JRC130862 01

ISSN 1831-9424
STRESS-TESTING OF POLICY
OPTIONS USING FORESIGHT
SCENARIOS:
A pilot case
y Lab
EU Polic
STRATEGIC FORESIGHT
BETTER REGULATION
FORESIGHT SCENARIOS Joint

Research EUR 31850 EN
Centre
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JRC130862
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How to cite this report: Vesnic-Alujevic, L., Stoermer, E., Stress-testing of policy options using foresight scenarios: a pilot case, Publications
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2024, doi: 10.2760/292666, JRC 130862.
STRESS-TESTING OF POLICY OPTIONS
USING FORESIGHT SCENARIOS:
A pilot case
Authors:
Lucia Vesnic-Alujevic
Eckhard Störmer
EU Policy Lab
The EU Policy Lab is a space for cross-disciplinary exploration and innovation in
policymaking. We apply collaborative, systemic and forward-looking approaches
to help bringing the scientific knowledge of the Joint Research Centre into EU
policy making.
Stress-testing of policy options

We experiment with the new, the unprecedented and the unknown. We seek to
augment our understanding of the present, challenge and reinvent the way we
think about the future.
using foresight scenarios:

The EU Policy Lab is also a mindset and a way of working together that combines
stories and data, anticipation and analysis, imagination and action. We bring policy-lab.ec.europa.eu
new practical and radical perspectives to tackle complex problems in a
collaborative way. Together, we explore, connect and ideate to create better
Contents
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Glossary ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................. 5
2. Use of reference foresight scenarios for stress-testing policy options .................................................... 7
3. The pilot case: Standard Essential Patents ............................................................................................................ 11
4. Stress-testing of policy options – Assessment of policy options across the scenario set .......... 19
5. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................................... 24
6. References ................................................................................................................................................................................ 25
Annex I: Detailed description of Workshops 1 to 3.......................................................................................................... 26
Annex II: Detailed scenario-specific assessment of the policy options................................................................ 31
1
Abstract
This report summarises a pilot process of stress-testing policy options against a set of reference
foresight scenarios. The process was led by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC)
and applied to a specific EU policy proposal on Standard Essential Patents. The goal of this report is
to provide an example and serve as a guide for any future process of stress-testing policy options
against foresight scenarios.
A set of reference foresight scenarios on the global standing of the EU in 2040 was used to stress-
test five policy options and the baseline option, in relation to the EU policy initiative on Standard
Essential Patents. The process ran during the initial stage of the impact assessment process, but it
was not an official part of it.
The results of this pilot helped to understand which policy options are more or less robust and how
they can be made more future-proof. The process also provided rich insights into what the challenges
and opportunities of this approach are, and into how stress-testing can be further incorporated into
EU policymaking.
2
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank current and former colleagues from the European Commission, Department
for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) who helped us in this pilot
project to stress-test policy options against reference foresight scenarios.
We are grateful to the JRC colleagues Jean-Paul Triaille and Wouter Verburg for their support and
collaboration, as well as Fabiana Scapolo for the support to initiate this pilot and for moderation of
workshops and Anne-Katrin Bock for suggestions on improving the report. In addition, we would like
to thank Jonas Hoffmann from Normann Partners for his support in developing and conceptualising
the process of stress-testing.
Finally, we would like to thank the workshop participants, without whom this report would not have
been possible.
3
Glossary
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions (as criteria to

FRAND: commit to license the technology protected by the relevant SEPs to
implementers)
IoT: internet of things
MNCs: multinational companies
OEMs: original equipment manufacturers
R&I: research and innovation
SEP: standard essential patent
SMEs: small and medium-sized enterprises

A foresight method used to assess the robustness of specific policy or
Stress-testing: strategic options against a set of scenarios, reflect on how to improve them,
and contribute to making these options future-ready.
4
1. Introduction
In 2002, the European Commission launched a new regulatory approach with the aim to reduce
regulatory burden (European Commission, 2002). This proposal resulted in the ‘better regulation’
agenda, which tries to make EU laws ‘simpler, more targeted and easier to comply with’. The ‘better
regulation’ agenda encourages an approach to design and evaluate policies in a more transparent
way, based on evidence, and informed by the input of stakeholders and the public (European
Commission, 2015). ‘Better regulation’ guidelines provide a set of procedures and practices that the
European Commission uses when preparing new policy initiatives and proposals, as well as when
managing existing policies and legislation.
Impact assessment is the logical process of steps carried out during the preparation phase of a
Commission proposal for a new law. It examines whether there is a need for EU action and it analyses
the possible impacts of different solutions. This assessment seeks to identify and develop EU policies
and laws so that they achieve their objectives in the most efficient and effective way. According to
the ‘better regulation’ agenda, ‘evaluation’ is an assessment of the performance of already
implemented laws, policies, and spending activities against the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency,
relevance, coherence and EU added value. To make sure that policies are future-proof, since 2021,
the updated ‘better regulation’ toolbox includes tool #20: ‘Strategic foresight for impact assessments
and evaluations’ (European Commission, 2021). The inclusion of foresight in the ‘better regulation’
toolbox is one of the major novelties, contributing to bringing anticipation into EU policymaking. This
follows the mandate on strategic foresight that was given to the Commission Executive Vice President
Šefčovič in 2019.
Strategic foresight is the discipline of exploring and anticipating the future. In the context of the EU,
it can be used to inform policymaking. In order to increase its preparedness and resilience, the EU
needs to develop policies that are robust and future-ready. Policymakers and political institutions
must also anticipate changes in order to proactively shape the future according to the EU’s political
priorities. The systematic use of foresight analysis for preparing impact assessments helps European
Commission services to better deal with uncertainty and to ensure that Commission initiatives benefit
from:
● a clearer understanding of the drivers of change that may impact the policy problem and its
future development;
● having policy objectives that take into account the key challenges resulting from the policy
problem and its future development;
● future-proofing policy options that are designed to address the key challenges resulting from
the policy problem and its possible future development.
The Competence Centre on Foresight (CC-FOR) is a part of the EU Policy Lab at the European
Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC). Its role is to support the Commission’s policy departments
with the integration of strategic foresight in policymaking processes and with strengthening their
strategic foresight capacities 1. The CC-FOR has developed, tested and adapted numerous
foresight methods for their use in the specific context of EU policymaking.
1
For more information, please see https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/foresight/about_en
5
This report describes a pilot process to stress-test policy options against a set of reference foresight
scenarios. The process2 was led by the CC-FOR and applied to a specific EU policy proposal on
Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). This report aims at providing guidance for any future stress-testing
of policy options against foresight scenarios, as a part of an impact assessment or conducted
separately.
A set of reference foresight scenarios, developed by the JRC (Vesnic-Alujevic, Münch and Störmer,
2023), were used to stress-test five policy options and a baseline option in relation to SEPs. The
exercise was carried out during the initial stage of the impact assessment process, although not as
an official part of it.
The results of the pilot process contributed to the understanding of possible alternative trajectories
of context conditions such as: (i) geopolitical and economic developments; (ii) innovation processes;
(iii) the business environment; (iv) governance. Looking at a spectrum of alternative ways in which
the world could have developed by 2040 helps to integrate uncertainty into the development of policy
measures and thus to make EU policies more future-ready.
2
The process of stress-testing is explained in more detail in the next section.
6
2. Use of reference foresight scenarios for stress-
testing policy options
In general, foresight scenarios are used to better understand how a problem or an area of interest
can develop over time and change in unexpected ways. This type of analysis can generate awareness
of the influencing factors that shape the policy area, including factors that might not be considered
in more traditional analyses. It can also facilitate an understanding of uncertainties and ambiguities
relevant for the area that are often not included in more narrow, topic-centred analyses.
The development of the reference foresight scenarios on the global standing of the European Union
in 2040 (Vesnic-Alujevic, Münch and Störmer, 2023) was based on a participatory process, generating
four plausible scenarios that depict the EU’s global position and standing in 2040. The four scenarios,
Storms, Endgame, Struggling Synergies, Opposing Views, explore key uncertainties in five areas: i)
social values; ii) source of geopolitical power; iii) reaction to environmental degradation; iv) food,
water, health, and energy nexus; and v) technological developments.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the scenario set. In the scenario Storms, societies became more self-
centred and retreated inwards, strengthening the role of nations and regional blocs. in the scenario
Endgame, economic growth and competitiveness trump well-being and social equality. In the scenario
Struggling Synergies, there is a strong multilateral determination to fight climate change while side-
lining other aspects of sustainability. In the scenario Opposing views, society is divided into a
regenerative and an exploitative alliance and both try to impose their paradigm.
These reference foresight scenarios were created for use by the EU institutions and policy
departments, but also other stakeholders, be it from the government or any other sector. They are
intentionally broad so that they can be adapted to a variety of specific policy fields. The scenarios
describe plausible and consistent ways in which the world could develop in the next 20 years. They
do not predict the future. Instead, they can be used to increase the EU’s resilience and preparedness
for possible future developments.
Built on trends, uncertainties and weak signals, the scenarios can be used as simulations of plausible
futures. They raise ‘what if’ questions to stress-test a strategy or a policy against performance in
these different futures and point towards the potential weaknesses of a specific proposal. In this way,
they can help to understand the choices available today and their consequences for the future.
If the reference foresight scenarios are perceived as too generic for a specific policy area of interest
that should be stress-tested, they can be used as a starting point for further adaptation. This starting-
point approach was followed for using reference foresight scenarios to assess SEPs. Topic-specific
drivers can be added to the scenarios to meet the particularities of a specific policy area or sector.
Factors that could affect the future development of different drivers of change may need to be
supplemented; and if they are supplemented they must be consistent and plausible with the more
generic pre-existing factors. The added value of this adaptive approach is that it can be used for
comparisons across different policy areas or sectors while saving time in the setup phase of scenario
building.
Reference foresight scenarios can be used to stress-test a set of policy options, programmes, or
strategies. In the process described in this report, and in other similar exercises, alternative future
worlds are used as framework conditions under which policy options can be ‘wind-tunnelled’ (or
stress-tested) to assess their robustness, considering different uncertain futures (Van der Heijden et
7
al, 2002; Strelkovskii et al, 2020). ‘Wind tunnelling’ as a term referring to scenario planning was
introduced by Pierre Wack, an executive at the Shell company in the 1970s (Van der Heijden,
1996/2005). It uses an analogy from the world of aerospace and airplane manufacturing: strategies
can be tested under different conditions in the same way that an airplane prototype is put in a wind
tunnel before it is considered as safe to fly. Thus, a ‘wind tunnelling’ process can also serve to test
policies for their robustness, future-readiness, and flexibility, ‘to be changed or reversed if new
insights emerge’ (van Asselt, 2000). Those policies that are robust would perform well across most
future scenarios (van Asselt et al, 2014). By assessing different possible scenarios for the future,
policymakers can be better prepared and increase their capacity to deal with uncertainty.
Figure 1. An overview of the reference foresight scenarios
8
Foresight scenarios support three key elements of stress-testing policy proposals and making them
more future-ready. These three elements can all be used in the impact assessment:
● Understanding the evolution and possible futures of the policy problem. This helps
policymakers to future-proof their definition of the problem. Scenarios make it possible to
grasp uncertainties in the long term and consider plausible challenges and opportunities that
differ from scenarios that were developed based on baseline assumptions only.
● Reflecting on – and adapting – the objectives of a policy initiative. This makes it
possible to assess whether policy objectives cover future challenges and opportunities in a
variety of different scenarios.
● Stress-test or wind-tunnel policy options. A policy initiative can be stress-tested against
a set of alternative future scenarios to understand whether an option is robust across
different future framework conditions and, if it is not robust, how it can be made more
resilient.
Stress-testing should be done in a participatory process, consisting of several workshops or a

