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Blockchain-Based Secured Access Control in an IoT System

Article in Applied Sciences · February 2021

DOI: 10.3390/app11041772

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 applied
sciences
Article
Blockchain-Based Secured Access Control in an IoT System
Sultan Algarni 1 , Fathy Eassa 2 , Khalid Almarhabi 3, * , Abduallah Almalaise 1 , Emad Albassam 2 ,
Khalid Alsubhi 2 and Mohammad Yamin 4

1 Department of Information System, Faculty of Computing and Information Technology,

King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah 21589, Saudi Arabia; [email protected] (S.A.);
[email protected] (A.A.)
2 Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Computing and Information Technology,
King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah 21589, Saudi Arabia; [email protected] (F.E.);
[email protected] (E.A.); [email protected] (K.A.)
3 Department of Computer Science, College of Computing in Al-Qunfudah, Umm Al-Qura University,
Makkah 24381, Saudi Arabia
4 Department of Management Information Systems, Faculty of Economics and Administration,
King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah 21589, Saudi Arabia; [email protected]
* Correspondence: [email protected]

Abstract: The distributed nature of Internet of Things (IoT) and its rapid increase on a large scale
raises many security and privacy issues. Access control is one of the major challenges currently
addressed through centralized approaches that may rely on a third party and they are constrained
by availability and scalability, which may result in a performance bottleneck. Therefore, this paper
proposes a novel solution to manage the delivery of lightweight and decentralized secure access
control of an IoT system based on a multi-agent system and a blockchain. The main objective of the
proposed solution is to build Blockchain Managers (BCMs) for securing IoT access control, as well as
allowing for secure communication between local IoT devices. Moreover, the solution also enables





 secure communication between IoT devices, fog nodes and cloud computing.
Citation: Algarni, S.; Eassa, F.;
Keywords: access control; security; blockchain; Internet of Things; fog computing; cloud computing
Almarhabi, K.; Almalaise, A.;
Albassam, E.; Alsubhi, K.; Yamin, M.
Blockchain-Based Secured Access
Control in an IoT System. Appl. Sci.
2021, 11, 1772. https://doi.org/ 1. Introduction
10.3390/app11041772 Internet of Things (IoT) is an extension of Internet power that allows different digital
devices to connect to one another in order to send information back and forth. In other
Received: 24 December 2020 words, IoT is a system for connected computing devices. Each of these devices has a unique
Accepted: 9 February 2021 identifier and can communicate with other devices, which ultimately allows people and
Published: 17 February 2021
businesses to connect with each other and make meaningful strategic decisions.
IoT will not only lead to some revolutionary changes that improve the quality of
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral
human life but will also lead to many security challenges in relation to privacy, system
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
configuration, information storage/management and access control, a situation that merits
published maps and institutional affil-
careful consideration [1]. Addressing security and privacy issues is one of the key chal-
iations.
lenges of IoT. Heterogeneity is also one of the major pillars of IoT that leads to security
issues [2].
One of the key aspects of security and privacy issues in resource-constrained IoT
devices is designing appropriate authentication and authorization solutions [3]. In this
Copyright: © 2021 by the authors. paper, we have proposed an architecture based on a multi-agent system and used a private
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. distributed blockchain to manage the delivery of lightweight and decentralized IoT secure
This article is an open access article
access control. The main objective of the proposed solution is to secure the entire IoT archi-
distributed under the terms and
tecture, including communication between IoT devices, fog nodes and cloud computing.
conditions of the Creative Commons
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ • The primary contribution of this paper is to propose a novel blockchain-based ar-
4.0/). chitecture for securing an IoT system. The solution is based on decentralized access

Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 1772. https://doi.org/10.3390/app11041772 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/applsci

Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 1772 2 of 16

control and uses a multi-agent system. The architecture adopts a private hierarchi-
cal blockchain structure to improve the security of the IoT system and to meet the
requirements of resource-constrained IoT devices.
• Moreover, our proposed solution uses mobile agent software, which can play a signifi-
cant role in the reduction of traffic overheads, exemplifying the high level of mobility
and intelligence of our solution.
• We designed a generic, lightweight and scalable solution that can be applied to various
IoT applications.
As opposed to other solutions, our approaches focus on ensuring the effective and
efficient protection of each tier of IoT architecture via a private hierarchical blockchain
structure and enable a significant reduction in traffic overheads via the adoption of a
lightweight consensus mechanism based on IoT requirements (and using mobile agent
software), the addition of mobility and intelligence (via mobile agent software) and the
application of Mandatory Access Control (MAC), which is based on a hierarchical security
level that works in line with our hierarchical blockchain in order to guarantee our multilevel
security (MLS) policy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the existing
access control system in IoT. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the blockchain and
examines the use of blockchain technology in IoT. Section 4 presents a review of the relevant
literature. The proposed architecture is explained in depth in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper and discusses future work.

2. Background of Access Control System in IoT

2.1. Access Control in IoT
Access Control (AC) involves the authentication and authorization of communication
rights and resource access with respect to defined security guidelines and policies [4]. AC
refers to the granting of permission to authenticated entities so that they can access the
resources under predefined conditions.
Applying an optimal access control model to billions of IoT devices is a challenging
task. Although authentication and authorization issues have been extensively studied in the
literature, these issues in the IoT environment are still in their early stages. Access control
List (ACL), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
are some of the most widely used access control mechanisms in IT infrastructure but are
not fully appropriate for providing scalable, efficient and easily manageable applicability
in an IoT environment [1].
In ACL, access control strategies are implemented in the cloud with better administra-
tion and tracking of activities but are constrained by a centralized infrastructure. As the
number of IoT devices increases, the complexity of access rules also increases, resulting in
confused duty problems. ACL lacks granularity and scalability and is very much prone to
a single point of failure due to its centralized infrastructure [5].
The RBAC model provides a resource access authorization mechanism to users based
on roles and defined principles, such as priorities, the separation of duties and administra-
tive function partitioning, in order to define access policies for smart devices by capitalizing
on the Web of Things (WoTs) approach [6]. These solutions do not fully meet the require-
ments of access control mechanisms and inter-device communication in a highly distributed
network environment. The drawbacks associated with conventional access control models
make them unsuitable for an IoT environment, which leads to the use of Capability-Based
Access Control (CapAC) systems. To overcome the role explosion problem in RBAC, the
ABAC model directly associates attributes with subjects. Access rights are granted based
on the user attribute certificate [5]. As the number of IoT devices increases, the ABAC
model’s complexity increases and policy management becomes a critical issue [2].
A capability model is implemented for large-scale IoT-based systems. In this model,
the capability list is associated with each subject, which defines its access rights to the
target objects [7]. Despite its large-scale successful deployment, CapAC introduces several
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 1772 3 of 16

challenges in relation to the propagation and revocation of access rights. Table 1 shows a
comparative list of access control limitations in the IoT environment.

