and its feeling of entitlement have served to skew political power and
the distribution of the country’s resources, especially oil in favor of those in
the SPLM Leadership, which has promoted selfish interests, power struggles
and ethnicisation.96
It all started in 2013 when fights and rifts emerged between the units
94 Koul Bol Deng “Tribal War in South-Sudan is unavoidable in 2014-2015” East African Report,
Institute for Security Studies.
95 Ibid, John Campbell, ‘Congressional Interest in South Sudan’, Africa in Transition, Council on
Foreign Relations, (2015), Available online: http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2015/09/10/congressional-
interest-in-south-sudan/. Access: 3 January 2015.
96 Ajak, ‘State Formation’; ICG, ‘Keeping Faith’; ICG, ‘Merging Conflicts’; Kisiangani, ‘Reviewing
Options’; Mesfin, ‘Regionalization’
of SPLA.97 President Salva Kiir addressed the nation and announced an

attempted coup, from his hiding place; Riek Machar denied that he was behind
it.98 Meanwhile, rebel soldiers took control of the towns of Bor and Bentiu
and parts of Malakal and estimates by various sources have so far put the
number of deaths from the fighting at 10,000 people countrywide99, and the
displaced are estimated to number 1.7 million100 with four million people at
risk of starvation.101 Since July of last year, fighting has escalated in South
Sudan’s Equatoria region between pro-government and the armed opposition
forces, amidst reports of gross human rights violations in the form of rape and
civilian abductions.102 It has generally been established that the current conflict
in South-Sudan is as a result of Factionalism- internal disagreements between
sections in the SPLM party.103 From then on, the conflicts have been based on
retaliation by both sides. This clearly shows that the conflict resolution attempts
have failed because of these differences and most importantly the structural
grievances and challenges in the new state. The two powers, Riek Machar and
Salva Kiir have used their respective armed forces to cause violence. They have
used their political power to get properties in Kenya at the expense of the poor
South-Sudan nation who cannot flee to Kenya for safety.
First, if the arms are available and the government is not providing security
to the people, the people take matters into their hands. Second, the Constitution
makes the South-Sudan President, Salva Kiir one of the most powerful men
in Africa and his right to withdraw powers off Riek Machar, is additionally
a contributing factor to the conflict between them.104 Moreover, he cannot
be impeached by parliament and has the power to prorogue the legislative
assemblies of any of the ten states. In fact parliament has little to say in whatever
the president does, this shows that the president can do whatever he wants
to do because he is above the law.105 Third, the political tension between the
state and the opposition is appalling. For instance, the National Reconciliation
Project, which was created to resolve the conflict, was cancelled after being
97 Al Jazeera, ‘AU report finds forced cannibalism and rape in S Sudan,’ (28 October 2015).
Available online: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/au-report-finds-forced-cannibalism-rape-
sudan-151028162544581.html. Access
98 Al Jazeera, ‘Scores of civilians, including children, killed in South Sudan in October,’ (24 October
2015). Available online: http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/10/24/scores-of-civilians-including-
children-killed-in-south-sudan-in-october.html. Access: 4 January 2016; BBC News, ‘South Sudan civilians
recount atrocities,’ (28 September 2015),
99 AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 27-28, 45-46
100 AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 27; Fleischner, Deadly Enterprise,
101 Salva Kiir & Riek Machar, ‘South Sudan Needs Truth, Not Trials’, The New York Times, (7 June
2016), Available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/opinion/south-sudan-needs-truth-not-
trials.html?_r=0. Accessed: 27 July 2016.
102 Sudan Tribune “South-Sudan says 6 pro-government soldiers killed”. January 2017.
103 Burke, ‘More than 300 dead’; IGAD, ‘Reports of Violations’; UN News Centre, ‘As deadline slips’
104 Roland Paris & Timothy D. Sisk, ‘Understanding the Contradictions of Postwar statebuilding’, in
The Dilemmas of Peacebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Post-War Peace Operations, Roland
Paris & Timothy D. Sisk (eds.), (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2009), 1-3
105 Gerenge, ‘South Sudan’s conflict’, 87, 95, 105; AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final
Report, 37-38; Young, The Fate of Sudan, 4
constituted by the opposition; it was described as a political project which the

