We use cookies to ensure you get the best experience on Lawphil.net.

By continuing to browse our site, you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

Find out more here.

OK

Today is Wednesday, July 10, 2024home

ConstitutionStatutesExecutive IssuancesJudicial IssuancesOther IssuancesJurisprudenceInternational

Legal ResourcesAUSL Exclusive

SECOND DIVISION

January 30, 2019

G.R. No. 211829

JACINTO J. BAGAPORO, Petitioner

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 with application for temporary restraining order
assailing the January 29, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which denied petitioner Jacinto
Bagaporo y Jabon's "Petition for Relief from Resolution or Judgment in Case Entry was Already Ordered,"
and its March 24, 2014 Resolution3 denying reconsideration.

We briefly go over the antecedents.

Petitioner was indicted for Bigamy in an Information4 dated May 31, 2006, worded as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of September 1991, in the Municipality of Calauag, province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Jacinto Bagaporo, being
then legally married to one Dennia Dumlao in a marriage ceremony solemnized on March 10, 1986 at
Quezon City by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr., and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or
annulled, did then and there willfully[,] unlawfully and feloniously contract a second and subsequent
marriage with Milagros Lumas.

Contrary to law.5

Docketed as Crim. Case No. 4789-C before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calauag in Quezon, Branch
63, trial ensued.

In a Decision6 dated October 1, 2012, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Bigamy. Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment with a
minimum term of two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional, to a maximum term of
eight years and one day of prision mayor, with the accessory penalties.

Petitioner appealed his conviction. According to the petitioner, his then counsel of record, Atty. Angelo
Cerdon (Atty. Cerdon), broached the idea that he might want to engage a new lawyer based near in
Manila to henceforth handle the appeal. This allegedly prompted the petitioner to consult his present
counsel, Atty. Berteni Cataluna Causing (Atty. Causing), in January of 2013.
Atty. Causing advised the petitioner to secure first Atty. Cerdon's formal withdrawal as counsel.
Nonetheless, upon Atty. Causing's advice and assistance, ostensibly as collaborating counsel, petitioner
filed a Motion to Withdraw Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC on
January 11, 2013.7 Copies of both motions were allegedly furnished to Atty. Cerdon when the petitioner
visited the former's office on February 25, 2013. It was then that petitioner supposedly clarified with
Atty. Cerdon's secretary that Atty. Cerdon remained to be his counsel of record to take charge of the
appeal before the CA, notwithstanding Atty. Causing's engagement to pursue post-judgment remedies
before the RTC.

Meanwhile, the appeal before the CA proceeded. Petitioner was, thus, required by the CA on March 18,
2013 to file an appeal brief. The notice was received by Atty. Cerdon on April 8, 2013.

On July 31, 2013, the CA dismissed petitioner's appeal for failure to file the required appellant's brief.
Entry of Judgment then followed after the dismissal became final on August 31, 2013.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed in the same case a "Petition for Relief from Resolution or Judgment in Case
Entry was Already Ordered" dated December 26, 2013, alleging gross negligence on the part of Atty.
Cerdon. Treated as a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the petition was denied by
the CA on January 29, 2014.

Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration8 on February 17, 2014, which the CA denied
for utter lack of merit on March 24, 2014. Hence, petitioner's present recourse.

Without necessarily giving due course to the instant petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
was required to file its Comment, which it complied with on September 18, 2014.9 The OSG points out
that petitioner's conviction had already attained finality and is, thus, no longer subject to review; the
negligence of petitioner's counsels binds him; and that, the elements of the crime of bigamy were
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Through a Reply10 filed on October 7, 2014, petitioner invokes this Court's authority to vacate null and
void decisions notwithstanding their finality. Reasoning that his collaborating counsel could have only
done so much, petitioner argues that he should not be bound by the negligence of his lead counsel.
Finally, petitioner insists that the elements of bigamy were not proven in his case.
The present petition essentially seeks the reopening of petitioner's lost appeal and reasserts the merits
of his case. Framed as one raising questions of law,11 petitioner argues that Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, particularly the last clause,12 violates the equal protection clause and the due process
clause. The petitioner also claims that he was convicted on facts not stated in the Information.

