Spotlight on leadership lessons from the military

Spotlight ARTWORK Stacy Pearsall, Lead the Way

March 9, 2007, Old Baqubah, Iraq

Extreme Negotiations
What U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan have learned
about the art of managing high-risk, high-
stakes situations by Jeff Weiss, Aram Donigian,
and Jonathan Hughes
 HBR.org

 November 2010 Harvard Business Review 67

 I
SPOTlighT On leadershIp lessOns frOM the MIlItary

It’s often not easy to “get to yes,” particularly given the pace of
business and the structure of organizations today. CEOs and
other senior executives are under extreme time pressure,
managing complex, high-stakes conversations across functional
areas and divisions, with alliance partners and critical suppliers,
and with customers and regulators. Many report feeling that


they are constantly in negotiation mode—trying to have neither), rely on coercion rather than collabora-
gain approval for deals in which hundreds of mil- tion, trade resources for cooperation rather than get
lions (and sometimes billions) of dollars are at stake, genuine buy-in, and offer unilateral concessions to
in the shortest possible time frames, from people mitigate possible threats.
who may hold the company’s (and even the leader’s U.S. military officers serving in Afghanistan have
own) future in their hands. To these executives, ne- found themselves trying to hold these pressures at
imPlEmENTiNg gotiation isn’t just about transactions anymore; it’s bay while engaging, often daily, in dangerous nego-
STRATEgy about adapting to rapidly changing information and tiations. Over the past six years or so, we’ve studied
get the circumstances. how they resolve conflict and influence others in sit-
Big picture U.S. military officers around the globe confront uations where the levels of risk and uncertainty are
this sort of challenge every day—patrolling in hot off the charts. We find that the most skilled among
avoid spots like Afghanistan and Iraq, attempting to per- them rely on five highly effective strategies: (1) un-
suade wary local leaders to share valuable infor- derstand the big picture, (2) uncover hidden agendas
assuming you have all mation while simultaneously trying to distinguish and collaborate with the other side, (3) get genuine
the facts: “look, it’s
friend from foe, balancing the need to protect their buy-in, (4) build relationships that are based on
obvious that.…”
troops with the need to build indigenous support for trust rather than fear, and (5) pay attention to pro-
America’s regional and global interests. cess as well as desired outcomes. These strategies,
assuming the other side
is biased—but you’re not The business and military contexts are quite dif- used in combination, are characteristic of effective
ferent, but leaders in both face negotiations in which in extremis negotiators, to adapt a term from Colo-
assuming the other the traps are many and good advice is scarce. We call nel Thomas Kolditz, a professor at the U.S. Military
side’s motivations and these “dangerous negotiations”—meaning not that Academy at West Point and the author of In Extremis
intentions are obvious— they are necessarily aimed at solving an immediate Leadership.
and probably nefarious
life-and-death crisis but that the stakes involved put Negotiation behaviors tend to be deeply in-
intense pressure on a leader. grained and are often reactive rather than deliber-
instead Clearly, the danger for a business leader who is ate, especially in dangerous situations. These five
trying to reach an agreement with a single-source strategies can help business negotiators not only to
Be curious: “help me supplier, close a multibillion-dollar deal with a tar- respond quickly at the bargaining table but also to
understand how you see
the situation.” get company before its stock dives any further, or reshape their thinking ahead of the deal. Let’s take
renegotiate prices with a dissatisfied customer dif- a closer look at each of them and how they’ve been
Be humble: “What do I fers from that for a soldier negotiating with villagers implemented by officers in Afghanistan.
have wrong?” for intelligence on the source of rocket attacks. But
the perception of danger prompts business and mili- STRATEgy 
Be open-minded: “Is tary leaders to resort to the same kinds of behavior. get the Big Picture
there another way to Both commonly feel pressure to make rapid progress, Start by soliciting the other person’s or
explain this?”
project strength and control (especially when they group’s point of view. Use what you learn to
68 harvard Business review November 2010
 Extreme Negotiations HBR.org