president was unaware of; which he should be, especially since reconciliation is
a sensitive issue.106 Generally, such projects should involve political leaders, the
government and the opposition, local communities and other stakeholders; all
actors should be part of the conversation. Public participation is very crucial.
If not, the project is bound to fail and the conflict resolution process will not
bear much fruit.
It is also important to note that the government and other actors including
the African Union (AU) used “negotiations” also known as soft power to resolve
the conflict. Soft power has been defined in a number of ways. For example,
soft power is viewed as the “non-material capabilities such as reputation,
culture, and value appeal that can aid the attainment of a state’s objectives”
(Viotti & Kauppi, 2013: 207). Joseph Nye (1997), who has written the seminal
work on soft power in the study of international relations, says that soft power
is “getting others to want the outcomes that you want.” However, with soft
power, as opposed to hard power, the idea is to elicit change by altering what
others prefer which can be challenging in negotiating a peace deal.
In the case of South-Sudan, the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 was
a noble peace deal but it did not address the issues that caused the civil war
for a decade, this agreement was broken by the north, and the expectation of
providing autonomy to the south did not resolve the violence.107 Next came
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed in 2005, which
led to the independence of South-Sudan. While the agreement appeared to a
hopeful beginning for the new state, unfortunately, the structural challenges
and grievances of previous agreements had not been confronted. After that,
in 2013, the new state broke into violence which led to the signing of the
2014 agreement to resolve the conflict which has now led to current multiple
conflicts in several parts of South-Sudan. Unfortunately, these agreements are
discriminatory in nature because they do not involve all the actors hence the
recurring violence. If there is no engagement or exchange between the leaders
and the communities including its followers, conflict is inevitable.
As noted earlier, the negotiations were purely among external forces and
did not involve all the stakeholders including the local community which led
to the intermittent conflict that is still going on until now. As John Burton
(1987) puts it, if conflict resolution is to be taken seriously and if it is to be
more than just introducing altered perceptions and goodwill into a specific
situation, it has to be logically assumed that societies must adjust to the needs
106 Ajak, ‘State Formation’, 3-5; AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 28, 44-46;
Kisiangani, ‘Reviewing options’, 3-4
107 Maxwell et al., Livelihoods, 16; Gorur, Perceptions of Security, 5
of the people, and not the other way around.108 The public must be recognized
and treated as people who can make decisions on issues that affect them in
order for societal problems to be contained and young people also must be
given a more empowering role in society. For instance, if armed violence is to
vanish then the ethnic minorities must be given an autonomous status and if
violence is to be avoided, decision-making systems must be non-adversarial
and leadership roles must be collaborative in nature.109 This should be viewed
as a partnership between the leaders and followers as opposed to the leaders
taking ownership of the process.
Thus, soft power is more than the ability to influence other actors in
international relations, but rather, it is the “the ability to attract, and attraction
leads to acquiescence.”110 Vuving (2009) suggests that we can add the word
“accept” to the definition, and thus, soft power becomes the ability to get others
to want or accept what you want, which can be challenging to the peace process.
Regional organizations and heads of state have worked towards ensuring that
South-Sudan attains the stability and security over the years since the civil war
began. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) met three
times to find a solution to the conflict.111 This is in addition to a number of
bilateral visits by individual heads of states and governments of some of the
IGAD member states to Juba to talk to President Kiir about the conflict.112
In “An Agenda for Peace” (1992), Boutros-Ghali encouraged the activities
of regional arrangements when he observed that regional arrangements or
agencies can render great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner
consistent with the purposes and principle of the UN charter.113 He added,
“Regional action would lighten the burden of the UN Security Council and also
contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization
in international affairs.”114 However, the negotiations from IGAD did not work
mainly because the mediators did not have leverage over the conflicting parties;
it did not have the financial capacity to mount a successful mediation.115
In addition, from the beginning of the conflict, both the government of
108 Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 5
109 John Burton “Conflict resolution: The human dimension” the International journal of peace
studies 1991. http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol3_1/burton.htm
110 ISS, ‘Deal or No Deal’; Fabricius, ‘Juggling a hot potato in South Sudan’
111 Kasaija Philip Apuuli(2015) IGAD’S Mediation in the current South Sudan Conflict: Prospects and
challenges, African Security, 8:2, 120-145.
112 Kasaija Philip Apuuli(2015) IGAD’S Mediation in the current South Sudan Conflict: Prospects and
challenges, African Security, 8:2, 120-145
113 Awolich, ‘National Identity Challenge’, 9; AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final
Report, 60-61; Gerenge, ‘South Sudan’s conflict’, 97-99; Rolandsen, ‘Another civil war’, 165
114 Augustino Ting Mayai, ‘The Compromise on Resolving South Sudan’s Conflict: How IGAD’s New
Peace Offer is Unsustainable’, Weekly Review, SUDD Institute, (11 August 2015), 3-4
115 Tendai Marima. ‘Can South Sudan’s Fragile Peace Agreement Endure?’, IPI: Global Observatory,
(2015), Available online: http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/09/south-sudan-salva-kiir-riek-machar/.
Access: 8 February 2016.
Salva Kiir and the SPLM/A in opposition have not shown a commitment to
end the violence through negotiations.116 Both sides have mounted obstacles
to peacefully resolving the conflict. For instance, before the 2014 negotiations
commenced, the opposition demanded that all political detainees be released
before they could take part in the negotiations.117 External actors were also
imposing sanctions to solving the conflicts but it did not work effectively.
The UN Security Council rejected a US-drafted resolution to impose an
arms embargo and more sanctions on South Sudan, this was a setback for its
proponents as they believed the measure could help mitigate a four-year-long
conflict that UN officials warned could escalate into genocide.118 The measure
garnered only seven votes in favor in the 15-member council, while eight
countries including Russia, China, and Japan abstained. Nine votes and no
veto are required for resolutions to be adopted by the council.119 The council
members who didn’t support this resolution are taking a big gamble that South
Sudan’s leaders will not “instigate a catastrophe,” US ambassador Samantha
Power told the council after the vote120.
The UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, UNMISS, remains in
the country as a security actor. UNMISS was originally established in 2011
to conduct and assist the government with various peace building activities
such as ‘state-building and economic development’, ‘conflict prevention,
mitigation, and resolution and [protection of] civilians’ and the development
of ‘capacity, to provide security, to establish the rule of law, and to strengthen
the security and justice sectors’.121 Since violence broke out in 2013, its efforts
have centered around the protection of civilians and facilitating humanitarian
assistance (amongst other more short-term activities).122 In particular, it aimed
to protect those civilians concentrated in IDP and refugee camps, as it lacked
the capacity to patrol and provide security sufficiently beyond these camps.123
UNMISS’ current strength sits at 12,523 uniformed personnel (the majority
116 Associated Press, ‘South Sudan: Creation of New States Draws Opposition Protests’, The New
York Times, Available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/26/world/africa/south-sudan-
creation-of-new-states-draws-opposition-protests.html?_r=0, Access: 17 February 2016.
117 Government of Republic of South Sudan quoted in: Sudan Tribune, ‘South Sudan’s Kiir appoints
governors of 28 new states’, (24 December 2015). Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.
php?article57484. Access: 29 January 2015.
118 Burke, ‘More than 300 dead’; Adrian Edwards, ‘South Sudan fighting drives surge of
refugees to Uganda’, UNHCR, (26 July 2016), Available online: http://www.unhcr.org/news/
latest/2016/7/57973cde4/south-sudan-fighting-drives-surge-refugees-uganda.html. Accessed: 27 July
2016.
119 Ajak, ‘State Formation’, 1-5; AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 37-109;
Gerenge, ‘South Sudan’s conflict’, 87
120 AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 27-28; Kisiangani, ‘Reviewing options’,
4; Young, Fate of Sudan, 134-135
121 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), ‘Resolution 1996 (2011)’, S/RES/1996, (8 July 2011), 3-5
122 UNSC, ‘Resolution 2155 (2014)’, S/RES/2155, (27 May 2014), 4-5
123 UN, ‘Remarks from Hilde F. Johnson Special Representative of UN Secretary- General and Head of
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Press Conference on South Sudan,’ (1 January 2014).
Notes to Correspondents, Available online: http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=3232.
Access: 3 December 2015.
of which are troops, with 994 police and 179 military liaison officers), 769
international civilian staff, 1,204 local civilian staff and 409 UN Volunteers.124
The operation has also been involved in conflict mediation and prevention at
a local level, conducting workshops and facilitating dialogue.125 In addition to
this, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
released a report in March 2016, which also detailed extensive human rights
abuses that occurred primarily in 2015 including the killing of civilians, sexual
and gender based violence, recruitment of child soldiers, destruction and
looting of civilian property, violations of political freedoms such as freedom
of expression and assembly, and the starvation of civilians which the report
characterized as a ‘scorched earth’ policy.126
In addition, there have been some attempts by civil society and local leaders
to mediate and support peace. Dinka and Nuer elders met in Nairobi in an
attempt to engage and promised to ‘work for peace’. Other efforts by civil
society organizations include reconciliation workshops across ethnic divides.127
The South Sudan NGO Forum records over 80 of its members of national
NGOs involved in conflict prevention and peace building.128 In addition,
some NGOs have sought to hold government accountable and contribute to
peace building where the government was failing. For example, prior to the
conflict, several NGOs, under the leadership of the South Sudan Law Society
and Justice Africa, took it upon themselves to conduct discussions with the
population after a lack of consultation on the part of government regarding
the drafting of the permanent constitution.129 Civil society has also been active
in calling for justice for victims of human rights abuses.130 Yet, with increased
government interference and as conflict progresses, it appears civil society is
losing the space and capacity to build peace.131 In addition, the South Sudanese
government has generally been ineffective in, or unwilling to, engage with
local or regional authorities in neither development nor aid planning.132 Finally,
while traditional authorities have historically been critical to conflict resolution
across communities, they also seem to have lost their ability to mediate conflict
and, in some reports, have recently encouraged violence.133
124 UN, ‘UNMISS Facts and Figures’, (2015), Available online: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
missions/unmiss/facts.shtml. Access: 3 December 2015.
125 UNSC, Report of the SG, 8
126 Human Rights Council, Assessment mission by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights to improve human rights, accountability, reconciliation and capacity
in South Sudan, (10 March 2016), Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Advance unedited version, A/HRC/31/49, 3-12
127 Moro, ‘CSO’s/CBOs’, 6-7
128 South Sudan NGO Forum, ‘3W: Operational Presence - National NGOs,’ 2015, Available online:
http://southsudanngoforum.org/3w-nngo/. Access: 29 December 2015.
129 AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 42-43
130 Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Era of Injustice’
131 Moro, ‘CSO’s/CBO’s’, 7-8
132 Ajak, ‘State Formation’, 5
133 Moro, ‘CSO’s/CBOs’, 5-6
Challenges facing the conflict resolution in