combination of workshops and smaller dedicated sessions with the ‘core’ team working on a specific
policy file. We propose a four-step process for using reference foresight scenarios for stress-testing
(a more detailed guide on how the process could be conducted can be found in Annex 1).
1. Linking the reference foresight scenarios to the policy problem

The first step of analysis is linking the reference foresight scenario set to the policy problem. This
kind of analysis is done for each scenario separately to answer questions such as: What do specific
context conditions in each of the future scenarios mean for the policy issue at stake? Do these
conditions change either the types and numbers of actors involved or the type of activities that are
relevant for the issue? By asking these questions, opportunities and challenges can be identified and
plausible shifts in the policy problem can be identified.
Because the reference foresight scenarios are rather broad, they might speak mainly to broad policy
areas and questions. For narrower policy problems, the reference foresight scenarios might need to
be further developed, and more relevant aspects might need to be added to provide the relevant
context. This can be done by specifying existing drivers of change to better address relevant issues
and/or by adding topic-specific drivers of change and consistent descriptions of the future.
2. Review of the policy objectives against the possible future developments of

the policy problem
In the second step, the policy objectives are reviewed to see: (i) how comprehensively the objectives
encompass the future possible states of the policy problem; (ii) whether the objectives are relevant
to these possible future states of the policy problem; and (iii) whether the objectives cover the key
challenges in the possible future states of the policy problem.
3. ‘Wind tunnelling’ policy options

In the third step, each policy option is assessed against all four scenarios. The assessments use a
scale (for example from 1 to 5 or from – – to ++), answering the question of how well a single policy
option would perform in each scenario (from very negative to very positive). The assessments also
collect arguments that support the evaluation made in the ‘quantitative’ assessment, as well as ideas
to adapt and change the policy option so that it performs better.
9
4. Validation and reporting
Based on the results obtained through Steps 1-3, a validation workshop can be organised and a report
can be drafted. The report could provide input for three sections of the impact assessment report. It
can inform the ‘problem definition’ section by helping to describe the development of the policy
problem and related uncertainties. The second section of the impact assessment report for which it
can provide input is the ‘objectives’ section, by making a proposal to adapt policy objectives if
necessary. The input is particularly valuable for the ‘impacts’ section of the impact assessment report,
by showing how policy options are likely to perform in different future conditions and the different
impacts that these policy options might achieve.
If applied to the impact assessment process, these four steps should be carried out by a core team
that works on the respective policy file. This core team should also organise a series of half-day
workshops with some members of the impact assessment inter-service group 3 to look at the policy
initiative from the perspectives of different related and affected policy areas. If external experts
support the inter-service group as members of an expert group, they should also be invited to these
workshops to provide an additional perspective outside of the realm of EU policy making. The
preparation and – if needed – the adaptation of the scenario set should be in the hands of the core
team, as should be the preparation and post-processing of the workshop results. Steps 1 and 2, linking
the reference foresight scenarios to the policy problem and reviewing the policy objectives can be
done in one half-day workshop. The ’wind-tunnelling’ of policy options can be carried out in one to
three half-day workshops, depending on the complexity of the policy options and their number. The
draft report can be validated and supplemented in a final session.
The experience of ‘wind tunnelling’ or stress-testing of policy options against alternative future worlds
shows that future context conditions matter. A scenario-based foresight analysis can bring quite a
differentiated picture of the performance of different policy options. An exercise of this type can also
reveal which policy options are robust across different context conditions and which policy options
might need adaptations to perform well under certain future conditions.
3
An inter-service group consists of members from different European Commission departments that have a stake in a specific policy file.
10
3. The pilot case: Standard Essential Patents
Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) are patents that are essential for some standards and as such,
ensuring smooth licensing and clear rules is necessary for the success of a standard and diffusion of
innovation. Their use is based on fair access for all users of a given standard at reasonable costs
(European Commission, 2023a). The number of SEPs is constantly increasing, driven by the Internet
of Things and 5G where SEPs play a key role. Because of that, the Intellectual Property action plan
acknowledged that “there is a need for a much clearer and more predictable framework, incentivising
good faith negotiations rather than recourse to litigations” (European Commission, 2020; for full
context and background of the policy problem, see for example Thumm, N. (ed) (2017) and Thumm,
N. (ed.) (2020)).
Taking this into account as well as the “continued friction in the uptake of SEP-protected standards”
(European Commission, 2023a) and the complex landscape of new players and challenges, a policy
package on SEPs was announced in the 2023 Commission Work Programme (European Commission,
2022b). The CC-FOR was contacted by the European Commission’s Department for Internal Market,
Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) to develop this pilot foresight process together.
The foresight process was conducted in a participatory way, through four workshops and several
smaller engagement sessions. The workshops were conducted with experts from DG GROW and other
European Commission departments (as members of an inter-service group) and academia. These
workshops were moderated by the CC-FOR. Smaller sessions were conducted with the ‘core’ team,
consisting of five colleagues from DG GROW working on this policy file and with expertise in the field.
In the first step of this foresight process (corresponding to Step 1 in Chapter 2), the reference
foresight scenarios had to be adapted to be fit for purpose for the area of SEPs. Scenario-specific
contexts were developed and validated in an expert workshop (Workshop 1, half-day). These scenario-
specific contexts made it easier to understand the spectrum of future challenges of the policy
problem.
Step 2, review of policy objectives, was done internally with the ‘core’ team and was used for further
reflection and as input for workshops 2 and 3.
In two workshops (Workshops 2 and 3, half-day, equivalent to Step 3 of the process as described in
Chapter 2), the scenario-specific conditions were used to assess the performance of five alternative
policy options and a baseline option (no policy change) to identify which policy options were future-
ready and which needed to be revised to be made more robust regarding possible future
developments.
Workshop 4 served for the validation of results (Step 4). As this was a pilot process, this additional
workshop was also used to discuss and evaluate the overall process and to draw conclusions for
future applications.
Five specific policy options and the baseline option were taken into account in this pilot process.
However, it is important to stress that these options were not the final ones used for the impact
assessment of the SEPs, although some might seem similar or overlapping. Because the workshops
were conducted at the same time of the initial phase of the impact assessment and were not a part
of the official impact assessment, they used some of the proposed options available at that stage.
The workshops provided further reflections on which options should be changed, improved or removed
for greater overall robustness and future-readiness.
11
Adapted reference foresight scenarios: SEPs context
The reference foresight scenarios were adapted to the area of SEPs to provide a better understanding
of the possible long-term developments of the context conditions of SEPs that could lead to shifts in
the policy problem.
We started with the policy problem, described in the call for evidence launched by the European
Commission in 2022 (European Commission, 2022a):
The main problem is inefficient licensing, including hold-up 4, hold-out 5 and forum shopping 6. Potential
implementers, including start-ups and SMEs, may opt-out from using the standards altogether, or
they may use the relevant standards without a licence, assuming any risks related to SEP
infringement. These problems may slow the pace of innovation, hamper development in critical
technologies, and delay the scaling up of start-ups and SMEs in the EU.
These problems stem mainly from (i) insufficient transparency and predictability, (ii) uncertainty about
FRAND (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) terms and conditions, and (iii) high enforcement
costs and inefficient enforcement.
The scenarios were adapted by adding relevant additional aspects, expressed through the following
three questions.
● What is the EU (and world) regulatory environment?