Table 1. Access control drawbacks with Internet of Things (IoT) environment.

Access Control Models Limitations with IoT Environment

Lack of granularity and scalability.
ACL
Prone to a single point of failure due to its centralized infrastructure.
Lack of complexity.
RBAC and ABAC Not supporting user-driven.
Policy management becomes a critical issue.
Propagation issue.
CapAC
Lack of context consideration.

2.2. Access Control Challenges in IoT

The main challenges of applying existing access control mechanisms in the IoT envi-
ronment are as follows:
1. Reusability of existing solutions.
Access control mechanisms have been extensively studied in the literature and suc-
cessfully deployed but these solutions cannot be applied directly to an IoT infrastructure,
as they are complex and do not fit IoT requirements. Building a solution from scratch takes
time to implement, deploy and adopt [1].
2. Centralized vs. distributed access control mechanisms
Centralized solutions provide control policies that are easily accessible but which
possess a single point of failure. Centralized state-of-the-art security frameworks that
are not suitable for the IoT environment are constrained by scalability issues [8]. In a
centralized end-to-end mechanism, the user is not involved in the access control of their
data. The distributed solution ensures privacy at a low cost and does not involve third-
party trust. These distributed solutions are difficult to manage and require device-side
access control policy updates.
3. Scalability
Interconnected devices are increasing at a significant speed, which, in turn, increases
their management workload. A decentralized and distributed access control mechanism
must provide scalability in order to accommodate the ever-growing number of homoge-
neous and heterogeneous IoT devices [9].
4. Heterogeneity
IoT infrastructure is distributed and incorporates multiple heterogeneous, intercon-
nected devices with different underlying technologies, originating from multidisciplinary
domains [1]. These technologies, under each domain, have different underlying authenti-
cation and authorization policies that make heterogeneity a major hindrance to providing
a scalable, robust and secure IoT environment.
5. Resource constraints
IoT devices are bound by computation and storage capabilities and are connected
via low-power and loss-prone networks. The access control system must provide an easy
solution to address the abovementioned challenges within the resource constraints [10].
Consequently, the IoT environment required additional requirements to be considered
in the access control mechanism, particularly distribution, scalability, heterogeneity and
lightweight architecture.
 records, as shown in Figure 1. Blockchain is characterized by the fact that data cann
modified because they are copied and stored in a distributed and dependent manner
Blockchain is a highly transparent access control technology that provides en
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 1772 end decentralized security and reduces the risk of human error. It provides 4 of 16solid pr
tion against hacker attacks and can be of ultimate importance to access control system
was introduced in 2008 as a core framework of Bitcoin and it allows data to be reco
stored
3. Theand
Useupdated in a distributed
of Blockchain in IoT way [11]. Blockchain is a decentralized approach
maintains the integrity of data by using
A blockchain (a chain of linked blocks) is a consensus
a distributedmechanism. A third-party
ledger with a list of linked inte
diary
dataisrecords
not required
or blocks,and
whichtrust is developed
are linked through
and secured a public ledger
by cryptographic hashes. stored
Each block in a decen
contains a set of new data records or transactions, as well as the hash value
ized manner in order to ensure secure distributed transactions in a trustless environmof the previous
block, along with a timestamp that verifies the transactions at the time of the creation of the
Theblock,
blockchain protocol is a potential candidate that may bring some evolutio
making the modification of records difficult, as they are dependent on prior records,
changes
as shownto in
traditional IT security
Figure 1. Blockchain technologies
is characterized duefact
by the tothat
its decentralized infrastructure
data cannot be modified
anonymity
because theymaintenance
are copied and[12].
stored in a distributed and dependent manner [10].

Figure
Figure Thecomponents
1. 1.The components and
andbasic architecture
basic of the of
architecture blockchain.
the blockchain.
Blockchain is a highly transparent access control technology that provides end-to-end
Traditional
decentralized security
security and measures
reduces theand access
risk of human control
error. Itmechanisms
provides solid require
protectiona centra
trusted
againstentity
hackerthat
attacksultimately
and can be compromises end-to-end
of ultimate importance security
to access controlproperties.
systems. It Apply
was introduced in 2008 as a core framework of Bitcoin
centralized access control mechanism to an ever-growing number of IoT and it allows data to be recorded,
devices can
stored and updated in a distributed way [11]. Blockchain is a decentralized approach that
plicate the process of trust management and affect the scalability of the system. U
maintains the integrity of data by using a consensus mechanism. A third-party intermediary
blockchain can and
is not required helptrust theisdevelopment
developed through of aa fair
publicauthorization
ledger stored inframework
a decentralized to addres
abovementioned
manner in order to IoT access
ensure control
secure challenges.
distributed Thein Ethereum
transactions blockchainThe
a trustless environment. is used t
blockchain
thenticate theprotocol
serveris introduced
a potential candidate
by Auth0that may bring
[3] by somethe
using evolutionary changes to
challenge–response me
traditional IT security technologies due to its decentralized infrastructure and anonymity
This model uses the decentralized approach of a blockchain but is also dependent
maintenance [12].
third-party authentication
Traditional server.and
security measures This centralized
access infrastructure
control mechanisms requireisaone of the major d
centralized
backs (single
trusted entitypoint of failure;
that ultimately single point
compromises of trust)
end-to-end of this
security method.Applying
properties. Ourad et a al. [3]
posed a blockchain-based IoT access control and secure authentication mechanism fo
centralized access control mechanism to an ever-growing number of IoT devices can com-
ersplicate the process
to connect securely of trust management
to IoT devices by andproviding
affect the scalability of the system.
accountability (achieved Using through
blockchain can help the development of a fair authorization framework to address the
perproof records) and availability.
abovementioned IoT access control challenges. The Ethereum blockchain is used to au-
thenticate athe
While public
server blockchain
introduced bybrings
Auth0 numerous benefits,
[3] by using the it is not suitable
challenge–response method. for reso
constrained
This modelIoT usesdevices due to itsapproach
the decentralized high bandwidth overheads,
of a blockchain but is also delays and utilization
dependent on
a third-party authentication server. This centralized infrastructure
large amount of computation resources [11]. Therefore, to address these challenges is one of the major
drawbacks (single point of failure; single point of trust) of this method. Ourad et al. [3]
proposed solution uses a private blockchain, which provides light and decentralized
proposed a blockchain-based IoT access control and secure authentication mechanism for
access
userscontrol security.
to connect securely to IoT devices by providing accountability (achieved through
tamperproof records) and availability.
4. Related
While Work
a public blockchain brings numerous benefits, it is not suitable for resource-
constrained IoT devices due to its high bandwidth overheads, delays and utilization of a
The related work in this paper can be classified into three main categories, with s
large amount of computation resources [11]. Therefore, to address these challenges, our
overlap
proposedbetween
solutionthem:
uses acurrent security control
private blockchain, solutions
which provides lightinandIoTdecentralized
[1,2,5,13–26]; IoT multi-a
systems for access
access control control [27]; and blockchain-based access control for IoT [3,7–12].
security.
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 1772 5 of 16