South-Sudan
At the moment, the conflict resolution strategies, especially the 2014
peace agreement, is facing implementation challenges. There is worry that the
conflict will continue to emerge and this will hinder the South-Sudan State from
achieving sustainable peace by 2030. A number of obstacles have hindered the
peace agreement of 2014, including the disagreement surrounding the creation
of 28 new states, which contributes to marginalizing some communities and
this makes them feel excluded from the development process. The reason
for this is because conflicts are more common in areas which have been
excluded further including Western Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria states.
The state is absent in proving security and basic social services like health
facilities and employment opportunities. The youth in the area have engaged
in violent activities as well as human rights violations like child abduction,
rape, kidnapping and illegal arrests of civilians.134 There are also key groups
of people that threaten the peace in South-Sudan. This includes the groups of
people, on both sides of the conflict, unhappy with the peace agreement.135 In
addition, the spread of arms and the high number of local militia groups make
it difficult to guarantee peace, as not all stakeholders’ interests were addressed
in the mediation efforts.
However, the risk of conflict emerging occasionally is not ultimately
confined to the disagreements between the opposition and government
regarding the implementation of the peace agreement. The conflict is also
likely to occur if key structural and societal issues including poverty, inequitable
distribution of resources, high unemployment rates and lack of health services
are not addressed, particularly the challenge of leadership and government
structures, the problem of state reach, the patrimonial nature of the state,
societal rifts and widespread poverty. All these challenges interact to provide
a situation where access to power is economically attractive and necessary for
core elite able to dip into a large pool of grievances to mobilize the population
behind their claim to power. But the elite goals are so far removed from the
reality of everyday life for most South Sudanese that a common vision for the
country is difficult to achieve.
134 Burke, ‘More than 300 dead’; IGAD, ‘Reports of Violations’; UN News Centre, ‘As deadline slips’
135 Fleischner, Deadly Enterprise, 4, 11-14
Recommendation
As noted earlier, conflict resolution in South-Sudan is elusive. It will
definitely take time to restore a stable, peaceful and democratic South-Sudan.
The conflict is deeply embedded in structures of historical injustices that
need to be carefully unpacked if sustainable peace is to be achieved by 2030.
There is need for engagement between all actors in the society including the
leaders, followers and specific actors. For instance, you cannot have the larger
population excluded from basic services like health care and education since
it is believed that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) provide most
of the services in the area. Public participation is fundamental so that all the
grievances can be addressed accordingly.
A clear framework and road map with timelines and mechanisms for
implementation, along with accountability on the part of the government in
fostering inclusive development policies, is required. This includes regional
and international involvement to create a meaningful avenue for reform. For
instance, the IGAD mediation efforts were fundamental to conflict resolution
but there was no political will from the government and the opposition. It was
bound to fail because all actors were not included in the peace building process
in order to bring a lasting solution.
The last resort to conflict resolution in South-Sudan would be to transform
the South-Sudan governance structures so that they are more fair and inclusive
in nature. The conflict in South-Sudan cannot be resolved if there is a high
percentage of unemployed youth. Various armed groups have been formed in a
number of states that loot people’s property, raid cattle and kidnap community
members.
Negotiations should include civil society, church leaders, traditional
tribesmen, and young political leaders to ensure that there is inclusivity. There
needs to be a bottom-up approach to foster public participation from all parties.
Conclusion
In this fragile state of affairs in South-Sudan, it appears that the unfolding
peace process needs robust engagement from the local, regional and
international actors to keep it on track. This is because these conflict resolution
engagements should realize, among other things, that the recent violence in
South-Sudan is a product of the overall crisis that has bedeviled the nascent
state since its inception and needs to be addressed at that level effectively using
proper mechanisms that are inclusive.
Resolving conflict calls for an inclusive process and the participation of
citizens, which John Buron (1987) terms as cooperative peace that all actors
come to an agreement about the way forward in conflict resolution.
South Sudan needs government structures that support justice, peace and
strong institutions that have a road map to the development process if the
Sustainable Development Goal number 16 is to be achieved by 2030. Fairness,
accountability and inclusiveness need to be fostered in the new state as well
as relentless political will, where all actors are committed to work towards a
common goal.
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Smart Power by Small African
States in Conflict Resolution
Bruno Mve Ebang
Applying theoretical canons of Smart Power to action by small African