On procedural grounds, petitioner asserts that he could still withdraw his appeal before the CA and
substitute the same with a motion for reconsideration before the RTC. Allegedly, the CA unjustly and
incorrectly treated his petition as one under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. Contending that there are
compelling reasons to give due course to his appeal, petitioner claims that he was a victim of gross
ignorance of the law and that there exists a "gross negligence of counsel" remedy established by
jurisprudence, under which his petition for relief should have been recognized by the CA.

The Court's Ruling

We address first the propriety of the CA's outright denial of the petition.

The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on
the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.13 Notably, the petition for relief was
filed in the same case, which resolution had already become final. An examination of petitioner's
averments and relief sought, i.e., the setting aside of a final and executory resolution denying an appeal,
leads to no other conclusion than that it is the mode provided under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
whether or not that was what petitioner intended. The CA cannot, thus, be faulted for treating the
petition as one which sought the relief provided by Rule 38, and consequently dismissing it. It is settled
that a petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the CA.14

Citing Spouses Mesina v. Meer15 in its assailed January 29, 2014 Resolution, the CA reasoned that a
petition for relief is not the proper remedy from a CA Resolution dismissing an appeal. As explained in
Mesina:

x x x While Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to municipal/metropolitan and regional
trial courts.
The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of
the Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals allow the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals.16
(Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner nonetheless insists that his petition for relief is different from that under Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court. As his petition was based on the alleged gross negligence of his counsel, he asserts that there
exists a distinct remedy provided by jurisprudence and not by the Rules of Court. There is, however, no
such mode that is independent of the Rules.

While the Court indeed provides relief to litigants when gross negligence of counsel is manifest, in such
cases, petitioners go to court through modes specifically provided by law and the Rules. In both APEX
Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,17 and Legarda v. Court of Appeals,18 cited by petitioner, the remedy
availed of before the CA was a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
In Callangan v. People of the Philippines,19 the petitioner resorted to a Rule 45 petition on a pure
question of law before this Court, which assailed the RTC's dismissal of a Rule 65 petition questioning
the MTC's denial of a motion for new trial in a criminal case. We are, thus, confounded by what mode of
relief petitioner is referring to in his contention that the CA erred in treating his petition before it as one
filed under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

As to petitioner's vain attempt to withdraw his notice of appeal to give way to a motion for
reconsideration before the RTC, without manifesting such fact before the CA, the same smacks of forum
shopping. The allegation that Atty. Causing was consulted so that the handling lawyer at the appeal
stage would be based near in Manila contradicts petitioner's feigned expectation that Atty. Cerdon
would continue to represent him before the CA. It puts into doubt the claim that petitioner left word
with Atty. Cerdon's secretary that Atty. Cerdon shall continue to be his counsel of record to take charge
of the appeal. While Atty. Causing ostensibly signed on as collaborating counsel, as Atty. Cerdon has not
formally withdrawn from the case, there was in fact no collaboration between the two counsels. At any
rate, it remains incumbent upon the petitioner to manifest before the CA the engagement of present
counsel, the filing of motions before the RTC, and to follow-up the status of the case at the appellate
stage.

Even if we were to presume good faith, petitioner cannot avoid responsibility for any confusion caused
by his engagement of a new lawyer without securing the written withdrawal or conforme of the lawyer
who handled his case during the trial stage. Furthermore, on petitioner's averments alone, this Court
does not have sufficient basis to conclude that Atty. Cerdon was grossly negligent, especially without
having heard Atty. Cerdon's side on the matter. Petitioner must, therefore, bear the loss of his appeal.

