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Strategic Leadership and Innovation at Apple Inc.
Chapter · January 2016

DOI: 10.4135/9781526446565
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SOTIRIOS PAROUTIS . LOIZOS HER ACLEOUS . DUNCAN ANGWIN
Practicing
Strategy Te x t & C a s e s
2ND
EDITION
STRATEGIC
LEADERSHIP AND
INNOVATION AT
13
APPLE INC.1
Apple, Inc. is actually four diverse and thriving companies all wrapped up into one. It’s a hardware company,
a software company, a services company, and a retail company. Most technology companies in the world can
manage one or two of these disciplines, but only Apple has all four entities working in harmony. (Bajarin, 2011)
Back in 1997 few would have thought that Apple Computers would one day be recognized as
one of the most innovative companies in the world, transcending the barriers of the computer
industry to compete in the consumer electronics, telecommunications, and music industries
(see Figure 13.1 for an outline of Apple’s product and service portfolio). Since the return of
Steve Jobs to the company, Apple rose from a $2 billion company in 1997 to nearly $417 billion
in 2011, overtaking Exxon Mobil to become the world’s most valuable company by market
capitalization in August 2011 (Economist, 2011a). In 2010 Apple surpassed Microsoft in mar-
ket capitalization, which was regarded as an important milestone in the technology industry
(Rusche, 2011). By the end of March 2012, Apple’s market capitalization rose to $573bn, more
than twice that of Microsoft at $273bn; and it accounted for 4.5% of the S&P 500, and 1.1% of
the global equity market (Economist, 2012). The company’s upward trajectory continued, and
by March 2015 Apple Inc was still the most valuable company in the world, worth over $719bn.
In comparison, Google was worth $380bn, Exxon Mobil $351bn, and Microsoft $336bn.
Building on innovative products that have redefined their markets (such as the iPod, the
iPhone, and the iPad), a consumer base as loyal as a fan club, and a business model character-
ized by integration of products and services, lean operations, and operational synergies that no
1
This case was prepared by Professor Loizos Heracleous and Angeliki Papachroni for the purposes of class
discussion and is not meant to illustrate effective or ineffective handling of administrative situations.
Warwick Business School, [email protected], March 2015.
13_Paroutis_BAB1511B0433_Ch-13.indd 168 04-Dec-15 5:56:38 PM

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND INNOVATION AT APPLE INC.169 169
Phone Products & Music Products &

Computer Hardware
Services Services
− iPod & related accessories

− Mac Hardware products
− iTunes Store:
− iPad, tablet PC − iPhone Online service to distribute 3rd
− Server & Storage Products − App Store party music/audio books/music
− Related devices & Peripherals
videos/short films/tv shows/
− 3rd party Hardware
movies/podcasts/iPod games
Software Products &

Apple Inc Peripherals
Computer Technologies
− Apple branded & 3rd

− Software programs
party Mac compatible
(Mac OS X and iOS)
peripheral products
− iLife, iWork
Wireless
Internet Software
Connectivity
& Services
& Networking
− iCloud
− Web browser (Safari5)
− Airport extreme
− MobileMe
(wireless networking
− Quick Time
technology)
FIGURE 13.1 Apple Inc. Key Product and Service Portfolio

Source: Authors.
competitor could easily imitate, Apple outperformed its competitors and the market. In 2011,
the year that Steve Jobs died, Apple reported $108bn in revenues – up from $65bn in 2010 – and
$26bn net income and nearly $82bn in cash reserves (Nuttall, 2011). (See Tables 13.1 and 13.2
for an outline of Apple’s financial performance during 2009–11). By the year ending September
2014, Apple had revenues of $182bn and cash reserves of $155bn. Operating income stood at
28.7%, and net income at 21.6% (Annual Report, 2014). Apple Inc’s financial statements and
sales by segment are included in Tables 13.1 and 13.2.
JOBS’ TURNAROUND AND REBUILDING AN

INNOVATIVE ORGANIZATION
Things haven’t always been that rosy for the company once known as the underdog of the com-
puter industry. During the time when Steve Jobs was away from the organization (1985–97)
Apple progressively degenerated to the point of struggling for survival. Apple charged premium
prices and operated through a closed proprietary system, at a time when more economical, IBM-
compatible PCs gained mass appeal. Its cost base was high compared to its major competitors.

170 CASE STUDIES
This combination of factors led to shrinking market share and lower profitability. Apple lost
momentum in the PC industry, despite the effort of three different CEOs to reverse the downfall
(see Table 13.3 for a timeline of Apple’s CEO tenures).John Sculley attempted to gain market
share (at the time around 7%) by introducing lower priced products that still had a technological
edge, forged alliances with IBM to work on a joint operating system and multimedia applica-
tions, and outsourced much of manufacturing to subcontractors to cut costs. A joint alliance was
also formed with Novell and Intel to reconfigure Apple’s OS to run on Intel chips. By the end of
Sculley’s tenure in 1993 however, market share was still at around 8%, and Apple’s gross profits
had reduced from around 50% to 34% (Yoffie and Slind, 2008).
During Spindler’s tenure, the alliances with Intel and Novell, as well as with IBM, were
exited, and a decision was taken to license Apple’s OS to companies that would make Mac
clones (a decision subsequently reversed by Jobs in 1997). There was focus on international
growth, and more cost-cutting efforts. With performance remaining flat, Spindler was replaced
by Gil Amelio. In 1996, under Amelio, Apple went through three successive restructurings and
further cost cutting. At the same time, Amelio aimed to return Apple to its premium price,
differentiation strategy (Yoffie and Slind, 2008). The biggest challenge at the time was the
release of Apple’s new-generation operating system in response to the release of Microsoft’s
Windows 95, which had received great attention upon its release one year earlier. Apple’s OS
system named Copland, on the other hand, was so behind schedule that the company decided to
turn to external help. Ironically, Apple turned to NeXT, a software company founded by Steve
Jobs after his departure from Apple in 1985. Meanwhile, Apple’s market share fell to 3% and
Amelio was forced out by the board of directors.
After NeXT’s help with the new version of Apple’s operating system, Apple’s executive board
resolved to buy the company. A year later, in July 1997, Jobs was offered the title of Apple’s
CEO, after spending a few months as a consultant at Apple. This was a crucial time in the com-
pany’s history. Apple’s stock had sunk to $3.30 and the company reported a net loss of $708
million in its second quarter that year, flirting with bankruptcy. At the same time competitors
such as Dell and Microsoft were thriving, following the tech boom of the late 1990s. Jobs took
on the role of Interim CEO in 1997 and then became CEO during 2000.
The return of Steve Jobs to Apple in 1997 marked the beginning of a new era for the company.
Jobs worked for a salary of $1 per year for 30 months (and plenty of stock options), leading
Apple’s successful turnaround. His priority was to revitalize Apple’s innovation capability. “Apple
had forgotten who Apple was,” as he noted in an interview (Burrows, 2004), stressing that it was
time for Apple to return to its core values and build on them. At the time, Michael Dell was asked
at an investor conference what Jobs should do with Apple. He replied “I’d shut it down and give
the money back to the shareholders” (Burrows and Grover, 2006).
According to a former Apple executive who participated in Jobs’ first meeting with the top
brass on his return to Apple, Jobs went in with shorts, sneakers, and a few days’ beard, sat on
a swivel chair, spun slowly, and asked them what was wrong with Apple. Jobs then exclaimed
that it was the products, and that there was no sex in them anymore (Burrows and Grover,
2006). Upon taking charge, Jobs announced that Microsoft would invest $150m in Apple,
reaffirming its commitment to producing Microsoft Office and other products for the Mac,
and soon scrapped the Mac OS licensing program, that he believed was cannibalizing Mac sales
(Yoffie and Slind, 2008). He axed 70% of new products in development, kept 30% that he

believed were “gems,” and added some new projects that he believed could offer breakthrough
potential. He also revamped the marketing message to take advantage of the maverick, creative
Apple brand, and re-priced stock options to retain talent (Booth, 1997).
In January 2000, when Apple became profitable with a healthy share price, Apple announced
that it would buy Jobs a Gulfstream V jet, at a cost of $88m, fulfilling Jobs’ request for an aero-
plane so he could take his family on vacation to Hawaii and fly to the East coast. Larry Ellison,
Oracle CEO and a board member at Apple, said at the time, “with what he’s done, we ought to
give him five airplanes!” (Elkind, 2008). Between 2003 and 2008 Apple’s sales tripled to $24
billion and profits increased to $3.5 billion, up from a mere $24 million. Apple topped the list
of Fortune 500 companies for total return to shareholders both over 2003–8 (94% return) as
well as over 1998–2008 (51% return) (Morris, 2008: 68), a remarkable achievement.
In January 2007, Apple Computer changed its name to Apple Inc. (Yahoo finance, 2008),
signifying a shift away from its computer vendor roots. Since 2006, revenues from desktop and
portable computers were accounting for less than half of Apple’s total revenues; and by 2011,
just one fifth. By early 2007, Apple had come a long way: it had produced the world’s fastest
personal computer, introduced a series of attractive new Macintosh models with a reliable,
competitive operating system known for its astonishing backward compatibility, created a cult
following of iPod users, and begun its inroads into the mobile phone industry with the iPhone.
REDEFINING THE PC INDUSTRY

Upholding the value of user friendliness, Steve Jobs led the launch of the first iMac in 1998, his
first project after his return to the company. The iMac, or “the computer for the rest of us,” its
slogan when it was launched, revolutionized desktop computing by combining technological
advancements and unique design. The combination of a CPU, a CD ROM drive and a modem
all packed in a translucent case, that could support all “plug and play” peripherals that were
designed for Windows-based machines, for the compelling price of $1,299, marked Apple’s
dynamic comeback. Even though the iMac was the fastest selling Macintosh model ever, Apple
refused to rest on its laurels, continually updating its hardware and operating system, and
launching newer models and software almost every four months. Most importantly the iMac
was the first Apple product with wide consumer acceptance, since 70% of sales were Apple
converts, adding to the Macs already in use, helping Apple double its worldwide market share
to 6% by the end of 1998 (Linzmayer, 2004).
In parallel, Steve Jobs proceeded to simplify Apple’s product mix in terms of four lines of
desktop and portable computers designed for both the professional and consumer markets.
Following the iMac’s success, the iBook was launched in 1999. This consumer portable
computer featured an optional AirPort wireless networking hub that allowed up to ten
Macs to share an Internet connection. Just six weeks after the iBook’s unveiling, Apple
had received more than 140,000 advance orders, making it a success equal to the iMac
(Linzmayer, 2004).
After the introduction of the iMac and the iBook, Apple’s figures looked a lot healthier. In
October 1999 Apple announced its eighth consecutive profitable quarter and closed that fiscal
year with revenues of $6.1 billion and net earnings of $601 million. Whereas most of Apple’s

172 CASE STUDIES
innovations led to an even more closed Apple archipelagos (software and hardware integration),
at the same time Jobs decided to loosen control in other areas, for example the use of standard
interfaces, such as the USB port. This change made the Mac a more open system since users of
a Mac Mini for example could use a non-Mac keyboard (Yoffie and Slind, 2008). In the years
to follow, a variety of innovative proprietary applications, developed in-house, supported the
Macintosh product lines. These include programs such as Apple’s own Web browser, Safari,
developed in 2003, as well as those in the iLife package (iDVD, iMovie, iPhoto,) that offered
editing and creative opportunities to users.
GROWING THE APPLE ECOSYSTEM: BREAKTHROUGH

INNOVATION IN THE CONSUMER ELECTRONICS
AND ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES
In 2001 Apple introduced its first iPod, launching a new era for the company as it entered the
consumer electronics industry. Capitalizing on the emerging trend of MP3 music, Apple intro-
duced a breakthrough product that soon became synonymous with the MP3 music player
category. With impeccable design and easy to use menu, the iPod could load 1000 songs in just
10 minutes and play music for 10 hours. The integration with the iTunes 2.0 software also ena-
bled easy synchronization of music libraries. A year later, in 2002 Apple released iPods with
larger memory that were compatible with Windows, a move that further pushed iPod sales. By
the end of 2003 more than one million iPods were sold, marking the first substantial stream of
revenues apart from the Macintosh. Since then the iPod product range has been renewed every
three to five months and the company announced in 2007 that it sold the 100-millionth iPod.
These numbers made the iPod the fastest selling music player in history (Apple, 2007).
One the most important innovations for Apple has been the launch of the iTunes Music store
in 2003, a revolutionary service through which consumers could access and purchase online
music for only $0.99 per song. The iTunes Music Store was compatible with all iPods (running
both on Macs as well as Windows-based computers) and served as Apple’s Trojan horse to what
Jobs had envisioned as the digital hub where digital content and Apple devices would be seam-
lessly interconnected. The downloaded songs had royalty protection and could only be played by
iPods, bringing the interoperability between Apple’s hardware, software, and content to a new
level and creating higher barriers to entry into this ecosystem. iPods had the capacity to display
videos and through them Apple became a significant distributor of movies and TV shows. Five
years after entering the music business, Apple surpassed Walmart to become the largest music
retailer in the USA (McCracken, 2011a).
Apple’s next groundbreaking innovation was the iPhone, a device combining a phone, a
music player, and a personal computer that redefined the mobile phone industry in the same
way iPod and iTunes revolutionized the music industry. According to Jobs, “It was a great chal-
lenge: Let’s make a great phone that we fall in love with. Nobody had thought about putting
operating systems as sophisticated as an OS X inside a phone, so that was a real question”
(quoted in Morris, 2008: 69). iPhone’s success has been attributed not only to its technological
capacity but also to its design: “We had a different enclosure design for this iPhone until way

too close to the introduction to ever change it. And it came one Monday morning and I said:
I just don’t love it. And we pushed the reset button. That happens more than you think because
it is not just engineering and science. There is art too.” (Jobs quoted in Morris, 2008: 70).
According to Burrows and Grover (2006), “Jobs’ true secret weapon is his ability to meld tech-
nical vision with a gut feel of what regular consumers want and then market it in ways that
make regular consumers want to be part of tech’s cool club.” The success of the iPhone has been
phenomenal. In 2011 alone, iPhone handset sales reached 72.3 million units, up from nearly
40 million in 2010 (see Table 13.1).
In 2008 Apple launched the App Store, the only authorized service for loading programs onto
the iPhone. The App Store was based on the same principle of seamless integration between
hardware and software, giving Apple 30% of third-party developers’ revenues along the way.
Although Apple followed a particularly strict policy regarding the authorizing of applications,
the App Store still gave the iPhone a vast selection of desirable applications, adding precious
content to the iPhone offering (McCracken, 2011a).
The Apple ecosystem was further reinforced in 2010, with the introduction of the iPad, a
tablet computer that aimed at revitalizing a niche and up till then commercially risky prod-
uct category. Whereas the iPad was initially received with some skepticism, Jobs’ intuition
proved correct. Within its first year of release, Apple sold 14.8 million iPads (McCracken,
2011a) and with the launch of the iPad 2 sales rose further to an astonishing 32 million
in 2011 (see Table 13.1), giving Apple two-thirds of the tablet computer market. Spurred
by the iPad’s success, the tablet computer market grew to approximately $35bn in 2012
(Economist, 2011b). At the same time, the traditional PC market experienced stagnation,
marking what was seen as the first signs of the post-PC era (Forbes, 2012a).
During the launch presentation of the iPad Jobs revealed that the company was already
in agreement with top publishers such as Penguin and Simon & Schuster for the creation of
specially made books to be purchased online at the new iBooks store. Applications were also
available for the electronic version of major newspapers such as the New York Times. Further,
the iPad was designed so that most of the 140,000 gaming applications already available at the
App Store, could run on it straight away, turning it into a key gaming platform. In order to
ensure that the iPad was seen as more than an entertainment gadget, the iWork software (includ-
ing word-processing, spreadsheet, and presentation software) was also updated. The iPad was
priced at $499 for the basic version and $829 for one with larger memory and a 3G wireless
connection, making it premium priced but approachable for consumers (Economist, 2010).
In October 2011, Apple introduced iCloud, a cloud service for storing music, photos, applica-
tions, calendars, and documents that can be wirelessly transferred to multiple iOS devices, Macs,
and Windows-based computers. During its first three months of release 85 million customers
had signed up (Elmer-DeWitt, 2012). iCloud came with 5GB of free space while additional
space could be purchased from Apple. By providing a means of integrating the use of multiple
Apple devices iCloud marked a key strategic move towards a mobile Apple ecosystem (Satariano
and Burrows, 2011).
In early 2015 the market was eagerly awaiting the commercialization of the Apple Watch,
a re-invention of the watch as a lifestyle gadget which could exploit Apple’s enviable cache
of apps including health, financial, travel, and entertainment. Apple billed the watch as “the
most personal product we’ve ever made, because it’s the first one designed to be worn”

174 CASE STUDIES
(Apple Inc, 2015) and would introduce three editions at different price points; a regular
model, a sports model, and a luxury model.
THE COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE

Given Apple’s diversified product portfolio, competition includes companies from various
industries; from computer hardware and software to mobile communications and internet. In
that context apart from traditional competition from PC manufacturers who have struggled to
keep up in the mobile, what some have called post-PC era, Apple’s increasing role in content
distribution has brought the company a new set of competitors such as Amazon and Google
(Bajarin, 2011).
The giants: IBM and Microsoft

By 2015, the computer technology industry had undergone some profound changes that shaped
the competitive context within which Apple operated. IBM, the once undisputed leader in PC
manufacturing, had gradually moved away from its traditional territory of computer hardware
and with a focus on computer technology, research, and service consulting became a very differ-
ent company from what it used to be in the 1990s. In 2014 IBM had sales of $92.8 billion in
services, software, and hardware to businesses and governments. Its market capitalization in
March 2014 was $162bn, and its profitability was healthy, with an operating margin of 21.4%
and a net margin of nearly 13%.
IBM’s acquisition of PwC Consulting in 2002 marked the company’s serious entry into the
business services sector (Doz and Kosonen, 2008: 38). After selling its PC and laptop business
to Chinese company Lenovo in 2005 (a segment it had itself created) to allow a higher strategic
focus on services, and higher end servers, IBM’s strategy also moved to encompass open busi-
ness approaches. IBM was a significant contributor to open source movements such as Linux
by investing in the program’s development, growth, and distribution (Linux is supported on
all modern IBM Systems) and in 2005 the company gave away approximately 500 software
patents (valued over $10 million) with the aim of enhancing global innovation and profiting
from newly created business opportunities. Through these actions, IBM aimed to enlarge the
global market for IT products and services and to benefit by responding to this demand. IBM
made over 50 acquisitions during 2002–7, building a portfolio around “networked, modular-
ized and embedded technologies, including service-oriented architecture (SOA), information
on demand, virtualization and open, modular systems for businesses of all sizes” (IBM Annual
Report, 2007: 2). With IBM exiting the PC manufacturing industry the competitive environ-
ment in this front included HP, Dell, Acer, and Lenovo.
Following the launch of the IBM PC, Microsoft dominated the PC operating system market
mostly because it offered an open standard that multiple PC makers could incorporate into their
products. Windows OS became the dominant operating system in the industry with more than
85% of all PCs in the world running on some Windows version (Yoffie and Slind, 2008). By
2009 Microsoft faced increased competition in the software front from Apple, HP, IBM, and Sun
Microsystems, as well as Linux OS derived from UNIX. Microsoft’s portfolio also included the

online search and advertising business (MSN portals, Live Search, etc.) in which the company
sought to invest further. In 2009 after a long period of speculation Microsoft and Yahoo joined
forces in the internet-search business in an effort to respond to Google’s market domination (BBC,
2009). Microsoft’s position in the entertainment industry was holding strong with the Xbox 360
console selling 13.7 million units in 2011 (Microsoft Annual Report, 2011). Microsoft’s revenue
reached $93.5 billion in fiscal year 2014, with an operating profit margin of 30.6% and net mar-
gin of 22.1%. By 2014 Microsoft was facing new challenges stemming from stagnating growth
of the PC industry due to increased interest in mobile devices such as smartphones and tablet
PCs, leading to a gradual decline in its Windows revenues. As a competitive response Microsoft
released its Mobile Operating System, Windows Phone in 2011 as part of a partnership with
Nokia; and announced an update of its Windows OS for tablet PCs (New York Times, 2012a).
The computer vendors: Hewlett-Packard, Dell, and Lenovo

After the acquisition of Compaq in 2002, which brought significant scale in its desktop and
laptop product lines, HP became the world’s largest PC vendor, surpassing rival Dell in 2007
with a 3.9% market share lead. By 2011 the company’s revenue was $125 billion, making it
the world’s largest technology company in terms of revenues; even though its profitability
was relatively thin, at 8.4% operating profit margin, and 4.75% net profit margin (and mar-
ket capitalization of $48.2bn in mid-March 2012); reflecting the intense levels of competition
in the computer hardware industry. By the fiscal year 2014, HP’s revenues declined to
$110bn, with operating profits remaining at 8% and net profits at 4.5%; with a market capi-
talization of $60bn in March 2015. HP’s portfolio included personal computing, imaging
and printing-related products and services, as well as enterprise information technology
infrastructure, including enterprise storage and servers, technology support and maintenance,
consulting and integration and outsourcing services. After experiencing a turbulent period
due to an unsuccessful effort to enter the mobile business, in 2011 HP was the largest PC
manufacturer in the world with 17.6% share of worldwide PC shipments in the first quarter
of 2011 (Shukla, 2011). If tablet PCs, however, are included in the global PC market, HP has
been overtaken by Apple as market leader due to the stellar success of the iPad from 2011
onwards (Mellow, 2012).
Dell Inc. offered a range of product categories including desktop personal computers, servers
and networking products, storage, mobility products, software and peripherals, and services.
It was the first computer company to sell customized PCs directly to consumers without using
intermediaries. Once the leading PC vendor in terms of both profitability and market share,
Dell faced increased competition in the desktop and notebook business that made it difficult to
sustain its earlier growth and profitability rates.
Although Dell had based its success in its distinctive business model of direct sales and built to
order manufacturing, in 2011 the company was surpassed by China-based Lenovo, which rose to
second place in the PC market after HP with sales of more than 12 million units, growing by more
than 25% over the previous year. Dell had $62bn of revenues in 2011, with relatively thin profitability
of 7.2% operating margin and 5.6% net margin, with a market value in March 2012 of $30.6bn.
By 2012 Lenovo announced its very own cloud strategy to integrate its line of personal computing,
smartphones and tablets marking its aspired transformation from a hardware manufacturer to a

176 CASE STUDIES
“solutions provider” (New York Times, 2012b). In October 2013 Dell went private, acquired by its
founder Michael Dell and technology investment company Silver Lake Partners, in a $25bn deal.
Emerging competition: Google, Amazon, and Samsung