Idea in Brief
Business leaders today The end result may be a To avoid these dangers, ex- build trust and commitments
report feeling that they compromise that fails to ecutives can apply the same over time, and take steps to re-
must constantly negotiate to address the real problem strategies used by well- shape the negotiation process
extract complex agreements or opportunity, increased trained military officers in hot as well as the outcome.
from people with power over resistance from the other side spots like Afghanistan and Iraq.
industries or individual careers. that makes agreement impos- Those in extremis negotiators
Sensing that they’re in contin- sible, resentment that sours solicit others’ points of view,
ual danger makes them want to future negotiations, a failure to propose multiple solutions and
act fast, project control (even develop relationships based on invite their counterparts to cri-
when they don’t have any), rely mutual respect and trust, or an tique them, use facts and prin-
on coercion, and defuse ten- agreement that creates enor- ciples of fairness to persuade
sion at any cost. mous exposure to future risk. the other side, systematically

shape the objectives of the negotiation and the village of Azrow, Dubay’s platoon came under at-
to determine how you’ll achieve them. tack from two buildings about 200 yards away. After
Negotiators in dangerous situations try to act fast to 45 minutes of fighting, the anticoalition forces dis-
reduce the perceived level of threat. They often dive appeared into nearby qalats (fortified shelters). The
into discussions before they’ve fully assessed the platoon went into assessment mode, checking for in-
situation, reacting to assumptions and gut feelings— juries among the citizens. Dubay and a squad moved
and they tend not to test or revisit those assumptions. to the building that most of the shots had come from.
So business and military leaders alike end up nego- They discovered 25 women and children huddled in
tiating on the basis of incomplete or incorrect infor- a small room. Without entering the room, Dubay ex-
mation—which often leads to conflict, impasse, or a plained through an interpreter that his platoon had
solution that addresses only part of the problem or just been fired on and he was looking for informa-
opportunity. But in fact they usually have more time tion that might help identify the insurgents who had
than they realize to talk, consider, and respond. been in the compound.
When Taliban fighters set fire to an Afghan sup- “There are no bad guys here—no one was firing at
ply truck less than two miles from his combat out- you,” one woman barked, her voice shaking a bit.
post, Sergeant First Class Michael Himmel (his and Dubay needed information fast. He could have
all other officers’ names have been changed, as have obeyed his instincts and started making harsh de-
the locations in which the incidents described in this mands. But he recognized the women’s fear—and
article occurred) knew that an immediate response his own—and decided to slow things down, test his
was required. But all U.S. units were on patrol, so assumption that the women were collaborating with
he decided this was a good opportunity for the Af- the enemy, and change his approach to getting the
ghan National Police to handle a crisis situation on intelligence he needed.
their own. (Himmel’s platoon had been training and He took off his dark glasses, slung his weapon
patrolling with the ANP for six months.) The ANP onto his back, and knelt just outside the room. He
chief, a 55-year-old local man with 30 years of police reassured the women that their homes were now
experience, immediately pushed back. He tried to secured by both Afghan and American forces and
express his concern about performing a solo mission said he just wanted to understand why they were
and requested support. “My men are inadequately all clustered in this one room. Over the next 15 or 20
prepared,” he said—indirectly blaming Himmel for minutes he talked softly, acknowledging their fright
this state of affairs. The sergeant, who was locked at being caught in the middle of a firefight. Finally,
into the assumptions he’d made about the chief and one woman came forward and spoke about the men
his team, ignored the request and insisted that all who had herded them all into this room and then
they lacked was “courage and a commitment to hard taken up positions. Dubay thanked her. Another
work.” The chief of course felt disrespected. Eventu- woman spoke up. The men were not Afghan, she
ally he sent a poorly equipped team to investigate said; they looked like foreign fighters. Three or four
the fire. Not surprisingly, the men came back with other women offered more details.
little information. Dubay took notes and amended his objective: He
First Lieutenant Daniel Dubay handled a similar would not only gather the information he needed
negotiation much differently. While on patrol near about this particular situation but also develop an

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Spotlight on leadership lessons from the military

Artwork
Stacy Pearsall
Before the Fight
February 16, 2007
Buhriz, Iraq

A threatening situation makes

2
people want to look strong and more
in control than they probably are.
Implementing
Strategy
ongoing relationship with these women to get infor- Captain Chris Caldwell received intelligence that
Uncover and the soldiers in his company had inflicted casualties
mation in the future. He gave them a card providing
Collaborate the phone number of the district center; promised on the enemy. He knew there was only one Afghan
to check in on them two days later, when his platoon medical center in the area equipped to treat the
avoid would be on patrol in that village again; and asked wounded. Seeking to assert his company’s control in
that they share information with him as they dis- the region, Caldwell went to the center to interview
Making open-ended
offers: “What do you covered it. He established mutual respect with the a doctor who was known to be a Taliban sympathizer.
want?” people of Azrow—a relationship that paid off in the After being denied permission to enter, Caldwell
months that followed. forced his way into the facility, found evidence that
Making unilateral offers: the enemy combatants were being treated, and de-
“I’d be willing to.…” Strategy 2 tained the doctor for questioning.
Uncover and Collaborate When they heard about Caldwell’s actions, the
Simply agreeing to Learn the other party’s motivations and village elders paid an angry visit to the captain. He
(or refusing) the other
side’s demands concerns. Propose multiple solutions and defended himself, stating that he would respond dif-
invite your counterparts to improve on them. ferently in the future only if the locals began work-
As well as pressuring people to act fast, a threaten- ing with, not against, his troops. The elders argued
instead ing situation makes them want to look strong and in turn that the villagers would cooperate only when
more in control than they probably are. In this state they were given an incentive—that is, when they
Ask “Why is that impor-
tant to you?” of mind, negotiators tend to stake out extreme posi- were shown respect. One such sign, they said, would
tions and make aggressive demands. Unfortunately, be a big boost in reconstruction dollars. Caldwell
Propose solutions that almost always triggers or exacerbates resistance told them that if they wanted anything from him,
for critique: “Here’s a from the other side. Discussions become conten- they would have to give him information about the
possibility—what might tious and inefficient, and both parties run the risk of wounded people at the clinic. This enraged the el-
be wrong with it?”
a stalemate. ders, and the negotiation spiraled out of control.

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 Extreme Negotiations HBR.org

The skilled in extremis negotiator focuses on turn- Strategy 3

ing negotiation into side-by-side problem solving Elicit Genuine Buy-In
rather than a test of wills. Captain Andrew Williams, Use facts and the principles of fairness,
an artillery battery commander in Ghazni, received rather than brute force, to persuade
a report that his soldiers had seen an improvised others. Arm them with ways to defend their
explosive device being placed along a roadside. He decisions to their critics, and create useful
instructed them not to use force but to monitor the precedents for future negotiations.
site and identify the men who were planting IEDs. Danger often tempts negotiators to play hardball,
(His team would eventually remove and detonate using coercion to make deals. That typically engen-
the devices in a controlled environment.) Once he ders resentment and leads to future conflict, mak-
had this information in hand, Williams went to the ing follow-on negotiations much more difficult. Of
village where the men lived, gathered the elders, and course, a hostile takeover isn’t quite the same as an
told them he wanted IED placements in the area to armed standoff. But the terms presented can be simi-

3
stop. The elders said that as long as they received larly stark or shocking.
money in return, they would make sure the villagers Captain Kyle Lauers’s first mission in Afghanistan
complied. was simple on its face: Capture or kill Wahid Salat, a
Given the time and safety pressures he was feel- Taliban leader who was staying in a nearby village.
ing, Williams was tempted to ask, “How much?” But he felt tremendous pressure to get his 130 sol-
Instead he asked, “Why?” He explained that he diers in and out safely. The main challenge would be
couldn’t offer the elders anything unless he under- negotiating with the local police chief and the village
stood what they were trying to achieve. Eventually elder for help in securing the building where Salat Implementing
Strategy
they told him they would need to pay for informa- was staying. When Lauers asked the police chief to
Elicit Genuine
tion about who was responsible for planting IEDs— apprehend Salat, the chief flatly refused.
Buy-In
and money was obviously in short supply. They also “We need to move now,” Lauers told the chief. “If
wanted to give some of the money to the village, to you won’t help, I can’t be responsible for what hap-
preserve their status and prove that they weren’t just pens.” The chief said nothing. Lauers ordered his
avoid
informants. platoon to cordon off the building. As shots rang out,
Threats: “You’d better
Williams made a reasoned counteroffer: His men he spotted the village elder approaching from across agree, or else.…”
would do the work of identifying the culprits, and the street, clearly angry and confused. The elder
the elders would be responsible for taking them began to shout at Lauers just as the platoon leader Arbitrariness: “I want it
to the nearest American combat outpost. Seeking to reported over the radio that the suspect and three because I want it.”
draw the elders out and engage them as partners, he bodyguards had been killed. The elder demanded
asked, “What would be wrong with this idea?” to know why Lauers’s company had entered the vil- Close-mindedness:
Surprisingly, the elders liked the plan but ex- lage and started shooting without any ANP support “Under no circumstances
will I agree to—or
pressed concern that the captured men were not or discussions with the elder. Lauers explained that even consider—that
extremists, just short on cash and trying to support the police chief had refused to cooperate. The elder proposal.”
their families. Williams said that if the elders took immediately turned the blame back on Lauers and
the men to the combat outpost and let the Ameri- demanded money for damages. Lauers replied that
instead
cans enter their names into a database, then they since the Taliban were responsible for the damages,
could take the men back to the village. He added the elder could get reparation from them. He then Appeal to fairness:
that this would help them build prestige with the left to check on his men. “What should we do?”
villagers, because they’d be handling the situation Over the next 11 months this village continued to
themselves. The elders agreed. Two days later they be a problem for Lauers’s company. Regular mortar Appeal to logic and
arrived with the wanted men, whose names were en- attacks were staged from the vicinity. Whenever of- legitimacy: “I think
this makes sense,
tered into the database. The men were warned about ficers wanted information from anyone in the village, because.…”
future actions and allowed to return to the village they had to pay in either money or supplies—and
and their families. even then they were often given the wrong names, Consider constituent
Before long, record numbers of weapons caches places, or dates. Threats and force have their place, perspectives: “How
were being turned in, and locals were warning sol- especially in certain military situations. In this case, can each of us explain
this agreement to
diers on patrol about IEDs that lay ahead and volun- however, Lauers’s negotiation strategy compro- colleagues?”
tarily reporting information on mortar launch sites. mised both his near and his long-term objectives.

November 2010 Harvard Business Review 71

Spotlight on leadership lessons from the military

Offering to trade resources for help

almost always invites extortion and
breeds disrespect or even contempt.
The effective in extremis negotiator recognizes Strategy 4
that his objectives will almost always be better Build Trust First
achieved if he elicits true buy-in rather than grudg- Deal with relationship issues head-on.
ing compliance from the other side. Upon his arrival Make incremental commitments to
in Afghanistan, Captain John Chang found that his encourage trust and cooperation.
company’s Afghan National Army counterparts were When stakes and risks are at their highest, business
regularly using threats, especially in dangerous or and military leaders are often tempted to take the
high-stakes contexts, to change the local popula- quick and easy path of trading resources for help.

4
tion’s behavior. Chang knew enough about both Af- After all, a dangerous situation doesn’t provide the
ghan culture and the Koran to understand the value time to develop a good working relationship or to fix
the locals put on respectful treatment. He decided whatever stands in the way of one. But making sub-
that if he could change the way his soldiers inter- stantive concessions almost always invites extortion
acted with the ANA, he could affect how the ANA and breeds disrespect or outright contempt.
worked with the villagers. He invited ANA soldiers Military officers frequently fall prey to the con-
Implementing to move into the Americans’ combat outpost. The cession trap. Farrukh, an Afghan, had opened a girls’
Strategy
two units began to eat, train, plan, patrol, and relax school outside Baraki and was continually harassed
Build Trust First together, resulting in a true partnership. Within a by local Taliban leaders. Intelligence officers discov-
month the ANA was serving as an advocate for the ered that a known insurgent had made a call to Far-
avoid U.S.-led mission, explaining to village elders that the rukh’s cell phone. They seized the phone and found
Americans were guests in their country—operating that Farrukh had received calls from several other
Trying to “buy” a good to help people at the request of the Afghan govern- Taliban leaders. They arrested him, and Farrukh
relationship
ment—and reminding them of the cultural impor- served 12 months in a detention center, waiting for a
tance of hospitality in Afghanistan. hearing. Eventually he got his time in court and was
Offering concessions to
repair breaches of trust, When violence later erupted in the area, a prece- found not guilty. But in the meantime, his school
whether actual or only dent had been set. Rather than make threats, Captain had been closed, his reputation had been severely
perceived Chang and his ANA counterpart solicited recommen- damaged, and he had suffered considerable physical
dations from the village elders about how to provide hardship. He had to be compensated.
instead better security in the valley and asked what justifica- The Army officer in charge offered a sum of
tions the elders would need to defend any pacts the money for lost wages. Farrukh wanted more: an
Explore how a break- U.S. and ANA forces made. The elders voiced their explanation for his arrest and detention, and proce-
down in trust may have objections to coalition forces’ searching homes, de- dures that could be put in place to avoid such mis-
occurred and how to
remedy it. taining people in the middle of the night, and ran- understandings in the future. The officer simply
domly stopping and searching vehicles. They talked threw in an additional sum for his pain and suffering
Make concessions only about being afraid to hunt or to let livestock graze and sent him on his way, barely offering an apology.
if they are a legitimate in the mountains, where U.S. forces were shooting Farrukh—who was a leader in his village and had a
way to compensate for artillery. Any negotiated agreement about reduc- long history of working with Western peacekeeping
losses owing to your
nonperformance or ing the violence, they advised, would have to show forces—left with $12,000 in his pocket, but he vowed
broken commitments. respect for personal liberties and local laws. Most never to trust an American again. Worse yet, as he
important, it should look like an ANA—not a U.S.— told his story to others, their distrust grew, making it
Treat counterparts with solution. Chang and his ANA counterpart crafted an difficult for U.S. officers to get any sort of useful intel-
respect, and act in ways agreement that the elders could defend to the popu- ligence or active cooperation from the villagers.
that will command
theirs. lace, and Taliban recruitment in the area dropped Skilled in extremis negotiators never make arbi-
significantly. trary concessions in an effort to buy goodwill. In-

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Training Officers to Negotiate

Why do military officers Negotiation for Leaders presents
need to negotiate? case studies for discussion. Each
For those in Iraq and Afghanistan, class introduces a bargaining
stead they build trust over time through incremental the nature of the job has changed. strategy applicable to the case at
and reciprocal commitments. Captain Aaron Davis In a 2005 briefing at West Point, one hand. We systematically review the
was deployed to Khost Province with orders to settle division commander outlined a day approach cadets took to each case
“quickly and finally” several long-standing disputes in Baghdad for his lieutenants: going study—looking hard at how and why
with local leaders. Within a week of his arrival Davis on patrol at 0700, helping set up they made the choices they did.
headed out to a village where a man named Haji Said a local market at 0900, working to We also do one-on-one coaching
Ullah owned what had once been a lucrative gas sta- restore power to a city block at 1200, to help officers examine their own
tion. Ullah’s business had all but dried up two years attending a town council meeting tactics, using probing questions such
earlier, when U.S. forces closed a road to secure a at 1800, and conducting a raid on as: How did you react when your
newly built airfield, preventing people from getting a suspected insurgent’s residence counterpart made a threat? Why did
to his pump. For two years, various Army officers at 0100. Each of these missions you react that way—what was your
had promised Ullah both compensation and aid involved some type of negotiation. goal? What response did you expect?
in finding his brother, who he suspected had been Given the outcome, would you
kidnapped by Taliban forces. None of their promises Why don’t demands and change your approach in the future?
had been kept. No wonder, then, that Ullah greeted threats work just as well? If so, how and why?
Davis with disdain—and a demand for more money. Sometimes they do; and sometimes Interactions with superiors provide
Davis resisted the temptation to throw cash at the they are necessary. But these officers further learning. If a commander
problem; this was, at its core, a relationship issue. face increasingly complex situations asks a negotiating officer if he got
Davis visited Ullah several times, listening to his involving multiple parties, issues, the other side to back down or if he
angry tales and asking questions. At no point did he and cultures. The stakes can be life kept it “happy,” the officer probably
offer compensation. He did, however, tell Ullah that and death, physical security, critical won’t develop the strategic thought
he would look into what had happened and return scarce resources, or political capital. process and skills in extremis nego-
within three days. The two men sat down for tea In July 2010 General David Petraeus tiators need. But if the commander
three days later, and the captain offered apologies reminded our forces in Afghanistan asks how well the officer understood
for what Ullah had been through and updates on to focus on the decisive human ele- and addressed the other side’s con-
what he had learned. He asked for Ullah’s help in ment. That keeps military leaders at cerns and motivations, or whether
figuring out how to repair the relationship and, ul- all levels mentally agile and adapt- the outcome sets a good and easily
timately, rebuild trust with other local leaders. The able—not just skilled with weapons explained precedent for others, the
men talked about ways to get information concern- and combat protocol. officer is likely to begin thinking stra-
ing Ullah’s brother, how to improve communication tegically about negotiations.
between U.S. forces and villagers, and how to make How do you train in extremis Business executives, too, can use
the population more secure. Only then did Davis negotiators? these methods to develop the nego-
turn back to the question of compensation, sharing At West Point we focus on applied tiating skills of their organizations’
his estimate of Ullah’s business losses as judged by practice. For instance, the course leaders.
local standards. (It was a basic calculation, but no
one else had bothered to do it.) Ullah considered the
numbers and within a few minutes agreed to what
he deemed a fair figure—a small fraction of what
he’d initially demanded.

