Iso Fdis 13855 (E)

FINAL DRAFT
International
Standard
ISO/FDIS 13855
ISO/TC 199
Safety of machinery — Positioning
of safeguards with respect to the Secretariat: DIN
approach of the human body Voting begins on:

2024-03-26
Sécurité des machines — Positionnement des moyens de Voting terminates on:
protection par rapport à l’approche du corps humain 2024-06-18
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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
Contents Page
Foreword....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... v
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... vii
1 Scope.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
2 Normative references.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 2
3 Terms, definitions, symbols and abbreviated terms................................................................................................................. 2
3.1 Terms and definitions....................................................................................................................................................................................2
3.2 Symbols and abbreviated terms........................................................................................................................................................... 5
3.2.1 Symbols....................................................................................................................................................................................................5
3.2.2 Abbreviated terms.......................................................................................................................................................................... 5
4 Methodology.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
4.1 General.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................6
4.2 Static and dynamic separation distances..................................................................................................................................... 8
4.3 Reference planes................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8
4.4 Assumptions........................................................................................................................................................................................................10
4.5 Specific requirements for ESPE regarding whole body access...............................................................................11
4.5.1 General...................................................................................................................................................................................................11
4.5.2 Additional requirements for detection zones mounted vertical to the reference
plane.........................................................................................................................................................................................................11
4.5.3 Additional requirements for single beam devices......................................................................................... 12
4.6 Reaching distance to SRMCD............................................................................................................................................................... 12
4.7 Direction of approach toward detection zone of ESPE................................................................................................. 12
4.8 Speed and separation control (SSC).............................................................................................................................................. 13
5 Separation distance.................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
5.1 General..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
5.2 Separation distance S.................................................................................................................................................................................. 14
5.3 Approach speed K........................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
5.3.1 Approach speed of the human body............................................................................................................................. 14
5.3.2 Approach speed of mobile machinery....................................................................................................................... 15
5.4 Overall system response time T........................................................................................................................................................ 15
5.5 Reaching distance factors associated with a protective device DDS.................................................................17
5.5.1 General...................................................................................................................................................................................................17
5.5.2 Reaching distance in applications initiating a safety function............................................................17
5.5.3 Reaching distance in applications where hazard zones can be reached by
circumventing the safeguard.............................................................................................................................................18
5.6 Supplemental distance factors............................................................................................................................................................18
6 Dynamic separation distance.......................................................................................................................................................................... 19
6.1 General...................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 19
6.2 Dynamic separation distance for unknown human direction of approach................................................19
6.3 Dynamic separation distance for known human direction of approach...................................................... 20
7 Consideration of the direction of approach to a detection zone................................................................................. 22
8 Orthogonal approach to a detection zone........................................................................................................................................... 23
8.1 Determination of the reaching distance for an orthogonal approach to a detection zone........... 23
8.2 Reaching over a vertical detection zone.................................................................................................................................... 25
8.2.1 General.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 25
8.2.2 Vertical detection zones without additional protective structures............................................... 25
8.2.3 Vertical detection zones with additional protective structures........................................................27
8.3 Reaching through a vertical detection zone...........................................................................................................................27
8.3.1 General...................................................................................................................................................................................................27
8.3.2 Reaching through a vertical detection zone with effective detection capability
de ≤ 40 mm......................................................................................................................................................................................... 28
40 mm < de ≤ 55 mm................................................................................................................................................................. 29
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55 mm < de ≤ 120 mm.............................................................................................................................................................. 29
de > 120 mm or undefined.................................................................................................................................................... 29
8.3.6 Indirect approach — Path restricted by obstacles........................................................................................ 30
8.4 Reaching under a vertical detection zone.................................................................................................................................32
8.4.1 General...................................................................................................................................................................................................32
8.4.2 Reaching under a vertical detection zone with (de + HDB) ≤ 40 mm.............................................. 33
8.4.3 Reaching under a vertical detection zone with height of the lower edge from the
reference plane 40 mm < de + HDB and HDB ≤ 300 mm............................................................................... 33
8.4.4 Reaching under a vertical detection zone with additional protective structures............ 34
8.5 Single beam applications......................................................................................................................................................................... 35
8.6 Cycle re-initiation of machine operation employing active opto-electronic protective
devices (AOPDs) with control function....................................................................................................................................... 35
9 Parallel approach to a detection zone..................................................................................................................................................... 36
9.1 General..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 36
9.2 Height of a detection zone for a parallel approach........................................................................................................... 36
9.3 Separation distance of a detection zone for a parallel approach......................................................................... 38
9.4 Depth of a detection zone for a parallel approach............................................................................................................ 38
10 Two-hand control devices.................................................................................................................................................................................... 39
10.1 Two-hand control devices not preventing encroachment......................................................................................... 39
10.2 Two-hand control devices preventing encroachment................................................................................................... 40
11 Single control devices............................................................................................................................................................................................... 40
11.1 Hand-operated single control devices......................................................................................................................................... 40
11.2 Foot-operated single control devices............................................................................................................................................41
12 Interlocking guards.................................................................................................................................................................................................... 42
12.1 General......................................................................................................................................................................................................................42
12.2 Interlocking devices without guard locking...........................................................................................................................42
12.2.1 General...................................................................................................................................................................................................42
12.2.2 Calculation of the opening e for an interlocking guard with an interlocking
device with rotary cam actuated position switch.......................................................................................... 44
12.3 Interlocking devices with guard locking....................................................................................................................................45
Annex A (informative) Achieving intended risk reduction.................................................................................................................. 47
Annex B (informative) Measurement and calculation of system performance to achieve the
intended risk reduction......................................................................................................................................................................................... 48
Annex C (normative) Devices with multiple beams or arrangements of single beams with
effective detection capability de > 120 mm or undefined — Number of beams and their
height above the reference plane without change in elevation................................................................................... 51
Annex D (normative) Supplier information for time and distance to achieve the intended risk
reduction................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 53
Annex E (informative) Variable key for determining separation distance for safeguards............................... 54
Annex F (normative) Time factors in the overall system response time to achieve the intended
risk reduction.................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 63
Annex G (informative) Explanations of the formulae and values used within this document...................... 66
Annex ZA (informative) Relationship between this European Standard and the essential
requirements of Directive 2006/42/EC aimed to be covered........................................................................................ 70
Bibliography.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 71

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Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards
bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through
ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee
has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations,
governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely
with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described
in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the different types
of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the
ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
ISO draws attention to the possibility that the implementation of this document may involve the use of (a)
patent(s). ISO takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of any claimed patent
rights in respect thereof. As of the date of publication of this document, ISO had not received notice of (a)
patent(s) which may be required to implement this document. However, implementers are cautioned that
this may not represent the latest information, which may be obtained from the patent database available at
www.iso.org/patents. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions
related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.
This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 199, Safety of machinery, in collaboration with
the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) Technical Committee CEN/TC 114, Safety of machinery,
in accordance with the Agreement on technical cooperation between ISO and CEN (Vienna Agreement).
This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition (ISO 13855:2010), which has been technically
revised.
The main changes compared to the previous edition are as follows:
— document expanded for applicable cases and partly revised to be state-of-the-art;
— figures revised for clarity and better understanding;
— scope wording improved to better focus on the document’s content;
— Clause 4 improved for better explanation of the methodology;
— document restructured from Clause 5;
— calculation of reaching distances separated for those applications which are initiating a safety function
and those which are not initiating a safety function;
— dynamic separation distance calculation included for mobile applications with unknown human direction
of approach;
— improvements for better distinction of different paths of approach;
— requirements for single control devices (hand- and foot-operated) and interlocking guards added;
— annexes revised in order to match with the body text of this document;
— Annexes D to G added.

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Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards body. A
complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso.org/members.html.

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Introduction
The structure of safety standards in the field of machinery is as follows:
a) type-A standards (basic safety standards) giving basic concepts, principles for design, and general
aspects that can be applied to all machinery;
b) type-B standards (generic safety standards) dealing with one safety aspect or one type of safeguard
that can be used across a wide range of machinery:
— type‑B1 standards on particular safety aspects (e.g. safety distances, surface temperature, noise);
— type‑B2 standards on safeguards (e.g. two-hand control devices, interlocking devices, pressure-
sensitive devices, guards);
c) type‑C standards (machine safety standards) dealing with detailed safety requirements for a particular
machine or group of machines.
This document is a type-B1 standard as stated in ISO 12100.
This document is of relevance, in particular, for the following stakeholder groups representing the market
players with regard to machinery safety:
— machine manufacturers (small, medium and large enterprises);
— health and safety bodies (regulators, accident prevention organisations, market surveillance).
Others can be affected by the level of machinery safety achieved with the means of the document by the
above-mentioned stakeholder groups:
— machine users/employers (small, medium and large enterprises);
— machine users/employees (e.g. trade unions, organizations for people with special needs);
— service providers, e.g. for maintenance (small, medium and large enterprises);
— consumers (in case of machinery intended for use by consumers).
The above-mentioned stakeholder groups have been given the possibility to participate in the drafting
process of this document.
In addition, this document is intended for standardization bodies elaborating type-C standards.
The requirements of this document can be supplemented or modified by a type-C standard.
For machines which are covered by the scope of a type-C standard and which have been designed and
built according to the requirements of that type-C standard, the following applies: if the requirements of
that type-C standard deviate from the requirements in type-B standards, the requirements of that type-C
standard take precedence over the provisions of other standards.
Correct positioning of protective devices is critical for them to be effective. In deciding on these positions, a
number of aspects are taken into account, such as:
— the necessity of a risk assessment according to ISO 12100;
— the practical experience in the use of the machine;
— the overall system response time;
— the time taken to achieve the intended risk reduction following operation of the safeguard, for example
to stop the machine;
— the bio-mechanical and anthropometric data;

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— any intrusion by a part of the body towards the hazard zone until the protective device is actuated;
— the path taken by the body part when moving from the detection zone towards the hazard zone;
— the possible presence of a person between the safeguard and the hazard zone;
— the possibility of undetected access to the hazard zone.

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FINAL DRAFT International Standard ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
Safety of machinery — Positioning of safeguards with respect

to the approach of the human body
1 Scope
This document specifies requirements for the positioning and dimensioning of safeguards with respect
to the approach of the human body or its parts towards hazard(s) within the intended span-of-control as
follows:
— the position and dimension of the detection zone(s) of ESPE and pressure-sensitive mats and pressure-
sensitive floors;
— the position of two-hand control devices and single control devices;
— the position of interlocking guards.
This document also specifies requirements for the positioning of safety-related manual control devices
(SRMCD) with respect to the approach of the human body or its parts from within the safeguard space
relative to
— the position and dimension of the detection zone(s) of ESPE and pressure-sensitive mats and pressure-
sensitive floors, and
— the position and dimension of interlocking guards.
When evaluating the ability of the human body or its parts to access SRMCD from within the intended
safeguarded space, the requirements of this document are also applicable to determine the dimensions of
safeguard(s). Approaches such as running, jumping or falling, are not considered in this document.
NOTE 1 The values for approach speeds (walking speed and upper limb movement) in this document are time
tested and proven in practical experience.
NOTE 2 Other types of approach can result in approach speeds that are higher or lower than those defined in this
document.
This document applies to safeguards used on machinery for the protection of persons 14 years and older.
Safeguards considered in this document include:
a) electro-sensitive protective equipment (ESPE) such as:
— active opto-electronic protective devices (AOPDs) (see IEC 61496-2);
— AOPDs responsive to diffuse reflection that have one or more detection zone(s) specified in two
dimensions (AOPDDRs-2D) (see IEC 61496-3);
— AOPDs responsive to diffuse reflection that have one or more detection zone(s) specified in three
dimensions (AOPDDRs-3D) (see IEC 61496-3);
— vision based protective devices using reference pattern techniques (VBPDPP) (see IEC/TS 61496-4-2);
— vision based protective devices using stereo vision techniques (VBPDST) (see IEC/TS 61496-4-3);
b) pressure-sensitive mats and pressure-sensitive floors (see ISO 13856-1);
c) two-hand control devices (see ISO 13851);

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d) single control devices;

e) interlocking guards (see ISO 14120).
This document is not applicable to
— safeguards (e.g. pendant two-hand control devices) that can be manually moved, without using tools,
nearer to the hazard zone than the separation distance;
— protection against the risks from hazards arising from emissions (e.g. the ejection of solid or fluid
materials, radiation, electric arcs, heat, noise, fumes, gases);
— protection against the risks arising from failure of mechanical parts of the machine or gravity falls.
The separation distances derived from this document do not apply to safeguards used solely for presence
sensing function.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes
requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references,
the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO 12100:2010, Safety of machinery — General principles for design — Risk assessment and risk reduction
ISO 13857:2019, Safety of machinery — Safety distances to prevent hazard zones being reached by upper and
lower limbs
3 Terms, definitions, symbols and abbreviated terms

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO 12100 and the following apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https://w ww.iso.org/obp
— IEC Electropedia: available at https://w ww.electropedia.org/
3.1 Terms and definitions

3.1.1
overall system response time
DEPRECATED: overall system stopping performance
T
time interval between the actuation of the sensing function and achieving the intended risk reduction
Note 1 to entry: This time typically includes tolerance factors (e.g. due to uncertainty of measurements, consideration
of environmental factor such as friction).
3.1.2
response time
tx
maximum time between the occurrence of the event leading to the actuation of the safeguarding device and
the achieving of its intended state
Note 1 to entry: This time typically includes tolerance factors (e.g. due to uncertainty of measurements, consideration
of environmental factor such as friction).
[SOURCE: IEC 61496-1:2020, 3.21, modified — The wording “output signal switching devices OSSD achieving
the OFF state” has been replaced by “achieving of its intended state”. The wording “sensing” has been

