5-13!1!109a Single Control Node Failure May Prevent Fuel Shutoff

SERVICE BULLETIN
NOTICE: The Type of Change and Recommended Compliance specified reflects Solar’s best judgment regarding the Service
Bulletin. All questions should be directed to your Solar Field Service Representative. Solar, Saturn, Centaur, Taurus, Mercury,
Mars, Titan, SoLoNOx, and Turbotronic are trademarks of Solar Turbines Incorporated. Cat and Caterpillar are trademarks of
Caterpillar Inc. Specifications subject to change without notice.
NUMBER: 5.13.1/109A
ISSUED: November 2006
REVISED: December 2007
PRODUCT: All
MODEL(S): All
Specifics: 1) Refurbished and Retrofitted Units with Pre-Engineered
“PE” Turbotronic Controls Fuel Modules and
2) Certain Production Units (Circa 1999 to 2003). In both
cases, units will also have: Turbotronic 3MX Controls (Allen
Bradley PLC-5 with ControlNet 1.25 Flex I/O.
SUBJECT: SINGLE CONTROL NODE FAILURE MAY PREVENT FUEL SHUTOFF

FOR SOME TURBOTRONIC 3MX SYSTEMS
PRODUCT SAFETY
—REVISION NOTICE—
Added time limit to Action Required section
Type of Change: Product Safety

Recommended
Compliance: Immediate
Purpose:
To inform users of risks related to Rockwell Automation® ControlNet® 1.25 node adapter failures
when backup systems share a common node with the main system, and to provide means to reduce
these risks.
SERVICE BULLETIN Page 1 of 3

NUMBER: 5.13.1/109A
GENERAL INFORMATION:
In August 2006, a Solar pre-engineered (PE) controls retrofit package experienced a node adapter
failure (node 5) in which all I/O signals froze in the last state. The adapter is programmed to
fail in the safe state (off), but experienced a failure mode where this didn’t occur. The node that
failed contained the channels for primary and secondary fuel shutoff valves, the fuel metering
valve, and the micro-processor (micro-p or PLC™) initiate relay. The PLC detected this failure and
commanded the micro-p fail initiate relay to de-energize which should activate the backup system.
Unfortunately, this command signal was also on node 5 and was frozen in the energized state. At
that point, the control system could not take any further action to safeguard the unit. An operator
manually initiated an emergency shutdown via push-button. This successfully activated the backup
system and placed the turbine package into a safe state. This incident resulted in no damage to the
package. Under different circumstances, it is possible for this failure to have resulted in serious
damage or harm through a turbine overspeed, flameout, or other significant failure.
The failed module in this case is presently undergoing root cause failure analysis. Once complete,
Solar will determine if any further actions are required and communicate as necessary.
Solar has installed this single-node-controlled fuel system, utilizing a Allen-Bradley® PLC-5™
processor with ControlNet™ 1.25, on retrofitted and refurbished packages in the aftermarket. In
contrast, the Turbotronic™ 4 control system, used on new prodution equipment, employs several
different measures to detect control system hardware failures and then places the turbine package
into a safe state. The Turbotronic control system includes a backup relay system that shuts off fuel,
depressurizes the compressor, and enables the turbine post lube pump.
ACTION REQUIRED:
Affected units will have primary and secondary fuel shutoff valves and the “micro-p” fail relay
connected through the same control node (Figure 1). Specifically, the channels for primary fuel
shutoff valve feedback, the secondary fuel shutoff valve command, and the microprocessor fail
relay command must be relocated to a different node. This will leave the primary fuel shutoff valve
command, secondary fuel shutoff valve feedback and the fuel metering valve command on the
original node. This modification places some devices on a separate node which will ensure that the
PLC retains the ability to shutoff fuel despite the failure of a single node.
This notice does not apply if the primary or secondary shutoff valve command is located on a node
separate from the micro-p failure (K240) output.
Please contact your local Solar District Service Office prior to July 31, 2008 to request a
modification of a control system needing this change. This modification program is offered for a
limited time only; and after July 31, 2008, customers will be responsible for all charges necessary
to effect this change.
SERVICE BULLETIN
Page 2 of 3 NUMBER: 5.13.1/109A
Figure 1 Simplified Diagram of the Present Fuel Shutoff System Architecture
Figure 2 Simplified Diagram of the Revised Fuel Shutoff System Architecture
SERVICE BULLETIN Page 3 of 3

NUMBER: 5.13.1/109A

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SERVICE BULLETIN

SUBJECT: SINGLE CONTROL NODE FAILURE MAY PREVENT FUEL SHUTOFF

Type of Change: Product Safety

SERVICE BULLETIN Page 1 of 3

Figure 2 Simplified Diagram of the Revised Fuel Shutoff System Architecture

SERVICE BULLETIN Page 3 of 3

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