Egoism, Altruism and The Social Contract

Egoism, Altruism, and the
Social Contract
Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
• Describe the differences between
• Discuss how egoism is connected to
descriptive (or psychological) egoism and
laissez-faire capitalism and economics.
ethical egoism.
• Evaluate the challenge that egoism
• Explain criticisms of altruism and the
poses for the moral point of view.
importance of reciprocal altruism.
• Defend your own ideas about egoism,
• Evaluate disputes about the sources of
altruism, and the social contract.
morality and reasons to be moral.
• Explain the prisoner's dilemma and how
it relates to the discussion of egoism and
the social contract.
MindTap’ For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
M
orality seems to require that individuals sacrifice their own selfish interests
for the benefit of others. We tend to praise altruists and condemn egoists.
Altruism means, most basically, concern for the well-being of others. Some ver
sions of altruism may even appear to hold that truly self-sacrificial behavior is the
peak of moral development. Unlike altruists, egoists are primarily concerned with
their own well-being. Sometimes egoists are purely selfish, even to the point of
being willing to take advantage of others. But less selfish defenders of egoism may
claim that egoism is not about taking advantage or being uncaring. Rather, egoism
may be a descriptive thesis about human behavior, which claims that even appar
ently altruistic behavior is ultimately motivated by self-interest. From this perspec
tive, people behave altruistically because they hope to gain something in return,
even behaving altruistically in hope of developing social relations of cooperation,
which are valuable in the long run. A further form of egoism holds that we would
all be better off if people just looked out for themselves and left other people alone.
From an egoistic perspective, social rules can be understood as resulting from agree
ments among rational and self-interested individuals. That idea is known as the
social contract theory. This chapter considers egoism, altruism, and the theory of
the social contract.
It 20118 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part . W CN 02-200-202
Chapter 4 << Egoism, Altruism, and the Social Contract 69
Popular culture is full of examples of the con psychologists call pro-social behaviors—that is,
flict between egoism and altruism. Television pro behaviors that are not primarily self-interested and
grams like Survivor create circumstances in which that are motivated by basic concern for others.
people are forced to forge short-term alliances to The empirical question of whether human
maximize their own self-interest. The film and book beings are motivated by self-interest or by non
The Hunger Games shows us a life-and-death com self-interested concern for others is not so easy
petition in which children struggle for survival in a to answer. How do we really know what moti
war of all against all. In these contexts, egoism is vates others? Indeed, are you sure that you know
to be expected and altruism is an exceptional and what motivates yo u all of the time? Scientists have
heroic virtue. examined this question from various perspectives.
Disagreements about ethics and political life often Psychological studies, including accounts of devel
rest upon divergent ideas about human nature. We opmental psychology, can give us some insight into
wonder whether people are basically egoistic or what actually motivates people. Another line of
altruistic, whether we are motivated by self-interest, inquiry looks at pro-social behavior from an evo
or whether we are able to genuinely concern our lutionary perspective. It turns out that pro-social
selves with the interests of others. Our conception of cooperation produces an evolutionary advantage,
social organizations, politics, and the law often rests especially in social species of animals such as our
upon what we think about the motives of individu own. Individuals who cooperate with others tend
als. Are individuals basically cooperative or competi to be able to pass on their genes better than selfish
tive? Are individuals motivated primarily by egoistic egoists and those who cheat. This is especially true
or altruistic concerns? Should social organizations be when we cooperate with and support those who are
set up to minimize the dangers of an inevitable cut related to us. Our genes get passed on when we are
throat competition? Or is there a more cooperative altruistic toward our close relations, helping those
and altruistic basis for social cooperation? who share our genes to survive. This might explain
To think about these issues, we need to consider a why parents are willing to sacrifice for their own
basic empirical question: Are people basically selfish children—but not so willing to sacrifice for children
and primarily motivated by self-interest or are people to whom they are not related. It might also explain
altruistic and motivated by concern for others? We why we may be more willing to help a cousin than
also have to ask a normative question: Is selfishness a stranger. Such an evolutionary explanation points
good or bad? These two issues illustrate two differ toward instinctive forces that lie below the surface of
ent versions or meanings of egoism and altruism. One our more explicit motivations and intentions.
version is descriptive and answers the empirical ques Of course, an account of human behavior that is
tion. According to this version, egoism (or altruism) solely focused on the ways that pro-social behav
is a theory that describes what people are like. Simply ior functions in evolutionary contexts fails to con
put, descriptive egoism holds that people are basi sider the subjective side of experience and human
cally self-centered or selfish; that is, people primar freedom. Sometimes our motivations and intentions
ily pursue their own self-interest. It is a view about run at cross-purposes to attitudes and behaviors that
how people behave or why they do what they do. It provide evolutionary advantage. Furthermore, it is
is often referred to as psychological egoism. possible to ask a normative question with regard
Egoism is opposed to altruism. Altruism is often to the descriptive science of pro-social behavior.
viewed as pure concern for the well-being of others. We may be instinctively motivated to help those to
Sometimes altruism is thought to require entirely whom we are more closely related. But should we
unselfish behavior, even to the point at which we really help our close relations and only our close
sacrifice ourselves for others. But a broader con relations? The term nepotism is used to condemn
ception of altruism involves a variety of what those who show favoritism to their close relations.
Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part . W CN 02-200-202
70 PART ONE » ETHICAL THEORY
Films such as The Hunger Games illustrate conflicts between egoism and altruism.
Maybe we should ignore everyone else and focus Ron Paul (who ran for president in 2012); his son,
only on our own needs and interests. Or maybe we Kentucky Senator Rand Paul (a presidential candi
should focus our concern more broadly on humanity date in 2016); and Wisconsin Congressman Paul
at large, possibly even extending moral concern to Ryan (who was Mitt Romney’s vice presidential
members of other species. running mate in 2012 and Speaker of the House of
We must, then, ask a moral question with regard Representatives in 2016). Paul Ryan has explained
to the empirical science of egoism and altruism. that his reading of Ayn Rand is “ the reason I got
Should we be motivated by self-interest or should involved in public service.” 1 These politicians tend
we be concerned with the well-being of others? As to hold to a libertarian ideology, which emphasizes
a normative theory, ethical egoism holds that it laissez-faire capitalism and limited government
is good for people to pursue their own self-interest. intervention (these political and economic issues are
Some versions of ethical egoism also hold that altru discussed in more detail in Chapter 14).
ism is misguided and wrong. In this view, people A fiercely individualistic emigre from Bolshevik
should pursue their own self-interest, while minding Russia, Ayn Rand thought that altruism was perni
their own business and ignoring others. In defense cious. She argues that altruistic morality “regards
of this idea, ethical egoists may argue that altruism man as a sacrificial anim al” and that altruism
breeds dependency and undermines the self-esteem “holds that man has no right to exist for his own
of those who receive benefits and gifts from do- sake, that service to others is the only justification
gooder altruists. of his existence, and that self-sacrifice is his highest
Various authors have defended egoism. One moral duty, virtue and value.” Her argument goes
of the most influential is the novelist and essay on to present the altruistic idea of self-sacrifice as
ist Ayn Rand. Rand’s ideas have had a significant a kind of death wish: “altruism holds death as its
influence on the thinking of a variety of American ultimate goal and standard of value—and it is logical
politicians—including former Texas Congressman that renunciation, resignation, self-denial, and every
у Jii
other form of suffering, including self-destruction, claim that the moral point of view simply ought to
are the virtues it advocates.”2 point toward altruism. Baier explains that one of our
While Rand condemns altruism, most main “most widely held moral convictions” is that “in cer
stream moralists tend to hold that altruism is better tain circumstances it is morally wrong to promote
than egoism. We tend to praise self-sacrifice. And one’s own best interest or greatest good.”4 We tend
we tend to agree with the basic principle of altru to think that morality involves overcoming ego
ism that is outlined in the Golden Rule—that you ism and learning to develop an altruistic (or at least
should “do unto others as you would have them do impartial and non-self-interested) point of view.
unto you .” One might say that the moral point of A further issue has to do with the question of how
view is one that involves some basic level of altru social cooperation is supposed to occur. Defenders of
ism. While altruists need not go to the extremes altruism can argue that there is something natural
that Rand criticizes—in advocating suicidal self about developing and nurturing caring relation
sacrifice, for example—most people tend to think ships with others—perhaps grounded in an account
that pro-social and cooperative behavior are mor of natural family bonds or group belonging. It may
ally praiseworthy. Indeed, philosophers such as Kurt appear to be more difficult for egoists to explain how
Baier, James Sterba, and Alan Gewirth have argued self-interested egoists can avoid brutal and coun
in various ways that egoism is basically inconsis terproductive competition and develop a system of
tent. As Gewirth explains, the egoist’s moral claims cooperation. But cooperation can be explained as
do not apply to all other people in the same way paying off in terms of self-interest. From the per
that they apply to himself.3 Furthermore, one might spective of egoism, it is rational for self-interested
persons to cooperate, since cooperation tends to
produce good outcomes for those who cooperate.