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replaced by “safeguarding”. The original Notes 1, 2 and 3 to entry have been deleted and a new Note 1 to
entry has been added.]
3.1.3
detection capability
d
ability to detect the specified test piece(s) in the specified detection zone
[SOURCE: IEC 61496-3:2018, 3.3, modified — The Notes to entry and references have been removed.]
3.1.4
effective detection capability
de
sensing function parameter limit set by the integrator of the device that will cause its actuation
3.1.5
electro-sensitive protective equipment
ESPE
assembly of devices and/or components working together for protective tripping or presence-sensing
purposes and comprising as a minimum:
— a sensing device;
— controlling/monitoring devices;
— output signal switching devices and/or a safety-related data interface.
Note 1 to entry: ESPEs refer only to non-contact sensing devices.
[SOURCE: IEC 61496-1:2020, 3.5, modified — The original Notes 1 and 2 to entry have been deleted and a
new Note 1 to entry has been added.]
3.1.6
indirect approach
approach where the shortest path to the hazard zone is obstructed by a mechanical obstacle
Note 1 to entry: The hazard zone can only be approached by going around the obstacle.
3.1.7
detection zone
zone within which a specified test piece is detected by the sensitive protective equipment
Note 1 to entry: The detection zone can also be a point, line or plane.
Note 2 to entry: ISO 13856-1 uses the term “effective sensing area” when describing pressure-sensitive mats
and pressure-sensitive floors. In this document, the terms “detection zone” and “effective sensing area” are used
synonymously.
[SOURCE: IEC 61496-1:2020, 3.4, modified — “electro-” has been removed before “sensitive protective
equipment” and Note 2 to entry has been added.]
3.1.8
separation distance
DEPRECATED: minimum distance
S
minimum distance required between the actuation position of the protective devices and the hazard zone
to prevent the human body or its parts from reaching the hazard zone before the cessation of the hazardous
machine function
Note 1 to entry: Examples of protective devices are found in ISO 12100:2010, 3.28.
Note 2 to entry: The separation distance is always the shortest distance between the detection zone and the hazard
zone, independent from the entry point of the person through the detection zone.
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3.1.9
reaching distance associated with a protective device
DEPRECATED: intrusion distance
DDS
distance that a part of the body can move through or past the safeguard prior to actuation of the safeguard
either towards the hazard zone or towards a safety-related manual control device (SRMCD) (3.1.14) from
within the safeguarded space
3.1.10
reference plane
level at which persons would normally stand during the use of the machine or access to the hazard zone or
safety-related manual control device (SRMCD) (3.1.14)
Note 1 to entry: The reference plane is not necessarily the ground or the floor (e.g. a working platform can be the
reference plane).
[SOURCE: ISO 13857:2019, 3.2, modified — “or safety‐related manual control device (SRMCD)” and its
definition reference “(3.1.14)” have been added.]
3.1.11
span-of-control
predetermined portion of the machinery under control of a specific device or safety function
Note 1 to entry: A protective device can initiate a stop function of a machine or a portion of a machine.
3.1.12
safeguarded space
area or volume enclosing a hazard zone(s) where guards and/or protective devices are intended to
protect persons
3.1.13
whole body access
situation where a person can be completely inside a safeguarded space (3.1.12)
Note 1 to entry: The term whole body access is used differently in other documents to specify the opening size for
ergonomic access.
3.1.14
safety-related manual control device
SRMCD
control device which requires deliberate human action and whose actuation can result in an immediate
increase of the risk(s)
Note 1 to entry: Examples include actuating devices such as pushbuttons, selector switches, or foot pedals designed
for functions such as reset, start/restart, unconditional guard unlocking or hold-to-run control (e.g. jog, inching).
3.1.15
single control device
control device which requires actuation by either a single hand or foot in order to initiate hazardous machine
functions, thus providing a protective measure only for the person who actuates it
Note 1 to entry: Examples include actuating devices such as pushbuttons or foot pedals designed to control hazardous
machine functions only during actuation, or incremental movement upon each actuation.
3.1.16
industrial environment
workplace where the public is restricted from access or not reasonably expected to be present for the
intended tasks and machine applications

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3.1.17
dynamic hazard
source of harm that changes its location either by the movement of parts of the machine or the machine itself
Note 1 to entry: The dimensions and shape of the hazard zone associated with the dynamic hazard result from the
range of the moving parts of the machine (operating space) or the moving range of the machine itself.
3.1.18
stopping distance
distance travelled by the hazard, hazardous point or part of the machine or the machine itself, from the
initiation of the safety function until the intended risk reduction is achieved
Note 1 to entry: Situations are possible in which the intended risk reduction is achieved even if the hazardous machine
parts are still moving.
Note 2 to entry: Hazards can also travel even if machine parts do not (e.g. a rotating laser beam).
3.1.19
speed and separation control
SSC
safety function that achieves the intended risk reduction by maintaining the separation distance by changing
the speed and or the trajectory of the machine or its parts relative to the detected position of parts of the
human body
Note 1 to entry: The separation distance depends on several parameters, e.g. the speed and approach direction of the
parts of the human body; the speed, direction, and orientation of moving hazard zones; the detection capability (3.1.3)
of the protective devices; the response time (3.1.2) of the safety-related parts of the control system involved.
3.1.20
safety-related part of a control system
SRP/CS
part of a control system that performs a safety function, starting from a safety-related input(s) to generating
a safety-related output(s)
[SOURCE: ISO 13849-1:2023, 3.1.1, modified — Note 1 to entry has been deleted.]
3.2 Symbols and abbreviated terms
3.2.1 Symbols
See Annex E.
3.2.2 Abbreviated terms
AOPD active opto-electronic protective device
AOPDDR active opto-electronic protective device responsive to diffuse reflection (e.g. laser scanner)
VBPD vision-based protective device
ESPE electro-sensitive protective equipment
SPE sensitive protective equipment (see ISO 12100:2010, 3.28.5)
SRMCD safety-related manual control device
SRP/CS safety-related part of a control system
SCS safety-related control system (see IEC 62061:2021, 3.2.3)
SSC speed and separation control

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4 Methodology
4.1 General
Safeguards shall be configured and positioned such that access to the hazard zone to be safeguarded shall
be detected in time to achieve the intended risk reduction.
In an application using an ESPE where two or more hazard zones are present, the separation distance for
each hazard zone shall be calculated. Where necessary, additional safeguards shall be provided to prevent
circumventing the detection zone of the safeguard (see Figure 12).
Figure 1 provides a representation of the methodology for determining the positioning of sensing or
actuating devices of safeguards in accordance with this document, which is as follows:
a) Determine if the considered safeguard is appropriate to achieve the intended risk reduction for the
identified hazard (as specified in ISO 12100).
NOTE 1 Intended risk reduction can include detection of access toward a hazard zone, as well as reaching
toward an SRMCD from within the safeguarded space.
b) If a type-C standard exists for the machinery, select one of the specified types of safeguards from that
standard, and then use the distance specified by that standard. If no type-C standard exists, continue to
Step c).
If there is no type-C standard, use the formulae in this document to calculate the separation distance for
the safeguard selected.
NOTE 2 Type-C standards can specify minimum distances (referred to as separation distance in this document)
directly or by reference to this document.
c) Confirm that the application of the safeguard is within the assumptions identified within this document.
d) Identify the hazard zones associated with the safeguard.
e) Determine the separation distances between the safeguard and its hazard zone(s). Then select the largest
(most protective) of the separation distances. Consideration shall be given to possible circumvention of
the safeguard (e.g. reaching over, through, around or under).
f) Determine if whole body access is possible. If whole body access is possible, apply additional protective
measures to prevent unexpected reset/restart with person(s) inside the safeguarded space according to
step g). If whole body access is not possible or is not applicable (e.g. two-hand control device, continue
to step i).
NOTE 3 ISO 12895 is under preparation specifically for the topic of whole-body access and its derived risks.
g) When no additional detection of persons within the safeguarded space is used, SRMCD(s) shall be
identified and step h) applies. Where additional detection of persons within the safeguarded space
is used for those additional detection means, the separation distances of this document do not apply,
continue to Step i);
h) Determine the reaching distances for each possible approach (over, through, around or under) from the
safeguard toward the SRMCD(s). Then select the largest (most protective) of the reaching distances such
that circumvention is prevented.
i) Determine if the separation and reaching distances are feasible for the application. If feasible, the
process is completed, otherwise a design modification is required. Where this modification only applies
to the considered safeguard, the process shall be repeated starting at step e). Where the modification
consists of the application of a different safeguard or a modification of the machinery design (including
additional guards or safeguards), the process shall be repeated starting at step a).
NOTE 4 Redesign of the machine or the safeguard can result in a risk reduction measure which does not require the
application of this document.

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a This applies to the function of the detection of persons within the safeguarded space, regardless of whether this
function is provided by the same device providing the trip function or a different protective device providing the
detection function. See Clause 1, last paragraph.
Figure 1 — Methodology

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4.2 Static and dynamic separation distances

Two different scenarios shall be considered for machinery:
a) Static separation distance: The separation distance is determined to the maximum boundary of the
hazard zone, independently of the actual position of the origin(s) of the hazard(s) within the physical
limits of the machine, or the position of the machine itself.
b) Dynamic separation distance: The separation distance is determined to the boundary of the hazard
zone that the origin(s) of the hazard(s) can reach according to its actual position and the change in this
position during the overall system response time, T to achieve the intended risk reduction.
Clause 5 describes the calculation of the static separation distance, e.g. for the proper positioning of an AOPD
(safety light curtain) away from the die of a power press. The static approach, however, can lead to large
safety distances due to its worst-case approach or cannot be applicable due to the nature of the hazards to
be covered by the intended safeguarding (e.g. the collision of a mobile platform with a human).
Clause 6 describes the calculation of the dynamic separation distance, e.g. for the proper sizing of the
detection zone of an AOPDDR-2D (safety laser scanner) or AOPDDR-3D (safety 3D sensor) or VBPD monitoring
a safeguarded space. As a basis for the dynamic separation distance calculation, the position of the hazard
and the overall system response time according to the actual speed and braking capability (deceleration) of
the hazard shall be known.
4.3 Reference planes

The parameters specified in this document are applicable to typical approaches of persons in the workplace.
In some applications, movement near machinery requires persons to change elevation to perform expected
tasks (step up or step down). Furthermore, design of machinery can present the ability for persons to change
elevation while accessing the hazard zone or an SRMCD. In such cases, the level the person is using for access
shall be considered when determining appropriate reaching considerations.
When a change in elevation is present (e.g. step, platform, machinery frame), the reference plane shall be
determined according to Table 1 and Figure 2.
When using Table 1 and Figure 2, the direction of approach toward the hazard zone or the SRMCD shall be
considered.
NOTE The situation where a person climbs and stays on the higher surface is not considered in the scenarios
described in Table 1 (see 4.4).

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Table 1 — Determination of reference plane with elevated surfaces when reaching toward hazard
zone or SRMCD
Width of step from edge to detec-
Height of step
tion zone
Direction of approach SPE location to step
HS WS
< 50 mm a ≥ 50 mm a
In front ≥ 1 000 mm A A
[see Figure 2 a)] < 1 000 mm A A
Stepping up
At or behind ≥ 1 000 mm b B B
[see Figure 2 b)] < 1 000 mm b A C
In front ≥ 500 mm c D D
[(see Figure 2 c)] < 500 mm c E E
Stepping down
At or behind ≥ 500 mm c D F
[(see Figure 2 d)] < 500 mm c E G
Scenario Possibility of access Reference plane
A Undetected access to higher surface not possible Lower surface
B Access to higher surface not possible Lower surface
C Undetected access to higher surface possible Higher surface
D Undetected access to lower surface not possible d Higher surface
E Undetected access to lower surface not possible Higher surface
F Undetected access to lower surface possible d Lower surface
G Undetected access to lower surface possible Lower surface
a 50 mm value derived from P5 heel width given in DIN 33402-2:2020-12, Table 60.
b 1 000 mm value taken from ISO 13857:2019, Table 1 Note a and Table 2, Note b.
c 500 mm presents risk of falling; value taken from ISO 14122-2:2016, 4.2.3.
d See ISO 14122-2 for further information for other means to address additional falling hazards.

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a) Stepping up (SPE in front of the step) b) Stepping up [SPE behind (or at) the step]
c) Stepping down (SPE in front of the step) d) Stepping down [SPE behind (or at) the step]
Key
1 higher surface HS height of step
2 lower surface WS width of step from edge to detection zone
3 direction of approach DDS reaching distance associated with a protective device
4 nearest point when approaching an SRMCD K approach speed
5 nearest point when approaching a hazard zone T overall system response time
6 hazard zone Z application-dependent supplemental distance factor
Figure 2 — Representation of elevated surfaces for determining reference plane when reaching
toward hazard zone or SRMCD
4.4 Assumptions
The reaching distances have been derived by making the following assumptions:
— persons reaching toward a hazard zone(s) are not inserting the head or leg over or under the safeguard
in order to reach the considered area (hazard zone or SRMCD);
— anthropometric data from the 5th to the 95th percentile of persons of 14 years and older were used in the
determination of the reaching distance values in the formulae;

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— data specifically for children have not been used in this document. Until specific data are available
for approach speeds for children, the designer should calculate the distances taking into account that
children can be quicker and that a child can be detected later;
— the largest anticipated value of de is used to determine DDS for the application;
— the safeguards retain their position relative to the hazard zone(s) and SRMCD location(s);
— attention should be paid to the possibility that the hazard zone changes its position relative to the
safeguard or reference plane during the time interval from the actuation of the safeguard or reference
plane to achieving the intended risk reduction (e.g. industrial mobile robot);
— reaching distances are measured from the surface, restricting the relevant part of the body;
— persons can force parts of the body around or through openings created between safeguards and other
protective structures (e.g. mounting/support structures, machine frame) in an attempt to reach the
identified area (hazard zone or SRMCD);
— the reference plane is a surface on which a person would normally stand, but is not necessarily the floor
(e.g. a permanent working platform or permanent means of access);
— there is some contact with the reference plane (e.g. climbing is not included);
— no aids (e.g. chairs, portable ladders) are used to change the reference plane;
— it is not possible to gain access to the identified area by stepping or climbing on the housing of the
safeguards, including associated mounting structures;
— no aids (such as rods or tools) are used to extend the natural reach of the upper limbs that can reach or
become engaged with the identified area.
4.5 Specific requirements for ESPE regarding whole body access
4.5.1 General
When an ESPE is used only for the detection of whole-body access on an orthogonal approach, the height of
the lower edge of the detection zone (e.g. beam) from the reference plane HDB, to prevent access under the
detection zone, shall be ≤ 200 mm. For industrial environments, a maximum height of 300 mm for the lowest
edge of the detection zone is acceptable if the results of the risk assessment show this to be sufficient. See
Annex C.
4.5.2 Additional requirements for detection zones mounted vertical to the reference plane
a) The height of the upper edge of the detection zone HDT shall be ≥ 900 mm to prevent stepping over the
detection zone. This is not applicable where a single beam is used (see Annex C) as well as where the
detection zone is parallel to the direction of approach (see 9.2);
b) the beam spacing of the ESPE shall be ≤ 400 mm. See Figure 3.

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Dimensions in millimetres
Key
1 reference plane
2 ESPE beams
Figure 3 — Example of multiple beam system used for whole body access
In exceptional cases (see 8.3.5) a beam separation of 500 mm may be applied.
4.5.3 Additional requirements for single beam devices
Single beam devices shall only be used for openings with height ≤ 500 mm and shall be placed at a height of
200 mm parallel to the reference plane. See Annex C.
4.6 Reaching distance to SRMCD

The concept of reaching distances has previously only been applied to distances for parts of the human body
accessing a hazard zone. This document extends this concept to include accessing an SRMCD from within a
safeguarded space. This concept shall be applied to positioning of any SRMCD whose actuation can result in
an immediate increase of the risk.
For use with SRMCD, substitute in the relevant parts of this document the point defined as the nearest
hazard (e.g. location, measurements) with the SRMCD where contact shall be prevented.
When actuation of an SRMCD can result in harm to individuals, the SRMCD shall be oriented and located at
sufficient distance to prevent actuation by a person from inside the safeguarded space.
Examples of SRMCD include pushbuttons, selector switches, or foot pedals designed for functions such as
reset, start/restart, guard unlocking or hold-to-run control (e.g. jog, inching).
For SRMCD used in conjunction with protective structures (e.g. guards), the requirements of ISO 13857 shall
apply in addition to the requirements of this document.
4.7 Direction of approach toward detection zone of ESPE

The direction of approach of the person or part of the person’s body shall be determined to be
a) orthogonal (at right angles or normal) to the detection zone (see Clause 8), or
b) parallel to the detection zone (see Clause 9).