4. Related Work
The related work in this paper can be classified into three main categories, with slight
overlap between them: current security control solutions in IoT [1,2,5,13–26]; multi-agent
systems for access control [27]; and blockchain-based access control for IoT [3,7–12].
Ouaddah et al. [1] presented a comprehensive review of the current access control
solutions in IoT based on Objectives, Models, Architecture and Mechanisms (OM-AM).
Moreover, the paper proposed a taxonomy based on the authors’ comprehensive review.
The paper analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of access control models and protocols
regarding the IoT environment. Furthermore, they presented a decentralized access control
framework called FairAccess [10] for IoT, based on a blockchain. The framework used the
Pseudonymous technique to ensure the privacy of the users. They proposed a new type of
transaction that is used to grant, obtain, delegate and revoke access based on access tokens.
This is based on an Attribute-Based Access Control model. The authorization mechanism
of FairAccess is based on authorization tokens, which provide access rights to a specific
resource, identified based on its address and smart contract expressing its access control
policies, to the requester or receiver. Nevertheless, this framework may cause a delay due
to owner communication, authorization through tokenization only and terminating a token
or requesting new access from the owner.
Novo [8] proposed scalable decentralized access management based on blockchain
technology for IoT devices. The architecture excluded IoT devices from the blockchain
network in order to overcome network overheads. The system has several advantages in
relation to access control in IoT, namely mobility, accessibility, concurrency, lightweight
architecture, scalability and transparency. This framework has managers that enable the
registering of IoT devices and their verification. Even though this solution gains scalability
as a result of distributing query permissions via management hubs, it could encounter
security threats if the manager is malicious.
Dorri et al. [12] proposed a lightweight architecture for securing IoT using private
blockchain technology. The proposed solution uses an access control list for ensuring
authorization and their architecture encompasses three main models, namely smart homes,
an overlay network and cloud storage. This solution stores the access control policies in the
policy header of a local blockchain and does not use a Proof of Work (PoW) consensus to
validate blocks as all IoT devices in the smart home tier are controlled by the miner. They
argued that the overheads of the solution are insignificant compared to its security gains.
However, the proposed architecture is a smart home application-based solution, which is
not a generic solution and may not apply to other IoT domains. Moreover, this mechanism
does not support self-enforced access control policies.
Almarhabi et al. [27] proposed a framework based on a multi-agent system for access
control in the cloud and bring your own devices (BYODs) environments by addressing
several security and privacy issues related to BYODs, such as the leakage of sensitive
information and unauthorized policy changes. They proposed an architecture to address
security and privacy issues by incorporating Mandatory Access Control policies in the
cloud and BYOD environments delicately and securely with an independent platform.
Liu et al. [13] proposed an authentication and access control mechanism for an IoT
infrastructure by establishing an ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem)—based security key
and using an RBAC authorization method based on the user’s role. The proposed solution
is not scalable in an IoT environment due to the large number of users and the inability of
RBAC to assign permission in advance. The proposed protocol requires frequent message
exchanges and the security assessment is not strong. Ndibanje et al. [14] improved the effi-
ciency at a minimal communication cost by incorporating secure session key establishment,
maintaining user anonymity and mutual authentication. However, this solution is lacking
in terms of its protection of the integrity of the transmitted messages.
Both role- and credential-based access control models cannot be directly applied
to IoT due to their inherited disadvantages, as discussed before. However, using the
strengths of these models and combining them with other models can overcome their
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 1772 6 of 16

weaknesses. Moreover, Kaiwen et al. [15] proposed a hybrid role- and Attribute-Based
Access Control model to target large-scale dynamic users by keeping policy integrity intact.
They also proposed a mechanism to resolve policy conflicts and redundancy. Granting
permissions and role management are still the responsibilities of the administrator in the
proposed model.
Touati et al. [16] proposed an activity control mechanism (a generalized version of
context-aware access control) by focusing on user and system preferences to grant or
deny access. They used Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) and a
finite state machine for dynamic access policy adaptation. Touati et al. [17] also targeted
the key/attribute revocation problem by proposing a Batch-Based CP-ABE method. The
proposed mechanism does not require extra nodes for processing and reduces the overall
complexity and overheads.
The Cap-BAC model is based on the least privileged principle for access service
management. The service provider requires an authorization certificate from the user to
give access to the required resources.
Sicari et al. [18] proposed a Unified Modeling Language (UML) conceptual model
to define privacy policy definitions and data quality assessment in order to lay the foun-
dation for the development of a secure and private IoT-based environment. Moreover,
Goncalves et al. [19] proposed a secure architecture to establish and manage medical pre-
scriptions in a mobility context by using Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology.
Gusmeroli et al. [20] proposed a capability-based approach to address IoT access con-
trol issues with low computation and storage capabilities, which requires lightweight secure
control access policies. Moreover, Bernabe et al. [21] proposed a trust-aware lightweight
access control mechanism to provide a reliable and secure link between connected devices
in an IoT environment. They proposed a novel trust model based on the trust values
accumulated from Quality of Service (QoS), security measures and reputation. As the
identities of devices are not known in a distributed and decentralized IoT environment,
this makes trust management a core issue to address.
Mahalle et al. [22] proposed an energy-efficient trust-based dynamic access control
framework by capitalizing on the fuzzy approach to trust calculation from linguistic
information gained from IoT devices. In Mandatory Access Control (MAC), an individual
or a group with the authority to grant access rights to a resource grants access control. This
is mostly implemented in government organizations and access is granted based on the
sensitivity label associated with that particular resource.
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) Innovation Institute [23] proposed a Manda-
tory Access Control mechanism for securing an IoT framework and hosting policy admin-
istration points by forcing unauthorized communications to shut down. They eased the
administration of policies by incorporating attribute-based control policies.
Seitz et al. [24] proposed a distributed authorization framework by keeping the num-
ber of messages exchanged between resource-constrained devices to a minimum.
Naedele et al. [25] proposed a public key-based protocol to gain secure access and
communication between embedded devices by specifying numerous authentication and
access control policies. The proposed protocol requires frequent message exchange to make
a secure connection and it does not conform to industry standards. The device’s local
condition and status are also not taken into consideration.
Zhang et al. [26] proposed a distributed privacy-preserving access control scheme
specifically for sensor networks. It asks users to buy a token from the network owner and
request the sensor data, which are delivered after the verification of the token. They use a
distribution token reuse detection mechanism to avoid the reuse of tokens, which would
enable unauthorized access. Their main work focused on privacy preservation and did not
consider fine-grained access control policies for end devices. Table 2 shows the advantages
and drawbacks of the related works.
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 1772 7 of 16

Table 2. Summary of the advantages and drawbacks of the related works.

Reference Advantages Limitations

Produces possible delays due to owner
The Pseudonymous technique is used to ensure the
FairAccess [10] communication as authorization occurs
privacy of the users.
through tokenization.
Even though this solution gains scalability as a result
It utilizes managers, who are responsible for of distributing query permissions via management
Novo [8]
registering IoT devices and verifying them. hubs, it could encounter security threats if the
manager is malicious.
It does not use Proof of Work (PoW) consensus The proposed architecture is smart home application
validation blocks as all IoT devices in the smart based, not a generic solution and may not be well
Dorri [12] home tier are controlled via the miner. suited to other IoT use cases. Moreover, this
It is argued that the overheads of the solution are mechanism does not support self-enforced access
insignificant compared to its security gains. control policies.
The architecture addresses security and privacy
issues by incorporating Mandatory Access Control
It does not protect the integrity of the
Almarhabi [27] policies in the cloud and BYOD environments
transmitted messages.
delicately and securely with an
independent platform.
The solution is highly centralized and therefore is
The infrastructure established an ECC-based not well suited to the IoT environment due to the
Liu [13] security key and uses the RBAC authorization distributed nature of IoT networks.
method based on the user’s role. The protocol requires frequent message exchanges
and its security assessment is weak.
It improved efficiency at a minimal communication
Role-Based Access Control and credential-based
cost by incorporating secure session key
Ndibanje [14] access control models cannot be directly applied to
establishment, maintaining user anonymity and
IoT due to their inherited disadvantages.
mutual authentication.
It uses hybrid Role-Based Access Control and
Granting permissions and role management is still
Attribute-Based Access Control models to target
Kaiwen [15] the responsibility of the administrator in the
large-scale dynamic users. It resolves policy conflicts
proposed model.
and redundancy.
It is based on a UML conceptual model to define
privacy policy definitions and data quality
The data integrity and security of the transmitted
Sicari [18] assessment in order to lay the foundation for the
messages must be ensured.
development of a secure and private
IoT-based environment.
It used a Mandatory Access Control mechanism for
securing an IoT framework and hosting policy
NTT Innovation administration points by forcing unauthorized The integrity of transmitted messages is not
Institute [23] communications to be shut down. fully protected.
It eases the administration of policies by
incorporating attribute-based control policies.
It enables keeping the number of messages
Transmitted messages are not fully protected (in
Seitz [24] exchanged to a minimum between
terms of their integrity) against illegal modifications.
resource-constrained devices.
It requests users to purchase a token from the
network owner in order request the sensor data,
The main work focused on privacy preservation and
which are delivered after the verification of the
Zhang [26] did not consider fine-grained access control policies
token. It uses a distribution token reuse detection
for end devices.
mechanism to avoid the reuse of tokens, which
would enable unauthorized access.

Nevertheless, current security solutions are not fully suited to IoT due to the dis-
tributed nature of IoT networks and the limited resources of IoT devices. Traditional
access control methods are costly in terms of their high power consumption and processing
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 1772 8 of 16

overheads. Furthermore, public blockchains are not suitable for resource-constrained IoT
devices, as they demand high computational power for mining processes.
Unlike traditional access control methods, our proposed architecture provides
the following:
• Ensuring effective and efficient protection for each tier of the IoT architecture via a
private hierarchical blockchain structure.
• Enabling a significant reduction in traffic overheads by adopting a lightweight consen-
sus mechanism based on IoT requirements and using mobile agent software.
• Incorporating mobility and intelligence via mobile agent software.
• Applying MAC, which is based on a hierarchical security level, to work in line with
our hierarchical blockchain architecture and guarantee MLS protection.
• Designing a generic, lightweight and scalable solution that can be applied to various
IoT applications.

5. Proposed Solution
The proposed solution is based on a multi-agent system and uses a private blockchain,
which provides lightweight and decentralized access control security for an IoT system. The
proposed architecture is shown in Figure 2 and relies on a hierarchical blockchain structure,
consisting of a Local Blockchain Manager (LBCM), which includes IoT devices at the
bottom of our proposed architecture, a Fog Blockchain Manager (FBCM), which includes
fog/edge nodes, a Core Fog Blockchain Manager (CFBCM), which includes core fog nodes
and a Cloud Blockchain Manager (CBCM), which represents cloud blockchain storage.
Each BCM has a block header, MAC policy header and transactions. Our framework meets
the requirements of the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) security triad and
is well-suited to the specific requirements of IoT in terms of its scalability, distributed
nature, constrained devices and defense against various security issues, such as single
points of failure. Finally, our proposed architecture is generalizable and can be applied to
Appl. Sci. 2020, 10, x FORIoT
various PEERapplications.
REVIEW 9 of 16

Figure
Figure 2. Proposed
2. Proposed blockchain-basedframework
blockchain-based framework for
forsecure
secureInternet of of
Internet Things (IoT)
Things access
(IoT) control.
access control.

5.1. Transactions
Communications among IoT devices, fog nodes, core fog nodes, and/or cloud com-
puting are known as transactions. Transactions can be classified based on their specific
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 1772 9 of 16

Taking into account the limited resources of IoT devices and the high computational
overheads for solving cryptographic puzzles such as Proof of Stake (PoS), it is not straight-
forward to adopt blockchain technology in IoT devices. Regarding the miners in our pro-
posed solution, each Blockchain Manager (BCM) is equipped with an online, high-resource
device, identified as a miner, which is responsible for controlling all communications within
and outside of each Blockchain Manager (BCM). Moreover, the BCM has the responsibility
of removing or adding IoT devices and possesses a policy header, which is a MAC policy
that enables the BCM to control all of the transactions inside each BCM and between
BCMs. Furthermore, each Blockchain Manager (BCM) has the following mobile agents:
Signature Verification Agent, Authentication Agent, Authorization Agent, Encryption and
Decryption Agent. However, the Local Blockchain Manager (LBCM) does not contain an
Encryption and Decryption Agent due to the existence of resource-constrained IoT devices,
as encryption and decryption algorithms are computationally expensive, which would be
unsuitable for the limited resources of IoT devices.
Regarding the applicable consensus mechanisms in our proposed solution, consensus
mechanisms in public blockchains require costly mining methods, such as Proof of Work
(PoW), which are not suitable for IoT networks for various reasons. For instance, public
blockchains allow any nodes in the blockchain network to participate in the consensus
process and transactions can be seen publicly, which is not desirable to many business
blockchain solutions, as their sensitive data may be revealed and their privacy can be
compromised. Moreover, public blockchains are vulnerable to the effects of a 51% attack.
Hence, we use private (or permissioned) blockchains [28] to address the abovementioned
challenges within IoT resource constraints and we use a lightweight consensus mechanism.
In permissioned blockchains, the mining processes are managed via authenticated par-
ticipants and are not open to the public. We will illustrate the main components of the
proposed framework in the following sections.

5.1. Transactions
Communications among IoT devices, fog nodes, core fog nodes, and/or cloud com-
puting are known as transactions. Transactions can be classified based on their specific
functions, namely Access, Update, Add, Monitor and Remove. An Access transaction
is created by BCMs to access data and is associated with granting read-only permission.
Update transactions are created by devices/nodes to update stored data and are associated
with granting read-and-write permission. BCMs can create Add, Remove, or/and Monitor
transactions and BCMs have read/write permissions. Add transactions are used to add
a new IoT device/node, while Remove transactions are used to remove them. Monitor
transactions are used to monitor IoT devices/nodes’ information and status.

5.2. MAC Policy

MAC stands for Mandatory Access Control and offers tighter security because only
Blockchain Managers (BCMs) can access or modify the access control policy, which can, in
turn, reduce security errors. MAC is based on the security clearance of a subject (user), such
as secret, top secret or confidential and an object’s resource classification, such as secret,
top secret or confidential. Clearance and classification data are stored in the security labels.
The determination of granting access to a request is based upon the clearance levels of
subjects and the classification levels of objects. MAC policy is enforced by comparing the
clearance of the subject to that of the object according to the Bell-LaPadula model, which
is used for enforcing access control based on multilevel security policies [29]. Moreover,
it focuses on maintaining data confidentiality and guarantees that users do not acquire
access to resources above their security clearance, as shown in Figure 3.
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 1772 10 of 16

Appl. Sci. 2020, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 10 of 16

Figure3.3.Bell-LaPadula
Figure Bell-LaPadulamodel.
model.
5.3. Blockchain Managers (BCMs)
5.3. Blockchain Managers (BCMs)
BCMs are the core of our proposed framework and they manage all communications
in fourBCMs areLocal
layers: the core of our proposed
Blockchain Manager framework
(LBCM), Fog and they manage
Blockchain all communications
Manager (FBCM), Core
in four layers: Local Blockchain Manager (LBCM), Fog Blockchain
Fog Blockchain Manager (CFBCM) and Cloud Blockchain Manager (CBCM). Furthermore, Manager (FBCM), Core
Fog Blockchain
BCMs Manager
are responsible (CFBCM)
for setting and Cloud
the access controlBlockchain
policy forManager (CBCM). Further-
each device/node in each
layer. Each block in the blockchain comprises two headers: a block headerdevice/node
more, BCMs are responsible for setting the access control policy for each and a policyin
each layer.
header. Each policy
The MAC block in the blockchain
is inserted into thecomprises two headers:
block structure a block header
of each blockchain and a
transaction.
policy header. The MAC policy is inserted into the block structure
The BCMs have a policy header that allows them to control access permission for all of each blockchain
transaction. The
transactions. BCMs all
Although have a policy
blocks in a header that allows
blockchain have a them
policytoheader,
controlthe
access
most permission
updated
for at
one allthe
transactions.
head of theAlthough
block headerall blocks
in BCMsin aisblockchain have a policy
used for checking header, policies.
and changing the most
updated one at the head of the block header in BCMs is used for checking
The miner in the proposed solution is the BCM in each layer, which is the central security and changing
policies.
device The minerfor
responsible in the proposed solution
authenticating, is the BCM
authorizing in each layer,
and auditing which isMoreover,
transactions. the central
security device responsible for authenticating, authorizing and
when a block is added, BCMs create a pointer to the prior block, copy the policy in the auditing transactions.
Moreover,
prior when a to
block header block
the is added,
new blockBCMs createthe
and attach a pointer
block toto the
the prior block, copy the policy
blockchain.
in the prior block header to the new block and attach the block to the blockchain.
5.4. Software Agent
5.4. Software Agent framework uses a software agent that can work effectively due to its
The proposed
mobility,
The adaptability, transparency,
proposed framework uses raggedness and self-starts
a software agent and stops.
that can work Furthermore,
effectively due to its
the software
mobility, agent can transparency,
adaptability, enable resource-constrained
raggedness andIoT devices and
self-starts to reduce
stops. costs and re-
Furthermore,
sources duringagent
the software coordination
can enable with other machines. The
resource-constrained IoTfollowing
devices tosubsections
reduce costs illustrate
and re-
each software
sources agent
during of the proposed
coordination framework.
with other machines. The following subsections illustrate
each software agent of the proposed framework.
5.4.1. Signature Verification Agent
5.4.1.This mobileVerification
Signature agent is located
Agentin BCMs. The agent aims to ensure message integrity
to guarantee that a message was sent
This mobile agent is located by a known
in BCMs. The agentuser andtowas
aims not message
ensure modifiedintegrity
in transitto
and that it is not concerned with encrypted data. In LBCM, we are only
guarantee that a message was sent by a known user and was not modified in transit concerned with
and
ensuring that the data were not modified to ensure trust between IoT devices via symmetric
that it is not concerned with encrypted data. In LBCM, we are only concerned with ensur-
key algorithms (shared secret keys). Therefore, we run a lightweight hashing function and
ing that the data were not modified to ensure trust between IoT devices via symmetric
verification agents, which are suitable for resource-constrained IoT devices.
key algorithms (shared secret keys). Therefore, we run a lightweight hashing function and
For LBCM layer, each sender generates a hash value of the original message and
verification agents, which are suitable for resource-constrained IoT devices.
assigns the sender’s shared secret key to each message they send. The verification agent
For LBCM layer, each sender generates a hash value of the original message and as-
verifies the data in the LBCM layer by decrypting the message using the shared secret key
signs the sender’s shared secret key to each message they send. The verification agent
and comparing the received hash value to the generated hash value.
verifies the data in the LBCM layer by decrypting the message using the shared secret key
However, as FBCM, CFBCM and CBCM have more computing power, these agents
and comparing the received hash value to the generated hash value.
use digital signatures, as shown in Figure 4, which generates a hash value of the original
However, as FBCM, CFBCM and CBCM have more computing power, these agents
message and assigns the sender’s private key to each message they send. The verification
use digital signatures, as shown in Figure 4, which generates a hash value of the original
agent verifies the data by decrypting the message using the sender’s public key and
message and
comparing theassigns
receivedthe sender’s
hash value private key to each
to the generated message
hash value. Ifthey
the send.
valuesThe
are verification
equal, this
agent verifies the data by decrypting the message using the sender’s public
means that the message has not been modified and the identity of the sender is confirmed.key and com-
paring the received hash value to the generated hash value. If the values are equal, this
means that the message has not been modified and the identity of the sender is confirmed.
 Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 1772 11 of 16
Appl. Sci. 2020, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 11 of 16

Figure 4. Signing Agent and Verification Agent for Fog Blockchain Manager (FBCM), Core Fog Blockchain Manager
(CFBCM) and Cloud Blockchain Manager (CBCM).
Figure 4. Signing Agent and Verification Agent for Fog Blockchain Manager (FBCM), Core Fog Blockchain Manager
5.4.2.(CFBCM) and Cloud
Authentication Blockchain Manager (CBCM).
Agent
This agent is responsible
5.4.2. Authentication Agent for ensuring that a user is valid and authenticated. Each
device/node must share a secret key. Each BCM miner has an Authentication Agent, which
This agent
ensures that a is responsible
user is valid and forauthenticated.
ensuring thatThe a user is valid andAgent
Authentication authenticated.
authenticatesEach IoT
device/node must share a secret key. Each BCM miner has
devices/nodes based on a shared secret key, which is issued by the BCM miner in each an Authentication Agent,
which
layer.ensures
The shared that asecret
user keyis valid and authenticated.
is based The Authentication
on the Diffie-Hellman key exchangeAgent authenti-
algorithm, which
cates IoT devices/nodes based on a shared secret key, which is issued
enables the generation of a shared secret key between two parties that have not previously by the BCM miner
in know
each layer. The shared
each other secret key is
over a non-secure based in
channel onorder
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algo-
to secure their communications [30].
rithm, which enables the generation of a shared secret
When two IoT devices/nodes want to communicate with each other key between two parties
in thethat
same have
layer,
notthe
previously
agent firstknowcheckseach other
if they haveoverthearight
non-secure channel
shared key. in order
However, to secure
if the IoT nodestheir
arecom-
in dif-
munications
ferent layers, [30].
the communication takes place between the BCMs in each layer using public
keyWhen two IoT devices/nodes
cryptography. If the agent does want nottoapprove
communicate with eachthen
their identities, other incommunication
the the same layer, is
thediscarded.
agent firstIfchecks
the agent approves their identities, then they can communicatenodes
if they have the right shared key. However, if the IoT are inon
and move
different
to the next step, which is the Authorization Agent, to determine which resourcesusing
layers, the communication takes place between the BCMs in each layer can be
public key cryptography.
accessed based on the MAC If thepolicy.
agent does not approve their identities, then the commu-
nication is discarded. If the agent approves their identities, then they can communicate
and5.4.3.
moveAuthorization
on to the next Agent
step, which is the Authorization Agent, to determine which re-
sourcesThis
can agent
be accessed based on
is responsible forthe MAC policy.
enforcing access control policies and granting permission
rights to the requester based on its digital identity (ID) after authentication. It enables
5.4.3.
the Authorization
BCM miner to Agent determine exactly what IoT devices/nodes are allowed to do based on
theThis
MAC policy.
agent Although the
is responsible for Authentication
enforcing accessAgent approves
control policiesthe andcommunication,
granting permis- this
agent
sion takes
rights the requester
to the ID of the connected
based on its party from
digital the Authentication
identity Agent. Then,Ititenables
(ID) after authentication. searches
thefor userminer
BCM security clearance and
to determine resource
exactly what classification basedare
IoT devices/nodes on allowed
the stored toMAC policy
do based onin
the BCM. The BCM miner uses the most updated MAC policy
the MAC policy. Although the Authentication Agent approves the communication, this file based on the last block
header.
agent takesThis
the agent implements
ID of the connected the concept
party fromofthe theAuthentication
MAC policy, which Agent. includes
Then, itthe security
searches
classification level, to determine the type of permission (read;
for user security clearance and resource classification based on the stored MAC policy in write). Furthermore, the
theAuthentication
BCM. The BCM Agent
miner monitors
uses thethemost
behavior
updated of IoT
MACdevices/nodes and assigns
policy file based on thealast
trust value
block
for each IoT device/node. Moreover, it enforces the access
header. This agent implements the concept of the MAC policy, which includes the securitycontrol policy to determine
which resource
classification level,thetousers can access
determine basedofon
the type the Bell-LaPadula
permission model.Furthermore, the
(read; write).
Authentication Agent monitors the behavior of IoT devices/nodes and assigns a trust
5.4.4. Encryption and Decryption Agent
value for each IoT device/node. Moreover, it enforces the access control policy to deter-
This mobile
mine which resourceagent assures
the users canthe confidentiality
access based on theofBell-LaPadula
data and guarantees
model. that only ap-
proved users and agents can read and understand these data. This agent is located in FBCM,
CFBCM
5.4.4. and CBCM.
Encryption While we assume
and Decryption Agent that data confidentiality is not needed between IoT
devices in LBCM, it is needed between any BCMs. The agent can encrypt and decrypt all
This mobile agent assures the confidentiality of data and guarantees that only ap-
access control policies and data transmitted between BCMs. This agent uses an asymmetric
proved users(public
algorithm and agents can read and
cryptography), whichunderstand these
encrypts the data. This
message withagent is located
the receiver’s in
public
FBCM, CFBCM and CBCM. While we assume that data confidentiality
key and the message can be decrypted by the receiver’s private key. is not needed be-
tween IoT devices in LBCM, it is needed between any BCMs. The agent can encrypt and
decrypt all access control policies and data transmitted between BCMs. This agent uses
Appl. Sci.
Appl. Sci. 2021,
2020, 11,
10,1772
x FOR PEER REVIEW 12 of 16
12 of 16

an asymmetric algorithm (public cryptography), which encrypts the message with the re-
ceiver’s public key and the message can be decrypted by the receiver’s private key.
A
A sequence
sequence diagram,
diagram, as as shown
shown in in Figure
Figure 5, illustrates
illustrates the interaction
interaction between
between various
various
software agents, specifically the Authentication Agent, Authorization
software agents, specifically the Authentication Agent, Authorization Agent, resource Agent, resource
and
and BCM
BCM forfor aa user
user who
who requests
requests aa modification
modification of of the
the data
data in
in aa resource.
resource. Now,
Now, we we will
will
illustrate
illustrate how a user can modify data based on our framework. When the user wants to
how a user can modify data based on our framework. When the user wants to
modify
modify existing
existing data,
data, itit sends
sends aa request
request to
to the
the Authentication
Authentication Agent,Agent, which
which checks
checks the
the
identity
identity ofof the
the user.
user. InIn our
our case,
case, the user has
the user has aa secret
secret shared
shared key.
key. The
The Authentication
Authentication AgentAgent
checks
checks the identity of the user and approves it, as it has a valid key and provides the user
the identity of the user and approves it, as it has a valid key and provides the user
with
with anan ID.
ID. Then,
Then, thethe user
user uses
uses the
the provided
provided ID ID and
and sends
sends aa request
request to to the
the Authorization
Authorization
Agent,
Agent, which
whichimplements
implementsthe theMAC
MAC mechanism.
mechanism. It checks
It checksthethe
MAC MACpolicy for the
policy for user and
the user
the resource; in our case, the user is granted access, as the user can neither
and the resource; in our case, the user is granted access, as the user can neither write nor write nor read
above or below
read above its classification
or below level.
its classification Then,
level. Then,the the
useruser
directly sends
directly a request
sends a requestto to
modify
mod-
the
ify the data to the authorized resource and can only perform authorized actions based on
data to the authorized resource and can only perform authorized actions based on
the MAC policy. After the resource has been modified, it sends an updated transaction
the MAC policy. After the resource has been modified, it sends an updated transaction
with an updated blockchain hash value to the LBCM. Finally, the LBCM sends an updated
with an updated blockchain hash value to the LBCM. Finally, the LBCM sends an updated
transaction to inform the Authorization Agent and update the blockchain hash value for
transaction to inform the Authorization Agent and update the blockchain hash value for
the updated resource.
the updated resource.

Figure 5. Sequence diagram for Authentication and Authorization Agents.

Figure 5. Sequence diagram for Authentication and Authorization Agents.

5.5. Results
5.5. Results and
and Discussion
Discussion
The result
The result of of this
this paper
paper is is that
that current
current security
security solutions
solutions are are not
not fully
fully suited
suited toto IoT
IoT
due to the distributed nature of IoT networks and the limited
due to the distributed nature of IoT networks and the limited resources of IoT devices. resources of IoT devices.
Traditional access
Traditional access control
control methods
methods are are costly
costly in in terms
terms of of their
their high
high power
power consumption
consumption
and processing
and processing overheads.
overheads. Furthermore,
Furthermore, publicpublic blockchains
blockchains are are not
not suitable
suitable for
for resource-
resource-
constrained IoT devices as they demand high computational
constrained IoT devices as they demand high computational power for mining processes.power for mining processes.
Therefore,there
Therefore, thereisisaaneed
needtotodesign
designdistributed
distributed andand lightweight
lightweight secure
secure access
access control
control for for
an
IoT network. The paper’s contribution is the proposal of a novel architecture based onon
an IoT network. The paper’s contribution is the proposal of a novel architecture based a
a multi-agent
multi-agent system,
system, which
which usesuses a private
a private distributed
distributed blockchain,
blockchain, providing
providing a light-
a lightweight
weight architecture
architecture and decentralized
and decentralized access
access control controlfor
security security
the IoTfor the IoT
system. Thesystem.
framework The
framework
relies relies on a hierarchical
on a hierarchical blockchain blockchain
structure and structure
consists andof consists of a Local Blockchain
a Local Blockchain Manager
Managerwhich
(LBCM), (LBCM), whichIoT
includes includes
devices, IoTadevices, a Fog Blockchain
Fog Blockchain Manager Manager (FBCM),
(FBCM), which which
includes
includes fog/edge
fog/edge nodes, anodes,
Core aFog Core Fog Blockchain
Blockchain Manager Manager
(CFBCM), (CFBCM),
whichwhich includes
includes core core
fog
fog nodes
nodes and and a Cloud
a Cloud Blockchain
Blockchain ManagerManager(CBCM),(CBCM),which which is a cloud
is a cloud computing
computing node.node.
Our
Our framework
framework meetsmeets the requirements
the requirements of the
of the CIA CIA security
security triad and triad and is well-suited
is well-suited to the
to the specific
requirements of IoT inof
specific requirements terms of terms
IoT in its scalability, distributed
of its scalability, nature, constrained
distributed devices and
nature, constrained de-
defense
vices and against
defensevarious security
against various issues, suchissues,
security as singlesuch points of failure.
as single pointsThe limitations
of failure. The will
lim-
appear
itationsclearly after the
will appear implementation
clearly and testing ofand
after the implementation the proposed
testing of architecture.
the proposedHowever,
architec-
it may be deduced that they will involve performance and
ture. However, it may be deduced that they will involve performance and convenience convenience issues. Finally,
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 1772 13 of 16