One way of describing this is in terms of reciprocal
altruism, which holds that altruistic behavior makes
sense for self-interested persons when it is repaid in
kind. A more elaborate development of reciprocal
altruism is found in the social contract theory, which
holds that it is in each person’s self-interest to join
with others in a social contract that helps us each to
maximize our self-interest in community with oth
ers. We discuss the social contract theory in more
detail at the end of this chapter.
P SYC H O LO G IC A L EGOISM
What Is Psychological Egoism?
Psychological egoism is a descriptive theory about
our motivations and interests. In one interpreta
tion, it might be taken to say that people are basi
cally selfish. Here, psychological egoism holds that
people usually or always act for their own narrow
and short-range self-interest. But a different formu
lation of this theory asserts that although people do
act for their own self-interest, this self-interest is to
Ayn Rand (1905-1982) was a well-known proponent be understood more broadly and as being more con
of egoism. cerned with long-term outcomes. Thus, we might
distinguish between acting selfishly and acting in version of psychological egoism asserts that human
our own self-interest. beings act for the sake of their own best interests.
In the broader view, many things are in a per In this version, the idea is not that people sometimes
son’s interest: good health, satisfaction in a career or always act in their own interests, but that this
or work, prestige, self-respect, family, and friends. is the only thing that ultimately motivates people.
Moreover, if we really wanted to attain these things, If they sometimes act for others, it is only because
we would need to avoid shortsighted selfishness. they think that it is in their own best interests to
For example, we would have to be self-disciplined do so. A stronger version of psychological egoism
in diet and lifestyle to be healthy. We would need to asserts that people cannot do otherwise than act for
plan long-term for a career. And we would need to the sake of their own interests. But how would we
be concerned about others and not be overbearing if know this? We know how people act, but how could
we wanted to make and retain friends. we show that they cannot act otherwise?
However, a friendly egoist does not actually need
to be concerned about others but only to appear to For more chapter resources and
activities, go to MindTap.
be concerned. In this view, doing good to others
would be not for the sake of others but, rather, to
enable one to call on those friends when they are Is Psychological Egoism True?
needed. This would be helping a friend not for the In the early 1990s, a study was done in which
friend’s sake but for one’s own sake. people were asked whether they believed in or sup
Putting the matter in this way also raises another ported the jury system; that is, should people be
question about how to formulate this theory. Is psy judged guilty or not guilty by a group of peers? Most
chological egoism a theory according to which peo responded that they do support the jury system.
ple always act in their own best interests? Or does it However, when asked whether they would serve on
hold that people are always motivated by the desire a jury if called, significantly fewer said they would.6
to attain their own best interests? The first version Those who answered the two questions differently
would be easily refuted; we notice that people do not might have wanted justice for themselves but were
always do what is best for them. They eat too much, not willing to extend it to others. Some of our most
choose the wrong careers, waste time, and so forth. cherished social values may involve more selfish
This may be because they do not have sufficient motivation than we generally like to admit. Consider
knowledge to be good judges of what is in their best the following story about Abraham Lincoln.7 It is
interests. Or it may be because of a phenomenon reported that one day as he was riding in a coach
known as weakness of will. For example, I may over a bridge he heard a mother pig squealing. Her
want to lose weight or get an A in a course but may piglets were drowning after having fallen into the
fail to do what I have to do in order to achieve my creek and she could not get them out. Lincoln sup
goal. Philosophers have puzzled over this problem, posedly asked the coachman to stop, waded into the
which is also called the problem of akrasia (to use creek, and rescued the piglets. When his companion
the Greek term for the problem of weakness of will). cited this as an example of unselfishness, Lincoln
This is a complex issue in moral psychology; to treat responded that it was not for the sake of the pigs
it adequately would take us beyond what we can do that he acted as he did. Rather, it was because he
here.5 But the basic concern is why we fail to do the would have no peace later when he recalled the
things we know we ought to do. If we really know incident if he did not do something about it now. In
what we ought to do, it might seem that we would other words, although it seemed unselfish, his action
never fail to do what we ought. was quite self-centered. Advocates for psychological
On the other hand, it might be true that people egoism often draw on such accounts of underlying
always do what they think is best for them. Another selfish motivations to bolster their arguments.
But how are we to evaluate the claims of psycho obtain happiness while pursuing other worthwhile
logical egoism? As a theory about human motiva objects.
tion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove. How Thus, we have seen that the most reasonable
do we assess the motivations of people? We cannot or common form of psychological egoism, a theory
just assume that apparently altruistic individuals are about human motivation, is especially difficult to
acting for the sake of the selfish satisfaction they prove. It also can’t be disproved or falsified. Even
receive from what they do. Nor can we ask them, if it were shown that we often act for the sake of
for individuals are often poor judges of what actu our own interest or satisfaction, this is not enough
ally motivates them. We commonly hear or say to to prove that psychological egoism is true. Accord
ourselves, “I don’t know why I did that!” ing to this theory, we must show that people always
Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish different act to promote their own interests. Next, we need to
sources of our motivations. Are we innately egoistic consider whether this has any relevance to the nor
or altruistic—that is, are we born with a tendency mative question of how we ought to act.
toward egoism or altruism? Or do our cultural val
ues contribute to our egoistic (or altruistic) tenden ETH IC A L EGOISM
cies? For example, we might consider differences in What Is Ethical Egoism?
socialization between boys and girls. It might be that Ethical egoism is a normative theory. It is a theory
female children are expected to be altruistic and car about what we ought to do, how we ought to act.
ing, while male children are taught to be indepen As with psychological egoism, we can formulate
dent and self-motivated. And it might be that these ethical egoism in different ways. One version is
differences in socialization are also dependent upon individual ethical egoism. According to this version,
other cultural differences, with boys and girls from I ought to look out only for my own interests. I ought
different cultures growing up with divergent disposi to be concerned about others only to the extent that
tions toward altruism or egoism. this concern also contributes to my own interests.
Leaving aside the issue of socialization, suppose A slightly broader formulation of ethical egoism,
that people do, in fact, get satisfaction from helping sometimes called universal ethical egoism , main
others. This is not the same thing as acting for the tains that people ought to look out for and seek only
purpose of getting that satisfaction. What psycho their own best interests. As in the individual form, in
logical egoism needs to show is not that people get this second version, people ought to help others only
satisfaction from what they do, but that achieving when and to the extent that it is in their own best
such satisfaction is their aim. Now, we can find at interests to do so. It is possible to explain cooperation
least some examples in our own actions to test this from this perspective as a kind of reciprocal altruism:
theory. Do we read the book to get satisfaction or to we cooperate because we each see that it is in our
learn something? Do we pursue that career oppor own self-interest to cooperate. As the saying goes,
tunity because of the satisfaction that we think it I’ll scratch your back, if you scratch mine. From this
will bring or because of the nature of the opportu point of view, what I really want is to get my back
nity? Do we volunteer to help the sick or the needy scratched (something I cannot do for myself) and I
because we think it will give us personal satisfac realize that in order to get what I want, I have to give
tion or because we think it will actually help some you something you want in return.
one? In addition, directly aiming at satisfaction may
not be the best way to achieve it. Henry Sidgwick Is Ethical Egoism a Good Theory?
described this as the paradox of hedonism: “The We can evaluate ethical egoism in several ways.
impulse toward pleasure, if too predominant, defeats We will consider its grounding in psychological
its own aim.”8 We probably have a better chance of egoism and its consistency or coherence. We will
being happy if we do not aim at happiness itself, but also consider how it explains social cooperation in
the social contract theory as well as its derivation game in which I can say that the other player ought
from economic theory. Finally, we will consider its to block my move, even though, at the same time,
conformity to commonsense moral views. I hope that she or he does not do so.
Grounding in Psychological Egoism Let us con The Prisoner's Dilemma A serious problem plagu
sider first whether psychological egoism, if true, ing agreements that are made among egoists is the
would provide a good foundation for ethical egoism. temptation to cheat. If I agree to scratch your back
It might be that we should affirm ethical egoism after you scratch mine, what guarantee do you have
because people are basically and unavoidably ego that I will follow through on my promise once I’ve
istic. But recall the discussion of the naturalistic fal gotten my back scratched? If we are both convinced
lacy in Chapter 1: it is not clear that we can derive that human beings are basically egoistic, then you
the value of ethical egoism from thefa c t of psycho will suspect that I will cheat (and I’ll suspect that
logical egoism. If people were in fact always moti you will cheat), in which case it will be difficult to
vated by their own interests, then would this be a cooperate. For this reason, there is a worry that ego
good reason to hold that they ought to be so moti ism will lead to conflict and war. To prevent this
vated? It seems superfluous to tell people that they from happening, even egoists might agree that we
ought to do what they always do anyway or will need something external to ourselves to guaran
do, no matter what. One would think that at least tee that we do not renege on our promises. This is
sometimes one of the functions of moral language the basis for the development of the social contract,
is to try to motivate ourselves or others to do what which can be interpreted as an agreement made by
we are not inclined to do. For example, I might tell self-interested persons who want to establish a legal
myself that even though I could benefit by cheating system that ensures promises are kept and that pre
on a test, it is wrong, and so I should not do it. vents cheating by egoists.