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Requirements are also provided for arrangements where

— an angled approach (between orthogonal and parallel) needs to be considered (see Clause 7);
— it is necessary to address possible circumventing of the detection zone (see 8.2 and 8.4);
— the path from the detection zone to the hazard zone is restricted by obstacles (indirect approach) (see 8.3.6).
NOTE 1 These situations also appear in combination.
NOTE 2 This document is not intended to provide measures against reaching a hazard zone by climbing over.
For the use of AOPDDRs or VBPDs with a two-dimensional protection zone, the calculation of the separation
distance shall be in line with Clauses 8 or 9, depending on the approach direction.
4.8 Speed and separation control (SSC)

SSC may be used to achieve the required risk reduction by maintaining the dynamic separation distance
by appropriate adaptation of the speed or trajectory of the potential hazardous movements of the machine
or its parts. The change of speed or trajectory of the hazardous movements of the machine or its parts can
include causing a stop.
Safeguarding with SSC shall meet the requirements of 6.1, 6.2 and the following:
— Any parts of the human body intended to be detected and present in the safeguarded space shall be
detected.
— Failure to track all parts of the human body intended to be detected in the safeguarded space shall result
in an immediate command to achieve the intended risk reduction within the span-of-control.
— Failure to maintain the separation distance between a human or parts of the human body in the
safeguarded space shall result in an immediate command to achieve the intended risk reduction within
the span-of-control.
The dynamic separation distance shall be calculated according to 6.3. Where the protective equipment
measures the approach speed of the human or parts of the human body, the measured value may be applied
for the calculation. Otherwise, the approach speed according to 5.3.1 shall be applied.
The performance of the SRP/CS or SCS providing the approach speed measurement shall be such that it does
not diminish the performance of the SRP/CS or SCS that provides the SSC function. The uncertainty of the
measurement of the position and speed of the hazardous machine parts or the machine itself as well as the
uncertainty of the measurement of the position and speed of parts of the human body shall be included in
the supplemental distance factor Z. If the measurement uncertainty is known, it shall be stated as ZM as
described in 5.6. If the measurement uncertainty is unknown, then three standard deviations shall be added
to the mean value of the measurements. See B.5 for additional information.
5 Separation distance
5.1 General
The protective device shall be located at the separation distance from the hazards or hazard zone within
the span-of-control of the protective
device to protect persons when reaching over, through or under the safeguard. See also, Annex A for
information regarding achieving intended risk reduction.
Safeguards that require a separation distance include:

a) ESPE (see Clauses 7, 8 and 9);
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b) pressure-sensitive mats and pressure-sensitive floors (see Clause 9);

c) two-hand control devices (see Clause 10);
d) single control devices (see Clause 11);
e) interlocking guards (see Clause 12).
NOTE The variables used to determine the separation distance for safeguards have been modified in this
document to avoid confusion with other International Standards which use the same variables to represent different
parameters. See Annex E.
5.2 Separation distance S

The separation distance shall be calculated by using Formula (1).
S = (K ×T) + DDS + Z (1)
where
S is the separation distance, in millimetres (mm);
K is a parameter, in millimetres per second (mm/s), derived from data on approach speeds of the
body or parts of the body (see 5.3);
T is the overall system response time, in seconds (s), (see 5.4);
DDS is the reaching distance associated with a protective device, in millimetres (mm), (see 5.5);
Z is an application-dependent supplemental distance factor, in millimetres (mm), (see 5.6).
5.3 Approach speed K
5.3.1 Approach speed of the human body
The factor K is the speed constant which includes hand and body movements of a person(s) approaching a
hazard zone.
This document considers the following factors for the determination of K:
— hand and arm movement;
— twisting of the body or shoulder, or bending at the waist;
— walking.
The speed constant of 2 000 mm/s defines the hand speed value, usually considered as the horizontal motion
of the upper limbs (hand and arm, also known as reaching). For approaches to the hazard zone where this
hand and arm movements are involved, a value for K = 2 000 mm/s shall be applied.
The speed constant of 1 600 mm/s defines the walking speed value.
For approaches to the hazard zone where walking movement is required, a value for K = 1 600 mm/s shall be
applied.
These values do not include other movements of the body, machinery or combinations which can affect the
actual approach speed. Consideration of these movements shall be included when determining the speed
constant for a given application.

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5.3.2 Approach speed of mobile machinery
Where the hazard itself is derived from the mobility of the machine, the combined approach speed of the
mobile machine and the person(s) shall be considered if
— it is reasonably foreseeable that a person will approach the machine at the same time the machine
approaches the person.
NOTE When collision avoidance requires timely detection of the human approach, even larger sizes of the
detection zone resulting from the consideration of the combined approach will not prevent the collision when the
person reaches the crossing at nearly the same time the machine does.
The resulting approach speed shall be determined as the vectorial subtraction (speed value and movement
direction) of the human and machine approach speeds.
5.4 Overall system response time T

The overall system response time T used to determine the separation distance of a safeguard shall be
determined either by calculation or by measurement (Tm).
The overall system response time T for the machinery to achieve the intended risk reduction includes
portions of time that vary by machine type, the safeguard(s) applied, and the elements of the SRP/CS or SCS
involved in the safety function. See Formula (2) and Figure 4.
When the overall system response time is calculated, it shall be the sum of the following factors as
represented by Formula (2):
T ≥ t SRP/CS + t ME +t F (2)
where
T is the overall system response time used in the calculation to determine the separation distance;
t SRP/CS is the response time of the SRP/CS or SCS;
t ME is the response time of the machinery;
tF is the time related to a tolerance factor for the machinery, if necessary.

t SRP/CS is determined by adding the worst-case assumptions from the manufacturer of the safeguard and the
related parts of the SRP/CS or SCS.
t ME is estimated by the machine manufacturer during the design and includes uncertainties.
t F is a value typically determined based on Tm and is influenced by various factors. When determining t F,
factors such as tool weight, temperature, and aging of components as well as the worst-case scenario (e.g.
maximum speed of a moving part) should be considered.
The overall system response time T can be determined as the sum of these factors and may be represented
by Formula (3):
T ≥ t I + t L + tO + t D + t R + t M + t F (3)

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where
tI is the response time of the input (e.g. sensor, protective device);
tL is the response time of the SRP/CS or SCS logic;
tO is the response time of the SRP/CS or SCS output;
tD is the response time related to dissipation of source energy;
tR is the response time related to mechanical response;
tM is the response time related to mechanical inertia;
Key
T overall system response time
Tm overall system response time determined by measurement
For tI , tL, tO, tD, tR, tM, tF see Key to Formula (3).
Figure 4 — Factors of T and measurement principle
NOTE 1 Each block within t SRP/CS and t ME adds time delay from the initiation of a safety function (detection event of
a potentially hazardous situation by the sensor) to the final achievement of the intended risk reduction.
NOTE 2 Not all elements of t ME can affect the overall system response time in all safety functions to achieve the
intended risk reduction. Elements which do not affect the overall system response time are not included in T.
When embedded safety functions prevent exceeding the time limit to achieve the stated risk reduction, the
values t ME and t F in Formula (4) may be substituted with t SF as shown in Formula (4).
T ≥ t SRP/CS + t SF (4)

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where
t SRP/CS is the response time of the SRP/CS or SCS;
t SF is the time delay from the initiation of a safety function.

Where the determination of t SRP/CS and t ME is not possible, the overall system response time T shall be
determined by measurement. The value Tm is the time resulting from measurements of the application.
Deviations due to measurement errors shall be included based on the evaluation of multiple measurements
with appropriate statistical methods. The overall system response time used within the calculation shall be
greater than or equal to the sum of Tm and t F as shown in Formula (5).
T ≥ Tm + t F (5)
where
Tm is the overall system response time determined by measurement;

NOTE 3 Measurement of the time required to achieve the intended risk reduction can also be used for verification
and validation of the separation distance.
NOTE 4 If a stop time measurement device is used to measure the value of Tm and start and completion triggers do
not encompass all of the devices used in the logic path, the measured time can be shorter and therefore less accurate.
To determine Tm, the start and completion triggers shall be as close as possible to the trigger event of the
input [presence or absence of a person(s)] and when the intended risk reduction is achieved, respectively.
Manual operation of the start and completion trigger can introduce larger variables.
Determination of the time factors in the overall system response time to achieve the intended risk reduction
is provided in Annex F.
5.5 Reaching distance factors associated with a protective device DDS
5.5.1 General
Additional reaching distance factors are dependent upon how safeguards are applied. Safeguards allow
a certain amount of reach toward the hazard zone prior to initiating a safety function; see 5.5.2. In some
instances, the application can also allow reach toward the hazard zone around the safeguard without
detection of a person; see 5.5.3.
5.5.2 Reaching distance in applications initiating a safety function
For the following safeguards, the associated reaching distances shall be in accordance with Clauses 7 to 12:
— ESPE and pressure-sensitive mats and pressure-sensitive floors,
— two-hand control devices and single control devices, and
— interlocking guards.
NOTE ESPE and pressure-sensitive mats and pressure-sensitive floors do not detect the presence of a person or
parts of the human body at the detection zone until an amount of penetration into the detection zone occurs. When
using two-hand control devices, single control devices, or interlocking guards, it is possible for a person to reach
toward the hazard zone before initiating a safety function. This amount is the reaching distance associated with a
protective device DDS .

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5.5.3 Reaching distance in applications where hazard zones can be reached by circumventing the
safeguard
In addition to the separation distance resulting from the calculations related to the overall system response
time [see Formula (1)], the hazard shall be beyond the reach of a person. Situations where a person(s) can
reach a hazard which shall be prevented include
— interlocking guards where a person(s) can reach over, through or under the guard;
— reaching around the mechanical enclosure of an ESPE; or
— the detection zone of an ESPE is combined with a protective structure, allowing a person to reach over
without detection. See also 8.2.3 and 8.4.4.
The reach by a person in such situations shall be determined in accordance with ISO 13857.
When determining the separation distance associated with a safeguard according to the provisions of this
document, parameters which influence the reaching distance shall be identified and evaluated. Applicable
parameters shall be included to determine the sizing, location or orientation of each safeguard or detection
zone to achieve intended risk reduction. To determine the separation distance, the largest values according
to Formula (1) and ISO 13857 shall be applied.
5.6 Supplemental distance factors

Depending on the application, machinery, and safeguard, a supplemental distance factor Z can be necessary.
The manufacturer’s instructions for use shall be applied when determining the supplemental distance
factor(s).
NOTE The manufacturer can be the manufacturer of the safeguard or the machinery, or the integrator of the
application or system.
Supplemental distance factors to be considered include, but are not limited to:
— ZG = supplement for general device measurement errors, e.g.:
— ZM = supplement for position uncertainty of the machinery, resulting from the accuracy of the
machinery position measurement system;
— ZP = supplement for position uncertainty of the person, resulting from the accuracy of the presence-
sensing device.
— ZR = supplement for reflection-based measurement errors. This supplement can be necessary if a
retroreflector is in the vicinity of an ESPE.
— ZF = supplement for lack of ground clearance of moving machinery (e.g. a vehicle). This supplement can be
necessary because, generally, a person is detected by an ESPE above the foot, and the braking process of
the machinery cannot take into account the length of the foot in front of the point of detection. A person’s
foot can be injured if the machinery has no ground clearance.
— ZB = supplement for the decreasing braking torque of moving machinery (e.g. a vehicle), from the
manufacturer’s information for use.
By adding any applicable supplemental distance factors to Formula (1), the formula for calculating the
separation distance becomes Formula (6):
S = (K × T) + DDS + (ZG+ ZR +ZF + ZB +…) (6)

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where
S is the separation distance, in millimetres (mm);
K is a parameter, in millimetres per second (mm/s), derived from data on approach speeds of
the body or parts of the body (see 5.3);
T is the overall system response time, in seconds (s), (see 5.4);
DDS is the reaching distance associated with a protective device, in millimetres (mm), (see 5.5);
ZG, ZR, ZF, ZB are the supplemental distance factors as explained above.
6 Dynamic separation distance
6.1 General
The dynamic separation distance is determined to the boundary of the hazard zone that a hazard, hazardous
point, parts of the machine that are the origin for the hazard or the machine itself can reach according to
its actual position and the change in this position during the overall system response time T to achieve
the intended risk reduction. The overall system response time T is analogous to that in 5.4 for the static
separation distance with the addition of control system sampling interval t S as shown in Formula (7):
T = t I + t L + tO + t D + t R + t M + t F + t S (7)
where
t I, t L, tO, t D t R, t M and t F are as stated in the key to Formula (3);
tS is the control system sampling interval necessary to consider that the detection
can occur at the very start of the following sample.
The position of the hazard at the time where the protective device is actuated and its stopping distance
according to its actual speed and deceleration shall be considered for the relevant calculation.
6.2 Dynamic separation distance for unknown human direction of approach

Where the human direction of approach is unknown, the dynamic separation distance calculation shall
include the additional change in position of the hazard SM during the overall system response time T to
achieve the intended risk reduction. Therefore, the formula for the separation distance S to a dynamic
hazard becomes Formula (8):
S = (K × T) +SM + DDS + Z (8)
where
K is the approach speed (see 5.3);
T is the overall system response time as calculated according to Formula (7);
SM is the change in position of the hazard (the distance travelled by the machinery until intended risk
reduction is achieved);
DDS is a reaching distance factor(s) as determined according to 5.5;
Z is an application-dependent supplemental distance factor(s) as determined according to 5.6.

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If the acceleration and deceleration are known and constant, SM shall be calculated as shown in Formula (9):
SM = v0 × T – (d/2) × t M2 + (a/2) × t SRP/CS2 (9)
where
v0 is the initial speed of the machinery, in mm/s;
a is the known possible acceleration of the machinery, in mm/s2;
d is the known possible deceleration (braking capability) of the machinery, in mm/s2;
tM is the time related to mechanical inertia;
t SRP/CS is the response time of the SRP/CS or SCS.

When considering the possible acceleration, the maximum speed vmax achievable by the machine should be
taken into account.
Furthermore, if a is unknown, it can be calculated from the speed difference measured by the system, and
v − v0 
therefore Formula (9) can be reduced to Formula (10), where a can be replaced by  max  :
 t
 SRP/CS 
SM = v0 × T – (d/2) × t M2 + ((vmax – v0)/2) × t SRP/CS (10)
or, if infinite acceleration can be used, the following Formula (11) applies:
SM = vmax × T – (d/2) × t M2 (11)
where vmax is the maximum speed of the machinery.