Strategy 5
Focus on Process
Consciously change the game by not
reacting to the other side. Take steps to
shape the negotiation process as well as
the outcome.
In negotiations that they perceive to be dangerous,
executives and officers naturally want to avoid harm
to themselves or their constituents. Together with
the inevitable need to act quickly, that creates pres- artwork Stacy Pearsall, Staff
sure for them to give in on critical issues—not a good Meeting, April 11, 2007, Buhriz, Iraq

November 2010 Harvard Business Review 73

Spotlight on leadership lessons from the military

Giving in on critical issues may

create an exposure to risk far beyond
the immediate threat.

5
idea. The resulting agreement may create an expo- in danger, or to simply capitulate and hope for the
sure to risk far beyond the immediate threat. best. He should have stepped back from the issues
First Lieutenant Matthew Frye and his platoon immediately at hand, analyzed the elders’ tactics,
had been under rocket attack for eight straight days, and considered how to shape the negotiation pro-
at about the same time each day, at the forward op- cess to his advantage.
erating base where they were stationed. On the ninth On his first patrol in Kunduz, First Lieutenant
Implementing day, while his platoon was patrolling, Frye received Billy Gardner was leading his platoon through a
Strategy
word that insurgents were preparing another attack bazaar when he was approached by five men. The
Focus on Process on the base and that his group should investigate the men, who represented apple farmers in the local
vicinity where earlier attacks had originated. He felt agricultural cooperative, were angry that a previous
avoid intense pressure to quickly determine the current American unit had given the district several million
location, description, and disposition of the enemy. dollars to purchase land for the expansion of its for-
Acting without gauging After all, one of the last rockets launched had landed ward operating base. The person the district subgov-
how your actions will be
perceived and what the only about 400 yards from his tent. ernor had paid was not the legal landowner, and the
response will be Once in the vicinity, Frye sought information men demanded that they and their fellow farmers
from the elders and asked what they wanted in ex- be compensated immediately. A crowd gathered,
Ignoring the conse- change for giving him the insurgents’ names. Not the men began making threats, and when Gardner
quences of a given ac- surprisingly, they requested a great deal—primarily did not respond, they demanded even more in com-
tion for future as well as
current negotiations in the form of food, water, and clothing. Frye prom- pensation. They tried to involve Gardner’s squad
ised to provide this humanitarian assistance, but members in the negotiation, angrily directing some
when he asked for information in return, the elders of their demands to one while being extremely so-
instead licitous of another.
denied knowing anything about the insurgents.
Wanting to protect his men, Frye made further of- Gardner recognized their divide-and-conquer
Talk not just about the
issues but about the fers: emergency relief funds and assistance from his ploy. He refused to respond to it, and he refused to
negotiation process: soldiers on a well project. The elders accepted but compromise. If he did either, he would be reward-
“We seem to be at an again were mum. Realizing that he was being taken, ing negotiating behaviors that he wanted no part of.
impasse; perhaps we
should spend some Frye said his promises had been contingent on re- Instead, Gardner set about changing the nature of
more time exploring our ceiving information. The elders were angry that he the conversation. He sat down, greeted the men in
respective objectives was backing away from his commitments and sug- Pashto, took off his helmet, put down his rifle, and
and constraints.”
gested that Frye and his men should be extra careful listened attentively. He spoke slowly and quietly. In
when they headed back to their base. no time, the farmers’ body language changed and
Slow down the pace:
“I’m not ready to agree, Feeling threatened and nervous, Frye agreed to their shouting diminished. In fact, they were strain-
but I’d prefer not to fulfill the one-sided bargain and said he hoped the ing to hear Gardner. He began asking questions in a
walk away either. I think elders would be a little more cooperative the next manner that was both respectful (he didn’t insist on
this warrants further
exploration.” time. He came away with neither the information his point of view) and commanding. He assumed the
he needed nor a good working relationship with the natural demeanor of a judge—one seeking to impar-
Issue warnings without elders. Intelligence later confirmed that the enemy tially determine the appropriate course of action and
making threats: “Un- had watched the Americans throughout their visit to having the authority to do so.
less you’re willing to the village—so he had created even more danger for Gardner asked the men about the nature of their
work with me toward
a mutually acceptable his platoon. business arrangements, their crops, whom they
outcome, I can’t afford Frye’s first mistake, of course, was believing that represented, and how the land sale had directly af-
to spend more time he had only two options: to refuse the elders’ de- fected them. Apples were the mainstay of the local
negotiating.”
mands, in which case he and his men would remain economy, he learned. The men were not opposed to

74 Harvard Business Review November 2010

 Extreme Negotiations HBR.org

WEBINAR Jeff Weiss and

Aram Donigian will discuss
extreme negotiations in
a free webinar on Novem-
selling the land, but they wanted to be recognized as Perhaps the most important lesson the in extremis ber 9, 2010, from 1 to
2 pm est. To join in, sign
the lawful owners of the parcels in question. Gardner negotiator has to teach both executives and mili- up at hbr.org./webinars/
began to propose some possible solutions. Had they tary officers is that in the very context where one extreme-negotiations.
approached the provincial subgovernor about their feels the most pressure to act fast and stake out an
grievance? he asked. Or taken it to the subdistrict unwavering position, it is best to do neither. Con-
shura (council)? They said they had not: They didn’t trol and power can be asserted most effectively by
trust the subgovernor, and they thought the shura slowing down the pace of the negotiation, actively
was ineffective. leading counterparts into a constructive dialogue,
Gardner listened without definitively answering and demonstrating genuine openness to others’
when new demands—by now framed as requests for perspectives. That isn’t giving in. It is being strate-
assistance—were put forth. He began to recognize gic rather than reactive. It’s thinking several moves
that the cooperative represented a form of stable civil ahead about how your actions might be perceived.
government; here was an opportunity to strengthen And it’s making tactical choices that elicit construc-
democratic practices and institutions. Gardner ex- tive responses and advance your true objectives.
plained to the men that once the issues had formally  HBR Reprint R1011c
been brought to the subgovernor, the Americans
would be better able to help. The farmers ultimately Jeff Weiss ([email protected]) is an
adjunct professor at the U.S. Military Academy at
agreed to try what he suggested—especially if he West Point and a partner at Vantage Partners, a Boston-
would continue to provide them with advice, which based consultancy specializing in corporate negotiations
he agreed to do. What had begun as an impromptu, and relationship management, where he focuses on sales
negotiations and strategic alliances. Aram Donigian
tense situation characterized by aggressive behavior ([email protected]), a major in the U.S. Army, is
evolved into hours of talking, an invitation to stay for an assistant professor at West Point, where he codirects
lunch, and a conversation that eventually shifted to the Negotiation Project. Jonathan Hughes (jhughes@
vantagepartners.com) is a partner at Vantage Partners,
the farmers’ sharing what they knew about recent specializing in supply chain management, strategic
insurgent activity in the area. alliances, and change management.
Cartoon: P.c. Vey

“There’s one piece of pie left. I’ll share it with you if you agree, in principle, that it’s mine.”

November 2010 Harvard Business Review 75

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