To emphasize:

x x x The doctrinal rule is that negligence of the counsel binds the client because, otherwise, there would
never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and [prove] that
prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned.

xxx

x x x Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that clients are bound by the actions of their counsel
in the conduct of their case. If it were otherwise, and a lawyer's mistake or negligence was admitted as a
reason for the opening of the case, there would be no end to litigation so long as counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. The only exception to the general rule is when the
counsel's actuations are gross or palpable, resulting in serious injustice to client, that courts should
accord relief to the party. Indeed, if the error or negligence of the counsel did not result in the
deprivation of due process to the client, nullification of the decision grounded on grave abuse of
discretion is not warranted. The instant case does not fall within the exception since petitioners were
duly given their day in court.

x x x To rule otherwise would result to a situation that every defeated party, in order to salvage his case,
would just have to claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel as a ground for reversing an
adverse judgment. There would be no end to litigation if this were allowed as every shortcoming of
counsel could be the subject of challenge of his client through another counsel who, if he is also found
wanting, would likewise be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so on ad
infinitum. x x x

xxxx

Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent party leaves the
fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer
from time to time in order to be informed of the progress and developments of his case; hence, to
merely rely on the bare reassurance of his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough.20

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process.1âшphi1 It is a mere
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law.21 Indeed, any liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may be properly invoked only in
cases of some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but definitely not in cases like now
where a liberal application would directly subvert the essence of the proceedings or results in the utter
disregard of the Rules of Court.22

Although the petitioner cannot successfully invoke gross negligence of counsel to reinstate his lost
appeal, it cannot be said that he was deprived of due process. It is beyond question that the petitioner
had his day in court. His case was tried on the merits and he was ably represented during the trial stage.
Furthermore, the merits of the petitioner's case deserve scant consideration.

There can be no quibbling over whether or not the elements of bigamy were successfully proven by the
prosecution. Petitioner does not deny that he contracted a second marriage without a judicial
declaration that his absent spouse from a prior marriage may be legally presumed dead. The gist of
petitioner's claim is alleged good faith and that there is no need for a judicial declaration of a disputable
presumption (of death of the absent spouse) that has already been provided by law.

According to petitioner, it was the prosecution's burden to prove that his absent wife was still alive
when he contracted his second marriage. Petitioner essentially asks, what if his absent spouse was in
fact already dead, which is undeniably possible? It is argued that there is no substantial distinction
between such a situation and that of a present spouse who contracts a subsequent marriage with the
knowledge that the absent spouse is already dead.

The legal questions raised are not novel. As discussed in Manuel v. People of the Philippines:23

x x x Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would
negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he
could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of
empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse
is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second
marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good
faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution, "the State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution." Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the
interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its
severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. The laws regulating civil
marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings.

A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it
enhances the welfare of the community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving
State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on
every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent
parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of
the absent spouse after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the
requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as
proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death
of the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true," is a maxim of the old jurists.
To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be
dead would make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily
capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals. Only with
such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages. Thus, Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal
belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance, namely,
a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.

All told, the assailed Resolutions of the CA must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and Hernando,* JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Additional Member per S.O. No. 2630 dated December 18, 2018.

1 Rollo, pp. 7-52.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with then Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now a
member of the Court) and Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; id. at 79-80.

3 Id. at 55.

4 Id. at 82.

5 Id.

6 Id. at 82-90.

7 Id. at 91-105.
8 Id. at 57-77.

9 Id. at 122 and 143-155.

10 Id. at 156-163.

11 Id. at p. 13.

12 Bigamy. - The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)

13 City of Dumaguete vs. Philippine Ports Authority, 671 Phil .610, 629 (2011).

14 Purcon, Jr. v. MRM Philippines, Inc., 588 Phil. 308, 314 (2008).

15 433 Phil. 124 (2002).

16 Id. at 135-136.

17 377 Phil. 482 (1999).

18 272-A Phil. 394 (1991).

19 526 Phil. 239 (2006).

20 Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 764 Phil. 53, 63-65 (2015).

21 Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. v. Villareal, 708 Phil. 443, 452 (2013).

22 Heirs of Arturo Garcia I v. Municipality of Iba, Zambales, 764 Phil. 408, 416-417 (2015).

23 512 Phil. 818, 836-838 (2005).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation