Cutting to the Chase: Carl Schmitt and Hans

Blumenberg on Political Theology and

Secularization
Ifergan, Pini . New German Critique ; New York Iss. 111, (Fall 2010): 149-0_4.

ProQuest document link

ABSTRACT
[...] this statement- and political theology in general- has drawn criticism from both adherents of theological
worldviews and those committed to the tenets of modernity. [...] when Political Theology first came out, the
trenchant Nietzschean critique of the origins of modern consciousness and, above all, Max Weber's sociological-
historical characterization of the modern era's social and political institutions were already in the background.

FULL TEXT
The teunpolitical theology conceptualizes an attempt to rediscover and expose the theological dimension
entwined within the fabric of politics. Political theology must be understood against the backdrop of the common
perception of "the political" in the modern era, at least since the publication of Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan in
1651. On this view, among the distinctive features of the political are its complete independence from any and all
lofty theological notions and, conversely, its preoccupation with the here and now. This effort to reexpose the
relations of dependence between the theological and political does not entail moving theology or religion back to
the center of human existence- a position that these beliefs lost after the profound changes in the modern West's
understanding of the world and humanity. Needless to say, religion has not disappeared in the modern epoch, and
its place on the pedestal has indeed been subsequently restored. Be that as it may, the motivation for clarifying the
relations of dependence between the theological and the political is not religious, but emerged from within modern
political and legal thought itself, as it endeavored to answer the following question: to what extent is modern
political theory based on or independent of the theological realm?
The philosopher most closely identified with elucidating the modern attributes of the political is Carl Schmitt
(1888-1985). In Political Theology (1922), Schmitt formulated political theology's principal argument: "All the
quintessential concepts of the theory of the modern state are secularized theological concepts."1 From a
normative standpoint, this statement can be interpreted as a neutral observation. In other words, rather than make
a principled judgment, Schmitt merely points to a conceptual analogy or resemblance between the underlying
theoretical principles of the modern state and those of Christian theology. That said, this succinct sentence can
just as easily be read as a normative observation on the question of modernity's liberation from the legacy of
theological thought. In fact, this statement- and political theology in general- has drawn criticism from both
adherents of theological worldviews and those committed to the tenets of modernity. The former lash out at the
attempts to eviscerate political thought of what they believe to be its rudimentary theological content, whereas the
standard-bearers of modernity bemoan the absence of a political theory that is radical enough to completely
extricate itself from the grips of the religious worldview. Schmitt is chiefly responsible for the ambiguity over
political theology's fundamental position, as he persistently refrained from spelling out his motives. In
consequence, the normative ramifications of his position remain an open question. This veil of uncertainty does
not emanate solely from Schmitt's position, however, as his oeuvre clearly points to his theological leanings.
The ambiguity also stems from a broader and more principled issue, which is well reflected in Schmitt's position:
the view of modern consciousness as a self-contained and self-derived system of well-defined norms that strive

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for self-justification. Only through this unique form of justification will modern self-consciousness be able to
reaffirm that it is an all-inclusive system of norms and absolutely distinct from the Christian theological
framework, which the founders of modernity saw themselves as breaking away from. This fundamental objective,
which has yet to be attained, has accompanied the West's intellectual history since long before the appearance of
Schmitt's theologicalpolitical thesis. However, the latter molded this entire issue into a particular form that sets it
apart from its previous manifestations.
Schmitt's approach is unique for two reasons. To begin with, when Political Theology first came out, the trenchant
Nietzschean critique of the origins of modern consciousness and, above all, Max Weber's sociological-historical
characterization of the modern era's social and political institutions were already in the background. More
specifically, Friedrich Nietzsche and Weber had substantially deflated the self-confident attitude of modernity's
defenders who were certain that modern consciousness was a historical phase in which humanity had cast off the
shackles of the Christian theological worldview.
The second reason is much more local. Schmitt wrote his seminal works (Political Theology included) during the
nascent stages of the Weimar Republic. The founding of the new political order on the ruins of the imperial
government in the immediate aftermath of Germany's defeat in World War I triggered an extensive discussion on
the fledgling regime's stability and strength, or lack thereof. Schmitt adopted a critical line toward the new
government. Focusing on the concept of sovereignty, he claimed that it had lost some of its validity because of the
inherent ambiguity over who holds the decisionmaking power in the Weimar Republic. It was in this highly tangible
context that political theology's underlying principle- that secularized theological concepts undergird the theory of
the modern state- came into being. This position allowed Schmitt to launch a lucid discussion on sovereignty,
which he identified with the age-old theological belief in a divine ruler. The concept of sovereignty's legitimacy, in
Schmitt's view, can be rehabilitated only if we assume that there is a succession between the terminology of
Christian theology and that of the modern state. Put differently, his secularization argument must be understood
primarily as a way to shore up the sovereignty of governments (most notably the Weimar Republic) in the modern
political sphere, so that they may overcome their inherent instability. However, the specific political context of
Schmitt's argument eventually took a backseat to the discussion on secularization, especially in all that concerned
modernity's demand to view itself as a new historical epoch, which derives its legitimacy from itself, alone.
While the history-of-ideas movement, which jettisons central ideas in favor of the marginal, partly contributed to
this shift to a much wider context, it was primarily the result of the deep rupture that beset the modern West
because of, among other events, the Weimar Republic's collapse and its replacement with a totalitarian
government. These events rendered the discussion on sovereignty, certainly in all that concerns Schmitt's local
points of emphasis, irrelevant and even illegitimate (Schmitt was personally involved with the Nazi regime).
Instead, the desire to explain the deep rupture caused by the horrors of World War II spurred on the need to analyze
the ideological origins as well as question the legitimacy of modern consciousness. This imperative was manifest
in works as varied as Dialectic of Enlightenment, by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W Adorno (1944), and Meaning
of History, by Karl Lowith (1949). As part of this same discourse, Hans Blumenberg (1920-96) proposed The
Legitimacy of the Modern Age in 1966. Blumenberg's vantage point is unique in that it seems completely detached
from the discussion in which the consciousness of the crisis plays a major role and also in his innovative focus on
demonstrating that secularization was not a factor in the advent of modern consciousness. Blumenberg clearly
distinguishes his own work from the criticism on modernity. In so doing, he situates himself in a unique position.
Blumenberg's emphasis on the dynamics that spawned the change, while emphatically ignoring its ramifications,
led him to focus his criticism on those schools of thought that held that secularization is the key to understanding
the workings of the historical dynamic. According to Blumenberg, this explanation is inappropriate for modernity
and is based on a misunderstanding of its very nature. But Blumenberg's overt effort to distance himself from the
critical-normative discussion on modernity means not that his position lacks a normative dimension but that it
merely disguises it. In Blumenbergian thought, the modern era's normative obligation may be ascertained from the
account of the dynamics of historical change, which assumes a patently modern picture of humanity and the

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motives behind human actions in the world. These motives are not openly declared but gradually revealed to be
the components of this same account.
Blumenberg's unique strategy bears a certain resemblance to the one that Schmitt adopted in his critique of
modernity. Neither directly confronts the problem of modernity itself, as their views on the topic rise to the surface
within the framework of the theological-political debate. The similarity between the two philosophers' mode of
argumentation heightens our interest in their exchange of letters. Not only does their correspondence enable us to
further understand their positions, but above all it points to an unusual way to contend with the problem of
modernity. By refusing to place themselves in the seat of either the theologian (Schmitt) or the advocate of the
Enlightenment (Blumenberg), both philosophers deviate from the standard framework wherein the contours of the
debate between the supporters and detractors of modernity are clear-cut. Instead, the two correspondents
reevaluate these positions and alter their meaning while nevertheless remaining within the boundaries of the
important discussion on modern consciousness.
Blumenberg initiated the correspondence with Schmitt, which ran between 1971 and 1978 and was published in
2007.2 In the first letter, from March 1971, Blumenberg ascribed his decision to solicit his colleague to a "strong
urge" aroused by Schmitt's criticism of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age.3 Schmitt's comments appeared in the
appendix to his own work Politische Theologie II, published in 1970, four years after the first edition of
Blumenberg's book.4 What transformed Blumenberg's "strong urge" into action was the encouragement of Rainer
Specht, a close associate of both scholars; Specht assured Blumenberg that the elder philosopher was amenable
to such an overture.5 As the letter reveals, Specht's nudge was necessary not only because of Blumenberg's
understandable fear lest his gesture be ignored or deemed inappropriate by Schmitt, whom he held in the highest
regard, but also because of the singular potency of the critique. Blumenberg informed Schmitt that he normally
considered it improper for the criticized to respond in kind to the critic, but he felt the need to make an exception
this time around because Schmitt's words had particularly "innervated" (innerviet) him. While heeding the pitfalls of
overanalysis, it would appear as though Blumenberg's use of a physiological term to describe the impact of
Schmitt's critique was intended to set it apart from the other responses to his book, as there was indeed
something in Schmitt's words that aroused Blumenberg to the point where he could not resist the temptation of
formulating a response. To discern the unique elements of Schmitt's criticism and understand exactly why it
elicited such strong feelings in its recipient, I open with a summary of Blumenberg's original stance and then
describe Schmitt's criticism.
In 1966, some thirty years after the publication of Schmitt's pamphlet Political Theology? Blumenberg's thick tome
The Legitimacy of the Modern Age made its debut in Germany. In the book's first part Blumenberg explored the
varied use of secularization as a theoretical category. In so doing, he explained the deep changes in the way that
human beings have come to understand themselves and their surroundings since the rise of the modern era, one
of whose most prominent attributes is secularization. From the very title of the book's opening part-
"Secularization: Critique of a Category of Historical Wrong"7- it is clear that Blumenberg set out not only to outline
the usages of the secularization category in various contexts of religious knowledge but to shed light on the
category's normative elements, which transcend its ostensibly neutral role. Although Blumenberg joined others in
exposing the exploitation of the secularization category, his work is unique in that it does not "accuse" those
philosophers who availed themselves of this category of consciously attempting to undermine the justification of
the new historical age. According to Blumenberg, their efforts should not be attributed to a preconceived
normative motive. Instead, they should be understood as the result of a neutral theoretical consideration that
pertains to the nature of the historical period, especially in all that concerns the changes that it has reputedly
ushered in. Deeming the historical-conceptual category of secularization one of the causes behind the genesis of
the modern age essentially delegitimizes the notion that it is indeed a new epoch, for it lends credence to what
Blumenberg referred to as a quasi-"cultural debt" of the new historical age to its predecessor. In Blumenberg's
estimation, this claim can be refuted only if secularization is perceived as a "reoccupation of the position" held by
the religious-theological outlook, whereby completely new ideas supplanted the old context, as opposed to a

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process of copying extant religious-theological notions into a new format that preserves the original content. Thus
Blumenberg contended that the historical transition to the modern era consisted of the evisceration of the old
content and then the appropriation of the vacated framework on the part of new elements, thereby giving rise to
what is deemed a new epoch. In contrast to the use of the secularization category by the critics of modernity,
which Blumenberg considered a travesty, the legitimacy that he demanded for "the new age" was presented as the
minimal criteria for inaugurating something "new," even if that same phenomenon is not- and can never be-
something created ex nihilo.
This extremely brief summary of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age focuses on the project's complex and
nebulous normative standing. Blumenberg launched his attempts to dispense with the normative vagueness, or at
least explain it, in the second (1974) edition, as part of his effort to respond to the various critiques of the first
edition. As noted, one critic who forced Blumenberg to amend his first version was undoubtedly Schmitt, whose
philosophy focuses on the modern state's legal system. The nature and magnitude of Schmitt's criticism are
somewhat surprising, given that Blumenberg hitherto referred to his work only in passing; to wit, in the first edition
Schmitt is but one in a long line of philosophers for whom secularization is a fundamental category in their
analysis of the modern era. Nonetheless, Blumenberg probably viewed Schmitt from the outset as one of the more
prominent thinkers to embrace the secularization category unequivocally. For example, in Political Theology
Schmitt asserted that "all the significant concepts of the modern doctrine of the state are secularized theological
concepts."8 In the epilogue to Politische Theologie II, however, Schmitt contended that Blumenberg's failure to
distinguish between his own unique use of this category and that of the other cited scholars had led Blumenberg
to misunderstand his theologicalpolitical thesis and the role that secularization fills therein.
More specifically, Blumenberg failed to distinguish Schmitt's position from those motivated by "ambiguous
metaphysics" and thus depicted his view superficially. Schmitt also surveyed some of the positions espoused by
the other philosophers targeted by Blumenberg, such as the correlation between the notion of modern progress
and the messianic-eschatological impulse in monotheistic theology, or the view that Western rationalism in its
modern form incarnates the religious praxis of asceticism. In characterizing these views as metaphysical, Schmitt
partly accepted Blumenberg's criticism of the secularization category, whereby the latter homed in on the
metaphysical premise that underpins the enduring historical substance that the secularization category
undertakes to explain, including certain modifications it underwent. Nevertheless, Schmitt endeavored to show
why Blumenberg's inclusion of his work in this category was misguided. As far as Schmitt was concerned, his own
use of the category is predicated on a highly specialized tradition of the theory of state and law according to which
the transition between its first and second phases, which are based on the Catholic Church's interpretation of this
theory and lus Publicum Europeum (the international European law or order), respectively, entail the secularization
of one stage in the terms of the other. Schmitt assumed that this shift pertains to the rewriting of the international
rules of war and constituted the primary historical venue in which the coming of the new era played itself out. In
other words, the transition to modernity released humanity from the theological context in which these laws were
previously understood. In both Politische Theologie II and his personal letter to Blumenberg, Schmitt directed his
readers' attention to Alberico Gentili, the renowned international law scholar (1552-1608). According to Schmitt,
Gentili's exhortation that theologians should "keep quiet about a matter outside your field"- that is, the field of
history- marked the threshold of the new era.
At this early juncture in the debate, Schmitt already proved an extremely ironic critic who, at least to some extent,
was inclined to assume a self-induced naïveté. For example, Schmitt made use of Blumenberg's own terms to
describe the dawn of the "new" age, which the former considered a process of "reoccupying the position" of the
erstwhile rules of war with those practiced in the modern era. The evocation of Gentili's command also contained a
bit of nuanced irony, as immediately after the citation Schmitt alluded to the fact that Gentili was a contemporary
of Giordano Bruno, who was also persecuted by the Inquisition. What is more, Bruno was cast as a leading
protagonist in Blumenberg's account of the rise of the modern era. In resorting to irony, Schmitt apparently sought
to point to the propinquity between his and Blumenberg's positions by distancing his theory from the other objects

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of his correspondent's criticism and by taking the trouble to hint at the structural resemblance between his own
Une of thought and the Blumenbergian alternative. In other words, Schmitt adopted this approach to blunt the
sting of his critic's assault and to cloak himself in a shroud of naïveté as if something had been imputed to him
that he neither intended nor had the power to do. Schmitt thus presented himself as having been falsely pegged as
a member of the camp that aspires to undermine the efforts to distinguish modernity from the previous epoch.
This critical irony and self-induced naïveté that he brought to bear on his polemic with Blumenberg can hardly be
considered chance strategies of a master rhetorician of Schmitt's caliber; they were calculated to serve a highly
specific purpose- to safeguard and justify Schmitt's theological-political category- which constitutes a mainstay of
his entire philosophy. In fact, Schmitt expressly noted that his decision to lock horns with the Blumenbergian
enterprise stemmed from the fact that he considered it the most updated and nontheological attempt to render his
theological-political category superfluous:
This book positions the nonabsolute as an absolute and undertakes to scientifically negate every political
theology. The negation is understood to be scientific only from the standpoint of a scientific term that is free of all
remnants of continued influence, or "reoccupation," on the part of the redemption gospel, which, for its part, is valid
only within a religion that positions itself as absolute. That same "reoccupation," which preserved a link to that
same theology, is perceived by him [Blumenberg] as merely a "tragic debt" to eras past. The tireless efforts to
cancel that same "debt" are attributed to the worldliness of the new age, which was eviscerated theologically, and
it remains the ongoing critical mission of modernity.9
Accordingly, Schmitt devised two approaches for contending with Blumenberg's project. The first, ostensibly
neutral, points to the methodological resemblance between their stances, whereas the second considers
Blumenberg's work a frontal attack on the conceptual standing of his political theology. These two strategies
indicate the ambiguity that informs Schmitt's own position: the dual commitment to a supposedly neutral
scientific objective versus his largely normative and theological outlook. Schmitt and Blumenberg's dialectics
inevitably lead us to ask whether political theology is indeed a neutral category that explains the changes the
theory of law and state underwent during the transition to the modern era through, among other things, an analogy
between political theology itself, or the Christian theory of law and state, and modernity. Alternatively, perhaps any
understanding of the modern era must preserve a Christian-theological dimension, for any explanation- and
perhaps justification- of the modern era that lacks this element is bound to be wanting, if not defective.
The polemic between the two philosophers provides us with an opportunity to dissipate the cloud of ambiguity
surrounding the theological-political category. Schmitt projected the general debate over this issue onto the
Blumenbergian enterprise by exposing the fact that behind his correspondent's so-called neutral explanation for
the genesis of the new era, which Blumenberg refrained from couching in terms of the secularization category,
stands an unequivocally antitheological motive. In so doing, Schmitt affirmed- both de jure and de facto- the
existence of a strong theological impetus behind the theological-political category, even if it was broached solely
as an analogous explanation for the rise of the new historical era. In addition, Schmitt contrived to trap
Blumenberg in his own problematics and compelled him to take part in the theological debate over the enduring
presence of Christianity in the political-public sphere.
For the most part, Schmitt conducted this polemic with theologians who assumed that the political-theology
category should be removed from the public discourse on account of the distinction they drew between the
"divine" and "temporal city," as well as the theological realm's inherent incompatibility with politics. Conversely, the
dialectic with Blumenberg over secularization was waged on an entirely different front. Blumenberg mainly pitted
himself against critics of modernity who contended that the new era is still in thrall to the conceptual frameworks
of Christian theology. After being dragged into the fray by Schmitt, Blumenberg- who joined others in contending
that modernity has been remarkably successful in detaching itself from its Christian roots- found himself lumped
together with those same theologians whom his interlocutor accused of undermining the validity of the
theological-political category. In so doing, Schmitt basically positioned himself, once more, among those who
believed that modernity has failed to extricate itself from its theological origins. In fact, he apparently found