● How are the patent system, standardisation and competition aspects configured?
● What is the pace and locus of innovation?
These aspects were conceived within the DG GROW team working on the SEP file and then developed
across all four scenarios with participants in Workshop 1 (see Table 1). The scenarios were
subsequently further refined ahead of Workshops 2 and 3 to allow for their use in stress-testing the
policy options.
An additional reflection on the implications of possible alternative futures for the policy problem of
SEPs was also developed with workshop participants. This reflection is described in the last row of
Table 1 ‘What does this mean for SEPs?’.
Summary of the set of adapted reference foresight scenarios

The set of reference foresight scenarios, described in Chapter 2, had to be further adapted for the
stress-testing of SEP policy options, according to the aspects mentioned above. This was particularly
important for the success of this exercise, taking into account that the field of SEPs is quite narrow
compared to the broadness of the scenarios. The summary of the adapted set of scenarios is
presented below:
4
Hold-up refers to a difference between the patent-holders’ pricing incentives ex ante, namely before the standard is set, and their pricing
incentives ex post, i.e. after the standard is set.
5
Hold-out refers to a situation where an implementer of a standard refuses to pay royalties to SEP owners until forced to do so by a court.
In practice, hold-out is rarely as ‘naked’ as a blanket refusal but rather involves various delaying tactics.
6
Forum shopping refers to the practice of choosing the court or jurisdiction that has the most favourable rules or laws for the position
being advocated.
12
Storms
This is a world where there is a decrease in global trade, and one where multilateralism has been
undermined by the emergence of regional blocs. Different technology approaches lead to the creation
of parallel systems of standards in different regions of the world, and therefore global interoperability
does not exist. The ‘splinternet’ 7 has replaced the internet, creating a division between Chinese, US,
European, and Russian-led internets. The diversity of standards and limitations on export
opportunities limit the pace of innovation. China is the biggest producer of internet-of-things (IoT)
devices. Patent systems are regional, and owners of intellectual property (IP) encounter difficulties
enforcing their rights in other regions of the world. The licensing of SEPs is regional or local, which
significantly increases transaction costs, and thus reduces the profitability of the licensing business.
End game
This is a world where economic growth is prioritised over environmental and social issues.
Opportunistic global alliances emerge, maximising global trade. China, under economic and military
pressure, loses power. Innovation is concentrated in the EU and US, and their companies lead in setting
standards. EU governments take a ‘soft’ regulatory approach to competition, which attracts large
multinational corporations (MNCs). Given their power, these MNCs strongly influence and shape both
policy and court decisions. New disruptive technology is stimulated, boosting innovation, and keeping
ICT markets open and competitive. IoT devices are well integrated with a high degree of
interoperability. Proprietary solutions are dominant and the patent system loses its importance. There
is also a niche open-source market but it does not have any major impact.
Struggling synergies
In this world of multilateralism, the EU strives to remain influential between the US and China, while
undergoing relative decline. There are geopolitical tensions here and there, but no real conflict breaks
out. More standards are created globally, mostly by the US and China, which are both also innovation
loci. Increasing proportions of the population and businesses in the EU feel alienated by the
opaqueness of the cumbersome compliance regimes, full of rules and tensions. Foreign private
companies try to game this slow-paced system. The EU’s joint and publicly-led innovation is mission-
oriented to further stimulate innovation-led growth. The patent system is harmonised globally, with
the possibility of being turned into a global system, although some well-known challenges remain.
The registration and enforcement of patents remain complex.
Opposing views
This is a world where the EU and other like-minded countries prioritise environmental policies and the
health of natural ecosystems. The ‘regenerative alliance’ standards are constantly raised to further
stimulate green innovation and applications. Green technologies are enabled by digital solutions, and
green IoT devices are ubiquitous. Different platforms with different standards are used to fulfil
specific requirements. Investments in interoperability are key. Patent systems are divided between
the ‘regenerative’ and ‘exploitative’ alliance. There is a unified patent system with strong intellectual
7
The ‘splinternet’ means a splintering/division of the internet. This can be due to various factors, such as technology, politics, and divergent
national interests.
13
property protection in the ‘regenerative alliance’. To promote market diffusion, green-tech patents are
made available royalty-free within the ‘regenerative alliance’. Standards, patent licences, and access
to cutting-edge green/clean tech are used as a geopolitical carrot-and-stick to encourage countries
to join this alliance.
Overview of the SEP context in 2040 in four distinct scenarios and

implications for SEPs
Table 1 outlines the additional SEO-specific aspects developed within each scenario (regulatory
environment, patent system, standardisation and competition aspects, pace and locus of innovation),
and a reflection on implications of different scenarios for SEPs. These aspects were mainly developed
in Workshop 1.
14
Table 1. Overview of the SEP context in 2040 across the scenarios and implications
(IP – Intellectual property; MNC – Multi-national companies; FRAND – Fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory)
Question/ Scenario: Scenario: Scenario: Scenario:

Driver Storms End game Struggling synergies Opposing views
Globalisation fails. Free market dominates. Globalisation and multilateral In the regenerative alliance,
efforts continue at a slower green standards are constantly
Increased tension between Government is strongly
pace. raised to drive further
regional blocs and blocs of influenced by MNCs.
innovation. The exploitative
shared interest. All nations try to work on
Political institutions have been alliance focuses on economic
common high-level principles.
The EU focuses on economic weakened. growth only.
What is the EU
issues of common interest to Opaque and cumbersome
(and world) Courts are put under pressure Courts in regenerative alliance
Member States. regimes for implementation and
regulatory from MNCs, and they either may be required to make
compliance due to local
environment? Low degree of harmonisation submit to these MNCs or defend decisions beyond their
specificities.
on rules, practices, and social values. jurisdictions to enforce green
principles between blocs. Collaboration among courts is targets on companies in
necessary, but slow. exploitative alliance. There is
Court decisions have national potential for conflicts among
effect and can diverge jurisdictions.
between blocs.
More powerful geopolitical Large corporations influence Filing patents in every The regenerative alliance has a
blocs dominate the rule- different geographies to protect jurisdiction and getting licence single unified patent system.
How are the
making process. rents or revenues, and economic rights are cumbersome There is strong intellectual
patent system,
growth is the ultimate goal. processes with huge compliance property protection.
standardisation Standards and patents are
requirements, because of
and competition used as a tool of industrial Regional patent systems are Two paradigms compete:
various local requirements.
aspects policy and protectionism. For created (e.g. EU-US harmonised investing in patents on green
configured? example, national system), but the patent system Standardisation processes and technologies vs. promoting
governments strengthen and in general has been weakened agreements are complex and open-source technology if
adapt their intellectual consensus building is slow. That
15
property systems to support and the focus is on proprietary is why European companies try applied for green/clean
public policy objectives, such solutions. to bypass this process with objectives.
as the inclusion of their either proprietary or open source
Large companies dominate Aiming at international green
national technologies in solutions.
international standardisation. standards cannot be too
international standardisation.
Global trade and interoperability Competition rules strongly ambitious in order to keep the
Large markets such as China are perceived as most protect consumers’ choices exploitative alliance unified.
start developing their own important. within their jurisdictions.
Competition policy likely to be
standardisation solutions with
Competition rules are applied supportive for green industries.
their own policies on
selectively, in support of the
intellectual property rights.
interests of large companies.
Innovation in the EU and the Very high exponential rate of Innovation thrives but at a The direction of innovation
US slows in pace, while it innovation is driven by slower pace because of differs between the
increases in pace in Asian technological convergence in cumbersome compliance ‘regenerative alliance’, focused
countries such as China, Japan connectivity, computing, systems. on green and clean tech and
and South Korea. biotechnology, and health. with advanced levels of energy
Complex innovative products
transition, and the ‘exploitative
What is the pace The diversity of national The US and EU lead in enter the market, and there is a
alliance’, focused on efficiency,
and locus of standards – and therefore the innovation, with China lagging lot of innovation outside of
profitability and dealing with
innovation? reduced export opportunities behind due to its internal standards.
resource scarcity. Carbon border
between blocs – impedes problems.
Greater pressure for joint tax protects the industry of the
innovation.
SMEs lose out to large MNCs. governance brings benefits in ‘regenerative alliance’. The
The IoT enables the terms of redistribution and the ‘explorative alliance’ still heavily
emergence of many small green transition. relies on fossil fuels.
scale ‘local’ solutions, which
address local needs. This
16
decreases the need for global SMEs are supported by The pace of innovation is
solutions. governments but may struggle medium to high depending on
for resources to handle all the the sector and region.
SMEs are the backbone of
complexities imposed by the
innovation. Green SMEs thrive, as they are
state.
responsible for breakthroughs
and increasingly low-cost
innovation.
There is no global technologyRoyalty-bearing standards have There are tensions between For green technologies, the
market, but rather parallel attracted many contributors and compliance with regulation on global market is split between
systems of standards and a patenting has increased. the one hand and the needs of the two alliances, with both
‘splinternet’. However, the number of businesses on the other. possibly having different
products implementing such International standards are put standards.
There is increased tension
standards has increased even under pressure because of the
between foreign-based MNCs Governments may require
more. lengthy processes.
and national governments. royalty-free green standards, if
Given the inherent opaqueness IP owners feel under pressure, applicable, to promote faster
Regional and national
What does this champions are supported to of SEP licensing, a number of especially those that do not uptake of the technology.
mean for SEPs? patent their technologies and courts are involved in setting implement the standards. IP
Specifically low-FRAND royalties
royalties but their adjudication implementers cannot predict
contribute those technologies are set for communication
doesn’t always seem fair. whether they will be given a
to international standards. standards (for IoT devices and
licence, its cost and if their
A gap in innovation emerges beyond) used in green
National governments are competitors will be in a similar
between countries that are technologies.
confronted with the needs of situation.
‘haves’ (i.e. that innovate) and
their implementers to access In Europe, civil society
blocs/countries that are ‘have Loose international coordination
standards. organisations and NGOs
nots’ (i.e. that do not innovate). on SEP rules does not solve all
participate in developing
Global SEP holders are This gap increases further problems. Small EU companies
standards and discussing SEPs
sometimes invited to still cannot fully enforce
17
contribute to national fuelled by proprietary solutions (licence) their patents and take to ensure the inclusion of values
standards on unfavourable and trade secrets. a licence on competitive terms. in the tech standards.
terms.
IP owners face limitations in
various legal systems on
enforcing their rights.
Enforcement is complicated
and costly.
In jurisdictions friendly to the

IP owners, implementers may
not get a fair deal.
Forum shopping and anti-

(anti-) suit injunctions become
the norm.
18
4. Stress-testing of policy options – Assessment of
policy options across the scenario set
In Workshops 2 and 3, the set of policy options was assessed under the context conditions of the four
alternative future worlds (see Chapter 3). The objective was to understand how well a policy option
might perform under different possible framework conditions and how this policy option could be
made more robust to a number of different futures that might unfold.
Accordingly, workshop participants were asked to evaluate how well each SEP policy option would
have performed in each of the four scenarios. The term ‘performance’ was understood as ensuring
an efficient and sustainable SEP licensing ecosystem, innovation, and the diffusion of technologies.
The seven point evaluation scale consisted of the following:
++ This decision would be seen as very positive with almost no downsides

+ On balance, this decision would be seen as positive
On balance, this decision would be irrelevant OR have neither a net positive or a net
0
negative impact
- On balance, this decision would be seen as negative
-- This decision would be seen as very negative with almost no upside
Each workshop participant had to rate the performance of each policy option within the four
alternative futures. Detailed results of the ratings are provided below and in Annex II.
Policy options8
0. Baseline option
In Europe, there is no system in place for assessing whether SEPs declared to Standard developing
organisations (SDOs) are truly essential, and the number of SEPs continues to increase. Publicly
available information on FRAND terms and conditions and on royalty rates continues to be patchy,
disaggregated, and of inconsistent quality. All negotiations continue to be conducted under non-
disclosure agreements. Courts deal with FRAND issues on a case-by-case basis, but certain (divergent)
practices are taking shape in different countries.
1 Increased transparency
Focus on transparency only: There is an up-to-date register of all SEPs at the adoption of any new
standard and essentiality checks are carried out to ensure that only true SEPs are registered. Standard
FRAND terms and conditions are published and a competence centre providing more information on
FRAND practice and jurisprudence is set up.
8
As stated in the Introduction (Chapter 1), these are not the final policy options that were used in the Impact assessment report. For the
final options, please see: European Commission (2023b)
19
2 FRAND solution
In addition to increased transparency, guidance on FRAND is adopted, including on price
differentiation based on objective criteria and on levels of licensing plus ex ante aggregate royalty
announcements.
3 Industry-led clearing house, differentiated prices

There is increased transparency and guidance on FRAND. Aggregate royalties are determined by the
industry ex-post following adoption of the standard on the basis of the principle of price
differentiation based on objective criteria. Every implementer has the possibility of paying the
aggregate royalty into an escrow account and not being subject to infringement cases.
4 Clearing house led by an independent authority, uniform prices

Increased transparency. FRAND is the same irrespective of the use. Aggregate royalties are
determined by a public authority following the adoption of the standard. Every implementer has the
possibility of paying the aggregate royalty into an escrow account and not being subject to
infringement cases.
5 SEPs are licensed royalty-free or the EU resorts to open standards

All future standards are licensed royalty-free. There is therefore no need for FRAND negotiations.
Overall assessment of the policy options across four scenarios from a 2040
perspective
Stress-testing the five SEP policy options and the baseline option against alternative future scenarios
shows that the conditions of each future scenario matter significantly (Table 2).
Table 2. Summary of the stress-testing of policy options across future scenarios

World Option 0 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5
in 2040
Baseline Increased FRAND Industry-led Clearing house Royalty-free
transparency solution clearing house led by an SEPs
independent
authority
Storms neutral / neutral / slightly positive positive negative

slightly slightly positive
positive positive
End game rather positive neutral / negative & very very

negative positive positive negative negative
Struggling neutral / positive positive neutral / negative / rather

synergies slightly slightly but diverse negative
negative positive
Opposing neutral positive positive neutral / negative negative

views slightly
positive
20
The scenario-based foresight exercise produced a differentiated picture of which policy options are
robust across different context conditions and which policy options might need adaptations to work
well under certain possible future conditions. The results of assessing the policy options against
possible future scenarios can be summarised as:
● The baseline policy option (Option 0) is considered as neutral or rather negative in 3 out of 4
scenarios.
● Policy options 1 and 2 are robust and perform relatively well in most of the scenarios.
● Policy option 3 is considered as only slightly positive across three scenarios, while the results
for Option 3 in the End game scenario are varied.
● Policy options 4 and 5 are perceived as relatively negative in most of the four scenarios
(although Option 4 is perceived as positive in the Storms scenario).
Considering that SEPs as a policy instrument mainly play a role in a world where there is effectively
a global technology market, the performance of policy options in the two scenarios Endgame and
Struggling synergies are the most important. In the Storms scenario, characterised by splintered
technologies across blocs, there is no need for SEPs. In the Opposing views scenario, characterised by
diversity in the area of green technology in Europe and its partner countries (but no such diversity in
the area of green technology in the rest of the world), SEPs might also not play an important role.
Policy options 1 and 2 perform best and are clearly better than the baseline option. The guidance on
the level of licensing in Option 2 might need to be carefully considered, as this level of licensing was
the sole element to create a clearly positive result for Option 2 in the End game scenario.
It is important to note that this exercise is based on a qualitative participatory process. As in many
similar participatory exercises, the results depend on the group of people involved in the workshops
and their subjective, yet expert, assessment.
More explanations on the performance of the policy options across the future scenarios are provided
below.
Option 0: Baseline option

● Storms: neutral / slightly positive
● End game: rather negative
● Struggling synergies: neutral / slightly negative
● Opposing views: neutral
Overall assessment
This is not a robust option, and its performance is strongly dependent on context conditions. This
option is only slightly positive in Storms, where technology distribution is relatively limited to regional
blocs. To a certain extent, it could be an option in Struggling synergies with more synergies across
society.
21
Option 1: Increased transparency
● Storms: neutral / slightly positive
● End game: positive
● Struggling synergies: positive
● Opposing views: positive
Overall assessment
Option 1 is perceived as a relatively robust and positive option across all four scenarios; although its
performance is slightly less good in Storms. This policy option seems to perform relatively well in a
range of different context conditions.
Option 2: FRAND solution

● Storms: slightly positive
● End game: neutral / positive
● Struggling synergies: positive
● Opposing views: positive
Overall assessment
Option 2 is a relatively robust and positive option. Its performance is slightly less good in the Endgame
and Storms scenarios. The level of licensing involved could either change the negotiation dynamics
(for example, if a licence-to-all principle is adopted) or deprive the system of the flexibility to adjust
based on economic considerations (for example, if the Commission itself determines the level of
licensing). As long as the guidance related to the level of licensing remains sufficiently general and
flexible, this option will work well. More detailed and inflexible guidance may hurt the industry and
thus this option might be less effective.
Option 3: Industry-led clearing house – differentiated prices

● Storms: positive
● End game: negative & positive
● Struggling synergies: neutral / slightly positive
● Opposing views: neutral / slightly positive
Overall assessment
The performance of Option 3 depends on the context conditions, especially related to the public-
private sector relations and configurations. This option has a clearly positive result only in the Storms
scenario. It has varied results (some good, some bad) in the End game scenario.
Option 4: Clearing house led by an independent authority – uniform prices

● Storms: positive
● End game: very negative
22
● Struggling synergies: negative / but diverse
● Opposing views: negative
Overall assessment
The performance of Option 4 depends on the context conditions. This policy option performs overall
not well, except for the Storms scenario.
Option 5: SEPs are licensed royalty-free or the EU resorts to open standards