Apple’s ecosystem of products topped with the iCloud strategy, was faced with several com-
petitors including Amazon, Google, and Samsung. Apart from being the biggest online retailer
with $89bn revenues in 2014, Amazon also offered its own cloud service. With products and
services that span digital music, movies, books, TV shows, and consumer electronics, Amazon
was a leading competitor in the digital content market (Bajarin, 2011). Amazon’s tablet propo-
sition, the Kindle Fire challenged the iPad due to its low entry price: $199 versus $499 for the
iPad 2 (Forbes, 2012b); even though its aesthetics and functionality were below those of the
iPad, but improving. Reflecting the challenging nature of Amazon’s markets, its profit margins
were razor thin or negative. In 2014, its operating margin was 0.2% and net margin was
–0.27%, with a market value of $174bn in March 2015.
At the same time, Google with its Chrome browser and its Android operating system that run
on both tablets and smartphones was a credible challenger in these product-markets. Contrary
to Apple’s ecosystem approach, Google made its Android system available to be installed on
a variety of different handsets by Sony, Motorola, Samsung, LG, and others. Android’s code
was open for manufacturers and developers whose applications were available at the Android
Market. By fiscal year 2014, Google had revenues of $66bn, operating profits of 25.6%, net
profits of 21.9% and market value of $380.9% in March 2015. Samsung, a South Korean
conglomerate operating in the mobile telecommunications, consumer electronics, information
technology, healthcare, and other sectors, became a leading competitor in mobile phone and
tablet devices through offering high quality, keenly priced hardware based on the Android oper-
ating system. As a corporation, Samsung had revenues of $186.6bn, with operating margin of
12.1% and net margin of 11.2%, and a market value of $192bn in March 2015.
PLAYING WITH DIFFERENT RULES

Deep Collaboration
Long before it was voted as the world’s most innovative company, Apple had placed its trade-
mark on a long list of technological breakthroughs including the mouse, the graphical user
interface, color graphics, built-in sound, networking and wireless LAN, FireWire, and many
more (some of which, such as the mouse and graphical user interface were inspired from Steve
Jobs’ visit to Xerox Parc in 1979). Apple’s approach over the years had been to make use of a
personal computer as easy and intuitive as possible through developing a highly responsive
operating system, establishing standard specifications to which all applications’ software pack-
ages were expected to conform, strict control of outside developers, and delivering computers
with high performance (Cruikshank, 2006).
Apple’s innovations enhanced the consistency across applications, which translated to
ease of use, an attribute that helped to explain to some extent Apple’s loyal consumer base.

Another significant characteristic of Apple’s approach to innovation was the diffusion of

innovation across the value chain (Cruikshank, 2006) with both high-end and mid-market
products that appealed to a wide audience ranging from amateurs to professionals. According
to Jobs, “Apple’s DNA has always been to try to democratize technology. If you make some-
thing great then everybody will want to use it” (quoted in Morris, 2008: 69).
Many of the disruptive innovations Apple has introduced are based on what employees call
“deep collaboration,” “cross pollination,” or “concurrent engineering.” This refers to products
not developed in discrete stages but by “all departments at once – design, hardware, software –
in endless rounds of interdisciplinary design reviews” (Grossman, 2005). In an interview about
how innovation is fostered in the company, Jobs noted that the system for innovation is that
there is no system: “The reason a lot of us are at Apple is to make the best computers in the
world and make the best software in the world. We know that we’ve got some stuff that (is) the
best right now. But it can be so much better. … That’s what driving us … And we’ll sleep well
when we do that” (quoted in Cruikshank, 2006: 25).
Although Apple has been envied for its ability to catch the wave in new technology fronts
earlier than competitors (such as in the case of iTunes and the iPhone) Jobs describes it as a
rather slow process:
Things happen fairly slowly, you know. They do. These waves of technology, you can see them way before they
happen, and you just have to choose wisely which ones you are going to surf. If you choose unwisely, then you can
waste a lot of energy, but if you choose wisely, it actually unfolds fairly slowly. (Jobs, quoted in Morris, 2008: 70)
Sticking with a Proprietary Ecosystem

In a world filled with junky devices, clunky software, inscrutable error messages and annoying interfaces, Jobs’
insistence on a simple, integrated approach led to astonishing products marked by delightful user experiences.
Using an Apple product could be as sublime as walking in one of the Zen gardens of Kyoto that Jobs loved …
Sometimes it’s nice to be in the hands of a control freak. (Isaacson, 2011)
Apple’s innovations have redefined existing product categories such as music players and mobile
phones, and helped the company successfully enter hotly contested new markets such as the
entertainment industry. Key to these achievements have been the focus on design, the consumer
experience, and the seamless integration of hardware and software and content. The tight inte-
gration of its own operating system, hardware and applications, has been a strategy followed
diligently by Apple. As Steve Jobs says: “One of our biggest insights [years ago] was that we
didn’t want to get into any business we didn’t own or control the primary technology, because
you’ll get your head handed to you. We realized that for almost all future consumer electron-
ics, the primary technology was going to be software. And we were pretty good at software”
(Morris, 2008: 70).
Apple is nearly unique among contemporary technology companies in doing all of its own
design in-house, at its Cupertino campus. Other companies have outsourced most or all of their
product design function, relying on outsourced design manufacturers (ODMs) to develop the
products that with minor adaptations will fit into their product lines. Apple, however, believes
that having all the experts in one place – the mechanical, electrical, software, and industrial

178 CASE STUDIES
engineers, as well as the product designers, leads to a more holistic perspective on product
development; and that a critical mass of talent makes existing products better and opens the
door to entirely new products. According to Jobs,:
… you can’t do what you can do at Apple anywhere else. The engineering is long gone in the PC compa-
nies. In the consumer electronics companies they don’t understand the software parts of it. There’s no other
company that could make a MacBook Air and the reason is that not only do we control the hardware, but
we control the operating system. And it is the intimate interaction between the operating system and the
hardware that allows us to do that. There is no intimate interaction between Windows and a Dell computer.
(quoted in Morris, 2008)
The company’s tightly knit proprietary system has been frequently seen as the reason for
Apple’s loss of initial momentum in the PC industry and increasing isolation until the mid 90s.
According to Kahney, “When Jobs returned to Apple in 1997, he ignored everyone’s advice and
tied his company’s proprietary software to its proprietary hardware” (Kahney, 2008: 142). He
has persisted in following this strategy over the years even as other Silicon Valley firms were
turning towards openness and interoperability. Tony Fadell, Vice President of engineering in the
iPod division, notes that Apple aims to develop a self-reinforcing, synergistic system of products
rather than a series of individual products: “The product now is the iTunes Music Store and
iTunes and the iPod and the software that goes on the iPod. A lot of companies don’t really have
control, or they can’t really work in a collaborative way to truly make a system. We’re really
about a system” (quoted in Grossman, 2005).
Over the years, there have been some notable exceptions to this proprietary approach. In order
to reach a broader consumer base, in late 2003 Apple offered a Windows compatible version of
iTunes allowing not only Windows users to use the iPod but more importantly to familiarize
them with Apple products. Another milestone came with the company’s switch from PowerPC
processors made by IBM to Intel chips, a decision announced in mid-2005. This decision allowed
Macs to run Windows software, implied lower switching costs for new Mac consumers and also
allowed software developers to adapt more easily their programs for Apple. A previous alliance
with Microsoft occurred in 1997 when Microsoft agreed to invest $150 million in Apple, reaf-
firming its commitment to develop core products such as Microsoft Office for the Mac.
Other Strategic Moves

Apple has developed a series of strategic alliances in the course of its efforts to become the
center of the digital hub, where digital content would be easily created and transferred to any
Apple device. Development of the iPod, iTunes, and iPhone have necessitated this collaborative
approach, since entry in the entertainment and consumer electronics markets would not have
been as successful without some key strategic partners (for example the big record labels such
as EMI, Sony BMG, Universal and Warner Brothers for iTunes, or YouTube for the iPhone). In
this process of building systems, Apple has been very selective about its strategic partners.
Rather than aiming for the most partners, Apple focuses on engaging with the best companies
for a specific purpose (for example the partnership with Google in developing mapping and
video applications for the iPhone).