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confirmation for his view in Blumenberg's assumption that an intentional effort was being, or had been, waged to
oust religion from the public sphere. For his part, Blumenberg deemed Schmitt and his ilk his sworn ideological
enemies, so that it was incumbent on him to dispel their persistent theologically motivated attempts to undermine
the legitimacy of the modern age. In sum, Schmitt sought to lure Blumenberg into the debate, while Blumenberg
entered the fray of his own volition. Thereafter the two philosophers began to gather evidence for the ongoing
struggle between the proponents of monotheistic theology and the proponents of the modernist worldview
(including the conceptual framework that the latter is predicated on), even though members of both sides claimed
that the struggle had already been decided or had never actually taken place.
Blumenberg's willingness to participate in the debate within the confines of Schmitt's ambiguous framework is
evident from his very first letter. Blumenberg unreservedly accepted Schmitt's contention that he had
compartmentalized the latter's usage of the secularization category together with that of other philosophers and
had failed to discern its uniqueness. Notwithstanding his acceptance of Schmitt's criticism, Blumenberg did not, at
least in this particular letter, explain how he understood his addressee's use of the category to be different from
the rest. Instead, he undertook, in this of all contexts, to disclose the dynamics that led him to the concept of
legitimation. It turns out that what made Blumenberg reassess the historical change in terms of "reoccupying" or
"reconquering the position" was the desire not to defend the new epoch but to uncover the element of illegitimacy
that was latent in its various detractors' use of the secularization category. Only by dint of this new understanding
could he consider the possibility of tying secularization to legitimation. In his first letter to Schmitt, Blumenberg
described the meteoric rise of this concept within the context of attempting to convey the utter contingency of the
legitimation argument as "strange and almost paradoxical."10 More specifically, it did not derive from an
established conceptual system, according to Blumenberg, but is among the "arbitrary" results of the dynamics of
historical change. The objective behind this brief genealogy of the Blumenbergian concept of legitimation was to
muster a riposte against Schmitt's contention that Blumenberg's use of the term legitimacy was misleading and
the suggestion that his true intention was to argue on behalf of the new age's legality. Schmitt showed that the
term's usage contains a bona fide historical dimension in which the present is considered a legitimate successor
of the past if it fulfills certain conditions of succession that render the transition legitimate or justified. However,
this sort of justification model is obviously predicated on an interpretation that preserves the idea of a succession
between past and present. Schmitt argued that this was not the justification that Blumenberg was referring to.
According to Schmitt, Blumenberg essentially advocated a rational justification model whereby the modern era's
legitimacy derives from a system of unbending and historically self-contained laws, so that the epoch's adherence
to the law is the sole criterion for its standing. In crafting this argument, Schmitt endeavored to lure Blumenberg
into becoming another representative of modernity who sought to justify the epoch by trumpeting it as the Age of
Enlightenment- an era that, from a historical standpoint, embodies reason's perennial and mandatory system of
laws. Although Schmitt indeed pushed in this direction to position himself as a champion of the Enlightenment
and enemy of religion, his primary objective was to thwart Blumenberg's criticism concerning the use of the
secularization category. By claiming that Blumenberg's concept of legitimation essentially refers to legalization,
Schmitt could argue that the legalization of the modern age is merely a secularized reincarnation of the theological
idea of the law.
Blumenberg was well aware of Schmitt's tactics and knew that the short genealogy was meant to be the first step
toward a possible answer. His comprehensive response would have to wait, however, until the expanded second
edition of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age appeared in 1974: "The objection that under the title of legitimacy,
what I was concerned about was only legality, puts in question the status of the book's problematic and its thesis
as historical. As a criticism this could hardly be stronger."11 Blumenberg insisted that his proffered conception of
legitimation should be considered a historical category or, more accurately, a category that arises from an
understanding of historical dynamics rather than a logical or temporary antecedent to the actual historical event.
His firm stance should be viewed as a conscious attempt to distinguish his theory from those aimed at justifying
the Enlightenment and from those premised on the fact that the only substitute for this line of thinking is to return

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to the theological apologetics of yesteryear, namely, the position that was the object of criticism of the
Enlightenment's supporters. In claiming that Blumenberg's concept of legitimation refers exclusively to
legalization, Schmitt sought to trap the former in a pincer movement, which would force him either to adopt the
outlook of the Enlightenment, so that he could accuse Blumenberg of essentially being interested in "the self-
empowerment of man,"12 which testifies to the fact that human reason is the only source of justification, or to
acknowledge the huge debt that the modern era owes to the same theological forms of justification that
Blumenberg sought to extricate himself from, lest he be accused of what Schmitt described as a form of
justification whose immanent characteristic is that of "autism."
However, Schmitt turned a blind eye to a third option whereby that same "self-empowerment"- or what Blumenberg
referred to as self-assertion and self-determination- is an inherently historical reaction, which assumed the form of
an enduring (atemporal and ahistorical) set of laws and is to be conceived as a replacement for the earlier
explanatory framework. Insofar as Blumenberg was concerned, the emphasis need not be on the self-depiction of
that same system but on the "specific historic function" that it fulfilled- a function that can be defined in terms of
self-assertion and self-determination.13 In his own detailed account of the genesis of the new age (a topic beyond
the purview of the present article), Blumenberg explained why this rational system, which derives from the
individual himself or herself, is essentially a historical reaction to the implosion of the theological system. The
reason behind Schmitt's misunderstanding of the unique alternative that Blumenberg introduced is twofold. He
ignored its existence and overemphasized the self-characterization of that rational system- a description
putatively unconnected to the historical conditions that paved the way for that system. Blumenberg portrays
Schmitt's oversight thus:
Self-assertion determines the radicalness of reason, not its logic. An extreme pressure toward self-assertion gave
rise to the idea of the epoch as a selffoundation . . . that emerges from nothing. It must seem paradoxical to Carl
Schmitt that the legitimacy of an epoch is supposed to consist in its discontinuity in relation to its pre-history, and
this paradox prevents him from thinking that anything else could be at issue but mere legality vis-à-vis a
hypostatized reason that decrees positive law.14
Schmitt's misunderstanding of Blumenberg's conceptual alternative also prevented him from appreciating the
difficulties that pertain to secularization, for he basically viewed it as a means for legitimation. As a result, Schmitt
approached the historical past as a source for reorienting and thereby stabilizing contemporary reality, which
seems on the brink of collapsing into a rudderless state of serendipity, by maintaining its connection with that
same past. According to Schmitt, the secularization category fosters legitimacy for the new historical state of
affairs by deeming it an indivisible part of the ongoing construction of a historical identity whose attendant
transitions are similarly characterized and justified by secularization. Assuming that this sort of historical identity
renders secularization into a particularly attractive category insofar as legitimation is concerned, as it engenders
the requisite succession for contemplating a historical identity that negates the possibility of a radical "new." In
fact, it is this very negation that exposed the stratum of illegitimacy in the category of secularization. Schmitt was
careful not to disclose the defining attributes of his version of "historical identity." Instead, he preferred to
undermine the claim for a new age by pointing to the inherent absurdity of attempting to create anything ex nihilo.
From Schmitt's vantage point, it was clear that there exists a "something" whose multifarious reincarnations or
phases can be tied to a single identity, which will constitute the source for explaining the change. In addition, that
same "something" will impart meaning to the exceptional or aberrant. This is of utmost importance to Schmitt's
hypothesis because in the absence ofthat identity, the aberrant is bound to constitute a lingering threat to the
system's stability. At this juncture, it is worth asking whether Schmitt's concept of identity is akin to god, a
metaphysical substance, existence itself, or whoever embodies the principle that the "sovereign is who decided on
the exception" at any given moment.15 Or perhaps it is a dichotomous pair, such as friend-foe or sea-land, whose
constituent parts express that same identity in concert. To anyone who reads Schmitt's writings, he clearly
oscillated between these possibilities. Be that as it may, the present article is not the venue to decide which option
is best suited to Schmitt's stance or best conveys the relationship of these antitheses. Yet Schmitt's deep