Furthermore, the fact that we do behave in a The problem for egoism can be clarified with
certain way seems a poor reason for believing that reference to a thought experiment known as the
we ought to do so. If people always cheated, would prisoner’s dilemma. Imagine that the cops arrest
that make cheating right? Thus, although it may at two suspects, X and Y. The cops have the prisoners
first seem reasonable to rely on a belief about peo in two separate rooms. They offer each prisoner the
ple’s basic selfishness to prove that people ought to following deal: If you betray the other suspect, you
look out for themselves alone, this seems far from will go free instead of getting a twenty-year term in
convincing. prison; but if you both betray each other, you will
each end up with ten years in prison. On the other
Consistency or Coherence Universal ethical ego hand, if both prisoners keep their mouths shut and
ism may be inconsistent or incoherent. Ethical ego refuse to betray each other, there will be no convic
ism holds that everyone ought to seek his or her tion and they will both go free. The choices look like
own best interests. But could anyone consistently this:
support such a view? Wouldn’t this mean that we
would want our own best interests served and, at
the same time, be willing to allow that others serve Y betrays X Y does not
their interests—even to our own detriment? If food betray X
was scarce, then I would want enough for myself, X betrays Y Each ends up X goes free; Y gets
and yet, at the same time, I would have to say that with 10 years 20 years
I should not have it for myself when another needs
X does not Y goes free; X Each goes free
it to survive. This view seems to have an internal
betray Y gets 20 years
inconsistency. We might compare it to playing a
For the prisoners, the best option is if they coor result, the state of nature will be one of war, of all
dinate their choices and both refuse to betray each against all, and the results, as Hobbes describes
other. But if the prisoners suspect each other of them, are quite bleak,
being self-interested egoists, they will not trust each
In such condition there is no place for industry,
other. Each will suspect that the other prisoner will because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and
betray him or her in pursuit of a better deal. And so, consequently, not culture of the earth, no navigation,
it is likely that self-interested prisoners will end up nor the use of commodities that may be imported
with less-than-optimal outcomes. Each prisoner will by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of
suspect the other of operating out of self-interested moving and removing such things as require much
motives that will lead toward cheating and reneging force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no
on prior promises. The prisoner’s dilemma thought account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and
experiment is often used as a model to show why which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of
violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty,
we need some larger structure to ensure that we
brutish, and short.9
do not break our promises. It might be that moral
ity itself provides that larger structure: if we would The solution is peace via an agreement in which
just agree to comply with the dictates of morality, we one gives up as much liberty “as against other men,
would be able to guarantee cooperation. But if there as he would allow other men against himself.”10 For
are egoists who would break moral rules when they Hobbes, the social contract is an agreement to give
think that they can get away with it, we might need up certain things to better secure one’s own self
something stronger than morality—we might need interest. Thus, individuals will agree to certain rules,
an enforcement mechanism, that is, something like which would be in each individual’s best interest
a legal and political system that helps to guarantee to accept and obey. To secure the peace and ensure
cooperation. It is possible, then, that rational, self that these rules are obeyed, Hobbes believes that an
interested individuals would agree to something like absolute sovereign ruler is required.
a social contract. Hobbes’s social contract theory is based on a
desire of each person to secure his own advantage
The Social Contract while agreeing to social rules enforced by a sover
A justification of the legal system can be grounded in eign; it is a view of how society should function and
the rational self-interest of human beings. The idea thus both a political and a moral position. Other ver
of the social contract is that it is rational for self sions of the social contract idea were proposed by
interested individuals to join together and submit to philosophers such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques
the rule of law in order to ensure that promises are Rousseau. Contemporary moral and political theo
kept and that social cooperation will occur. One of ries that appeal to contract ideas can be found in the
the earliest versions of this idea is found in the writ works of Thomas Scanlon, David Gauthier, and John
ings of the seventeenth-century English philosopher Rawls.11 Gauthier’s idea is that we should imagine
Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes holds that individuals are basic moral rules that rational, self-interested parties
self-interested; that is, they seek to fulfill their inter would voluntarily agree to. Gauthier suggests that
ests and desires and above all seek self-preservation. rational, self-interested agents would recognize the
Hobbes maintains that in the state of nature, indi need for mutual restraint: it is in the interest of self
viduals would be equal in terms of strength, since interested agents to agree to restrain the unbridled
even weak individuals can band together with pursuit of self-interest. John Rawls imagines an ideal
others or use sneak attacks to overpower stronger form of the social contract. He asks what rational
individuals. Conflict arises when these equally pow self-interested people would agree to, in terms of
erful individuals seek the same thing. The compet justice, if they did not know if they were young or
ing individuals will thereby become enemies. As a old, rich or poor, male or female, healthy or disabled.
Rawls’s influential ideas are considered in more contributes to the general well-being is not ethical
detail in Chapter 14. egoism at all—since self-interest is merely used here
as a means to pursuing a broader collective value. As
Derivation from Economic Theory One argument we will come to see more clearly when we examine
for ethical egoism is taken from economic theory— it, this is a form of utilitarianism (see Chapter 5).
for example, that proposed by Adam Smith. He
and other proponents of laissez-faire capitalism Conformity to Commonsense Morality Finally, is
(a form of capitalism with minimal government ethical egoism supported by commonsense moral
regulation or intervention) argue that self-interest ity? Some elements of ethical egoism seem to be
provides the best economic motivation. The idea is contrary to commonsense morality. For example,
that when the profit motive or individual incentives egoism seems to assume that anything is all right
are absent, people will either not work or not work as long as it serves an individual’s best interests.
as well. If it is my land or my business, then I will Torturing human beings or animals would be per
be more likely to take care of it than if the profits go mitted so long as this served one’s interests. When
to others or to the government. In addition, Smith not useful to one’s interests, traditional virtues of
believes that in a system in which each person looks honesty, fidelity, and loyalty would have no value.
out for his or her own economic interests, the gen Ethical egoists could argue on empirical or factual
eral outcome will be best, as though an “invisible grounds that the torturing of others is never in one’s
hand” were guiding things.12 best interests because this would make one less sen
Although this is not the place to go into an sitive, and being sensitive is generally useful to an
extended discussion of economic theory, it is enough individual’s objectives. Similarly, they might argue
to point out that not everyone agrees on the merits that the development of traditional virtues is often
of laissez-faire capitalism. Much can be said for the in one’s own best interests because these traits are
competition that it supports, but it does raise ques valued by society. For example, possessing these
tions, for example, about the breakdown of “winners” traits may enable me to get what I want more read
and “losers” in such a competition. Is it acceptable if ily. Whether these are good enough reasons to value
the same individuals, families, or groups consistently these virtues or condemn torture is something you
win or lose, generation after generation? What if must judge for yourself.
there are many more economic “losers” and a few Part of the intuitive appeal of egoism may derive
extremely wealthy “winners”? And what about those from the sense that people ought to take better care
with innate or inherited disadvantages that prevent of themselves. By having a high regard for ourselves,
them from competing? Is care for these people a com we increase our self-esteem. We then depend less
munity responsibility? Recent community-oriented on others and more on ourselves. We might also be
theories of social morality stress just this notion of stronger and happier. These are surely desirable traits.
responsibility and oppose laissez-faire capitalism’s The altruist, moreover, might be too self-effacing.
excessive emphasis on individual rights.13 (Further He or she might be said to lack a proper regard for
discussion of capitalism can be found in Chapter 14.) himself or herself. There is also some truth in the
In any case, a more basic question can be asked view that unless one takes care of oneself, one is not
about the relevance of economics to morality. Even if of much use to others. This view implies not ethical
an economic system worked well or efficiently, would egoism, however, but again a form of utilitarianism.
this prove that morality ought to be modeled on it? Is
not the moral life broader than the economic life? Are TH E M ORAL PO INT OF VIEW
all human relations economic relations? Suppose that a person cares for no one but himself
Furthermore, the argument that everyone ought or herself. Would you consider that person to be a
to seek his or her own best interests because this moral person? This is not to ask whether the person
is a morally good person, but rather whether one operating in the moral domain? Questions can be
can think of that person as even operating in the raised about the extent to which impartiality influ
moral realm, so to speak. In other words, the ques ences the moral domain or is required in order to be
tion concerns not whether the person’s morality is moral. Some feminists, for example, would rather
a good one, but whether he or she has any morals define morality in terms of sympathy and caring.
at all. (See Chapter 9 for further treatment of this issue.)
Suppose we want to know whether a person has
been given a moral education.14 A woman might W HY BE M ORAL?
answer that she had because she had been taught Let us assume that morality does involve consider
not to lie, to treat others kindly, not to drink to ing other people’s points of view and treating people
excess, and to work hard. When asked what rea equally or impartially. Why should anyone do that,
sons she had been given for behaving thus, sup especially when it is not in one’s best interests to do
pose she responded that she was taught not to lie so? In other words, are there any reasons we can
because others would not trust her if she did. She give to show why one should be moral? One rea
was taught to treat others well because then they son is that doing what one ought to do is just what
would treat her well in return. She was taught to being moral means. But how can we explain why
work hard because of the satisfaction this brought we ought to do what we ought to do?
her or because she would then be better able to sup We could argue that it is generally better for peo
port herself. Would you consider her to have been ple to have and follow moral rules. Without such
given a moral education? rules, our social lives would be pretty wretched.
It might be that this woman was given counsels As Hobbes suggests, a life of egoism in the state of
of prudence, not morality. She was told what she nature would be one of constant conflict and war.
should do to succeed in life in order to secure her However, this does not answer the question con
own self-interest. But morality seems to imply more cerning why I should be moral when it is not in my
than prudence. We don’t lie because it is wrong to best interests to do so.
do so, or because others have a right to know the If you were trying to convince a man why he
truth. We treat others well because they deserve to should be moral, how would you do it? You might
be so treated, or because it would be wrong to do appeal to his fear of reprisal if he did not generally fol
otherwise. It seems that moral education cannot be low moral rules. If he is not honest, then he will not
merely egoistic. Do you agree? be trusted. If he steals, he risks being punished. In the
Taking the moral point of view appears to selection from Plato’s Republic that appears in this
involve being able to see beyond ourselves and our chapter, Glaucon tells the story of a shepherd named
own interests. It may also mean that we attempt Gyges. Gyges comes into possession of a ring that
to see things from another’s point of view; or that makes him invisible. He proceeds to use his invisibil
we attempt to be impartial. Morality seems to require ity to take what he wants from others. Glaucon then
that moral rules apply equally to all, or that we have asks whether we all would not do the same if we, like
to give reasons why some persons are treated differ Gyges, could get away with it. He believes we would.
ently than others. But is he right? Is avoiding punishment the only rea
But this view of morality as a set of neutral and son that people do the right thing?
impartial social rules raises a number of tricky ques There are other more positive but still self
tions. We usually do not think that we have to jus interested reasons you might offer someone to con
tify treating those close to us differently and more vince that person that he or she ought to be moral.
favorably than others. If we are nepotistic and care You might tell the individual that being virtuous is
more for our own children or our own friends than to one’s own advantage. You might recall some of
we do for strangers, does this mean that we are not the advice from Benjamin Franklin’s Poor Richard’s
A lm anac.15 “A stitch in time saves nine.” “Observe offers a thought experiment involving invisibility
all men, thyself most.” “ Spare and have is better and a magic ring to help us think about what we
than spend and crave.” Many of the moral apho would really do if no one was looking. In the second
risms put forward by motivational speakers and reading, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes
self-help gurus—from Dr. Phil and Oprah Winfrey provides an answer to the question of what people
to Deepak Chopra—are focused on maximizing self would do if they were not regulated by social rules.
interest. These are the self-interested counsels of a He argues not only that all human beings tend to
practical morality. It turns out that most of the tradi pursue their own safety and interests—but also why
tional virtues are usually in our own best interests. it is rational for self-interested individuals to cre
It is in our interest to be temperate, courageous, ate a social contract that furthers the goal of self
thrifty, kind, honest, and so on—because these protection. Finally, drawing on the resources of
virtues help us live a stable life in a world that we modern biological science, Steven Pinker offers an
share with others. Indeed, it does appear to be in our account of how selfishness and pro-social behavior
interests to be altruistic, since concern for others is are related to the social contract.
often reciprocated.
You might go even further in thinking about rea NOTES
sons to be moral. You might make the point that being
moral is ennobling. Even when it involves sacrifice 1. Stephen Prothero, “You Can’t Reconcile Ayn Rand
for a cause, being a moral person gives one a certain and Jesus,” USA Today, June 5, 2011, accessed
dignity, integrity, and self-respect. Only humans are March 13, 2013, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
capable of being moral, you might say, and human news/opinion/forum/2011-06-05-Ayn-Rand-and-
beings cannot flourish without being moral. You can Jesus-dont-mix_n.htm
2. Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” available at the
give more thought to this question when you read
Ayn Rand Institute website: http://www.aynrand.
about Kant’s moral theory in Chapter 6. For Kant,
org/site/PageServer?pagename=ari_ayn_rand_
human dignity and worth is wholly bound up with
the_objectivist_ethics
being able to act for moral reasons.
3. Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago:
Nevertheless, one can point to many examples in
University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 85.
which people who successfully break the moral rules
4. Kurt Baier, The Rational and the Moral Order
seem to fare better than those who follow them.
(Open Court, 1995), p. 159. Also see James P.
“ Nice guys [and gals?] finish la st,” as baseball
Sterba, “Morality and Self-Interest,” Philosophy
great Leo Durocher put it. If being moral seems too
and Phenomenological Research 59, no. 2
demanding, then some say this is too bad for moral (June 1999).
ity. We ought to have a good life, even if it means 5. For a discussion of “weakness of will,” see
sacrificing something of morality. In another view, Gwynneth Matthews, “Moral Weakness,” Mind
if being moral involves sacrificing something of the 299 (July 1966), pp. 405-19; Donald Davidson,
personally fulfilling life and perhaps even “finishing “How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?” in Moral
last” sometimes, then this is what must be done. No Concepts, ed. Joel Feinberg (New York: Oxford
one ever said being moral was going to be easy!16 University Press, 1970), pp. 93-113.
The discussion of egoism, altruism, and the social 6. Amitai Etzioni, a presentation at the University of
contract is an old one that extends throughout the San Francisco, December 1, 1992.
history of philosophy. The reading selections for this 7. From the Springfield Monitor (ca. 1928), cited in
chapter span that history. In the first reading, Plato’s Louis Pojman, Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth,
characters in The R epublic explore the contention 1990), p. 41.
that we always act in our own interests—one of the 8. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods o f Ethics (London:
reasons given in support of an egoist theory. Plato MacMillan and Co., 1884), p. 47.
9. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in The English Works 14. See W. D. Falk, “Morality, Self, and Others,” in
o f Thomas Hobbes, ed. Sir William Molesworth Morality and the Language o f Conduct, ed.
(London: John Bohn, 1839), pp. 2:38-41, 85. Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian
10. Ibid., Chapter 14. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963),
11. Tom Scanlon, What We Owe Each Other pp. 25-67.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); 15. Benjamin Franklin, “Poor Richard's Almanac,” in
David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: American Philosophy: A Historical Anthology, ed.
Oxford University Press, 1987); John Rawls, A Barbara MacKinnon (New York: State University of
Theory o f Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard New York Press, 1985), pp. 46-47.
University Press, 1971). 16. See Thomas Nagel's discussion of these different
12. See Adam Smith, The Wealth o f Nations possibilities of the relation between the good life
(New York: Edwin Cannan, 1904). and the moral life in “Living Right and Living
13. See the communitarian views in Robert Bellah, Habits Well,” in The Viewfrom Nowhere (New York:
o f the Heart (Berkeley: University of California Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 189-207.
Press, 1985); and Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit o f Com Also see David Gauthier, “Morality and
munity: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communi Advantage,” The Philosophical Review (1967),
tarian Agenda (New York: Crown, 1993). pp. 460-75.
R EA D IN G
The Ring of Gyges
PL ATO
MindTap For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. W hat view of morality is described using the story of the ring of Gyges?
2. How does this story describe the difference between appearing just and being just?
3. According to the story, what do parents (and religions, myths, and poetry) teach their children and us about
morality?
G
laucon (to Socrates). They say that to do injus and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is
tice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation;
but that the evil is greater than the good. And so and justice, being at a middle point between the two,
when men have both done and suffered injustice is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and
and have had experience of both, not being able to honoured by reason of the inability of men to do
avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a
they had better agree among themselves to have man would ever submit to such an agreement if he
neither; hence there arise laws and mutual cov were able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such
enants; and that which is ordained by law is termed
by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the
From Plato, The Republic, bk. 2, in The Dialogues of Plato, 3rd
origin and nature of justice;—it is a mean or compro ed., trans. B. Jow ett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892),
mise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice pp. 357a-369.
is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no
origin of justice. man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature
Now that those who practise justice do so invol that he would stand fast in justice. No man would
untarily and because they have not the power to keep his hands off what was not his own when he
be unjust will best appear if we imagine something could safely take what he liked out of the market, or
of this kind: having given both to the just and the go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure,
unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and or kill or release from prison whom he would, and
see whither desire will lead them; then we shall in all respects be like a God among men. Then the
discover in the very act the just and unjust man to actions of the just would be as the actions of the
be proceeding along the same road, following their unjust; they would both come at last to the same
interest, which all natures deem to be their good, point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great
and are only diverted into the path of justice by proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he
the force of law. The liberty which we are suppos thinks that justice is any good to him individually,
ing may be most completely given to them in the but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that
form of such a power as is said to have been pos he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all
sessed by Gyges the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more
According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in profitable to the individual than justice, and he who
the service of the king of Lydia; there was a great argues as I have been supposing, will say that they
storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining
earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. this power of becoming invisible, and never doing
Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, any wrong or touching what was another’s, he
where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most
brazen horse, having doors, at which he stoop wretched idiot, although they would praise him to
ing and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as one another’s faces, and keep up appearances with
appeared to him, more than human, and having one another from a fear that they too might suffer
nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the injustice. Enough of this.
finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shep Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the
herds met together, according to custom, that they life of the just and unjust, we must isolate them;
might send their monthly report about the flocks to there is no other way; and how is the isolation to
the king; into their assembly he came having the be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely
ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them unjust, and the just man entirely just; nothing is to
he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his be taken away from either of them, and both are to
hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective
of the company and they began to speak of him as lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished
if he were no longer present. He was astonished at masters of craft; like the skilful pilot or physician,
this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps
outwards and reappeared; he made several trials of within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point,
the ring, and always with the same result—when he is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his
turned the collet inwards he became invisible, when unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he
outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to means to be great in his injustice (he who is found
be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to out is nobody): for the highest reach of injustice is,
the court; where as soon as he arrived he seduced to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say
the queen, and with her help conspired against the that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the
king and slew him, and took the kingdom. Suppose most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction,
now that there were two such magic rings, and the but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust
acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for "His mind has a soil deep and fertile,
justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able Out of which spring his prudent counsels."
to recover himself; he must be one who can speak In the first place, he is thought just, and there
with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and fore bears rule in the city; he can marry whom he
who can force his way where force is required by his will, and give in marriage to whom he will; also he
courage and strength, and command of money and can trade and deal where he likes, and always to
friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his own advantage, because he has no misgivings
his nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus about injustice; and at every contest, whether in
says, to be and not to seem good. There must be no public or private, he gets the better of his antago
seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be hon nists, and gains at their expense, and is rich, and
oured and rewarded, and then we shall not know out of his gains he can benefit his friends, and harm
whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the his enemies; moreover, he can offer sacrifices, and
sake of honours and rewards; therefore, let him be dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and magnifi
clothed in justice only, and have no other cover cently, and can honour the gods or any man whom
ing; and he must be imagined in a state of life the he wants to honour in a far better style than the
opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, just, and therefore he is likely to be dearer than they
and let him be thought the worst; then he will have are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and men
been put to the proof; and we shall see whether he are said to unite in making the life of the unjust bet
will be affected by the fear of infamy and its conse ter than the life of the just.
quences. And let him continue thus to the hour of A deim antus. Socrates, you do not suppose that
death; being just and seeming to be unjust. When there is nothing more to be urged?
both have reached the uttermost extreme, the one Socrates. Why, what else is there?
of justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be A deim antus. The strongest point of all has not
given which of them is the happier of the two. been even mentioned.
Socra tes. Heavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, Socrates. Well, then, according to the proverb,
how energetically you polish them up for the deci “Let brother help brother”—if he fails in any part do
sion, first one and then the other, as if they were you assist him; although I must confess that Glaucon
two statues. has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust,
Glaucon. I do my best. And now that we know and take from me the power of helping justice.
what they are like there is no difficulty in tracing A deim antus. Nonsense. But let me add some
out the sort of life which awaits either of them. This thing more: There is another side to Glaucon’s argu
I will proceed to describe; but as you may think ment about the praise and censure of justice and
the description a little too coarse, I ask you to sup injustice, which is equally required in order to bring
pose, Socrates, that the words which follow are not out what I believe to be his meaning. Parents and
mine.—Let me put them into the mouths of the tutors are always telling their sons and their wards
eulogists of injustice: They will tell you that the just that they are to be just; but why? not for the sake
man who is thought unjust will be scourged, racked, of justice, but for the sake of character and reputa
bound—will have his eyes burnt out; and, at last, tion; in the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed
after suffering every kind of evil, he will be impaled: just some of those offices, marriages, and the like
Then he will understand that he ought to seem only, which Glaucon has enumerated among the advan
and not to be, just; the words of Aeschylus may be tages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of
more truly spoken of the unjust than of the just. For justice. More, however, is made of appearances by
the unjust is pursuing a reality; he does not live with this class of persons than by the others; for they
a view to appearances—he wants to be really unjust throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell
and not to seem only— you of a shower of benefits which the heavens, as
they say, rain upon the pious; and this accords with in public and private when they are rich or in any
the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the other way influential, while they despise and over
first of whom says, that the gods make the oaks of look those who may be weak and poor, even though
the just— acknowledging them to be better than the others.
"To bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the
But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speak
middle; And the sheep are bowed down with the ing about virtue and the gods: they say that the gods
weight of their fleeces,"1 apportion calamity and misery to many good men,
and good and happiness to the wicked. And mendi
and many other blessings of a like kind are pro
cant prophets go to rich men’s doors and persuade
vided for them. And Homer has a very similar strain;
them that they have a power committed to them
for he speaks of one whose fame is—
by the gods of making an atonement for a man’s
"As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god, own or his ancestor’s sins by sacrifices or charms,
Maintains justice; to whom the black earth brings with rejoicings and feasts; and they promise to harm
forth W heat and barley, whose trees are bowed with an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a small cost;
fruit, And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as
gives him fish"2
they say, to execute their will. And the poets are the
Still grander are the gifts of heaven which authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing
Musaeus and his son3 vouchsafe to the just; they the path of vice with the words of Hesiod—
take them down into the world below, where they "Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the
have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlast way is smooth and her dwelling-place is near. But
ingly drunk, crowned with garlands; their idea seems before virtue the gods have set toil,"4
to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the
and a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as
highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards
a witness that the gods may be influenced by men;
yet further; the posterity, as they say, of the faithful
for he also says—
and just shall survive to the third and fourth genera
tion. This is the style in which they praise justice. "The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose;
But about the wicked there is another strain; they and men pray to them and avert their wrath by
sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and by libations
bury them in a slough in Hades, and make them
and the odour of fat, when they have sinned and
carry water in a sieve; also while they are yet living
transgressed"5
they bring them to infamy, and inflict upon them the
punishments which Glaucon described as the portion And they produce a host of books written by
of the just who are reputed to be unjust; nothing else Musaeus and Orpheus, who were children of the
does their invention supply. Such is their manner of Moon and the Muses—that is what they say—
praising the one and censuring the other. according to which they perform their ritual, and
Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider persuade not only individuals, but whole cities, that
another way of speaking about justice and injustice, expiations and atonements for sin may be made by
which is not confined to the poets, but is found in sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour,
prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is and are equally at the service of the living and the
always declaring that justice and virtue are honour dead; the latter sort they call mysteries, and they
able, but grievous and toilsome; and that the plea redeem us from the pains of hell, but if we neglect
sures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment, them no one knows what awaits us.
and are only censured by law and opinion. They And now when the young hear all this said about
say also that honesty is for the most part less profit virtue and vice, and the way in which gods and
able than dishonesty; and they are quite ready to men regard them, how are their minds likely to be
call wicked men happy, and to honour them both affected, my dear Socrates,—those of them, I mean,
who are quickwitted, and, like bees on the wing, we are just, although we may escape the vengeance
light on every flower, and from all that they hear of heaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice; but,
are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our
of persons they should be and in what way they sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the
should walk if they would make the best of life? gods will be propitiated, and we shall not be pun
Probably the youth will say to himself in the words ished. “But there is a world below in which either
of Pindar— we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds.”
Yes, my friend, will be the reflection, but there are
"Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend
mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great
a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my
power. That is what mighty cities declare; and the
days?"
children of the gods, who were their poets and
For what men say is that, if I am really just and prophets, bear a like testimony.
am not also thought just, profit there is none, but On what principle, then, shall we any longer
the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistake- choose justice rather than the worst injustice? when,
able. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard
of justice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since to appearance, we shall fare to our mind both with
then, as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes gods and men, in life and after death, as the most
over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance numerous and the highest authorities tell us. Know
I must devote myself. I will describe around me a ing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any
picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be
exterior of my house; behind I will trail the subtle willing to honour justice; or indeed to refrain from
and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, laughing when he hears justice praised? And even
recommends. But I hear some one exclaiming that if there should be some one who is able to disprove
the concealment of wickedness is often difficult; to the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that
which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, justice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust,
the argument indicates this, if we would be happy, but is very ready to forgive them, because he also
to be the path along which we should proceed. With knows that men are not just of their own free will;
a view to concealment we will establish secret broth unless, peradventure, there be some one whom the
erhoods and political clubs. And there are professors divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred
of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts of injustice, or who has attained knowledge of the
and assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and truth—but no other man. He only blames injustice
partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not who, owing to cowardice or age or some weak
be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods ness, has not the power of being unjust. And this is
cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. proved by the fact that when he obtains the power,
But what if there are no gods? or, suppose them to he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.
have no care of human things—why in either case The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated
should we mind about concealment? And even if by us at the beginning of the argument, when my
there are gods, and they do care about us, yet we brother and I told you how astonished we were to
know of them only from tradition and the geneal find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice—
ogies of the poets; and these are the very persons beginning with the ancient heroes of whom any
who say that they may be influenced and turned by memorial has been preserved to us, and ending with
“sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings.” the men of our own time—no one has ever blamed
Let us be consistent then, and believe both or nei injustice or praised justice except with a view to the
ther. If the poets speak truly, why then we had bet glories, honours, and benefits which flow from them.
ter be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice; for if No one has ever adequately described either in verse
or prose the true essential nature of either of them this question, unless I hear the contrary from your
abiding in the soul, and invisible to any human or own lips, I expect something better. And therefore,
divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a man’s I say, not only prove to us that justice is better than
soul which he has within him, justice is the greatest injustice, but show what they either of them do to
good, and injustice the greatest evil. Had this been the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a
the universal strain, had you sought to persuade good and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen
us of this from our youth upwards, we should not by gods and men.
have been on the watch to keep one another from Socrates. Sons of an illustrious father, that was
doing wrong, but every one would have been his not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses which
own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of the admirer of Glaucon made in honour of you after
harbouring in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say you had distinguished yourselves at the battle of
that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold Megara—
the language which I have been merely repeating, “ ‘Sons of Ariston,’ he sang, ‘divine offspring of
and words even stronger than these about justice an illustrious hero.’”
and injustice, grossly, as I conceive, perverting their The epithet is very appropriate, for there is some
true nature. But I speak in this vehement manner, thing truly divine in being able to argue as you have
as I must frankly confess to you, because I want to done for the superiority of injustice, and remain
hear from you the opposite side; and I would ask ing unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do
you to show not only the superiority which justice believe that you are not convinced—this I infer from
has over injustice, but what effect they have on the your general character, for had I judged only from
possessor of them which makes the one to be a good your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But
and the other an evil to him. And please, as Glaucon now, the greater my confidence in you, the greater
requested of you, to exclude reputations; for unless is my difficulty in knowing what to say. For I am in
you take away from each of them his true reputa a strait between two; on the one hand I feel that I
tion and add on the false, we shall say that you am unequal to the task; and my inability is brought
do not praise justice, but the appearance of it; we home to me by the fact that you were not satisfied
shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep with the answer which I made to Thrasymachus,
injustice dark, and that you really agree with Thra proving, as I thought, the superiority which justice
symachus in thinking that justice is another’s good has over injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help,
and the interest of the stronger, and that injustice while breath and speech remain to me; I am afraid
is a man’s own profit and interest, though injurious that there would be an impiety in being present
to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that jus when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting up a
tice is one of that highest class of goods which are hand in her defence. And therefore I had best give
desired indeed for their results, but in a far greater such help as I can.
degree for their own sakes—like sight or hearing or Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means
knowledge or health, or any other real and natural not to let the question drop, but to proceed in the
and not merely conventional good—I would ask you investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth,
in your praise of justice to regard one point only: I first, about the nature of justice and injustice,
mean the essential good and evil which justice and and secondly, about their relative advantages. I told
injustice work in the possessors of them. Let oth them, what I really thought, that the enquiry would
ers praise justice and censure injustice, magnifying be of a serious nature, and would require very good
the rewards and honours of the one and abusing the eyes. Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits,
other; that is a manner of arguing which, coming I think that we had better adopt a method which I
from them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you who may illustrate thus; suppose that a short-sighted
have spent your whole life in the consideration of person had been asked by some one to read small
letters from a distance; and it occurred to some one Socrates. Then in the larger the quantity of jus
else that they might be found in another place which tice is likely to be larger and more easily discern
was larger and in which the letters were larger—if ible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the
they were the same and he could read the larger let nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in
ters first, and then proceed to the lesser—this would the State, and secondly in the individual, proceed
have been thought a rare piece of good fortune. ing from the greater to the lesser and comparing
A deim antus. Very true. But how does the illus them.
tration apply to our enquiry? Adeim antus. That is an excellent proposal.
Socrates. I will tell you. Justice, which is the sub
ject of our enquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spo NOTES
ken of as the virtue of an individual, and sometimes
as the virtue of a state. 1. Hesiod, Works and Days, p. 230.
Adeim antus. True. 2. Homer, Od, xix, p. 109.
S o cra tes. And is not a State larger than an 3. Eumolpus.
individual? 4. Hesiod, Works and Days, p. 287.
Adeim antus. It is. 5. Homer, Iliad, ix, p. 493.
RE ADI NG
Self Love**
THOMAS HOBBES
Study Questions
1. In what ways are men equal and unequal? Which is more significant?
2. W hat does Hobbes mean when he says that nature has given everyone a right to all?
W hat is the result of this?
3. Beyond society and its rules, is there any right or wrong, or just or unjust, according to Hobbes?
T
here be in animals, two sorts of m otions pecu fancy is but the relics of the same motion, remain
liar to them: one called vital; begun in genera ing after sense____And because going, speaking,
tion, and continued without interruption through and the like voluntary m otions, depend always
their whole life; such as are the course of the blood, upon a precedent thought of whither, which w ay,
the pulse, the breathing, the concoction, nutrition, and w hat; it is evident, that the imagination is the
excretion, etc. to which motions there needs no help first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. And
of imagination: the other is anim al m otion, other although unstudied men do not conceive any motion
wise called voluntary motion; as to g o, to speak, to
m ove any of our limbs, in such manner as is first From Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in The English Works of Thomas
fancied in our minds. That sense is motion in the Hobbes, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London: John Bohn, 1839),
organs and interior parts of man’s body, caused by pp. 2:38-41, 85.
the action of the things we see, hear, etc.; and that *Title supplied by the editor.
at all to be there, where the thing moved is invis desire, than to taste and try. But aversion we have
ible; or the space it is moved in is, for the shortness for things, not only which we know have hurt us,
of it, insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that but also that we do not know whether they will hurt
such motions are. For let a space be never so little, us, or not.
that which is moved over a greater space, whereof Those things which we neither desire, nor hate,
that little one is part, must first be moved over that. we are said to contemn; CONTEMPT being nothing
These small beginnings of motion, within the body else but an immobility, or contumacy of the heart, in
of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding
striking, and other visible actions, are commonly from that the heart is already moved otherwise, by
called ENDEAVOR. other more potent objects; or from want of experi
This endeavor, when it is toward something ence of them.
which causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE; And because the constitution of a man’s body is
the latter, being the general name; and the other in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the
oftentimes restrained to signify the desire of food, same things should always cause in him the same
namely hunger and thirst. And when the endeavor appetites, and aversions: much less can all men con
is fromward som ething, it is generally called sent, in the desire of almost any one and the same
AVERSION. These words, appetite and aversion, we object.
have from the Latins; and they both of them sig But whatsoever is the object of any man’s appe
nify the motions, one of approaching, the other of tite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth
retiring____For nature itself does often press upon good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil;
men those truths, which afterwards, when they look and of his contem pt, vile and inconsiderable. For
for somewhat beyond nature, they stumble at. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever
the schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no used with relation to the person that useth them:
actual motion at all: but because some motion they there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor
must acknowledge, they call it metaphorical motion; any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from
which is but an absurd speech: for though words the nature of the objects themselves___
may be called metaphorical; bodies and motions Felicity of this life consisteth not in the repose of
cannot. a mind satisfied. For there is no such fin is ultim us,
That which men desire, they are also said to utmost aim, nor summum bonum, greatest good, as
LOVE: and to HATE those things for which they is spoken of in the books of the old moral philoso
have aversion. So that desire and love are the same phers. Nor can a man any more live, whose desires
thing; save that by desire, we always signify the are at an end, than he, whose senses and imagina
absence of the object; by love, most commonly tions are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress
the presence of the same. So also by aversion, we of the desire, from one object to another; the attain
signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the ing of the former, being still but the way to the lat
object. ter. The cause whereof is, that the object of man’s
Of appetites and aversions, some are born with desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant
men; as appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future
exoneration, which may also and more properly be desire___
called aversions, from somewhat they feel in their So that in the first place, I put for a general incli
bodies; and some other appetites, not many. The nation of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire
rest, which are appetites of particular things, pro of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.
ceed from experience, and trial of their effects upon And the cause of this, i s . . . that a m a n . . . cannot
themselves or other men. For of things we know not assure the power and means to live well, which he
at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further hath present, without the acquisition of more___
Nature hath made men so equal, in the facul invader hath no more to fear, than another man’s
ties of the body, and mind; as that though there be single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a
found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in convenient seat, others may probably be expected to
body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and
is reckoned together, the difference between man, deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labor, but
and man, is not so considerable, as that one man also of his life, or liberty. And the invader again is in
can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which the like danger of another.
another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the And from this diffidence of one another, there is
strength of body, the weakest has strength enough no way for any man to secure himself, so reason
to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, able, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to
or by confederacy with others, that are in the same master the persons of all men he can, so long, till
danger with himself. he see no other power great enough to endanger
And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside him: and this is no more than his own conserva
the arts grounded upon words, and especially that tion requireth, and generally allowed. Also because
skill of proceeding upon general, and infallible rules, there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating
called science; which very few have, and but in their own power in the acts of conquest, which they
few things; as being not native faculty, born with pursue farther than their security requires; if others,
us; nor attained, as prudence, while we look after that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within
somewhat else, I find yet a greater equality amongst modest bounds, should not by invasion increase
men, than that of strength. For prudence, is but their power, they would not be able, long time, by
experience; which equal time, equally bestows on all standing only on their defense, to subsist. And by
men, in those things they equally apply themselves consequence, such augmentation of dominion over
unto. That which may perhaps make such equality men being necessary to a man’s conservation, it
incredible, is but a vain conceit of one’s own wis ought to be allowed him.
dom, which almost all men think they have in a Again, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary
greater degree, than the vulgar; that is, than all men a great deal of grief, in keeping company, where
but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, there is no power able to overawe them all. For
or for concurring with themselves, they approve. every man looketh that his companion should value
For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they him, at the same rate he sets upon himself: and
may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, natu
more eloquent, or more learned; yet they will hardly rally endeavors, as far as he dares, (which amongst
believe there be many so wise as themselves; for them that have no common power to keep them
they see their own wit at hand, and other men’s at a in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each
distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that other), to extort a greater value from his contem
point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily ners, by damage; and from others, by the example.
a greater sign of the equal distribution of any thing, So that in the nature of man, we find three prin
than that every man is contented with his share. cipal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly,
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of diffidence; thirdly, glory.
hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if The first, maketh men invade for gain; the sec
any two men desire the same thing, which neverthe ond, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The
less they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; first use violence, to make themselves masters of
and in the way to their end, which is principally their other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle;
own conservation, and sometimes their delectation the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as
only, endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another. a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other
And from hence it comes to pass, that where an sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons,
or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of vio
nation, their profession, or their name. lent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty,
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men brutish, and short___
live without a common power to keep them all in It may peradventure be thought, there was never
awe, they are in that condition which is called war; such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I
and such a war, as is of every man, against every believe it was never generally so, over all the world:
man. For WAR, consisteth not in battle only, or the but there are many places, where they live so now.
act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the For the savage people in many places of America,
will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and except the government of small families, the concord
therefore the notion of time, is to be considered in the whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no gov
nature of war; as it is in the nature of weather. For ernment at all; and live at this day in that brutish
as the nature of foul weather, lieth not in a shower manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be per
or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many ceived what manner of life there would be, where
days together: so the nature of war, consisteth not in there were no common power to fear, by the manner
actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, of life, which men that have formerly lived under
during all the time there is no assurance to the con a peaceful government, use to degenerate into, in a
trary. All other time is PEACE. civil war.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of But though there had never been any time,
war, where every man is enemy to every man; the wherein particular men were in a condition of war
same is consequent to the time, wherein men live one against another; yet in all times, kings, and per
without security, than what their own strength, sons of sovereign authority, because of their inde
and their own invention shall furnish them withal. pendency, are in continual jealousies, and in the
In such condition, there is no place for industry; state and posture of gladiators; having their weap
because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and conse ons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another;
quently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the
use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies
no commodious building; no instruments of moving, upon their neighbors; which is a posture of war. But
and removing, such things as require much force; because they uphold thereby, the industry of their
no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery,
of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which which accompanies the liberty of particular men___
RE ADI NG
The Social Contract and Altruism
STEVEN PINKER
Study Questions
1. How are "nepotistic altruism" and "reciprocal altruism" explained in evolutionary terms?
2. W hat is the problem with people caring more for their close relations or with parents preferring to save their own
children instead of the children of others?
3. How does the modern theory of evolution fall "smack into the social contract tradition?"
I
t’s no mystery why organisms sometimes harm generous act. Such genes will, on average, come to
one another. Evolution has no conscience, and if predominate, as long as the cost to the helper is less
one creature hurts another to benefit itself, such as than the benefit to the recipient discounted by their
by eating, parasitizing, intimidating, or cuckolding it, degree of relatedness. Family love—the cherishing
its descendants will come to predominate, complete of children, siblings, parents, grandparents, uncles
with those nasty habits. All this is familiar from the and aunts, nieces and nephews, and cousins—can
vernacular sense of “Darwinian” as a synonym for evolve. This is called nepotistic altruism.
“ruthless” and from Tennyson’s depiction of nature Altruism can also evolve when organisms trade
as red in tooth and claw. If that were all there was favors. One helps another by grooming, feeding, pro
to the evolution of the human condition, we would tecting, or backing him, and is helped in turn when
have to agree with the rock song: Life sucks, then the needs reverse. This is called reciprocal altruism,
you die. But of course life doesn’t always suck. and it can evolve when the parties recognize each
Many creatures cooperate, nurture, and make peace, other, interact repeatedly, can confer a large benefit
and humans in particular find comfort and joy in on others at small cost to themselves, keep a mem
their families, friends, and communities. This, too, ory for favors offered or denied, and are impelled
should be familiar to readers of The Selfish Gene and to reciprocate accordingly. Reciprocal altruism can
the other books on the evolution of altruism that evolve because cooperators do better than hermits or
have appeared in the years since. misanthropes. They enjoy the gains of trading their
There are several reasons why organisms may surpluses, pulling ticks out of one another’s hair,
evolve a willingness to do good deeds. They may saving each other from drowning or starvation, and
help other creatures while pursuing their own inter baby-sitting each other’s children. Reciprocators can
ests, say, when they form a herd that confuses also do better over the long run than the cheaters
predators or live off each other’s by-products. This is who take favors without returning them, because
called mutualism, symbiosis, or cooperation. Among the reciprocators will come to recognize the cheaters
humans, friends who have common tastes, hobbies, and shun or punish them. The demands of recipro
or enemies are a kind of symbiont pair. The two par cal altruism can explain why the social and moral
ents of a brood of children are an even better exam istic emotions evolved. Sympathy and trust prompt
ple. Their genes are tied up in the same package, their people to extend the first favor. Gratitude and loy
children, so what is good for one is good for the other, alty prompt them to repay favors. Guilt and shame
and each has an interest in keeping the other alive deter them from hurting or failing to repay others.
and healthy. These shared interests set the stage for Anger and contempt prompt them to avoid or punish
compassionate love and marital love to evolve. cheaters. And among humans, any tendency of an
And in some cases organisms may benefit other individual to reciprocate or cheat does not have to
organisms at a cost to themselves, which biologists be witnessed firsthand but can be recounted by lan
call altruism. Altruism in this technical sense can guage. This leads to an interest in the reputation of
evolve in two main ways. First, since relatives share others, transmitted by gossip and public approval or
genes, any gene that inclines an organism toward condemnation, and a concern with one’s own repu
helping a relative will increase the chance of sur tation. Partnerships, friendships, alliances, and com
vival of a copy of itself that sits inside that relative, munities can emerge, cemented by these emotions
even if the helper sacrifices its own fitness in the and concerns.
Many people start to get nervous at this point,
"The Blank Slate [Discover Magazine 10/2002]'" adapted from The but the discomfort is not from the tragedies that
Blank Slate: The Modern Denial O f Human Nature by Steven Pinker, [Robert] Trivers explained. It comes instead from
copyright © 2002 by Steven Pinker. Used by permission of Viking
Books, an imprint of Penguin Publishing Group, a division of two m isconceptions, each of which we have
Penguin Random House LLC. encountered before. First, all this talk about genes
that influence behavior does not mean that we are “Antz”, an ant with the voice of Woody Allen com
cuckoo clocks or player pianos, mindlessly execut plains to his psychoanalyst:
ing the dictates of DNA. The genes in question are
It's this whole gung-ho superorganism thing that I
those that endow us with the neural systems for
just can't get. I try, but I just don't get it. W hat is it, I'm
conscience, deliberation, and will, and when we talk
supposed to do everything for the colony and... what
about the selection of such genes, we are talking about my needs?
about the various ways those faculties could have
evolved. The error comes from the Blank Slate and The humor comes from the clash between ant
the Ghost in the Machine: if one starts off think psychology, which originates in a genetic system
ing that our higher mental faculties are stamped in that makes workers more closely related to one
by society or inhere in a soul, then when biologists another than they would be to their offspring, and
mention genetic influence the first alternatives that human psychology, in which our genetic distinct
come to mind are puppet strings or trolley tracks. ness leads us to ask, “What about my needs?”
But if higher faculties, including learning, reason, Trivers, following on the work of William Hamilton
and choice, are products of a nonrandom organiza and George Williams, did some algebra that predicts
tion of the brain, there have to be genes that help the extent to which people should ask themselves
do the organizing, and that raises the question of that question.
how those genes would have been selected in the The rest of this chapter is about that deceptively
course of human evolution. The second misconcep simple algebra and how its implications overturn
tion is to imagine that talk about costs and benefits many conceptions of human nature. It discredits the
implies that people are Machiavellian cynics, coldly Blank Slate, which predicts that people’s regard for
calculating the genetic advantages of befriending their fellows is determined by their “role,” as if it
and marrying. To fret over this picture, or denounce were a part assigned arbitrarily to an actor. But it
it because it is ugly, is to confuse proximate and ulti also discredits some naive views of evolution that
mate causation. People don’t care about their genes; are common among people who don’t believe in the
they care about happiness, love, power, respect, Blank Slate. Most people have intuitions about the
and other passions. The cost-benefit calculations natural state of affairs. They may believe that if we
are a metaphorical way of describing the selection acted as nature “wants” us to, families would func
of alternative genes over millennia, not a literal tion as harmonious units, or individuals would act
description of what takes place in a human brain in for the good of the species, or people would show
real time. Nothing prevents the amoral process of the true selves beneath their social masks, or, as
natural selection from evolving a brain with genu Newt Gingrich said in 1995, the male of our species
ine big-hearted emotions. It is said that those who would hunt giraffes and wallow in ditches like little
appreciate legislation and sausages should not see piglets.
them being made. The same is true for human emo Understanding the patterns of genetic over
tions. So if love and conscience can evolve, where’s lap that bind and divide us can replace simplistic
the tragedy? Trivers noticed that the confluence of views of all kinds with a more subtle understand
genetic interests that gave rise to the social emotions ing of the human condition. Indeed, it can illumi
is only partial. nate the human condition in ways that complement
Because we are not clones, or even social insects the insights of artists and philosophers through the
(who can share up to three-quarters of their genes), millennia.
what ultimately is best for one person is not identical The most obvious human tragedy comes from
to what ultimately is best for another. Thus every the difference between our feelings toward kin
human relationship, even the most devoted and and our feelings toward non-kin, one of the deep
intimate, carries the seeds of conflict. In the movie est divides in the living world. When it comes to
love and solidarity among people, the relative vis wealth to their children is one of the steepest imped
cosity of blood and water is evident in everything iments to an economically egalitarian society. Yet
from the clans and dynasties of traditional societ few people would allow the government to confis
ies to the clogging of airports during holidays with cate 100 percent of their estate, because most peo
people traveling across the world to be with their ple see their children as an extension of themselves
families. and thus as the proper beneficiaries of their lifelong
It has also been borne out by quantitative stud striving. Nepotism is a universal human bent and a
ies. In traditional foraging societies, genetic relatives universal scourge of large organizations. It is notori
are more likely to live together, work in each other’s ous for sapping countries led by hereditary dynasties
gardens, protect each other, and adopt each other’s and for bogging down governments and businesses
needy or orphaned children, and are less likely to in the Third World. A recurring historic solution was
attack, feud with, and kill each other. to give positions of local power to people who had
Even in modern societies, which tend to sun no family ties, such as eunuchs, celibates, slaves, or
der ties of kinship, the more closely two people are people a long way from home.
genetically related, the more inclined they are to A more recent solution is to outlaw or regulate
come to one another’s aid, especially in life-or-death nepotism, though the regulations always come with
situations. tradeoffs and exceptions. Small businesses or, as
But love and solidarity are relative. To say that they are often called, “family businesses” or “Mom-
people are more caring toward their relatives is to and-Pop businesses” are highly nepotistic, and
say that they are more callous toward their non thereby can conflict with principles of equal oppor
relatives. The epigraph to Robert Wright’s book on tunity and earn the resentment of the surrounding
evolutionary psychology is an excerpt from Graham community.
Greene’s “The Power and the Glory,” in which the The sciences of human nature are pressing on
protagonist broods about his daughter: “He said, ‘Oh two political hot buttons, not just one. The first is
god, help her. Damn me, I deserve it, but let her live how we conceptualize the entity known as “society.”
forever.’ This was the love he should have felt for The political philosopher Roger Masters has shown
every soul in the world: all the fear and the wish how sociobiology (and related theories invoking
to save concentrated unjustly on the one child. He evolution, genetics, and brain science) inadvertently
began to weep___ He thought: This is what I should took sides in an ancient dispute between two tradi
feel all the time for everyone.” Family love indeed tions of understanding the social order.
subverts the ideal of what we should feel for every In the sociological tradition, a society is a cohe
soul in the world. Moral philosophers play with a sive organic entity and its individual citizens are
hypothetical dilemma in which people can run mere parts. People are thought to be social by their
through the left door of a burning building to save very nature and to function as constituents of a
some number of children or through the right door larger super organism. This is the tradition of Plato,
to save their own child. Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Kroeber, the soci
If you are a parent, ponder this question: Is there ologist Talcott Parsons, the anthropologist Claude
any number of children that would lead you to pick Levi-Strauss, and postmodernism in the humanities
the left door? Indeed, all of us reveal our preference and social sciences. In the economic or social con
with our pocketbooks when we spend money on tri tract tradition, society is an arrangement negoti
fles for our own children (a bicycle, orthodontics, an ated by rational, self-interested individuals. Society
education at a private school or university) instead emerges when people agree to sacrifice some of their
of saving the lives of unrelated children in the devel autonomy in exchange for security from the depre
oping world by donating the money to charity. dations of others wielding their autonomy. It is the
Similarly, the practice of parents bequeathing their tradition of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, and
of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Smith, restated in biological terms. Of course, humans were
and Bentham. In the twentieth century it became never solitary (as Rousseau and Hobbes incorrectly
the basis for the rational actor or “economic man” surmised), and they did not inaugurate group living
models in economics and political science, and for by haggling over a contract at a particular time and
cost-benefit analyses of public choices. The mod place. Bands, clans, tribes, and other social groups
ern theory of evolution falls smack into the social are central to human existence and have been so for
contract tradition. It maintains that complex adap as long as we have been a species. But the logic of
tations, including behavioral strategies, evolved to social contracts may have propelled the evolution
benefit the individual (indeed, the genes for those of the mental faculties that keep us in these groups.
traits within an individual), not the community, spe Social arrangements are evolutionarily contingent,
cies, or ecosystem. arising when the benefits of group living exceed the
Social organization evolves when the long-term costs.
benefits to the individual outweigh the immedi With a slightly different ecosystem and evolu
ate costs. Darwin was influenced by Adam Smith, tionary history, we could have ended up like our
and many of his successors analyze the evolution cousins the orangutans, who are almost entirely
of sociality using tools that come right out of eco solitary. And according to evolutionary biology, all
nomics, such as game theory and other optimiza societies “animal and human” seethe with conflicts
tion techniques. Reciprocal altruism, in particular, of interest and are held together by shifting mixtures
is just the traditional concept of the social contract of dominance and cooperation.
REVIEW E X E R C I SE S
1. Explain the basic difference between psychological utilitarianism— in other words, the view that we
egoism and ethical egoism. ought to do what is in the best interest of all or the
2. Give tw o different formulations or versions of psy greatest number?
chological egoism and ethical egoism. 7. Explain how the prisoner's dilemma can be used in
3. Is psychological egoism true, and what must be discussions of egoism and cooperative endeavor.
shown to prove its truth? 8. W hat is meant by taking the "moral point of view?"
4. How is psychological egoism supposed to provide 9. How does the example of the "ring of Gyges" illus
support for an argument for ethical egoism? What is trate the question: "W hy be moral?"
one problem for this argument? 10. Is Hobbes' proposed solution to the problem of ego
5. Summarize the arguments regarding the consis ism, via the social contract, acceptable?
tency or inconsistency of ethical egoism. 11. How does the discussion of evolution (in Pinker)
6. In what sense does the argument for ethical ego inform your understanding of the conflict between
ism based on economics support not egoism but egoism and altruism?

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Egoism, Altruism, and the

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