states yields effective international policy. The implementation of conflict
resolution in accordance with international rules, while using the banner
of international organizations, is an intelligent way of acting on the
international scene. Such behavior renders small African States essential
actors in the African space in view of their engagement. This engagement
should however be taken with caution, given the strong dependence of
these countries on Western support for the implementation of their smart
foreign policy.
Introduction
Can small African states implement an intelligent foreign policy that
combines “softness” and coercion? Is the neo-concept of Smart Power suited
to describe the international action of “small” states? Starting from a theoretical
and practical adaptation of the precepts of this concept, this article aims to
highlight the capacity of small African states to exercise soft and hard power.
Theories of international relations were forged over the years by focusing
on the international behavior of large states. The principal concepts of
power, national interest or security are analyzed in classical theories (realism,
constructivism, and functionalism) by categorizing the world into a center
on the one hand, the West and a periphery on the other hand, the rest of
the world and Africa in particular. As a result, these concepts were adapted
to the African context by enacting reductive concepts such as “failed state”,
“quasi-state”, etc. The resurgence of conflicts in Africa during the Cold War,
resulting in sovereign State failures due in large part to the ideological conflict
between the two blocs, is at the origin of this categorization. While carefully
not focusing on the international behavior of stable or relatively viable African
states, leading political theories both internal and external, focused their
attention on the nature of African power and increased the number of studies
of dictatorships and patrimonialism... Indeed, Africa was seen exclusively as a
space for the supply of strategic resources; reflections on conflict resolution
through concepts of Hard and Soft power136, better yet, Smart power137
conceived around the United States of America, were in no way imaginable
(Ntunda Ebode, 1999: 3).
Now, as do the United States of America or France, African countries
carry out external actions to shape their international political environment,
particularly in their own immediate vicinity. This is all the truer when foreign
policy is conceived in the national interest, because for African states “security
is the ultimate price in the international policy game and States are its main
actors” (Baldwin, 1997: 11). If true for the United States of America, France
or South Africa, it may also apply to small African States. Owing to their
weakness in the face of international anarchy favoring the strongest, due to
insufficient means and vulnerability to collaterality in conflict, foreign policy
of small African states is fundamentally preventive, anticipatory and therefore
conceived both towards peaceful resolution of potential regional destabilizers
136 The concept of Soft power was first used by Joseph Nye in his book “Bound to lead: the changing
nature of american power”, New York, Basic Books, 1990.
137 Before being taken up by Nye in his celebrated 2004 book, the concept of Smart Power was first
highlighted by Suzanne Nossel, Executive Director of PEN America Center, in an article in Foreign Policy
magazine, where she emphasized that diplomacy, international aid, trade and the dissemination of values
have as important a role as military power.
Smart Power by Small African States in Conflict Resolution
(Boussetta, 1994 : 232-234) and if transnational armed escalation is reached, to

participation in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), generally under the banner
of the United Nations (Mve Ebang, 2014).
Smart power is a savvy combination of both Soft and Hard power. The
latter two concepts were developed by Joseph Nye to describe the “soft power”
or “strong power” of American foreign policy. According to Nye, unlike hard
power, involving coercion, soft power refers to the ability to get what one
wants through seduction, persuasion and attraction (Nye, 2004: 75). Military
deployment, embargo or economic sanctions are usually put in the hard policy
basket. Democracy, negotiation and therefore persuasion used in a discourse
putting forward a State’ model of life, characterize Soft Power.
In fact, the concept of Smart Power brings nothing new to the understanding
of international behavior of States (Wilson, 2008). It nonetheless provides a
modern analysis of these actions. In cases of conflict resolution for example,
it suggests that States use the best-fitting tool to a given situation, thus limiting
pro-war actions. Based on partnerships, alliances and above all under the banner
of international institutions, smart foreign policy generally operates towards
global best interest. While Nye and Suzanne Nossel put the United States
of America at the center of their thinking, emerging powers such as China
and India have shown keen interest for Smart power by increasing defense
spending and development aid as well as reforming their armies and public
diplomacy policies (Akcadag, 2014 8). Speeches by former External Relations
Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Ferrerro-Waldner, 2007), European
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs Olli Rehn (Rehn, 2008),
Director of the European Commission Delegation to Japan Hugh Richardson
(Richardson, 2008), and High Representative Catherine Ashton (New Europe,
2010), and numerous symposia, seminars and conferences organized by
research centers and universities show that the European Union (EU) is also
far from indifferent to the concept of smart power.
While it is obvious that concepts of Soft, Hard and Smart power do not
apply to small African States in their original sense, a broader analysis reveals
that the maintenance of cordial cooperation, respect for sovereignty of each
State, respect for international rules and participation in universal actions are
qualities that distinguish States from one another. Nevertheless, it is clearly
surprising to think that a State would want to adopt the model of a country
smaller than itself, let alone an Africa one. Small states are those that “have less”
and must therefore develop effective alternative (or compensatory) strategies
to influence international relations in their favor (Guilbaud, 2016: 13). So, in
accordance with international norms, rules and practices, small African states
carry out actions for peace and security that intelligently link diplomacy and
military deployments in a gradual manner. An analysis linking the concepts of

power and of conflict resolution by small states is a necessary precondition,
alongside the empirical study of actions by these actors.
The concept of power to begin with, is ‘’the common referent’’ (Dussouy,
2009: 231) to all areas of the international system. It is practically omni-
explanatory for all attempts to analyze behaviors of actors on the international
scene. The classical conception of the notion traditionally links it to realism and
this theory identifies three components to the notion of power: capacity - to
do, to have done or to refuse to do (Sur, 2011: 239), possession of a portfolio
tangible and intangible resources and access to a cultivated social relationship
network. Fundamentally analyzed through a spectrum of military might, the
concept has gradually shifted to the point of broadening its range notably to
economy, fossil resources, diplomacy, peaceful conflict resolution, etc. From
then on, the concept of power is increasingly translated as the capacity of a
State to possibly act for peace and to succeed in restoring it (Becker Fox, 1959:
38). So according to Hannah Arendt, “might always is possible might and not
an unchanging, measurable and secure entity, like energy or force. Because of
this particularity shared with all potentials that can only be actualized and never
fully materialized, might is to an astonishing degree independent of material
factors, numbers or resources” (Arendt, 1983: 225). Indeed, the ability of a
state to peacefully resolve a conflict or to participate in a UN operation reveals
a certain power and it is in this, as we shall later see that small African states
have proved their ability.
Besides, “small” is relative. One State is often described as “small”
compared to another, which would be “large” or even “larger”138. Size, in terms
of surface area and population is generally evoked to justify this qualification,
and quantitative criteria attached to realism are added to military power, natural
resources, etc. While such data is an objective element of categorization, it is
rather during the emergence of economic work on small States that a preliminary
response emerged with the notions of vulnerability and resilience. Indeed, as
early as the 1980s, Peter Katzenstein postulated that large internal markets
allow self-sufficiency, States with smaller territory are thus more outward-
looking and consequently more vulnerable to shocks and fluctuations in the
world economy (Katzenstein, 1985). Unfortunately, no definition of the notion
emerged nor found unanimity at that time despite the plethora of studies about
them (see bibliography), the reductive nature this induces notwithstanding.
While some countries claim to be small states at the UN Security Council,
individually or collectively - the Small States Forum, the Alliance of Small Island
138 Work on small states is closely linked to debates on the measurement of power and the hierarchy
between hyper, large, medium and small power.
States or Small Island Developing States - this does not justify the absence of a
conceptualization effort. Nevertheless, smallness promotes a capacity for rapid
reaction and flexibility that allows to respond to adversity (Katzenstein, 2003:
9-30). This capacity to react to economic difficulties is extended to conflict
resolution, in the sense that the appetite of small states for mediation and UN
PMOs makes them outside contenders in international relations (Guilbaud,
2016: 4-6). As their survival depends on it, small States participate strongly in
international efforts to preserve peace and security. As “the size of a country
that produces peace efforts matters little” (Tonra, 2002: 232) and because “the
strong does what it wants and the weak does what it must” (Mve Ebang, 2014:
76), the world owes a lot to small states in conflict resolution and peacekeeping.
For instance, countries such as Ghana, Rwanda and Benin were the 6th, 8th
and 17th UN military contributors respectively in 2008 (UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, 2008). Gabon made its capital Libreville a hub for
African mediation (M’bokolo, 2009) in the context of conflict resolution,
understood as the quest for peaceful means to appease conflicts. This should
be negotiated so as to be acceptable to all parties in conflict. “Since the end of
the Cold War, countless international community actors have striven to make
peace rather than prepare for war and conflict resolution became crucial to
the international community wherever states are fragile and unstable” (Conoir
and Verna, 2005 :13). Smart conflict resolution by small states as a critical issue
is subject to a number of conditions (1) which nevertheless hardly conceal
difficulties encountered despite a proven track record (2).
I. Conditions for implementing smart conflict

