A Mini Project

ON
“GROWTH OF FINTECH INDUSTRY”

To Be Submitted to
DR. APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY,LUCKNOW
In The Partial Fulfillment Of The Requirement For The Degree Of
MASTERS OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
Session 2023-24
Submitted to: Submitted By:
Prof. Ms. Sayma Shan Deepak Kumar
Deptt. Of Mini Project MBA-2nd Sem.

IIMT ENGINEERING COLLEGE, MEERUT (127)

 BONAFIDE CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that this Mini Project is the Bonafide work of Deepak Kumar who
carried out the project entitled “GROWTH OF FINTECH INDUSTRY ”.

Prof. Ms. Sayma Shan

 DECLARATION

I, Deepak Kumar here by declare that the work presented in this Project entitled
“GROWTH OF FINTECH INDUSTRY” .For the fulfillment of the award of the Masters Of
Business Administration from IIMT ENGINEERING COLLEGE MEERUT (127).

The project embodies the result of original work and studies carried out by me and
the contents of the project do not form the basis from the reward of any other
degree to me or to anybody else.

Date:

Deepak Kumar
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am highly thankful to Prof. Ms. Sayma Shan, who gave the golden opportunity to
do this wonderful project and the valueable time that he gave during my project. I
shall be failing in my duty if I do not acknowledge my thanks to staff members of
my institute , without their guidance and cooperation this project would haven’t
been successfully accomplished.

I also express my gratitude to all those people who has provided me all the
necessary information providing me throughout this infrastructure to carry out the
project and people who were directly and indirectly instrument in enabling me to
stay committed for the project.

Deepak Kumar
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 INTRODUCTION
 ECONOMIC FRICTIONS AND FORCES IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE
FINANCIAL
 SECTOR INDIVIDUALS AS FINANCIAL SERVICES PROVIDERS
 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND NEW TRADE-OFFS
 FIDING AND SOLUTIONS

 CONCLUSIONS
 Executive summary
Finance is undergoing a profound transformation. Digital technologies are reshaping payments,
lending, insurance and wealth management – a process that the COVID-19 pandemic has
accelerated. While this is making financial services in many economies more diverse,
competitive, efficient, and inclusive, it may also increase concentration in markets. Moreover,
new risks may arise to a range of key public policy goals. This paper draws on the underlying
economics of financial services and their industrial organization to examine – with recent
empirical evidence – the implications of digital innovation for market structure and attendant
policies, including financial and competition regulation.
The key organizing framework for the discussion is economic frictions such as information
asymmetries and economic forces such as economies of scale and scope. These frictions and
forces give rise to financial intermediaries and shape market structure. We show that while
technological advances are not new to finance, digital innovation has brought major
improvements in the connectivity of systems and in computing power and cost, which have
resulted in large volumes of newly created and usable data. For example, mobile phone usage
has surged globally, social and economic activity has shifted online (often to platform-based
businesses), and new technologies like cloud computing have become widely adopted.
These improvements have alleviated frictions, blurred firm and industry boundaries, and given
rise to new business models. New, often smaller and specialized financial technology (fintech)
players have unbundled services (see definitions below). However, classic economic forces
remain relevant. Economies of scale and network effects are strong in digital platforms and
cloud computing. These scale effects, alongside economies of scope encourage re-bundling, and
allow large technology (big tech) firms and other new players to deepen their inroads into core
financial products. Available evidence shows that big tech firms in particular are rapidly
expanding their footprint in finance, and can use big data in ways that reduce the need for
collateral. Meanwhile, incumbent financial institutions have adapted by adopting new
technologies and disaggregating their production of financial services to improve efficiency.
Digital innovation could drive a range of industrial organization outcomes. On the one hand,
digital technology enables niche providers to reach a target customer base and be economically
viable. On the other hand, customer acquisition, funding, “assembly,” and switching costs tend
to favour larger providers of digital financial services. One possibility is a “barbell” outcome
composed of a few large players and many niche players. The large, multi-product players could
include traditional financial institutions, fintechs and big techs – thus both incumbents and new
entrants. Small players may include fintechs as well as geographically or sector focused
incumbents.
While a ‘‘barbell’’ is not the only potential outcome, it is a central case given the economic
forces at work. It is a potential steady-state market structure as some participants leverage scale
economies and network effects to grow larger, while innovation continues to result in new
entrants. There will be a tendency for players to either hyper-focus or to aim for the large,
multi-product space. However, continued atomization, stalled re-aggregation, or limits on entry
could result in a different configuration.
vi
This analysis gives rise to important policy issues regarding competition, regulatory perimeters,
and ensuring a level playing field. Concentration risks may increase in the provision of financial
services to end-users, and in the provision of infrastructure to financial institutions. Market
structures that concentrate data and supercharge network effects could reduce intermediation
costs and broaden inclusion. In many markets, however, the resulting market power might be
seen as detrimental. Competition regulators will have to strike a balance appropriate to the
needs of their markets, since different societies will attach different preferences to market
structure outcomes.
At the same time, financial regulatory authorities are working to manage policy trade-offs
among (i) stability and integrity, (ii) competition and efficiency, and (iii) consumer protection
and privacy. The barbell outcome, for example, could present challenges in terms of stability
with respect to both large and small payers. Widespread access to data raises privacy concerns.
Regulators need to balance the innovation and efficiency brought by new entrants with the
potential challenges for oversight, enforcement and consumer protection. Emerging policy
approaches – such as new anti-trust rules for the digital era, data mobility requirements and data
protection laws – may help to mitigate the policy trade-offs. Yet the responsibility for these
changes generally lies with different public authorities, and with legislatures. To navigate this
new territory effectively, and to balance the necessary policy goals, authorities will need to
collaborate. This will need to occur both domestically – with cooperation between central
banks, financial sector regulators, other industry regulators, and competition and data protection
authorities – and across borders. Such collaboration can help to ensure regulatory consistency
and peer learning within and between countries, and ultimately better development outcomes
for the country.

Definitions of key terms used in this paper

Digital financial services (DFS) are financial services which rely on digital technologies for
their delivery and use by consumers.
Fintech refers to digital technologies that have the potential to transform the provision of
financial services spurring the development of new – or modify existing – business models,
applications, processes, and products. In practice, the term “fintech” is also broadly used to
denote the ongoing wave of new DFS. Examples of these technologies include web, mobile,
cloud services, machine learning, digital ID, and application programming interfaces (APIs).
A fintech firm is one that specializes in offering DFS to consumers, or enables other
providers to offer DFS. While many of these companies are relatively new to the financial
sector, others are by now well-established public companies. Examples of fintechs include
digital payment providers (eg PayPal), financial infrastructure/connectivity providers (eg Plaid),
digital insurers (eg BIMA, Policy Bazaar), peer-to-peer lending platforms (eg Afluenta, Funding
Circle, Investree).
A big tech firm is a large company whose primary activity is digital services. Examples of
big techs include online search engines, social media platforms, e-commerce platforms, ride-
hailing platforms, and mobile network operators. Numerous big techs have started to offer DFS,
leveraging their large customer bases and the data they have on transactions and activities that
give rise to payments or a need for credit, insurance or other financial services.
 Introduction
Digital innovation is transforming financial services. Innovations in financial technology such
as mobile money, peer-to-peer (P2P) or marketplace lending, roboadvice, insurance technology
(insurtech) and crypto-assets have emerged around the world. 1 In the past decade, fintech has
already driven greater access to and convenience of financial services for retail users.
Meanwhile, artificial intelligence (AI), cloud services, and distributed ledger technology (DLT)
are transforming wholesale markets in areas as diverse as financial market trading and
regulatory and supervisory technology (regtech and suptech). A host of new firms have sprung
up to apply new technologies to meet customer demand and most incumbents indicate that
digital transformation is a strategic priority (Feyen et al 2021). Indeed, leading banks are rapidly
closing gaps in digitization of internal processes and customer offerings, to compete with
fintechs and the large technology (big tech) firms that have also entered the fray (BIS 2019;
Frost et al 2019).
These developments have the potential to make markets more diverse, competitive,
efficient, and inclusive, but could also increase concentration. Innovation has introduced
competition and increased inclusion, particularly in emerging markets and developing
economies (Pazarbasioglu et al 2020; Frost et al 2021). Fintech seems to have thrived
particularly in markets where the financial system had been less developed (FSB 2020; Didier
et al 2021). However, the underlying economics of intermediation combined with new
technology may lead to concentration among both traditional and new financial services
providers. Monopolistic or anticompetitive behaviours by big technology platforms are already
being scrutinized. As financial services move towards similar technology-driven configurations,
regulators are grappling with questions of how best to regulate and supervise a landscape that is
increasingly characterized by new players and business models; and to address potential
challenges to financial stability, financial integrity, fair competition, and consumer protection
(including data privacy).
The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the digital transformation. In particular, the need
for digital connectivity to replace physical interactions between consumers and providers, and
in the processes that produce financial services, will be even more important as economies,
financial services providers, businesses and individuals navigate the pandemic and the eventual
post-COVID-19 world. For instance, the pandemic has already accelerated the shift to digital
payments (Auer et al 2020a). It has also intensified e-commerce (BIS 2020; Alfonso et al 2021),
which may benefit big tech firms and their activities in finance. Countries with more stringent
COVID-19 policies and lower community mobility experienced a larger increase in financial
app downloads in the wake of the outbreak (Didier et al 2021). Finally, it may be speeding up
work on central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) (Auer et al 2020b).

1
This paper examines the implications of digital innovation for market structure and
attendant policies, including financial and competition regulation. There have been
a number of surveys of regulatory responses. This paper takes a step back, to look at
what the economic theory of banking and financial intermediation can tell us about
how technology may drive industrial organization in the sector, and how that might
inform further policy responses. The paper roots the impact of the digital
transformation of finance in how innovation has enabled providers to address
longstanding challenges of financial intermediation – including asymmetric
information, uncertainty, incomplete markets, and fixed and variable costs of
production. The paper describes how digital innovation affects these key economic
frictions in finance, and alters the financial services value chain and industrial
organization. The forces driving these changes, and potential outcomes in terms of
industry structure, lead to insights for policy makers on how to harness the benefits
of fintech, while mitigating some of the risks, particularly around competition and
market structure. The focus is on economic and technological forces that apply
broadly across financial services. It recognizes that the sector encompasses a wide
range of different products and services, and is composed of numerous sub-markets
that might use different technologies or have different economic structures. These
may thus diverge in market structure and competition outcomes.
 Economic frictions and forces in financial services
Fundamentally, financial firms, like other firms, owe their existence to transaction costs
(Baltensperger 1980). In the absence of complete trust between parties, market interactions
on the production side and the customer side are characterized by risks, due eg to principal-
agent challenges and incomplete or asymmetric information. Solving these to reduce risk
and create trust imposes costs on both institutions and consumers, including contracting,
search, and verification costs. For example, lending is characterized by information
asymmetries ex ante, as lenders need to determine the risk profile of potential borrowers,
and ex post, as they need to monitor the repayment capacity of borrowers (Dewatripoint and
Tirole 1994). A fundamental feature of payment markets is the need to keep track of
payment obligations, and to verify the identity of account holders or the veracity of payment
tokens (Kahn and Roberds 2009). Different actors in the payment processing chain must
trust that the other links will not expose them to fraud or liability, and customers require
trustworthy counterparties with which to lodge funds and reliable processes for their
delivery. Financial market investment and insurance are subject to uncertainty around future
outcomes, adverse selection, and moral hazard. Those creating investment products rely on
sound underwriting and execution services to be able to offer a quality product to their
customers. Customers in turn must be able to trust the soundness of the investments and of
the operations that underlie their ability to buy and sell.
As in other industries, internalization of activities within a single financial services firm
overcomes principal-agent and asymmetric information challenges, to align interests and
monitor actions. This ensures trusted interactions across teams. Linking deposit taking to
lending enables close coordination of asset and liability management. Combining payments
execution with account management allows the provider to confirm availability of funds
before transfer instructions are carried out. Linking underwriting, trading, and sales allows
firms to design new investment products in line with market conditions and investor
preferences.
The presence of uncertainty about future outcomes, for example whether a borrower will
go bankrupt, adds further frictions. Because it is difficult to define a contract for all potential
future states of the world – and the resulting solvency status of the borrower – markets are
not complete in the Arrow-Debreu (1954) sense. As a result, resource allocations may be
inefficient: some borrowers will have to pay higher interest rates to compensate the lender
for expected (but not necessarily realized) losses, costly insurance may be required, or some
loans will not be made at all. More generally, the difficulty of tailoring products to the
precise circumstances of different customers, due either to asymmetric information or
uncertainty about outcomes, means that pricing, maturity, or other terms will inevitably be
less than perfectly suited to the circumstances of some clients. They may decline the offer, or
the intermediary may deem certain segments unviable commercially. Either way, some
customers will not be served.
Financial services companies are structured to address particular information gaps and
frictions related to intermediation. Banks developed to address the maturity transformation
challenge resulting from incomplete information about future liquidity needs of depositors.
 They also address the transactional costs and risk management needs of intermediating
investments across individuals who lack direct knowledge of other counterparties or
information about economic activities taking place

elsewhere. Banks diversify across large numbers of borrowers to better manage

uncertainty of outcomes. Exchanges and brokers address the search and transaction costs of
individual issuers and investors, reducing information asymmetries through listing
requirements and publishing prices, and providing infrastructure and services to match and
enable transactions between buyers and sellers who don’t know each other. Because so much
of the intermediation process is not readily visible to customers, and risks may only be
realized after an extended period of time, the consumer need for trusted providers manifests
more than in other industries. A provider that gains customer trust with one product can
leverage that trust to offer other services.
Providing these services requires not only information and financial resources, but also
real resources. These include the labour, equipment, and premises to produce financial
contracts, manage accounts, and process customer transactions. The mix of labour, physical
capital, financial capital, and trust capital will vary by business type, and has been rapidly
changing. Nevertheless, financial services production is subject, in varying degrees, to the
same frictions that affect production in other industries, including real resource indivisibility
and fixed costs. Thus, while financial intermediation is subject to unique information and
transaction frictions, as an industry it is also subject to familiar economic forces observed
across sectors.
Basic economic forces are at play across both the financial and real resources deployed
by financial firms. These include:

• Economies of scale. On the supply side, traditional financial firms have had large fixed cost
investment needs for the creation and maintenance of back-office systems and physical
distribution networks to connect to the consumer. There may also be fixed costs of minimum
capital requirements and regulatory compliance operations. As in any industry with fixed
costs, economies of scale emerge when a larger producer can amortize those costs over a
larger customer base. Scale also permits the development of a diversified balance sheet to
better manage liquidity and credit risk. Scale can reduce the marginal cost of risk-taking
(Mester 2010) and allow better pricing and/or ability to serve a wider range of customers.

• Economies of scope. Also on the supply side, financial intermediaries enjoy economies of
scope by bundling interdependent financial services that can be delivered through the same
physical customer interfaces and leverage the same balance sheet. Cross-selling loan
products and insurance, and offering both asset and liability products, can create synergies
and reduce costs. Economies of scope are further enforced by the demand side as many
customers prefer a conveniently offered suite of products. This also reinforces the
institution’s role of gatekeeper to the customer.
• Network effects. On the demand side, network effects (or “externalities”) are significant in
financial services such as payments, where the value of the network to all users (both payers
and payees) increases when the number of connected users increases. A bank serving a
business, suppliers and as well as its customers, could more efficiently connect
counterparties to quickly transfer payments and provide working capital.
Given the available technology and prevailing regulation, these forces have historically
conferred advantages to “first movers” and large, vertically and horizontally integrated
players. This has been particularly true for capital-intensive products such as lending, for
institutions that put consumers’ savings at risk such as deposit taking, and for capital and
network-intensive areas such as payments.
The Impact of digital innovation on key economic frictions

The adoption of technology is not new in the financial sector, but a number of constraints
had defined the operating environment until recently. In the late 20th century, the industry
was already characterized by a relatively high degree of computerization since most
financial services were dematerialized.2 Only payments frequently required physical cash or
a check, and onboarding for new products and services often required in-person or paper-
based processes. Still, reaching and connecting to customers routinely required physical
infrastructure such as branches and automated teller machines (ATMs). Customers wishing
to transact with counterparties using other banks had to use expensive and sometimes slow
or risky processes such as wire transfers. Even after the advent of digital payment systems
and the dematerialization of securities, connectivity remained a barrier to entry – an
institution typically had to be licensed and part of the consortium of banks or brokerage
houses to participate in a transactional network. Furthermore, data processing and storage
were expensive, requiring the operation of bespoke mainframes and data centres. This
limited the volume of information that could be gathered, stored, analysed, and exchanged to
improve efficiency, better price risk, and tailor products to customer needs.

Technology advances in connectivity, data processing, and storage

Significant technology advances have taken place in two key areas that have contributed to
the current wave of technology-based finance:

• Increased connectivity. Internet and mobile technology have rapidly increased the ability to
transfer information and interact remotely, both between businesses and directly to the
consumer. Through mobile and smartphones, which are near-ubiquitous, technology has
increased access to, and the efficiency of, direct delivery channels and promises lower-cost,
tailored financial services.

As of late 2019, GSMA estimated that there were more than 5 billion mobile subscriptions
worldwide. Building on this user base, there were nearly one billion registered mobile
money accounts (Graph 1). In principle, most financial services can be now delivered
directly and digitally, vastly increasing access to finance. An emerging class of services and
assets could in principle even be delivered without the need for an intermediary. At the same
time, the rapid increase in connectivity has enabled large network effects and strengthened
the position of established intermediaries offering mobile networks and subscriptions, such
as telecom companies, particularly in some emerging market and developing economies
(EMDEs). Furthermore, the development of widely used applications and services like
social media, search and social communication have enabled more peer-to-peer casual

2
 interactions. These are increasingly being tapped for economic interactions, as well. This has
strengthened the position of the companies providing these services.

Mobile and mobile wallet growth worldwide

In billions Graph 1

0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
1
Number of registered mobile money accounts Unique mobile subscribers

1
Defined by GSMA Intelligence as individual person that can account for multiple ‘mobile
connections’ (ie SIM cards).
Source: GSMA Intelligence.

• Low-cost computing and data storage. Computing efficiency has risen exponentially, as the
cost of data storage has rapidly declined. The Cray-1 was the world’s fastest
“supercomputer” from 1976-1982, operating at 80 MHz, weighing 5.5 tons, and costing $10
million.4 The A11 chip powering an iPhone X runs at a speed of 2.39 GHz – 30 times faster
– and at a small fraction of the size and cost. 5 Data that required a room full of tape or hard
drives in 1980 can fit on a micro secure digital (SD) card today. As the cost of data storage
has fallen, from USD 0.11 per gigabyte in 2009 to 0.02 in 2020, the volume of data being
generated globally has increased exponentially – to an estimated 48 zettabytes (48 trillion
gigabytes) in 2020 (Graph 2). The ability to process such data rapidly has also risen with
advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (FSB 2017). Digital
technologies like smartphones, and activities like social media and e-commerce generate a
wealth of new data. Much of the new data relates to individuals (“personal data”) or firms,
and can be processed automatically to

4
See https://www.computerhistory.org/revolution/supercomputers/10/7.
5
See https://igotoffer.com/blog/iphone-x-sum-technologies.
identify the characteristics of existing or potential clients and offer the financial services that
best fit them.
 Costs of storage have declined as global data volumes have surged Graph 2
US dollars Zettabytes

0.09 45

0.06 30

0.03 15

0.00 0
2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
1
Lhs: Average cost per GB for hard drives Rhs: Annual size of global datasphere
From Sep 2017, data extrapolated using the growth rate in price per MB from
http://www.jcmit.net/diskprice.htm. The increase in 2012 is explained by flooding in
Thailand, where one-third of hard drives were produced globally. One zettabyte is one
trillion gigabytes.

Sources: BACKBLAZE; jcmit.net/diskprice; SEAGATE (2018), The digitization of the

world from edge to core, November.

Data, networks, and new business models

These advances have enabled the creation of huge amounts of capturable data, new tools to
analyse those data, and new business models leveraging insights from the analysis.
Connectivity generates and captures a variety of data, and digitalization of more activities
generates higher volumes of data at an even greater velocity. Storage and processing
capacity allows data to be organized, validated, and analysed, including through
computationally intensive techniques such as AI, including machine learning applications on
vast troves of data. Digitally “native” data with high volume, variety, velocity and veracity
are referred to as “Big Data.” 3 These characteristics mean that not only did big data emerge
due to increased digitization of activities (including those facilitated by connectivity), but
big data also requires low cost storage and high capacity computing power to be useful. Big
data emerges from a variety of sources, including the location and usage data from mobile
phones, the contact information from social networks, the delivery information from
logistics companies, and the sales data from retail outlets and payments networks. Big data
is being used in a wide range of traditional financial services and new types of businesses to
improve credit analysis, process efficiency, risk management, product design, customer
service and other areas. Examples include Trusting Social, which uses call records to
develop credit scores, and Tenda Pago, which uses retailers’ consumer goods order
information as a basis for working capital loans. Data can be an important resource for, and
driver of, economic development (World Bank 2021).

3
Enterprises using cloud storage in Europe rose sharply over 2014–18
In per cent of enterprises Graph 3

These advances also enable a number of new business models for the provision of
technology, one of which is cloud-based computing. This combines the ability of an
enterprise or individual to connect to externally operated and managed data centres with
low-cost computing power and storage. The result is an ability to obtain infrastructure on
demand and reduce the fixed cost barrier to entry to offer financial services. Surveys show
that cloud adoption has proceeded rapidly. For instance, in Europe, Eurostat estimates that
over half of enterprises in the Nordic countries used cloud storage in 2018, while firms in
the Netherlands, Ireland, UK and Malta have also seen rapid adoption (Graph 3). Recent
evidence suggests that cloud adoption has even accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic
(McKinsey 2020). For instance, a recent survey of IT leaders from 250 mid-sized companies
around the world found that 82% of respondents increased cloud usage as a result of the
COVID-19 pandemic and 91% are planning a more strategic use of cloud in the near future
(Snow 2020). Innovation in cloud services is proceeding apace, as growing volumes of
venture capital and private equity funding have flown into new applications of cloud
technology and development operations (DevOps) over the past three years (Graph 4).
Another result of the technology advances described above has been the wide
emergence of platform-based business models. Fintechs, big techs and even some
incumbents have moved increasingly to a role as “matchmakers” between different users and
providers on their platforms (Croxson et al 2021). These businesses leverage the
connectivity of individuals and businesses, and the ability to quickly and easily collaborate,
discover counterparties, and package and deliver a range of digital and physical goods and
services. Platforms are two-sided or multi-sided markets, and benefit from network effects
that create more value for each participant with increased numbers of other participants.
 Investment in CloudTech and DevOps companies1 Graph 4

Lhs: Total capital invested Rhs: Number of deals

1
As classified by PitchBook. CloudTech and development operations (DevOps) include
companies that help organizations develop, operationalize and monitor software applications
at scale. Data accessed on 18 November 2020.
Source: PitchBook Data Inc.

The platform provider also benefits from the network effects that attract more users,
transaction volumes from which to earn revenues, and data that in turn enables the provider
to target users with more goods or services. The ability to connect large numbers of users to
a wide array of services has led to the rise of so-called ‘super apps’ such as WeChat, AliPay,
and (perhaps) Facebook. These and other technology companies operating platforms with
large customer bases are often referred to as big techs (Frost et al 2019). For this analysis,
almost any large company that has or can leverage big data against a large customer base
could become a big tech. Examples include telecom providers like Vodafone M-Pesa, and
retailers such as Walmart, which is already a substantial e-commerce player and in early
2021 announced intentions to create a fintech operation. It could also include business-to-
business (B2B) players such as consumer goods manufacturers and distributors. Among
other features, platform operators can leverage digital delivery channels and application
programming interfaces (APIs) to seamlessly “embed” financial services such as payments
or loans into non-financial services such as e-commerce or social media.
Network effects in these business models can lead to market concentration and
competition concerns. The effect of adding users on one side of a platform market (ride-
hailing drivers, for example), creating more value to users on the other side (riders), and
therefore becoming more attractive to users on the first side (drivers), can result in a positive
growth spiral and a “winner-takes-all” or “winner-takes-most” outcome, where all market
participants want to be on the same platform. There is the risk that a platform that builds a
dominant market position would extract rents from its massive data and networks (Croxson
et al 2021). The multi-sided nature of the market, however, makes it difficult to define the
relevant market interactions, such as product tying, for competition analysis. Furthermore,
 multi-sided markets are characterized by complex pricing structures, including asymmetric
pricing that more finely divides the consumer surplus amongst participants. Pricing practices
that could be considered anti-competitive in one-sided markets might be pro-competitive in
a multi-sided market by attracting more participants and increasing welfare-enhancing
network effects (White et al 2018). The implications of these aspects for financial services
delivered through fintech or big tech platforms will be explored further below.

Impact on transaction costs, information asymmetries, and market gaps

Through the advances in connectivity and computing, digital innovation helps to alleviate
transaction costs and enable a wide range of new financial services business models.
Adoption cuts across traditional and new providers. Digital technologies can help reduce the
costs of collecting, storing, processing, and exchanging information – including search costs,
replication costs, tracking costs, and verification costs (Goldfarb and Tucker 2019). In
finance, this can help borrowers to more quickly find a suitable offer on a loan, or help
savers to find an investment product that suits their specific needs. Technologies can also
help parties to automate verification of events, enabling the creation of a wider range of
state-contingent products. For instance, an insurance client may use a phone camera or other
remote device to document damage that results in an insurance claim, or a drone may verify
that a field has been planted to enable disbursement of an agricultural loan. Blockchain
technologies take these a level further by providing a set of underlying capabilities making it
easier for individuals and businesses to interact on a peer-to-peer basis even when they do
not know each other beforehand (trustless context). At the limit, such advances may obviate
the need for intermediation, by enabling individuals or firms – such as the lenders and
borrowers in P2P and private credit markets – to interact directly without the need for a bank
to aggregate funds, assess credit, and provide ongoing monitoring and servicing functions.
Incumbents, fintech entrants, and big techs are leveraging technology to address
economic frictions. They can close information gaps (asymmetric information, uncertainty),
and cut costs by:

• Reducing information asymmetries. Classic theories of intermediation describe how banks

address information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders (Aghion and Bolton 1997;
Holmström and Tirole 1997). They also discuss how residual gaps increase credit costs or
restrict the supply of credit, both in terms of interest rates and the costs of ancillary activities
such as attaching collateral. Better information, for example leveraging consumer data and
analytics, could improve risk assessment and reduce the need for collateral as an indicator of
creditworthiness in lending (Gambacorta et al 2020; see Box A). The use of vast troves of
data enables the provision of financial services to individuals and small businesses with no
or limited traditional credit history, promoting financial inclusion. More information and
greater transparency tend to increase trust, enabling providers and users of funds to work
with a wider range of counterparties. With enough transparency between users of finance
and providers of funds, intermediation itself may not be necessary. For example, fintech
credit models such as P2P or marketplace lending seek to directly link investors and
borrowers (Claessens et al 2018).
• Enabling customization of financial services to construct more complete markets. Data and
automation facilitate the execution and monitoring of complex contracts and creation of
more complete markets. This could bring financial services closer to the stylized general
equilibrium of the classic Arrow-Debreu (1954) model. Traditional core banking systems
and marketing channels were built around standardized products, and did not facilitate a
fully consumercentric approach to product development and marketing. More tailored
services, such as loans, investment advice, or retirement planning structured to take account
of the individual circumstances of the borrower across different outcomes and states of the
world, required highly trained and expensive experts. In contrast, fintech-enabled
automation of processes reduces the set-up costs for customized products and can track
different contingencies across a wide range of outcomes. Digital marketing systems enable
specialized products to find a sufficient customer base. The increased availability of data and
computing power makes it possible to better price risk, tailor a product or service to the
needs of the consumer, and potentially construct a range of state-contingent products,
executed and monitored through smart contracts or other emerging technologies.

• Reducing fixed and marginal costs of producing financial services. Technology has reduced
the costs of, and need for, much of the traditional physical infrastructure that drove fixed
costs for the direct financial services provider. An early example that has been particularly
important in EMDEs is mobile money. Mobile money has reduced the need for traditional
bank branches and payments acceptance infrastructure, eg point of sale (POS) terminals, and
has become a widely used alternative to bank accounts in some countries. Cloud-based
infrastructure, including Banking-as-a-Service (BaaS), provides computing power, data
storage, and even compliance services. A niche financial services provider can connect to
these services and purchase as much capacity as it requires on demand without the need to
build data centres and other back-office infrastructure (or, in the case of BaaS, a license). 4
Financial intermediaries can reduce marginal costs through technology-enabled automation
and “straightthrough” processing, which are accelerating with the expanded use of data and
AI-based processes. Digital innovation can also help to overcome spatial (geographical)
barriers, and even to bridge differences across legal jurisdictions (akin to processes
discussed by Bodie and Merton 2005). The increased use of digital tools and platforms for a
range of economic activities makes it possible to embed tailored financial products into non-
financial activities, drastically reducing customer acquisition costs and risks. Contextualized
finance will be discussed further below.

Box A

4
 Data and collateral
Banks usually require borrowers to pledge tangible assets, such as real estate, to help offset
asymmetric information problems. Collateral performs several functions: it can indicate
creditworthiness, to the extent that having accumulated the means to possess a tangible asset
signals something about ability to repay a loan; it provides an alternative means to recover
the loan in case the borrower becomes unable to repay; and it aligns interests because the
potential loss of the collateral would be costly for a borrower who becomes unwilling to
repay. By contrast, big techs can use big data to better assess firms’ creditworthiness. They
can link repayment performance to other sources of value, such as access to new inventory
or to an e-commerce platform to sell goods. These capabilities could help to reduce the
importance of collateral in solving asymmetric information problems and maintaining
alignment of interests.
Gambacorta et al (2020) compare how credit from a big tech firm (Ant Group) and
traditional bank lending correlate with local economic activity, house prices, and firm-
specific characteristics. Using a unique random sample of more than 2 million Chinese
firms, the paper finds that big tech credit does not correlate with local business conditions
and house prices when controlling for demand factors.
Graph A1 indicates the unconditional elasticity between the different credit forms and
house price. The dots in the figures indicate the average logarithm credit use (y-axis) and the
average logarithm of housing price (x-axis) at the city-year level. The left-hand panel plots
big tech credit, the middle panel plots bank secured credit (mortgages) and the right-hand
panel plots bank unsecured credit. Linear trend lines are reported in each graph, together
with 95% confidence bands. The (unconditional) elasticity of big tech credit with respect to
house prices is 0.09, while that of unsecured bank credit is twice as high (0.184). That of
secured bank credit is five times higher (0.488). A greater use of big tech credit could
therefore have macroeconomic implications, weakening the relevance of the collateral
channel.
Based on a 100,000 random sample of firms served by both MYbank (Ant Group) and
traditional Chinese banks. The dots in the figures indicate the average logarithm credit use
(y-axis) and the average logarithm of housing price (x-axis) at the city-year level. Growth
rates are approximated using first differences of log values. The left-hand panel plots big
tech credit, the middle panel plots bank secured credit and the right hand panel plots bank
unsecured credit. Linear trend lines are reported in each graph, together with 95% degree
confidence bands. Standard errors in brackets.

Source: Gambacorta et al (2020).

• Reducing search and switching costs for consumers. Advances in connectivity and online
search mean finding and using a financial services provider in the next state or province – or
across the globe – can be as easy as finding one in the same city. On the consumer side, the
marginal cost of using multiple financial service providers is also reduced. Technologies
have become increasingly plugand-play, from the advent of common internet
communications protocols and mark-up languages, to “open banking” and standardized APIs
that facilitate data access and exchange. Increased access to information about remote
providers and their products and prices reduces search costs for users. The reduction in
search and switching costs thus applies both to providers and individual customers. For
example, a customer can now choose a start-up remittance service provider offering lower
fees and ready connectivity to the customer’s bank account, or an established social media
company that already has the customer’s trust and connectivity to friends and family to
whom remittances are sent. Reduced search costs could eventually enable those who need
finance to connect directly to those with excess funds to invest, with smart loan contracts
replacing the monitoring provided by intermediaries. Lower search, on-boarding, and
switching costs could make markets more competitive.
Despite reduced costs, increased efficiency, and all the new data and computing power
available, fintech remains subject to the same risks traditionally present in finance. Credit,
liquidity, market, and operational risks can be reduced or transferred, but not eliminated
completely. Market failures can result in financial instability, speculative bubbles, domino
effects and, potentially, systemic risks (Frost 2020). In most markets digital finance has not
reached levels at which it presents systemic risk, but as fintech and big tech finance grow,
and traditional banks use similar technologies to a greater degree, that will shift. P2P lending
in China reached significant volumes before the regulatory crackdown began in 2017. This
culminated in the November 2019 requirement that all platforms close or convert to
regulated small loan providers within two years. P2P lending in China and the more recent
Wirecard failure in Germany offer lessons on the need for appropriate regulation and
supervision of fintech. Big tech firms may already have reached the level of systemic
importance (too-big-to-fail) in some economies, notably in China. Authorities are actively
formulating appropriate regulatory responses to these risks (see Section 4).
The digital transformation of finance also introduces – or heightens – cyber risks.
Cybersecurity is an issue for all sectors and for traditional financial services providers as
well as fintechs and big techs. The attack surface is broadening, however, as
interconnectivity increases and the disaggregation of services introduces more links to each
product chain and user interface. These factors can also increase operational risks as a
greater number of distinct entities may be involved in the provision of a single product or
service, creating complex webs of operational dependency. These risks may have increased
further during the COVID-19 pandemic (Aldasoro et al 2021). At the same time, certain core
services have become more concentrated (eg provision of cloud services), creating the
potential that single points of failure could result in systemic disruption.
Finally, there are new risks to privacy and consumer protection. The proliferation of
providers and tailored services, reaching new customers and embedding financial products
into other activities, increase the risks of compromising privacy, abusive practices or errors
by unaware consumers. Consumer protection and regulation of risks arising from fintech and
digital transformation are addressed in other papers in the forthcoming Future of Finance
series.
 Consequences for financial services firms
The financial services value chain consists of four broad components: customer interface,
back-office functions, infrastructure, and balance sheet. The operations that ‘manufacture’
financial services involve the first three of these. The theory of the firm in economics
highlights transactions costs as a key determinant of whether a given process or interaction
will be mediated through the market or within a firm (Coase 1937; Williamson 1971). Prior
to the advent of fintech, the combination of transactions costs and economies of scale and
scope resulted in large financial intermediaries that tended to be vertically and horizontally
integrated, providing all four components (and multitudes of subcomponents) internally.
i. Customer interface. This consists of physical networks such as branches, ATMs, and points-
of-sale to distribute core financial products and services. In the past, customers needed to be
physically present to conduct activities such as opening an account, buying a product,
making a transaction, and getting advice. In many cases, these activities were paper-based
and cumbersome. Although the advent of the internet gave rise to online and mobile
banking, these were again owned and operated by a particular financial institution. As a
result, financial institutions largely remained as gatekeepers to the consumer with a basic
bank account being the pre-condition to participate in the economy and acquire additional
financial services. As a result, financial institutions were also able to tap into a highly
regulated, but sticky and cheap source of funding: retail deposits.
ii. Back and middle office. This consists of all the departments, processes, and internal systems
to operate the bank’s products and balance sheets. These functions include risk management,
regulatory compliance, credit decisions, fraud detection, call centres, trade reconciliation,
technology operations, and record keeping. Prior to the advent of fintech, these processes
involved manual and paper-based intervention and required cross-departmental coordination.
Organizational complexity and siloed legacy IT systems further increased transaction costs,
left customer data unexploited, impeded the ability to innovate, and degraded customer
experiences.
iii. Infrastructure. This connects individual financial sector participants (including the central
bank) to collectively comprise the financial system. This includes payment and settlement
systems (retail and wholesale) as well as other financial infrastructures such as credit
information bureaus and arrangements that facilitate transactions across cross-borders. Many
of these infrastructures still face inefficiencies due to, for example, limited operating hours
and interoperability constraints. Further, until recently, non-banks typically could not access
these infrastructures directly and were therefore reliant on banks.
iv. Balance sheet. Deploying customer deposits (or other sources of funds) into productive loans
(and other uses of funds) through balance sheet intermediation is one of the oldest functions
in finance. A modern balance sheet serves more complex functions and is optimized to
attract a mix of retail and wholesale funds, to match assets and liabilities across multiple
dimensions (tenor, currency, etc.) and to maintain adequate capital and liquidity levels.
Balance sheets of regulated financial institutions are subject to a variety of requirements and
constraints. Certain types of financial institutions – eg payment service providers, mutual
fund managers, and more recently P2P or marketplace lenders – do not create customer
liabilities and assets on their own balance sheets. Nevertheless, balance sheet finance
remains dominant in most EMDEs. Even in advanced economies, assets that are ultimately
funded through capital markets are often originated on-balance sheet before being
securitized or sold to a ‘shadow bank.’
As technology has reduced transaction costs, the boundaries of the firm have changed
and the production chain for financial services could be more disaggregated (vertical
disintegration). This has been taking place for decades; an example is the use of third-party
ATM and card networks to process banking withdrawals or payments transactions. First, the
ATM moved the transaction outside the bank branch. Then, connectivity and information
transfer technologies enabled different companies to provide elements of the transaction
value chain – an issuing bank, a merchant processor operating a POS terminal, and a
network operator. As a result, the customer-facing bank could focus on its core competencies
and customers. With advances in technology, this process has accelerated. There is an
increasing array of products and services that can be sourced from multiple different
providers, combined, and offered to the customer as an integrated whole. The customer-
facing provider might incorporate features and functions from external vendors, outsourcing
providers, or partners. Examples include using third-party sales agents or internet
marketplace originators, external credit scoring services, outsourced card issuer processing,
and white-label integration of fintech services.
Advances in information and connectivity have also led to an unbundling of financial
services consumption (horizontal disintegration). Customers now have more information
about different providers and an increased ability to interact across providers, so they can
choose different providers for the different financial products they use. Similarly, providers
have more access to information about new or potential customers, can market to them
better, and can offer services directly. The availability of data also makes it easier for
providers to underwrite a customer without having had a prior relationship, so the inherent
competitive advantage of a single provider in offering additional products is diminished.
Services that were once consumed from one financial institution can be offered by a wide
range of specialized firms. Examples in both personal and business banking underscore this
unbundling (Graph 5). However, even as the consumer’s need for a horizontally integrated
provider has been reduced, providers can now integrate more products from different
providers. The outcome in terms of horizontal disintegration depends on individual
preferences, views on convenience, and costs to search and assemble product sets. All of
these are affected by changing access modes, eg from branch to internet, agent, or mobile
app.
 Specialist providers challenging the services of large banks Graph 5
Unbundling of personal banking Unbundling of business banking

Source: World Bank; authors’ elaboration after Barrett (2018).

Consumer interfaces are changing from physical branches to convenient digital access
from anywhere. Digital consumer interfaces (eg web, mobile) enable new players to directly
reach consumers both near and far. By using apps from different competitors, consumers can
build their own complete bank and gain more personalized services. This has likely reduced
the value of legacy physical networks and the incumbent’s grip on the customer, who can
easily shift funds to different providers to access preferred services (Shevlin 2019). For
example, the innovation of mobile money was a network-based account ledger provided by
non-bank players and mobile network operators, leveraging already-ubiquitous mobile
network connectivity infrastructure. This was combined with a new ecosystem of low-cost
agents for the customer interface, and a high degree of automation to eliminate most back-
office processes. Mobile money ecosystems deliver low value/high volume transactions cost
effectively, making this a viable offering for low income inclusive finance segments.
Similarly, fintech payment aggregators (eg Square and Stripe) offer convenient payment
services to merchants without the need for them to set up a merchant account with a
processing bank. The aggregators act as the ‘merchant of record’ taking responsibility for
compliance vis-à-vis network and bank requirements. A related development is that the
customer interface could be with institutions outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the
customer. On the internet, it does not matter to the consumer if the provider is in Kansas or
Kathmandu (although it may matter to the regulator!) Services have adapted accordingly.
Non-financial companies can also leverage customer connectivity and data to offer
financial services, altering the competitive landscape and blurring industry boundaries. As
mobile applications and the internet have become a dominant way through which consumers
live their lives and businesses operate, e-commerce, telecom, online search,
logistics/transportation, and social media platforms have become the new gatekeepers to the
customer. Digital platforms and big techs in particular are well placed to directly tap into
their vast customer networks and data (BIS 2019). They are able to offer contextually
relevant financial services to their user bases to enhance the customer’s experience or
increase sales of their core product. For example, e-commerce, ride-hailing, and social
media platforms have integrated seamless payment services to strengthen the value
proposition in their core markets. Micro-insurance has been embedded into mobile money
and the sale of consumer products. Users do not desire most financial services in and of
themselves, but see them as a means to another activity (eg pay a driver to reach a
destination, take out a working capital loan to obtain inventory). As such, embedding the
financial service directly into that core activity can be attractive to the customer. It can even
make the customer more aware of services about which they otherwise might not have
known, or to which they might not have had access. Banks have used customer relationships
to cross-sell financial services since the beginning of banking; now an increasing range of
non-bank actors are doing the same thing.
The back and middle office are being revamped – or eliminated entirely. Technology has
reduced the costs of, and need for, much of the traditional backoffice infrastructure, from
paper processing to data centres. The back office is being revamped to lower costs and
improve communication. Process automation and upgrades to software and IT systems are
causing a restructuring of financial institutions and a reduction of full-time employees.
Middle-office functions such as reconciliations are increasingly unnecessary. Entire
processes, and many of the skills that previously had to be hired, can be replaced with
automation or expert systems. This has also given room for third parties to step in, such as
cloud service providers and fintechs with specialized capabilities that sell their software-as-
a-service (SaaS) to banks (eg data processing, credit scoring, electronic know-your-customer
(e-KYC)). For example, a bank can work with a credit-scoring company that leverages
unique data and scoring expertise to provide a seamless customer experience.
Unencumbered by legacy systems, some new entrants have built new software platforms
to handle their core banking activities, while others rent. Cloud-based infrastructure and
BaaS providers allow smaller banks to outsource technology operations and leverage the
latest systems to compete alongside larger banks. They enable small start-ups to purchase
not only data processing and storage capacity, but also entry points into regulated
infrastructure and regulatory compliance. Thus, smaller players can grow capacity in tandem
with their customer base, without the initial setup costs and step function cost curves
previously required.
Technology has also accelerated the internationalization of back-office functions. For
several decades there has been a trend of offshoring back-office functions. Many financial
firms first shifted call centres and customer service to lower-cost environments; they later
shifted application processing and IT operations. This trend is accelerated by the advent of
cloud computing. Entire IT systems, including core banking systems, can now be hosted
anywhere in the world. In regions with common regulatory frameworks, even the entire
provision of some products and services could be outside the boundaries of the customer’s
country. For example, a digital bank domiciled in Lithuania can bundle products and
services from elsewhere in the European Union (EU) and offer them to customers over the
entire EU. On the other hand, in jurisdictions where the use of cloud-based infrastructure
and/or overseas data processing and storage have been restricted (due to data localization or
other policies), efficiencies and entry may be limited. This is particularly true if the market is
too small to support its own localized infrastructure. The shift of back-office functions – and
associated processes and customer data – to other jurisdictions can raise a new set of
supervisory challenges.
Supporting infrastructures are changing. Much of the traditional infrastructure, which
was both a cost and source of competitive advantage for incumbents, can be reduced or
replaced, or must be shared. Digital identity (ID) and know your customer (KYC) registries
are implemented in many countries and can help redefine the onboarding and authentication
process that has long required in-person verification at a branch (D’Silva et al 2019). New
infrastructures such as API platforms for payments or lending, and distributed ledger
systems that can support crypto-assets or stablecoins, could produce large network effects
and change the role of, or even disintermediate, certain players (Arner et al 2020). Open
banking initiatives require banks to share customer data with fintechs. In some jurisdictions
banks must initiate transactions introduced by fintechs upon customer request, further
eroding the traditional incumbent-customer relationship. At the same time, public payment
system innovations have allowed access to non-banks. On the one hand, open banking APIs
enable non-banks to offer payment initiation services, without them having to participate in
any of the payment systems themselves. On the other hand central banks are requiring
transparent and risk-based access criteria for payment and settlement systems, replacing
earlier restrictions of access to only banks.
 Implications for the industrial organization of the financial sector

1.1 Implications for market entry

Digital innovation has reduced cost barriers, allowing new and smaller players to enter. The
elimination of many fixed costs and a reduction in variable and switching costs makes it
possible for low-cost providers to enter the market, subject to local regulation. Although a
trusted reputation must still be developed, small providers are more likely than in the past to
be economically viable. Such new providers may strip away particular customer segments
and revenue bases from traditional providers, or broaden access to finance for previously
underserved segments, without needing to achieve large scale and scope. Apps and cloud-
based computing and software platforms have enabled entrepreneurs to quickly bootstrap
without the need to raise huge amounts of capital to finance massive upfront investments.
APIs and open banking initiatives have the potential to further accelerate this trend, since a
new service need not wrench the customer completely away from the incumbent, and can
therefore build trust by layering a service on top of the safety net provided by legacy
institutions.
Infrastructure connectivity and a reduced need for physical branches allow established
companies from other sectors to offer financial services as well. These entrants can deploy
automated processes in lieu of hiring a specialized workforce, connect to the financial
transactions infrastructure, and leverage cloud-based infrastructures to reduce the cost of
cross-market entry. For many of these new providers, such as digital platform companies and
some telecoms, consumer trust and a customer base are already established in their core
markets and potentially transferable to the financial sector (Oliver Wyman 2019). Some are
able to combine financial services with other products or core capabilities as part of a
platform offering. This is particularly relevant in EMDEs where the financial system is less
developed and access to financial services is more limited. This affords fintechs and big
techs more room to expand their financial activities and compete with incumbents (FSB
2020).
Entry into financial services is accelerated by the ability to turn regulatory compliance
into a technology integration process. Several banks have built BaaS platforms to serve
fintechs and even other banks. They can connect these clients to the payment system or a
bank balance sheet, thus reducing the need to deal with the complexities of licensing,
regulation, and developing their own core banking systems. Leveraging BaaS, new entrants
can tap into existing – and already regulated – financial transactions and balance sheet
providers. Where open banking is in force, they can also leverage the data, and sometimes
functionality, of existing financial accounts. This allows a wider range of use cases into
which finance can be embedded; in particular, a range of commercial platforms or
transactional situations can layer on a financial service from a BaaS provider without much
of the systems and compliance overhead previously required. While increasing competition,
this multi-faceted and multi-tiered access to the regulated banking sector introduces new
challenges for regulators and supervisors, as discussed below.
1.2 Shifting economies of scale and scope

However, basic economic forces remain relevant. Economies of scale and scope remain,
even as the minimum efficient scale for service delivery is lower for the individual user and
for most financial services providers. That has been accomplished in part by shifting the
scale effects to the infrastructure providers; scale remains highly relevant in areas of cloud
computing and data processing and software platforms. In fact, new forms of scale have
emerged in connectivity and computing, along with previously present economies of scale in
capital, including reputation, or ”trust capital.”
In the digital finance era, economic frictions have not disappeared, but take on new
forms. The costs of services have been reduced in many cases, but certainly not eliminated.
Financial services providers, particularly new non-bank providers, face two important costs
in the unbundled marketplace:

• Customer acquisition costs. Customer acquisition costs, comprising marketing, onboarding,

KYC, and initial credit assessment, remain significant relative to revenues, especially for
retail financial services. This is partly due to regulatory requirements, but marketing and
other onboarding costs remain pertinent even when remote interactions are possible (eg
leveraging e-KYC). While technology has made it easy to directly reach users digitally, the
cost to acquire new customers remains high because of user inertia, which is particularly
present in retail and SME business lines. Customer acquisition costs are also significant for
wholesale customers, as systems integration and business process changes may be
cumbersome, and initial credit assessment is more complex. Amortizing these and other
fixed costs across more customers and products allows for economies of scale and scope.
This naturally puts larger incumbents and big techs at an advantage.

• Funding costs. As noted above, some products have natural complementarities that reduce
the cost of providing one or the other product if offered in tandem. Most clearly, offering
loans is more economical if there is a cheap source of funding in the form of deposits. There
are other complementarities in derivatives, stock lending, insurance, etc. Size, and the
diversification it brings, can provide a funding advantage due to lower risk, and greater
liquidity of traded funding instruments (bonds, shares) issued at scale. In general, big tech
firms have a higher overall cost of funding than global systemically important financial
institutions (G-SIFIs) because they use more equity and have no deposits. However, when
analysing similar funding components (ie bonds) big techs tend to have a lower cost at
issuance (Graph 6).
 Average spread of active bonds to benchmark government bonds at issuance

The dashed horizontal lines indicate the simple average.

Average spread of active bonds over the respective benchmark government bond at issuance
as collected by the Bloomberg SRCH function. Terminal accessed on 3 Sep 2020. Filters
used: Corporates, Active Bonds, Issue Date >01/01/2013 and Issuer Name as listed in the
graph.
Sources: Cornelli et al (2020b); Bloomberg.

Consumers and other users also experience frictions in the unbundled financial services
marketplace. As consumers balance choice and convenience, they may favour firms offering
broader scope:

• Assembly costs. Simplicity and convenience have significant value, often resulting in
preferences for a single provider that offers an integrated suite of financial products and
services, even if each individual product may be less convenient or well-designed, or
marginally more expensive, than those of alternative niche providers. For many consumers,
there is a cost to the time, effort, and potential confusion of assembling fragmented services
from unbundled providers and moving funds between them. Thus, most savers still use
intermediaries or platforms to deploy their savings instead of searching out individual
borrowers. Similarly, “contextualized finance” embeds the financial service into the actual
economic activity the customer is seeking to perform (eg pay for a trip on a hail riding
platform, take out a loan on an e-commerce platform). This can provide the service that is
needed exactly when it is needed. Where the customer is already using a platform provider
or big tech, onboarding costs are reduced, and convenience for the user creates economies of
scope for the provider. The rise of “super apps” such as WeChat, AliPay, Yandex, and Grab,
 and contenders such as Rappi and Revolut which add multiple services, is testament to the
value consumers place on being able to go to a single source for multiple services.

• Switching costs. For consumers, business users and financial services providers considering a
change of vendor, there are barriers in the form of effort, inertia, inconvenience, and the
difficulty of disentangling a service that has been linked
to multiple activities and systems. Switching costs can also result from intentional technical
design. Consumers may flock to digital platforms with large customer bases to benefit from
network effects. Yet once they become large, platforms may seek to increase switching costs.
If a service has been integrated into multiple activities or workflows, or has accumulated
significant user data, it may also able to provide better or more tailored services that a new
provider would not be able to match. Where proprietary protocols are in place, or historical
data are difficult to share, connectivity across different providers might be hindered.

1.3 Impact on financial services providers

Reduced economic frictions, the ability to reconfigure the value chain, new opportunities for
entry, and shifting economies of scale and scope will affect different financial services
providers differently. The impact will depend on their current market positions and ability to
leverage technology. Incumbents start with advantages in trust capital and regulatory
position. Fintechs are proving nimble at leveraging data, connectivity, and improved
processing capacity, and at converting regulatory barriers into solvable technology
challenges. Big techs compound the advantages of fintechs with large scale existing
customer bases for non-financial business lines, associated customer data, and high levels of
brand trust (Stulz 2020; OECD 2020). 5 Individuals play a limited role as financial service
providers today, interacting largely via intermediaries. In a future of increased connectivity
and decentralized finance, individuals may be further empowered as direct providers of
financial services.

Incumbents
Although there is increasing competition, the continued relevance of basic economic forces
enables incumbent financial institutions with integrated product offerings to maintain – at
least for now – significant market share. Incumbents have an advantage in having already
overcome some of the information asymmetries that form a barrier to trust: they are
regulated and have been in the market and demonstrated their reliability over time. Multi-
product incumbents ameliorate customer switching and assembly costs. Incumbents benefit
from economies of scale in financial capital, and the diversification benefits inherent in
larger scale and broader scope. Incumbents also have economies of scale in customer data,
which they are beginning to better leverage, and customers often have higher trust in
incumbents to safeguard their data (Armantier et al 2021).
Unbundling could reduce the cross-subsidies that are inherent in the integrated banking
model. Free use of a current account is often funded by the use of the balances to lend to
other customers, or by the value created in providing other products to the account holder.
5
While product tying is often considered an anticompetitive practice, in most markets
traditional banking products have explicit exemption from anti-tying rules (see, eg OCC
1995). Disaggregation can disrupt this business model, potentially stripping away the more
profitable products and services that have stand-alone profitability (eg remittances), and
leaving traditional providers with an embedded cost base and products with low margins or
that the market expects to get for free. Open banking regulations that require banks to offer
access to their customers’ accounts could accelerate this process.
Incumbents are innovating and upgrading across each component of the value chain.
Indeed, a recent World Bank survey finds that digital transformation is a strategic priority for
the overwhelming majority of incumbents. They aim to shed overhead costs and employees,
improve products, and compete for the consumer relationship (Feyen et al 2021). Many
expect further growth in digital customer interactions and transactions, which will intensify
competition. The largest institutions can leverage their scale, customer base, regulatory
expertise, and capacity to update their technology stacks and manage large balance sheets in
order to effectively compete with big tech entrants. Smaller institutions can take advantage
of ondemand infrastructure and external service providers to undertake a rapid and less
costly digital transformation. Incumbents that are not able to adapt in time may perish or be
acquired.
Some incumbents have built distribution platforms to enrich their own product offering
by allowing fintechs to offer their products directly to the incumbent’s users. In essence,
these incumbents have become marketplaces and leverage network effects. 6 Innovations in
infrastructure such as APIs can facilitate these partnerships, which benefit from both the
fintechs’ need to achieve scale, and banks’ continued centrality in the financial services
relationship for many customers. As long as customers remain tethered to bank accounts
directly or through fintechs, banks can continue to benefit from their own economies of
scale in capital, connectivity, and high-fidelity consumer financial data.
Banks continue to have deep expertise in regulation and compliance and have already
passed key regulatory hurdles ahead of new entrants. Many fintechs and big techs offer their
financial services in close direct or indirect collaboration with banks to access the regulated
financial system at the back office or infrastructure layers. B2B fintechs and big techs offer
their services to incumbents in the form of partnerships or SaaS engagements. This is also
the main level where banks engage with big techs to procure state-of-the-art cloud
computing and data processing services which require deep expertise and economies of
scale. Business-to-consumer (B2C) fintechs and big techs that compete directly at the
customer interface level often still rely on banks themselves to store value (eg the so-called
float, or deposited funds, of mobile money operators). They also use banks to access the
payment system, or use other core banking system functions that are difficult to build in-
house (eg by using BaaS). Moreover, depending on the regulatory environment and the
business model choices fintechs make, their customers often need to have an account with a
financial institution to use the fintechs’ services, driving continued demand for at least some
incumbents’ services.

6
 Incumbents also have a comparative advantage in managing complex, large balance
sheets and navigating compliance with evolving regulations. This is critical since finance is
one of the most highly regulated sectors. As such, many fintechs and big techs may be
reluctant to become full-fledged regulated financial institutions, which can be a slow, costly,
and uncertain process. However, regtech solutions could erode part of this comparative
advantage of incumbents (Auer 2019). As another example, lending platforms also rely on
incumbents and institutional investors to purchase the loans originated on the platform.
The main challenge for incumbents is that they are encumbered by legacy systems,
networks, and cultures; not all will be able to adapt and survive. Legacy, fixed-cost
infrastructure cannot be easily scaled back at the same rate as it becomes obsolete. Financial
institutions (and regulators) are also mindful of the need to maintain minimum services for
non-digitized customer segments, especially in more remote locations where alternatives are
limited. Incumbents bear regulatory and compliance requirements that may not apply to new
competitors or that can be evaded via regulatory arbitrage. Incumbents may also have
service obligations not imposed on fintech or big tech players. These regulatory and social
obligations can present competitive disadvantages if steps are not taken to level the playing
field.

Fintechs
After driving the unbundling of financial services, many fintechs have begun to rebundle.
Fintechs have been adding new products to their offerings, by themselves or via partnerships
and platform approaches. This allows them to cross-sell to existing customers and make
themselves more attractive to new ones. Some examples are shown in Graph 7. For some,
this has been the result of opportunities to provide a better customer experience and increase
revenue. For others, it has been a matter of necessity. Since scale and scope economies still
matter, fintechs that focused on a limited range of products may not be able to achieve
funding synergies or amortize customer acquisition costs, regulatory compliance costs, and
investments in brand recognition across a sufficiently large revenue base to be able to
generate profits or fully compete on price with incumbents. It will be interesting to observe
how these newly re-bundled product sets evolve. Newer companies building up a set of
services for a particular customer base in today’s environment, leveraging high quality-data
on market needs and customer profitability, will doubtless arrive at a different product set
than was developed by universal banks through agglomeration of products over a long
period, from the 18th to the 20th centuries.
New entrants initially stayed away from financial activities that carry large licensing,
capital and regulatory burdens. Most new players focused on activities such as payments,
cards and financial advice, and avoided highly regulated, capital intensive activities such as
on-balance sheet lending and securities underwriting. Indeed, the rapid rise of fintechs was
facilitated in many markets by regulatory gaps that allowed new service providers to enter
and operate with minimal regulatory burden. As regulators caught up, fintech strategies
shifted; in some markets they were forced to seek licenses.
Some fintechs have chosen a regulated status as part of their evolving product strategies.
For example, alternative finance platforms initially focused on matching supply and demand
of capital, avoiding the regulatory burden of intermediation. However, in the process of re-
bundling, some fintechs have sought full banking licenses. In particular, lending platforms
have faced challenges to fund their operations in wholesale markets or using a pure P2P
funding model. As a result, they have become more reliant on incumbents for funding, or
have sought their own banking licenses. For example, Grab and SoFi have sought banking
licenses, while GoJek and MoneyTap partner with banks (the latter also has a non-bank
financial company license). Other fintechs prefer to avoid a higher regulatory burden by
expanding across borders to reach scale with their existing product offering. The COVID-19
pandemic and resulting economic dislocations have exacerbated the challenges of relying on
crowdfunding, capital markets, or bank partners for balance sheet capacity. As a result, two
prominent early fintech lenders, OnDeck and Kabbage, were sold to other companies in July
and August 2020.

Fintech product offerings have expanded over time Graph 7

Big techs
Basic economic forces such as scale and scope economies, along with network effects, also
play to the fundamental strengths of big tech companies. Big techs already enjoy an active
customer base, creating economies of scale and scope and network effects in their core
markets; they are increasingly able to leverage these to exert market power in the financial
sector (BIS 2019; Frost et al 2019). Agility in systems development and creating easy-to-use
customer interfaces are relative strengths of tech companies compared to traditional
financial institutions, and big techs’ access to customer data and understanding of customer
behaviours may equal or exceed those of financial institutions. Big techs can bundle
financial services to reinforce the value proposition of the ecosystem in their core markets,
such as e-commerce and social media, or offer financial services as a new product line cross-
sold to the existing customer base. This phenomenon is manifest in developed and emerging
markets, often led by the latter. Alibaba was a leader in layering payments onto e-commerce
with AliPay. It then developed a broad range of financial services. (By contrast, eBay’s
integration of the original incarnation of PayPal did not go as far). Marketplaces from
Amazon to Gojek, Grab, Jumia, Lazada, and Mercado Libre are integrating merchant loans
into their offerings. Because financial services are layered over other cash generating
activities, these companies can subsidize the financial services. For instance, WeChat Pay,
WhatsApp Pay and other providers allow users to send money to each other for free –
though fees may be higher for merchants and business users. In some cases, the value a big
tech can generate from customer data by driving traffic to its core business may be higher
than the financial service fee income.
Big techs have already amassed vast troves of relevant alternative customer data which
traditional financial institutions lack. Combined with their ability to process these data for
insights, this has enabled big techs to offer tailored financial services such as insurance or
working capital loans to merchants on their platforms who traditionally lack collateral or
strong credit histories. This has uprooted the notion of traditional “relationship banking” in
which banks have superior proprietary hard and soft information about their clients thus
keeping them captive. Big techs also often choose to partner with incumbent financial
institutions to offer these services so they can focus on their core markets. Regardless,
bundling of services sets in motion a feedback loop, ie the data-network-activities (DNA)
loop (see Box B) where big tech ecosystems become more valuable to users. This begets
new users, higher user engagement, and more user data. This in turn boosts network effects
and economies of scale and scope, which enable big techs to increase the value of their
ecosystems.
Big techs can leverage unique market power in providing contextual finance – the
bundling of financial services with core activities. In addition to the data-networkactivity
feedback loop described above, “contextualized finance” may result in improved operational
efficiency and portfolio performance relative to traditional financial institutions. A ride
hailing service that is financing the driver’s automobile can monitor usage, maintenance
patterns, and cash flows. A distribution platform offering working capital credit to retailers
purchasing inventory could cut off the supply of goods if the retailer is late in repaying;
similarly, an e-commerce platform providing logistics and financing to merchants could
seize inventory. Given network effects and high switching costs, big techs could enforce
loan repayments by the simple threat of a downgrade or exclusion from their ecosystem in
case of default. Their position as customer gatekeepers in their core businesses helps
establish roles as gatekeepers and potentially enforcers for financial services, as well.
Although research has shown that fintech and big tech credit tends to complement, rather
than replace, other forms of credit (see Box B), some big techs have explored becoming a
full-fledged deposit-taking financial institution. Big techs active in EMDEs, with lower
levels of financial development and inclusion and more permissive regulatory environments,
have had more scope to venture on this path. Other jurisdictions impose limits to the span of
activities of regulated financial institutions, with the result that big techs have not taken on a
regulatory status that might restrict their ability to continue their other activities.
Box B

The data-network-activity feedback loop may explain the rapid growth of big tech credit
The data-network-activity (DNA) feedback loop helps big tech firms to correctly predict
clients’ creditworthiness, future income and individual demands (BIS 2019). As a result, big
techs can have a competitive advantage over banks and serve firms and households that
otherwise would remain unbanked. Recent work suggests that big techs’ credit scoring
applied to small vendors outperforms models based on credit bureau ratings and traditional
borrower characteristics (Frost et al 2019; Gambacorta et al 2019). All this could represent a
significant advance in financial inclusion and help improve firms’ performance (see Luohan
Academy, 2018).
 Cornelli et al (2020a) find that in 2019, fintech and big tech credit (together “total
alternative credit”) reached nearly USD 800 bn globally (see Figure B1). Big tech credit has
shown particularly rapid growth in Asia (China, Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia), and some
countries in Africa and Latin America. By contrast, fintech credit volumes have declined in
2018-19 due to market and regulatory developments in China. Outside China, fintech credit
is still growing. These alternative forms of credit are more developed in countries with
higher GDP per capita (at a declining rate), where banking sector mark-ups are higher and
where banking regulation is less stringent. Fintech credit is also more developed where there
are fewer bank branches per capita. Moreover, these alternative forms of credit are more
developed where the ease of doing business is higher, investor protection disclosure and the
efficiency of the judicial system are higher, the bank credit to deposit ratio is lower, and
where bond and equity markets are more developed. Overall, both fintech and big tech credit
seems to complement other forms of credit, not to substitute for them, and may increase
overall credit access.

Global big tech credit is booming, overtaking fintech credit Graph B1

Big tech credit is overtaking fintech credit1 These alternative forms of lending are becoming
a significant portion of total credit in a few economies
USD bn USD mn, logarithmic scale
Per cent

750 100,000 2.5

600 10,000 2.0

450 1,000 1.5

300 100 1.0

150
10 0.5
0
1 0.0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 CNUS JP KRGB ID NLRUKE
DE
Lending volume:Fintech Big tech 2 3

Lending volume (lhs): Ratio to total stock

of credit (rhs):
Fintech Total alternative credit
Big tech
1
2019 fintech lending volume figures are estimated on AU, CN, EU, GB, NZ and US. 2
Data for 2019. 3 Domestic credit provided by the financial sector. Data for 2018. 4 Total
alternative credit is defined as the sum of fintech and big tech credit.

Individuals as financial services providers

Technology will enable individuals to move beyond providing finance via intermediaries.
Today, individual savers provide the deposits that banks use to lend, and equity capital via
investment and pension funds. There is the occasional direct family loan, or high net worth
angel investor providing direct finance. Technology could allow this to be much more
pervasive. P2P was an initial step in that direction.
Reduction of the frictions that give rise to intermediation raises the prospect of radical
disintermediation such that individuals become financial services providers directly. The
core of financial services is the transfer of resources between individuals directly and over
time. New technologies could decentralize decision-making, risktaking and record keeping
(FSB 2019a). Distributed ledger technologies (DLT) have already demonstrated the potential
for transfers of value without intermediaries. P2P lending was designed as a way to directly
transfer resources and risk, with limited centralized matching services by the P2P platform.
Technology obviates the need for a bank balance sheet by synthesizing a set of contributing
liabilities against each asset (loan) as it is originated. Even these platforms could be
eliminated. Drastic reductions in search costs could allow individuals at the retail level to
connect directly to borrowers. Publicly available data and analytics applications could be
applied to investments decisions and portfolio construction at the individual level, as robo-
advisors are already doing. Smart contracts could automate monitoring and collection
processes and reduce the coordination costs for a borrower working with multiple small
lenders.
To date, consumers have not broadly embraced the role of direct payments provider in
decentralized models. DLT-based alternative payments via cryptocurrencies are growing but
the main use of cryptocurrencies has been speculation rather than payments. Most
individuals using crypto-currency still prefer to go through crypto-currency wallet providers
or exchanges. While decentralized finance (“DeFi”) and decentralized apps (“DApps”) are
growing, these are still a niche market (Schär 2021). Other venues that might have fostered
direct peer-to-peer exchange such as social media platforms and messaging apps have either
offered payments intermediation themselves or linked to banks.
Similarly, individuals have been reluctant to act as direct lenders assuming full
responsibility for credit screening and lending decisions. P2P marketplaces initially offered
savers the ability to choose individual borrowers. The option for microassembly of loan
portfolios is not much used, however; most consumers chose to let the platforms
algorithmically allocate their funds. Behaviour on equity crowdfunding platforms is
somewhat different, though increasingly these platforms are also offering diversified fund
structures to consumers who would prefer not to individually vet investments. OurCrowd,
 for example, began with a direct individual selection model but now operates a full menu of
funds to allow investors to programmatically deploy and diversify.
The direction of technology and developments in decentralized finance, however,
suggests that these trends bear monitoring. While savings and investment activities still bear
a high cost of assembly, part of the promise of technology is the empowerment of
individuals. Technology is reducing the need for intermediaries. Unintermediated finance
would render any individual with surplus funds a financial services provider. While the
emergence of individuals as direct providers of financial services is nascent at present, it
cannot be discounted as a potential influence on market structure in the future.
1.4 Impact on sector composition, competition, concentration

The diversity of the financial sector has increased in both developed and emerging markets.
Alongside incumbents, there are many different types and sizes of fintechs and big techs,
offering a wide range of financial services. Some remain focused on a single product or
service, while others have leveraged their initial successes to broaden their service offerings
(eg Square and PayPal moving from payments to lending). Some fintechs are converting to
banks, while others have become service providers to, or value chain partners with banks.
Depending on licensing approaches in different jurisdictions, a range of digital-only or
digital-mainly neo-banks emerged. They compete largely in the same regulatory space as
incumbents, but with modernized business models and streamlined infrastructure. Big techs
with core markets ranging from telecommunications to logistics, transportation, e-commerce
marketplaces, and online search add another set of diverse players to the industry.
Incumbents are also adopting new technology, partnering with fintechs, setting up new
digital units and otherwise adapting to the new environment. This hyperdiversification of
financial services has implications for competition, as well as for regulation (see section 4).
Fintechs have significantly increased competitive pressure by directly engaging with the
consumer. The battle to ‘own the customer’ will be closely fought, since in most industries
the links in the value chain closest to the customer earn the highest margins (eg European
Banking Authority (2018), OECD (2020), Petralia (2020)). Some fintechs have skilfully
targeted high-margin products or services and stripped those away from incumbents, leaving
the incumbents with a lower-margin product mix. For example, companies like Wise
(previously Transferwise) and Remitly targeted the relatively high-margin international
transfer business. However, many fintechs are struggling to compete at scale. Through re-
bundling, some digital-only banks may be able to broaden scope and compete at scale, but at
the cost of having to maintain a broader product mix in which some products or customers
will generate lower margins.
Disruption may be contained in areas where fintechs themselves relying on incumbents
for their operations. As described above, many fintechs still rely on banks to store value and
process payments, and users often originate fintech transactions from an account with a
financial institution. Products like Wise rely on existing bank or card accounts not only for
the cash-in/cash-out (CI/CO) functions, but also for a layer of KYC compliance. In some
markets, digital financial services providers have built their own infrastructure for some of
these functions (eg mobile agent networks for CI/CO). The introduction of stablecoins and
CBDCs might reduce the dependence of fintechs on incumbents, particularly for payment
services.

For fintechs that target back-office activities, the relationship with incumbents will be
collaborative. For example, B2B fintechs offer services to incumbents in the form of
partnerships or SaaS engagements. BaaS providers present a distinct competitive challenge.
These regulated banks enable a range of businesses, including fintechs, to compete more
effectively with other banks. The ability to embed a tailored payment, loan, insurance or
other financial service into any economic, business, or social activity may be the most
powerful disruptor of traditional financial services, and this is an area in which big techs
excel.
Big techs have the potential to compete at scale and become dominant players. They
already enjoy economies of scale and scope and network effects in their core markets. By
adding financial services to their ecosystems, on their own or using BaaS, they can leverage
these economies to compete with traditional providers and fintechs. They also have the clout
and deep pockets to navigate complex regulations and build parallel infrastructures and
closed-loop systems, which could solidify their role as gatekeepers to the consumer (and
their relevant data) in the financial sector. The resulting “winner-takes-all” or “winner-takes-
most” dynamics may reduce competition and contestability of the sector and trigger
monopolistic behaviour as customers become locked-in. Some big techs (eg AliPay) fortify
customer lock-in by allowing funds to flow into their systems for free but charging a fee for
withdrawals. They may tie the availability of a loan to consumption of other platform
services, or cross-subsidize financial services with revenues from their core business. This
could result in consumer benefits but destructive competition for the rest of the sector and
potentially in other sectors. While there are ways regulators can attempt to re-level the
playing field,7 the intermingling of financial and non-financial services presents a number of
challenging financial regulation and competition policy issues (see below).
Incumbents large and small are embracing digital transformation across the value chain
to compete with fintechs and big techs. Competitive pressure on traditional financial
institutions may force even those that are lagging to transform or risk erosion of their
customer base, income, and margins. In addition to partnering with fintechs, some have set
up their own digital-only banks. Where regulation permits, as in Thailand, some banks have
countered the big tech incursion into banking with bank-centric e-commerce marketplace
offerings (for example, Kasikorn Bank’s K+ market). Formerly captive local markets have
become highly contestable by international players (eg DBS entry to India via Digibank).
Local banks or those serving specific industries may still be competitive in their niche
markets, if they can manage the transition to digital delivery and maintain customer trust and
loyalty, and the other competitors don’t turn their focus to those niches.
The largest markets might be expected to receive more attention from innovators, but
small markets are affected as well. Overall, fintech adoption seems to be higher in higher-
income markets (Didier et al 2021), and these will often be more attractive for Venture

7
 Capital investment. However, some mid-size countries have been ahead of the digital
finance curve, perhaps because they had not received sufficient investment in traditional
financial services and there were more underserved segments or larger margins to capture.
Kenya’s ecosystem of digital payments, savings, and lending is a prominent example.
Innovators in small countries can leverage the cost reductions discussed above to enter
markets that may not have been viable with a higher cost structure. For some services,
however, small markets may lag in terms of home-grown innovation. Innovations centred on
data use may advance faster in larger markets that generate more data (World Bank 2021).
Emerging and smaller markets could nonetheless benefit from incumbent transformation or
geographic extension. The local incumbents can adopt new technologies to improve reach
and efficiency, and large regional telecom and ecommerce players could extend financial
services into these smaller markets. The ability to serve remotely could make a small market
part of a larger market, provided the regulatory frameworks permit.
More intense competition among a more diverse set of industry participants could result
in a range of possible market outcomes. As different institutions compete, cooperate or do
both, industry structure will evolve, depending on which combination of three forces prevail
in a given market.
1. Economies of scale and scope: where production costs remain significant relative to revenues
(or cross-subsidization is possible), and network effects and switching costs or convenience
effects are significant, we may expect consolidation into a set of large players who can
leverage scale in capital, connectivity, and data to offer a broad range of products at high
volume and low cost. This could potentially also result in displacement of incumbent
financial institutions by big tech firms, in particular in the retail banking domain. The
conditions for “natural monopolies” could result from strong scale economies combined
with low marginal costs of service provision. These are countered by the reduction in fixed
costs that allow for smaller scale entry.
2. Preferences for choice or convenience: As we have seen, alongside the economies of scale
achievable by big players, technology has enabled unbundling of products and services.
These may vary along price, quality, and service dimensions. Customer can choose a custom
mix of separate products and selfaggregate. This is more likely when customers are
extremely price-sensitive or value more tailored services, and search and switching costs are
low. Niche providers can then focus on product-market fit for a target customer base, and
that customer base can easily find the product and migrate to it. The niche providers can
thrive, taking advantage of their ability to manage infrastructure costs while reaching and
retaining their target customers wherever they may be. The unbundling effects could
dominate, with a resulting atomization of the industry. In this scenario, there would be space
for new players that enable aggregation of the services and those that provide common
services to the entire market. On the other hand, too much choice can overwhelm individuals
and undermine the benefits that choice can provide (Schwartz, 2005). Search and switching
costs may reduce the convenience of self-aggregation. Customers may then prefer banks or
platforms that integrate services for them, even if they end up paying more or accepting
inferior service for one or more products.
3. Regulation: The above two forces will not play out independently from the actions of
financial services and competition regulators, who will continue to shape outcomes with a
variety of policy instruments.
Given the diversity of providers and consumers, the corner solutions of large multi-
product players and small focused players may co-exist. As shown in Graph 8, the tendency
of providers to seek scale (leverage scale, scope, and network economies) alongside
consumer preferences for choice could result in four potential configurations, of which two
appear to be dominant outcomes. A small player (left bottom corner) attempting to provide a
broad range of products will find it difficult to deliver fully across that product range, and
will be pressured to either merge with others to grow large (left upper corner) or to focus on
niche services (right lower corner). A large company with an initially narrow scope (right
upper corner) will find that its size enables it to broaden, and will tend to add products (left
upper corner). For instance, a payments firm may choose to add lending or insurance
services, while an international money services provider may start offering checking
accounts.

Corner solutions of scale vs. atomization Graph 8

Degree of
Scale, Scope
Large Large
and Network
Multi-Product Narrow Scope
Economies
Size enables broader
(advantages product scope;
to size) tendency to shift left

Small Small
Multi-Product Narrow Scope
Difficult for small player
to deliver across range
of products: grow or
focus

Degree of Choice Preference

(customer tendency to unbundle)

Source: authors’ elaborations.

Thus the financial services market may coalesce around one set of providers adopting
large/multi-product strategies, and another set offering focused products and services. This
might be termed a “barbell” distribution, with a small set of large multi-product players on
one side, and a large set of small niche service players on the other. 11 While this market
structure reflects in part the “winner-takes-all” or “winner-takes-most” character of some
tech-driven markets, the impact of friction and cost-reducing innovation in finance leaves
the door open for smaller players to thrive. If regulation permits, this may mean continued
market fluidity from new entrants and cross-overs from one sub-sector to another.
 The large, multi-product players could include traditional players, fintechs and big techs
– ie both incumbents and new entrants (Graph 9). These may include banks that master the
digital transformation, along with new financial services entrants that achieve scale, and big
techs or other firms that have customer data and can link to BaaS. A recent survey indicated
that large banks are ahead of smaller banks in terms of digital transformation, and are overall
more positive about the impact of technology on their businesses (Feyen et al 2021). Banks
that pull ahead in terms of digitization will be able to leverage the DNA feedback loop to
grow market share relative to other banks. Some technology-savvy and agile smaller or
newer banks and bank-like players could also ride this wave to grow. 12 Big techs, on the
other hand, enter the large size of the barbell on the strength of the customer base they bring

So-called ‘barbell’ distributions, with clusters on two ends of the scale, have been observed in
many markets, including labour markets (Autor 2019), product pricing and quality (Britton,
2018), and portfolio strategy (Rutherford 2013). Such distributions have been observed in
banking markets in previous periods or disruption, for example in the wake of mega-mergers in
the US in the 1990s (Deogun 1996) and the financial crisis of 2008.
For example, NuBank (a payment services provider) in Brazil went rapidly from challenger to
30 million customers, placing it in the top ranks in that market. Cross-River Bank in the US has
just one branch, but leveraged fintech to be one of the biggest lenders nationwide for the US
Government’s pandemic response program (Cowley 2020).
from their core businesses, and the ability to convert those relationships into financial
service product offerings at scale.

Potential barbell financial services market (illustrative)13 Graph 9

Source: authors’ elaborations.

The small, niche players could also include some traditional providers alongside fintechs
(Graph 9). Niche players may directly serve customers with a focused product set, or may
serve large players with B2B services. Small local institutions such as community banks and
credit cooperative banks, for example, occupy geographic niches and fill gaps not served by
larger institutions, and may have significant trust capital as a competitive advantage (Mester
2018). A recent study of regional banks in the US found that many have been able to
leverage technology and geographic focus to thrive against large scale players (Alexopoulos
2020). Many fintechs enter the market as single product providers or with a product tailored
to a specific market segment, such as small businesses in a given industry or set of markets.
Unbundled fintech service providers with a strong value proposition can viably serve a
narrow market given the ability to reduce fixed costs using flexible cloud-based
infrastructure, digital channels, and other service delivery innovations, and build customer
affinity with tailored products. De-centralization through DLT and other innovations will
enable service providers to build on these new products and infrastructures to provide
additional unbundled services. Small niche players could thus continue to thrive as they
tailor their products and services to a specific market segment or customer base. As noted
above, there are scenarios where individuals could act as direct providers of certain products
or services; these would be extreme instances of small niche players.
There is likely to be a degree of connectivity between the two ends of the barbell. Some
narrow, tailored services will partner with large institutions to provide their specialized
services to the customers of the larger institutions, while big techs and other platforms may
provide some of the connectivity that allows small fintechs to reach customers. The size of
both ends of the barbell are also influenced by regulations that might limit the size of a
particular firm.

Graph 9 is purely illustrative and does not constitute endorsement of particular companies’
potential roles in financial services or projections as to their future size or success.
A barbell is a potential steady state market structure, as some participants grow larger
but innovation drives continued entry. During the current transition phase, small multi-
product providers and mid-size players continue to operate, increasingly challenged to
compete against the scale players or to lock in a focused niche. Re-bundling by the larger
formerly single-product fintechs is well underway in the more advanced markets, and entry
by big techs is adding to the large player end of the distribution directly. Entry can
continually replenish the small player end of the distribution. Large players will inevitably
leave some markets less well-served and new technologies will continue to reduce costs or
offer the prospect of new products. As long as regulatory barriers are not raised,
entrepreneurs will continue to bring innovative new products and services to the market;
these may not compete across the board with the large players but provide a reservoir of
contestability to counterbalance the concentrated end of the barbell. As illustrated in Graph
8, there will be a tendency for players to either focus or to move to the large/multi-product
space. Left to market forces, the dominance of the two sides of the barbell may very well
squeeze out the middle (except insofar as a company passes through on its growth path from
one side to the other). Those providers that cannot achieve the scale to compete with the
larger providers but fail to focus on a sustainable niche may be forced to exit. A recent
survey by FIS on new banking relationships established in the US in the last 12 months
showed that 37% of new banking relationships went to large banks and 48% went to niche
and neo banks (community banks, credit unions, online banks and non-bank entities); the in-
between regional banks got only 10% (see Marous 2021).
A barbell is not the only possible outcome, but is a central case given the economic
forces at work. Continued atomization, stalled re-aggregation, or limits on entry could result
in a different configuration. Factors that will contribute to determining this outcome include
core market forces such as the economies of scale and scope discussed above, regulatory
limits on entry or on re-aggregation by nonbanks, and consumer preferences for trusted
incumbents or for convenience and internal product linkage vs. tailored solutions and more
direct control. Societal preferences will matter and will be expressed not only by consumers
but also in the degree to which policies for, and regulation of, financial services,
competition, and consumer protection shape both market forces and consumer behaviour.
 Policy implications and new trade-offs
National authorities aim to foster the benefits of digital transformation in finance. These
include reduced costs and frictions, increased efficiency and competition, narrowing
information asymmetry, and broadened access to financial services. At the same time,
authorities are aware of the potential risks to the financial system and to customers (FSB
2017). A policy agenda (“Bali Fintech Agenda”) outlined by the World Bank and IMF
advocates embracing the promise of fintech while managing risks to consumers and to the
stability and integrity of the financial system (World Bank/IMF 2018). In particular,
reinforcing competition and a commitment to open, free, and contestable markets were seen
as a foundation for innovation and consumer choice while maintaining a level playing field.
The Agenda also recognized the need to adapt regulatory frameworks and supervisory
practices, including monitoring of new market participants, to facilitate the safe entry of
new products, activities, and intermediaries while maintaining financial stability and
sustaining trust, confidence, and the ability to respond to risks. The importance of robust
data infrastructure, both from a cybersecurity perspective and with respect to concentration
risks, data ownership, protection, and privacy, was also noted.
Reinforcing competition requires taking both horizontal and vertical views of the
financial services landscape, and cooperation between financial and competition authorities.
Horizontally, how a market is defined is fundamental to the assessment of competition. The
multiplicity of financial products, the tendency to bundle them, and the role of multi-sided
market dynamics in providing and pricing all make this a more complex landscape.
Vertically, a competitive market at the consumer level may mask concentration at different
levels of the reconfigured financial services value chains. With finance increasingly
embedded as an adjunct in other businesses, it becomes critical for financial regulators to
coordinate with other regulators, particularly where the adjacent businesses are themselves
highly concentrated or subject to network effects. Consideration of ex ante vs ex post
remedies may need to recognize the particular features of data concentration, the power to
exclude, and the gateway functions inherent in emerging digital business models.
Adapting regulatory frameworks will require recognizing new and sometimes
heightened trade-offs between specific policy goals. Changes in provider diversity and the
competitive landscape may imply a need to revisit the regulatory perimeter and supervisory
practices. Meanwhile, authorities may need to make tough choices between: (i) financial
stability and market integrity, (ii) efficiency and competition, and (iii) data privacy and
consumer protection. It is important to find policies that can mitigate these trade-offs and
allow priority goals to be achieved simultaneously to the degree possible. In the next
sections we explore the implications for the regulatory perimeter, supervisory practices, and
competition, and the relevant tradeoffs between the policies that authorities are adopting in
practice.
1.5 Implications for the regulatory perimeter and supervisory practices

The growing diversity of financial services providers and business models often requires
expanding the regulatory perimeter. Payments, loans, and deposit taking services may be
provided by specialized payment service providers (fintechs), e-commerce platforms (big
techs), and other non-banks. It is therefore important that regulators develop approaches to
ensure a level playing field and provide clear requirements for licensing. Similar activities
and similar risks should in principle be treated similarly, regardless of the market participant,
underlying technology, or method by which the service is provided. Yet in practice, a purely
activities-based approach to regulation may not be sufficient. Particularly the entry of big
techs may require more, not less, entity-based regulation, for instance to address risks
around competition and operational resilience (Restoy 2021). Expansion of the regulatory
perimeter can ensure that activities are appropriately and comparably regulated and
supervised (World Bank and IMF 2018; Alonso et al 2021; Ehrentraud et al 2020). This may
extend to the perimeter of financial safety nets. Data reporting perimeters may need to be
expanded even further, given the disaggregation of finance and the embedding of financial
services into non-financial activities. The adoption of targeted regtech and suptech solutions
may merit consideration by regulators as part of the policy response to fintech developments
(Broeders and Prenio 2018).
Expanding the regulatory perimeter may be challenging in practice. Bringing new
entities into the fold of financial regulation may require legislative changes, which could be
considered controversial and may be resisted by powerful interests with deep pockets, such
as big techs. There may be resistance to granting more discretionary powers to supervisors,
even though such powers may be needed to continually adapt policy approaches to a
changing sector. The challenges may be even more acute in EMDEs, where resource
constraints make it more difficult to stay abreast of changes and to regulate powerful
(foreign) service providers. Yet emerging policy approaches in several jurisdictions show
that applying an entity-based approach to new players such as big techs may be possible (see
section 4.2).
The disaggregation and reconfiguration of finance value chains introduces new
challenges in day-to-day supervision. For a traditional, vertically integrated bank, it is clear
where responsibility lies for the financial soundness, cybersecurity, and consumer impacts of
a product. When the financial services value chain is spread across different players with, for
example, one holding the customer relationship, another holding the customer funds, a third
providing data analytics and deciding which customers get services, and a fourth providing
technology infrastructure, it is more difficult to pin down responsibility for mishaps or
misdeeds and to ensure that consumers’ interests are protected. Moreover, when customer
interactions are handled by entities that are not directly subject to extant consumer
protection regulations, any shortcomings such as unfair practices may not surface through
traditional supervision focused on the regulated entity. This can lead to undetected consumer
protection risks. This becomes even more challenging when services are provided across
borders.
 Complex processes and interactions across different players and systems can create new
points of failure. Multiple entities and interlinkages create a wider attack surface for
cybercriminals, which requires a strong regulatory approach to promote cyber security. The
balance of power in these partnership relationships is very different than in a traditional
outsourcing relationship, so the ability of the regulated financial institution to enforce its
own policies might be challenging. Multi-tiered access to regulated systems, for example
through BaaS models, requires that regulators ensure that the BaaS provider has sufficient
visibility through the value chain to ensure compliance. In some circumstances, regulators
may need to extend their supervision past the first-tier regulated entity, downstream to the
customer interface entity or upstream to infrastructure providers.
Reconfiguration of value chains is creating concentration risks at the technology
services level that need to be monitored from both competition and systemic stability
perspectives. The cloud services market is highly concentrated. While provision of services
to financial institutions has long been subject to concentration (for example, limited numbers
of mainframe, ATM, cash transport, and payments network providers), growing reliance by a
large swath of the financial sector on a small number of cloud services providers has been
flagged as carrying the potential for new concentration or single-point-of-failure risks (FSB
2019b). Notably, four players control around two thirds of the global market for cloud
services (Graph 10). While cloud providers generally have deep expertise in systems
architecture and cyber security, an operational or cyber incident at one major cloud provider
could have systemic implications for the financial system (Danielsson and Macrae 2020).
Open infrastructure, including API hubs, KYC utilities, and changing access policy for
existing payment systems and credit reporting infrastructures, can mitigate concentration
risks, increase contestability, and dilute data concentrations. However, there are indicators
that a number of B2B fintech services may be equally prone to concentration; the example
of API middleware providers cited earlier is a case in point.

Market share of leading firms in the cloud infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) market, across
all industries (Q4 2019)
In per cent Graph 10

23
33
2
2
3
5
6 18
8

Amazon Web Services Microsoft Azure Google Cloud IBM Cloud Alibaba Cloud
Salesforce Oracle Cloud Tencent Cloud Others

Source: Synergy Research Group.

 As authorities contemplate the regulatory and supervisory response to fintech,
developments need to be examined in light of the needs in each market. Some of the issues
related to disaggregation and the incorporation of new players into financial product value
chains can be addressed through regulatory guidance on governance of partnerships and
outsourcing, including clear allocation of responsibilities and supervisory reporting, applied
to each individual institution. Traditionally, regulators have placed responsibility for
regulatory compliance with the licensed institution. However, as mentioned before, this may
not work in a scenario where the licensed institution has much less scope to enforce specific
requirements – for example a small niche player partnering with a big tech or using a global
cloud provider. Thus, many challenges, such as up- or downstream concentration risks, may
need to be addressed at the sector level, eg through enhanced oversight of systemically
important providers. Further, regulatory authorities might need to increase their ongoing
scrutiny of the operational and process model of licensed institutions and introduce changes
to ensure that they are able to discharge their consumer protection responsibilities.

1.6 Implications for competition policy

Concentration risks in financial service provision may increase under the central scenario
outlined above. Digital platform providers in particular may quickly achieve dominant
positions. On its own, this need not have a detrimental effect on consumer choice and
welfare, even if a small number of dominant players reduces coordination barriers and may
increase the risk of collusion. Provided switching costs remain low, markets can remain
contestable and deliver beneficial outcomes – even in a barbell market structure. On the
other hand, the concentration of big data may result in data monopolies. Data-driven
advantages of larger players can increase switching costs and effectively lock in certain
customers, and ex post remedies for abuse of this customer lock-in may be difficult. In such
cases ex ante remedies by the sectoral regulators on the ability to switch or interoperability
requirements are better suited.
Graph 11 compares ex ante sectoral regulations with ex post competition interventions. As
an example, the largest two mobile payment providers in China reached a combined market
share of 94% in 2019 (FSB 2019). The authorities were concerned that this could also pose
severe systemic risks if one such provider were to be impaired. In 2018 the People’s Bank of
China (PBC) implemented a new mobile payment regulation requiring all mobile payments
to be cleared through the PBC rather than settled internally within the mobile payment
platform provider (Liu 2019). In this way, a sector-specific ex ante approach was able to
address concerns rather than waiting for ex post correction.
Interplay of ex ante sectoral regulations and ex post interventions by competition authority
Graph 11

While overall financial services may remain competitive, in certain specific product
segments monopolies or quasi-monopolies could emerge. Some services, such as exchanges,
have inherent network and scale economies that could result in only a very few viable
providers. While this is not new, the entry of companies from adjacent spaces or the
embedding of financial services into non-financial products means the market structure of
those industries becomes relevant. A monopoly utility or logistics company could require
customers to use its embedded payment instrument. It could also embed working capital
lines that could not be obtained by most customers from other lenders who do not have the
data and leverage of these providers. This would allow them to effectively dominate a
financial services segment by virtue of the control held in the primary industry. The
movement of highly concentrated mobile network operators into payments, often setting up
their own proprietary agent networks, is an example of how a player from concentrated
adjacent market that is regulated with respect to competition can carry that market structure
over into a financial product area where the regulation was not attuned to that issue. Kenya
provides a case study of regulatory response to concentrated market structure and
anticompetitive behaviours in digital payments (see Box C).
 The proliferation of new products has not always resulted in competition at all levels of
the restructured value chains. The consumer-facing end of payments has become more
diverse, with a range of wallets, affinity and prepaid card programs, and embedded
payments offerings. At the underlying transaction processing level, though, there is an
oligopoly in many markets. In 2016, the UK Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) reviewed
the ownership and competitiveness of infrastructure that supports the three major UK
payment systems – BACS, Faster Payments Service, and LINK – and found there was no
effective competition for the provision of UK payments infrastructure (UK PSR 2016).
Various measures were proposed to increase competition and remove barriers to entry.
A similar challenge is emerging in the context of open banking and APIs. The back-end
connection to APIs to facilitate data exchange is a high-volume, low-margin business. But
since each bank may have different API specifications, it can be costly for a specific
provider, such as a fintech start-up, to develop connections to everyone. Aggregation occurs
at a middleware level through players like Plaid, Tink, and Yodlee. These are emerging as
dominant networks of API connections, a potentially oligopolistic layer at the choke point
between more competitive segments. Even in markets where APIs are standardized, API
hubs are emerging to simplify the interface requirements.
While unbundling would tend to reduce anti-competitive product tying, reaggregation
and embedding potentially put tying at the centre of financial product economics. In
particular, platform models that combine free services that have network effects with
financial services might represent exactly the type of situation anti-trust authorities were
concerned with in establishing anti-tying rules: that a monopoly provider of one service
might require customers to use its other products. Thus a dominant social network platform
that has a quasi-monopoly position over small local businesses’ connections to their
customers might embed payments in the social networking experience, and make it difficult
for a customer to pay the business through anything other than the network’s payment
product. The more dominant the social network, the more necessary it is for a business to be
present on that platform, effectively reducing competition in payments acceptance.
Dominant technology companies have already run afoul of anti-tying regulations (eg Apple,
Microsoft). While regulators have moved away from considering tying arrangements to be
illegal per se, and focused more on rule-of-reason analysis that looks at both the benefits and
potential costs of tying, these analyses are sure to be tested as financial services tying moves
from the "traditional bank product exception" space to the sphere of big techs and embedded
finance.
Market structures that concentrate data and supercharge network effects could reduce
intermediation costs and broaden inclusion. In many markets, however, the resulting market
power might be seen as more detrimental than these benefits. For example, in November
2020 the US Department of Justice sued to block the proposed merger of Visa, a payments
company, and Plaid, a fintech data aggregation platform; the merger was abandoned in early
2021. Chinese regulators have recently addressed concerns of anti-competitive practices that
exclude competitors in associated digital services such as e-commerce and social media
 when providing services to customers (McMorrow 2021). As in other industries, regulators
will have to balance the efficiencies of natural monopolies against restraining market power.
This is not a new consideration in financial services, but is just one of several trade-offs that
become more pronounced as technology re-shapes financial services.
Different societies will also attach different preferences to market structure outcomes.
Regulatory policies governing entry and scope of activity of new players, from small
fintechs to big tech platforms, will have profound effects on competitive dynamics both in
financial services and in the core industries of cross-over players. Fintech and big tech will
require changes in the way that competition authorities and financial regulators interact, and
calls for more coordination between regulators (Petralia et al 2019). Approaches to
competition policy differ starkly across societies. Some societies may welcome market
structures that concentrate data and supercharge network effects if they reduce
intermediation costs and broaden inclusion. In other markets, the resulting market power
might be seen as more detrimental than these benefits. Concentration of infrastructure and
data in state hands may be accepted in some societies, while others may be more concerned
about potential extension of state surveillance. As in other industries, regulators will have to
balance the efficiencies of natural monopolies against restraining market power. This is not a
new consideration in financial services, but is just one of several trade-offs that become
more pronounced as technology re-shapes financial services.

1.7 New dimensions to financial regulation policy trade-offs

Digital innovation may thus give rise to complex trade-offs between three categories of
policy goals. These are: (i) financial stability and market integrity; (ii) efficiency and
competition; and (iii) data privacy and consumer protection. Graph 12 gives a visual
representation of these trade-offs as a triangle. This final section discusses the three edges of
the triangle in turn – and which types of policies authorities are applying to mitigate these
trade-offs.
Policy trade-offs from digital transformation in finance Graph 12

Source: authors’ elaboration.

Efficiency and competition vs financial stability and integrity

Regulators have long debated the relationship between competition and financial stability.
There are broadly two schools of thought on the competition-stability nexus (red arrow in
Graph 12). One school of thought argues that greater market entry, or at least contestability,
in the financial sector is desirable, as it fosters competition and reduces incumbents’ market
power. This can lead to greater efficiency and better outcomes for customers. It can also lead
to more diversified activities (Amidu and Wolfe 2013) and fewer institutions that are
individually systemically important and must be treated as “too-big-to-fail.” Systemic
importance can introduce governance challenges and moral hazard, as well as a financial
sector that is, on aggregate, larger than would be economically optimal (Feldman 2010). An
alternative school of thought emphasizes that greater competition is not always optimal or
conducive to financial stability. Financial institutions that are more profitable may be able to
accumulate more equity capital, have a higher franchise value and therefore act more
prudently (Keeley 1990). This may occur at least up to a point where they incur moral
hazard by becoming too big to fail. An implication may be that some barriers to entry are
justified to help mitigate risks (Hellman et al 2000). This may be particularly true in a period
of rapid market transition. New entrants can target high-margin products, or skim off the
most profitable customers, leaving incumbents with loss-making and riskier businesses.
Regulators may view managing incumbents’ adjustments to either adoption of new
technology, consolidation, or exit with a slower pace of entry or dampened competition as
more welfare-sustaining than rapid and potentially disruptive exits.
Fintech and big tech entry may turn some existing insights on their head. In particular,
the assumption that entry increases competition may no longer be true in an environment
supercharged by the DNA feedback loop (see Box B). While there is agreement that
contestability matters greatly for the overall degree of competition (Claessens 2009), and the
reservoir of contestants represented by the small niche services side of the barbell would
tend to maintain at least some competitive pressure on the larger players, big techs with
control over key digital platforms in e-commerce, search or social media may establish and
entrench market power very quickly after entry. Such control may also generate conflicts of
interest when both big techs and their competitors (eg banks) rely on the same core
infrastructures such as networks or cloud computing services.
The traditional focus of competition authorities on a single market, firm size, pricing and
concentration may no longer be well suited to these market outcomes. Indeed, digital
platforms that pursue growth over profits, and data over revenue, may not be well-captured
by competition policy approaches focusing on prices and consumer welfare (Khan 2017).
While indicators of market power like large market share and high margins provide useful
first-order indications, they are insufficient to determine whether a provider has market
power and has the incentives to abuse it. Moreover, the speed of changes to market structure
presents challenges, as firms can go from “too small to care” to “too large to ignore” to “too
big to fail” in only a few short years (Arner et al 2017). This was apparent particularly with
the growth of the big techs in China, but similar growth is being seen in many other markets,
particularly EMDEs. Large foreign players in particular may become “too powerful to
regulate and supervise.” Ex post remedial action, as with traditional antitrust and mergers
policies, may not be sufficient to address risks.
This may be a reason that some jurisdictions have upgraded their rules and
methodologies for assessing and addressing anticompetitive conduct. In India, for example,
the main e-commerce platforms are prohibited from selling products supplied by affiliated
companies on their websites – including financial products – to avoid potential conflicts of
interest (BIS 2019). In the EU, proposals for a Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital
Services Act (DSA) include ex ante requirements on “gatekeepers” to prevent self-
preferencing and bundling or tying, and requirements on “very large platforms” around
reporting, risk assessment and crisis protocols (European Commission 2020a,b). In the UK,
the Digital Competition Expert Panel (“Furman Report,” HM Treasury 2019) recommended
the establishment of a digital markets unit to develop a competitive code of conduct, enable
greater personal data mobility and advance data openness. In the United States, a US House
(2020) committee recommended rules to prevent discrimination, favouritism, and
selfpreferencing, and to strengthen antitrust laws and enforcement. In China, meanwhile, the
State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) published draft guidelines on antitrust
measures for internet companies (including big techs), proposing to block anticompetitive
behaviours such as exclusivity clauses, price discrimination and market barriers (Restoy
2021).8
There could be stability challenges in a barbell outcome with respect to both large and
small players. As in the traditional competition-stability nexus, greater franchise values may
create incentives for large players to act prudently and mitigate risk (such as those around
cyber security, where the expertise of big techs is clear). However, systemic importance (too
big to fail) may entail pressing risks to financial stability. Meanwhile, small, specialized
8
players may help to serve specific market segments, but their lack of diversification may
also mean less stability. The niche providers would not have the diversification to survive a
demand shock affecting their segments, and a specific market segment dependent on only a
few niche providers could be particularly hard hit when a specialized player exits. In
addition, costs to authorities to effectively supervise a large number of small entities is
significant; this would be particularly burdensome for many EMDEs.
Authorities may also need to revisit existing rules on the relationship between banking
and commercial activities. In some jurisdictions (eg the UK and Japan), it is common for
non-financial institutions to own financial institutions subsidiaries, while in others (eg the
US) there is an explicit separation between banking and commerce. 9 As the boundaries
between digital financial services and other services blur, there may be new challenges. For
instance, would a big tech that partners with a small bank and provides financial services
have indirect power to influence lending decisions without having to have an ownership
stake? Can cross-subsidization of financial and non-financial services introduce systemic
risks, either from the “real” or financial side of such links? These and further aspects may
require additional attention.

Efficiency and competition vs privacy and consumer protection

As data become an even more important source of market power, a trade-off between
efficiency / competition and privacy / consumer protection arises. This is represented by the
blue segment in Graph 12, and has implications for financial inclusion and market structure.
The massive volumes and types of data powering new financial services offerings have
unique characteristics. One special aspect of the use of big data as an input to production is
that data can be used many times and by any number of firms simultaneously, without being
depleted. This is referred to as “non-rivalry.” Data are often generated at zero marginal cost
as a by-product of other digital services. Reuse and exchange of data can generate large
welfare gains, but market mechanisms may result in re-use and exchange at below optimal
levels (World Bank 2021).
The control by providers of their customers’ data maintains privacy but can reduce
competition. The non-rivalry of data can generate increasing returns for data in both scale
and scope (Farboodi et al 2019; Boissay et al 2021). Any single additional piece of data (eg
payments information or a client’s review on a firm’s product) has additional value when it
is combined with an already existing large stock of data. For this reason, data are more
valuable to big tech firms and other firms with a wide range of business lines, giving rise to
so-called digital monopolies. Data may thus become an “essential facility” in an antitrust
sense. Fuelled by big data, algorithmic price discrimination is able to parse the population of
potential customers into finer and finer subcategories – each matched with a different price.
Large multi-product providers could in principle capture the entire consumer surplus (Bar-
Gill 2019).
In the absence of privacy concerns, wider sharing of data could in principle be more
efficient. If markets are competitive, it could be socially desirable to enable data sharing
with providers able to make better use of the data, for example as manifested by being able
9
to sell a product to the customer and therefore being willing to pay the data producer for
access. This could increase efficiency and personalization and enhance competition and
financial inclusion. This consideration has been an important driver behind open banking
rules, which allow customers to share their data between providers (eg banks and fintechs),
and thus support competition.
Privacy concerns are valid, however; free sharing of data can harm individuals. In the
case of personal data, open access to data can bring important costs, as individuals value
their privacy (Acquisti et al 2019). Bank transaction data can be an important input into
credit scoring decisions, and it can reveal a wide array of information about consumers’
preferences, buying habits, location and a host of other attributes, particularly when
combined with other data sources. Open access to personal data can allow for identity theft,
reputational damage and the manipulation of behavioural biases to sell consumers products
that are not in their interests – to name only a few examples (Ru and Schoar 2016). Open
access across providers could also leave consumers worse off through high, personalized
prices.10 In insurance markets, greater data could allow for more granular pricing, thus
undermining the risk pooling or solidarity function of insurance (IAIS 2017).
Control over personal data may be subject to market failures. These come about as data
are non-rival and only partially excludable (Carrière-Swallow and Haksar 2019), and due to
challenges in obtaining reliably informed consent. This can invite too much data sharing
(Acemoglu et al 2021), hoarding of data, too little investment in cyber-security, and
fragmentation across borders. While it would in principle be optimal to define “property
rights” over data – a decentralized or “Coasian” solution, in line with Coase’s classic theory
of property rights (Coase 1960) – this may not be easily applied in practice. In particular,
large, multi-product institutions may have access to types of data that others do not have,
and given returns to scale and scope they may be able to bid more for such data than
specialist providers. Thus, data can be the source of further competitive distortions. In
addition, consumers cannot always fully process available information, and the information
available when they grant ‘consent’ may be incomplete. This could result in consumers over-
sharing, or undervaluing their own data property rights.
Given the network effects underlying competition, the competitive playing field may be
levelled more effectively by placing well-designed limits on the use of data. Introducing
some additional rules regarding privacy – while at the same time allowing selectively for the
sharing of some types of data – could increase effective competition, because the addition of
such limitations on the use of data could curb big techs’ exploitation of network effects. Just
as governments have decided that certain information – such as gender or pre-existing
medical conditions – cannot be used in the pricing of health insurance contracts, there may
be a need for legislatures to define types of personal data that cannot be used in credit
decisions or other types of financial services. Moreover, policies may be needed to give
individuals greater control over their data. Jones and Tonetti (2020) show in a theoretical
model that endowing individuals with data rights may lead to outcomes that are close to
optimal. Design of such policies must also recognize that mandating data sharing could

10
reduce incentives to produce high quality data, or to provide valuable services that depend
on the provider monetizing data (World Bank 2021).
Data mobility requirements may also help to mitigate trade-offs. Work on consumer data
rights in the EU, Australia and Canada are examples of steps in this direction. Proposals on
data mobility are also included in the EU DMA and DSA proposals and the UK Digital
Competition Expert Panel (2019). Making data “portable” across providers and increasing
data subjects’ control of their data could help to allow the efficient uses of data while
preventing data monopolies from arising. While some types of data (eg genome data, social
contacts) may still be judged “off-limits” for use in financial services, the ability to port
permissible data between different providers may allow for efficiency and competition in a
way that empowers and benefits consumers, reducing rents by providers.
Beyond data privacy, new entrants are often shifting credit, market, and operational risks
to consumers with limited validation of informed consent or product appropriateness.
Marketplace finance platforms were initially designed as a regulatory arbitrage, gathering
funds through a non-deposit mechanism to avoid being termed a bank. The platforms
introduced competition to banks, reducing costs to borrowers, and offering higher yields to
investors. The increased efficiency of the platforms, stems in part from the reduced
regulatory overhead, minimal required capital, and absence of deposit insurance premiums
(some P2P platforms do set aside funds to self-insure). Investors in many marketplaces have
looked at P2P as an alternative to bank savings products, but in most cases they bear direct
credit risk without any type of deposit insurance, and often are not aware of that risk.
Roboadvisors and gamified trading platforms expose consumers to market risks from new
instruments with which they may have limited familiarity. Cryptocurrencies have been
subject to volatility risk that might not be anticipated by those seeking to use them for
payments. DLT-based payments embed operational risks with respect to the exchanges, and
even the underlying consensus mechanisms, that are not always well understood. While
Stablecoins seek to address volatility against a particular basket of currencies, they
fundamentally alter the protection for the holder by removing the guarantee of redemption at
par that e-money issuers and banks provide their customers. Increased usage of digital
means of communication between providers and customers might expose the customers to
clever social engineering attacks. The increased speed of processing of transactions affords
little or no time to rectify any mistakes by customers.
Regulators need to balance the innovation and efficiency introduced by broader
competition with the potential dampening effects of consumer protection oversight and
enforcement. Much depends, as with data privacy, on whether consent can be adequately
‘informed’ and whether there are reliable objective tests for product suitability. The
challenge of protecting the consumer will become more acute as the consumer takes on more
direct roles in assembling, and even providing, financial services (eg unintermediated P2P).
Depending on how the regulatory perimeter is set, new approaches to disclosure,
determining product appropriateness, and informed consent need to be developed to ensure
the promise of increased efficiency does not come at the cost of customer losses and reduced
trust.
Privacy and consumer protection vs financial stability and integrity
Data sharing can alleviate problems of asymmetric information and thus could be beneficial
for financial stability and integrity. This potentially introduces a new tradeoff between
privacy (and consumer protection more generally) on the one hand and financial stability
and market integrity on the other. This trade-off is represented by the green segment in
Graph 12.
In the credit market, there is ample evidence that more data can improve stability. Credit
registries (CRs), for instance, can counter adverse selection and reduce information
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. CRs allow loans to be extended to safe
borrowers who had previously been priced out of the market, resulting in higher aggregate
lending (Pagano and Jappelli 1993) and furthering financial inclusion. They can also counter
moral hazard by increasing borrowers’ cost of default, thus increasing debt repayment
(Padilla and Pagano 2000).11 Conversely, sharing of credit-related information has the
benefit of reducing the information monopoly a lender has on its borrowers. For example,
banks with long-standing relationships with their borrowers have exclusive information that
allows them to charge higher interest rates and extract other rents from those high-quality
borrowers (Padilla and Pagano 1997). CRs can counter this. Finally, they can reduce
overindebtedness by revealing borrowers’ debt exposure to all participating lenders, leading
informed borrowers to extent them less credit (Bennardo, Pagano and Piccolo 2015). Brown
and Zehnder (2007) show that an information sharing institution helps lenders avoid serious
losses from short term borrowers.
As the experience with credit registries shows, this is not without its downsides for
consumers. In the United States, for instance, consumer advocates have criticized systems
that screen for past overdraft fees and allow banks to deny account services to individuals
(Baradaran 2015). Transparency in how personal data are used, and recourse in the event of
misuse, provide some mitigation for these potential exclusionary effects. A large body of
regulations has allowed borrowers to gain insights into their personal credit score and the
information collected about them. In a world of digital innovation, in which a much wider
range of data is available for screening, there may be an even higher premium on giving
individuals such access and rights, commensurate with the growing impact of providers’ use
of individuals’ data on availability of services.

For example, there are concerns that opaque algorithmic processing of personal data in
banking could result in biases and discrimination. AI/ML-based credit scoring is supposed to
11
reduce the incidence of non-performing loans, thereby contributing to stability. However,
sophisticated ML algorithms may not be as neutral as their mathematical nature suggests at
first glance. While less human intervention means that taste-based discrimination may
decline, algorithms developed by humans or trained on historical data can introduce new
biases (Morse and Pence 2020). Using data on US mortgages, Fuster et al (2019) find that
Black and Hispanic borrowers are disproportionately less likely to gain from the
introduction of machine learning in credit scoring models. This suggests that the algorithm
may develop differential effects across groups and increase inequality (Graph 13, left-hand
panel). Borrowers to the left of the solid vertical line represent “winners,” who are classified
as less risky by the more sophisticated algorithm than by the traditional model. Based on the
cumulative share, about 65% of White Non-Hispanic and Asian borrowers would win,
compared with about 50% of Black and Hispanic borrowers. In another study, fintech does
not seem able to close the gender gap in access to financial services, as women have a lower
propensity to share data than men. Chen et al (2021) find that men are more likely to use
fintech product services than women (27% vs 19%) and that this pattern holds in every
country (except for Peru and India; Graph 13, right-hand panel). Moreover, women report
being more worried about their security when dealing with companies online, and less
willing to share data for better offers on financial services.
Reducing illicit activity is another area where use of personal data can potentially
improve stability and market integrity, but carry costs in terms of privacy and financial
exclusion. For example, anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of
terrorism (CFT) practices require the exchange of detailed information on all parties
involved in a financial transaction. This could result in exclusion of individuals who cannot
present sufficient documentation or have not had prior access to demonstrate positive
patterns that the screening mechanisms may seek. The data analysis may reveal habits and
preferences that are not related to illicit activity but are nonetheless sensitive or personal.
Since sanctions monitoring, KYC remediation, AML measures, and transaction monitoring
are among the most expensive elements of compliance by banks, the motivation to use
advanced data analytics is strong. Increased automation and use data generated at low
marginal cost could drive down costs and enable more low income customers to be
accredited. However, a general raising of the bar as data coverage of the more active and/or
high income customers improves will exacerbate the data divide relative to previously
excluded segments. Tiered KYC requirements attempt to address this as a way of balancing
data coverage and market integrity requirements.
Discussions around central bank digital currencies put these issues into particularly
sharp focus. Some central banks, such as the People’s Bank of China, are considering CBDC
architectures in which the central bank will have full access to transactions data so as to
support AML/CFT and prudential supervision. Other central banks are leaning against
having access to such data, and looking into so-called “intermediated” options where private
sector intermediaries keep such data and the central bank only has a ledger of wholesale
transactions (Auer et al 2020b; Carstens 2021). Given the stark divergence in preferences for
privacy-stability tradeoffs across different jurisdictions, it is possible that final designs may
also differ in this regard.
 Winners and losers of machine learning credit scoring and the fintech gender gap
Graph 13

Distributional effect of machine learning in US The fintech gender gap mortgages1

Cumulative share of customers seeing rate change

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0
–1.0 –0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Asian White Hispanic 50%
White non-Hispanic Black
1
The change in the log predicted default probability as lenders move from traditional
predictive technology (a logit classifier) to machine learning technology (a random forest
classifier) is reported on the horizontal axis. The cumulative share of borrowers from each
racial group who experience a given level of change is reported on the vertical axis.
Sources: Fuster et al (2019); Chen et al (2021).
Addressing these trade-offs, too, will require a societal discussion on data sharing. Data
protection rules like the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and California
Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) have represented important steps in protecting privacy and
limiting data use based on consumer consent. Yet further debate will be needed to determine
under which circumstances privacy rules may be relaxed to improve stability and integrity,
and how consumers can be protected from algorithmic discrimination. This remains a
frontier issue in policymaking in the financial sector and the digital economy more
generally, where different jurisdictions may continue learning from one another going
forward.
CHALLENGES OF FINTECH IN INDIA

Fintech despite of having huge opportunities has still a tough path to walk on.
Below is the probable roadblocks list in the path of Fintech enterprises
1. It is not very easy to enter into the Indian market and perform due to the
restrictive regulatory framework designed to prevent frauds. It acts as a huge
barrier for the new entrants. They need to fulfil lot of formalities before the
start of its operations itself
2. Unbanked population, Poor infrastructure in terms of Internet
Connectivity and low literacy level are the other hindrances. Still a huge
Indian population (48 percent) do not have bank accounts which are a must for
conducting online transactions. Even though the people have bank accounts
they still face the issues of poor internet connectivity which takes more
processing time to finish the transaction. So people tend to prefer a cash
transaction rather than online transaction. Keeping aside, the point of having a
bank account and internet connectivity the majority of the Indian population
still do not have enough financial literacy level suitable to go for it.
3. It is very tough to change the conservative approach of merchants and
users who deal the daily transactions with cash. Majority of the aged people
have been doing these transactions in cash from a long time and it’s hard to
suddenly change their old habits and introduce them to new avenues at this
age.
4. Different frauds leading to loss of money in online transactions is a very
hard bite to swallow for the customers.
People’s money is looted by the fraudsters by using technology and this has
been a great challenge in front of the fin tech firms. So the firms indeed have
to work hard for bringing improvements in infrastructure and being more
consumer friendly.
5. Fin tech in India is deprived of lack of government support and
Incentives for protecting their interests. At a very basic level this demoralizes
the entrepreneurs. They were not provided the right guidance and support to
start though it is something for the betterment of the country’s economy as
well.
6. Like in any industry gaining investors trust is very difficult in these days
for the Fin tech industry too. Getting the required seed capital and other
investment on time is becoming very difficult and this is going to reflect
negative on the operations and functioning.
 Conclusions
This paper has shown that digital innovation is bringing about economically meaningful
changes in the production of financial services, with implications for the industrial structure
of finance. Improvements in connectivity and computing can help to enhance efficiency and
competition. In many cases, financial services have seen an un-bundling of different
products and services. At the same time, financial frictions and forces that drove the need for
financial intermediators in the first place have reasserted themselves. The financial sector
may be tending toward a barbell outcome in market structure, in which large multi-product
institutions exist alongside more specialized niche institutions.
Regulatory and supervisory policy tools will have to adapt. Existing regulatory
perimeters may not adequately cover emerging providers of financial services, and new
players may pose challenges for day-to-day financial supervision. It is increasingly
challenging to balance competition and stability, both among financial services providers
and across myriad players in reconfigured financial product value chains. Rules for control
over data, and which data are allowable for specific services, will need to be defined –
ideally in a way that gives individuals control, balances competition and efficiency with
privacy and consumer protection, and enhances financial inclusion. New forms of
discrimination and bias will need to be understood and countered. A new balance will have
to be struck across consumer protection, privacy considerations and stability and integrity in
a way that respects societal preferences in different jurisdictions around the world, and
within different societies. Monetary policy, systemic stability, and consumer protection tools,
which have been left largely beyond the scope of this paper, may also need to adapt.
Challenges include access to lender of last resort programs by new providers, stabilizing
credit markets in which non-bank players become major lenders, and maintaining the
viability of deposit insurance programs where new players become large.
Authorities need to be intentional with respect to market structure. Prior notions around
the trade-offs between competition and stability need to be re-examined. Longstanding
precepts on the separation of banking and commerce are already being upended. Existing
approaches to competition policy and antitrust may not be wellsuited to digital financial
services, where measures of pricing and concentration for one market or firm may have
become less informative. The nature of contestability must be understood anew in markets
driven by increasing returns to scale but also increasingly low entry barriers for niche
services. The desirability of a barbell market configuration will depend in part on consumer
behaviours and skills that determine switching costs in a given market. Market forces are
already being shaped by minimum capital, licensing requirements, activity restrictions and
other policies. Pretending that market forces are just running their course is inaccurate at
best, and at worst could lead to negative outcomes for consumers and macro stability.
Several authorities are taking promising policy measures to mitigate trade-offs. Recent
entity-based measures around big techs, such as the proposals in the EU, UK, US and China
can take a more ex ante approach to address risks, prevent anticompetitive behaviours, and
in the process promote a level playing field. Data privacy protections and data mobility
 requirements can support consumer protection and may also promote competition. Still,
a societal debate will be needed on what types of data should be permissible for use in
financial services and when privacy rules can be relaxed in the service of stability.
To tread into this new territory effectively, and to balance the necessary policy goals,
authorities will need to collaborate. At the domestic level, central banks and other financial
sector regulators need to cooperate with industry regulators (eg for telecoms and other
utilities that may offer financial services) as well as competition and data protection
authorities. At the international level, authorities are working together to share expertise on
financial regulation of both new entrants and incumbents, and to coordinate policies. This
becomes ever more important given the cross-border spillovers of anti-trust and data
governance decisions, and the potential to improve service efficiency through harmonization
of standards in areas such as cybercrime prevention, data protection, and interoperability
(World Bank 2021). Collaboration can help to ensure regulatory consistency and peer
learning between countries, and ultimately higher welfare for their populations.