● Storms: negative
● End game: very negative
● Struggling synergies: rather negative
● Opposing views: negative
Overall assessment
Option 5 is perceived as negative in all four scenarios – while performing slightly better in Struggling
synergies than in other scenarios. The lack of monetary incentives for innovation is prevalent in this
policy option, regardless of the context conditions described in the scenarios, so other incentives for
innovation would be required. The Opposing views scenario calls for royalty-free green technology to
accelerate dissemination, but it may impact incentives to invest without government support.
A more detailed scenario-specific assessment in provided in Annex II, along with detailed comments
on the options in the scenarios and ways to improve them, as noted by participants in the workshops
where these options were discussed.
23
5. Conclusions
In times of TUNA (Turbulent-Uncertain-Novel-Ambiguous) conditions, political institutions must be
prepared to anticipate possible changes and disruptions and understand uncertainties in order to
create more resilient and future-ready policies. For this reason, the European Commission has
introduced foresight in its Better Regulation Toolbox. The case of Standard Essential Patents was
used as a pilot to explore the potential of reference foresight scenarios to be used in impact
assessment exercises for policy stress-testing or wind-tunnelling purposes.
This report offers practical guidance, showing which steps need to be taken and how the process
could be conducted. Most important, stress-testing is a participatory exercise that should not be done
individually but needs to include different viewpoints and if possible a range of stakeholders. Also, a
facilitation from an experienced foresight practitioner remains key for obtaining robust results.
The results show how different policy options are assessed in a range of ways depending on different
future context conditions. They show that some options work better than others within different future
contexts and how these options could be adapted to make them more fit for purpose and adapted
for a range of futures. They also show how some options lack robustness across multiple futures.
Looking at the policy options through a foresight lens remains key in order to develop more resilient
and future-ready EU policies. Foresight can thus enhance the anticipatory culture in EU institutions
and bring future-oriented policy relevant insights across different policy fields.
24
6. References
European Commission (2002). Action Plan Strelkovskii, N., Komendantova, N., Sizov, S.,
"Simplifying and improving the regulatory Rovenskaya, E. (2020). Building plausible
environment". COM(2002) 278 final futures: Scenario-based strategic planning of
https://eur- industrial development of Kyrgyzstan, Futures,
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CO 124,
M:2002:0278:FIN:en:PDF https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2020.102646
European Commission (2015). Better Thumm, N. (ed) (2017). Licensing Terms of
regulation for better results - An EU agenda. Standard Essential Patents: A Comprehensive
COM (2015) 215 final Analysis of Cases. Luxembourg: Publications
Office of the European Union.
European Commission (2021). Better
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/
Regulation
handle/JRC104068
Toolbox. https://commission.europa.eu/law/law
-making-process/planning-and-proposing- Thumm, N. (ed.) (2020). Pilot study for
law/better-regulation/better-regulation- essentiality assessment of Standard Essential
guidelines-and-toolbox/better-regulation- Patents. Luxembourg: Publication Office of the
toolbox_en EU.
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/
European Commission (2020). Making the handle/JRC119894
most of the EU’s innovative potential An
intellectual property action plan to support the van Asselt, M.B.A. (2000). Perspectives on
EU’s recovery and resilience. COM/2020/760 Uncertainty and Risk. Springer
final
van Asselt, M.B.A., van't Klooster, S.A. &
European Commission (2022a). Call for Veenman, S.A. (2014). Coping with Policy in
evidence for an impact assessment. Foresight. Journal of Futures Studies, 19(1):
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better- 53-76
regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13109-
van der Heijden, K., Bradfield, R. M., Burt, G.,
Intellectual-property-new-framework-for-
Cairns, G., & Wright, G. (2002). The sixth sense:
standard-essential-patents_en
accelerating organizational learning with
European Commission (2022b). Commission scenarios. John Wiley & Sons Inc.;
work programme 2023. A Union standing firm
van der Heijden, K. (1996/2005). Scenarios:
and united. COM (2022) 548 final.
The Art of Strategic Conversation. Wiley and
European Commission (2023a). Standard sons.
Essential Patents. https://single-market-
Vesnic-Alujevic, L, Münch, S., Störmer, E.
economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/strategy/intell
(2023). Reference foresight scenarios:
ectual-property/patent-protection-
Scenarios on the global standing of the EU in
eu/standard-essential-patents_en
2040, Luxembourg: Publication Office of the
European Commission (2023b). Impact EU,
Assessment Report. SWD (2023) 124 final. https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/
https://single-market- handle/JRC132943
economy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-
04/SWD_2023_124_1_EN_impact_assessme
nt_part1_v4.pdf
25
Annex I: Detailed description of Workshops 1 to 3
Based on the reference foresight scenarios and the existing literature on the method of wind-
tunnelling and stress-testing, workshops to stress-test policies have been developed to help make EU
policies more robust and future-proof. The workshops are designed to be as interactive as possible.
Each workshop has a duration of not more than 3 hours. In addition, preparatory time is needed.
OBJECTIVES
● To test policy options against different future conditions
● To explore how different conditions might impact the expectations of stakeholders
● To determine whether policy options are robust enough or should be changed to ensure that
they are able to perform under different conditions
PREPARATION FOR THE WORKSHOPS

When preparing the workshops, it is important to: (i) clarify the underlying policy issue of the initiative;
(ii) clarify the policy options to be analysed; and (iii) for core team members to get a gist of the
scenario set.
● Using the created set of policy options, decide on clear choices to be tested (i.e. testing the
policy assumptions);
● Go through scenarios and make sure they are clear to the core team; discuss and determine
the most important additional aspects that will serve as a basis for discussion during the
workshop;
● All participants should prepare by reading the set of scenarios and the policy options before
the workshops;
● Templates and canvases should be prepared in advance, either physical ones or virtual ones
using online collaborative platforms and virtual white boards.
PARTICIPANTS
Participants in the exercise could be an inter-service group or study group that works on the policy
initiative. There should be (at least) 10-15 participants.
In addition to participants from the responsible department, inter-service group members should
participate in this workshop to add different perspectives on the policy. External experts could be
involved as well.
FACILITATION
Because strategic foresight and foresight scenarios are relatively new to policy departments, it is
strongly recommended that an experienced foresight facilitator collaborates with the lead policy
officer on the specific policy initiative. In any case, the workshops’ leader needs to be familiarised
with both the policy area and the scenarios (both in methodological terms and content-wise). The
facilitator needs to adopt a participatory approach and be able to moderate discussions. If the
workshops take place online, a team member needs to be in charge of technical support.
WORKSHOP 1
The following describes the sequence of steps for Workshop 1 (linking the reference foresight
scenarios to the policy problem).
26
1 Introduction
1.1 Introduce what foresight is and what the aim of the exercise is.
1.2 Present briefly the scenarios, the policy issue to be discussed, the policy objectives, and policy
options.
1.3 Start the workshop with an ‘icebreaker’, to make sure everyone understands the scenarios and
policy areas to be discussed. For example, the task could be for participants to write on a post-it
note their expectations for this workshop; or to ask participants what the fundamental issue is
(or will be in the future) that this policy needs to address.
In the case of SEPs, a week before the first workshop, the organisers sent out a summary of the
scenario set. They asked every participant to write a 2040 newspaper headline about SEPs in a
given scenario.
1.4 Group the participants into breakout teams (not less than 5 persons per team, especially online)
and hand out the templates for the teams to fill in (if online, invite participants to join breakout
groups). An example of a template is shown in Figure 2. There should be either two or four teams.
If four teams, each team will work on one scenario, if two teams, each team will work on two
scenarios agreed upon in advance.
Figure 2. Print screen from the SEPs workshop showing the development of additional
aspects and the input from participants
27
2 Customising the scenario set
2.1 This is done by using summaries of the reference foresight scenarios, which are then adapted by
adding or removing some of the aspects connected to the respective policy area. Several new
aspects should be developed in advance, so that they can be validated in the workshop.
2.2 Ask participants to identify the main aspects from the contextual environment that could have an
impact on a specific policy area. A series of prompts and ‘what if’ questions should be used to
stimulate the discussion among the participants. Through this exercise, participants add missing
elements and strengthen the existing ones that they consider as important contextual factors for
a given policy area.
2.3 Optionally, participants could also be asked to identify different stakeholders within their scenario.
In the case of SEPs, participants were asked to look at the scenario, check the additional aspects that
were created in advance and validate them. They were also asked to reflect on additional factors that
could have a big impact on SEPs. For example, to think about what could happen with the patent
system, global economy (global/regional), innovation loci, the future of IP. They were also asked to
identify winners, losers, key actors and new actors.
WORKSHOPS 2 and 3 (assessing the performance of policy options across

the different scenarios)
Depending on the number of policy options, two or more workshops might be needed to discuss all
policy options. Optimally each workshop should not have more than 3 options discussed at once,
especially if there are only two breakout groups and each group needs to go through two scenarios.
1 Introduction
1.1 Introduce the workshop and its goals.
1.2 Present briefly the adapted versions of the reference foresight scenarios, the policy issue to be
discussed, the policy objectives, and the policy options.
1.3 Group people into 2 or 4 breakout teams.
2 Policy stress-testing
2.1 Give a template with policy options and one scenario to participants to fill it in (as an example,
see Table 3). Participants familiarise themselves with the template and their scenario.
2.2 Ask participants to analyse how different policy options perform in the scenario. For this task,
they use post-its to assess individually each policy option within the scenarios. The task is to
evaluate how well each SEP policy option would have performed in that scenario (Table 3).
Alternatively, if there is more time and the need for such an exercise, the same assessment could be
done by including a time perspective for the performance- short, mid and long-term, as shown in
Table 4.
28
Table 3. SEPs policy stress-test template for each scenario with the first 3 options to be
tested.
SEP POLICY OPTIONS PERFORMANCE What would work well (+), How could this
++/+/0/-/-- when? What would not work policy option be
well (-), when? improved?
1 – Increased transparency
2 - FRAND solution
3 - Industry-led clearing
house, differentiated prices
Assessment scale:

0
negative impact
Table 4. Assessment of policy options’ performance over short (S), medium (M) and long
(L)-term futures for each scenario with the first 3 options to be tested.
SEP POLICY OPTIONS PERFORMANCE What would work How could this policy
++/+/0/-/-- well (+), when option be improved
SHORT MID LONG (S/M/L)? and when (S/M/L)?
+5 +10 +20 What would not
years years years work well (-), when
(S/M/L)?
1 – Increased
transparency
2 - FRAND solution
3 - Industry-led
clearing house,
differentiated prices
Assessment scale:

0
negative impact
29
2.3 All participants come together in plenary. Each group presents their assessment of policy options
within their scenario. There is a joint discussion on strengths and weaknesses of the policy options
to reach agreement among participants.
In this part, participants use a synthesis template (see Table 5) with scenarios on one side and policy
options on the other, plus another column for consolidated results. At the end of the discussion, the
group evaluates policy options overall using a ‘robustness’ scale with three options: (i) robust; (ii) to
be redesigned, (iii) obsolete/not needed anymore.
Some of the guiding questions for this part of the discussion are:
o How might policy options be affected in these scenarios?
o What policy options are robust enough across (almost) all scenarios?
o What policy options are not robust?
o How can these policy options be made more resilient? Do they need to be reassessed
or revisited?
o Is a specific policy option still desirable?
o
Table 5. A synthesis template for stress-testing

SEP POLICY STORMS ENDGAME STRUGGLING OPPOSING OVERALL
OPTIONS Performance Performance SYNERGIES VIEWS OPTION
++/+/0/-/-- ++/+/0/-/-- Performance Performance ROBUSTNESS
++/+/0/-/-- ++/+/0/-/--
1 – Increased
transparency
2 - FRAND
solution
3 - Industry-led
clearing house,
differentiated
prices
3 After the workshops
The results should be used to review the policy options. Therefore, such workshops should be
conducted at initial stages of the impact assessment to be able to feed into the further assessment
and development of the policy options.
30
Annex II: Detailed scenario-specific assessment of
the policy options
Annex II provides more details regarding the performance assessment of the policy options, as
discussed in the participatory Workshops 2 and 3.
Storms scenario
General comment on the scenario: In this world, standards and SEPs are likely to be a lot less relevant,
and their existence might be questionable (small markets would have difficulty justifying the
investments). If the costs of licensing are very high and markets for technology are not efficient,
companies will go back to vertical integration, in a way similar to how some big companies operated
in the mid-20th century (Bell Labs, etc.). Standards are produced in-house within companies.
(0) Baseline option

This option has been assessed as neutral / slightly positive (but also with a balanced and
negative perspective) within this scenario (negative (-): 1 participant; neutral (0): 1 participant;
positive (+): 3 participants 9).
Some comments on this option in the Storms scenario are set out below:
● Market players would be free to develop practical solutions. A mix of models would continue
to exist. There would be a prevalence of OSS/RF 10 models for the internet. The FRAND regime
would be increasingly limited to certain technologies.
● It is possible that there would be more than one global standard. This would support the
diversity of approaches to technology by different countries/blocs. Splintering of technologies
across blocs could make the baseline the most appropriate option.
● However, because there would be no coordination between blocs, every bloc would do its best
to maximise revenues. For example, Chinese SEP holders would likely make their money from
EU implementers.
● This option might not work if large players on opposite sides do not agree. Conflict resolution
across blocs might be weak.
● Revenues of SEP holders are low for this option in the Storms scenario. There would be few
incentives for them to invest in innovation.
9
These results are based on the number of participants in each subgroup and the assessment scale they used during the workshop.
0 On balance, this decision would be irrelevant OR have neither a net positive nor a net negative impact
While all participants in each subgroup were invited to vote, some of them occasionally decided not to vote.
10
OSS: Operational Support Systems / RF radio frequency.
31
(1) Increased transparency
This option has been assessed as neutral / slightly positive (but with one negative perspective)
within this scenario (negative (-): 1 participant; neutral (0): 2 participants; positive (+): 3
participants).
This option has been assessed as neutral / slightly positive (but with one negative perspective)
within this scenario (negative (-): 1 participant; neutral (0): 2 participants; positive (+): 3 participants).
Some comments on this option in the Storms scenarios are set out below:
● Transparency would be good. There would be more knowledge about FRAND conditions and
jurisprudence, and better market players would be able to survive.
● Transparency might also reduce litigation on essentiality and FRAND terms, and enable SEP
licences to be enforced in the EU.
● Transparency is a public good. However, it might impose costs on SEP holders who would
need to invest in such transparency. Therefore, this policy option might need to include
incentives to encourage innovators to contribute to transparency.
● Too much transparency might also be perceived as more negative, creating disadvantages
compared with other regional blocs that do not have the same transparency requirements.
Therefore, a careful approach to the issue of transparency – and how much transparency to
insist on – would be necessary.
Suggestions to improve the policy option
● Consider how to subsidise, share, and limit the costs of ensuring transparency to enable a
balanced approach in relation to other measures and obligations.
● Ensure that transparency does not go beyond what the market needs to protect the interests
of SEP holders.
(2) FRAND solution

This option has been assessed as slightly positive within this scenario (neutral (0): 2 participants;
positive (+): 3 participants).
● In such a hostile environment, there would not be any global standards in place that are
comparable to today.
● The SEP holders would carry the main burden of providing the data required for transparency,
announcing the aggregate royalty rate, etc. while the regulation would only apply in the EU.
So, SEP holders might not benefit from better enforcement/protection in other regional blocs.
It is unclear how other blocs would react.
● FRAND guidance is more likely to be followed in the EU regional bloc. Under this scenario, it
is unclear whether other regional blocs would follow this guidance or adopt their own
guidance.
● This option might have positive effects in the EU, but it is unclear whether those positive
effects would spill over to other regional blocs, because of the different policies the different
regional blocs might adopt.
(3) Industry-led clearing house – differentiated prices

This option has been assessed as positive within this scenario (positive (+): 3 participants; very
positive (++) 1 participant).
32
● The industry setting of an aggregate royalty for the regional bloc or worldwide would be
helpful to ensure: (i) fair and reasonable revenue for the SEP holders; and (ii) predictability
for the implementers.
● Collecting revenues via an escrow account would be effective. It is likely that the Asian
regional bloc would become more implementer-friendly, thus eroding the revenues of SEP
holders. An aggregate royalty would at the same time ensure that implementers remain
competitive. There would be a need to protect EU interests in a more effective manner.
● Setting royalties at industry level could be more efficient compared to involving public
authorities, as industry players would better understand the interests at stake and be directly
involved and affected.
● The challenge for policymakers would be to set the rules for 98% of the SMEs in the EU and
guarantee a return on investment for EU SEP holders.
(4) Clearing house led by an independent authority – uniform prices

This option has been assessed as positive within this scenario (neutral (0): 1 participant; positive
(+): 3 participants; very positive (++): 2 participants).
● Having a public authority set aggregate royalty rates could be a solution under this particular
scenario if other mechanisms failed due to coordination failures (e.g. if companies could not
coordinate in the market). However, involving a public authority in this way might be
disproportionate given the costs of the policy intervention (i.e. the costs of running a clearing
house led by a public authority).
● The non-cooperative equilibrium of industrial policies might lead to heavy government
pressure to reduce royalties.
● The strong role of a clearing house led by a public authority could balance interventions from
other blocs, in particular if countries from the Asian bloc undermined the investment efforts
of EU companies. If international standardisation were to be influenced by contributors from
the Asian bloc, this method of creating a clearing house led by a public authority would be
particularly beneficial for EU implementers.
● The framework conditions in the Storms scenario would encourage concentration and regional
cartelisation, so there might be no need to manage royalty rates through a clearing house. If
standards are produced through individual efforts and owned by individual companies
(because it is so costly to coordinate among themselves, companies would not produce
standards in a cooperative manner anymore), then there would be no need to set aggregate
royalty rates. There would be just a single royalty rate.
(5) SEPs are licensed royalty-free or the EU resorts to open standards

This option has been assessed as negative within this scenario (negative (-): 5 participants; neutral
(0): 1 participant).
● Standards would rest heavily on public support as the standards have to be provided royalty-
free or as open standards. Innovators would be unable to get a return on investment unless
they were able to integrate downstream. To promote innovation, public R&D incentive
33
schemes would be required. The research landscape would be different compared to today,
and there would be little international cooperation.
● Non-cooperative strategies by the blocs would weaken intellectual property rights, but
increase competition between market actors. Intellectual property rights might be eroded.
Most/all business models based on SEP licensing would vanish, and research institutes would
be chased out of standardisation. In this world of regional technologies, SEPs’ royalty model
would no longer work, as market reach would be limited to the bloc.
● The ‘open standards’ system might be destroyed across regional blocs in a scenario that is
characterised by the ‘splinternet’ and diverging technologies.
● Allow innovators to licence their technology on a FRAND basis as this would keep the
innovation process open.
Endgame scenario
General comment on the scenario: In this world, the patent system is weak despite the relative
increase of the number of patents and SEP-based products. Companies that lead in setting standards
are based in the EU and US, where the innovation is concentrated and markets are open and
competitive. There is an increase of trade secrets and proprietary solutions are dominant. With
weakened political institutions and the leading role of MNCs, start-ups would be endangered. Also a
bigger gap in innovation emerges between countries that innovate and those that do not.
(0) Baseline option