resolution
The implementation of smart conflict resolution policies by small states is
based on two main conditions. First of all, it must comply with international
law (1.1.) as this enhances a State’ perception by the international community.
The unilaterality of US engagement in Iraq and Russian engagement in Ukraine,
beyond international normative constraints, eroded their respective images
and caused considerable tension on the international scene. This also further
proved the absurdity of the right of veto and of the failure to enlarge the
UN Security Council. It gave the impression to countries present only at the
General Assembly, however large or small, that the fate of the world does not
depend on them and that a global bipolarization they believed abandoned or at
least limited had resuscitated. This makes it difficult for African countries that
have made conflict resolution a priority in their international commitments,
to criticize actions especially those of the “West”. This so as to maintain
external logistical, financial and material support and operate under the banner
of international institutions, offering international visibility and opportunities
(1.2.).
1. Conflict resolution in accordance with international

law
Peaceful conflict resolution by small African states is achieved through

the full observance of international precepts. Respect for international law,
especially international humanitarian law (Devillard, 2007: 75-130) enables
States to confer a legal (Suy, 1987: 523-531), solemn (Pictet, 1952: 26) and
neutral political character to their external engagements (Tourme-Jouannet,
2013: 17). Because of principles of non-interference and non-intervention,
State involvement requires compliance with a number of prerequisites. In the
specific case of negotiations or mediation, consent from the state in crisis
is an essential condition. Omar Bongo Ondimba’s mediations in Congo and
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for example, were conducted
within the framework of peaceful non-jurisdictional settlement of disputes,
as advocated by the UN Charter in its Chapter VII. The practice of mediation
is a technique of customary origin codified by the Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907. It aims to involve a third party, State or person, in order to
establish or re-establish broken contact between parties to a conflict, while
proposing a basis for discussion and intervening in the course of negotiations
to promote a rapprochement of points of view, without however seeking to
impose a solution. In this sense, Gabon’s mediations in Central Africa (1996,
1998, 2001, and 2002) or Congo (1977, 1997) were either offered or solicited
(Mve Ebang, 2014: 332). In the case of the Congo for instance, it occurred
either under the mandate of the United Nations General Secretariat (UNSG),
through the Gabonese presidency of the “International Committee on the
Congolese Crisis” or through an offer by President Bongo himself. As a result,
tensions between Pascal Lissouba and Denis Sassou Nguesso in Congo were
resolved (Le Pape and Salignon, 2001: 85). The 1998 Gabonese mediation in
the Central African Republic (CAR) under UN mandate helped ease tensions
between Ange-Félix Patassé and mutinous soldiers led by François Bozizé
(Doui Wawaye, 2012). Despite permanent and ongoing insecurity in the country,
Gabon never ceased to work for peace in accordance with international rules,
as in the 2008 mediation held at the request by François Lonseny Fall, Special
Representative of the UNSG in CAR (Doui Wawaye, 2012).
The prioritization of mediation by small States as a means of conflict
resolution has several explanations. First of all, it reduces the financial and
logistical costs and more importantly limits the collateral humanitarian
consequences of military deployment. In this, we agree with Marcel Merle when

he says that “by the very nature of international relations characterized by the
absence of a supranational authority with the competence to settle relations
between States, negotiation offers outside war, the only possible way of settling
disputes between States “ (Merle, 1980: 60). Consideration of these issues by
small African states demonstrates a certain pragmatism, giving primacy to
dialogue rather than to weapons. Legal prioritization of mediation occurs in
conflict resolution, defined as “the non-coercive application of negotiation and
mediation methods by third parties to defuse antagonism between adversaries
and to promote a lasting cessation of violence” (David, 1967: 283). Recognized
methods of peaceful conflict resolution are enshrined in jus gentium 139.
Notwithstanding the lack of deterrence provided by international law,
compliance with the rules of conflict resolution creates a good image, gives
confidence and offers a presumption of competence to third parties. This
compliance can accordingly ensure an exit from a crisis and eventual adherence
to a possible memorandum of understanding. Unlike major powers, survival of
small countries depends on the respect of peace agreements in nearby conflict
zones. Indeed, conflict collaterality exerts strong pressures on the stability of
these states. As a result, this respect enables small states working for peace
to maintain stability in their international environment, particularly in their
immediate vicinity. They therefore seek to shape the world on a small regional
scale, just as the United States of America strives to make the world in its
image.
2. Using the banner of international institutions and

international support
Besides respect for international law, which dictates the involvement of

small states in conflict resolution, the use of an international organization’s
banner, especially at a UN PMO shows a certain intelligence. Indeed, beyond
participation in an operation, the use of an international organization’s banner
to help Africa’s security and stability offers several advantages. Not only does
it provide so-called small States with a role, albeit often a minor one, but it
also secures recognition of their status and international legitimacy, while
remaining within an international legal framework (Albaret and Placidi-Frot,
2016: 25). Notwithstanding their limited resources and apart from recognition,
139 According to historiography, the original name of international law, the law of nations was born
with the treaties of Westphalia in 1648. From the 18th century onward, it expanded to govern a more
homogeneous, plural international society, where resources are unevenly distributed among States and
where populations and individuals, who make up States, are unequally endowed with wealth, freedom and
well-being. It was only between the 19th and 20th centuries that the name “international law” emerged
with the definitive consolidation of the modern European state.
military participation by small African States in the provision of personnel to