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commitment to this sort of concept of identity, which in his estimation stands at the heart of historical events, is
what essentially sets his position apart from that of Blumenberg.
Blumenberg, who is considerably more skeptical as to whether there is such an identity, replaces it with a
functional constraint that recognizes the need for a system which confers order and significance. But
Blumenberg's system is not intrinsically tied to any claim of identity. The quest to validate the modern era does not
entail the need to justify the attempt to reveal the "essence of human rationality," the "system of order," or the
"ultimate meaning of existence." Moreover, it does not express the zenith of the historical or theological process
but merely contends that the new historical epoch is a legitimate and unique framework for coping with the
ineluctable demand for order and meaning. It was Schmitt, of all people, who concisely phrased Blumenberg's
intentions in the concluding paragraph of his 1942 book Land and Sea: "Human trepidation of the new is frequently
as great as the trepidation from the void, even when the new is . . . [aimed at] overcoming ... the void. Therefore,
many see but an incomprehensible lack of order upon hearing the ring of the new understood."16 In fact,
Blumenberg advocated this very definition on chronicling how the new era came into being and humanity's efforts
to cope with the disappearance of a meaningful order by instituting a new one that derives from the individual. As
such, this solution endows the new order with a legitimation not dependent on the previous one. According to
Schmitt, this transition to a new framework proceeds through an apparent void and is constantly reined in by
erstwhile phases, which infiltrate the present system and provide the framework for crafting a new meaning and
order. Notwithstanding its novelty, the modern age is not incommensurate with either the past or its forms. In light
of the above, must we assume the existence of an enduring identity to contend that this sort of transition from old
to new indeed transpired? Does every change basically consist of reappareling an existing identity?
The fact that the debate between Schmitt and Blumenberg ultimately came down to this fundamental
metaphysical issue can be gleaned from two subsequent stages of their correspondence, wherein Blumenberg
assumed the lead in trying to pinpoint the differences between them. In the same epilogue to Politische Theologie
II, containing Schmitt's original critique of Blumenberg, the former put forward an interpretation to the epigraph of
the fourth part of Goethe's autobiography, Poetry and Truth. The epigraph states that "nemo contra deum nisi deus
ipse" (no one can stand against a god unless he is a god himself).17 Although Goethe's aphorism reflects on a
notion of a unity, it leaves more than enough room for the possibility of an embedded dualism. For Schmitt, this
passage must be understood in a theological-political context. In other words, it contains a kernel of instability or
friction that is liable to alter the sense of that same unity. (Schmitt used the Latin transcription of the Greek word
stasis to describe a state of political unrest, disobethence, or civil war. However, he noted that in Greek dictionaries
this meaning is but a secondary definition to the first: an inherent state of harmony or stability.) According to
Schmitt, Goethe's statement harbors the expression "theology that turned into stasisology."18 Put differently, even
though the statement was penned by a consummately modern thinker, it constitutes yet another manifestation of
the deep bond between the theological and political. Schmitt attributed his interest in tracking down the
mysterious origins of this epigraph not only to philological curiosity but to a discussion he participated in on the
concept of the enemy in the political thought of Carl von Clausewitz, against the backdrop of the military theorist's
struggle against Napoléon. In attempting to distinguish Clausewitz's concept of enemy from that of Johann
Gottlieb Fichte, Schmitt analyzed Goethe's aphorism from a theological-political standpoint. Moreover, Schmitt
took the trouble to underscore the political relevance of the discussion on Goethe's epigraph by noting that "in
many private conversations during the [Second World War], many people well versed in Goethe quoted and
interpreted this aphorism."19 Needless to say, this context explains why Schmitt was interested in tracing the
epigraph's lineage to a theological source, as he was eager to attribute another theological-political statement to a
venerated figure who is widely considered not to have taken sides in the debate over political theology. While the
epigraph's political context revolves around Napoléon and his conquests of the cities of Germany, Schmitt posited
that its theological element derives from a fragment of Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenz's unfinished play, Catherine
of Sienna.20 Schmitt cites a few lines from the play as "evidence" that it is indeed the epigraph's theological
source:

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My Father looked at me threateningly,
Like a loving, aggrieved God.
But if he had reached out both his hands- God against God!
[She draws a small crucifix from her bosom and kisses it, promising
herself to the other God.]
Save me, rescue me, my Jesus, whom I follow, from his arms!21
To Schmitt, the connection is so obvious that he did not even bother to elaborate on why this passage should be
viewed as an expression, much less the origin, of Goethe's epigraph.
This omission obviously warrants criticism, but it is peripheral to the debate with Blumenberg. The crux of
Schmitt's argument lies in the need for a theological key to unlock the mystery surrounding the position of Goethe,
who can hardly be suspected of religious fanaticism. If Goethe indeed espoused this view, it would bolster the
argument that the theological dimension cannot be dislodged and can even be found in decidedly political
contexts. The presence of a theological matter at the heart of a historicopolitical situation reinforces the argument
that an underlying theological basis is required- be it consciously or not- to understand the political, and the
theological may very well serve as the basis of its meaning. Schmitt subsequently quotes from a conversation
between Goethe and Chancellor Friedrich von Mueller on October 10, 1823, which Goethe documented in his diary:
"His doctrine with respect to the divinity of Jesus," Goethe wrote, "is in need of a despotism, perhaps even more
than despotism needs it."22 Although Schmitt cited this passage to soften the impression that Goethe was
ambivalent toward Christian theology, it apparently encapsulated his own theological-political position.
As noted, Blumenberg's concerted effort to plumb the differences between himself and Schmitt commenced in his
very first letter to his critic. Blumenberg mentioned how surprised he was to find that they both independently
sought to interpret and track down the source of Goethe's cryptic epigraph. But in contrast to Schmitt's
Christological exegesis, Blumenberg offered a polytheistic reading that revolves around the image of the rebellious
god Prometheus. Blumenberg took the trouble (perhaps for the sake of showing his correspondent that they
shared a similar point of departure and his interest in Goethe's epigraph served no ulterior motive) to inform
Schmitt that he had first tackled Goethe's aphorism a year before the publication of Schmitt's book (in a
conversation with Gershom Scholem and Hans Georg Gadamer). The premise behind Blumenberg's interpretation
is rather straightforward and is connected to the fact that toward the end of the third part (the installment before
the epigraph), Goethe discussed a scandal that was prompted by his "Ode to Prometheus" and that subsequently
gave rise to the so-called pantheism polemics (whose main protagonists were Gotthold Ephraim Lessing and
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi). In Goethe's words, the ode was "the tinder for an explosion which revealed and brought
to discussion the most secret concerns of worthy men, concerns which, unknown even to them, slumbered in an
otherwise very enlightened society."23 Controversy aside, within the narrow scope of Schmitt and Blumenberg's
relationship, I am more concerned with how the latter used the polytheistic context to undermine Schmitt's
theological-political interpretation that is dependent on a strong principle of identity. Blumenberg appears to argue
that the riddle of Goethe's aphorism yields to a polytheist reading that allows for the rise of a new order that, unlike
Schmitt's position, is not limited to modifying a single, strong identity that appears in different guises. Instead, the
era is forged either by a struggle between separate forces or by the petering out of one force and the emergence of
another from the ruins of the former. Even in the absence of a detailed explanation or justification for his
interpretation, Blumenberg's mobilization behind a polytheistic reading of that epigraph constitutes, among other
effects, an assault on the underlying premise of Schmitt's political theology and its monotheistic Christian context.
As such, Blumenberg assumes- and Schmitt was in no rush to deny it- that the sense of succession from a past
epoch is manifest only under the assumptions of monotheistic theology, whereas the shift to a polytheistic mind-
set pulls the ground out from beneath the theologicalpolitical category and its instrument of implementation- the
category of secularization. As opposed to Schmitt and his Christological rendering, Blumenberg apparently adopts
the explanation that Goethe himself gave for his excitement over what the latter referred to as the "poetic figure" of
Prometheus, which he contrasted with Satan, the "poetic figure" of the monotheistic theological tradition:24

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The Titans are the foil to polytheism, just as the devil can be viewed as the foil to monotheism. But neither the
latter nor the One God to whom he stands in contrast is a poetic figure. Milton's Satan . . . remains in a
disadvantageously subaltern position as he attempts to destroy the splendid creation of a superior Being.
Prometheus, on the other hand, has the advantage of being able to create and form in defiance of higher beings.
Also, it is a beautiful thought, one appropriate for poetry, to have human beings created, not by the supreme ruler
of the world, but by a lesser figure who, however, is sufficiently worthy and important to do this because he is a
scion of the oldest dynasty.25
The second occasion on which Blumenberg sought to underscore the differences between himself and Schmitt
took place after a three-year silence between the two in the aftermath of their initial exchange. In a relatively long
letter, Blumenberg responded to an article penned by Schmitt, "The Three Phases of Providing Historical
Understanding," which the latter attached to one of his letters.26 Like the correspondence on Goethe's epigraph,
the two philosophers availed themselves of this opportunity to demarcate more sharply their positions. What is
more, the article introduced Lowith to the mix. Löwith's work, especially his book Meaning in History, played a
central role in Blumenberg's decision to embark on a treatise on modernity in the first place.27 It also had a
significant impact on the theological-political theory of Schmitt, who praised and made direct reference to
Meaning in History in the abovenoted article. The book's well-known theory, which has long become a mainstay in
the theoretical discourse of the history of ideas, posits that the modern phenomenon of the philosophy of history
should be understood as a later, secularized incarnation of the Judeo-Christian eschatological outlook. Of course,
this theory further enhanced Schmitt's theological-political position, as his contribution to the theory of the modern
state seems in keeping with Löwith's contribution to the historical-ideological sphere, which undergirds the
discourse of modern consciousness. However, this substantive resemblance between Löwith's and Schmitt's
thought does not extend to their motivations. Although Löwith's theory debunks the modern camp's pretension for
autonomy and liberation from its theological origins, Lowith did not espouse this view in the name of either
theology or secularized modernity. Instead, he wielded this theory against both schools of thought on the premise
that modern consciousness can be explained only from a theological standpoint; that is, it is deeply indebted to
the eschatological idea. In contrast, Schmitt's case against modernity appears to focus on its adherents' inherently
false pretenses of detaching themselves from their theological roots, which Lowith revealed in his book. Schmitt
averred that this can be remedied if modernity recognized its debt to its theological past. By dint of Löwith's
fundamental historical distinction between circular (Greek-pagan) and linear (Judeo-Christian) time, Schmitt put
forward his own characterization of historical consciousness, which informed his own day and age. More
specifically, Schmitt asseverated that time is neither circular nor eschatological but is entirely limited to the
individual who presents and determines the meaning of historical time and constantly transforms it into a
framework of meaning for himself or herself and other human beings. As such, history is no longer understood as
a manifestation of either cosmic time or a divine plan; it is merely a way to bestow meaning on oneself and then
apply it to or force it on others. Though Lowith shared Schmitt's view according to which historical consciousness
is a later incarnation of the perception of eschatological time, the latter eschewed Löwith's conclusion that
humankind must reembrace some version of circular time to avert the problematic outcome of eschatological
time. To wit: Schmitt insisted that it is possible to dovetail eschatological faith to historical consciousness. It
seems rather odd, however, to ascribe this view to Lowith, given that he viewed historical consciousness as a
reincarnation of and dependent on eschatological faith.
It is precisely at this point where the disparate motivations driving Löwith and Schmitt come to light and, for my
purposes, array the former and Blumenberg against Schmitt. Lowith linked his criticism of modern historical
consciousness to eschatological belief to show that at the very moment the West unfettered itself from the
promise of the redemption, which heretofore had kept it in check, humankind turned into a destructive force. So
long as eschatological faith was emphasized and undisputed, it had the wherewithal to prevent the advent of a
historical consciousness that would distort the accepted meaning of the historical- that is, a longing for the end of
time or redemption. Schmitt, who endeavored to demonstrate that eschatological faith continues to exist within

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the framework of the new form of historical consciousness, insisted that a way could be found to bridge the two.
With this in mind, he turned to the theological idea of the katékhon, "the restrainer," which appears in Paul's Second
Epistle to the Thessalonians (2:7). "The bridge rests," according to Schmitt, "on the image of the power that delays
the apocalyptic ending and defeats evil."28 In other words, modern consciousness fills the role of the restrainer. As
such, it merely delays the coming of the end; it does not go so far as to eradicate eschatological faith. Since it is
the individual who imparts meaning onto history, the theological system is flexible enough to encompass this
delay and even shield humankind from the collapse that Lowith warned against.
In his letter to Schmitt, Blumenberg wondered if "I have already managed to point out the crux of the difference
between us."29 Nevertheless, he took another stab at it by responding to Schmitt's above-noted article. Unlike
Schmitt, Blumenberg espoused a view somewhat reminiscent of Löwith's, whereby historical consciousness and
eschatological belief are beyond reconciliation. Once again, Blumenberg undertook to justify the new- modern
historical consciousness- by offering a divergent interpretation of the said katékhon. Blumenberg asked whether
the postponement of the end of time and the enervation of eschatological faith remain within the same
eschatological purview, or perhaps signify the abandonment of the entire outlook. He answered, in his patented
style, that the modern perspective advocates not the simultaneity of history and eschatology but the inversion of
their meaning. Consequently, the prospects of the redemption still retain the form of an eschatological promise,
but now it entails suspending the eschatological denouement. Blumenberg offered a comprehensive interpretation
of this inversion whereby the hopes for redemption were dashed time and again. In the process, the signs that
were supposed to herald the beginning of the end were metamorphosed into something so atrocious that
humankind was left with no choice but to stop it from coming to pass. According to Blumenberg, the katékhon is
but an expression of the radicalization of the eschatological craving at this moment in history. As such,
Blumenberg left the interpretation of the katékhon within the theological framework, thereby upholding his refusal
to view it as the conceptual basis of historical consciousness.
This notion of the radicalization of a religious concept that triggers the evisceration or disappearance of that
concept, and the emergence of another one in its place, constitutes the linchpin of Blumenberg's depiction of the
rise of modern consciousness. Nevertheless, his account revolves around the concept of God as an "absolute
power," rather than the notion of eschatological redemption. What sets this particular instance of radicalization
apart from the similar process that Blumenberg believed to have transpired in the theological nominalism of the
late Middle Ages is that in the latter the theological framework managed to contend with the resurgent yearnings,
whereas in the Enlightenment the radicalization led to the collapse of that framework and the construction of
another. Consequently, Blumenberg wrote to Schmitt that, from a conceptual standpoint, the rise of the modern
consciousness must have been preceded by a marked waxing or waning of the force of "eschatological paralysis."
However, its emergence could have transpired only against the backdrop of an "absolute negation" of the
eschatological force- as opposed to a mere transformation or modification- for otherwise it would have been
capable of restraining the eschatological element. In light of the above, Blumenberg realized that Schmitt was
committed to a strong concept of identity, which serves, among other purposes, to connect eschatological belief
and historical consciousness. On the other hand, Blumenberg endorsed a much weaker, "functional" concept of
identity that enables us to keep track of the entire processthe evisceration of a framework of meaning that induced
a reaction whose implications can no longer be explained in terms of that framework.30 Blumenberg elaborated on
the weak identity that he advocated in the fourth part of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, where he contended
that "reoccupation" is the key concept for comprehending the new historical era: "The concept of 'reoccupation'
designates, by implication, the minimum of identity that it must be possible to discover, or at least presuppose and
to search for, in even the most agitated movement of history."31
Blumenberg's efforts notwithstanding, Schmitt was under no obligation to accept his correspondent's depiction of
his own position. If Schmitt indeed rejected Blumenberg's reading, we would then be forced to formulate another
explanation for Schmitt's insistence on finding alternative bridging or transitional categories for preserving the
succession not of the historical as such but of the historical as an entity predicated on the theological. As

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Blumenberg argued, Schmitt's notion of an unceasing effort to bridge the conceptual gap between the theological
and what seeks to detach itself from the theological can be understood as a practice that assumes, and is
dedicated to, a strong metaphysical notion of identity, which embodies its debt to the Christian theological
worldview. However, Schmitt could have eschewed this metaphysical assumption by asserting that this
commitment is merely ethicotheological and not metaphysical; in other words, it is a perspective motivated by a
normative worldview in which the historicophilosophical discourse is only a means for justifying this stance. The
exposure of this discussion's metaphysical strata apparently stemmed, at least partly, from Schmitt's inclination to
keep a safe distance from the normative or theological sphere while taking advantage of conceptual analogies that
fall between the theological and other areas of human endeavor. This tendency was put to the test during the
correspondence with Blumenberg, who agreed to participate in the conceptual exchange according to the rules
that Schmitt laid down in his initial critique. Blumenberg then proceeded to expose Schmitt's underlying
metaphysical point of departure by compelling Schmitt, who sought to avoid the metaphysical realm, to articulate
a normative-theological commitment in its stead, which undergirds his position. The fact that this disclosure
transpired during the dialogue with Blumenberg is no accident. For Blumenberg, the point of departure, which
disclosed Schmitt's above-noted leanings, is a conceptually neutral discourse. That said, disclosure was neither
Blumenberg's express purpose nor even his intention. The normative strata naturally surfaced during the debate's
clarification process, at the very moment the conceptual description was jettisoned. Indeed, the correspondence
shed light on Blumenberg's loyalties in equal measure. Schmitt described Blumenberg as the most cogent
representative of the opposing viewpoint and was cognizant of the role his younger colleague played in elucidating
his own position. Blumenberg was unwittingly cast by Schmitt in the role of the most eloquent voice of a
worldview that he was not interested in championing. Schmitt, of all people, provided a succinct survey of this
outlook in his initial critique of Blumenberg (i.e., the appendix to Politische Theologie II, which was the last work
that Schmitt was to publish in his lifetime).
Schmitt offered a lucid yet satirical look at this same worldview as early as 1918, through a fictional character
named Buribunken:
I write therefore I am; I am, therefore I write. What do I write? I write myself. Who writes me? I myself. . . . What is
the content of my writing? I write that I write myself. What is the principal driving force that saves me from the self-
serving cycle of the "I?" History! If so, I'm a letter in the typewriter of history; I'm a letter that writes itself. Yet if we
are to be precise, it is not I who writes me, but merely the letters that are me which write. However, it is through me
that the global spirit perceives- writes- itself, so when I perceive my own self the global spirit is perceived. ... In
other words: I am not only the reader of world history, but ... the one who writes it.32
It may very well be that that same "innervation" that Schmitt's critical response aroused in his colleague was
connected to Blumenberg's desire to wash his hands clean of this sort of figure, which ostensibly represented the
impetus behind his attempt to bestow legitimacy on the new age. Blumenberg withstood the temptation of
affiliating himself with this figure or directly renouncing it. Instead, he dug himself in· behind a neutral discourse
that revolves around the possibility of historical change, which at times appears to be his only commitment to
modernity. In other words, the notion that this worldview possesses a clear normative dimension derives solely
from his unwavering commitment to a conceptual analysis that shuns basic metaphysical assumptions, be they
hidden or revealed. Nevertheless, his inability to remain completely ambivalent to the normative dimension that
Schmitt had thrust on his shoulders points, at the very least, to the fact that he recognized the possibility of a
normative dimension, even if he sought to distance himself from it and preferred to view it as no more than the
product of, rather than the reason behind, a conceptual decision. Likewise, it may be said that Blumenberg's
insistence on critiquing Schmitt by emphasizing his theory's underlying metaphysical premise, instead of its
conspicuous theological dimension, indicates that same desire to refrain, as much as possible, from routing the
polemic onto a normative track. However, here too, Blumenberg's adamancy ultimately engendered his own
commitment to the normative sphere, which may perhaps be defined as "modern." This is manifest in
Blumenberg's critical aversion to the notion of a strong, substantive identity that he found looming over whatever