This option has been assessed as rather negative in this scenario (very negative: 2 participants;
negative (-): 2 participants; neutral (0): 1; positive (+): 1 participant).
Some comments on this option in the Endgame scenario are set out below:
● Much of the action would be left to the market. The responsibility for resolving conflicts would
be left to the interested parties. This could work if the courts’ decisions are fair and if the
legal system works well. However, court proceedings might often be too slow to solve the
disputes.
● This option could also lead to the over-declaration of SEPs, and there could therefore be
uncertainty regarding essentiality. This could increase the problems caused by slow court
proceedings and possible immediate injunctions from MNCs. It could also damage the position
of SMEs.
● Small companies would not be able to assess the risk of SEP exposure (ex post tax on
innovation). New entrants, such as start-ups, might not have sufficient access to SEP licences
(however, start-ups might not play a key role in this scenario).
● If there are more SEP holders that are not implementers, immediate injunctions from MNCs
could lead to higher costs of collecting a unit of royalty.
● There would be limited incentives to set up patent pools.
34
● Draw up guidelines for industry on how it can organise itself, e.g. on how to set up essentiality
checks;
● Request that standard-setting organisations limit declarations to valid and granted patents.

This option has been assessed as positive within this scenario (positive (+): 6 participants).
Some comments on this option in the End game scenario are set out below:
● This option would perform in a similar way as the baseline, with slight improvement.
● In general, transparency improves trust among different actors and fosters good-faith
licensing. However, in this scenario, certain MNCs experienced in SEP licensing would dominate
the market, and these dominant MNCs might put pressure on governments to decrease
transparency. The lack of transparency can be beneficial to experienced players in the market,
both SEP holders and implementers. This lack of transparency would be detrimental for SMEs
and inexperienced end-product manufacturers from new sectors.
● This policy option would lead to more challenges on patent validity between SEP holders. But
it would also lead to greater certainty for both implementers and SEP holders. It would
increase the capacity of SMEs to litigate against MNCs.
• Ease as much as possible the burden for start-ups and SMEs
(2) FRAND solution

This option has been assessed as neutral to positive within this scenario (negative (-): 1
participant; neutral (0): 2 participants; positive (+): 5 participants).
Some comments on this option in the End game scenario are set out in the bullet points below.
● The FRAND guidance is likely to be ignored in a world of very influential MNCs.

● Guidance on the level of licensing, if detailed and inflexible, could be abused by the MNCs
depending on their interests.
● Strong implementers could withstand pressure from SEP holders (there would be powerful
MNCs on both sides: implementers and SEP holders). Governments would not be able to
influence MNCs.
● This option would support SMEs as it would deal with the asymmetry of information and
increase business predictability. However, SMEs under this scenario would not have sufficient
leverage in negotiations.
● FRAND guidance should be complemented by strong incentives.

● This policy option would only work in combination with mandatory essentiality checks that
give an indication of the portfolio shares of the different SEP holders. Otherwise, companies’
self-declared ‘reasonable’ aggregate royalty rates would be meaningless, as there would be
no clear indication of companies’ share in that aggregate rate.
35
This option has been assessed as both negative and positive within this scenario (negative (-):
2 participants; neutral (0): 1 participant; positive (+): 2 participants; very positive (++): 1 participant).
● The industry might not be able to agree on aggregate royalties, as key industry players could
be in a heavily competitive environment. Negotiations on industry platforms would be
complex.
● This option provides for a mechanism to determine aggregate royalties ex post. However,
systems already exist, such as pools and other mechanisms, that would make similar
determinations possible. If properly incentivised, those mechanisms could be more
appropriate as industry knows the market best and therefore knows best how to set FRAND
terms and conditions.
● It would be difficult to decide on an aggregate FRAND ex post or to decide on apportionment
rules that correctly reflect each SEP holder’s contribution. Pricing through market interactions
and negotiations would both be limited (ordinarily, these are a valuable source of information
on value creation in industry).
● Whether this policy option would work or not would largely depend on the design of the
system. There must be clear timelines and a system in place to ensure that the different
parties agree. This would not be easy given the power of some big players. This policy option
should be designed in such a way that gaming the system – for example by delaying the
process – would not be possible.
● In some cases (complex standards with potential multiple implementations), it might be
difficult to set up an aggregate royalty. Some flexibility to adapt to market evolution might
be needed.

This option has been assessed as very negative and unlikely within this scenario (very negative
(--): 6 participants; negative (-): 1 participant).
General remark: Governments in the End game scenario would not be interventionist in nature. It is
not likely that governments in this scenario would set up such a central system led by a public
authority. Governments in this scenario would rather leave it to the market to develop solutions.
● The non-market, public price setting included in Option 4 would be in contrast with free-
market principles. Price formation through market interaction would be restricted in this policy
option. This could make it difficult to set the right incentives for SEP holders.
● The public authority running the clearing house would need to obtain specific knowledge on
products and markets. This might reduce the risk of errors, ambiguities, and unnecessary
disputes.
● Uniform price setting could eliminate the implementation of many standards, in particular
from SMEs. This would mean that certain implementers could be priced out.
36
● Undercompensating intellectual property rights would mainly be of benefit to large foreign
MNCs.
● Because MNCs and large companies have the most power in this scenario and could influence
governments, there would be no trust in the public authority’s clearing house.

This option has been assessed as very negative in this scenario (very negative (--): 4 participants,
negative (-): 2 participants).
Some comments on this option in the End game scenario are set out below.
● There would be no uncertainty about prices for implementers.

● However, the absence of incentives to invest in the development of standards would lead to
fewer – and suboptimal – standards, and therefore lead to less technology diffusion (only
SEP owners who are also implementers would stay).
● There would be no return on investment and no incentive to participate in standardisation.
Only companies that could invest in standardisation and that are big enough to produce and
implement a standard would do so (production of an entire standard would be difficult).
● Therefore, big implementers would have standards that favour their business models and
there would be no incentives to integrate standards, leading to a possible duplication of costly
technologies. This would discourage SMEs and there would be no markets for technology.
Companies would not specialise.
Struggling synergies scenario

General comment on the scenario: In this world, more standards are created globally, mostly by the
US and China. Both IP owners and implementers are put under pressure. The patent system is
harmonised globally, with the possibility of being turned into a global system, but the patent
registration and enforcement are complex. If a loose international coordination on SEP rules was
strengthened, small EU companies could licence their patents or take licence on more competitive
terms.
(0) Baseline option

This option has been assessed as neutral / slightly negative within this scenario (negative (-): 2
participants; neutral (0): 2 participants).
Some comments on this option in the Struggling synergies scenario are set out below:
● The baseline option could work to some extent, as global solutions would be found via
multilateral negotiations. However, this could cause long delays. It would pose the risk that
European companies might become mainly payers, and that innovation could be disrupted by
litigation.
● If this scenario is already characterised by many regulations, and the pace of innovation is
slower, it might be a good idea to leave SEP transfer to markets so that bureaucracy would
not hamper this aspect of innovation. This could be a desirable option in this scenario.
● On the other hand, SEP problems are unlikely to be resolved in this option as there would be
no coordinated action at international level and it is likely that many regional guidelines would
37
emerge. This would increase complexity. In the baseline scenario, the EU would not take a
leadership position to influence decisions at international level.
• Increase transparency

positive (++): 1 participant).
● More transparency would not create more rules, but would make it possible to better apply
the rules. Therefore, this option would be beneficial (if the scenario is not super-bureaucratic).
(2) FRAND solution

This option has been assessed as positive within this scenario (neutral (0): 1 participant; positive
(+): 6 participants).
● If governments agreed on a single set of guidance globally, this option could work well. The
EU could take the lead in this case.
● FRAND guidance might be helpful. Any guidance on the level of licensing, if it is too detailed
and inflexible, might not receive support internationally and might risk regional divergences.
This would make SEP licensing less efficient.
● In this scenario, SEP policies around the world could converge on basic principles but there
would be a danger of discrepancies in their implementation.
● In this scenario, Europe would be likely to contribute to SEPs via mission-driven R&D efforts
(supported by taxpayers’ money). SEP holders who developed new standards or who
developed new SEPs based on public funding might be more likely to share information and
be transparent. This research and innovation system might be more conducive to
transparency.