the United Nations140 can also be explained by an interest in resolving conflicts
with regional overtones and by a need for training and/or financing of national
contingents (Albaret and Placidi-Frot, 2016: 28), thus the fusion of African
personnel in well-equipped international coalitions likely to resolve crises. In
the particular case of UN-mandated military deployments, the aim is to have
adequate equipment at one’s disposal and thus avoid the risk of disarray or
debacle before the enemy because of a lack of means. It is thus a matter of
making the most of advantages offered by international alliances, for these
small States to overcome their weaknesses. Within this framework, a country
like Togo deployed more than 150 soldiers to the United Nations Integrated
Multidimensional Mission for the Stabilization of Mali (UNMISMA). In fact,
1,799 Togolese peacekeepers are deployed in Darfur, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire.
This engagement, which makes Togo the 27th contributor, aims to strengthen
Togo’s involvement in the international community’s effort to guarantee
necessary resources for UN peacekeeping operations (Operationsdepaix.net).
Benin has also established an international reputation, first at the UN level
as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, then by participating
in five PKOs in Africa, (BINUB) in Burundi, (MINURCAT) in CAR and
Chad, (UNMIL) in Liberia, (UNMIS) in Sudan, (UNOCI) in Côte d’Ivoire)
as well as in two others outside the continent, with (MONUK) in Kosovo
and (MINUSTAH) in Haiti. Participation by this country in theatres outside
Africa proves once again the strong involvement of small African States in the
maintenance of international peace and security. This also enabled the Beninese
army to discover the value of teamwork, the living conditions of people in
countries in crisis and the reality of war horrors. This also exposed the army
to tougher combat and conflict management techniques than it would have
had the opportunity to acquire in Africa (panapress.com, 2014). Above and
beyond visibility gained, this was about gaining experience in a well-equipped
international coalition, which regional operations rarely offer. Togolese and
Beninese engagements echo the early commitments of other small states in
the past. Building on past experiences of Gabon, Rwanda and Burundi within
the framework of the Bangui Agreement Monitoring Mission (MISAB), based
on Resolution 1125 of 6 August 1997 (S/RES/1125), replaced by the United
Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), based on UNSC
Resolution 1159 adopted on 27 March 1998, then reaffirmed by Resolution
1271 (S/RES/1271) of 26 February 1999, the continued involvement of small
African States under UN mandate reinforces our assessment that the latter
and the support it induces, are evidence of smart foreign policy. Enlargement
and coalition have the advantage of pooling resources and therefore spreading
140 In 2015, Rwanda deployed more than 5,600 people, Togo, Benin and Burundi between 1,250 and
1,800, and Gabon, Gambia, Guinea and Djibouti between 100 and 500 peacekeepers.
the cost of war to everyone. Fundamentally deprived of financial means, the

only possible contribution by these small states is their soldiers, accumulating
experience and stature in the process.
Use of international organizations’ cover, especially regional ones, is also a
token of confidence because the latter have in-depth knowledge of the terrain
(Jorge, 2013:2). This same cover also makes it possible to secure the logistical
and financial support from major powers, such as France and the United States
of America, which are reluctant to get directly involved. While African states
have accepted, albeit with difficulty that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, “the
great ones” would become less and less involved in conflict resolution in
Africa, they have nevertheless assured themselves that these powers continue to
finance the continent’s security and pacifist actions. In this context, new French
military cooperation in Africa is based on the RECAMP program, which “aims
to strengthen African peacekeeping capabilities through action based on the
principle of United Nations standby force modules” (De Bellescize, 1999:
10). Relying on the training of African military personnel, this program can
also, when the need arises, contribute “to the deployment of an international
inter-African force to monitor a ceasefire and contribute to the return of the
rule of law and the reintegration of all parties into a peaceful political order”
(De Bellescize, 1999: 12). Training not only consists in developing an African
peacekeeping capacity but also in alleviating the military training of Africans in
France and progressively transfer such training from mainland France to Africa
(Possio, : 256). Accordingly, in 2000 France co-organized Operation Gabon
2000 alongside Gabon141.
African states are well aware that this support is intended to promote
relative stability in certain African countries, where major powers have
economic and above all, strategic interests (Kameni, 2013). How can France’s
recent involvement in Mali or Côte d’Ivoire be explained, while countries
such as CAR are simultaneously experiencing an escalation of conflict with
confessional overtones, other than by the presence of the Eramet and Bolloré
groups in these countries. This awareness is present in the development of
small states’ foreign security policy and their capacity to act to shape their
environment is thereby strengthened. Still, African States are unable to do
141 This operation aimed at ECCAS member States covered the reception of refugees, the protection
of populations and the installation of a field hospital. It aimed to develop regional cooperation in
peacekeeping by testing the intervention of an inter-African peace force with a humanitarian mission
in a fictitious country divided by an internal conflict (Koungou, 2007). Gabon 2000 mobilized 1,750
participants, including 1,500 military personnel from 16 African and Western countries subdivided into
an inter-African peacekeeping battalion of 600 men (300 Gabonese), more than 200 officers and non-
commissioned officers at the command post, 500 non-African soldiers from donor countries in charge
of logistical support (The 8 ECCAS troop-contributing countries were Gabon, Burundi, Sao-Tomé and
Principe, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Chad and Cameroon. The 8 donor countries were France, Great
Britain, the United States of America, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands).
without international logistical support in this context. In 2007 for instance,

approximately 7,000 military personnel from Nigeria and most notably Rwanda,
who had strongly advocated for the implementation of the African Union
Mission in Sudan (AMIS), were deployed in response to the Sudanese crisis.
The mission intended to act as a follow-up body to the June 2004 Ceasefire,
was however underfunded and ill-equipped, and ultimately merged with the
Joint United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), composed of 20,000 men
with greater resources and UN backing.
The involvement of a number of small African states for peace in Africa
began in the mid-1990s. Over 20 years later, an experience combining dialogue
and military deployment, mixing cooperation and coalition, skillfully balancing
soft power and strong power, is clearly visible.
II. Difficulties of small states

notwithstanding a proven track record
All of the above proves the genuine commitment of small African states to
continental peace and stability. Some of these states have continuously worked
in this direction since their independence. As a result, they have gained valuable
experience in peaceful conflict resolution (2.1.). Resolution that promotes
dialogue. However, whenever this resolution requires the deployment of
resources in a theatre of intervention, difficulties begin to emerge when
violence escalates, revealing the limits of these small states’ commitment (2.2.).
1. The proven track record of small states
The experience of small states in conflict resolution is a practical one. The

pragmatism they display highlights a capacity to influence their regional space
in a positive way. Africa is an undeniable learning ground for the workings of
diplomatic and military practices in view of the security and stability deficit
that continues to mark the continent. One might have expected that the fall
of the Berlin Wall, which partly explains the gradual disengagement of the
West in Africa, would have put an end to the upsurge in violence. However,
according to Pascal Boniface, “the end of the Soviet-American competition
did not put an end to conflicts in Africa [as in some other parts of the world].
It only diminished the strategic interest of the continent. Since the early 1990s,
Eastern Europe has become increasingly crucial for European states to help,
in order to facilitate the reunification of the continent. So, the risk for Africa
is not so much of being a victim of international competition again, but to
be indeed abandoned to its tragic fate by the outside world” (Boniface, 2000).
We agree with this scathing observation, despite the fact that a country such
as France has never really abandoned the continent, albeit with a prioritization
of funding when direct commitment can be avoided. A direct commitment
that focuses, nowadays, on the fight against terrorism (Mali, Libya, Niger) and
maritime piracy (Gulf of Aden).
African countries, particularly “small’ “countries, whose very survival
depends on their regional environment, have been fully aware of these factors
for some time. As a result, owing to the weakness of their means, they opt
primarily for a peaceful non-jurisdictional resolution of conflicts. While this
choice is explained by reasons mentioned above, it is also attributable to the
experience gained through the practice of mediation by Félix Houphouët-
Boigny (Côte d’Ivoire), Mobutu (DRC), Omar Bongo Ondimba (Gabon),
Thomas Yayi Boni (Benin), Paul Kagamé (Rwanda), etc. This experience is
drawn from the historical lesson “that conflicts, whatever their importance,
extent, duration or bitterness, in most cases end in negotiation, agreement
or treaty” (Bertrand, 2009). The prioritizing of palaver, negotiation, dialogue
and mediation by small states also has its origins in African history (Traoré,
2010). President Houphouët-Boigny, in keeping with ancestral traditions, made
dialogue one of his trademarks because “he considered this method of conflict
resolution a mark of the strong” (Jeune Afrique, 2013). As a matter of fact, this
African preference aims to transmit such values to future generations so that
weapons do not become the first mode of dispute resolution, regardless of the
scale of conflict (Diangitukwa 2014). This soft dissemination of African values
thus allows smart solutions to deadlocked conflicts.
During their mediation, these states try to ease tensions by promoting the
benefits of stability, dialogue and development as prevalent on their territories.
The dissemination of their stability model is one of the axioms for soft
international policy. Countries such as Gabon pursue this objective in their
conflict resolution (Bongo, 1986: 231-232). While rooted in “the wisdom of
African tradition teaching that it is impossible to remain inactive in front of
a fire that threatens a neighbor’s house at the risk of seeing flames spread to
one’ s home” (Ping, 2002: 43), the transmission of this commitment model
occurs using mechanisms amplified by the effect of globalization. In the field
of resolution in particular, the regular convening of meetings to reconcile
parties- be it within a framework of regional or global organizations- is an ideal
opportunity for a small country such as Gabon to express its vision for peace
and security (Mve Ebang, 2014: 250-251). It is about conveying an idealization
as embodied in the reality within that State. Such communication is a means of
conflict resolution by managing the emotions of stakeholders and encouraging
them into making concessions potentially leading to an exit from crisis.
2. Challenges requiring increased international

involvement
Notwithstanding the experience and real commitment of small states

in the fight against insecurity in Africa, the overall security situation still
remains fragmented. Countries such as CAR, Sudan and the DRC have never
experienced stability. And the emergence/resurgence of terrorism, combined
with insufficient development does nothing to help an already dismal situation.
Against this backdrop, aggravated by the wait-and-see attitude and even
ineffectiveness of the AU and African sub-regional organizations, external
support is a fundamental condition for conflict resolution in Africa. In addition
to the above-mentioned contributions, support from the United States of
America and France for the containment of terrorism in Central Africa is
essential. Inaction by countries such as Rwanda and Gabon in this area is
manifest. As a matter of fact, the inter-African coalition (Chad-Cameroon-
Nigeria) fighting Boko Haram does not include soldiers from the two small
Central African states with the most experience in conflict resolution. While
this may be explained by the inexperience of their armies in this domain, it
must nevertheless be acknowledged that their support has been diluted in
ECCAS’s action. At a meeting of the Central African Peace and Security
Council (COPAX) in February 2015, ECCAS allocated CFAF 50 billion to
support Cameroon’s and Chad’s war effort against Boko Haram. Emergency aid
is provided when States and, above all, populations are subjected to atrocities
and may also be used at the operational level (Mvelle, 2016: 199). While these
two Central African countries are failing in this battle against terrorism, others
are not. Benin for example, has made a strong commitment to the fight against
AQIM in Mali (Quénum and Padonou, 2011) and against Boko Haram by
deploying 700 soldiers in Nigeria (Xinhua, 2015).
This commitment is however truly dependent on international support,
which once again reveals the difficulties of small African states, particularly
due to the scant resources at their disposal. The United States of America and
France remain the largest providers of equipment, finance and logistics on the
field. In the fight against terrorism in the Sahel and Central Africa, France has
for instance deployed armed Male Reaper type UAV for intelligence purposes,
Atlantic 2 and Mirage F1CR aircrafts as well as Harfang drones and no doubt
other specific air assets from Special Operations Command (COS) and the
General Directorate for External Security (DGSE).
There is more to the difficulties of small African states than that. Starting
from the observation that the silence of weapons does not mean that conflict
is completely resolved, small States, always for lack of means, are conspicuous
by their absence in the so-called State reconstruction phase, through peace-

building. A phase during which such States are generally satisfied with mere
financial support, such as the disbursement of civil servants’ salaries in the
State to be rebuilt (Augé, 2004). Indeed, Gabon has for example in the past
paid the salaries of Central African civil servants for a number of months.
This attitude is explained by a desire to implement an African solidarity that
is seen as “financial aid from the richest African States to the poorest, instead
of dedicating enormous sums of money to maintaining spiraling conflicts and
fratricidal warfare in the name of principles that are principles but in word”
(Malloum, 2008: 32). Yet, conflict resolution in the context of reconstruction
also requires humanitarian aid. It is still Western countries that provide the
greatest support in this area while small African States often take the lead
in steering the distribution of this aid, in collaboration with affected States
(Mvelle, 2016: 201-206).
Conclusion
International Relations is a dynamic discipline. In constant turmoil, like its
area of study, this discipline has the ability to transform itself and to give birth
to new concepts. The concept of Smart power is proof of this. Conceived as a
clever mix of soft and hard power, it emerged about ten years ago to highlight
a necessary improvement in the conduct of American foreign policy. As things
evolved, this smart way of conducting foreign policy appealed to countries
such as China, Japan and even international institutions such as the EU.
While it might seem incongruous at first glance to adapt this concept
to the external action of small States, particularly in Africa. Deconstructing
the notions at the heart of the concept, smart (intelligent) power (force), an
analysis linking power and small states, and a study of conflict resolution by
such international actors all make this adaptability possible. Smart power by
small States in conflict resolution does indeed exist.
It is carried out under certain conditions, including compliance with
international law and use of international institutions’ banner and international
support. Adherence to international law by small States has been shown
to be a way of complying with the rules of non-interference that can give
compelling confidence in mediation (Mve Ebang, 2016). The use of the banner
of international institutions and international support, always within a well-
defined legal framework, provides a means of acquiring an international role
and legitimacy, while using the resources of international organizations in a
PKO. Increasing the chances of success, participation by small African states
in UN PMOs generally takes the form of military personnel deployment.
While these smaller States intelligently take advantage of UN actions, this is
not without exposing a number of difficulties, weaknesses and limitations in
conflict resolution by smaller States, despite the fact that they reveal undeniable
potentialities.
The peacekeeping experience of small African States is well established.
Resulting from an awareness of the urgency of assuming control of Africa’s
security destiny, following the gradual withdrawal of major powers after 1990,
this experience is achieved by prioritizing negotiation as the preferred method
for resolving disputes. The prioritization stems from African antiquity, when the
practice of palaver was found to be a method for resolving conflicts between
villages, clans, kingdoms, etc. It is thus quite comprehensible that heads of
state have made it a trademark. By instilling African values and traditions, this
way of resolving conflicts has all the characteristics of soft international policy.
Africa’s experience in soft conflict resolution is tainted in the implementation
of its hard international policy. Despite a lack of resources, small States want
to engage militarily in conflict resolution. Knowing that armed escalation is
often inevitable in Africa, they have found a way to help resolve crises by
participating in PKOs through coalitions. This does not exempt them from
being heavily dependent on the support of France and the United States of
America mainly. Material, financial and logistical support cannot be done
without at the moment. Consequently, some countries, such as Gabon or
Rwanda, do not act militarily in certain high priority areas of African insecurity.
This is true in the fight against terrorism, although other States, such as Benin,
are committed to it. This reliance on foreign donors also exists within the
humanitarian framework that succeeds traditional resolution.
We in conclusion consider it possible to adapt a number of concepts to
African realities by broadening the spectrum of the concept studied. The
vitality of the discipline from which it originates is a major factor. It is therefore
necessary to re-appropriate the different axioms, as a basis for a theory of
African international relations.
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Stability and Security in Africa:
The Role of Hard and Soft Power
Enhancing the strategic thinking on issues related to stability and security at the African
level requires challenging the predominant classical conception of security towards a
more comprehensive, supportive and inclusive approach. While traditional strategies
are often based on military responses and hard power, it is necessary to emphasize soft
power in all its dimensions, placing the individual at the heart of all conflict prevention
and management methods.
Some authors argue for a rupture with the post-colonial paradigm and advocate in favor
of a new polemological approach that takes into account African specificities and
“neo-customary methods” in preventing and resolving conflicts, while others,
contextualized the interaction between hard and soft powers through different case
studies.
POLICY CENTER FOR THE NEW SOUTH

Rabat, Morocco
www.policycenter.ma
AL AKHAWAYN UNIVERSITY
Ifrane, Morocco
www.aui.ma
ISBN : 978-9920-37-660-0

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Stability and Security

in Africa: The Role of Hard

Sara Hasnaa Mokaddem

Editor : Sara Hasnaa Mokaddem, International Relations Specialist, PCNS

Policy Center for the New South

Legal Deposit : 2019MO2501

Scientific Committee ......................................................................................................7

About Al Akhawayn University.....................................................................................8

About The Policy Center for the New South..............................................................9

Part I: Advocacy for a new polemological paradigm..................... 19

Soft Power and Traditional African Conflict Management.................... 21

Collective Security in Africa: Appropriation of Strategic Thought...... 43

Regional conflict system in Africa: an option for analysis..................... 69

Mutualization of Power and Security in Africa: for a Neo-Pragmatic

The Role of Hard and Soft Powers in Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria:

At a Crossroads: South Sudan’s Elusive Conflict Resolution

Smart Power by Small African States in Conflict Resolution............... 171

Inaugurated in 1995 by His Majesty King Hassan II and Crown Prince

Defining power is complex and ambiguous but understanding its

Dr. Nizar Messari Dr. Karim El Aynaoui

Africa is more relevant than ever in a constantly evolving global context

2 This is what natural sciences refer to as the “Cournot effect”.

Indigenous Conflict Management-

Group context and consensus, reconciliation and reinsertion, and resolution by

[T]he overriding concern of the [Buems’] normative order is

When an infraction such as a theft or murder takes place, intrinsic sanctions

may be reconciliation and restorations of good relations between claimants,

in a new land. Walking away is an established conflict management mechanism,

Indigenous Sources of Power

A community can come in many sizes contained in the notion of an extended

understand the questions. Inter-generational conflicts, changing ethnic groups,

Contemporary Conflict Management-Revival

based reconciliation proceedings in Mozambique (Igreja, 2010) are examples

different philosophical basis (Kolawole & Kolawole 2015, 269-278).

There is certainly room for a translation of neo-customary conflict

• ----------------1976. Modern Political Analysis. Prentice-Hall.

• Kah,Henry Kam 2011. “Regulatory Societies, Peacebuilding and Maintenance in

• Phillips, Oluwaseun 2011. “Peacemaking and Proverbs in Urhobo and Yoruba

I am grateful to Dr MaryJane Deeb of the Library of Congress for bringing this

I. Conflict and Insecurity in Africa:

1. African Polemology: A Paradigm Crisis

Emancipation for Africa today is equivalent to embracing an Afro-African

7 “Asymmetry is a dialectic of will, hypothetical (threat) or factual (hostilities), where an infra-state

that it is no longer stranded in the face of outsiders’ tyranny of wills and of

violence is also relevant. Atrocities that accompanied elections (e.g. Côte

2. Which Alternative Paradigm?

To answer this central question, let us empirically refocus our conceptual

As such, Edgar Morin opened the way to the possibility of a modeling

“We cannot conceive of an organization without antagonism

16 MORIN, E., « Pour une crisologie », op. cit. p. 152.

“[War is] made of a wonderful trinity. It contains the original

18 CLAUSEWITZ, C. « De la guerre » (1832), Éd. Perrin, 1999, p. 289.

R. Aron, G. Chaliand, T. Derbent), but just reminded that Clausewitz was a

II. Polemological Hybridity of African

1. Geopolitics of African Polemological Hybridity

Africa resembles a chaotic continuum at the crossroads of all contemporary

referenced. Early warning can thus be activated as soon as a State is powerless,

is not inherently beneficial, since it fuels a fundamental divergence in the

28 Cf. FRANCART, L. et VILBOUX,N.,« L’adaptation nécessaire à notre outil de défense et à celui