the objectives of the proposed solution are achieved in the framework by enhancing the
security of the access control mechanisms among IoT devices, as well as enabling secure
communication between IoT devices, fog nodes and cloud computing.
The Internet of Things has many uses. Such uses are still increasing and a promising
future for the Internet of Things is expected. With this increase, however, there have been
cases and incidents that have revealed the weaknesses of the Internet of Things and the
extent of its threat to users’ rights and freedoms [31]. It is imperative to develop technolo-
gies and solutions that reduce these effects and allow users to benefit from the advantages
of the IoT. One of the most widespread examples of the Internet of Things is smart home
devices, which may be the next arena for attacking and influencing individuals [32]. An
attacker could take control of the victim’s home and enter it by remotely opening the front
door or opening windows and damaging the home devices. Cameras can be hacked, access
to sensitive data and household appliances can be controlled and destroyed or fires can
threaten residents. This type of attack poses a new threat to smart home device users. The
risks in smart homes fall into five classes: technical vulnerabilities, user data risk, a lack
of encryption, privacy issues and increased complexity of the system [33]. On October of
2016, in one of the worst breaches, Mirai botnet attacked IoT, which affected the control
of the world’s Domain Name Server (DNS) infrastructure. As a result, many IoT devices,
such as DVR players and digital cameras as well as many websites including Netflix and
CNN, were affected and turned off. The attacker used default authentication data to log
in to victims’ IoT devices. The estimated number of targeted devices was approximately
100,000 [34].
In our proposed solution, we provide different levels of blockchain managers that
manage the IoT’s entire system. In the case of smart homes, the Local BlockChain Manager
(LBCM) works as a miner. It is installed in the home hubs or on a personal computer and is
directly connected to and manages the IoT devices located in a smart home, such as smart
TVs, lights and refrigerator devices. Each smart home has various IoT devices managed via
LBCM. A group of neighboring smart homes or a specific smart home owned by someone
can be managed and connected to each other by Fog BlockChain Manager (FBCM) through
LBCM. Core Fog BlockChain Manager (CFBCM) can manage different groups of FBCMs in
a wide area such as a city to increase scalability and for security purposes. Finally, these
groups of CFBCMs are connected to different Cloud BlockChain Managers (CBCM) so that
data can be stored and retrieved. The communication only takes place between BCMs. All
these managers perform as discussed in Section 5. Appropriate measures such as these
must be taken to make smart homes safer and more livable.
Smart home devises are a potential target of various security attacks due to the
availability of data and communication resources. Tampering and malicious code are some
of the common cyber-attack challenges for smart home devices. In these attacks, they refer
to a piece of software designed intentionally to inflict serious damage to a targeted device
to modify data and breach the integrity of the system. The primary target of the attacker,
after scanning the network of smart home, is to gain access to these devices and maintain
access to compromise the whole system. When attackers tamper with a smart home system
by adding a code or function on IoT devices to access and modify sensitive data, it leads to
system reliability being compromised. If our research proposal faces this kind of attack,
it will not function in some parts of the framework. In the proposed solution, firstly,
an authentication agent can distinguish between authorized and unauthorized access.
Secondly, the authorization agent is applied to the MAC policy, which limits the access
and searches for the security classification label. In addition, the compartmentalization
approach is applied. Finally, the signature verification agent ensures the reliability against
the change of data which leads to maintaining the integrity and safety of the system.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is one of the most threatening security
challenges for the IoT environment. In a DDoS attack, the attackers overwhelm a target
network resource with a large volume of fake requests to make the resource or service
unavailable for legitimate users. In the context of IoT environment, the DDoS attack can be
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 1772 14 of 16

launched by malicious smart home devices that flood the LBCM with a large number of
fake transactions. Our proposed solution is based on a hierarchical security level which
can reduce the possibility of DDoS attacks. As a result, malicious devices will not be
able to access the LBCM, as each smart home device needs to be authenticated before
communicating with the LBCM. The Authentication Agent ensures that each smart home
device has a valid shared secret key. Let us suppose that an adversary compromised
smart home devices. The next level of security can prevent this attack, which is based
on a multilevel security (MLS) policy in the Bell-LaPadula model. The Authorization
Agent applies a security classification level for each smart home device which limits the
access of each smart home device. In the worst case, let us suppose that the attacker gains
access to smart home devices, gains access and starts sending unnecessary transactions
to overwhelm the LBCM. In such an event, the Authorization Agent would assign a trust
value to each smart home device and update them periodically. This trust value is based
on the behavior of smart home devices and as a result, the compromised devices would be
blocked when the attackers conduct malicious activities such as unnecessary transactions
to the LBCM.

6. Conclusions and Future Works

The issues related to the security and privacy of the IoT system are immense and
require careful consideration. There are some pros and cons to both centralized and decen-
tralized solutions. Centralized solutions are constrained by scalability, while decentralized
approaches are bound by delays, computational overheads and energy constraints. We
proposed a multi-agent system to provide lightweight, decentralized IoT access control
security mechanisms. Blockchain Managers (BCMs) are responsible for providing the
necessary security for access control, securing communication between local IoT devices,
fog nodes, core fog nodes and cloud computing.
The proposed architecture is a generalizable solution that can be applied to various
IoT applications. Furthermore, IoT’s issues are not fully addressed in prior studies, as most
studies focus on addressing access control issues in a specific IoT application such as a
smart home.
The authors understand that research evaluation is must be based on implementation
and testing phases that specify the solution’s applicability and effectiveness compared to
related research. However, this research is still in progress and the authors believe that the
results of these two phases should be published in a separate paper due to the expectation
that a great number of details will need to be discussed, as well as new contributions.
In future research, the proposed framework will be implemented in a real environment
to measure the achievement of the fundamental security goals in relation to integrity by
applying the digital signature, authentication via shared secret keys, authorization via the
MAC policy and confidentiality via public key encryption.
We will examine various solutions to solve the big header size problem in the blockchain.
A possible solution is to separate the header block access control policy from the block
structure in the blockchain and place the access control policy in a separate policy file
blockchain or in a separate encrypted text file. The proposed architecture will be enhanced
in this domain and we will apply a case study for IoT applications that requires a high level
of security. The RaspberryPI IoT device will be used for the deployment of the solution
and we will use a private blockchain platform in its deployment. Further details will be
included in future works.

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, S.A., F.E. and K.A. (Khalid Almarhabi); methodology,
S.A.; validation, K.A. (Khalid Almarhabi), F.E. and M.Y.; writing—original draft preparation, S.A. and
K.A. (Khalid Almarhabi); writing—review and editing, M.Y.; supervision, F.E.; project administration,
F.E. and A.A.; funding acquisition, A.A., E.A. and K.A. (Khalid Alsubhi) All authors have read and
agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 1772 15 of 16

Funding: This project was funded by the Deanship of Scientific Research (DSR), King Abdulaziz
University, Jeddah, under grant No. (RG-18-611-38). The authors, therefore, gratefully acknowledge
the DSR technical and financial support.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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