Finally, if deceleration d is unknown, 0 mm/s2 shall be used in all cases.
NOTE Both reductions can occur simultaneously in the case where a and d are both unknown.
Alternatively, SM can be provided in accordance with a type-C standard, or, since the deceleration d can
depend on several factors, SM can be obtained by measurement. When obtained by measurement, SM shall be
determined according to Annex D. An additional application tolerance shall be added and this tolerance shall
not be less than 10 % of the measured value. The calculated value of SM shall be validated.
6.3 Dynamic separation distance for known human direction of approach

When the direction of the human approach is known, the dynamic separation distance may be calculated
according to Formula 12 (see Figure 5):
SS = SSAA + DDDS + ZZ (12)
with SSAA = SSMM2 + SSPP2 − 2SSM × SSP × cos(γγ)

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Key
SA separation distance (with dynamic approach)
SM change in position of the hazard (distance travelled by the machinery from T0 until the intended risk reduction is
achieved at T1) from its initial speed v0, the deceleration (braking capability) d, and the overall system response time
T according to Formula (7)
SP change in position of the person (distance travelled by the person from T0 until contact at T1 and the intended risk
reduction is achieved), assuming a constant (maximum) speed of 1 600 mm/s (SP = 1 600 mm/s × T)
T0 time at which the safety function is triggered at position P1
T1 time at which the intended risk reduction is achieved; therefore T = T1 − T0, where T is the overall system response
time
PO origin of coordinates
P1 position of the person when the safety function is triggered at time T0
P2 position of the machine hazard when the safety function is triggered at time T0
P3 position of the machine hazard when the intended risk reduction is achieved (hazardous function terminated, e.g.
the contact between robot and person does not lead to harm)
α approach angle of the hazard (to X-axis as reference. For simplification α = 0°)
β approach angle of the person (to X-axis as reference)
γ angle between the movement of hazard and movement of the person
NOTE 1 The angle γ can be determined in the control system of the machine by sensing the movement direction of
the hazard and detecting the approach direction of the person with an appropriate protective device.
Figure 5 — Approaching direction
The control system sampling interval t S between the measurements of the movement angles of the hazard α
and the person β shall not exceed 0,1s. Otherwise, the Formulae (8) to (11) in 6.2 apply.
NOTE 2 When the control system sampling interval ts is not short enough, the expected change or variation of the
angles will result in an unacceptable reduction of the dynamic separation distance which is only time related (K × T).
NOTE 3 The maximum sampling interval ts considers that human motion is unpredictable.
The provided example is illustrated in two dimensions for the simplicity of understanding. The principles
of the calculation apply identically in three dimensions, wherein either case the calculation is performed
continuously on a controller.

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7 Consideration of the direction of approach to a detection zone

This document considers two different approaches to a detection zone:
— Orthogonal approach to a detection zone [see Figure 6 a) and Clause 8];
— Parallel approach to a detection zone [see Figure 6 b) and Clause 9].
a) Orthogonal approach b) Parallel approach

Key
1 hazard zone
2 reference plane
3 direction of approach
Figure 6 — Typical directions of approach to a detection zone
If the detection zone has been installed such that it is angled 30° < Θ < 150° of the direction of approach, it
shall be treated as an orthogonal approach [see Clause 8 and Figure 6 a) and Figure 8 a)]. If the detection
zone has been installed such that it is angled 30° ≥ Θ or Θ ≥ 150° (up to 180°) of the direction of approach, it
shall be treated as a parallel approach [see Clause 9 and Figure 6 b) and Figure 8 b)].
For the different angles to the direction of approach see Figure 7.

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Key
1 direction of approach
Figure 7 — Different angles to the direction of approach
a) Orthogonal approaches b) Parallel approach

Key
1 hazard zone 3 direction of approach
2 reference plane θ angle of detection zone relative to direction of approach
Figure 8 — Detection zone angled to the direction of approach
For SPE detecting presence of persons using volumetric detection, the direction of approach shall take into
account the plane delimiting the volume at the point of detection.
8 Orthogonal approach to a detection zone
8.1 Determination of the reaching distance for an orthogonal approach to a detection zone
When determining the reaching distance DDS associated with an orthogonal approach to a detection zone
according to the provisions of this document, the applicable parameters shall be identified and evaluated.
These parameters shall be considered and a final determination made for sizing, effective detection
capability de and/or location of each detection zone to reduce risk to an acceptable level. Therefore, the
reaching distance DDS associated with an orthogonal approach to a detection zone shall be determined
based upon review of all relevant application concerns:
— reaching over the detection zone resulting in DDO (see 8.2);
— reaching through the detection zone resulting in DDT (see 8.3);
— reaching under the detection zone resulting in DDU (see 8.4).

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The largest value shall be applied for the reaching distance according to Formula (13) (see Figure 9).
DDS = max (DDO, DDT, DDU ) (13)
When preventing undetected access to the hazard zone, the separation distance shall apply from the nearest
beam to the hazard zone. When preventing undetected access to an SRMCD, the reaching distance shall
apply from the nearest beam to the SRMCD.
Key
1 reference plane
2 location outside of accessible reach
DDO reaching distance over a vertical detection zone
DDT reaching distance through a vertical detection zone
DDU reaching distance under a vertical detection zone
Figure 9 — Consideration of all reaching factors for an orthogonal approach to a vertical detection
zone (applies to protective devices as well as SRMCD)
Figure 9 shows an example illustrating a detection zone with effective detection capability de allowing
access toward the hazard with the fingers.
A detection zone shall be considered vertical when the angle to the reference plane is greater than 30° and
less than 150°. Otherwise the detection zone shall be considered horizontal. See Figure 10.
NOTE This document assumes that the reference plane is horizontal.
Key
1 reference plane 2 vertical 3 horizontal
Figure 10 — Angle of detection zone relative to reference plane

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8.2 Reaching over a vertical detection zone
8.2.1 General
To prevent undetected access over a vertical detection zone by

— reaching into a safeguarded space toward a hazard zone, or
— reaching out of a safeguarded space toward an SRMCD,
the separation distance shall include the reaching distance DDO (see Figure 11) according to this subclause.
NOTE This can also be achieved by the provision of guards or other protective measures.
The effective detection capability de can change the height of the effective detection zone which will affect
the reaching distance over a vertical detection zone DDO.
Key
1 hazard zone
2 reference plane
3 nearest point
S separation distance
K approach speed
HH height of the hazard zone from the reference plane
HDT height of the upper edge of the detection zone from the reference plane
DDO reaching distance over a vertical detection zone
Figure 11 — Reaching over a vertical detection zone
8.2.2 Vertical detection zones without additional protective structures
A distance DDO is required to prevent undetected access by reaching over a vertical detection zone. See
Formula (14).
For DDO, the values in Table 2 shall apply. DDO is given in Table 2 as the distance in millimetres, based on the
distance which a part of the body (usually a hand) can move, prior to the actuation of the ESPE, towards
— the hazard zone, or
— the SRMCD.

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Figure 11 illustrates reaching over a vertical detection zone without an additional protective structure.
Where the height of an ESPE is already fixed, Table 2 may be used to derive the separation distance S. Where
the separation distance is already fixed, Table 2 may also be used to derive the required height of the ESPE.
S = (K × T) + DDO + Z (14)
where K = 2 000 mm/s.

By replacing K with 2 000, Formula (14) becomes Formula (15):
S = (2 000 × T) + DDO + Z (15)
Formula (15) applies to all separation distances of S up to and including 500 mm. The minimum value of S
shall not be less than 100 mm. First calculate S using Formula (15).
Where the value of S exceeds 500 mm, Formula (14) may be used with an approach speed K = 1 600 mm/s to
become Formula (16). The value of S shall not be less than 500 mm.
S = (1 600 × T) + DDO + Z (16)
Table 2 — Reaching over the vertical detection zone of ESPE

Height of the Height of the upper edge of the detection zone from the reference plane
hazard zone HDT
from the refer-
ence plane 900 1 000 1 100 1 200 1 300 1 400 1 600 1 800 2 000 2 200 2 400 2 600
HH Reaching distance over a vertical detection zone
DDO
2 600a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 500 400 400 350 300 300 300 300 300 250 150 100 0
2 400 550 550 550 500 450 450 400 400 300 250 100 0
2 200 800 750 750 700 650 650 600 550 400 250 0 0
2 000 950 950 850 850 800 750 700 550 400 0 0 0
1 800 1 100 1 100 950 950 850 800 750 550 0 0 0 0
1 600 1 150 1 150 1 100 1 000 900 850 750 450 0 0 0 0
1 400 1 200 1 200 1 100 1 000 900 850 650 0 0 0 0 0
1 200 1 200 1 200 1 100 1 000 850 800 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 000 1 200 1 150 1 050 950 750 700 0 0 0 0 0 0
800 1 150 1 050 950 800 500 450 0 0 0 0 0 0
600 1 050 950 750 550 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
400 900 700 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
200 600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NOTE 1 ESPE with a height of the upper edge of the detection zone below 900 mm is not included since it does not offer sufficient
protection against circumventing or stepping over.
NOTE 2 Most values given in this table are lower in relation to the values of ISO 13857:2019, Tables 1 and 2, since parts of the
body cannot support themselves on safeguards in case of reaching over.
a Approach to the hazard zone or SRMCD by reaching over is impossible.
When determining the values of Table 2 it shall not be interpolated. If the known values HH, HDT or DDO are
between two values of Table 2, the greater separation distance shall be used.

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When determining an acceptable location of an SRMCD in accordance with 4.6, Table 2 applies. Instead of
measuring the height of the hazard zone from the reference plane HH, substitute the height of the SRMCD
from the reference plane.
In all cases Formula (13) of 8.1 applies.
8.2.3 Vertical detection zones with additional protective structures
When a protective structure is applied above a vertical detection zone, it can be possible to gain support on
the protective structure when reaching over the detection zone (see Figure 12). If access can be achieved by
reaching over the protective structure, the separation distance S shall not be less than the reaching distance
over a protective structure DGO determined according to ISO 13857:2019, 4.2.2, Table 2.
Key
1 hazard zone HH height of the hazard zone from the reference plane
2 reference plane HGT height of the upper edge of the protective structure from the reference plane
3 nearest point DGO reaching distance over a protective structure
4 ESPE
5 protective structure
Figure 12 — Example of reaching over the vertical detection zone of ESPE combined with protective
structure
When determining an acceptable location of an SRMCD in accordance with 4.6, ISO 13857:2019, Table 2
applies. Instead of measuring the height of the hazard zone from the reference plane HH, substitute the
height of the SRMCD from the reference plane.
8.3 Reaching through a vertical detection zone
8.3.1 General
If the effective detection capability can be modified (manually or automatically), the largest anticipated
value of de shall be used, and the reaching distance through a vertical detection zone DDT shall be adjusted
accordingly.
The effective detection capability de will affect how much of the human body can reach through a detection
zone without actuating the ESPE (see Figure 13).

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Key
1 hazard zone K approach speed
2 nearest point T overall system response time
S separation distance DDT reaching distance through a vertical detection zone
Figure 13 — Reaching through a vertical sensing field
8.3.2 Reaching through a vertical detection zone with effective detection capability de ≤ 40 mm
The separation distance S in millimetres, from the detection zone to the hazard zone shall be calculated
according to Formula (17):
S = (K × T) + DDT + Z (17)
where K = 2 000 mm/s and the reaching distance through a vertical detection zone, DDT, becomes
DDT = 8 (de – 14) (18)
but not less than zero.

T is the overall system response time and de is the effective detection capability, in millimetres (mm).
Z is an application-dependent supplemental distance factor, in millimetres (mm), (see 5.6).
By replacing K with 2 000 and DDT with 8 (de – 14), Formula (17) becomes Formula (19):
S = (2 000 × T) + 8 (de – 14) + Z (19)
Formula (19) applies to all separation distances of S up to and including 500 mm. The minimum value of S
shall be 100 mm.
Where the value for S, calculated using Formula (19), exceeds 500 mm, Formula (17) may be used with an
approach speed K = 1 600 mm/s and DDT = 8 (de – 14), but not less than zero to become Formula (20). In this
case, the minimum value of S shall be 500 mm.
S = (1 600 × T) + 8 (de – 14) + Z (20)
Where it is foreseeable that ESPE will be used in non-industrial applications, the separation distance S
shall be calculated with Formula (19) and be increased by at least 75 mm. In such cases, Formula (20) is not
applicable.

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40 mm < de ≤ 55 mm
The separation distance S, in millimetres, from the detection zone to the hazard zone shall be calculated
according to Formula (17) as given in 8.3.2.
Using Formula (17) with an approach speed K = 2 000 mm/s and
DDT = 208 + 12 (de – 40) + Z (21)
where de is the effective detection capability, in millimetres (mm), and the value 208 mm results from the
application of Formula (18) given in 8.3.2 for the portion of detection capability between 14 mm and 40 mm,
Formula (17) becomes Formula (22):
S = (2 000 × T) + 12 de – 272 + Z (22)
Where the value for S calculated using Formula (22) exceeds 500 mm, Formula (17) may be used with an
approach speed K = 1 600 mm/s and DDT = 208 + 12 (de – 40) to become Formula (23). In this case, the
minimum value of S shall be 500 mm.
S = (1 600 × T) + 12 de – 272 + Z (23)
Where it is foreseeable that ESPE will be used in non-industrial applications, the separation distance S shall
be calculated with Formula (22) and be increased by at least 75 mm. In such cases, Formula (23) is not
applicable.
When determining an acceptable location of an SRMCD in accordance with 4.6, Formula (21) applies.
55 mm < de ≤ 120 mm
ESPE with effective detection capability 55 mm < de ≤ 120 mm diameter does not always detect intrusion of
the hands and, therefore, shall only be used where the risk assessment indicates that detection of intrusion
of the hands is not necessary.
The separation distance S from the detection zone shall be calculated using Formula (17) as given in 8.3.2
with an approach speed K = 1 600 mm/s and DDT = 850 mm to result in Formula (24):
S = (1 600 × T) + 850 + Z (24)
NOTE 850 mm is considered to be the standard arm length.
When determining an acceptable location of an SRMCD in accordance with 4.6, the 850 mm reaching
distance applies.
8.3.5 Reaching through a vertical detection zone with effective detection capability de > 120 mm or
undefined
Devices with multiple beams or arrangements of single beams may present an undefined effective detection
capability or an effective detection capability greater than 120 mm. Such devices or arrangements can be
used to detect access of the whole body, but are not suitable for the detection of upper and lower limbs or
small parts of the body (e.g. hand or fingers).
If only whole body access detection is required, such devices or arrangements shall be positioned at a
separation distance in accordance with Formula (24). See Figure 14.

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The application of devices with multiple beams or arrangements of single beams shall consider methods by
which such devices can be circumvented. For example:
— crawling below the lowest beam;
— reaching over the top beam;
— reaching between two of the beams;
— whole body access by passing between two beams.
Where access to the hazard zone requires stepping up more than 300 mm from the lower surface, (HS > 300
mm) and the higher surface has a step width not greater than 50 mm, two beams with a separation equal
or less than 500 mm may be used. In such a case the lowest beam height shall be 200 mm above the higher
surface and the highest beam height shall be no less than 900 mm above the lower surface.
Additional requirements are given in Annex C.
Key
1 hazard zone S separation distance
2 reference plane K approach speed
3 nearest point T overall system response time
4 ESPE beams DDT reaching distance through a vertical detection zone
Figure 14 — Reaching through a vertical detection zone with effective detection capability
de > 120 mm or undefined
When determining an acceptable location of an SRMCD in accordance with 4.6, the 850 mm reaching
distance applies.
8.3.6 Indirect approach — Path restricted by obstacles
When the access by the upper limbs is hindered by obstacles that are permanently fixed, the separation
distance can be the shortest path around these obstacles (see Figure 15 for indirect approach). In this
case, the approach speed differs from the speed of the direct approach and, therefore, it may be reduced to
1 600 mm/s.
For S, the greater value resulting from the comparison of all the separation distances shall be applied.

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Obstacles can result from the functional design of the machine, but shall not be applied with the sole purpose
to reduce the approach speed of the upper limbs.
NOTE 1 Obstacles are parts of the machine, such as housings, covers, impeding devices, ancillary equipment that
prevent direct passage to the hazard.
NOTE 2 It can be acceptable to use a lower approach speed for certain infrequent operations where only indirect
access is possible. As an example, research has shown that for two obstacles with a distance of 1 m or less and a
minimum height of 500 mm, a reduction factor of 0,8 can be applicable (see Reference [28]).
Key
1 hazard zone 1
2 hazard zone 2
3 obstacle
4 direct approach
5 indirect approach
Figure 15 — Example of indirect approach
For the indirect approach, the actual distance travelled upon approach.
S* is the shortest path from the ESPE to the hazard zone around, the obstacle (s) and shall be calculated
according to Formula (25), see Figure16.
S* = l1 + l2 ...+ ln (25)
where
l1, l2, … ln are the shortest individual distances of each section of the path around the obstacles;
S* ≥ S with S calculated according to the relevant subclauses 8.3.1 to 8.3.5.

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Key
1 hazard zone
2 obstacle
l1, l2, l3 shortest distance around obstacles
S* actual distance travelled upon approach
Figure 16 — Illustration of calculating the actual distance travelled
8.4 Reaching under a vertical detection zone
8.4.1 General
The following values are considered to prevent undetected access to hazard zones when reaching under a
detection zone in an orthogonal approach.
The maximum height of the lower edge of the detection zone from the reference plane HDB shall not exceed
300 mm. Therefore, this clause only addresses applications where HDB ≤ 300 mm. See Figure 17.
Key
1 hazard zone
2 reference plane
3 nearest point
4 detection zone

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K approach speed
HH height of the hazard zone from the reference plane
HDB height of the lower edge of the detection zone from the reference plane
DDU reaching distance under a vertical detection zone
Figure 17 — Reaching under a detection zone with orthogonal approach
8.4.2 Reaching under a vertical detection zone with (de + HDB) ≤ 40 mm
To determine the separation distance from reaching under the detection zone, the following modified
calculation, based on Formula (20), shall be used.
The separation distance S, in millimetres, from the detection zone to the hazard zone shall be calculated
according to Formula (26):
S = (K × T) + DDU + Z (26)
where K = 1 600 mm/s and the reaching distance under a vertical detection zone, DDU, becomes Formula (27):
DDU = 8 (de +HDB – 14) + Z (27)
but not less than 0 mm

where
de is the effective detection capability, in millimetres (mm);
HDB is the height of the lower edge of the detection zone from the reference plane, in millimetres (mm).
By replacing K with 1 600 and DDU with 8 (de + HDB – 14), Formula (26) becomes Formula (28):
S = (1 600 × T) + 8 (de +HDB – 14) + Z (28)
When determining an acceptable location of an SRMCD in accordance with 4.6, Formula (27) applies.
8.4.3 Reaching under a vertical detection zone with height of the lower edge from the reference
plane 40 mm < de + HDB and HDB ≤ 300 mm
Table 3 shall be used to determine the reaching distance under a vertical detection zone DDU when the
effective detection capability de plus the height of the lower edge of the detection zone from the reference
plane HDB is greater than 40 mm and HDB is less or equal to 300 mm.
NOTE If the reference plane is above the hazard, such as when the reference plane is an elevated platform or the
hazard zone is in a recessed pit, the reference plane can be considered as a physical protective structure.

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Table 3 — Horizontal projection of the reaching distance when accessing with upper limbs under a
vertical detection zone with 40 mm < de + HDB and HDB ≤ 300 mm
Horizontal projection of the reach-
Height of the hazard zone from the
ing distance under a vertical detec-
reference plane
tion zone
HH
DDU
mm
mm
0 850
300 850
500 800
700 700
900 450
1 100 0
When determining an acceptable location of an SRMCD in accordance with 4.6, Table 3 applies. Instead of
measuring the height of the hazard zone from the reference plane HH, substitute the height of the SRMCD
from the reference plane.
8.4.4 Reaching under a vertical detection zone with additional protective structures
When the hazard zone can be approached by reaching under the protective structure, the horizontal
projection of the reaching distance to the hazard zone DGU shall not be less than the values according to
ISO 13857:2019, Table 4, when HGB ≤ 120 mm, and Table 4 of this document when 120 mm < HGB ≤ 180 mm
(see Figure 18).
NOTE According to ISO 13857:2019, Table 7, Note, slot openings with e > 180mm will allow access for the whole
body. In 8.4.3 of this document, HDB is equivalent to this value e.
Key
1 hazard zone HH height of the hazard zone from the reference plane
2 reference plane HGB height of the lower edge of the protective structure from the reference plane
3 nearest point DGU reaching distance under a protective structure
4 ESPE
5 protective structure
Figure 18 — Reaching under a vertical detection zone with an additional protective structure

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Table 4 — Horizontal projection of the reaching distance when accessing with upper limbs under a
protective structure with 120 mm < HGB ≤ 180 mm
Horizontal projection of the reach-
Height of the hazard zone from the
ing distance under a protective
reference plane
structure
HH
DGU
mm
mm
0 900
200 900
400 900
600 900
800 800
1 000 600
1 200 0
When determining an acceptable location of an SRMCD in accordance with 4.6, the values according to
ISO 13857:2019, Table 4 apply when HGB ≤ 120 mm. When 120 mm < HGB ≤ 180 mm, the values according
to Table 4 of this document apply, instead. Instead of measuring the height of the hazard zone from the
reference plane HH, substitute the height of the SRMCD from the reference plane.
8.5 Single beam applications

Where only a single beam is used to detect the approach of a person, the separation distance S, in millimetres,
from the detection zone to the hazard zone shall be calculated according to Formula (17) as given in 8.3.2.
Using Formula (17) with an approach speed K = 1 600 mm/s and DDT = 1 200 mm, the separation distance S
becomes Formula (29):
S = (1 600 × T) + 1 200 + Z (29)
NOTE 1 When a single beam is applied, the resulting approach is always orthogonal. See Annex C.
NOTE 2 The value 1 200 mm for DDT considers all possible approaches of the human body (reaching over, through
or under the single beam).
The single beam shall be positioned according to Annex C.

When determining an acceptable location of an SRMCD in accordance with 4.6, the 1 200 mm reaching
distance applies.
8.6 Cycle re-initiation of machine operation employing active opto-electronic protective

devices (AOPDs) with control function
Where AOPDs are used for cycle re-initiation of a machine:
— the effective detection capability de shall be ≤ 30 mm;
— Formula (19) (see 8.3.2) shall apply;
— the separation distance S shall be > 150 mm.
If the effective detection capability de is ≤ 14 mm:
— Formula (19) (see 8.3.2) shall apply;
— the separation distance S shall be > 100 mm.

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NOTE 1 Conditions for using ESPE in cycle initiation of machine operation are given in ISO 12100:2010, 6.3.2.5.3,
and IEC 62046:2018, 5.8.
NOTE 2 Additional requirements for ESPE are given in IEC 61496-1.
NOTE 3 It is possible for ESPE with an effective detection capability de > 30 mm diameter to not detect the wrist or
the lower arm after the hand has been detected. An unexpected cycle re-initiation can occur.
9 Parallel approach to a detection zone
9.1 General
If the effective detection capability de can be modified (manually or automatically), the largest anticipated
value of de shall be applied for the calculation of the separation distanceor it shall be ensured that the
associated reaching distance DDS resulting from each modification is added accordingly.
Detection zones used in parallel approach are realized using SPE, including:
— AOPD;
— AOPDDR;
— VBPD;
— pressure-sensitive mats and pressure-sensitive floors.
For ESPE, the part(s) of the human body which can be detected by the detection zone is a function of the
effective detection capability de. This effective detection capability is defined by the design of the ESPE, or
can be configurable within the ESPE (e.g. detection zone switching, blanking of the detection zone).
When a detection zone is used in parallel approach, the parameters addressed in 9.2 to 9.4 shall be identified
and evaluated.
9.2 Height of a detection zone for a parallel approach

For a safeguard where the direction of approach is parallel to the detection zone, the height of the detection
zone from the reference plane HD shall not be greater than 1 000 mm. However, if the height of the detection
zone from the reference plane HD is greater than 200 mm, there is a risk of inadvertent undetected access
beneath the detection zone. This shall be taken into account in the risk assessment and additional protective
measures applied, if necessary.
The minimum allowable height of the detection zone from the reference plane HD is directly related to the
effective detection capability de of the ESPE. A formula to determine the minimum allowable height of a
(horizontal) detection zone from the reference plane HD may be represented by Formula (30). See also,
Figure 19 and Figure 20.
H D ≥ 15 × ( de − 50) , but neither less than zero nor greater than 1 000 mm (30)
When an angled approach is considered as parallel approach [see Clause 7 and Figures 7 and 8b)], then
Formula (30) linking HD and de shall apply to the edge of the detection zone furthest from the hazard zone
(see Figure 19).

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Key
1 hazard zone
2 reference plane
HD height of the horizontal detection zone from the reference plane
Figure 19 — Height of the detection zone (lowest beam)
Key
1 maximum height
2 minimum height
3 permitted
4 not permitted
HD height of the horizontal detection zone from the reference plane
de effective detection capability
Figure 20 — Allowable height of the horizontal detection zone from the reference plane HD

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9.3 Separation distance of a detection zone for a parallel approach

When the direction of approach is considered parallel to the detection zone according to Clause 7, the
separation distance S, in millimetres, from the edge of the detection zone furthest from the hazard zone
shall be calculated using Formula (1) as given in 5.2, see Figure 21.
Using Formula (1) with an approach speed K = 1 600 mm/s and DDS = 1 200 mm, the separation distance S
becomes Formula (31):
S = (1 600 × T) + 1 200 + Z (31)
Key
1 hazard zone
2 reference plane
3 AOPDDR
4 AOPD
5 pressure-sensitive mat/floor
K approach speed
Z Application-dependent supplemental distance factor according to 5.6
DDS reaching distance associated with a protective device
NOTE S and Z are shown only for the minimum distance applicable to the AOPDDR (laser scanner).
Figure 21 — Separation distance for parallel approach
When determining an acceptable location of an SRMCD in accordance with 4.6, the 1 200 mm reaching
distance applies.
9.4 Depth of a detection zone for a parallel approach

The minimum depth of the horizontal detection zone FD shall hinder a person from stepping over the
detection zone undetected. Where a stepping surface with a depth of greater than or equal to 70 mm exists
beyond the detection zone, the minimum depth of the horizontal detection zone FD shall be greater than
or equal to 1 200 mm to prevent a person from stepping over and passing undetected [(see Figure 22a)]. If
additional measures (e.g. protective structures, physical obstructions or other fixed elements) are used to

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prevent this situation such that a person will be detected by the detection zone, the minimum depth of the
horizontal detection zone FD shall be greater than or equal to 900 mm (see Figure 22b).
GD ≥ 70 mm GD < 70 mm
FD ≥ 1 200 mm FD ≥ 900 mm
a) Person can step over the detection zone unde- b) Person cannot step over the detection zone un-
tected detected (in this example S begins closer than F D)
Key
1 hazard zone GD distance between detection zone and nearest obstruction
2 reference plane S separation distance
3 AOPDDR K approach speed
4 AOPD T overall system response time
5 pressure-sensitive mat/ Z Application-dependent supplemental distance factor
pressure-sensitive floor
FD depth of the horizontal detection zone
NOTE The minimum depth of a horizontal detection zone FD in a parallel approach addresses a different distance than the
reaching distance associated with a protective device DDS = 1 200 mm according to 9.3.
Figure 22 — Minimum depth of detection zone
10 Two-hand control devices
10.1 Two-hand control devices not preventing encroachment

The separation distance S from the nearest actuator to the hazard zone shall be calculated using
Formula (32):
S = (K × T) + DDS (32)
where
K = 1 600 mm/s;
DDS = 550 mm.

By replacing the approach speed K with 1 600 mm/s and the reaching distance associated with a protective
device DDS with 550 mm, Formula (32) becomes Formula (33):
S = (1 600 × T) + 550 (33)
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NOTE See also ISO 13851 for design criteria of two-hand control devices.
See Figure 23 and Annex G.
Key
1 hazard zone
2 reference plane
K approach speed
Figure 23 — Separation distance for two-hand control devices (no shroud)
10.2 Two-hand control devices preventing encroachment

If the risk of encroachment of the hands or part of the hands towards the hazard zone is eliminated while
the actuator is being operated, e.g. by adequate shrouding, actuator design or orientation of the workstation,
then DDS may be zero, with a minimum allowable separation distance of 100 mm.
NOTE ISO 13851 gives advice on shrouding to prevent defeating the intended operation of a two-hand control
device. The measures described are not adequate in all applications to prevent encroachment of the hands or parts of
the hands towards the hazard zone.
11 Single control devices
11.1 Hand-operated single control devices

The separation distance S from the actuator to the hazard zone shall be calculated according to Formula (32)
as given in 10.1. See also Figure 24.
By replacing in Formula (32) the approach speed K with 1 600 mm/s and the reaching distance associated
with a protective device DDS with 2 200 mm, Formula (34) results:
S = (1 600 × T) + 2 200 (34)

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Key
1 hazard zone
2 reference plane
K approach speed
Figure 24 — Separation distance for hand-operated single control devices
11.2 Foot-operated single control devices

The separation distance S from the actuator to the hazard zone shall be calculated according to Formula (32)
as given in 10.1. See also Figure 25.
By replacing in Formula (32) the approach speed K with 1 600 mm/s and the reaching distance associated
with a protective device DDS with 2 500 mm, Formula (35) results:
S = (1 600 × T) + 2 500 (35)

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Key
1 hazard zone
2 reference plane
K approach speed
Figure 25 — Separation distance for foot-operated single control devices
12 Interlocking guards
12.1 General
It can be possible to partially open an interlocking guard such that access is possible through the protective
structure before actuation of the interlocking device initiates the protective stop.
NOTE Examples include interlocking guards which open either linearly or angularly (see Figure 26), and the
interlocking device actuator is
— securely fixed, and the degree of travel of the actuator prior to initiating a protective stop is dependent upon
— the design of the interlock device (e.g. distance of travel (hysteresis) as specified by the manufacturer), and
— variable features (e.g. location of actuator, adjustable actuating angle);
— fixed by means of a flexible element (chain, cable) which increases the overall opening (e) prior to initiation of a
protective stop.
When determining an acceptable location of an SRMCD in accordance with 4.6, the guidance of this Clause is
also applicable.
12.2 Interlocking devices without guard locking
12.2.1 General
In order to ensure that the hazard zone cannot be reached when opening an interlocking guard without
guard locking before achieving the intended risk reduction, the separation distance S shall be determined.
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The separation distance from the nearest edge of the opening of the interlocking guard without guard
locking to the hazard zone shall be calculated by using Formula (36).
S = (K × T) + DGT (36)
where
K = 1 600 mm/s;
DGT is the reaching distance through the protective structure taken from ISO 13857:2019 as described
below.
By replacing the approach speed K with 1 600 Formula (36) becomes Formula (37):
S = (1 600 × T) + DGT (37)
NOTE 1 Only an approach speed of 1 600 mm/s has been considered, since in such a case the approach movement
does not result from an involuntary movement (reaction) of the person but from an intended access. It is assumed that
a person accessing in such a way will also prevent a collision with parts of the guard or the machine and wait for an
appropriate size of the opening before reaching in.
For interlocking guards, the resulting size and shape of the opening before activation of the interlocking
device shall be considered when determining the reaching distance DGT through the interlocking guard. See
Figure 26.
NOTE 2 Typically, the resulting opening is a slot created between the interlocking guard and associated frame,
however other opening shapes can result (see Figure E.1).
ISO 13857:2019, Table 4 shall be applied to determine the reaching distance DGT through the interlocking
guard based on the opening e, unless a risk assessment and evaluation of the application justifies the use of
other values.
NOTE 3 Examples include:
— proximity of person to the opening (e.g. person is forced to step back when opening the interlocking guard);
— angle of person approaching the opening.
a) Interlocking guard with linear motion b) Interlocking guard with angular motion

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
Key
1 hazard zone
2 interlocking guard
K approach speed
DGT reaching distance through the protective structure
e dimension of the opening in the protective structure (slotted)
Figure 26 — Example of interlocking guards
12.2.2 Calculation of the opening e for an interlocking guard with an interlocking device with rotary
cam actuated position switch
When an interlocking device with rotary cam actuated position switch is used on an interlocking guard with
angular motion, the opening e shall be calculated (see Figure 27). The opening e is dependent upon
— the actuating angle of the interlocking device with rotary cam actuated position switch ω,
— the width of the interlocking guard GW, and
— the thickness of the interlocking guard GT.
Key
1 interlocking device with rotary cam actuated position switch
2 interlocking guard
ω actuating angle of the interlocking device with rotary cam actuated position switch
b sum of opening size and thickness of interlocking guard
GW width of the interlocking guard
GT thickness of the interlocking guard
e dimension of the opening in the protective structure (slotted)
Figure 27 — Variables for determining opening (e) for an interlocking guard with an interlocking
device with rotary cam actuated position switch

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
The opening e between the machine frame and the interlocking guard with an interlocking device with
rotary actuated position switch is calculated according to Formula (38):
e = b − GT (38)
where
b = GW × sin (ω) (39)
By replacing b with GW × sin (ω) Formula (38) becomes Formula (40):

e = (GW × sin (ω)) − GT (40)
Table 5 shows the values for b based upon typical actuating angles of interlocking devices with rotary
cam actuated position switch ω and common widths of an interlocking guard GW. The thickness of the
interlocking guard GT shall be accounted for in order to determine the opening e of the interlocking guard
before actuation of the interlocking device with rotary cam actuated position switch.
Table 5 — Sample calculation of b for typical actuating angles of an interlocking device with rotary
cam actuated position switch ω
Actuating angle of an interlocking device with rotary cam actuated position switch
Width of the ω
interlocking
guard 3° 4° 5° 6° 7° 8° 9°
GW Sum of opening size and thickness of interlocking guard
mm b = GW × sin (ω)
mm
100 5,2 7,0 8,7 10,5 12,2 13,9 15,6
200 10,5 14,0 17,4 20,9 24,4 27,8 31,3
300 15,7 20,9 26,1 31,4 36,6 41,8 46,9
400 20,9 27,9 34,9 41,8 48,7 55,7 62,6
500 26,2 34,9 43,6 52,3 60,9 69,6 78,2
600 31,4 41,9 52,3 62,7 73,1 83,5 93,9
700 36,6 48,8 61,0 73,2 85,3 97,4 109,5
800 41,9 55,8 69,7 83,6 97,5 111,3 125,1a
900 47,1 62,8 78,4 94,1 109,7 125,3a 140,8a
1 000 52,3 69,8 87,2 104,5 121,9a 139,2a 156,4a
1 100 57,6 76,7 95,9 115,0 134,1a 153,1a 172,1a
1 200 62,8 83,7 104,6 125,4a 146,2a 167,0a 187,7b
1 300 68,0 90,7 113,3 135,9a 158,4a 180,9b 203,4b
1 400 73,3 97,7 122,0a 146,3a 170,6a 194,8b 219,0b
1 500 78,5 104,6 130,7a 156,8a 182,8b 208,8b 234,7b
a If resulting opening e > 120 mm, access of other parts of the body is possible. See ISO 13857.
b If resulting opening e > 180 mm, whole body access is possible.
12.3 Interlocking devices with guard locking

Where the release time delay t DY of the guard locking device is less than the overall response time T, the
separation distance S shall ensure that persons cannot access the hazard zone before the intended risk
reduction is achieved. The separation distance S shall be calculated according to Formula (41):
S = K × (T − t DY ) + DGT (41)

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
where
K is 1 600 mm/s;
T is the overall system response time;
t DY is the release time delay of the guard locking device;
DGT is the reaching distance through the protective structure taken from ISO 13857:2019, as described
in 12.2;

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
Annex A
(informative)
Achieving intended risk reduction
Application of a safeguard is one step in the overall process of risk reduction as addressed in ISO 12100.
Each safeguard applied has one or more intended purposes to reduce risk.
NOTE 1 See ISO 12100:2010, 5.6.2 for further details regarding adequate risk reduction.
When calculating the separation distance S of a safeguard according to the provisions of this document,
the time to achieve the intended risk reduction represents a decisive parameter. This time is when the
hazardous machine function (usually a motion) is altered in such a way that the intended risk reduction is
achieved. This concept has different names in industry and in standards, including:
— safe state;
— safe condition;
— termination of hazardous machine function;
— cessation of hazardous machine function.
This document presents information for the appropriate application of a safeguard based on the overall
system response time T. The reliability of this decisive time parameter is necessary for proper application
of safeguards according to this document. If the intended risk reduction is achieved before the machine
has come to a complete stop, but it is not possible to determine when the moment occurs, it is necessary
to consider the time at which the machine comes to a complete stop. There are many factors that can be
applicable and only limited guidance is currently available. Some examples that can be considered are given
in a) to f), but these references are not always directly relevant in a given application:
a) the force being applied to the human body;
b) the parts of the human body which can be affected;
c) the shape of the machine part (e.g. sharp edges, pointed parts);
d) the property of the material (e.g. soft rubber, deformable);
e) the speed of the movement;
f) the risk of crushing hazards.
NOTE 2 Some information about reduced energies (e.g. forces, speeds, kinetic) can be found in IRSST R-956[30].
NOTE 3 Minimum gaps to avoid crushing of parts of the human body can be found in ISO 13854.
If a separation distance is calculated according to the provisions of this document, the relationship between
the overall system response time T and the moment when the intended risk reduction is achieved before the
machine comes to a complete stop should be made explicit. Such a relationship can, for example, be defined
as follows:
— With crushing hazards the intended risk reduction can be achieved 2 mm prior to the position where the
machine comes to a complete stop, unless there is a risk of crushing of the head.
This means that the time represented by these 2 mm may be used to reduce the overall system response time T.
NOTE 4 A compression of 2 mm can be regarded as harmless to the parts of the human body other than the head.

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
Annex B
(informative)
Measurement and calculation of system performance to achieve the

intended risk reduction
B.1 General
Instructions or guidance on specific procedures applicable to measurement and calculation of time or
distance to achieve the intended risk reduction should be provided.
B.2 Machine test conditions

The signal to simulate the activation of the protective device (i.e. initiate the safety function) should be given
to the machine at the moment/position/phase of motion which gives the longest system response time or
distance. For some risk reduction measures it is necessary to determine the total distance of travel after the
safety function has been initiated. See 5.4 and Annex A for additional information regarding time to achieve
the intended risk reduction.
The time or distance to achieve the intended risk reduction should be measured for the worst credible
(longest) time or distance of a machine under maximum capability during normal operating conditions.
Various factors specific to an application can impact the worst credible situation such as, but not limited to:
— tool weight;
— temperature;
— switching times of valves;
— ageing of components;
— operating speed.
Among conditions to consider as the worst credible scenario include, but are not limited to, when:
— the machine is at maximum capable speed;
— the equipment is at maximum extension (extending the moment arm);
— the machine is at 90 ° on a sinusoidal crank.
The machine should be tested under conditions which most realistically replicate the normal operating
conditions. To achieve the intended risk reduction during all machine cycles, it can be necessary to test the
machine in conditions which replicate machine performance at both initial start-up and after multiple cycles.
To test machine performance under initial start-up conditions, the test should be performed with the machine
at normal operating conditions. To replicate performance at normalized internal conditions, multiple cycles
of the machine can be required. The test results can be affected by temperature of wear surfaces, lubricants,
hydraulic fluid and brake/clutch wear pads. Both sets of data should be evaluated according to B.3. The
largest resulting value should be used for final calculation of the separation distance S.
B.3 Test interval and measurement procedure

The interval between tests should follow the typical production cycle interval unless it can be shown that
shorter intervals will not adversely affect the performance measurements.
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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
Measurements should be taken using a stopping performance device which has been calibrated according
to the manufacturer’s instructions when applicable. One measurement is not sufficient. At least ten
measurements are required under each test condition. In addition to stating the calculated separation
distance S and identifying the machine on which the measurements were made, the measurement procedure
should also contain a list of assumptions that were made about how the worst-case scenario was determined
and how the intended risk reduction was defined. An adequately formulated measurement report should
contain the following information:
a) identification of the machine;
b) safeguard(s) and interface(s) used;
c) measuring equipment used;
d) verification (including calibration, when applicable) of measuring equipment;
e) identification of the person/company that performed the measurements;
f) date of measurements;
g) measuring method used;
h) assumptions made for the measurements and calculations;
i) additional information about the machine or measuring scenario;
j) calculated overall system response time T;
k) calculated separation distance S, showing values used in formulae.
The information listed above should be included with the documentation of the calculated separation
distance S.
B.4 Fault conditions

For the calculation of the separation distance S in accordance with this document, maximum capability
during normal operating conditions of moving equipment in the hazard zone may be taken. It is possible that
it will not be necessary to consider the speed of moving equipment under fault conditions as determined by
the risk assessment.
Where a person approaches a hazardous situation, two independent events need to occur at the same
time: the person stretches an arm out towards the hazard zone and the moving equipment fails in speed or
extension at the same time, which is unlikely.
The calculation of speed, even under fault condition, can be needed, e.g. when designing restricted travel or
motion of machine axis and persons can be hit in case of fault. Under such circumstances, a person is present
but not approaching and a single fault can lead to a hazardous situation. Such considerations are not dealt
with in this document, but can be the subject of type-C standards.
B.5 Calculation of the overall system response time T to achieve the intended risk
reduction
A statistical method to estimate 99,7 % of all values in a normally distributed population is to calculate the
mean value ±3 standard deviations. The highest measured value or the mean plus three standard deviations,
whichever is the greater, should be used. See B.6 for an example. The mean value alone should not be used,
since the machine in 50 % of the cases would have a longer overall system response time.
The practice of removing outliers in the measurements is not recommended unless it can be safe to assume
that the outlier is due to an error in the measurement.

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
B.6 Example measurement analysis — Calculation of the sample standard deviation

System response time measurements were performed for a machine at both cold start-up and again after
the machine had warmed up (see Table B.1). For each condition, 10 system response time measurements
were taken. The following steps show how to calculate system response time.
Table B.1 — Measured system response times

System response time
s
Measurement Cold machine start-up Hot machine
1 0,561 0,663
2 0,553 0,654
3 0,612 0,655
4 0,544 0,651
5 0,553 0,727
6 0,571 0,656
7 0,567 0,678
8 0,583 0,665
9 0,656 0,683
10 0,554 0,714
Step 1: Calculate the system response time under cold start-up conditions
The “mean plus three sample standard deviations”, 0,679 s, is greater than the highest measured time,
0,656 s, therefore the calculated system response time for cold start-up is 0,679 s.
Step 2: Calculate the system response time for machine running at normal conditions
The “mean plus three sample standard deviations”, 0,754 s, is greater than the highest measured time,
0,727 s, therefore the calculated system response time at normal operating conditions is 0,754 s.
Step 3: Compare measured system response times
The highest encountered system response time at normal operating conditions, 0,754 s, is greater than the
highest encountered system response time for cold start-up, 0,679 s, therefore 0,754 s should be used in the
calculation of the separation distance. See Table B.2.
Table B.2 — Comparison of system response time values

Calculation results
s
Variable Cold machine start-up Hot machine
Mean ( x ) 0,575 0,675
Sample standard deviation (sx) 0,034 4 0,026 5
x + 3 sx 0,679 0,754
Highest measured value 0,656 0,727
Highest encountered value 0,679 0,754
Value used for calculation of the separation
0,754
distance

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
Annex C
(normative)
Devices with multiple beams or arrangements of single beams with

effective detection capability de > 120 mm or undefined — Number of
beams and their height above the reference plane without change in
elevation
For devices with multiple beams or arrangements of single beams with effective detection capability de
greater than 120 mm or undefined intended to detect whole body access without change in elevation (see
4.3), the heights given in Table C.1 or Table C.2 shall be applied. Table C.2 shall only be applied in industrial
environments and where allowed by the risk assessment.
NOTE These heights have been found to be the best compromise between an adequate risk reduction and the
most practical in application. Not all applications allow the use of devices with multiple beams or arrangements of
single beams with effective detection capability de > 120 mm or undefined. Further protective measures to prevent
access to the hazard zone or SRMCD can be required.
Table C.1 — Heights above and parallel to the reference plane

Number of Applicable only for openings
Heights above and parallel to the reference plane
beams with dimensions
mm mm
Beam 1 Beam 2 Beam 3 Beam 4 Height Width
4 200 500 800 1 100 unrestricted unrestricted
3 200 600 1 000 unrestricted unrestricted
200 400 ≤ 600 unrestricted
2
200 ≤ 500 > 300

vertical beam > 500 ≤ 300
1
240 ≤ ⌀ ≤ 500
⌀/2
for round openings
Table C.2 — Alternative heights above reference plane for industrial applications where allowed by
a risk assessment
Number of Applicable only for openings
Heights above and parallel to the reference plane
beams with dimensions:
mm mm
Beam 1 Beam 2 Beam 3 Beam 4 Height Width
4 300 600 900 1 200 unrestricted unrestricted
3 300 700 1 100 unrestricted unrestricted
200 400 ≤ 600 unrestricted
2
200 ≤ 500 > 300

vertical beam > 500 ≤ 300
1
240 ≤ ⌀ ≤ 500
⌀/2
for round openings

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
The heights for 2, 3 and 4 beams given in Table C.1 and Table C.2 apply to beams
— positioned parallel to the reference plane,
— where the beams are in the same plane, and
— where the approach to the resulting plane is orthogonal according to Clause 7.

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
Annex D
(normative)
Supplier information for time and distance to achieve the intended

risk reduction
When a machine has a stopping time or stopping distance limiting safety function that causes a stop before
exceeding the set limit, the data according to this Annex are not required.
NOTE 1 For parameterization of limits, see ISO 13849-1:2023, 5.2.2.7 and 6.3.
When information is provided regarding time and distance to achieve the intended risk reduction, the
following metric shall be used to present standardized data. This information is needed to calculate the
separation distance when applying safeguards according to this document. To make this information useful
and practical, values need to be provided for varying steps up to maximum conditions to predict actual
running conditions.
Testing shall conform with documented overall system response time testing conditions (see Annex B), and
include the following:
a) the equipment shall be warmed up prior to testing;
b) the machine shall be installed per supplier’s requirements;
c) environmental requirements (e.g. power, temperature) shall be met;
d) a proper test procedure shall be established;
e) the method of measurement shall be described.
The supplier shall forecast the degradation of machine performance to achieve the intended risk reduction
due to normal use and recommend when the machine should be refurbished.
The data recommended is as follows:
— the time to achieve the intended risk reduction shall be determined from the initiation of a protective
stop to when all hazardous conditions have achieved acceptable risk;
— if validated simulation values are available, then these values may be obtained using simulation.
NOTE 2 This data varies depending on additive delays due to control system feature and configuration (e.g.
cableless pendants).
The stopping distance shall be determined as the total distance travelled after the initiation of a protective
stop. Distance shall be provided in linear or angular units as appropriate.
For stop Category 0 in accordance with IEC 60204-1, the measurement procedures under maximum
conditions (e.g. maximum speed, maximum load and maximum displacement, when applicable) are sufficient.
If the machine has a stop Category 1 in accordance with IEC 60204-1, additional data or correction factors
shall be provided. For stop Category 1, the stopping time and distance values shall be stated for 100 % of
maximum depending on application specific factors (e.g. speed, payload, extension).
A description of how to perform the measurement of time or distance to achieve the intended risk reduction
for a particular application, machine, and or tool and loads shall be provided by the supplier.