At the same time Apple has proceeded with a number of acquisitions intended to strengthen
its core competencies. For example, in 2002 it acquired the German specialist in music
software, Emagic, as well as Prismo Graphics, Silicon Grail, and Nothing Real, three small
companies involved in professional-level video creation and production. In April 2008 Apple
also announced the acquisition of the boutique microprocessor company PA Semi, known
for its highly sophisticated and low priced chips. With that acquisition Apple is said to be
building the capability to bring its chip design in-house, reinforcing an ever more tightly knit
ecosystem that helps to prevent copycat designs from rivals and offers the ability to design
chips for supporting specific new products or applications. According to CEO Tim Cook
(said at the time he was COO): “One traditional management philosophy that’s taught in
many business schools is diversification. Well, that’s not us. We are the antibusiness school”
(Burrows, 2004).
In 2001, Apple created a retail division to enable it to sell its products directly to the public.
By 2012 there were 357 retail stores in 11 countries (245 in the USA) accounting for almost
20% of total revenues (Apple’s retail stores rose to 437 by 2014). In 2006 Apple entered into an
alliance with Best Buy, and by the end of 2007 Apple products could be purchased in over 270
Best Buy stores (Yoffie and Slind, 2008). Being engaged at all parts of the value chain, including
retail outlets, enabled Apple to shape the whole customer experience.
CORPORATE CULTURE AND ORGANIZATION

DESIGN AT APPLE
Among the many amazing things about Apple is how scrutinized it is. Rarely have a company, its products,
and its top executive – the late Steve Jobs – been so thoroughly examined. And yet, for a corporation so fre-
quently discussed, Apple is poorly understood. Its products are ubiquitous, but information about the institution
is scarce – which is exactly how Apple wants it. (Lashinsky, 2012)
Along with being one of the most innovative companies in the world Apple has also gained a
reputation of being among the most secretive as well. A T-shirt for sale at the company shop
said: “I visited the Apple campus. But that’s all I’m allowed to say.” Few people know what
happens behind closed doors; Apple employees are bound with strict confidentiality agree-
ments and it seems that only one person authorized to ever talk about Apple was Steve Jobs.
His keynote speeches where he presented Apple’s newest products were kept under wraps
until the last moment and were eagerly anticipated by consumers and media all over the world.
The media coverage benefits were estimated at millions of dollars. Jobs’ keynotes diligently
followed a set sequence: first astonishing growth figures for each target market, presented
through clear and simple slices, and then Jobs would present Apple’s new product just by
saying “oh and one more thing,” followed by “cool, eh?!” The focus was on the product’s
usability, design, and simplicity.
Secrecy in terms of product launches was deemed necessary not only for generating hype but
also for ensuring that the expectation of a new version of a product wouldn’t cannibalize sales
of the current version too much; and for keeping competitors guessing for as long as possible.

180 CASE STUDIES
New recruits were not only warned that the penalty for revealing Apple secrets would be swift
termination, but were also hired in so-called dummy positions, roles that remained unspecified
until the hiring was complete. As a former employee describes:
There were just these things that were kept very, very secret. There was a project we were working on where we
put in special locks on one of the floors and put up a couple of extra doors to hide away a team that was work-
ing on stuff. You had to sign extra-special agreements acknowledging that you were working on a super-secret
project and you wouldn’t talk about it to anyone – not your wife, not your kids. (Lashinsky, 2012)
Before discussing a topic at a meeting all members would need to verify that they were “disclosed”
on it, meaning they had been granted the permission to discuss it. The whole organization was
thus comprised of smaller pieces of a bigger puzzle, which was in turn only known to the high-
est levels. This secretive approach was compared by analysts to terrorist organizations’ cellular
structure, which protects the organization from potential vulnerability if its individual members
or groups are compromised (Lashinsky, 2012).
Apart from ensuring confidentiality, other aspects of Apple’s organizational design provide
the necessary agility and focus. Small teams bear responsibility for crucial projects, a charac-
teristic that is reminiscent of startup companies. For example, only two engineers were said to
have written the code for converting Apple’s Safari browser for the iPad, a big and painstaking
project (Lashinsky, 2011). Committees are not prevalent at Apple. As Jobs (2010) mentioned:
We are organized as a startup. One person is in charge of iPhone Os software, one person is in charge of
Mac hardware, one person is in charge of iPhone hardware engineering, another is in charge of worldwide
marketing, another person is in charge of operations. We are organized like a startup. We are the biggest
startup on the planet. And we all meet for three hours once a week and we talk about everything we are doing,
the whole business. … Every Monday we review the whole business. We look at every single product under
development. I put out an agenda. Eighty percent is the same as it was the last week, and we just walk down
it every single week. We don’t have a lot of process at Apple, but that’s one of the few things we do just to all
stay on the same page. (Lashinsky, 2011)
Every Wednesday there would also be a marketing and communications meeting. Meetings
would involve an action list next to which there was the name of the DRI, or directly responsi-
ble individual. In this meeting there are frank discussions between Apple employees at various
levels. As a former Apple designer mentioned, “on a regular basis you either get positive feed-
back or are told to stop doing stupid shit” (Lashinsky, 2011).
The Top 100 team was a group of the 100 most influential employees from all ranks that
would meet annually and discuss key strategic issues regarding the present and future of the
company. The three-day intensive strategy session took place in a secret location, outside the
company and even its existence was a well-kept secret for Apple. Members of the Top 100 team
were not allowed to put the date down on their calendars, nor drive themselves to the meeting.
Instead a company bus, leaving from Cupertino headquarters would take the team to places like
the Chaminade Resort and Spa in Santa Cruz, which met two of Jobs prerequisites: good food
and no golf. During the course of the event, the Top 100 team would discuss Apple’s next steps
and new products under development. Position in the hierarchy did not guarantee attendance;

as Jobs said, “that doesn’t mean they’re all vice presidents. Some of them are just key individual
contributors. So when a good idea comes … part of my job is to move it around … get ideas
moving among that group of 100 people” (Lashinsky, 2011).
In addition to secrecy and a start-up mentality, Apple’s culture focused on intense work, crea-
tivity, and perfectionism, combined with a rebel spirit. For many years, Jobs stimulated thinking
out of the box and encouraged employees to experiment and share with others “the coolest new
thing” they had thought of. It may not be accidental that Apple’s emblem of corporate culture is a
pirate flag with an Apple rainbow colored eye patch, designed after a famous Jobs quote: “It’s bet-
ter to be a pirate than join the navy.” This flag was hanging over the Macintosh building as Apple’s
team was working on the first iMac, to act as a reminder of their mission (Grossman, 2005).
Along with the rebel spirit, Apple had a tradition of long working hours and relentless pursuit
of perfection. Each manufacturing and software detail was worked and reworked until a prod-
uct was considered perfect, aiming for seamless integration of software and hardware. Apple’s
engineers spent so much time on each product that they were able to foresee and respond to any
possible difficulties a consumer might encounter when using it:
It’s because when you buy our products, and three months later you get stuck on something, you quickly figure
out [how to get past it]. And you think, “Wow, someone over there at Apple actually thought of this!” And then
six months later it happens again. There’s almost no product in the world that you have that experience with,
but you have it with a Mac. And you have it with an iPod. (Jobs, quoted in Burrows, 2004)
Apple’s employees were not paid astronomically. They were not pampered, nor did they enjoy
unique privileges beyond what most large companies offered. They were talented people with
passion for excellence, proud to be part of the Apple community. This pride stemmed from
a corporate culture that fostered innovation and a sense of Apple’s superiority against com-
petitors, as a company that could shape the future of technology. Apple recruited talent of the
highest caliber, and Jobs often approached and recruited people known as the best in their
fields. Specialization and clear specification of responsibilities at Apple was a way of employing
the best people for particular roles, reflecting Jobs’ aversion towards a general management
approach (Lashinsky, 2011).
During their first day at Apple, new employees did not get instructions on how to connect
their computer to the network. The assumption was that having been hired at a technology
company they would know how to do it themselves; and in the process would get a chance
to meet others and blend into Apple. An informal iBuddy program provided support in the
early stages of a new employees’ entry into the company (Lashinsky, 2012). According to Gus
Mueller, founder of a software development firm that develops software for Apple, “Apple
only hires top-notch folks. I know a number of people there, and they are all super smart and
creative. I don’t know a single person who shouldn’t be there” (Guardian, 2008). Debate is
an important aspect of how great products get developed. As Jobs noted, “we have wonderful
arguments. If you want to hire great people and having them stay working for you, you have to
let them make a lot of decisions and you have to be run by ideas. Not hierarchy. The best ideas
have to win. Otherwise good people don’t stay” (Jobs, 2010).
For Apple employees this experience was both daunting and fascinating: “If you’re a die-hard
Apple geek, it’s magical. It’s also a really tough place to work” (Lashinsky, 2012). Contrary to

182 CASE STUDIES
Google’s infamous relaxed atmosphere, Apple is known for being tough and perfectionist.
If any product release does not meet expectations, Apple can be a “brutal and unforgiving place,
where accountability is strictly enforced” (Lashinsky, 2011).
Apple’s Organization Design

Apple’s organization design was flat and simple. Even though Apple did not have an official
organization chart, one interpretation of its design was that the organization radiated around
Jobs, with 15 Senior Vice Presidents and 31 Vice Presidents overseeing the main functions (see
Figure 13.2). In terms of this structure, Jobs would only be two levels away from any key part
of the company; and financial management was centralized, with the only executive responsible
for costs and expenses being the Chief Financial Officer. Jobs aimed for simplicity in the com-
pany structure as an enabler of the ability to be agile and successfully engage in the “deep
collaboration” model. As an observer said: “Processes lead according to Jobs to efficiency, not
innovation nor new ideas. These come from people meeting up in the hallways, calling each
other in the middle of the night to share a new idea or the solution to a long thought as
unsolved problem” (Grossman, 2005).
Jobs described this structure as one based on teamwork and trust:
There is tremendous team work at the top of the company, which filters down to tremendous team work through-
out the company. And teamwork is depended on trusting the other folks to come through with their part, without
watching them all the time … and that’s what we do really well. And we are great at figuring out how to divide
things up into these great teams that we have, all work on the same thing, touch bases frequently, and bring it all
together into a product. We do that really well. And so what I do all day is meet with teams of people. And work
on ideas and solve problems to make new products, new marketing programs or whatever…. (Jobs, 2010)
Despite advantages of flexibility and focus, the tight, CEO-centric organization structure built
around Jobs’ leadership raised concerns in terms of whether it could remain as successful under
a different CEO (Waters, 2012).
STEVE JOBS’ LEADERSHIP

Some leaders push innovations by being good at the big picture. Others do so by mastering details. Jobs did
both, relentlessly. (Isaacson, 2011)
When Jobs returned to Apple in 1997 after an absence of 12 years, he arrived with much histori-
cal baggage. He was Apple’s co-founder at the age of 21, and was worth $200 million by the age
of 25. He was then forced to resign by the age of 30, in 1985, after a battle over control with
CEO John Sculley, which ended with Jobs losing all operational responsibilities. Jobs (who had
been executive VP and General Manager of the Macintosh division) was considered a threat to
the company, accused of trying to “play manager” and control areas over which he had no juris-
diction. He was considered “a temperamental micromanager whose insistence on total control
and stylish innovation had doomed his company to irrelevance” (Burrows and Grover, 2006).

MICHAEL
JOHN FENGER DOUGLAS
BRANDON VP, Iphone BECK
JOHN VP, Channel Sales VP, Apple JENNIFER
COUCH Sales Japan BAILEY
VP, Education VP, Online
Sales Stores WILLIAM
MICHAEL
CULBERT FREDERICK
VP, VP, Ful-
Architecture fillment
RITA
KATIE LANE
COTTON JOEL
VP, Operations
VP, PODOLNY
Communications VP, HR
DAVID
TUPMAN TIMOTHY SABIH
VP, AR WARE KHAN
COOK VP, Operations
Engineering,
Iphone/Ipod
BOB Chief Operating
MANSFIELD Officer JEFFREY
SVP, Mac WILLIAMS
Hardware SVP, Operations DEIRORE
DAN RICCIO Engineering O’BRIEN
VP, Ipad VP, Operations
BRUCE JONATHAN
SEWELL IVE JERRY
JOHN
THERIAULT SVP, General SVP, Industrial MCDOUGAL
Counsel Design VP, Retail
VP, lo al
Security
STEVE
PETER
OPPENHEIMER JOBS GREG GILLEY
BETSY
RAFAEL SVP, Chief CEO VP, Video Apps
VP, Controller Financial
Officer
ROGER
ROSNER
GARY VP, Productivity
ANDY
WIPFLER HIROKI ASAI Apps
VP, reasurer MILLER SCOTT
VP, Mobile PHILIP VP, Creative
FORSTALL Director
Advertising/ SCHILLER
SVP, IOS
IAD SVP, Marketing HENRI
Software LAMIRAUX
GREG
JOSWIAK VP, Engineering,
VP, Iphone IOS Apps
Mar eting
ISABEL GE
MICHAEL
TCHAD
CRAIG MAHE
FEDERIGHI VP, IOS Wireless
VP, Ipad EODY CUE Software
Mar eting VP, Mac
VP, Internet
Software
DAVID
Services KIM VORRATH
Engineering
MOODY VP, Program
VP, Mac Management
Mar eting
RON JEFF ROBBIN
OKAMOTO VP, Consumer
VP, evelope r BRAIN Apps
Relations CROLL MAX PALEY
VP, Mac BUD VP, Audio/
SIMON
Software TRIBBLE Video
PATIENCE
Mar eting VP, Software
VP, Core OS
echnology
Executive VP Reports Vice

Team To Jobs President
FIGURE 13.2 Apple organizational chart, Fortune 2011

Source: Lashinsky (2011).
Twenty-three years later, however, Jobs was voted as one of the greatest entrepreneurs of all
time by Business Week (Tozzi, 2007), and the World’s Best CEO by Harvard Business Review in
2010 (Hansen et al., 2010). His leadership style and values left a mark on Apple in a way that
only a few leaders had achieved, making his name synonymous with the company, its remarkable

184 CASE STUDIES
turnaround, and its groundbreaking innovations. Described by his colleagues as brilliant, power-
ful, and charismatic, he could also be a demanding and impulsive perfectionist. As Jobs puts it:
“My job is not to be easy on people. My job is to take these great people we have and to push
them and make them even better. How? Just by coming up with more aggressive visions of how
it could be” (quoted in Morris, 2008: 70).
Jobs’ control-orientation was reflected in the tight integration of hardware and software.
According to insiders, he was opposed to using any sort of unauthorised applications or external
software in Apple products. Everything was to be designed by and follow Apple’s standards of
user-friendliness, excellence and simplicity. As Jobs explained, “We do these things not because
we are control freaks … We do them because we want to make great products, because we care
about the user and because we like to take responsibility for the entire experience rather than
turn out the crap that other people make.” (Isaacson, 2011)
Many believe that Jobs’ achievement of being regarded as one of the greatest technology
entrepreneurs is not based so much on his knowledge of technology (he was not an engineer
or a programmer, neither did he have an MBA or college degree) but on his innate instinct for
design, the ability to choose the most talented team and “the willingness to be a pain in the neck
for what matters for him most” (Grossman, 2005). With regard to the iMac, for example, a
product concept he and Jonathan Ive, Head of Design had envisioned, the engineers were ini-
tially sceptical: “Sure enough, when we took it to the engineers, they said, ‘Oh.’ And they came
up with 38 reasons. And I said, ‘No, no, we’re doing this.’ And they said, ‘Well, why?’ And I
said, ‘Because I’m the CEO, and I think it can be done.’ And so they kind of begrudgingly did
it. But then it was a big hit.” (Grossman, 2005). Jobs was cited as “co-inventor” on 103 Apple
patents (Elkind, 2008).
Jobs could be both inspirational, but also experienced by employees as scary. According to
Guy Kawasaki, former chief evangelist at Apple:
Working for Steve was a terrifying and addictive experience. He would tell you that your work, your ideas, and
sometimes your existence were worthless right to your face, right in front of everyone. Watching him crucify
someone scared you into working incredibly long hours. … Working for Steve was also ecstasy. Once in a
while he would tell you that you were great and that made it all worth it. (Cruikshank, 2006: 147)
Apart from displaying such behaviors as parking his car in handicapped places and publicly
losing his temper, Jobs often made his employees burst into tears through direct and personal
criticism. Robert Sutton, management professor at Stanford, discussed Steve Jobs in his book
The No Asshole Rule, in the chapter on the virtues of assholes (Sutton, 2007). Sutton then
reflected further on his discussion of Steve Jobs in his blog, suggesting that Jobs might be mel-
lowing as he got older (Sutton, 2008). Yet, according to Palo Alto venture capitalist Jean-Louis
Gasse, a former Apple executive who once worked with Jobs, “Democracies don’t make great
products. You need a competent tyrant” (Gasse, quoted in Elkind, 2008).
The high praise as well as high criticism made people try harder, jump higher, and work later
into the night. Jobs is credited with imposing discipline on Apple, a quality that the company
had lacked for years. The company that used to be known as the “ship that leaks from the
top” (Linzmayer, 2004) due to its relaxed management style and corporate culture was soon
transformed into a tightly controlled and integrated machine after Jobs’ arrival. At Pixar, things

were seen differently than at Apple, however. Reportedly Jobs spent less than a day per week
there, and was hands off, particularly on the creative front. According to a Pixar employee,
“Steve doesn’t tell us what to do … Steve’s our benevolent benefactor” (quoted in Burrows and
Grover, 2006).
Jobs’ charisma was depicted in the way he briefed his team concerning a new product: “Even
though Steve didn’t draw any of the lines, his ideas and inspiration made the design what it is.
To be honest, we didn’t know what it meant for a computer to be ‘friendly’ until Jobs told us”
(Terry Oyama, quoted in Cruikshank, 2006: 30). As author Scott Kelby put it:
There is one thing I am certain of: Steve’s the right man to lead Apple. There’s never been anyone at Apple who
has had the impact that Steve has since his return. He may be a tyrant, demanding, unforgiving and the worst
boss ever. But he is also a visionary. A genius. A man who gets things done. And the man who kept Apple afloat
when a host of other nice guys couldn’t. (Cruikshank, 2006: 175)
Jobs brought his own brand of strategic thinking to Apple; based on personal intuition and
understanding of technology trends:
The clearest example was when we were pressured for years to do a PDA, and I realized one day that
90% of the people who use a PDA only take information out of it on the road. Pretty soon cell phones
are going to do that so the PDA market’s going to get reduced to a fraction of its current size. So we
decided not to get into it. If we had gotten into it we wouldn’t have the resources to do the iPod. (quoted
in Morris, 2008: 69)
Jobs understood that to be different as a company, you have to make tough choices; in Apple’s
case, this was clearly reflected in the product-markets it decided to pursue, as compared for
example to large competitors. Referring to Apple’s focus, he noted “I’m as proud of what we
don’t do as I am of what we do” (quoted in Burrows and Grover, 2006).
Preparing Apple for the post-Jobs era

Jobs’ immense influence on Apple had given pause for skepticism regarding Apple’s future
without him. As Fortune magazine’s editor Elkind noted: “In the 26 years that Fortune has been
ranking America’s Most Admired Companies never has the corporation at the head of the list
so closely resembled a one-man show” (Elkind, 2008). After the onset of pancreatic cancer in
2003 and an operation to address it in 2004, by 2009 Jobs’ health was again deteriorating. In
January 2009 he announced that he was taking leave of absence from Apple until June, due to
health issues relating to a “hormone imbalance.” COO Tim Cook would handle day-to-day
operations, and Jobs would stay involved in major strategic decisions. Commentators disagreed
on the degree of impact Jobs’ absence would have. Some said that the new products Apple
would introduce over the following 18 months had already been developed, and that Cook
would manage Apple effectively in Jobs’ absence. Others, however, believed that Jobs’ motiva-
tional role, negotiation skills, and creative vision were crucial for Apple and therefore Jobs’
absence would adversely affect the company (Macworld, 2009). Another medical leave fol-
lowed in 2011, and in August 2011 Jobs resigned from his position as CEO, and Tim Cook,

186 CASE STUDIES
former COO, was appointed as CEO. In his letter of resignation he wrote: “I have always said
if there ever came a day when I could no longer meet my duties and expectations as Apple’s
CEO, I would be the first to let you know. Unfortunately, that day has come” (Primack, 2011).
He remained at Apple as Chairman, until his passing in October 2011. Cook’s leadership role
in Apple’s operations since 1998 had given him a deep understanding of the company and a
prominent position, being the only person to have a vast area of responsibility apart from Jobs
and the one who replaced him during his medical absences.
During his last few years in the company Jobs wanted to make sure that the company’s core
values (the relentless perfectionism, the focus on design, the close cross-functional collabora-
tion, and constant feedback loops), for which he so passionately fought, would guide Apple
in his absence. In 2008, Jobs created the Apple University and personally hired Joel Podolny,
then Dean of the Yale School of Management, who led a team of business professors to create
a series of case studies on Apple’s critical points in its history. These cases described strategic
issues such as Apple’s retail strategy and its iPhone supply chain strategy; and how Apple
executives took decisions at these points. The cases aimed at training and preparing the next
generation of Apple executives; as well as inculcating Apple’s values and DNA to future executives
(Lashinsky, 2011).
Many agreed that Jobs had built around him a team of competent, high-performing individu-
als who shared the same values and working style and could continue along the same lines in his
absence (Snell, 2009). According to observers, Jobs’ most important achievement was to make
an entire company act and think like himself (McCracken, 2011b): “You can ask anyone in the
company what Steve wants and you’ll get an answer, even if 90% of them have never met Steve”
(Lashinsky, 2011). In the end, Jobs’ greatest achievement may not have been the design of the
iMac, the iPod, the iPhone, or the iPad, but the design of Apple Inc. itself.
ENTERING A NEW APPLE ERA

Upon becoming Apple’s CEO, Tim Cook maintained a low profile and focused on managing
the transition to the post-Jobs era as smoothly as possible. He sent the following email to Apple
employees to reassure them that he would remain faithful to Apple’s DNA:
I want you to be confident that Apple is not going to change. I cherish and celebrate Apple’s unique principles
and values. Steve built a company and culture that is unlike any other in the world and we are going to stay
true to that — it is in our DNA. We are going to continue to make the best products in the world that delight our
customers and make our employees incredibly proud of what they do. (in Cheng, 2011)
Apart from being a known workaholic who would begin emailing his colleagues at 4:30am or
arrange meetings at any time of the day, little was known about the man who stood behind Jobs
for almost 14 years. Observers noted, however, that Cook appeared to be more collegial than
Jobs, giving much air time during his first keynote speech to his team: “the one thing about
Apple that will change going forward is that we are not going to see one person representing
himself as the physical manifestation of all Apple” (Menn and Dembosky, 2011). Contrary to
the flamboyant personality of his predecessor, Cook was characterized as a “quiet, soft-spoken,

low-key executive” and “the yin to Jobs’ yang” (Friedman, 2011); but also as demanding and
unemotional (Lashinsky, 2008).
Cook was recognized for his unprecedented discipline and focus on raising efficiency and
market reach at Apple, having made some drastic decisions including closing down most of
Apple’s manufacturing plans, streamlining logistics, and pushing sales towards high-end retail
outlets (Johnson, 2011). He was a strong believer in maintaining minimum inventory: “You kind
of want to manage it like you’re in the dairy business, if it gets past its freshness date, you have a
problem” (quoted in Lashinsky, 2008).
During his first few months as CEO Cook announced the company’s highest quarterly revenue
in Apple’s history for the first quarter of fiscal year 2012. With record quarterly revenues of
$46.3bn and record sales of 37 million iPhone units and 15.4 million iPad units (Apple, 2012),
Apple showed that its momentum was not only going strong, but also increasing. By March
2012, Apple’s cash and liquid assets exceeded $100bn; a third of which was held in the USA,
and two thirds overseas, managed by an Apple subsidiary, Braeburn Capital, based in Nevada.
For the first time in 17 years, Apple announced in early 2012 that it would return money to
shareholders through dividends and share buybacks amounting to $45bn. Even so, it was esti-
mated that its cash hoard would rise to over $200bn by the end of 2014 (Duke, 2012). Apple’s
cash and liquid assets stood at $155bn in September 2014.
Despite record profits, by 2014 Apple was facing new challenges: one was the effects of lead-
ership transition, with many observers wondering whether Apple could retain its distinct culture
and set of capabilities after Jobs, particularly its ability to redefine markets with groundbreaking
offerings. Further, in the smartphone market Apple was facing a strong alternative technology in
terms of Google’s Android system. High-quality hardware, which many believed were as good
as the iPhone, were available from Samsung, such as the Samsung Galaxy. Amazon’s Kindle was
improving with subsequent releases.
Apple was competing in a technology industry where many companies, inspired by Apple’s
own model, started to move away from single devices and specialization towards mobile con-
nectivity and interconnected service offerings. The benefits of the ecosystem approach were
obvious, but there were also potential costs, that customers however seemed to not care too
much about. According to an observer, Apple offers “beautiful hardware and intuitive software
that, most of the time, is even more of a joy to use than it is to look at. The downside, … is
that you are utterly in its hands: if you change your mind, there is no easy way out of Apple’s
system.” (Greene, 2010)
After Jobs’ passing, Apple continued to have outstanding financial performance. By early 2015,
however, it had not introduced another groundbreaking product along the lines of the iPod,
iPhone, or iPad. The Apple Watch was about to be launched, but there were several question
marks about its ability to reach the kind of revenue figures that would make a difference to Apple’s
total revenues of $182bn in 2014. Analysts were wondering whether Apple would be able to
sustain its innovation magic now that its chief architect had gone? Was Apple’s operating model
better understood by competitors and in danger of imitation? Was Apple making the best use of
its enviable cash hoard? Could it keep delivering blockbuster products, which would result in the
level of growth and profit performance that markets expected? Was Apple’s huge size becoming
a liability? What should Apple do differently, if anything, to address its strategic challenges and
sustain its exceptional performance to date?

188 CASE STUDIES
TABLE 13.1 Apple Inc Consolidated Financial Statements
Years ended
September September September

27, 2014 28, 2013 29, 2012
Net sales $ 182,795 $ 170,910 $ 156,508
Cost of sales 112,258 106,606 87,846
Gross margin 70,537 64,304 68,662
Operating expenses:
Research and development 6,041 4,475 3,381
Selling, general and administrative 11,993 10,830 10,040
Total operating expenses 18,034 15,305 13,421
Operating income 52,503 48,999 55,241
Other income/(expense), net 980 1,156 522
Income before provision for income taxes 53,483 50,155 55,763
Provision for income taxes 13,973 13,118 14,030
Net income $ 39,510 $ 37,037 $ 41,733
Earning TRANS share
Basic $ 6.49 $ 5.72 $ 6.38
Diluted $ 6.45 $ 5.68 $ 6.31
Shares used in computing earnings per share:
Basic 6,085,572 6,477,320 6,543,726
Diluted 6,122,663 6,521,634 6,617,483
Cash dividends declared per common share $ 1.82 $ 1.64 $ 0.38
Source: Apple Inc Annual Report, 2014 (000,000’s)
TABLE 13.2 Apple Net Sales by Operating Segment
2014 Change 2013 Change 2012
Net sales by Operating

Segment:
Americas $ 65,232 4% $62,739 9% $ 57,512

Europe 40,929 8% 37,883 4% 36,323

2014 Change 2013 Change 2012
Net sales by Operating

Segment:
Greater China 29,846 17% 25,417 13% 22,533

Japan 14,982 11% 13,462 27% 10,571
Rest of Asia Pacific 10,344 (7)% 11,181 4% 10,741
Retail 21,462 6% 20,228 7% 18,828
Toatal net sales $ 182,795 7% $170,910 9% $ 156,508
Net sales by product:
iPhone(1) $101,991 12% $ 91,279 16% $ 78,692

iPad(1) 30,283 (5)% 31,980 3% 30,945
Mac (1)
24,079 12% 21,483 (7)% 23,221
iPod (1)
2,286 (48)% 4,411 (21)% 5,615
iTunes, Software and 18,063 13% 16,051 25% 12,890
Services(2)
Accessories(3) 6,093 7% 5,706 11% 5,145
Total net sales $ 182,795 7% $170,910 9% $156,508
Unit Sales by Product:
iPhone 169,219 13% 150,257 20% 125,046

iPad 67,977 (4)% 71,033 22% 58,310
Mac 18,906 16% 16,341 (10)% 18,158
iPod 14,377 (45)% 26,379 (25)% 35,165
Source: Apple Inc Annual Report, 2014 (000,000’s)
TABLE 13.3 Timeline of Apple’s Chief Executive Officers
1977–1981 Michael Scott

1981–1985 Mike Markkula
1985–1993 John Sculley
1993–1996 Michael Spindler
1996–1997 Gil Amelio
1997–2000 Steve Jobs (Interim CEO)
2000–2011 Steve Jobs
2011– Timothy Cook
Source: Authors.

190 CASE STUDIES
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Strategic Leadership and Innovation at Apple Inc.

Chapter · January 2016

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

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Phone Products & Music Products &

− iPod & related accessories

Software Products &

− Apple branded & 3rd

FIGURE 13.1 Apple Inc. Key Product and Service Portfolio

JOBS’ TURNAROUND AND REBUILDING AN

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REDEFINING THE PC INDUSTRY

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GROWING THE APPLE ECOSYSTEM: BREAKTHROUGH

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THE COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE

The giants: IBM and Microsoft

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The computer vendors: Hewlett-Packard, Dell, and Lenovo

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Emerging competition: Google, Amazon, and Samsung

PLAYING WITH DIFFERENT RULES

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Another significant characteristic of Apple’s approach to innovation was the diffusion of

Sticking with a Proprietary Ecosystem

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Other Strategic Moves

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CORPORATE CULTURE AND ORGANIZATION

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Apple’s Organization Design

STEVE JOBS’ LEADERSHIP

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Executive VP Reports Vice

FIGURE 13.2 Apple organizational chart, Fortune 2011

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Preparing Apple for the post-Jobs era

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ENTERING A NEW APPLE ERA

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TABLE 13.1 Apple Inc Consolidated Financial Statements

September September September

Net sales $ 182,795 $ 170,910 $ 156,508

Cost of sales 112,258 106,606 87,846

Gross margin 70,537 64,304 68,662

Research and development 6,041 4,475 3,381

Selling, general and administrative 11,993 10,830 10,040

Total operating expenses 18,034 15,305 13,421

Operating income 52,503 48,999 55,241

Other income/(expense), net 980 1,156 522

Income before provision for income taxes 53,483 50,155 55,763

Provision for income taxes 13,973 13,118 14,030