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Schmitt had to say. Against this backdrop, Blumenberg refused to accept the image that Schmitt tried to foist on
him of an individual creating himself and his world. In so doing, however, it soon became evident that Blumenberg
cast doubt on the existence of anything that may be characterized as "absolute." His refusal to recognize the
existence of an absolute- be it God, humanity, existence, or the self-constitutive subject itself- is the only motive
that would appear to express, albeit in an admittedly circuitous fashion, a normative commitment to modernity
that may be ascribed to Blumenberg.
Blumenberg's inclination to extricate and distance himself from the "absolute" stands in stark contradistinction to
Schmitt's unremitting desire to locate and reinforce the presence ofthat same "absolute." Hence it appears that
Blumenberg and Schmitt needed one another to activate the normative dimension that both were inclined to
obfuscate- each in his own way- as part of a conscious effort to assume the role of the singular "outsider" within
the framework of a discussion they were expected to take part in. Just as Schmitt accomplished this objective
through the discussion on theology, Blumenberg did so in the philosophical discourse on modernity. In my
estimation, the correspondence between Schmitt and Blumenberg indeed repositioned each participant in the
coveted role of "outsider" or, at least, a unique thinker.
Footnote
1. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 57.
Footnote
2. Alexander Schmitz and Marcel Lepper, eds., Hans Blumenberg Carl Schmitt Briefwechsel, 1971-1978, und
weitere Materialien (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007). The letters appear on 103-58. All references to the
correspondence between Schmitt and Blumenberg are to this book and are cited as Briefwechsel. References to
the further materials included in this volume are cited as Materialien.
Footnote
3. Hans Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuezeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1966); The Legitimacy of the
Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985). All citations refer to the English version,
a rendering of the second German edition.
4. Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie II: Die Legende von der Erledigung jeder politischen Theologie (Berlin: Duncker
und Humblot, 1970). Subsequent quotations are my translations.
5. Schmitz and Lepper, the editors, expatiate on the chain of events that led to the correspondence between the
two in the epilogue to the exchange of letters; see Briefwechsel, 250-300, esp. 252.
6. Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie (Munich: Duncker und Humblot, 1934); see also Political Theology.
7. Blumenberg, Legitimacy, 3.
Footnote
8. Schmitt, Political Theology, 36.
Footnote
9. Schmitt, Politische Theologie II, 85.
Footnote
10. Briefwechsel, 105.
Footnote
11. Blumenberg's criticism of Politische Theologie II appears in the second edition of Legitimität, published in
1974. It is concentrated in the chapter "Political Theology I and II." See Legitimacy, 96.
Footnote
12. Schmitt, Materialien, 39.
13. Blumenberg, Legitimacy, 97.
14. Ibid.
Footnote
15. Schmitt, Political Theology, 5.

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Footnote
16. Carl Schmitt, Land und Meer: Eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung, 3rd ed. (Cologne: Hohenheim, 1981), 107;
my translation.
17. See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, From My Life: Poetry and Truth, in The Collected Works, ed. Thomas P. Saint
and Jeffery L. Sammons, trans. Robert R. Heitner, vol. 5 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).
Footnote
18. Schmitt, Materialien, 47.
19. Schmitt, Politische Theologie II, 94.
20. For some time Lenz was among the frequent guests in Goethe's home.
21. See Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenz, Werke und Schriften, ed. Britta Titel and Hellmut Haug, vol. 2 (Stuttgart:
Goverts, 1966), 435. For an English translation, see Hans Blumenberg, Work on Myth, trans. Robert M. Wallace
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 534.
Footnote
22. See the citation that Schmitt quotes in Politische Theologie II, 96.
Footnote
23. Goethe, Poetry and Truth, 469.
24. Blumenberg eventually turned this issue into the main topic of his book on myths, which also refers, albeit
briefly, to the polemic with Schmitt. See Hans Blumenberg, Arbeit am Mythos (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1979). For an English translation, see Work on Myth.
25. Goethe, Poetry and Truth, 469-70.
Footnote
26. Carl Schmitt, "Drei Stufen historischer Sinngebung," Universitas: Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft und Literatur 8
(1950): 925-30.
27. The book was originally written in English and published in the United States; see Karl Lowith, Meaning in
History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).
Footnote
28. Schmitt, "Drei Stufen historischer Sinngebung," 929.
29. Briefwechsel, 131.
Footnote
30. See Blumenberg to Schmitt, August 7, 1975, in Briefwechsel, 130-36.
31. Blumenberg, Legitimacy, 466.
Footnote
32. Carl Schmitt, "Die Buribunken," Summa: Eine Vierteljahrensschrift, 1918, 89-106, esp. 103.
AuthorAffiliation
PINI IFERGAN teaches in the Department of Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

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Subject: Theology; Politics; Theory

Company / organization: Name: MIT Press; NAICS: 511120

Publication title: New German Critique; New York

Issue: 111

Pages: 149-0_4

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