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
Annex E
(informative)
Variable key for determining separation distance for safeguards
E.1 Variables introduced in Clause 4
Table E.1 — Variables introduced in Clause 4

Used in this document Other references
ISO 13855:2010a
IEC 62046:2018
ISO 13857:2019
Reference for-
IEC 61496-
IEC 61496-
Reference
Reference
Variable Parameter
figure(s)
mula(e)
table(s)
2:2020
3:2018
Units
HS height of step mm – 2 1 – – – – –
width of step from edge to –
WS mm 2 1 – – – – –
detection zone
reaching distance associat- 1, 6, 8, 2, 21, 22,
DDS mm – C – C – –
ed with a protective device 13, 32 23, 24, 25
opening in protective struc-
e mm 38, F.2 26, 27 – – e – – –
ture
distance between detection
GD zone and nearest obstruc- mm – 22 – X – E – –
tion
18, 19,
20, 21,
effective detection capabil- 14, 20, G.2,
de mm 22, 23, 3 d – d d d
ity G.3
27, 28,
30
a Will be withdrawn once this edition is published.

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
a Slotted opening.
b Square opening.
c Round opening.
d Irregular opening.
Figure E.1 — Openings of irregular shape

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)

ISO 13855:2010a
IEC 62046:2018
ISO 13857:2019
Reference for-
IEC 61496-
IEC 61496-
Reference
Reference
Variable Parameter
figure(s)
mula(e)
table(s)
2:2020
3:2018
Units
1, 6, 8, 12,
14, 15, 16,
17, 19, 20, 5, 11, 13,
22, 23, 24, 14, 16, 17,
S separation distance mm 2 S – S – S
26, 28, 29, 21, 22, 23,
31, 32, 33, 24, 25, 26
34, 35, 36,
37
2, 11, 13,
1, 6, 8, 14,
14, 17, 21,
K approach speed mm/s 17, 25, 26, – K – – K K
22, 23, 24,
32, 36
25, 26
1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 14,
15, 16, 17, 2, 4, 11,
overall system response 19, 20, 22, 13, 14, 17,
T s – T – T – T
time 23, 24, 25, 21, 22, 23,
26, 28, 29, 24, 25, 26
31, 32, 33,
34, 35, 36,
37
response time of the SRP/CS
t SRP/CS s 2, 4, 9, 10 4 – – – – – –
or SCS
tI response time of the input s 3, 7, F.1 4 – t1 – – – –
tL s 3, 7, F.3 4 – t2 – – – –
or SCS logic
tO s 3, 7 4 – t2 – – – –
or SCS output
response time of the ma-
t ME s 2 4 – t2 – – – –
chinery
response time related to
tD s 3, 7 4 – – – – – –
dissipation of source energy
tR s 3, 7 4 – – – – – –
mechanical response
tM s 3, 7, 9 4 – t2 – – – –
mechanical inertia
time related to a tolerance
tF s 2, 3, 5, 7 4 – – – – – –
factor for the machinery
overall system response
Tm time determined by meas- s 5 4 – – – – – –
urement
time delay from the initia-
t SF s 4 – – – – – – –
tion of a safety function

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
Table E.2 (continued)

ISO 13855:2010a
IEC 62046:2018
ISO 13857:2019
Reference for-
IEC 61496-
IEC 61496-
Reference
Reference
Variable Parameter
figure(s)
mula(e)
table(s)
2:2020
3:2018
Units
1, 8, 14,
15, 16, 17,
Applicant-dependent sup-
Z mm 19 to 24, 2, 21, 22 – – – – – –
plemental distance factor
26 to 29,
31 to 37, 41
supplement for general de-
ZG mm 6 – – – – – – C TZ
vice measurement errors
supplement for position un-
ZM mm – – – – – – – –
certainty of the machinery
supplement for position
ZP mm – – – – – – – –
uncertainty of the person
supplement for reflec-
ZR tion-based measurement mm 6 – – – – – – –
errors
supplement for lack of
ZF ground clearance of moving mm 6 – – – – – – –
machinery
supplement for decreasing
ZB braking torque of moving mm 6 – – – – – – –
machinery

ISO 13855:2010a
IEC 62046:2018
ISO 13857:2019
Reference for-
IEC 61496-
IEC 61496-
Reference
Reference
Variable Parameter
figure(s)
mula(e)
table(s)
2:2020
3:2018
Units
control system sampling

tS s 7 – – – – – – –
interval
initial speed of the machin-
v0 mm/s 9, 10 – – – – – – –
ery
maximum speed of the
vmax mm/s 10, 11 – – – – – – –
machinery
known possible acceleration
a mm/s2 9 – – – – – – –
of the machinery
known possible deceleration
d (braking capability) mm/s2 9, 10, 11 – – – – – – –
of the machinery

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)

ISO 13855:2010a
IEC 62046:2018
ISO 13857:2019
Reference for-
IEC 61496-
IEC 61496-
Reference
Reference
Variable Parameter
figure(s)
mula(e)
table(s)
2:2020
3:2018
Units
separation distance with
SA mm - 5 - - - - - -
dynamic approach
change in position of the
hazard (distance travelled
SM by the machinery until mm 12 5 – – – – – –
intended risk reduction is
achieved)
change in position of the
person (distance travelled
SP mm 12 5 – – – – – –
by the person until intended
risk reduction is achieved)
time at which the safety
T0 function is triggered at s – 5 – – – – – –
position P1
time at which the intended
T1 s – 5 – – – – – –
risk reduction is achieved
PO origin of coordinates – – 5 – – – – – –
position of the person when
P1 the safety function is trig- – – 5 – – – – – –
gered at time T0
position of the machine
hazard when the safety
P2 – – 5 – – – – – –
function is triggered at time
T0
position of the machine
hazard when the intended
P3 – – 5 – – – – – –
risk reduction is achieved at
time T1
approach angle of the haz-
α deg – 5 – – – – – –
ard
approach angle of the per-
β deg – 5 – – – – – –
son
angle between the move-
γ ment of the hazard and deg – 5 – – – – – –
movement of the person

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)

Reference for-
Reference Fig-
Reference ta-
ISO 13855:2010a
IEC 62046:2018
ISO 13857:2019
IEC 61496-
IEC 61496-
Variable Parameter
mula(e)
2:2020
3:2018
ure(s)
ble(s)
Units
θ Angle of detection zone rela-
deg – 8 – – – – – –
tive to direction of approach

Reference for-
Reference fig-
Reference ta-
ISO 13855:2010a
IEC 62046:2018
ISO 13857:2019
IEC 61496-
IEC 61496-
Variable Parameter
mula(e)
2:2020
3:2018
ure(s)
ble(s)
Units
reaching distance over a 13, 14,

DDO mm 9, 11 2 CRO – – – –
vertical detection zone 15, 16
reaching distance over a
DGO mm – 12 – – sh – – –
protective structure
9, 13, 14
reaching distance through a
DDT mm – 15, G.2, – CRT – – – –
vertical detection zone
G.3
reaching distance under a
DDU mm – 9, 26, 27 3 – – – – –
vertical detection zone
reaching distance under a
DGU mm – 19 4 – sr – – –
protective structure
height of the upper edge of
HDT the detection zone from the mm – 11 2 b – A1 – b
reference plane
height of the upper edge of hps
HGT the protective structure mm – 12 – – – – –
from the reference plane b
height of the lower edge of
HDB the detection zone from the mm 27, 28 18 3 – – A2 – a
reference plane
height of the lower edge of
HGB the protective structure mm – 19 4 – h – – –
from the reference plane
h
height of the hazard zone 11, 12, 18, B1
HH mm – 2, 3, 4 A hh – –
from the reference plane 19 B2
a

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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)

Reference for-
Reference fig-
Reference ta-
ISO 13855:2010a
IEC 62046:2018
ISO 13857:2019
IEC 61496-
IEC 61496-
Variable Parameter
mula(e)
2:2020
3:2018
ure(s)
ble(s)
Units
shortest distance around
l1, l2 , l3 mm 25 17 – l1, l2, l3 – – – –
obstacles
distance of l1, projected on a
S1 mm – 17 – S1 – – – –
horizontal plane
S2 mm – 17 – S2 – – – –
horizontal plane
S3 mm – 17 – S3 – – – –
horizontal plane
actual distance travelled
S* mm 25 17 – S* – – – –
upon approach

Reference for-
Reference fig-
Reference ta-
ISO 13855:2010a
IEC 62046:2018
ISO 13857:2019
IEC 61496-
IEC 61496-
Variable Parameter
mula(e)
2:2020
3:2018
ure(s)
ble(s)
Units
height of the horizontal

HD detection zone from the mm 30 19, 20 – H – H – H
reference plane
depth of the horizontal
FD mm – 22 – – – A – –
detection zone

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Reference for-
Reference fig-
Reference ta-
ISO 13855:2010a
IEC 62046:2018
ISO 13857:2019
IEC 61496-
IEC 61496-
Variable Parameter
mula(e)
2:2020
3:2018
ure(s)
ble(s)
Units
reaching distance through
DGT the protective structure mm 36, 37 26 – – sr – – –
(e.g. interlocking guard)
actuating angle of the
interlocking device with ro-
ω deg 39, 40 27 5 – – – – –
tary cam actuated position
switch
thickness of the interlocking
GT mm 38, 40 27 – – – – – –
guard
width of the interlocking
GW mm 39, 40 27 5 – – – – –
guard
release time delay of the
t DY s 41
guard locking device
E.8 Variables introduced in Annex B
Table E.8 — Variables introduced in Annex B

Reference for-
Reference fig-
Reference ta-
ISO 13855:2010a
IEC 62046:2018
ISO 13857:2019
IEC 61496-
IEC 61496-
Variable Parameter
mula(e)
2:2020
3:2018
ure(s)
ble(s)
Units
sx sample standard deviation – – – B.2 – – – – –


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E.9 Variables introduced in Annex F
Table E.9 — Variables introduced in Annex F

Reference for-
Reference fig-
Reference ta-
ISO 13855:2010a
IEC 62046:2018
ISO 13857:2019
IEC 61496-
IEC 61496-
Variable Parameter
mula(e)
2:2020
3:2018
ure(s)
ble(s)
Units
opening time associat-
t3 ed with power-operated s F.2 – – t3 – – – –
guards
speed of the opening motion
vG of the power-operated mm/s F.2 – – v – – – –
guard
E.10 Variables introduced in Annex G
Table E.10 — Variables introduced in Annex G

Reference for-
Reference fig-
Reference ta-
ISO 13855:2010a
IEC 62046:2018
ISO 13857:2019
IEC 61496-
IEC 61496-
Variable Parameter
mula(e)
2:2020
3:2018
ure(s)
ble(s)
Units
height from the reference

H mm G.1 G.1 – – – – – –
plane

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Annex F
(normative)
Time factors in the overall system response time to achieve the

intended risk reduction
F.1 General
The overall system response time T is the time interval between the actuation of the input function to the
SRP/CS or SCS and achieving the intended risk reduction. See 5.4, Formula (1) and Annex A.
T includes portions of time that vary by machine type, the safeguard(s) applied, and the elements of the SRP/
CS or SCS involved in the safety function(s). See Figure 4.
F.2 Elements of the overall system response time T

F.2.1 Response time of the input tI
F.2.1.1 General
Protective devices have a delay from the time that they sense the presence, or absence (for hand controls) of
individuals until the output changes state (from ON to OFF). This time t I is the sum of the response times of
each protective device in series as shown in Formula (F.1):
t I = (t I1 + t I2 + t I3 +…) (F.1)
The maximum response time of the protective device(s), without the interface, is stated by the manufacturer.
F.2.1.2 Opening time associated with power-operated guards t3
In some cases, T may be reduced by the opening time associated with power-operated guards, t 3, which
is required for the power-operated guard to open to the extent that the opening size permits access of the
relevant parts of the body. The opening sizes e given in ISO 13857:2019, Table 4 shall be considered. The
calculation shall start with the smallest part of the body which can reach the hazard zone.
The opening time associated with power-operated guards, t 3, shall be determined by calculation or test.
When the value t 3 is calculated for power-operated guards (including interlocking roller doors) Formula (F.2)
shall be used:
e
t3 = (F.2)
vG
where
e is the opening size, in mm;

vG is the speed of the opening motion of the power-operated guard, in mm/s.
NOTE A separation distance which is too large can be reduced by applying an interlocking guard with guard
locking (see ISO 14119).

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F.2.2 Response time of the SRP/CS or SCS logic tL

The interface(s) between the protective device(s) and the output of the SRP/CS or SCS also has a delay from
the time that an input is received until the output changes state (from ON to OFF). This time t L is the sum of
the response times of each interface in series, see Formula (F.3).
t L = (t L1 + t L2 + t L3 +…) (F.3)
The maximum response time of the interface(s), without the protective device, is stated by the supplier.
F.2.3 Response time of the SRP/CS or SCS output tO

The response time of the SRP/CS or SCS output tO includes a delay from the actuation of its inputs and the
system logic initiating the signal to achieve the intended risk reduction, until the output de-energizes the
actuator.
F.2.4 Response time of the machinery tME

Response time of the machinery t ME is dependent upon the design of the machinery as follows:
a) The response time of the machinery t ME of part revolution clutch driven machines or machines that can
be stopped at any point in the machine cycle is equal to the time it takes to the achieve a stop (see item
b). If eddy current or other electro-magnetic clutches are used, see item c).
b) The response time of the machinery t ME is the sum of
— the time it takes to disengage the clutch,
— the time it takes to apply the brake, and
— the time it takes the brake to bring the hazardous motion to a condition where the intended risk
reduction is achieved.
c) The response time of the machinery t ME for direct drive, motor driven machines utilizing full voltage
motors, eddy current brakes, servo systems, vector systems or other variable speed systems, is equal to
the time it takes to achieve the intended risk reduction after the signal is given to the motor contactor
or drive system. This time should take into consideration both uncontrolled stops (Category 0) with
no braking and controlled stops (Categories 1 and 2), including dynamic braking. See IEC 60204-1 and
IEC 61800-5-2.
d) The response time of the machinery t ME for machines actuated or controlled by pneumatic or hydraulic
valves shall include the response time of the valve measured from the time that the valve is de-energized
until the intended risk reduction is achieved. The time to achieve the intended risk reduction for systems
using valves can be affected by high or low supply pressures, exhaust restrictions, sluggish spools or
poppets, or performance of the pilot valves.
F.2.5 Time related to a tolerance factor for the machinery tF

Performance monitoring systems are used to assure that a gradual increase in the time to achieve the
intended risk reduction caused by the degradation of components does not exceed the time used to calculate
the separation distance for the safeguard. Response time at the end of a machine cycle is usually different
than the response time during the hazardous portion(s) of the cycle, and since these times can vary due to
such factors as machine inertia, tool loading and energy transferred to the workpiece, a factor, t F, applies.
When a performance monitoring system is applied according to the relevant type‑C standard, the calculated
factor t F shall be added to the total time used to calculate the separation distance.
F.3 Using devices for measuring the overall system response time
Measurement devices are often used to measure the overall system response time or some of the elements
listed in F.2. When using these measurement devices, t M may be measured from the output of the actuator
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control system until the intended risk reduction is achieved. Likewise, tO + t M may be measured from the input
to the actuator control system until the intended risk reduction is achieved. Stop time measurement devices
can include plungers or flags that are used to simulate actuation of a protective device by an individual.
When using this type of measurement device, it is possible to measure the overall system response time T
presuming that there is an automatic means to detect that the intended risk reduction has been achieved.
The actual overall system response time is measured, at the moment in time of the measurement. The
protective device stated response time can be greater than that which was measured.
F.4 Applying the overall system response time to interlocking guards with guard locking
When an interlocking guard is provided with guard locking and a time delay feature is used to release the
guard locking feature, the overall system response time T should be used to determine the time delay of the
release.