This option has been assessed as neutral / slightly positive within this scenario (neutral (0): 3
participants; positive (+): 2 participants).
Some comments on this option in the Struggling synergies scenario are set out below.
● SEP licensing is global so the aggregate royalty-setting mechanism must aim at a global
aggregate royalty, and not an EU-specific aggregate royalty.
● The focus in this option should be on facilitating the adoption of solutions. Transparent pricing
would be key.
● SMEs would be better off with this option, because they would have predictability of cost and
due diligence protected by an escrow-account procedure.
38
This option has been assessed as negative, but diverse within this scenario (very negative (--):
1 participant; negative (-): 2 participants; neutral (0): 1 participant; positive (+): 1 participant).
● It is likely that the royalties set by the EU for foreign-held SEPs could be resisted. It would be
difficult to agree on principles for FRAND calculations, and authorities in third countries might
not accept the methodology (as it would impact the competitive advantage of their
stakeholders).
● If there was to be a focus on open-source with burdensome compliance regimes, the option
for a clearing house led by a public authority would be appropriate. This system would favour
implementers that are in favour of the open-source idea.

This option has been assessed as rather negative within this scenario (negative (-): 3 participants;
neutral (0): 1 participant).
● Standards would be ‘captured’ by US and Chinese firms, since these countries are home to
the main upstream innovators (under the assumption that other jurisdictions would allow
companies to charge royalties).
● The mission-driven innovation system in the EU would also need to devote efforts to
developing standards.
● Other incentives should be created for companies and other entities to participate in
standardisation together with non-implementers such as universities, etc.
Opposing views scenario

General comment on the innovation logic in the scenario: SEPs could affect the uptake of green
technologies in two ways:
o Firstly, standardised technologies based on SEPs might enable the use of green
technologies. For example, smart metres could measure the humidity and
temperatures in agricultural fields enabling the optimal use of water. Such smart
metres could use 5G technology to send the data to the cloud for aggregation and
predictions. In this case, SEPs would be a cost to the development of green
technologies.
o Secondly, standardised green technologies might be based on SEPs and a FRAND
royalty policy. Government support for the update of such standards could reduce the
reliance on SEPs as a means to support innovation. The level of investment in
technologies focused on such future green standards would depend on a balanced
SEP licensing policy.
39
The ‘exploitative alliance’ would not sponsor green standards and those countries would be more
interested to see reduced FRAND royalty rates to cover uses of standardised technologies that
enabled the use of green technologies. Therefore, in this scenario the EU should be interested in
striking a balance with a fair and reasonable reward for SEP holders and a fair and reasonable cost
for implementers to ensure that the latter remain competitive.
Because there is no global technology market, the role of SEPs for green technologies in this scenario
could be much reduced. Instead, a more regional market could emerge, partly due to the royalty-free
dissemination of green-tech within the EU and partner countries. Underlying standards would continue
to be relevant for SEPs (as they would apply to both green and non-green technologies).
(0) Baseline option

This option has been assessed as neutral /neither positive nor negative within this scenario
(negative (-): 1 participant; neutral (0): 3 participants; positive (+): 1 participant).
Some comments on this option in the Opposing views scenario are set out below:
● SEPs are included in all digital green solutions that would be needed to achieve the green
transition. The market for technologies that cover SEPs in the IoT would be expected to grow.
● Developing green standards and forcing their use would stimulate innovation. It would
inevitably provide a competitive advantage compared with non-green technology
applications, and this would be a policy choice in the scenario. The large-scale roll-out and
commercialisation of green technologies would require large subsidies for green R&I or for
other forms of compensation to help market players to overcome the financing gap from
royalty-free green-tech licences.
● The baseline option would leave it to market actors to organise the world of SEPs. The
development of green technologies might not be hampered in this option and scenario, but it
might also not support the EU’s ambition to be a leader in green technology.

positive (++): 1 participant).
Some comments on this option in the Opposing views scenario are set out below.
● Transparency can promote cooperation within a bloc of like-minded countries. Transparency

would promote the diffusion of green technologies, and the development of these kinds of
technologies would be a political priority.
● SEPs would apply mainly for green-enabling digital technologies, and thus promote the green
transition. Royalties and funding would go hand in hand and encourage further innovation.
(2) FRAND solution

This option has been assessed as positive within this scenario (positive (+): 5 participants).
Some comments on this option in the Opposing views scenario are set out below.
● Guidance could be used to incentivise companies to develop or implement green technologies.

● There could be special pricing for green SEPs: differentiated pricing would be required for
technology that is used for green applications (which would have a lower price) and non-
green applications (which could have a higher price).
40
This option has been assessed as neutral / slightly positive within this scenario (neutral (0): 3
participants; positive (+): 2 participants).
● The reduced need for global coordination makes this policy option viable.
● Dependence on royalty payments or compensation from the EU would act as incentives for
companies to invest in developing these technologies.
● The escrow simple access to licences would be beneficial for SMEs who want to use licences
for IoT functions in their green technologies.
● This option could apply to green technologies only. It might then be easier for stakeholders
to agree, as there would not be that many players involved.

This option has been assessed as negative within this scenario (negative (-): 6 participants).
● Uniform pricing would be favourable for mass consumer products, but it could also be to the
detriment of green applications.
● With green technologies, incentives to SEP holders seem particularly important. The EU would
want green technologies to be produced swiftly to foster the transition to sustainability. This
might be attained through higher aggregate royalties (as a premium to green innovation). But
this might delay or reduce the diffusion and implementation of green-tech solutions.
● Government-based price setting would likely result in low rates for the compensation of
royalty loss, and this could undermine incentives to invent green-tech. Bilateral negotiations
might be needed to resolve such trade-offs and develop a system for efficient pricing.

This option has been assessed as negative within this scenario (very negative (--): 1 participant;
negative (-): 4 participants; neutral (0): 1 participant).
● Royalty-free licences, such as open-source/open-hardware standards would reduce incentives

for market players to innovate. A balance would be required to compensate for the loss of
royalties by means of subsidies.
● Standards are highly varied. This policy option could lead to less investment but not zero
investment. This option risks removing the technologies protected by SEPs.
● If no subsidies or other forms of compensation are provided, there could be a risk that many
green technologies would not be developed, because the return on investment for developing
own products would be too little or non-existent. This could be an issue in this scenario, as
green technology development would predominantly depend on Europe and its partners. The
inability to charge licence fees for the use of technologies would mean that other forms of
compensation would be needed, and technologies might only be developed by original
41
equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Only powerful players able to develop products by
themselves (downstream integration) would remain successful in this scenario ecosystem.
This would lead to a disruption of the dominant strategy of upstream integration.
● If only the EU and its partners pushed for green technologies, most of the share of revenues
from innovation would need to be earned in Europe alone.
● The divergence of royalty regulation for applications between the bloc of EU-and-partners
and countries outside this bloc, for both green and non-green application cases, might require
complex arrangements for this policy option.
42
43
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU
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— via the following form: european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/write-us_en.
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU

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Open data from the EU
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and agencies. These can be downloaded and reused for free, for both commercial and non-
commercial purposes. The portal also provides access to a wealth of datasets from European
countries.
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ISSN 1831-9424

FORESIGHT SCENARIOS Joint

PDF ISBN 978-92-68-12851-0 ISSN 1831-9424 doi:10.2760/292666 KJ-NA-31-850-EN-N

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2024

© European Union, 2024

Cover page illustration based on ©NURA ALAM/ stock.adobe.com

Stress-testing of policy options

using foresight scenarios:

fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions (as criteria to

MNCs: multinational companies

OEMs: original equipment manufacturers

R&I: research and innovation

SEP: standard essential patent

SMEs: small and medium-sized enterprises

Figure 1. An overview of the reference foresight scenarios

Stress-testing should be done in a participatory process, consisting of several workshops or a

1. Linking the reference foresight scenarios to the policy problem

2. Review of the policy objectives against the possible future developments of

3. ‘Wind tunnelling’ policy options

● What is the EU (and world) regulatory environment?

Summary of the set of adapted reference foresight scenarios

Overview of the SEP context in 2040 in four distinct scenarios and

Question/ Scenario: Scenario: Scenario: Scenario:

In jurisdictions friendly to the

Forum shopping and anti-

++ This decision would be seen as very positive with almost no downsides

3 Industry-led clearing house, differentiated prices

4 Clearing house led by an independent authority, uniform prices

5 SEPs are licensed royalty-free or the EU resorts to open standards

Table 2. Summary of the stress-testing of policy options across future scenarios

Storms neutral / neutral / slightly positive positive negative

End game rather positive neutral / negative & very very

Struggling neutral / positive positive neutral / negative / rather

Opposing neutral positive positive neutral / negative negative

Option 0: Baseline option

Option 2: FRAND solution

Option 3: Industry-led clearing house – differentiated prices

Option 4: Clearing house led by an independent authority – uniform prices

Option 5: SEPs are licensed royalty-free or the EU resorts to open standards

PREPARATION FOR THE WORKSHOPS

WORKSHOPS 2 and 3 (assessing the performance of policy options across

1.3 Group people into 2 or 4 breakout teams.

++ This decision would be seen as very positive with almost no downsides

++ This decision would be seen as very positive with almost no downsides

Table 5. A synthesis template for stress-testing

3 After the workshops

(0) Baseline option

(2) FRAND solution

(3) Industry-led clearing house – differentiated prices

(4) Clearing house led by an independent authority – uniform prices

(5) SEPs are licensed royalty-free or the EU resorts to open standards

Suggestions to improve the policy option

(0) Baseline option

(1) Increased transparency

Suggestions to improve the policy option

• Ease as much as possible the burden for start-ups and SMEs

(2) FRAND solution

● The FRAND guidance is likely to be ignored in a world of very influential MNCs.

● FRAND guidance should be complemented by strong incentives.