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Annex G
(informative)
Explanations of the formulae and values used within this document
G.1 Reference planes

G.1.1 General
See 4.3, Table 1, table footnotes a to c.
G.1.2 Value a — Minimum step width

A surface with 50 mm width can be used as a step. The value has been derived from the P5 (5th percentile)
value of the heel width according to DIN 33402-2:2020-12, Table 60, and round-off to consider smaller
persons.
G.1.3 Value b — Minimum obstacle height

A surface not higher then 1 000 mm over the reference plane is considered as not sufficiently restricting
movement of the body and, therefore, allowing stepping or climbing over. This value has been taken from
ISO 13857:2019, Table 1, Footnote a and Table 2, Footnote b.
G.1.4 Value c — Height difference with the risk of falling

A surface height difference of 500 mm or more presents risk of falling. The value has been taken from
ISO 14122-2:2016, 4.23.
G.2 Leg width related to the height

See 9.2.
The increasing of the leg width with the height of the leg is represented by Formula (G.1):
H
GD =   + 50 (G.1)
 15 
where the added value of 50 mm represents the smallest profile of the leg (heel of the foot, see G.1).
Figure G.1 shows an illustration of Formula (G.1).

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Key
H height from the reference plane
Figure G.1 — Representation of the leg thickness (width) in relation to the height
G.3 Reaching distance DDT when reaching through vertical detection zones with the
upper limbs
NOTE See 8.3.
G.3.1 Reaching distance through a vertical detection zone DDT for effective detection
capability de ≤ 40 mm
Formula (18), DDT = 8 (de – 14), is a mathematical representation of the hand thickness in relation to the
intrusion depth as represented in Figure G.2. From the thumb root the thickness ratio decreases and
therefore the application of the formula is limited to 40 mm.

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Key
DDT reaching distance through a vertical detection zone
Figure G.2 — Representation of the hand thickness in relation to intrusion depth
capability 40 mm < de ≤ 55 mm
The formula DDT = 12 (de – 40), is a mathematical representation of the increasing arm thickness in relation
to the intrusion depth starting at the wrist as represented in the lower arm area of Figure G.3. Since the
formula shall be used for effective detection capabilities > 40 mm, the reaching distance resulting from the
application of Formula (18) to this value (8 × (40 – 14)) = 208 mm shall be added to the intrusion factor given
by the formula to result in DDT = 12 (de – 40) + 208. The arm thickness cannot increase after the elbow and
therefore the application of the formula is limited to a detection capability of 55 mm.
Key
1 hand
2 lower arm
3 upper arm
4 shoulder (area)
a DDT = 12(de − 40) mm + 208 mm.
Figure G.3 — Reaching distance for effective detection capability

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capability de > 55 mm
A device with a detection capability exceeding 55 mm is considered as unable to reliably detect the arm of a
person in all foreseeable circumstances. Therefore, for such devices, the reaching distance is the arm length,
with a value of 850 mm taken from ISO 13857:2019.
G.4 Reaching distance DDS for two-hand control devices not preventing
encroachment
See 10.1.
When two-hand control devices actuators do not prevent actuation using the forearm(s) or elbow(s)
according to ISO 13851:2019, 7.4, the reaching distance DDS is determined by the distance from the elbow to
the fingertips which is stated as 550 mm according to ISO 13851:2019, 7.3.
G.5 Reaching distance DDS when reaching over parallel detection zones
See 9.3
The value DDS = 1 200 mm represents the reaching distance when reaching over a detection zone parallel to
the reference plane that results from
a) bending the torso and extending the arm over a detection zone that cannot be stepped over, or
b) stepping over a detection zone while extending the arm.

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Annex ZA
(informative)
Relationship between this European Standard and the essential

requirements of Directive 2006/42/EC aimed to be covered
NOTE Annex ZA is not included in the final ISO publication.
This European Standard has been prepared under a Commission’s standardization request “M/396 Mandate
to CEN and CENELEC for Standardisation in the field of machinery" to provide one voluntary means of
conforming to essential requirements of Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 May 2006 on machinery, and amending Directive 95/16/EC (recast).
Once this standard is cited in the Official Journal of the European Union under that Directive, compliance
with the normative clauses of this standard given in Table ZA.1 confers, within the limits of the scope of this
standard, a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential requirements of that Directive, and
associated EFTA regulations.
Table ZA.1 — Correspondence between this European Standard and Annex I of Directive 2006/42/EC
The relevant Essential Require- Clause(s)/sub-clause(s) of this EN Remarks/Notes
ments of Directive 2006/42/EC
1.2.2 10, 11,
1.4.1 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12
1.4.2.2 12
1.4.3 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
1.7.4.2 Annex D
Table ZA.2 — Applicable Standards to confer presumption of conformity as described in this

Annex ZA
Reference in Clause 2 International Title Corresponding European
Standard Edition Standard Edition
ISO 12100:2010 ISO 12100:2010 Safety of machinery — General princi- EN ISO 12100:2010
ples for design — Risk assessment and
risk reduction
ISO 13857:2019 ISO 13857:2019 Safety of machinery — Safety distances EN ISO 13857:2019
to prevent hazard zones being reached
by upper and lower limbs
The documents listed in the Column 1 of Table ZA.2, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this
document, i.e. are indispensable for its application. The achievement of the presumption of conformity
is subject to the application of the edition of Standards as listed in Column 4 or, if no European Standard
Edition exists, the International Standard Edition given in Column 2 of Table ZA.2.
WARNING 1 Presumption of conformity stays valid only as long as a reference to this European Standard is
maintained in the list published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Users of this standard should consult
frequently the latest list published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
WARNING 2 Other Union legislation may be applicable to the product(s) falling within the scope of this standard.

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Bibliography
[1] ISO 7250-3, Basic human body measurements for technological design — Part 3: Worldwide and regional
design ranges for use in product standards
[2] ISO 11161, Safety of machinery — Integrated manufacturing systems — Basic requirements
[3] ISO 13849-1:2023, Safety of machinery — Safety-related parts of control systems — Part 1: General
principles for design
[4] ISO 13849-2, Safety of machinery — Safety-related parts of control systems — Part 2: Validation
[5] ISO 13851:2019, Safety of machinery — Two-hand control devices — Principles for design and selection
[6] ISO 13854, Safety of machinery — Minimum gaps to avoid crushing of parts of the human body
[7] ISO 13856-1, Safety of machinery — Pressure-sensitive protective devices — Part 1: General principles
for design and testing of pressure-sensitive mats and pressure-sensitive floors
[8] ISO 14119, Safety of machinery — Interlocking devices associated with guards — Principles for design
and selection
[9] ISO 14120, Safety of machinery — Guards — General requirements for the design and construction of
fixed and movable guards
[10] ISO 14122-2:2016, Safety of machinery — Permanent means of access to machinery — Part 2: Working
platforms and walkways
[11] ISO/TS 15066, Robots and robotic devices — Collaborative robots
[12] ISO 15534-1, Ergonomic design for the safety of machinery — Part 1: Principles for determining the
dimensions required for openings for whole-body access into machinery
[13] ISO 15534-2, Ergonomic design for the safety of machinery — Part 2: Principles for determining the
dimensions required for access openings
[14] ISO 15534-3, Ergonomic design for the safety of machinery — Part 3: Anthropometric data
[15] IEC 60204-1, Safety of machinery — Electrical equipment of machines — Part 1: General requirements
[16] IEC 61496-1:2020, Safety of machinery — Electro-sensitive protective equipment — Part 1: General
requirements and tests
[17] IEC 61496-2:2020, Safety of machinery — Electro-sensitive protective equipment — Part 2: Particular
requirements for equipment using active opto-electronic protective devices (AOPDs)
[18] IEC 61496-3:2018, Safety of machinery — Electro-sensitive protective equipment — Part 3: Particular
requirements for active opto-electronic protective devices responsive to diffuse reflection (AOPDDR)
[19] IEC/TS 61496-4-2, Safety of machinery — Electro-sensitive protective equipment — Part 4-2: Particular
requirements for equipment using vision based protective devices (VBPD) — Additional requirements
when using reference pattern techniques (VBPDPP)
[20] IEC/TS 61496-4-3, Safety of machinery — Electro-sensitive protective equipment — Part 4-3: Particular
requirements for equipment using vision based protective devices (VBPD) — Additional requirements
when using stereo vision techniques (VBPDST)
[21] IEC 61800-5-2, Adjustable speed electrical power drive systems — Part 5-2: Safety requirements —
Functional
[22] IEC 62046:2018, Safety of machinery — Application of protective equipment to detect the presence of persons
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ISO/FDIS 13855:2024(en)
[23] IEC 62061:2021, Safety of machinery — Functional safety of electrical, electronic and programmable
control systems for machinery
[24] EN 12203, Footwear, leather and imitation leather goods manufacturing machines — Shoe and leather
presses — Safety requirements
[25] EN 12453, Industrial, commercial and garage doors and gates — Safety in use of power operated doors
— Requirements
[26] ANSI B11.19, Performance Requirements For Risk Reduction Measures: Safeguarding And Other Means
Of Reducing Risk
[27] DIN 33402-2, 2020-12, Ergonomics — Human body dimensions — Part 2: Values
[28] “Reaching over ESPE and indirect approach to hazardous zones”; research by German
Berufsgenossenschaft Metall Nord Süd, Fachausschuss Maschinenbau Fertigungssysteme und
Stahlbau (FA MFS), W.Th. Römheldstr.15; D-55130 Mainz; DOK 612.1:2008 http://w ww.bg-metall.de/
[29] DGUV FB HM-072, “3D safety zone: positioning of ESPE - Determination of safety distance following
DIN EN ISO 13855”, Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung e.V. (DGUV), Sachgebiet „Maschinen,
Robotik und Fertigungsautomation“ im Fachbereich „Holz und Metall“ der DGUV, Glinkastraße 40
10117 Berlin; 2020
[30] IRSST R-956, “Study of Machine Safety for Reduced-Speed or Reduced-Force Work”; Y. Chinniah,
B. Aucourt, R. Bourbonnière, Institut de recherche Robert-Sauvé en santé et en sécurité du travail
(IRSST), 505 De Maisonneuve Blvd. West, Montréal, Québec, H3A 3C2, 2017 http://w ww.irsst.qc.ca/
media/documents/PubIRSST/R-956.pdf
[31] Research project No. FP-0317: “Collaborative robots – Investigation of pain sensibility at the Man‐
Machine‐Interface” Institute for Occupational, Social and Environmental Medicine at the Johannes
Gutenberg University of Mainz, Germany. Final report December 2014
[32] BG/BGIA Risk assessment recommendations according to machinery directive. “Design of workplaces
with collaborative robots.” U 001/ 2009e October 2009 edition, revised February 2011 https://
publikationen.dguv.de/dguv/pdf/10002/bg_bgia_empf_u_001e.pdf
[33] MEWES, D. AND F. MAUSER:, "Safeguarding Crushing Points by Limitation of Forces." International
Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics. 2003, 9. (2): 177-191
[34] SUITA K. YAMADA Y., TSUCHIDA N., IMAI K., IKEDA H., SUGIMOTO N. “A failure-to-safety "Kyozon"
system with simple contact detection and stop capabilities for safe human-autonomous robot
coexistence”, Proc. of 1995 IEEE Int. Conf. on Robotics and Automation, Vol. 3 (1995) pp. 3089-3096
[35] YAMADA Y., SUITA K., IKEDA H., SUGIMOTO N., MIURA H., NAKAMURA H.:, “Evaluation of pain
tolerance based on a biomechanical method for human-robot coexistence”, Transactions of the Japan
Society of Mechanical Engineers. Series C, Vol. 63, No. 612 (1997) pp. 2814-2819
[36] ISO 128951), Safety of machinery — Identification of whole body access and prevention of derived risks
1) Under development. Stage at the time of publication: ISO/DIS 12895.

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FINAL DRAFT

approach of the human body Voting begins on:

RECIPIENTS OF THIS DRAFT ARE INVITED TO SUBMIT,

ISO/CEN PARALLEL PROCESSING BEING ACCEPTABLE FOR INDUSTRIAL, TECHNO­

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

Safety of machinery — Positioning of safeguards with respect

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

d) single control devices;

3 Terms, definitions, symbols and abbreviated terms

3.1 Terms and definitions

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

3.2 Symbols and abbreviated terms

3.2.2 Abbreviated terms

AOPD active opto-electronic protective device

VBPD vision-based protective device

ESPE electro-sensitive protective equipment

SPE sensitive protective equipment (see ISO 12100:2010, 3.28.5)

SRMCD safety-related manual control device

SRP/CS safety-related part of a control system

SCS safety-related control system (see IEC 62061:2021, 3.2.3)

SSC speed and separation control

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

4.2 Static and dynamic separation distances

4.3 Reference planes

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

4.5 Specific requirements for ESPE regarding whole body access

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

In exceptional cases (see 8.3.5) a beam separation of 500 mm may be applied.

4.5.3 Additional requirements for single beam devices

4.6 Reaching distance to SRMCD

4.7 Direction of approach toward detection zone of ESPE

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

Requirements are also provided for arrangements where

4.8 Speed and separation control (SSC)

Safeguards that require a separation distance include:

b) pressure-sensitive mats and pressure-sensitive floors (see Clause 9);

5.2 Separation distance S

S is the separation distance, in millimetres (mm);

T is the overall system response time, in seconds (s), (see 5.4);

Z is an application-dependent supplemental distance factor, in millimetres (mm), (see 5.6).

5.3 Approach speed K

5.3.1 Approach speed of the human body

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

5.3.2 Approach speed of mobile machinery

5.4 Overall system response time T

t SRP/CS is the response time of the SRP/CS or SCS;

t ME is the response time of the machinery;

tF is the time related to a tolerance factor for the machinery, if necessary.

Licensed to: Santos, Ronaldo Gabriel Mr

ISO/CEN PARALLEL PROCESSING BEING ACCEPTABLE FOR INDUSTRIAL, TECHNO